New Technology for NATO: Implementing

Follow-On Forces Attack

June 1987

NTIS order #PB87-200267
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Force Attack, OTA-ISC-309 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1987).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-619814

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form on p. 231)
Foreword

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been wrestling with a

fundamental dilemma: how, within the confines of a strategy constrained by politics and geography, to maintain deterrence against the numerically superior and

increasingly technically sophisticated forces of the Warsaw Pact. Nuclear weapons

underpin NATO’s deterrent, but Alliance military planners are uncomfortable with

the prospect of a conventional defense that could be overwhelmed so rapidly as

to require early resort to nuclear weapons. Under the leadership of the Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Bernard W. Rogers, NATO has

sought to remedy this situation by exploiting a broad range of emerging technologies to enable it to effectively attack the follow-on forces of a Warsaw Pact

offensive—those ground forces that would extend and support the successes of

the initial attackers against NATO’s defenders—and thus help even the odds on

those fronts where armies are actually engaged.

The adoption of the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept has raised a

number of serious, complicated, and interrelated issues for the United States and

the other members of NATO. The range of issues is broad—encompassing political, military, and technological questions—although no single issue is dramatic

enough to garner headlines in any but the most specialized press. To help them

make decisions on this matter, the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and

Armed Services, with the support of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked

OTA to help bring some insight to this array of problems, so that the United States

can more clearly understand and effectively support agreed NATO policy. This

is the second report of that study effort. Complementary material can be found

in an earlier report “Technologies for NATO’s Follow-On Forces Attack Concept, ”

published in July 1986.

Because technology, military concept development, and political thinking have

all been evolving, the preparation of this report has been much like boarding a

moving train. The information in it is current as of February 1987. It begins from

the premise that NATO has officially adopted FOFA, and the United States has

supported that decision. Although some still question the wisdom of adopting

FOFA, the current debate is really over how best to implement that decision. The

report briefly reviews what FOFA is and how it fits into NATO strategy, but

is primarily concerned with the outstanding technical issues, how our Allies view

FOFA, how the Soviets might respond to it, and how the various technical developments might be brought together into “packages” of systems to support

specific operational concepts.

OTA gratefully acknowledges the help and cooperation of the United States

Army and Air Force, the Departments of Defense and State, NATO civilian and

military staffs, the governments and Parliaments of our European Allies, companies, and numerous individuals who assisted the research and writing of this

report.

Director

.,. ///
Preface

Volume II of this report consists of classified appendices that elaborate on

some of the material contained in this volume. It may be requested by writing to:

Congress of the United States

Office of Technology Assessment

International Security and Commerce Program

(ATTN: Program Manager)

Washington, DC 20510

providing full name and social security number and the agency or office that can

certify a SECRET security clearance and U.S. citizenship. For Congressional requests a need-to-know must be certified by a member of Congress. For other requests, need to know must be briefly explained.

The reader should be aware that the OTA staff did not have access to so-called

“black” programs that may be relevant. It is unknown whether the results of such

highly classified research could alter some of the technical discussions contained

in this report. Interested members of Congress are referred to the Department

of Defense for further information.
OTA Project Staff for New Technology for NATO:

Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Alan Shaw, Project Director

Stephen Budianskyl

Michael Callaham

Allen Greenberg’

Peter Lert

Nancy Lubin

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson

IOTA Fellow,

‘On detail from U.S. Department of State
Advisory Panel for New Technology for NATO:

Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Jan M. Lodal, Chair

President, INTELUS

George S. Blanchard

General, USA (retired)

Joseph V. Braddock

Senior Vice President

The BDM Corp.

P. Robert Calaway

President

Resource Management International, Inc.

Seymour J. Deitchman

Vice President, Programs

Institute for Defense Analyses

Victor L. Donnell

Colonel, USA (retired)

Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc.

Christopher Donnelly

Director

Soviet Studies Research Centre

Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Patrick J. Garvey

Colonel, USMCR

Post Commander, Camp Smith

New York State Division of Military and

Naval Affairs

Andrew Goodpaster

General, USA (retired)

Fred Haynes

Vice President for Planning and Analysis

LTV Aerospace & Defense Co.

Glenn Kent

Lt. General, USAF (retired)

Rand Corp.

Ambassador Robert Komer

Senior Consultant

Rand Corp.

Walter B. LaBerge

Vice President

Corporate Development

Lockheed Corp.

John Pauly

General, USAF (retired)

Chief Executive Officer

Systems Control Technology

William J. Perry

CEO

H&Q Technology Partners, Inc.

Stanley Resor

Attorney

Debevoise & Plimpton

Stuart Starr

Director of Planning

The MITRE Corp.

Dorm Starry

Exec Vice President

Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp.

Harry Train, II

President

Strategic Research and Management

Services, Inc.

John R. Transue

Technical Consultant

Falls Church, VA

Ralph Wetzl

Director of Systems Development

The BDM Corp.

Ennis Whitehead, Jr.

Major General, USA (retired)

Vice President for Analysis and Evaluation

Burdeshaw Associates

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report.

OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

vi
Contents

Chapter

Part I: Principal Findings and Summary

1. Principal Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Summary . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part II: Analyses

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Introduction and Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . . . . . . . . . .

Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces. . . . . . .

Soviet Responses to FOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

European Views on FOFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Current Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

to Support Follow-On Forces Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces .

Appendix 12-A: Summary of Packages for Attacks of Follow-On Forces.

Appendix 12-B: Flexibility and Application of Systems for Attacks of

Follow-On Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

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83

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135

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199

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PART I

Principal Findings and Summary
Chapter 1

Principal Findings
CONTENTS

Page

How Does FOFA Contribute to NATO’s Defense Posture? . . . . . . . . . . . . .

How Might the Soviets Respond? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What Are the Attitudes of Our Allies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What Is the Status of Relevant Technology and Developments? . . . . . . . .

What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Different

Approaches? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What Is the Likelihood That Plausible Combinations of Systems

Will Be Effective? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What Are the Outstanding Issues Before Congress?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Joint STARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Continuation of, or Successor to, PLSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RPV/TADARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Advanced Anti-Armor Submunitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Defense Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

‘4

5

5

6

7

8

9

9

1010

11

11
Chapter 1

Principal Findings

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) has adopted its Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept as part of its program

to counter a growing Warsaw Pact conventional threat, and thus to avoid either an early

resort to nuclear weapons or even a collapse

so rapid as to preclude escalation to nuclear

weapons. But the adoption of the concept has

itself raised issues that will have to be addressed.

The general issues are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

the role of FOFA within NATO strategy,

how FOFA could be done,

what is needed to make FOFA practical,

what the Soviets might do to make it impractical,

whether the supporting systems can be

made to work well enough to justify the

cost,

how they will be paid for, and

how to avoid political problems that could

weaken the Alliance.

In addition, Congress is faced with specific

FOFA-related funding issues, particularly: the

Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), a possible successor to the

recently cut back Precision Location Strike

System (PLSS), remotely piloted vehicles, advanced submunitions, and the issue of how to

handle related armaments cooperation with

our NATO Allies.

NATO currently has some quite limited capability to implement this concept, but faces

three major shortcomings: adequate resources

for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; capable munitions in sufficient quantities as well as the weapons to distribute those

munitions; and total systems—from surveillance to target destruction–that can respond

rapidly, flexibly, and effectively across large

areas. There are systems under development

that could alleviate each of these shortcomings.

However, it will be necessary to procure them

in complete packages of systems that work together to provide the required capabilities, and

buy enough of each to make a difference.

FOFA is a mission concept, not a specific

weapons system. In general terms, it is the use

of various conventionally armed long-range

weapons to attack Warsaw Pact ground forces

that have not yet engaged NATO defenders.

From the Air Force’s perspective it is interdiction; to the Army it is Deep Battle. The basic

objective is to delay, disrupt, and destroy these

follow-on forces so that NATO’s defenses can

hold as far forward as possible. Although applicable throughout NATO Europe, it is primarily focused on the Central Region, where West

Germany borders East Germany and Czechoslovakia. When first proposed by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR),

it was envisioned that attacks would take place

from just beyond the engaged troops to hundreds of kilometers into enemy territory.

SACEUR also suggested that implementing

FOFA would require an increase in national

defense budgets beyond the 3 percent real

growth to which the nations had at that time

committed themselves. Consensus has been

building for several years; clearly, although

very deep attack may remain an attractive

long-term goal, current interest is focusing primarily on shorter ranges. Rather than committing themselves to additional funding, the

member nations are primarily redirecting existing conventional force modernization programs to support the concept, as well as the

applications for which they were otherwise intended. This includes the United States, which

has many more FOFA-related efforts underway than the others.

The controversy that surrounded the adoption of the concept arose in part because it fit

neatly with systems under development in the

United States which had no European counterparts. Europeans saw this as requiring them

to spend large amounts of money on American

systems. This controversy has diminished as

the concept has been further developed to de3
4 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

fine much of what the Europeans are producing as FOFA systems, and as cooperative arrangements for developing and producing

other systems have been worked out.

Most of the systems needed for an effective

FOFA capability either exist or are in various

stages—mostly the later stages—of development. There are still important engineering

problems to be solved, and important pieces

may yet fail to materialize. But by and large

the issue is not one of starting new programs

to fulfill identified needs, but rather one of

keeping the necessary programs alive both

technically and financially. However, when

these programs move from development to

procurement, the budget requests will almost

certainly increase, and Congress will face the

question of how to finance them. Choices will

have to be made among programs that are relevant for FOFA, and probably between FOFA

and other areas as well.

HOW DOES FOFA CONTRIBUTE TO NATO’S DEFENSE POSTURE?

FOFA is one of a handful of key mission concepts for NATO’s conventional forces, all of

which are considered vital to a successful defense. It must be viewed not in isolation, but

rather within the context of all the others, such

as fighting the close battle against Warsaw

Pact ground forces, establishing and maintaining control of the air, and safeguarding rear

areas. For example, successfully attacking

follow-on forces could improve the outcome of

the close battle, and control of the air would

facilitate attacking follow-on forces.

Many of the systems being considered to

support FOFA would not be limited to that

role, but would have applications to other mission concepts. Many of the U.S. systems would

also have roles beyond NATO Europe. Furthermore, some surveillance systems that might

be used to find and target follow-on forces could

also aid in detection and assessment of Warsaw Pact activities prior to a conflict.

FOFA was conceived as a way to exploit

technology to counter two fundamental

aspects of Soviet strategy: their use of followon forces; and their ability to use a strategically mobile offense against a much less mobile defense. Soviet doctrine suggests that a

Warsaw Pact offensive would probably include

a substantial number of follow-on ground

forces, i.e., ground forces not involved in the

initial assault. These would either be moving

forward to join or exploit the attack, or preparing to do so. By attacking these follow-on

forces, NATO would hope to decrease their

ability to affect the war; and by “metering”

their arrival at the close battle, NATO would

be better positioned to defeat them and not

be overwhelmed by successive attacks. Soviet

doctrine suggests that the Warsaw Pact would

concentrate its ground forces, probably against

NATO’s weaker sectors, and have substantial

freedom to move and redirect its main efforts.

NATO, by contrast, would be very constrained

in its ability to move ground forces laterally

along the front in response. A FOFA capability could be used to compensate for this by

redirecting the firepower of long-range weapons and interdiction aircraft along the front.

If the follow-on forces are very important to

Soviet strategy (and if they can be found and

attacked effectively), FOFA could be enormously effective. However, if the follow-on

forces play a less important role, FOFA would

be less valuable (although the weapons and

other systems might not necessarily be any

less useful). Evidence suggests that Soviet

strategic, operational, and tactical planning is

flexible and that the Soviets could reduce their

dependence on the follow-on forces or the exposure of those forces to attack. The extent

to which they could do so is subject to debate,

as is the cost to them of taking these steps:

on the one hand, they had reasons for adopting their current strategy; on the other, they

may be ‘‘outgrowing’ it for reasons not

directly related to FOFA.
Ch. 1—Principal Findings . 5

HOW MIGHT THE

Soviet writings suggest a wide range of political as well as military responses to both the

FOFA concept and its implementing systems.

Soviet military writings focus on: 1) adjusting strategy and operations (e.g., by deemphasizing the role of the follow-on forces, intermingling their forces with NATO’s early in a

conflict, and increasing protection of their rear

areas); 2) developing operational and technical countermeasures to weapons and targeting systems; 3) adjusting their command and

control to compensate for quick-acting FOFA

systems; and 4) developing similar systems,

but not necessarily for similar uses. Some SoSOVIETS RESPOND?

viet responses could present NATO with opportunities. For example, moving more forces

forward before attacking could provide NATO

with longer warning which NATO could exploit. Keeping more forces closer to the close

battle could make them easier to engage.

On the political level, the Soviets apparently

have already been trying to influence European

public opinion to inhibit the successful implementation of FOFA, and to exploit European

concerns about FOFA to cause friction within

the Alliance.

WHAT ARE THE ATTITUDES OF OUR ALLIES?

Our NATO Allies endorsed the concept in

a very general form in November 1984; the definition of what has been agreed to and how it

should be implemented is still evolving. The

Europeans have been slower to accept the specifics than the United States has. This is due

partly to the long lead times in their defense

planning cycles, and partly to economic factors including an expectation that their defense

budgets are likely to remain constant or to decline over the next few years. The Europeans

expect that a significant FOFA capability will

be expensive, and are concerned about it requiring increases in their defense burdens or

decreases in their ability to perform other

missions.

The Europeans are most interested in approaches to FOFA that incorporate what they

have already been doing. Hence, they are most

interested in enhancing the role of artillery

and the new Multiple Launch Rocket System

(MLRS), some forms of aircraft interdiction

(but not all of those under discussion), remotely

piloted vehicles, and command and control systems. They are wary of FOFA as a source of

pressure to buy U.S. technology, and have been

cautiously negotiating memoranda of understanding for multilateral development and production programs, some of which include the

United States and some of which do not. The

Europeans have recently expressed a willingness to consider cooperative ventures on systems capable of striking as deep as 150 kilometers, but it is still too early to judge the

significance of this development.

Increasingly, the Europeans are coming to

insist that cooperative programs not only result in spending for European production, but

also invest in European technological development. As yet, the United States has not

found formal European support for two major programs, Joint STARS and the Army’s

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), but this

does not mean that our Allies will never be interested in those programs. Indeed, informal

interest appears to be growing. Several European systems with important implications for

FOFA are under development.

Many in Europe hold a different view than

the United States does of the proper balance

between nuclear and conventional forces, and

are less enthusiastic about conventional defense improvements. Furthermore, they are
6 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

concerned that FOFA not draw resources from

the close battle between opposing ground

forces, which they see as having the highest

priority. ’

FOFA has evolved from a major political issue within the Alliance in 1984 to quiet negotiations among armaments experts in 1987.

While the movement has been in the direction

of consensus, FOFA has failed to generate

much enthusiasm for increased spending.

FOFA is no longer a threat to Alliance cohesion, even though the major opposition parties in Germany and the United Kingdom have

declared themselves against the concept. These

parties have more fundamental and trouble-

‘SACEUR’S position is that all the mission concepts are necessary and that priorities cannot be established among them.

Some NATO governments have suggested that just such a prioritization should take place.

WHAT IS THE

some objections to NATO defense policy, particularly the objection of the British Labour

Party to nuclear weapons. However, Labour

has suggested that by eliminating nuclear

weapons it would spend much more on conventional defense.

From the perspective of early 1987, FOFA

appears to be a modest success story in the

history of NATO. When the concept was first

proposed, it evoked skepticism, misunderstanding, and political friction. But a rough

mutual understanding has now developed. In

the process, FOFA stimulated NATO’s “conceptual military framework” process, which

promises to be useful in coordinating military

. planning over the full range of NATO missions.

It has also served to provide an agenda for increasingly ambitious explorations in the area

of armaments cooperation.

STATUS OF RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY

AND DEVELOPMENTS?

A great deal of what is needed for FOFA is

already in the field or in production. Most of

the technology for the rest already exists and

could result in fielded systems over the next

decade. Engineering problems remain to be

solved, and some important advanced systems

have not been completely demonstrated, but

there is less concern about being able to make

the systems work than there is about the performance of combinations of systems in realistic countermeasure environments. There may

be value in getting systems into the field so

that the problems of integration can be worked

out and unrecognized problems and benefits

can be discovered.

Although discussion has tended to focus on

those developments that are primarily American, 2 our Allies have developed and are developing systems that could be used for FOFA:

the Tornado aircraft with its MW-1 dispenser;

remotely piloted vehicles and drones; some surveillance systems; and various munitions.

They are co-developing the Terminally Guided

Warhead for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS/TGW). Their technology is, in

many cases, equal to U.S. technology.

This focus on U.S. technology has raised a

major political problem: how to balance a desire to buy the best capability most efficiently

with growing allied pressure for a more equitable “two-way street” for NATO weapons

procurement.

‘The United States leads, but does not necessarily dominate,

in major areas such as broad area surveillance and targeting

systems, data analysis and dissemination systems, smart submunitions, and ground-launched missiles. This does not necessarily mean that the United States will successfully field more

(or better) systems than the Europeans.
Ch 1—Principal Find/ngs 7

WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF

DIFFERENT APPROACHES?

There are several different approaches to attacking follow-on forces, with many having

several variations. Implementing any single

approach will require a complete package of

several systems, including: systems to find and

locate the targets; systems to deliver the weapons; the munitions; and supporting systems

(e.g., for defense suppression and electronic

warfare). If it were possible to fund everything,

it would make military sense to procure the

systems to support a range of approaches. But

funding constraints are likely, and will limit

choices. It will therefore be important to fund

systems consistently so that the result is one

or more complete packages, and not pieces of

several incomplete ones, and perhaps to fund

systems that offer the most flexibility. Some

systems could contribute to many packages,

but others have only specific applications.

While choosing preferred operational concepts

is a job for the military, Congress’ funding decisions will determine which concepts are supported, and how well.

Different approaches to FOFA are primarily distinguished by what targets to attack,

and the means to attack them. Attacks can

be against moving combat units, supplies, command posts and other high-value units, or to

create chokepoints in the transportation system by destroying bridges or laying mines.

These attacks could be conducted with groundlaunched weapons or by interdiction aircraft

carrying a variety of weapons including airlaunched missiles.

Analysis shows that directly attacking combat units could be very effective in slowing and

reducing Pact forces. But it is not clear whether

NATO will have both the means to target them

effectively, and the weapons to kill the tanks.

Although the tanks are a major worry, all the

other armored combat vehicles are also needed

by the Soviets for a combined arms offensive,

and they are vulnerable to munitions now being procured. Opinions differ over the value

of attacking supplies, which could be done with

a variety of munitions. While supplies are necessary for an offensive, some analysts believe

that the Soviets could lose a large number of

supply trucks before combat capability would

be degraded. Combat vehicles go into battle

with significant amounts of fuel and ammunition on board. But small combat units such

as battalions have little excess supply, and

resupply is essential if an offensive is to be continued.

Advancing forces can be delayed by creating choke points (e.g., by destroying a bridge

just as a unit is about to cross it, or by sowing

a mine field). Analyses differ on whether sufficiently long delays could be produced. The ability of the Pact commanders to employ their

forces could be disrupted by attacking command posts. These, however, would be difficult targets to find and attack, and the effect

of doing so is difficult to gauge.

In general, the deeper into enemy territory

an attack takes place, the less will be its direct effect on the battle and the greater will

be both the Warsaw Pact ability to compensate and NATO’s opportunities to continue the

attack to produce the desired effects.

Ground-launched weapons like artillery,

MLRS, and the ATACMS missile are generally simpler to operate than tactical aircraft,

but would be more dependent on close coordination with sophisticated external surveillance

and targeting systems. NATO forces are upgrading artillery and buying MLRS. But these

weapons lack the flexibility y of the longer range

ATACMS to be redirected over long distances,

and waiting until the targets are close creates

a risk that NATO forces will be overwhelmed

as the targets dash forward. Missiles like

ATACMS could be used by one corps to support another and to concentrate firepower

across a wide segment of the front. If the

United States is to preserve the option to deploy ATACMS, it will have to exercise care

in arms control negotiations.
8 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Aircraft have the advantage of a man on

board, providing flexibility to compensate for

shortcomings in targeting information and to

respond to unforeseen circumstances. Air

power generally allows for more flexible employment across the entire Central Region than

ground-launched missiles do. Penetrating Warsaw Pact air defenses with acceptably low attrition requires sophisticated aircraft which are

generally expensive and must be equipped with

advanced navigation and target acquisition capability, electronic warfare systems, IFF (identification friend or foe) systems, and stand-off

weapons. The U.S. employment concept calls

for the use of large “packages” of attack aircraft, fighter escorts, jammers, defense suppression, etc. Planning such large packages

requires several hours, although there is flexibility to alter plans almost up to takeoff. These

sophisticated aircraft are likely to continue to

be in short supply and to be called on for other

urgent missions. It is not likely (but possible)

that interdiction aircraft-such as F-16, F-15E,

F-4, F-1 11, or Tornado—would be available in

great numbers to attack follow-on forces during the first day or two of a war. But there are

likely to be many high-value targets on day

three and beyond.

The Air Force is now considering using B52 bombers flying from bases in the United

States to launch long-range cruise missiles over

NATO territory to attack the Warsaw Pact

rail transportation system.3 This has the advantages of using an existing asset, the B-52s,

in combination with a yet-to-be-developed variant of a new or existing cruise missile and of

avoiding Pact air defenses. If successful, it

could produce long delays in the arrival of the

second Soviet strategic echelon, or produce

greater warning for NATO by inducing the

Soviets to move those forces forward through

the rail network prior to the war beginning.

However, the cruise missile variant has yet to

be demonstrated, and-depending on the outcome of the negotiations currently under way—

there may be serious arms control problems

to solve.

‘Applications of B-52s with cruise missiles in other theaters

are also possible.

WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT PLAUSIBLE

COMBINATIONS OF SYSTEMS WILL BE EFFECTIVE?

Plausible combinations of systems that

could perform the tasks that fall under FOFA

have been identified, but many of the components are still being developed. In order for any

one concept to work, each piece must work (because each individual function is necessary),

and they must be able to coordinate and interface.

Programs now under way are designed to

overcome deficiencies in NATO ability to attack follow-on forces, now primarily limited to:

aircraft attacking fixed targets like bridges,

as well as targets that, while mobile, don’t

spend much of their time moving;4 and possibly

‘For example, command posts, surface-to-surface missile

launchers, surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, resupply

aircraft flying along roads looking for columns

of vehicles. Capability will improve as each

deficiency is corrected, although all deficiencies need not be corrected to have a useful capability.

As each of these improvements comes on

line, FOFA capability will increase incrementally.

—..— .

points, and communications links. These targets are difficult

to locate and target: when broad-area moving target indicator

systems—like Joint STARS—become available, these will be

more difficult targets than moving units. The fact that these

targets “dwell” for long periods of time can be used to NATO’s

advantage to piece together information from a variety of existing systems. The munitions exist to attack these targets effectively, if they can be located.
Ch. 1—Principal Findings ● 9

—

Deficiency

1. Lack of ground-launched missiles

2. Little ability to operate aircraft at night and

in bad weather

3. Little ability to destroy masses of armored

vehicles

4. Little ability to rapidly target moving combat

units

5. Little ability for Army corps to support

adjacent corps

6. Enemy air defenses threaten both interdiction

aircraft and surveillance aircraft

7. No capability to attack very deep

Corrective Measures/Status

MLRS—in production

ATACMS—in full scale development

LANTIRN 5

–in limited procurement

F-15E–in procurement

(MLRS, ATACMS6

)

C E M

7

, DPICM8–in procurement (effective

against all but heavily armored tanks)

Smart anti-armor submunitions (sensor-fuzed

weapons and terminally guided submunitions)—in development

T MD

9—in procurement

NATO MSOW10–in development

Joint STARS–in full scale development

Aquila RPV11—in full scale development

other RPVs—various stages

Joint Tactical Fusion Program-in full scale development

ATACMS–in full scale development

Various air defense suppression and avoidance

programs in various stages

Various RPV programs in various stages

B-52s carrying cruise missiles–no development

yet

5Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night. A system to aid aircraft in finding targets.

‘These are not aircraft systems, but they can operate at night and in bad weather.

‘Combined I+jffects i$lunition.

‘Dual Purpose Improved Con\ent,ional hlunition.

“Tactical !LIunitions Dispenser. The dispenser part of the CE!kl; the munition itself is the CEf3 (Combined Effects

Bomblet).

“’hfodular Stand-off W’capon.

‘ ‘Remotely Piloted t’chicle.

WHAT ARE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BEFORE CONGRESS?

Several FOFA-related issues are likely to be

matters of controversy in Congress in the next

few years. These are: the Joint STARS program; the recently severely scaled-down PLSS

program; Aquila and other remotely piloted

vehicles (or unmanned aerial vehicles) programs; advanced anti-armor submunitions;

and co-development and co-production with

our European Allies.

Joint STARS

This program has been a matter of controversy between House and Senate for the

past few years. By providing an ability to

locate, track, and target groups of moving vehicles, Joint STARS is supposed to contribute to the commanders’ awareness of the battlefield and to target engagement, which are

central to many concepts for FOFA and probably very important if FOFA is to be successful. Such a capability would also be very important for identifying and analyzing the main

thrusts of a Soviet offensive, and for obtaining warning of suspicious movements prior to

hostilities. FOFA could be done without a system like Joint STARS, but not nearly as well.

At the heart of the controversy is the question of how survivable the E-8A (modified 707)

aircraft would be in a realistic combat environment. Critics contend that to be adequately

survivable it would have to be operated so far

from the FLOT13 as to be virtually useless. Supporters argue that flying in protected NATO

airspace with many other surveillance aircraft,

benefiting from suppression of enemy air

defenses, and protected by NATO fighters and

‘ ‘Forward Line of own Troops. The farthest line NATO troops

occupy’.
10 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

SAMS,

14 it would be “survivable but not immortal.

It is likely that even with all this protection,

Joint STARS would have to operate farther

from the FLOT than originally envisioned in

order to reduce its vulnerability. But its value

would degrade slowly as it moves back, and

it should be able to provide frequent coverage

of broad areas out to final assembly areas, and

perhaps somewhat beyond. This is the area in

which frequent coverage is most needed because events will develop rapidly there. Deeper

areas would be seen less frequently. This would

provide a great improvement over current capabilities in area covered, frequency of coverage, timeliness, and accuracy. However, it is

less than the nominal coverage usually assumed

for the system. Prior to hostilities, the E-8A

could operate up to the FLOT and provide

much deeper coverage for indications and

warning of attack.

Alternative systems that would be less detectable are possible; if operated so as to evade

detection, they would also be limited in coverage, but the limitations would be different from

those of the E-8A. Less area would be masked

by terrain and vegetation if the platform were

higher or closer to the FLOT. In combination

with E-8As they might provide nearly complete coverage. If the alternative or complementary system were to operate in the same

frequency band, it could probably use most of

the radar hardware and software developed for

the E-8A. As far as OTA is aware, no detailed

operations analysis that compares the FOFA capability using the E-8A Joint STARS, alternative systems, and combinations of the two has

been done. If this remains an issue, such a study

probably should be done, but it ought not to delay Joint STARS development. That analysis

should consider the possibility of reactive Soviet jammer development. In some cases, “customized” jammers could severely handicap either type of system, but the likelihood and

practicality of such jammers needs further

study.

“Surface to Air Missiles.

OTA has not had access to other than general

information on possible alternative systems, and

cannot comment on their status. Any decision

to cancel Joint STARS and begin another program should also take into account when the

alternative might become available, and whether

that alternative would be suitable for peacetime deployments and deployments outside

Europe.

Continuation of, or Successor to, PLSS

This year Congress and the Air Force decided not to fund procurement of the PLSS and

to return it to a relatively low-level developmental program. PLSS was designed to satisfy

a need to quickly and accurately locate and target emitters such as the radars of modern air

defense systems that would pose a threat to

NATO interdiction aircraft and to surveillance

systems like Joint STARS. The system was

cut partly because of technical problems, and

partly because the Air Force believed it was

no longer worth the cost. At the time of the

decision it had not achieved the specified system reliability or emitter location accuracy;

however, both have now reportedly improved

to near specified values. Its demonstrated target location accuracy, reporting rate, and timeliness are unsurpassed by other tactical electronic intelligence systems, but it sometimes

reports one emitting target as several.

Some within the Air Force argue that other

assets are adequate to do the job of locating

the targets. Others argue that there are important tasks that PLSS was supposed to do

that no other system can. OTA knows of no

other system that can locate emitters as

quickly and accurately as PLSS. Congress will

have to face the question of whether a system

like PLSS is needed, and, if so, whether it

should be obtained by continuing PLSS or

starting another program.

RPV/TADARS

The Target Acquisition/Designation Aerial

Reconnaissance System (TADARS), which

employs the Aquila RPV, is currently in fullscale development. Major problems that held
Ch. 1—Principal Findings ● 1 1

the system up appear to have been solved.

This system lacks the broad area, continuous

deep coverage of Joint STARS, but could provide dedicated targeting for Army systems.

TADARS can perform accurate target location

as well as laser designation for artillery and

laser-guided bombs. Some have proposed procuring another RPV in place of Aquila, but

procuring another RPV and equipping it with

Aquila’s capabilities would take longer and

cost more than completing TADARS development. Several types of RPVs are currently

operational and under development in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the

United Kingdom, and Israel. The U.S. Army

is developing a family of advanced unmanned

air vehicles, of which Aquila is the most mature, and the Navy and Air Force also have

RPV programs.

Advanced Anti-Armor Submunitions

Smart anti-armor submunitions with advanced

warheads-such as Skeet,15 SADARM, 16 and

MLRS/TGW17–may be a key to FOFA: they

are the only means of killing modern tanks in

significant numbers beyond the close battle. *8

But major uncertainties surround them, particularly the questions of whether technical and

operational countermeasures could defeat their

seekers and warheads. It will be necessary to

keep a close watch on these development programs. One very valuable tool is the Chicken

Little series of joint tests of munitions and munition concepts. OTA believes that this series, and others like it, ought to be supported

and the results given serious consideration.

Defense Cooperation

Many of our Allies initially reacted cautiously

to FOFA in part because it looked like another

excuse to induce them to buy U.S. high-tech-

“Smart anti-armor munition that fires a self-forging slug.

“search and Destroy Armor: Smart artillery submunition that

fires a self-forging slug.

“Terminally Guided Weapon for the MLRS: A smart submunition that carries a shaped charge warhead.

‘“Other existing and developmental munitions can destroy

other armored and unarmored vehicles and have some effectiveness against tanks. Scatterable mines can delay the movement

of tank units.

nology systems. They have a long-standing

concern that the “two-way street” of NATO

procurement favors the United States by a

large margin. In recent years, Europeans have

shown themselves willing to pay more for less

capability to get equipment made at home.

However, as the recent British decision to cancel the NIMROD and buy the AWACS demonstrates, they will not necessarily take this

position to the extreme.

In the past year, the U.S. Department of Defense has been working to resolve this problem by encouraging the Europeans to identify

systems they are developing and buying that

could be used to support FOFA, negotiating

agreements to explore co-development and coproduction of U.S. systems, and encouraging

the Europeans to form consortia among themselves to develop and produce FOFA-related

equipment. One particular vehicle for this effort has been the 1985 Nunn Amendment authorizing funding of cooperative development

projects. The European members of NATO,

including France, reacted very favorably to the

principle of this amendment, and to the concept of joint development of new military systems. However, it is clear that before such joint

development can take place, there will have

to be some major changes in existing ways of

doing business. The European Allies recognize

the difficulty of “harmonizing’ the specific interests of the various partners in cooperative

ventures. They are somewhat skeptical about

the ability of the U.S. armed services to do so

and about Congress committing itself to programs years in advance. However, the Europeans are increasingly unwilling to simply

“buy American” systems or technologies, and

indeed there are some European developments

in FOFA-related technologies which the United

States could profit from not having to reinvent.

This may ultimately pose a dilemma for the

United States. Cooperative programs usually

cost more and take longer than projects pursued solely in the United States. And, of

course, sharing production or buying European

systems will cost U.S. jobs. Congress will have

to deal with these programs one at a time as
12 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

they come up, but it might be wise to develop peans, funding U.S. companies, obtaining the

an overall approach to striking a balance best systems, and obtaining the most efficient

among accommodating the desires of the Euro- production.
Chapter 2

Summary
Page

The FOFA Concept and the FOFA Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Is FOFA Appropriate to the Threat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

How Do Our NATO Allies View FOFA?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

How Might the Soviets Respond to FOFA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Implementing FOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

What and Where to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Obtaining the Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Assembling the Pieces: “Packages’’o f Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

 Remaining Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) . . . . . . . 40

Replacement for the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS). . . . . . . . . 42

Munitions Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Remotely Piloted Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Arms Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Tables

Table No. Page

2-l. Illustrative Packages of Systems To Support Specific Operational

2-2

2-3

2-4

2-5

2-6

Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Packages Based on MLRS and Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Packages Based on ATACMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Packages Based on F-16 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Packages Based on F-15E Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Figures

Figure No. Page

2-1. Warsaw Pact Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2-2. NATO’s ’’Layer Cake’’ Defense.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2-3. FOFA Reduces Advancing Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
. .

Chapter 2

Summary

THE FOFA CONCEPT AND THE FOFA DEBATE

On several occasions, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General

Bernard W. Rogers, has warned that were the

Warsaw Pact to attack NATO, it would only

be a few days before he would have to ask

NATO political leaders for permission to use

nuclear weapons. Neither of the two implied

choices—surrender or nuclear war-is a pleasant one. Some analysts believe that the Soviets

might overrun NATO so quickly that NATO

would not have time to decide to use its theater nuclear weapons. Only strategic nuclear

weapons would be left.

With the strong backing of the United States,

General Rogers has been pushing for a third

alternative, to improve NATO’s conventional

defenses so that the credibility of NATO’s deterrent is maintained. FOFA is a major element of this conventional force improvement.

Many observers have suggested that major

changes are needed in NATO’s conventional

force structure, posture, and organization, as

well as in its strategy for employing those

forces and in its procurement procedures. But

several major political and bureaucratic factors combine with geography to limit NATO’s

likely options. First, economic and political

realities make it doubtful that the number of

NATO army divisions and air force wings will

be increased substantially. Early in its history,

NATO decided to rely on both conventional

and nuclear weapons because it could not afford a completely conventional defense. Second, NATO is a defensive alliance, and will not

Photo credi( NATO

NATO members signing the Paris Agreement in 1954.

15
16 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

adopt publicly a strategy that calls for sending its ground forces deep into Warsaw Pact

territory, even though that might give it a better chance of victory and of keeping conflict

off NATO soil. Tactical counterattacks, however, would not be precluded, and opinions differ on how deep those might be. Third, NATO

cannot plan to fall back deep into Germany

in the face of an attack, trading space for time.

Losing large parts of Germany would be catastrophic for the Alliance, and planning to do

so would be unacceptable to German public

opinion. These factors force NATO into a

defensive posture close to West Germany’s

border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which, combined with a “share the burden” political policy that gives each member

nation in the Central Region a section of the

border to defend, sharply restricts freedom for

major force movements along the front to

counter Warsaw Pact force movements.

Within these constraints, NATO has decided

both to improve the conventional forces it has

in place, and to adopt the FOFA concept. These

initiatives cannot overcome NATO’s fundamental problems, but are designed to make better

use of what Alliance members have procured

and are procuring.

In simple terms, FOFA means using longer

range weapons—airplanes, enhanced artillery,

rocket launchers, and guided missiles-to attack enemy ground forces that have not yet

come close enough to NATO’s defending ground

forces to engage them in direct combat. The

purpose of attacking follow-on forces is to impede the ability of the Warsaw Pact commanders

to bring their ground forces into the battle when

they want to and at full strength. While it has

application to operations in all parts of Europe, the primary focus of attention is on the

Central Region.

Three major factors came together to produce the FOFA concept and make it a major

part of NATO’s defensive strategy. First is a

recognition that successfully attacking the

follow-on forces could have a profound effect

on the ability of the Warsaw Pact to execute

its offensive strategy. Second is a new emphasis on directly attacking the ground forces

themselves, in addition to facilities such as air

bases that would support them: NATO has always had plans for interdiction missions into

enemy territory. Third-and perhaps most relevant to the issues before Congress-is the recognition that achieving a significant capability to attack follow-on forces depends strongly

on exploiting new technologies. In theory,

FOFA provides an opportunity to exploit technology to offset a fundamental East-West

asymmetry.

The Warsaw Pact not only enjoys significant

numerical superiority over NATO in the Central Region, it also has the advantage of conducting a strategically mobile offense while

NATO’s ground forces have much less freedom to maneuver in response. The Warsaw

Pact, following Soviet doctrine and leadership,

organizes its divisions into armies, which are

organized into army groups (called fronts by

the Soviets), all under the command of a theater commander.’ NATO expects that these

forces would be used not uniformly across the

entire border, but to conduct rapid, deep,

powerful thrusts into selected sectors of

NATO’s defensive line. These would be aimed

at getting into NATO’s rear area, disrupting

NATO’s ability to command and control its

forces, capturing or destroying NATO’s theater nuclear forces, and cutting off NATO’s individual army corps from each other and from

their support. These thrusts are likely to be

directed at NATO’s weakest corps sectors. The

strongest—especially the U.S. corps—are likely

to see only holding actions, designed to prevent them from redeploying to aid in defending against the main attacks. Of course, NATO

cannot know in advance how the offensive

would be conducted; surprise is a basic tenet

of Soviet doctrine. This offensive would be preceded and accompanied by massive air and mis-

‘Organizationally, Warsaw Pact armies are roughly equivalent to NATO corps, Pact fronts are roughly equivalent to NATO

Army Groups, and the commander of the theater of military

operations (TVD) is roughly equivalent to NATO’s Central Region commander. However, at each level there are major differences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for example in manpower and firepower.
Ch. 2—Summary . 17

sile attacks against NATO’s air bases and

other fixed facilities, and by small attacks by

special forces deep within NATO territory.

NATO expects that a Warsaw Pact offensive would be conducted with succeeding waves,

or echelons, of ground forces. Once thought

to be rigidly structured, this offensive is now

believed likely to display a good deal of flexibility at several levels of organization. The

fronts conducting the initial attacks would be

divided into first echelon armies that would

begin the attack, as well as operational maneuver groups (OMGS)

2 that would exploit it

and second echelon armies that would continue

it. The division among these elements is not

rigidly set. It could vary among fronts and be

altered as the front goes into battle. Each army

would be divided into first echelon divisions

to spearhead the attack, second echelon divisions, and mobile groups. And within each division there could be first and second echelon

regiments. After the first fronts have done

their jobs, the theater commander would have

second fronts available to follow them. By

NATO’s definition, all those forces moving up

behind the forces that are directly engaging

NATO’s defenders are follow-on forces.

NATO lacks a similar layered structure, although there is some ability for reinforcement.

Defending NATO divisions would defend against

one attack, only to be faced with another attack by fresh forces, and then another, and so

on. So, for example, a single U.S. (or German,

or Belgian) division might defend against two

(or one, or three, or more) first echelon divisions of the first echelon army, and—depleted

from that battle—be attacked by a fresh second echelon division of that same army, and

then by a force from the first echelon of the

second echelon army, etc. If the Soviet plan

went forward unimpeded, there would be no

time for the U.S. force to recover between assaults on it: each attack would find it weaker

than the preceding one did. Alternatively, while

occupied by an attack by the first wave, it

might be bypassed by follow-on forces seeking to reach deeper objectives.

Because of evolving flexibility in the way the

Soviets would use their forces, NATO cannot

expect a “set piece” of equal waves attacking

each division, or a uniform attack across the

Region. It can rely on two fundamental aspects

of a Pact offensive: that all the forces will not

attack at once; and that the Pact has much

greater freedom to maneuver their forces to

attack heavily on selected parts of the front

than NATO has to maneuver in response.

FOFA seeks to oppose both of these: impeding the movement forward of follow-on forces,

reducing the forces that NATO’s defenders

have to face and helping improve NATO’s ability to recover from one battle before facing

another; and moving firepower rapidly across

the front to compensate for difficulties in moving ground forces across the front.

Some believe that simply directing firepower

against forces moving up, or against main Soviet efforts, will not be effective: there are so

many targets that not enough would be killed

to make a difference. In this view, it will be

necessary to find that small part of the force

that is the focus of the attack and destroy it,

thus causing the entire effort to fail. Doing this

requires an ability to monitor and accurately

assess Warsaw Pact force movements.

FOFA was a matter of some controversy

when first proposed, and some still argue that

it is not sound policy. Some Europeans, perhaps confusing FOFA with the U.S. Army’s

AirLand Battle concept, have seen it as offensive and inconsistent with NATO’s defensive

posture. Others argue that it is more efficient

to wait until targets are close before attacking them, that attacking deep diverts resources

from the close battle while providing little payoff. Still others believe that the follow-on forces

will not be very important to the Soviet offensive, that most of the combat capability will

be in the initial attack. Finally, there are several groups who argue that while the idea may

be sound in principle, it will be very costly and

extremely difficult—if not impossible—to implement.

The FOFA concept is still under develop-

‘Also called Mobile Groups. ment, and is seen somewhat differently by the
18 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 2-1 .—Warsaw Pact Offensive

Czechoslovakia

/

f

●

Munich \

Austria

SuuHut AaapIea worn Jonn b r-rlnes, bowel r-rorr( uperallons In turope—~lannlng ror knclrclemenl, a paper presented at a conference sponsored I

the Alumn( Association of the Norwegian National Defense College Study Committee, Apr 25-26, 1985
Ch. 2—Summary ● 1 9

NATO’s Integrated Military Command

NATO members

France

Spain

Iceland

Denmark

Greece

Italy

Norway

Portugal

Turkey

Belgium

Canada

Germany

Luxembourg

Netherlands

United Kingdom

United States

I

NATO’s Integrated

Military

Command I

I v 1 +

Allied Allied Allied

Command Command Command

Atlantic Europe Channel A

I

I

I I

ACE Allied

Mobile Forces

Southern Force Europe

principal players: SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, the headquarters for NATO’s Allied Command Europe); the

U.S. Army; the U.S. Air Force; and the defense

forces of our Allies. SHAPE’s perspective is

all of Europe including the entire Central Region, and it defines FOFA as delaying, disrupting, and destroying follow-on forces from just

beyond the troops in contact to as far in the

enemy rear as NATO systems can reach.

SHAPE considers FOFA from the point of

view of: 1) the corps commander, who wants

to control the forces about to move in against

his troops; 2) the Army Group commander,

who wants to delay the second operational

echelon (second echelon armies) until his corps

have dealt with the first and his reserves are

in place; and 3) the Central Region commander,

who would like to make the second strategic

echelon (second fronts) irrelevant to the war.

The U.S. Army sees FOFA as the “deep battle” part of its operations, as a means for

“metering” the flow of enemy forces; its concentration is almost entirely on those sectors

in which U.S. Army forces would be defending. As the Army sees it, striking deep not only

reduces the threat to the defending ground

forces, but also improves the effectiveness of

the ground forces in handling the threat. Because their primary concern is the progress of

the close battle, focused at the individual corps

and subordinate division commanders’ levels,

the Army’s approach puts great emphasis on
20 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 2-2.— NATO’S “Layer Cake” Defense

North Sea

4

East

Germany

7A

A /

l--

SOURCE. Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987
Ch. 2—Summary ● 21

—

Figure 2-3.— FOFA Reduces Advancing Forces

SOURCE SHAPE

FOFA Provides Cross Corps Support

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

I

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1987
22 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

identifying and attacking those units-individual battalions, regiments, and possibly entire

divisions-that pose the most pressing threat

to its ground forces in the immediate future.

The U.S. Air Force, which sees FOFA as falling under its existing interdiction mission,

views it primarily from the Army Group/ATAF

(Allied Tactical Air Force) level, the command

level above corps. While individual regiments

and even battalions might be targeted at the

request of corps commanders, the Air Force

is more likely to think in terms of attacks on

whole divisions or their component regiments,

possibly before they become an immediate

threat to a corps sector. Attacking these larger

targets while they are farther out makes it easier to preplan takeoff times and attack routes—

necessary to keep attrition down-and permits

giving greater latitude to pilots to choose among

specific target vehicles within the larger array.

The Air Force is also interested in the concept

of striking very deep to cause long delays in

the arrival of the second fronts.

Is FOFA Appropriate to the Threat?

We can never know exactly what the Soviets

would do if they went to war against NATO.

Analysts working from similar sources have

disagreed over whether the Soviets would

launch a conventional offensive, and whether

follow-on forces would play a significant role

in that offensive. There is currently general

(but not unanimous) agreement that the

Soviets are at least preserving the option for

a conventional offensive, and most observers

argue that they would want to begin with a

conventional offensive and keep it conventional as long as possible. Most observers also

agree that while the Soviets are developing considerable operational flexibility in their use of

ground forces and have considerable latitude

to beef up the first echelons at the expense of

the second echelons, there will be significant

follow-on forces at all levels.

There is currently a great deal of uncertainty

—and a great deal of controversy—concerning

a number of factors of importance to FOFA.

In particular:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

how much flexibility Soviet ground forces

commanders have at various levels of

organization to change the direction of attack, to compensate for unanticipated situations, and to allocate their forces among

first echelon, second echelon, and mobile

groups;

how sensitive the Soviet offensive plan

would be to delays and to destruction of

some of its forces;

how robust and resistant to disruption the

Warsaw Pact command and control system is;

how important the follow-on forces are to

Soviet strategy; and

how much they could move their forces

forward prior to hostilities.

Mobilization is an important factor in a war

in the Central Region. It is thought unlikely

that the Soviets would attack without any

mobilization: not enough of their forces would

be ready and in place. However, some analysts

believe that by increasing the numbers, quality, and readiness of their forces in Eastern

Europe, and by reforming their command

structure, the Soviets may be developing a capability to do just that. NATO military planners are acutely aware that NATO would need

several days of mobilization before it could effectively resist a massive attack, in addition

to whatever time would be needed to recognize

a Pact mobilization and decide to respond.

Hence, NATO planners are very concerned

about a Pact attack preceded by a short or concealed mobilization.

A NATO ability to attack follow-on forces

would pose a dilemma for the Soviets: short

mobilizations mean more Soviet forces would

have to move forward during hostilities when

NATO could shoot at them, and less opportunity to ‘front load’ the offensive; long mobilizations would risk giving NATO sufficient

warning to also mobilize. This is part of the

appeal of the concept (discussed below) of using

B-52 bombers carrying cruise missiles to put

the rail lines in Eastern Europe at risk. Second echelon fronts—and possibly elements of
Ch. 2—Summary . 23

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Elements of Soviet army forces.
24 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

—. — —

the first fronts—would have to come forward

across Eastern Europe by rail to reach the battle. After leaving the rails, they would be transported on roads in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and

East Germany, and finally move under their

own power to join the battle.

It is widely believed that Warsaw Pact and

NATO forces would be intermingled to considerable depth. There would be Pact penetrations

into NATO territory and NATO penetrations

into Pact territory—much like interlocking

fingers. Some analysts believe that it therefore would be extremely difficult to pick out

and attack the follow-on forces.

How Do Our NATO Allies View FOFA?

Our European Allies generally have been

slower to accept FOFA than the United States

has. Up through early 1986 there appeared to

be little enthusiasm: conservative defenseminded governments were cautiously in favor;

opposition Socialist parties were generally opposed. Underlying some European reactions

have been long-standing transatlantic tensions

on the degree to which NATO should rely on

conventional forces, sharing of defense costs,

and trade in defense equipment. This was heightened by a perception, especially among the Germans, that FOFA would draw resources from

the close battle—their primary concern—and

yield little in return. The situation was aggravated because FOFA came in the midst of several other (primarily United States, or at least

viewed as such) initiatives that seemed to arrive at a faster pace than the Europeans could

respond, and because of calls for still greater

spending increases to implement FOFA.

There is mounting evidence that the Allies

are moving toward greater understanding and

acceptance of the FOFA concept, and are becoming more enthusiastic for developing and

procuring systems that could support FOFA.

To the Germans, whose thinking strongly

influences other Central Region nations, FOFA

is of lower priority than fighting the close battle or air defense, a sentiment echoed by some

other nations. However, they have apparently

dropped their efforts to get NATO to assign

priorities among the key mission concepts. It

is difficult for the Germans to accept anything

that might appear to reemphasize forward defense, which is a cornerstone of German public acceptance of NATO. And German membership is itself a basis of the Alliance.

The British, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians

—as well as the French, who are not part of

Allied Command Europe–have accepted the

value of attacks out to the range of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and are

planning to procure MLRS as well as enhanced

artillery and targeting systems. However, for

some this procurement is at least ten years in

the future.

The Germans and British accept, in principle, the value of striking deeper with army systems, but have not yet decided whether it can

be made practical and cost-effective. The Dutch

and Belgians think that their defense establishments are too small to support the necessary complex packages of systems. All the air

forces are interested in upgrading their interdiction capabilities, but here again the smaller

forces are limited in the variety of systems they

can support. Within the Conference of NATO

Armament Directors, a FOFA baseline listing

the basic capabilities needed for FOFA and

specifying a near term interest in ranges out

to 150 kilometers has been approved. Work is

now underway to produce an agreed list of candidate systems to meet these basic needs.

Availability of funding will limit what all the

nations can do (the United States included).

This is particularly a problem for the British,

whose defense budget is expected to decline

in real terms (with significant declines in spending for conventional defense in order to fund

Trident), and for the Belgians, who are more

likely to apply whatever money is available primarily to improving their ability to fight the

close battle.

The focus of attention appears to have shifted

from the conceptual to the more concrete arena

of arms production and cooperation. It seems

clear that the Europeans are unlikely to be enthusiastic about FOFA if FOFA means buying
Ch. 2—Summary ● 2 5

Photo credlf NATO

Ministerial meeting of North Atlantic Council.

predominantly American technology. There is

also evidence that they are becoming interested

in producing and selling systems that could support FOFA. On the other hand, while it may be

difficult to separate real concerns from rhetoric, it may be unwise to dismiss all previous European concerns as a rhetorical smokescreen for

economic considerations. U.S. efforts to develop

greater Alliance cohesion and cooperation on

the development of FOFA systems have centered on the Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Science Board FOFA II Task Force, and

the 1985 Nunn Amendment initiative. Both

have apparently achieved some initial success

in arousing European governmental and industrial interest, but it is too early to tell whether

there will be significant concrete results.

Nonetheless, some major elements are discernible. The Europeans are most interested

in those approaches to implementing FOFA

that are most in consonance with what they

have already been planning. In this they are

not alone-the U.S. approach to FOFA also

includes only systems that were underway before the term “FOFA” was invented. However,

the U.S. approach is focused at longer ranges

than the European, and one source of friction

appears to be the reluctance of our Allies to

jump to an approach centered on our products.

In particular, the Europeans are interested

in shorter ranges—out to roughly 30 kilometers

—where enhanced artillery and MLRS (which

several are now buying) could be applied, and

in air interdiction. The Europeans appear most

interested in FOFA enhancements to systems

in which they have already made large national

investments, such as the Tornado aircraft, and

continuing parallel development of sensor systems–e.g., Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV),

the United Kingdom’s Airborne Stand-Off Ra-
26 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

dar (ASTOR), and the French Observatoire Radar Coherent Heliporte d’Investigation Des

Elements Ennemis (ORCHIDEE)–that may

duplicate U.S. efforts. U.S./European cooperative efforts may thus focus largely on ensuring some degree of interoperability among competing systems. The Germans are developing

attack drones for use against armor and air

defenses, and advanced anti-armor weapons

to be carried on combat aircraft. There appears

to be little European enthusiasm for longer

range attack missiles, like ATACMS. Indeed,

political problems—centering on public perceptions of such missiles as being “offensive,” on

arms control considerations, and on notions

that they are destabilizing because the Soviets

might think they carry nuclear warheads and

respond with nuclear weapons—surround the

deployment of such missiles in Europe, and

might cause problems as the United States

seeks to deploy them.

There is a growing recognition within Europe

—including France-that cooperative programs

are the key to obtaining costly modern capabilities. But the Europeans have several concerns about cooperative programs. There is little sentiment for buying goods produced in the

United States, and a growing reluctance simply to co-produce U.S. developments, because

that stunts the growth of European technology. They prefer co-development programs

that draw on and nurture the technological

strengths of all parties. Many see in U.S. policy several impediments to cooperative programs: “buy American” sentiments; an inability to commit to a several year project;

“black” programs that they cannot have access to; restrictions on transferring technology to our allies; and restrictions on sales of

resulting products to third parties.

Based on past experience with cooperative

arms production, the process of developing and

procuring the many systems required for FOFA

is likely to be quite time-consuming. There are

several fora—formal and informal groupings

of European states, bilateral and multilateral

arrangements including the United States,

industry-to-industry cooperative programs,

and attempts to sell existing systems or their

co-production—through which such deals can

be arranged. All will have to be harmonized,

and the final products gotten through their

respective national governments.

Both the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party appear to be deeply opposed to FOFA (and to a number of other

basic NATO ideas). Labour stands a reasonable chance of coming to power. If this happens, NATO will face a very different situation, because both Britain and Germany are

not only major players, but have a strong influence on how the smaller countries react.

Even out of power, both these parties are important political forces in Europe.

How Might the Soviets Respond

to FOFA?

The Soviets are likely to regard FOFA both

as worrisome and as presenting an opportunity to stimulate and exploit a controversy

within NATO. Their reactions to it have taken,

and most likely will continue to take, two

forms: political exploitation of a new controversy within NATO; and adjustment of their

operations to take account of it.

Their propaganda has played on many of the

concerns voiced in Europe, in particular: that

FOFA is an offensive doctrine that threatens

the East; that FOFA would be destabilizing

because missiles carrying conventional warheads could not be distinguished upon launch

from nuclear missiles; and that it would lower

the nuclear threshold through the use of conventional weapons of high destructive potential. The Soviets have taken the position that

FOFA is yet another manifestation of aggressive U.S. behavior and intentions, and has contrasted that to the peace-loving image they

paint of themselves. They have drawn a picture

of the United States developing an aggressive

stance with new weapons having the destructive potential of “weapons of mass destruction” (i.e., nuclear weapons). They will try to

use it to drive a wedge between the United

States and Europe, and to stir up the European left.
Ch. 2—Summary ● 2 7

Although these concerns may not be taken

very seriously among defense professionals in

Europe, they do have some support within the

major opposition parties in Germany and Britain. Furthermore, these and similar arguments

can be exploited by the Soviets to influence

public opinion, and perhaps elections, in the

democratic European states. The threat to

NATO is both political and military. The Soviets

would probably prefer to split NATO and separate the United States from Europe by political means if they could do so, rather than risk

war.

On the military level, they are concerned

both about the concept itself, and about the

individual systems being designed to support

it. In the first instance, they have added FOFA

into their ongoing reevaluations of their strategy and operational art. Their reaction may

ultimately take the form of deemphasizing the

second echelon at all levels (and otherwise

‘‘front-loading’ their offensive), or increasing

the combat capability of their leading units,

or both. However, geography and a desire to

limit the vulnerability of massed forces to a

nuclear strike will reduce their opportunities

for front-loading. They can also be expected

to take active and passive countermeasures

against the weapons and other systems used

by NATO to find and attack their follow-on

forces. Each of these steps can be taken only

at some cost.

The Soviets appear to have deep concerns

about the rapid reaction capability of NATO’s

new strike systems. In the abstract, such systems could counter their plans faster than they

could modify their plans in response, and steal

the initiative from them. They will probably

take measures to speed their planning cycles

or protect them from FOFA weapons. They

are also developing similar systems and the

theory of their use on the modern battlefield.

IMPLEMENTING FOFA

Initially, a great number of different FOFA

concepts were under discussion. But over the

past few years, several important study efforts

have helped to narrow the range of possibilities by taking into account both operational

considerations and technological realities. Attacks could be conducted either by groundlaunched missiles or interdiction aircraft

against a variety of targets at many different

ranges from the FLOT. The targets could be

combat units, selected high-value elements of

the combat units (e.g., command posts or surface-to-surface missile launchers), or the supplies for those units. Moreover, attacks could

be launched to create chokepoints—for example, by dropping a bridge or sowing a mine field

along a route of advance-just as a unit would

be about to move through. Attacking the combat units might delay, disrupt, or destroy them;

attacking their command posts could disrupt

their ability to contribute to the offensive, and

creating chokepoints would delay their advance,

What and Where to Attack

Of the three general types of targets-groups

of vehicles, individual high-value units that,

while mobile, tend to spend most of their time

moving, and fixed chokepoint targets-the

fixed targets are the easiest to target, requiring at most some indication that the time is

right to hit them, in addition to information

that can be gathered in peacetime. The highvalue targets are inherently difficult because

their presence can be obscured. When NATO

deploys rapidly responding reconnaissance and

targeting systems that can find moving vehicles (as well as the weapons to engage them)

these targets will probably become easier to

locate and destroy than the high-value targets.

Until then, there is likely to be more interest,

as a practical matter, in the high-value targets.

Quantitative analyses have tended to favor

attack of moving combat units either in transit from division assembly areas (roughly 50
28 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

— —

to 150 kilometers from the FLOT) to final assembly areas (out to perhaps 50 kilometers

from the FLOT), or in their move out of final

assembly areas to join the battle. Although

opportunities to attack stopped units should

not be ignored if they present themselves, attacking moving units provides a better basis

for planning; stopped units are more likely to

have taken measures to hide from both detection and attack.3 The concept is to attack battalions or entire regiments, destroying so much

of their combat capability that they can no

longer be usefully committed to the assault as

scheduled.

In attacking these units, emphasis could be

put on killing tanks, the other armored vehicles, or the soft-skinned vehicles such as trucks.

Destroying tanks is particularly difficult; their

heavy armor is designed to protect against

most munitions. Fewer than half the armored

combat vehicles, however, are tanks. The others

—armored fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, surface-to-air missile launchers,

and surface-to-surface missile launchers, as

well as armored engineering equipment needed

by the combat vehicles-are easier to put out

of action and are also important to the combined arms offensive. Fewer than one-third of

the vehicles in a Soviet division are armored,

but the closer the division gets to the battle,

the more of its soft-skinned vehicles it leaves

behind.

The supplies for these forces would be almost

as hard to find as the forces themselves, but

easier to kill. However, analyses differ on the

value of attacking supplies. Although supplies

are vital, the Soviets may have much more

than they absolutely need. Some conclude that

forces going into battle carry enough on board

to do without resupply for a while. On the other

hand, some analysts conclude that these are

potentially valuable targets, especially supply

units that are part of combat units (i.e., “organic supply”). In order to continue an attack

or move forward and exploit it, a combat unit

would need at least minimal critical supplies.

3The U.S. ASARS-II system now in Europe can detect stopped

vehicles.

Close to the battle, combat vehicles would outnumber supply trucks, making each supply

truck a more valuable target.

High-value targets such as command posts,

missile launchers, and resupply points are

worth attacking when they can be located. No

means of routinely locating and engaging them

has as yet been identified, but the fact that

they tend to stay put for many hours increases

the likelihood that clues from a number of

sources can be pieced together successfully.

If found, they could be killed with today’s

weapons; they are much fewer in number than

the combat vehicles. The Army believes that

attacking these targets could seriously disrupt

the offensive. In the near term—until systems

for locating moving units and weapons for attacking masses of armored vehicles become

available-attacks would probably be limited
Ch. 2—Summary ● 2 9

Phc)fc~ credlf U S Deparimenf of Defense

Less well-protected Soviet vehicles outnumber the tanks.

to such high-value targets and to creating

chokepoints to cause delay.

Causing delays can be very useful if the delays are sufficiently long; however, studies indicate that most attacks would be incapable

of causing significantly long delays. In many

cases, there may be enough “slop” in the

Soviets’ schedule to compensate. Two promising exceptions are: deep strikes against the

rail lines in Eastern Europe, where delays measured in weeks may be possible; and strikes very

close to the FLOT, where delays of just a few

hours may be very significant. Some analysts

believe that it is very important to delay the

second operational echelon to allow NATO’s

reserves to get into place, and to delay the second strategic echelon until NATO has successfully dealt with the first.

In general, the closer to the FLOT the attacks take place, the more systems can reach

the targets, the more effective the attacks are

likely to be, and the more direct their effect

on the close battle. However, waiting for the

enemy to get very close risks not being able

to fire enough rounds in the time he is exposed

to attack. Furthermore, this is not necessarily

an argument in favor of short-range systems,

because longer range systems have greater

flexibility to redirect fire across the front.

Obtaining the Capability

The Systems: What’s in the Inventory,

What’s Being Bought, What’s Under

Development

Supporters of the FOFA concept believe that

some or all of these approaches can be made

to work, if all the necessary pieces can be procured. They differ as to which would be the

most useful and the most feasible.
30 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Implementing any of these approaches will

require a package of systems, the major components of which are:

1. reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition (RSTA);

2. data analysis and handling (data fusion);

3. attack platform;

4. munitions; and

5. systems to protect the airborne RSTA assets and to help the attack aircraft penetrate to their targets.

All of these will have to work and be available

in sufficient quantity if the concept is to be

viable.

This is illustrated in table 2-1, which suggests packages of systems to support specific

operational concepts. None of these concepts

could be fully implemented today, because systems are not yet deployed. Furthermore, a great

many more systems than are shown here—

both existing and developmental-might be

brought to bear. Table 2-2 shows what the U.S.

Army and Air Force are currently buying and

developing. NATO favors an evolutionary approach to FOFA, i.e., implementing a limited

capability while more effective systems mature.

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target

Acquisition (RSTA) Systems

Currently the Services have in Europe a

number of different systems that can detect

and locate fixed targets and targets that move

infrequently. Most of these systems are based

on aircraft, and locate their targets by imagery

or by detecting electronic emissions. They lack

an ability to look over broad areas for long

periods of time to find moving units and rapidly (i.e., within seconds) report that information to users. The Joint Surveillance Target

Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), currently

in full-scale development, is designed to do

that. Although strongly supported by DoD,

it has been a controversial program in Congress.

Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) could also

serve this function, but over a generally much

smaller area. Whereas one Joint STARS might

support several corps at once, one of the Army’s

Aquila RPVs might typically support a brigade’s

MLRS batteries. Aquila could see targets

masked from Joint STARS by terrain and vegetation and could identify individual vehicles.

It has also been a controversial program. Several other RPVs are under development both

here and in Europe. The Europeans generally

favor RPV systems, have many in the field,

and are developing upgrades and new systems,

particularly the CL289. The British are developing abroad area surveillance system—called

ASTOR–and the French are developing a heliborne MTI system called ORCHIDEE.

The Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)

has also been controversial and the program

was recently scaled back by DoD and Congress. PLSS would have been used to locate

radars of air defenses threatening NATO interdiction aircraft and RSTA platforms such

as Joint STARS.

Data Analysis and Handling

NATO’s ability to attack moving targets is

also limited by data-handling systems that consume long periods of time getting information

from RSTA systems to analysts and to attack

systems. This problem has been compounded

because modern collection systems can collect

large amounts of data. The Joint Tactical Fusion program, as well as other efforts, are working on using modern computers to streamline

this process. Systems like Joint STARS will

be able to send data both to assessment centers

to plan attacks, and directly to attack systems

such as MLRS batteries.

Attack Platforms

Currently NATO has a variety of tactical

aircraft-including U.S. F-16s, F-4s, and F111s, British and German Tornados, and several other types—conventional artillery, and

the Lance missile to strike into Warsaw Pact

territory. All of these are limited in their ability to attack follow-on forces. Of the aircraft,

only the Tornados and F-1 11s can operate at

night and in bad weather,4 and they will have

other interdiction tasks as well.

‘The others can fly at night, but because they lack systems

to support effective navigation and weapons employment in the

dark, they would not be particularly effective.
Ch. 2—Summary . 31

Table 2-1 .—illustrative Packages of Systems To Support Specific Operational Concepts

(as yet, not all the pieces exist)

—

Reconnaissance, surveillance,

— and target acquisition Attack ——

Reconnaissance, surveillance, ‘– Target acquisition,

Operational concept situation assessment attack control Platform Weapon

1, MLRS and artillery attack GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, AQUILA and 8-inc h SAD ARM

of regimental columns: 5 to Joint STARS, and ASAS AFATDS Artillery

30 km deep and MLRS MLRS/TGW

2. Aircraft attack of division GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS F-16 MSOW carrying -

columns: 30 to 80 km deep Joint STARS, and ENSCE Skeet or TGSM or

CEB

3. Ballistic MissiIe attack of GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS and MLRS

division columns: 30 to 80 Joint STARS, and ASAS

ATACMS carrying

AFATDS launcher DPICM or TGSM

km deep or Skeet

4. Attack with aircraft:create GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, ASARS and GACC F-15E AGM-130, MSOW

chokepoints and then Joint STARS, and ENSCE F-16 carrying various

attack the halted vehicles: munitions lnclud80 to 150 km deep ing mines —

5. Air-launched cruise missile Various national systems -

(on the weapon) B-52 Cruise missile

attack of rail network; 350 with various

to 800 km deep munitions — — —

NOTES

1

2

3

Deflnltlons

AFATDS—Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System provides target data to artillery and M LRS batter!es

AGM1 30—an alrlaunched mlsslle

ASARS—Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System provides Images of fixed objects

ASAS—a developmental Army center for collecting, analyzlng, and dlssemlnatlng surveillance data

ATACMS—Army Tactical Mlssde System a balllstlc m{ss!le to be launched from MLRS launchers

AQUILA—a remotely piloted vehicle

CEB– Combined Effects Bomblet Slmllar to DPICM, designed to be dispensed by the Combined Effects Munltlon (CEM)

DPICM—Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munltlon unguided submun!tlon for use against Ilght armor and soft targets

EN SC E–the Alr Force version of ASAS

GACC–Ground Attack Control Center a developmental center for controlling alr attacks aga!nst ground targets

GUARDRAIL–a tact{cal surveillance system

Joint STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System mov!ng target Indicator and attack control

MLRS—Multlple Launch Rocket System

MLRS/TGW–Terminally Gu!ded Weapon a smart anti armor submunltlon for MLRS

MSOW—Modular Standoff Weapon a weapons dispenser

SADARM –Search and Destroy Armor a smart anti.armor submun!t!on for artillery

Skeet —a smart anti-armor submunltlon

TGSM —Terminally Guided Submu,jltlon a smart anti.armor submunltlon

TRS—Tactical Reconnaissance System carries various sensor suites

Reconnaissance surveillance, and sltuatlon assessment would be performed by a number of systems–particularly those shown here —feed!ng into the as

sessment center Although all need not find the target for the attack to take place, the more there are the greater the chances are that the target WIII be

found, recognized and Identlfled wfth suff!clent accuracy to attack (t

Not all the submunttlons displayed (n the table are necessarily being developed for deployment on the weapons shown, however, there IS no fundamental

reason why they could not be engineered onto those weapons

The Air Force is currently buying the

LANTIRN system for the F-16, which will enable it to operate effectively at night. They

have also begun to procure the F-15E which

is designed for interdiction and carries the

LANTIRN and a terrain-following radar. The

F-15E has much greater range than the F-16.

The Army is procuring the Multiple Launch

Rocket System (MLRS), which has about twice

the range of 155mm artillery. The ATACMS

ballistic missile,5 which is designed to reach

‘Also called “Army TACMS” or just “TACMS.” The Army

split this development off from the Joint TACM S, or .JTACM S

program.

well over 100 kilometers into enemy territory

with high accuracy, has entered full-scale development. It will be launched from the MLRS

launcher. The Germans are developing attack

drones for killing armor and air defenses.

Munitions

Munitions are another major limitation on

NATO’s ability to attack follow-on forces. Current generation weapons are effective primarily against single, soft targets; the Air Force

has weapons (e.g., the GBU-15) that can be

used to destroy bridges. The Air Force’s Maverick missile can be used to kill tanks (and other
32 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

—

Table 2-2.—Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs

Statusa

System (3/1/87)

Platforms

F-15A/B/C/D/E . proc/FSD

F-15E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . proc/FSD

F-16A/B/C/D proc

A-7 upgrade FSD

ATF : : : : : : DEM/VAL

proto

Pods:

LANTIRN . . . . ..proc

Munitions and direct-attack weapons ’

CEM ,,, ,,, ... ... ..proc

SFW ... ... ... ..FSD

GATOR . . . . . . . .. ... ... ...proc

HVM ... ... .adv de v

missiles .

fire control sy s

HTM .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ... ..FSD

DAACM ..pre-FSD

Standoff weapons

GBU-15 .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ... .proc ends

AGB .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ...prop

HARM . . . . .. .,, .,, ,,. ,,, ...proc

LCS . . . . . . . . ., ... ... ..adv dev

AGM-65D/G . . ... ...proc

AGM-130. ....., ,, .,, ... ... ..FSD

MSOW .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ..RFP/PD

rel 3/87

AMRAAM .FSD/proc

RSTA Systems:

JSTARS E-8A.. .. ... ... ... ..FSD

PLS S

e .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ....OUE

AMS e 

. . . . . . . . . . .

SNS e 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ,,,..

case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TRS f ., ..., ., .proc

TR-1s, ,, . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SS f

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PGS f . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BGS f . ,.

F-O TRSg .adv dev

ESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..pre-FSD

GACC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ...pre-FSD

Communications and data fusion systems’

JTFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...FSD

HAVE QUICK., ,,, ,, .. . .. FSD/proc

(I/II/llA)

Electronic warfare systems:

EF-111A U/G

h .. .. ... ... ... ..FSD

F-4G WW’ . . . . . . .. ... ... ... ..FSD

computer s

receiver group s

Compass Call .. .. ... ... ... ..FSD

Air Force Programs

Through FY 1987 Expected total

-. —

Funds b

appropriated

$ 35B

$ 23B

$ 35M

$550M

$ 1.86

$ 1.2B

$ 85M

$560M

$ 34M

—

TBD

$ 1B

$ 33M RDT&E

$ 1.96

$110M

o

$ 1.8B

$625M

$675M

$ 1.5B

$ 27M

$ 34M

$ 3.5M

$ 80M

$160M

$ 90M

$240M

$325M

NOTES

Units

procured’

925

50

440

N/A

o

150 nav

10 tgt

48,000

0

10,200

0

0

0

0

—

TBD

4,500

TBD

10,000

40

0

180

2

3 +

6

1 —

27

14

1

1

0

0

0

0

22,000

0

150

0

16

Acquisition d

Cost b

$ 46B

$ 48B

$190M

TBD

$ 4B

$ 2.2B

$ 2.3B

$560M

$ 1.8B

$88M RDT&E

$340M

—

TBD

$ 2.1B

$ 67M RDT&E

$ 6B

$ 2.1B

TBD

$ 8B

$ 3B

$675M

$ 1.9B

$ 1.6B

$230M

$ 40M

TBD

$500M

$265M

$565M

$520

Units

procured c

1,270

390

2,740

N/A

750

700 nav

700 tgt

96,000

14,000

10,200

100,000

200

TBD

2,850

—

TBD

7,300

TBD

60,000

5,600

TBD

17,000

10

3+

6

1

27

14

1

2

TBD

34

N/A

TBD

43,000

38

150

124

16

a

adv advanced, DEM demonstration, dep deployment, dev development, FSD full.scale development, OUE operational utlllty evaluation PD Program Direcllve

proc procurement, prod production, prop proposed, proto prototype, RFP request for proposals, VAL valldaflon

bApproxlmate (n current (’then.year’] dollars

cApproxlmate number planned

dlncludlng ’05t Of research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement but not OPeratlOn and maintenance

‘PLSS Precls!on Locatton Str{ke System, AMS Airborne Mtsslon Subsystem, SNS Suite Nawgatlon Subsystem, CPS Central Processing Subsystem 3+ lndlcates

three allup AMSS plus apart!al AMS requ!rrng refurbishment

fTRS Tactical Reconnaissance System, SS sensor suite, PGS prototype ground station BGS bunkered ground station

9FOTRS Fooowon Tactical Reconnaissance Syslem (ATARS)

‘LUG upgrade

IWW Wild Weasel

SOURCE US Alr Force (SAF/LLL January 1987
Table 2.2.—Status and Costs of

System

P/at forms

MLRS

Iaunchers

rockets

ATACMS

Reconnaissance,

RPV/TADARS

G CS

AV1

IEW UAVrr’

GCS

AV’

JSTARS GSM

TRA C

Status A

Selected FOFA-Related

Army Programs

Through FY 1987

Fund s

b

(3/1/87) appropriate d

proc $ 3.1B

FSD $350M

Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Systems

FSD $820M

dev $ 28M

F S D $240M

adv dev $ 2 5M

Improved GUARDRAIL/

Common Senso r proc

&fun/f Ions

DPICM

155 m m proc

8-inch proc

155 mm B B

r

’ FSD

MLRS/TGW adv dev

SADAR M adv dev

MLRS rounds

155mm rounds

8-inch rounds

Communication Systems

SINCGARS proc

al r

groun d

ADD S proc

NCS ”

EPLRS[’

JTID S

FIC)T F$

$300M

$ 2.0B

$620M

$ 56M

$ 72M

$190M

$480M

$280M

Units

procured’

392

1951000

—

5

k

12

2

12

3

28

4.4M

640.000

35,000

—

150

12,000

4

670

10

Ch. 2—Summary ● 3 3

Programs—Continued

Expected total

Acquisition d Units

Cost b

procured’

$ 4.9B

681

440,000

$ 1.2B TBD

$ 2.2B

53

376

$110M

6

46

$730M 95

TED 1

$ 1.0B 65

$ 4.3B 9.4M

$640M 650,000

$ 2.2B 1.0M

TBD TBD

(Incl $310M RDT&E)

$ 3.4B 50,000

$910M 70,000

TBD 6,000

$ 4.9B

14,000

280,000

$ 2.4B

140

22,000

580

‘~afi, ac~, anc,e(~ DEM cfemc n strat! m de~ dCrIl CIf men f dev dt?~elopmenf FSD full scale develop rneflt OUE ope-at!onal u tIIIty evaluatmn PD P-oqfdm D!rec tIVP fJr OL

;,, ,,O ,,rernen~ ~,r,,,j ~r ,du, ~1,,~1 ~,,c,L) ~r.,r,,,~ed ~,~!r, ~rr,l~t ~pe RFP request ff,r proposals VAL valldal!(?n

[ A [,: .,, $ ,r~ ate - !J rr~rl 1 I t h+= n , oar I dcJl I d-s

[ APFrrJS rrdl~

Cl, q l,kr~,nq r,st ,f rps,-ar, h r!c, , el r ; mpnt tec,l I n r; P, aludi!r,r) and pro{ L rement bu ! n nt operat(on and rmalntenan~ e

JGCS G.mJ nc Conl.rJl Stdt J“

~ In, r,,n @ef P v IL FIs Rfim!e G, JL nd To<m I ndls ,rl I !

IAV A I c Veh IC Ie

m LJat ~ Is ‘r,. I n It d I E// L AV ’01 lb w or Ohle, I I ~e I E W U AV Druqram Is u rider de ielo~lment

‘) BB Base Bl~eO sh~li

‘

J P4CS Net c , nt, c,l S!dt I,, n

~ E pLRs E n h ~nr Prj P’jsII I,, n 1 c,( at r n Report I n q S, stem

See Glossdr, frr t her Ierrns

SOURCE U S Army (OSA/LL) January 1987

armored vehicles) one at a time, G but a capability to attack groups of vehicles with a single shot and to defeat masses of armor is generally lacking. Currently, the Air Force is

buying the Combined Effects Munition (CEM),

which dispenses about 200 bomblets (CEBs)

6

1, A NT I RN will support shooting two Mavericks per pass,

but the pilot must find a target for each Maverick he launches

and line it up with the crosshairs on his cockpit display while

flying his airplane. Many observers believe that multiple passes

per launch are more likely than multiple launches per pass.

from a tactical munitions dispenser dropped

from an airplane. The CEB is effective against

trucks and most armored combat vehicles except tanks. The Army is buying a similar munition, called Dual Purpose Combined Effects

Munition (DPICM) for the MLRS. Although the

DPICM could conceivably go in the ATACMS,

current plans call for initial ATACMS to carry

the anti-personnel-anti-material (APAM) munition which has essentially no capability against

armor. The German Tornado carries the MW-
34 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

1 dispenser that drops the KB-44 anti-armor

submunition as well as several other submunitions.

These munitions, although capable of hitting

several targets per weapon launch (or an area

target, or one whose location is imprecisely

known), are all unguided, and hence most will

fall on empty ground. Moreover, they have little effectiveness against tanks. The next generation of munitions, currently in development,

will have both greater effectiveness against

tanks and seekers to guide them to their targets. These include sensor-fuzed weapons, such

as the Army’s SADARM and the Air Force’s

Skeet, that fire a self-forging slug at a target,

and the Army’s Terminally Guided Submunition (TGSM, also called terminally guided

weapon, or TGW) that guides directly to a target and detonates a shaped charge warhead.

Technical issues still surround these programs,

but these munitions are needed if attacking

tank columns is to become a reality. The Germans are developing a new, improved, antiarmor submunition and a smart launcher for

it to be carried by an airplane.

Whether or not scatterable mines can provide an effective means of creating chokepoints

(or exploiting natural chokepoints, or augmenting the effects of dropping bridges) is a matter of some controversy. Advocates believe a

scatterable mine system could provide great

payoff for a small investment. Both Services

have inventories of anti-vehicular and anti-personnel mines, and programs to develop smart

mines that can sense targets at a distance and

fire munitions (e.g., Skeets) at them. But mine

programs tend to have low priority in both

services.

In defense procurements, munitions have

tended to get low priority. The munitions are just

as important to FOFA as any of the other system components. If the concept is to work, the

proper munitions will have to be bought and

bought in sufficient quantities to do the job.

Assembling the Pieces:

“Packages” of Systems

The five general packages of systems listed

below are now under serious consideration. All

are evolutionary in the sense that it is envisioned that capabilities will expand as new developments come online. With the possible exception of the last, all can be implemented with

limited capability before all the pieces of the

package are available:

1. package based on MLRS and artillery,

2. package based on the ATACMS ballistic

missile,

3. package based on F-16,

4. package based on F-15E, and

5. package based on B-52s carrying cruise

missiles for deep strike.

MLRS and Artillery

The Army is currently procuring the Multiple-Launch Rocket System.7 This, combined

with existing artillery, will provide some capability to engage follow-on forces during their

movement from final assembly areas to the

battle (see table 2-3). The DPICM8 submunitions being procured for these rockets will have

some capability against light armored vehicles

as well as against high-value targets like command posts, but very little against tanks. Antiarmor capability will improve with the deployment of the MLRS/TGW submunition9 and the

SADARM for the artillery, both of which could

be in production in the early 1990s. The Army

plans to procure 350 MLRS launchers.

Important improvements in the ability to

attack moving targets would be obtained from

either Joint STARS or an RPV system that

could target directly for an MLRS battery.

‘Several of our Allies also have plans to acquire MLRS.

‘Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition.

9MLRS/ Terminally Guided Warhead, a smart anti-armor submunition.
Ch. 2—Summary ● 3 5 —

Table 2-3.—Packages Based on MLRS and Artillery

Targets

Stopped

. . .

Fixed

.,

high value chokepoints

.-

Moving units

Trucks A CV Tanks

Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P)

RSTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . current current Joint STARS (F) or

RPV (F, D, N)

Munition . . . . . . ... DPICM (P) mines (various

stages)

KEY I In Inventory

P - In production

F = In full scale engineering development

N - Not yet In formal development

AC RON ‘fMS

MLRS—multlple launch rocket system

DPICM—dual purpose Improved conventional munltlon

Joint STARS —Jofnt Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

RPV–remotely piloted vehicle

TGW—terminally guided weapon

ACV—armored combat veh!cle

This concept has the advantage of being consistent with the preferences of our Allies, several of whom have plans to buy MLRS. And—if

deployed across the Central Region-would

provide a consistent capability across the region. The range of the MLRS limits its use in

supporting other corps, and therefore the abilit y to concentrate firepower across the region.

ATACMS Ballistic Missile

Adding the ATACMS missile would give a

U.S. corps the ability to attack divisions moving from division assembly areas to final assembly areas, helping to alleviate some of the

short reaction problems in the previous approach. It would also provide some capability

to support neighboring corps and to concentrate fire on massing forces. DoD’s efforts to

interest the Allies in ATACMS have thus far

been unsuccessful,10 but solely United States

deployments could be of some value across

nearly the entire Central Region.11

.—. . .—.

‘This may be changing. I%nentations to the NATO Army

Armaments Group Panel on Surface-to-Surface Artillery in November 1986 generated interest on the part of Germany, Italy,

and the Netherhnd~., but had not yet resulted in changes in

official positions.

11 ATACMS deployed in U.S. V corps could reach as far north

as the British I corps sector. ATACMS deployed with U.S. III

corps, if I I I corps is deployed into NORTHAG, can extend that

coverage to the border of the Central Region. However, 11 I corps

would be in reserve and would not likely be deployed at the beginning of the war.

DPICM (P) DPICM (P) TGW (D)

The initial ATACMS will be procured with

APAM submunitions which are not effective

against armored vehicles. Without a system

like Joint STARS, it would be limited to attacking soft high-value targets that don’t move

very often, such as command posts, missile

launchers, communications links, and logistics

links-when they could be adequately located.

Joint STARS would support the attack of moving supply trucks, and-with the addition of

anti-armor submunitions like TGW12—moving

armored columns. These targets also might be

located with RPVs or some combination of

other systems. Attacking moving columns

would also require systems to analyze and disseminate data quickly. Attacking small groups

of moving vehicles or a specific group of vehicles within a larger column at 100 kilometers

beyond the FLOT would require a cue that the

target had arrived at the intended aimpoint

just prior to missile launch. However, if the

object is to attack any vehicles within a large

column, less timely information would suffice.

Some observers consider the ATACMS to

be too closely linked to the RSTA system and

lacking in flexibility. They claim that breaking the link of rapid target observation, location transmission, and launch would render the

system nearly useless against mobile targets.

Izor I RTGSM, or SADARM, or DPICM, etc.
36 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

— —

Photo credit LTV Aerospace & Defense Co

ATACMS missile, launched from MLRS launcher.

Others believe that these concerns are overblown, and that even without Joint STARS and

advanced anti-armor submunitions, ATACMS

would be very important.

Although the ATACMS missile makes good

military sense, there may be political problems

associated with deploying it. Some Europeans

have voiced concerns that ballistic missiles

launched into Warsaw Pact territory will be

misinterpreted, leading to a nuclear response;

others fear that it will strengthen the U.S.

corps so much that the offensive will be channeled against weaker sectors. We do not know

how serious or enduring these concerns are.

The Soviets can be expected to play on at least

the first of these. On the other hand, if the

ATACMS works and is deployed, the Europeans may want it in their forces.

As arms control proposals get shuffled in the

wake of Reykjavik, some may cause problems

for the ATACMS; at one time the German Government was reported to have asked the United

States to seek to include limits on ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 100 kilometers in

the intermediate range arms control negotiations with the Soviets. If the United States

is to preserve the option to deploy ATACMS,

negotiators will have to see to it that ATACMS

is excluded from negotiated limits, either by

limiting only missiles with longer ranges, or

by some means of differentiating nuclear from

conventional ballistic missiles. This would become difficult if ATACMS were to be made

capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Compared to the next two concepts, which

rely on tactical airpower, the MLRS and
Ch. 2—Summary ● 3 7

Table 2-4.— Packages Based on ATACMS

Stopped Fixed Moving units

high value chokepoints Trucks ACV Tanks

Platform . ‘,-. . ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) — .

RSTA ., . . . . . . . . . . current current Joint STARS (F) or

RPV (N, D, F)

Munition . . . . . . ,APAM (1) mines APAM (1) [TGW (D)] [TGW (D)]

DPICM (P) [DPICM (P)]

[IRTGSM (D)] [IRTGSM (D)]

KEY I In Inventory

P In production

F In full scale engineering development

N Not yet in formal development

I I The next generation submunltlon for the ATACMS has not yet been selected TGW or IRTGSM could fit, as could [he DPICM currently In oroduct[on

ACRONYMS

ATACMS– Army Tactical Mlsslle System

DPICM—dual purpose Improved conventional munltlon

IRTGSM—infrared (guided) terminally guided submunltlon

Jo!nt STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

RPV—remo[.ely piloted vehicle

TGW—terminally guided weapon

ACV– armored combat veh!cle

ATACMS concepts share some advantages

and disadvantages. They are more dependent

on the RSTA systems—airplanes have pilots

who can compensate to some extent for late,

inaccurate, false, or missing information; and

although the ATACMS can be fired laterally

into other corps sectors, the launchers cannot

easily be moved large distances in response to

movements in Warsaw Pact forces. Tactical

airpower, by contrast, can be shifted rapidly

across most of the Central Region.

Conducting air interdiction is much more

complicated than launching a missile. Attacking aircraft would have to deal with enemy air

defenses, requiring defense suppression, escort

aircraft, and preparation of attack corridors.

Although the Air Force practices attacks on

fixed targets and moving targets that appear

approximately where and when anticipated,

planning large interdiction efforts against

moving targets that may appear on short notice is difficult. Although it generally takes

many hours to plan an attack, once planned

it can be redirected on shorter notice, although

not as quickly as a missile launcher can be

reprogrammed. NATO can expect the Pact to

make a strong effort to close NATO’s air bases:

effective airbase attacks would be likely to lead

to a reduction in sorties available for FOFA.

In addition, there are likely to be many competing demands for interdiction aircraft. In

conversations in Europe, OTA found general

agreement among Army and Air Force officers

that few aircraft would be available for FOFA

during the first few days, because the more immediate concerns of protecting NATO’s airspace

and ensuring NATO’s ability to fly over the battle area should take precedence in the first few

days. However, this is not set in stone, and if

SACEUR and CINCENT decide that emphasis should be on interdiction the first day, it

will be.

Because of the specific disadvantages of each

approach—air interdiction and missile attack

—a combination of the two would appear to

be more effective than either alone.

F-16 Aircraft

This concept would provide coverage similar to that of the ATACMS, but with greater

latitude to be moved to different sectors of the

front. It would make use of an existing asset,

the F-16, which is already in the force and in

production. Furthermore, attacking into Pact

territory with interdiction aircraft is accepted

by U.S. Allies, who themselves have capable

interdiction aircraft including F-16s and the
38 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Tornado. The German Tornado, which carries

unguided anti-armor submunitions in its MW-1

dispenser, may beat present NATO’s best asset against masses of armor.

If used against combat units, this concept

would almost certainly require a broad area

RSTA system like Joint STARS, especially if

it is to be responsive to Pact force movements

across the Central Region. Until such a system becomes available, it might be possible to

focus a complicated combination of other systems to obtain the necessary information.

However, unlike the preceding concepts, this

one would have greater capability to compensate for shortcomings in the RSTA system.

Other developments will be needed to complete this concept. The CEM is similar to the

Army DPICM–it is effective against lightly

armored vehicles, soft vehicles, and personnel,

but has little effectiveness against modern

tanks. If tanks are also to be attacked, it would

have to be replaced, or supplemented, by a

Skeet or some other terminally guided antiarmor submunition. The LANTIRN, as well

as short stand-off missiles like AGM-130 or

GBU-15 configured to carry a submunition dispenser or an inertially guided dispenser, would

be valuable for increasing aircraft survivability.

F-15E Aircraft

Under current plans, the F-15Es will start

to appear in Europe in the late 1980s. These

two-seat airplanes, configured primarily for

ground attack but retaining their fighter capabilities, will have much greater range and

payload than the F-16s, as well as night and

all-weather capability supported by LANTIRN

and terrain-following radar. They will, however, cost considerably more than F-16s. The

F-15Es will supplement United States Air

Force in Europe’s (USAFE’s) deeper attack capabilities that currently reside exclusively with

the F-111s.13 F-15Es and F-111s could attack

targets well into Western Poland. The F-15Es

“This might also be augmented by B-52s, and possibly

FB-111s.

Photo credff U S Department of Defense

F-1 11s, current mainstay of NATO’s deep attack

capability.

and some tasked F-111s14 could be operated

with or in place of the F-16s as described above,

and could be used to extend FOFA capability

to create chokepoints on the Oder and Neisse

Rivers (the GDR-Polish border) and attack

units in transit on road and rail in Western

Poland.

If they operate beyond the range of the

F-16s, the F-15Es will also be generally beyond

the range of Joint STARS and similar tactical surveillance systems. This will not limit

their ability to operate against fixed targets

like airfields and bridges, but it will affect their

ability to attack moving targets, and to create

chokepoints at the optimum time. Furthermore, the deeper these aircraft operate, the

more difficult it becomes to protect them. The

greater range of the F-15E could also be exploited to operate out of bases that are farther

from the battle (perhaps in Britain), and therefore less likely to be attacked than bases used

by the F-16s. The greater range would also provide improved flexibility to operate throughout the Central Region in response to an evolving Pact offensive.

Deep Strike Using B-52s

Carrying Cruise Missiles

The Air Force is considering the use of B-52

bombers carrying long-range cruise missiles

to interdict the rail network across Eastern

Europe. One variant of the cruise missile could

14The F-1 11s, limited in number, already have several important missions including interdiction and air base attack, and

standing nuclear alert.
Ch. 2—Summary 39

— — — .

Table 2-5.– Packages Based on F-16 Aircraft

—

Targets —.

Stopped Fixed Moving units

high value chokepoints Trucks ACV Tanks

Platform . . . . . . . . . . . F-16/LANTIRN

—.

F-16/LANTIRN F- 16/LA NT IRN F-16/ LANTIRN ‘

-

F-16/LANTlRN --

RSTA . . . . ... ... current current Joint STARS (F )

Advanced RPVS (?)

Weapon/Munition. ., . . Bombs, mines, bombs TMD/CEM (P)

cluster bombs, cluster bombs

TMD/CEM (P)

Other . . . . . . . . . ., . . systems for defense avoidance and suppression

KEY I In Inventory

. —

P - In production

F In full scale engineerlng development

N Not yet In formal development

ACRONYMS

LANTIRN –Low altitude navigation and targeting Infrared system for night

TMD—tactical munltlons dispenser

CEM–combined effects mun{t{on (a TMD carrylnq Combined Effects Bombletst

TMD/CEM (P)

Rockeye (1)

Maverick (I, P)

and for protection

Skeet—an IR guided submunltlon that fires a sel~forglng slug Also called SFW, or sensor fuzed weapon

Rockeye —a cluster bomb containing ant! armor submunltlons

Maverick—an anti.tank guided m{sslle

ACV—armored combat vehicle

Table 2-6.—Packages Based on F-15E Aircraft

Stopped

high value

Platform . . . . . . . . ., F-15E (P)

F-ill (1)

RSTA . . . . . . . ... current

Weapon/Munition, . . . Bombs,

cluster bombs,

TMD/CEM (P)

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . systems for — .

KEY I In Inventory

P In production

F - In full scale engineering development

N Not yet In formal development

ACRONYMS

GBU 15–a highly accurate guided gllde bomb

AGM.130—a powered verston of the GBU15

TMD—a tactical munitions dispenser

—

Targets

TM D/Skeet (D)

Maverick (I, P)

of RSTA assets

Fixed Moving units ———

chokepoints Trucks - ACV Tanks

F-15E (P) - F-15E (P) F-15E (P) F-15E (P)

F-1 11 (I) F-1 11 (l)(?) F-1 11 (l)(?) F-1 11 (I)(?)a

—

current Joint STARS (F)

GBU-15 (1) TMD/CEM (P) TMD/CEM (P) TM D/Skeet (D)

AGM-130 (F) cluster bombs Rockeye (1)

mines Maverick (I, P) Maverick (I, P)

defense avoidance and suppression and for protection of RSTA assets

CEM —combined effects munltlon (a TMD carrying Combined Effects Bomblets)

Skeet—an IR gu!ded submunltlon that f!res a self-forging slug Also called SFW or sensor fuzed weapon

Rockeye —a cluster bomb contalmng ant[.armor submunltlons

Maver!ck —an anti.tank guided missile

ACV—armored combat vehicle

aF 11 1s are typ!cally tasked for deep mlsslons against targets Ilke alrflelds and bridges

be configured to drop bridges, while another bers, and the airplanes could be released from

would sow smart mines along the rail lines. their strategic nuclear roles through introducThese aircraft would be flown from the United tion of B-Is into the force.

States to their launch points, launch their missiles against fixed targets, and return to bases The primary goal most likely would be to dein the United States. It has been estimated lay the arrival of forces rather than to cause

that by the mid-1990s suitable cruise missiles attrition. In theory, this would prevent the seccould be developed and built in sufficient num- ond fronts from arriving in time to exploit the
40 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

successes of the first fronts, and allow NATO

time to reverse the situation.

Proponents of this concept contend that having the capability to hold the rail lines at risk

in time of war could force the Soviets to a long

mobilization, bringing their forces through the

rail lines in peacetime and therefore providing

NATO with long, unambiguous warning. A

“long warning” scenario is generally more

favorable to NATO than a “short warning”

scenario, because NATO is expected to mobilize more slowly than the Warsaw Pact. However, the added warning would be of value to

NATO only if NATO accepts it and reacts accordingly.

This concept would make use of existing assets, the B-52s. There would be no aircraft

procurement costs, but operations and maintenance would be incurred to keep the force

active for this (and other conventional) roles.

Eventually, those B-52s would have to be

replaced by more modern aircraft or extensively overhauled. Suitable tanker aircraft support would have to be made available. Because

of the long range of the bombers and of the

weapons they would carry, exposure to enemy

air defenses could be kept to a minimum. Compared to the other four concepts, the requirements for timely surveillance are much less.

The proposed cruise missile could be developed from an existing type—e.g., the Boeing

ALCM or the Tomahawk. Engineering studies

have shown that this ought to be a straightforward task; it has yet to be demonstrated,

however. Alternatively, a new missile could be

developed.

Problems related to arms control may also

have to be solved. Under the SALT II agreement, the B-52 was defined and counted as a

strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. Whatever

arms control agreements ultimately are

produced in the wake of Reykjavik will have

to come up with a definition of a strategic bomber. If this option is to be pursued, either some

way will have to be found to keep conventionally armed B-52s from being counted as strategic nuclear weapons, or the United States

will have to give up some nuclear capability

to get conventional capability.

REMAINING ISSUES

There are a number of FOFA-related programs that Congress will decide on. Some—

such as the F-15E and the ATACMS missile—

do not appear very controversial, although that

might change. The controversial issues are:

Joint STARS, Aquila RPV, a successor to

PLSS, and advanced munitions programs. In

addition, Congress will have to deal with cooperative development and production with

our Allies.

Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System (Joint STARS)

Although Army, Air Force, and SHAPE favor the Joint STARS, it has been the subject

of much controversy, particularly in Congress.

In each of the past 3 years, the House opposed

the system while the Senate supported it. Conference action has supported funding for the

system. The Joint STARS, now in full-scale

engineering development, is built around a

moving target indicator (MTI) radar carried

on an E-8A (modified Boeing 707) aircraft. It

would provide both surveillance information

to assessment centers, and targeting information to command centers and directly to missile launchers or attack aircraft. From a patrol orbit behind the FLOT, it would provide

broad area coverage over extended periods of

time.

Opponents argue that the Joint STARS will

be vulnerable to Warsaw Pact surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs) and interceptor aircraft, and

will either be shot down or have to retreat so

far from the FLOT as to be not worth its cost.

They favor stopping the program until a much

more survivable version can be produced. Pro-
Ch. 2—Summary ● 4 1

ponents acknowledge its vulnerability, but argue that a variety of protective measures could

greatly enhance its survivability, and that even

when taking protective measures it would be

capable of providing a great deal of capability.

The capability that Joint STARS (or a system like it) would provide is very important

to most FOFA concepts. FOFA could be done

without it, but with much greater difficulty

and probably much less effectiveness. The system would be very useful for identifying the

focus and major movements of a Pact attack,

and, before the shooting starts, for monitoring Pact troop movements and providing effective warning of an attack. The Air Force

believes that an 13-8A-based system is necessary for deployments to areas other than Europe. Proponents argue that it would be useful

to get a system into the field as soon as possible, so that crews can learn how to operate it

and find out what it can really provide.

Prior to hostilities, the Joint STARS could

operate very close to the FLOT and observe

Pact movements deep inside East Germany

and Czechoslovakia. In wartime, the Air Force

would defend the Joint STARS (and the airspace it and other surveillance aircraft operate in), suppress enemy air defenses, and adjust the patrol pattern of the E-8A to reduce

its vulnerability. At selected times it could

surge forward, that is, patrol closer to the

FLOT with dedicated defenses in order to look

into selected deeper areas. As the war progresses and Pact defenses are suppressed, it

should become possible to increase the amount

of time spent patrolling closer to the FLOT.

If operated as the Air Force now intends,

the E-8A Joint STARS should be capable of

providing frequent broad area coverage to a

depth of 50 to 100 kilometers beyond the FLOT.

There will be a great many targets within this

band, and more weapons can attack here than

deeper. Attacking combat units in this band

can be more efficient because many of the noncombat vehicles will be left behind as the units

prepare to go into battle. Furthermore, frequent coverage is likely to be of greater importance within this band than deeper: the targets are expected to traverse this band rapidly

and be less constrained to major roads. Surge

operations would allow some coverage of

deeper areas. This pattern of operations would

generally require the Joint STARS to operate

farther from the FLOT than the nominal setback usually discussed for it. The coverage

would similarly be reduced from what a nominal orbit would provide,

Some opponents of the E-8A Joint STARS

have suggested that consistently deeper coverage could be obtained by basing Joint STARS

on an inherently more survivable platform that

could operate closer to the FLOT without being detected. OTA has not been given access

to information on such programs, and the reader

should be aware that there is potentially relevant information that OTA does not have. In

general, such a system would have its own limitations. For it to be stealthy, it will have to

carry an equally stealthy radar, known as ‘LPI”

(or low probability of intercept) radar, and a

radar antenna that—when illuminated by a

threat radar-is as difficult to detect as the

airplane. LPI may be achieved in part by managing power, that is by reducing the amount

of energy a radar transmits in a given time,

which reduces the amount of information the

radar can obtain. Therefore a stealthy Joint

STARS would also not be able to gather as

much data as the E-8A Joint STARS in its

nominal orbit.

Because the reduction in coverage would take

the form of “looking” less rather than moving back from the FLOT, coverage of both deep

and shallow targets would be reduced.

We at OTA do not have enough information

to compare the coverage of a E-8A Joint STARS

taking evasive, protective action and a stealthy

alternative, but we believe that such a comparison would be important. We believe that if Congress does not have enough information to make

a decision on Joint STARS, it ought to mandate

a study comparing the cost, survivability, coverage, and operational utility of Joint STARS

and proposed alternatives operated in a realistic manner, but ought not to stop the development program in order to do so.
42 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

One alternative that might be considered is

an E-8A Joint STARS complemented—rather

than replaced—by a more survivable system.

The E-8A Joint STARS could provide complete coverage to a limited depth, and each

could provide limited coverage deeper in Pact

territory. The coverage of both would be limited by terrain and foliage, but limitations

might be less for the more survivable platform.

An important consideration for either a substitute or a complementary platform is whether

the necessary LPI radar could be built from

the Joint STARS radar, or would require an

entirely new development effort. Without more

information, OTA cannot answer this question

in detail. However, the Joint STARS radar has

substantial capacity for conversion to LPI

operation. It appears to OTA that if the LPI

radar were to operate in the same frequency

band as the Joint STARS radar, much of the

existing design could be used.

Replacement for the Precision Location

and Strike System (PISS)

For fiscal year 1987, Congress decided, at

the request of DoD, to deny funding for procurement of the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS, pronounced “pens”), and to appropriate $20 million for further development and

testing. Congress and DoD now face the issue

of whether a new system is needed to perform

the function originally conceived for PLSS.

Until this year, PLSS–a developmental surveillance and control system designed to detect, identify, and accurately locate modern

mobile, electronically agile radars and jammers

in near real time—was an important part of

the program for improving surveillance in Europe. However, the Air Force has not requested

funding for procurement, and apparently has

taken the position that other systems could

adequately do the job for which PLSS was

designed. Moreover, PLSS has encountered

many problems and delays during its long development history.

Others still see value in PLSS, particularly

for targeting modern mobile SAMs, and as a

major contributor to the survivability of Joint

STARS and other surveillance systems. It has

demonstrated emitter location speed and accuracy which are superior to those of existing

theater systems, as well as a high emitter

reporting rate. These may be necessary if, as

expected, at the outbreak of a war enemy radars shut down, move, change frequencies, and

begin wartime operations in short on-time, electronically agile modes.

Modern mobile, electronically agile radars

and jammers would accompany and protect

follow-on forces; an ability to attack them soon

after they are detected in a new location would

be very valuable to protecting allied aircraft

used to detect and attack follow-on forces.

PLSS has demonstrated a capability to locate

and report more such emitters per hour with

greater accuracy and timeliness than all other

U.S. systems now reporting to Europe combined. It would use electronic equipment carried aloft by three TR-1 aircraft operating together, each communicating with a central

processing ground station. The ground station

would report emitter locations, and could also

control attacks against emitters.

During development, PLSS has failed to

demonstrate emitter location errors as small

as those required by its specifications, and its

reliability has been a problem. However, recently its performance has steadily improved.

Emitter location accuracy has approached the

specified value, and the reporting rate requirement has been reduced to what PLSS has already demonstrated. In addition, the system

has often reported each actual emitter as several. Some causes of this problem were identified and corrected.

Munitions Programs

There are three major concerns regarding

munitions programs: 1) the effectiveness of

anti-armor submunitions in a realistic combat

environment; 2) buying enough munitions for

FOFA to have an effect; and 3) what to do

about mines.

Munitions programs-and the weapons to

carry them—tend to be a neglected area. They

are usually not glamorous, and are often can-
Ch. 2—Summary ● 4 3

didates for scaling back and stretching out in

order to save money. None of the FOFA concepts will work if there are not enough munitions to kill a large enough number of targets

to have an effect. A multi-billion dollar investment in RSTA, data analysis centers, missiles,

and airplanes of various types can be undercut by not buying enough munitions. OTA cannot say how many of each type are needed (indeed, that is a job for the Services). However,

the Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe

have hundreds of thousands of vehicles, including many tens of thousands of armored combat vehicles.

Although current-generation unguided submunitions can be effective against most vehicles, including most armored combat vehicles,

advanced guided anti-armor submunitions now

under development may be the key to being

able to destroy groups of tanks. Because they

are guided, they may also be much more effective against less heavily armored vehicles. Two

types are under development: sensor fuzed

weapons—e.g., the Air Force Skeet and the

Army SADARM—that sense the presence of

a target within their search areas and fire a

self-forging slug at it; and terminally guided

submunitions--like the Army’s TGW for MLRS

—that search a large area, guide to the target,

and detonate a shaped charge warhead on

impact.

These concepts have been demonstrated in

controlled environments, but important questions remain regarding their ability to operate in the presence of countermeasures to both

warheads and seekers. Both operational and

technical countermeasures are of concern.

There has been concern that enemy forces

could use the cover of both forests and villages

to obscure the signature of the target vehicles

and to deflect incoming warheads so that they

lose momentum or do not hit the armor at an

angle that permits them to penetrate. Dashing between covered locations could reduce the

exposure of the targets. Both spreading formations out and bunching them tightly up

could affect the number of vehicles a group of

submunitions hits. There is also concern that

the damaged vehicles littering the battlefield

might attract submunitions away from functioning vehicles.

Smoke and various types of material covering a vehicle could reduce the ability of a sensor to find it. Various schemes have been suggested that would cause the munition to guide

to a spot off the target rather than one on it,

as have devices that would cause a shaped

charge warhead to detonate before reaching

its target.

Various advanced types of armor are under

development in the East and in the West. Some

are very effective against shaped charge warheads; others are more effective against kinetic

energy weapons like self-forging slugs. How

well advanced munitions do against advanced

tanks will depend in part on how well the warhead characteristics match the armor characteristics of the target.

Not all suggested countermeasures are practical and effective. However, it is very important to test munitions against various types

of targets employing various types of countermeasures. Programs like the joint Chicken

Little series of tests can be very valuable in

this regard.

Remotely Piloted Vehicles

The Army is developing a family of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, a term which

includes both remotely piloted vehicles and

drones) to perform a variety of functions including surveillance, reconnaissance, target

designation, jamming, and attack. The most

mature member of the family, the Aquila RPV

of the TADARS (Target Acquisition/Designation Aerial Reconnaissance System) now in fullscale development, has been a matter of concern in Congress.

UAVs could usefully complement airborne

stand-off radar systems like Mohawk, ASARSII, and Joint STARS: these could quickly

search large areas and tell UAVs whereto look;

and UAVs could find the targets and discriminate among them. UAVs could also find or follow targets hidden from airborne radars by

hills or trees. Aquila could locate shallow tar-
44 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Simple countermeasures, such as a camouflaged tank, may be able to outwit smart submunitions.

gets with greater precision and designate them

with a laser for either Copperhead artillery

rounds or laser-guided bombs. Several types

of UAVs are now operational or under development in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,

Italy, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Since 1978, the estimated time to develop

TADARS has more than doubled and the estimated program cost has quadrupled; the number of RPVs to be produced has been halved.

However, the major problems which have beset the system now appear to have been solved.

TADARS will have unique capabilities for accurate location and laser designation of shallow targets. These could be useful for FOFA:

TADARS could find and locate targets for artillery, MLRS, and ATACMS, and designate

for laser-guided bombs.

Other RPVs have been proposed as alternatives to Aquila, but lack its target location accuracy, laser designation capability, and jamresistance. According to the General Accounting Office, procuring another RPV and equipping it with the laser designator, navigation,

and communications systems developed for

Aquila would cost about $100 million more and

take a year longer than completing TADARS.

Arms Cooperation

When FOFA was first advanced, some Europeans tended to see it as a vehicle to sell them

American defense systems. The Defense Department has been working to dispel this problem by encouraging European-American arms

cooperation programs as well as the identifi-
Ch. 2—Summary 45 — —

Photo credit NAT O

Tornado aircraft, result of European collaboration, carry in the German MW-1 munitions dispenser.

cation of European systems that could support the concept.

The principal foci of activity have been the

NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and the Defense Science Board

FOFA II Task Force. A major stimulus to cooperation has been the money made available

under the 1985 Nunn Amendment.

The FOFA II Task Force has been working

with similar advisory groups associated with

European governments to identify potential

areas of cooperation that could then be recommended to their respective governments for

further action. The group will report during

the first half of 1987 on strategies to achieve

cooperation on several programs.

There are two major activities related to the

CNAD. The first is a FOFA ad hoc working

group that is preparing a paper outlining the

types of systems that are necessary to achieve

a FOFA capability. This activity is important

because it helps define what the allied governments (as distinct from NATO itself) agree

constitutes FOFA. Concurrently, the United

States is negotiating a number of memoranda

of understanding concerning co-development

of systems, only some of which are FOFA

related.

There has been a meeting of the minds on

a number of questions, but thus far the Europeans have shown no official interest in either

ATACMS or Joint STARS15 (although there

is interest in interoperability among Joint

STARS and the British ASTOR and French

ORCHIDEE MTI systems). Although some

of the arguments against these systems have

been on fairly fundamental grounds, interest

may develop in the future, particularly after

the systems are fielded and their real capabilities become known.

This process will pose three important issues

for Congress. First, if Congress supports this

form of cooperation, they will have to provide

the requisite funding for cooperative programs.

Second, Congress may have to make choices

between slowing programs to bring the Europeans on board and proceeding only in the

United States. Finally, the Europeans may

‘

5 There reportedly has been interest on the working level.
46 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

seek to sell us their equipment, to smooth the interests generally complicate such efforts, and

two-way street. Congress will then have the U.S. policies are seen as complicating them still

usual choice between buying American or buy- further. Nevertheless, the trends are away from

ing European. buying U.S. products, and toward greater intraThe Europeans are enthusiastic about the European cooperation. The Europeans believe

that their technology equals that of the United possibilities for joint programs; however, they States in many areas and may surpass it in are somewhat skeptical about the possibilities

for successful cooperative ventures, especially some.

with the United States as a partner. National
PART II

Analyses
Chapter 3

Introduction and Background
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

History .. ... ... ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● * 50

The Role of FOFA in NATO Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Chapter 3

Introduction and Background

INTRODUCTION

In late 1984, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the Follow-On Forces

Attack (FOFA) concept as one of a few critical

warfighting tasks for its conventional forces.

Although the concept had been under development for several years at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), it

was adopted in general terms only. This precipitated much activity on the part of the member nations, SHAPE, and the NATO international staff to define more clearly what FOFA

is, how it is to be implemented, and what the

individual nations are going to do to support

its implementation.

As part of the U.S. effort, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was asked by the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the

House Committee on Armed Services, and the

Senate Committee on Armed Services to conduct a study of options for implementing

FOFA. In particular, OTA was asked to:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

discuss the military and deterrence rationale;

survey the status of various applicable capabilities and programs, including those

to develop advanced conventional munitions;

review relevant Soviet doctrine and plans;

review the attitudes of our NATO Allies;

assess the strengths and weaknesses of

various existing and proposed alternatives;

assess the likelihood that various plausible combinations would meet U.S. and

NATO goals; and

discuss a range of policy options, their

pros, cons, and timing of availability.

This report is the final product of that study.

An earlier report— Technologies for NATO

Follow-on Forces Attack Concept: A Special

Report of OTA's Assessment on Improving

NATO Defense Response–released in July

1986, accomplished the first two tasks listed

above. This report covers the others. In the

special report, OTA suggested to Congress

that in considering how best to support the

FOFA concept, systems ought to be considered

not individually, but as complete packages to

support clearly defined operational concepts;

nonetheless, some systems will be “key systems”; all component systems will have to be

procured in sufficient quantities; practice and

training will be important; and some redundancy

may be desirable. Readers wishing an elaboration on these points, or greater background on

the FOFA concept and the technologies of interest, are referred to that special report.

After outlining the rest of the report, this

chapter provides a brief review of the history

of the FOFA concept, and of how FOFA fits

into NATO’s strategy. A fuller description is

found in the special report.

Chapter 4 addresses the threat: Warsaw

Pact forces, and what we know about that part

of Soviet doctrine that is relevant to FOFA.

All Warsaw Pact forces will follow Soviet doctrine. There has been some controversy in the

West regarding Soviet doctrine and the appropriateness of FOFA as a response. This chapter reviews those areas of controversy.

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the specific objectives for several different types of attacks on

follow-on forces, and the operational concepts

being considered for achieving those objectives. This sets the stage for the discussion of

packages of systems to implement these concepts and the technical issues surrounding

those systems, found later in the report.

Chapter 7 analyzes possible Soviet responses

to FOFA, and chapter 8 reviews the attitudes

of our Allies toward FOFA. FOFA was conceived by SHAPE as an Alliance-wide effort

(although primarily concerning those nations

49
50 New Technology for NATO: Implementing FoIIow-On

with forces in the Central Region); its value

would be diminished if only the United States

were to implement it, or if national responses

were uncoordinated. NATO’s current abilities

to attack follow-on forces are reviewed in chapter 9.

The technological advances that are important for FOFA were described at some length

in the special report. Although these are primarily mature technologies that could result

in fielded systems over the next decade, major issues—technical and other—remain, parForces Attack

ticularly regarding Joint STARS, PLSS, remotely piloted vehicles, and advanced smart

anti-armor weapons. These are the subject of

chapters 10 and 11.

Chapter 12 analyzes how existing and new

systems could be brought together into complete packages to implement the operational

concepts discussed in chapter 6.

Chapter 13 reviews previous studies of implementing FOFA, summarizes their conclusions, and discusses major common threads.

BACKGROUND

History

In the late 1970s, both the U.S. Army and

U.S. Air Force began to study seriously the

idea that much could be done to break up a

Soviet-style offensive by attacking deep into

enemy territory. Air bases and other major

fixed facilities, major formations of ground

forces, logistics, transportation nodes, and individual high-value targets like command

posts and missile launchers were among the

targets considered. To be sure, attacking into

enemy territory was nothing novel for either

service. The Air Force had always had interdiction of various forms as a major mission,

and the Army had always relied on firepower

delivered by these interdiction aircraft and by

its own artillery to “soften up” the enemy

forces prior to engaging them. And within

NATO’s integrated military command, into

which elements of both services would be integrated in the event of war, nuclear planning

had always considered such targets to be of

prime importance.

At the same time, the Army-in part because

of long-standing criticism that accused it of

being too static and insufficiently mobile for

modern warfare-was developing a new doctrine called “AirLand Battle. ” AirLand Battle, officially published in 1982, called for a

combination of deep fires to break up the

enemy’s offensive, and counterattacks to restore losses and seize the initiative. The Air

Force declared its support for AirLand Battle, and in late 1982 the services signed the

Joint Operational Concept Joint Attack of the

Second Echelon (J-SAK) that laid out procedures for cooperation between Army and Air

Force units in deep attack.

Also in 1982, the staff at SHAPE produced

a study of attacking follow-on forces. This led

to the NATO Defence Planning Committee

(DPC) formally approving SACEUR’s Long

Term Planning Guideline for FOFA on November 9, 1984, making FOFA officially part of

NATO strategy.

Although FOFA was a SHAPE development (known at various times as ‘deep strike,

‘‘strike deep, and the ‘Rogers plan’ ‘), its connection to the United States was inescapable,

and amplified by General Rogers’ also holding the job of Commander-in-Chief of U.S.

forces in Europe. The AirLand Battle concept

was unpopular among Europeans because of

its emphasis on counterattack, and it soon became confused with FOFA in the debate that

followed. In addition, many were (and some

remain) skeptical of the value of attacking deep

rather than waiting to engage the advancing

enemy forces in the close battle.

After the November 1984 DPC meeting, the

concept was turned over to the NATO international staff for coordination and refinement,

and subsequently to the office of the Assistant

Secretary General for Defence Support to pro-
vide a forum for the member nations to coordinate their armaments programs. The focus has

now largely shifted from doctrine development

to arms procurement, particularly arms trade

and cooperation. However, the attitudes of the

individual members regarding FOFA have not

as yet completely jelled.

On a parallel track, SHAPE is still developing the concept. The original rather general approach, of delaying, disrupting, and destroying enemy forces from just beyond the range

of direct fire weapons to as far in the enemy

rear as NATO’s forces can reach, is becoming

a set of more specific goals phased to coincide

with the introduction of new capabilities.

Meanwhile, both the Army and the Air Force

continue to refine their deep battle and interdiction concepts taking FOFA into account.

The Role of FOFA in NATO Strategy

Flexible Response is a strategy for deterring

aggression, underwritten by a triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear

forces. NATO would respond to any attack at

an appropriate level of violence, and reserves

the right to escalate a conflict, including the

first use of nuclear weapons. This strategy creates a risk to the Warsaw Pact that aggression can lead to nuclear warfare at a level such

that the cost to them would far outweigh whatever they would hope to gain by attacking in

the first place. NATO would resist a conventional offensive with conventional means, and

would escalate to the use of nuclear weapons

only if it proved necessary.

While there is agreement among the Allies

on this principle, there is debate and disagreement over how much conventional defense capability NATO should have: too little would

lead to being overrun before NATO could decide to escalate, while too much would risk a

lengthy and destructive war on NATO territory and perhaps encourage a Pact attack in

the belief that NATO would fight a conventional war which would carry little risk to the

Pact, Either, it is argued, would decrease deterrence. Although no one wants a nuclear war,

the nations that would be the most likely batCh. 3—Introduction and Background ● 5 1

tlefield in a conventional war-such as Germany—have the greatest interest in sending

the Soviets a clear message that aggression

would lead quickly and directly to nuclear war.

Although NATO anticipates a conflict that

would involve its Northern and Southern Regions in Europe (as well as the Atlantic), the

focus is expected to be the Central Region.

Warsaw Pact successes there would split the

Alliance and make the defense of the rest of

Europe all but untenable. Furthermore, Germany is the focus in the Central Region: its

collapse would almost certainly produce defeat

in the Central Region.

NATO strategy for a conventional defense

in the Central Region is dictated by political

and geographic considerations as well as by

the threat facing it. Ground and air forces of

the United States, the United Kingdom, the

Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium are under the command

of the Commander-in-Chief Central Region,

who in turn reports to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is responsible for the Northern, Central, and Southern Regions. France, although a member of the

Alliance, is not part of this integrated military

command. In the Central Region, the German

border is divided into eight corps sectors, each

defended by the ground forces of one nation.

These are organized into two Army Groups,

each supported by a multinational Allied Tactical Air Force. A relatively small force—much

of which would come from the United States—

would be held in reserve.

NATO is committed to a forward defense,

both because there is little room to fall back,

and because falling back would yield German

territory which would weaken Germany and

be politically unacceptable to the Germans.

This is not to say that NATO will defend right

at the border, but that it will take defensive

positions as close as practical to the border and

defend them with a tactically mobile defense.

It is, however, a strategically static defense

having little ability to move forces north/south

along the border to respond to the way the

Soviets choose to attack. NATO is also gener-
52 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

ally constrained from counterattacking across

the border, because it is a defensive alliance

that wishes to avoid a provocative, offensive

posture.

The Warsaw Pact not only enjoys significant

numerical superiority over NATO in the Central Region, but it is organized according to

Soviet doctrine for a strategically mobile offense. NATO believes Warsaw Pact ground

forces would concentrate to smash through

NATO’s weaker corps sectors, allowing highly

mobile divisions into NATO’s rear. NATO can

expect this attack on its rear to be aided by

airplane, missile, airborne, and special forces

attacks.

NATO is very constrained in its options for

responding to this threat. It will not make ma-

— —

jor increases in its force structure. The corps

that are attacked cannot fall back to reorganize

their defenses, and the stronger corps that are

not heavily attacked cannot counterattack

deep into Warsaw Pact territory. By attacking the follow-on forces before they join the

offensive, NATO hopes to reduce them to manageable proportions (i.e., reduce them through

attrition) and meter their arrival at the close

battle (delay them so they arrive in “drips and

drabs” and not all at once). It also provides

the opportunity to mass fire against concentrations of forces before they hit NATO’s

defensive line, thereby compensating at least

in part for NATO’s inability to shift its ground

forces in response.
Chapter 4

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Forces Threat

to Europe
CONTENTS

Page

Soviet Military Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Warsaw Pact Forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations . . . . . 57

Principles of Soviet Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Offensive Into Europe:

A Notional Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Soviet and Warsaw Pact Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Areas of Controversy and Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Tables

Table No. Page

4-1. Structure of Soviet Motorized Rifle and Tank Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4-2. Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Figures

Figure No. Page

4-l. NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4-2. Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

4-3. Soviet/Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

4-4. Example of Soviet ’’Front-Loading” of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter 4

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Forces Threat to Europe

In 1984, SACEUR General Rogers described

FOFA as “an attempt to come to grips with

the realities presented by Soviet doctrine for

offensive operations and the continuing massive Soviet conventional force build-up. This

chapter examines some of these realities, both

what we know about a potential Soviet ground

offensive in Central Europe, and the uncertainties surrounding those realities.

The Soviets have massed in Europe a large

number of ground forces with an enormous

amount of firepower: at present, the strength

of the in-place Warsaw Pact forces in the Central Region-in terms of divisions, tanks, and

artillery-is in each category close to twice that

of NATO’s in-place forces, and Warsaw Pact

forces possess a good deal more strategic depth,

for defensive purposes and to bring more forces

to bear.2 NATO, being a defensive alliance,

‘General Bernard W’. Rogers, “Fo11ow on Forces Attack

\~~~’A~: ~l~ths and Realities, ” ,’Vato Retriew, No. 6, December

‘J$’hile the territory of the J$’arsaw Pact extends thousands

of kilometers back into the U. S. S. R., NATO has little depth

must be prepared to react to however the Soviets might choose to use those forces should

a conflict arise. But how the Soviets might actually launch an offensive has generated a good

deal of controversy.

This chapter, therefore, examines what we

know and do not know about those aspects of

Soviet strategy, operational planning and tactics of significance for FOFA: the role of conventional forces in Soviet doctrine; the Soviet

ground forces facing NATO; the principles which

govern Soviet military planning and strategy;

the way a Soviet conventional offensive into

Western Europe might be waged; and implications for FOFA.

for defensive purposes: it is less than 500 kilometers from the

inter-German border to the English channel; and the importance

of Germany as a NATO land power in the Central Region makes

it more difficult for NATO to trade space for time than it would

be for Warsaw Pact forces to fall back when attacked to reorganize and counterattack. The U.S.S.R. is also better placed

than NATO to bring additional forces forward to sustain those

at the front line, as a good portion of NATO’s reinforcements

of men and equipment would have to come across the Atlantic

from North America.

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Among Western analysts, one of the most

controversial aspects of Soviet military planning is the role of conventional weapons in an

offensive. This is due largely to different assessments of Soviet military ‘‘doctrine’ and military thought.

Soviet military doctrine lies at the heart of

the overall Soviet approach to war, which is

quite different from that of the West. War, as

the Soviets see it, is a science, something governed by certain “laws” and principles reflected

in military history, and past and present wars,

tests, maneuvers, and the like. Soviet military

“doctrine” comprises a set of views defining

the goals and nature of a possible war, and how

the U.S.S.R. should prepare for and conduct

such a war should it be deemed necessary. It

provides a context for deciding the size and

composition of the Soviet Armed Forces, and

for integrating their organization, tactics,

training and equipment into a cohesive fighting force. Although viewed as scientific, military doctrine is not rigid or fixed; instead, it

has proven to be quite dynamic but, once

decided on, is rarely questioned except at the

highest levels.

It is generally accepted among Western observers that a major shift in Soviet doctrine

occurred in the mid-1960s, from a near total

reliance on nuclear weapons in Soviet military

planning, to a more balanced approach to de55
56 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

veloping nuclear and conventional forces. From

the late 1950s until the mid 1960s, the Soviets

believed any potential war would begin with

massive nuclear strikes that would totally, and

irreparably, destroy the losing side’s entire social and political system. With the ouster of

Khrushchev, however, and the adoption of a

strategy of Flexible Response in the West, the

Soviets began to consider the possibility of a

war remaining conventional. Although they

continued to believe that nuclear weapons

would be decisive in any conflict, the Soviet

military no longer contended that a conflict

would inevitably escalate to all-out nuclear

war. Since the mid 1960s, then, the Soviets

have emphasized the need to be able to win

at all levels of conflict, and have developed the

capabilities to fight with or without nuclear

weapons.

These developments have led to a good deal

of controversy in the West regarding current

Soviet doctrine and possible intentions. Some

observers contend that the Soviets still place

great weight on a “nuclear option” so that,

should military conflict start, nuclear weapons would play a role from the beginning of

that conflict. According to this view, “the

Soviets perceive a totally integrated nuclearconventional operation, within the framework

of which nuclear and conventional weapons

supplement and reinforce each other, creating

the synergistic effect deemed necessary for the

attainment of victory.”3

A more common view among Western observers, however, is that should war be precipitated,

the Soviets would want to keep the conflict conventional and regard nuclear release only as

a last resort. They believe that the Soviets have

become increasingly skeptical about the usefulness of nuclear weapons in combat today–

3

1. Kass and M. Deane, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the

Modem Theater Battlefield: The Current Soviet View, ” Comparative Strategy 4(3):212, 1984.

both for ideological reasons, and for operational

ones. 4 These observers view the continued Soviet buildup of nuclear capabilities not as

meant necessarily to wage a nuclear offensive,

but instead: 1) to discourage initial NATO nuclear use; and 2) should NATO call for nuclear

release, to be prepared to win at whatever level

of nuclear conflict might ensue.5

The fact that these differing views are derived from Soviet sources and actions suggests

the possibility of some degree of debate among

Soviet military planners themselves. For now,

the Soviets are apparently keeping their options open, with Soviet doctrine stipulating

that any potential wars could begin with either conventional or nuclear weapons. If they

are initiated with conventional weapons, it

stipulates that they may still escalate to a nuclear exchange.6

What this means for FOFA, and for NATO

as a whole, is that NATO cannot rule out, and

thus ought to be prepared for, a conventional

phase in any potential Soviet offensive. What

it also suggests is that—whatever strategies

the West may adopt, or whatever systems we

may buy today--evidence for assessing Soviet

concepts is patchy and controversial, and Soviet strategy and tactics may change. Since

this report deals with the conventional defense

of Europe, the remainder of this chapter examines how the Soviets might conduct a conventional offensive today should such an action be precipitated.

4Nuclear weapons would lower the Soviet rate of advance and

greatly confuse the battlefield, disrupting troop control and

fairly precisely defined operational plans. See, for example, Lt.

Col. John Hines and PhilLip Petersen, “The Soviet Convention~

Offensive in Europe, ” Ikfilitary Review, April 1985, p. 3.

‘See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 1. Volume 2 contains the classified

appendices to this report.

6See, for example, Capt. 1st Rank A. Belyayev, “Scientific

Concepts of Modern Warfare-An Important Element in the

Awareness of the Soviet Fighting Man, ” Komrnunist

Vooruzhemykh Sil, No. 7, 1985, as translated in Joint Publication Research Service, JPRS-UMA-85-050, Aug. 29, 1985, pp.

17-22.
Ch. 4— The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 57

WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE WESTERN THEATER OF

MILITARY OPERATIONS

The Soviet threat facing Western Europe is

a matter both of the numbers and equipment

of Warsaw Pact forces, and of Soviet strategy

for employing those forces. The main non-nuclear threat comes from the continental forces

of the Warsaw Pact, concentrated in Central

Europe along the eastern border of West Germany in what the Warsaw Pact designates as

its Western Theater of Military Operations

(TVD).7 This region contains generally-although

by no means exclusively–flat terrain (especially northern Germany), well suited to the

movement of armored combat units, and the

road to the key economic and political centers

of Western Europe.

The Warsaw Pact’s Western TVD consists

of Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)

forces in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian military districts of the U.S.S.R. With

a standing force of roughly 4 million personnel facing Europe, this area houses the Warsaw Pact largest, most ready, and most modern force, which far outnumbers NATO’s in-place

forces. 8 The Soviet forces include roughly 19

divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) in East Germany, five divisions

in the Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czechoslovakia, and two divisions in the Northern

‘For planning purposes, the Soviets have divided the areas

contiguous with their borders into five “theaters’ of military

operations or TVDs--the Northwest, the Western, the Southwestern, the Southern, and the Far Eastern—in which they

would expect military action on a strategic scale; the military

assets employed in each TVD vary, but the strongest force is

considered to be in the Western TVD. The Soviet Union itself

is divided into 16 military districts.

The Soviet term–teatr voennykh deistv–has been variously

translated in Western writings as Theater of Military Operations (TMO), Theater of Strategic Military Actions (TSMA),

and Theater of Military Actions (TMA). This report follows

DOD’s current usage of ‘theaters of military operations. and

the acronym taken from the Russian, TVD.

“According to a 1984 NATO force comparison, the Warsaw

Pact countries have a standing force of about 6 million personnel, of which about 4 million face NATO in Europe. The standing force of the NATO countries comprise about 4.5 million personnel, of which about 2.6 million are stationed in Europe. See

NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984, p. 4.

Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland. NSWP forces

include somewhere around 6 East German, 15

Polish, and 10 Czech divisions. Another 38 Soviet divisions lie in the three western military

districts of the U. S.S.R.9

All of the Soviet Groups of Forces stationed

in Eastern Europe are considered “ready”

forces, i.e., are highly manned, well-equipped

and trained, and are at least minimally prepared for combat with little or no mobilization

and preparation. Most of the approximately

38 divisions in the western military districts

of the U.S.S.R. are characterized as “notready’’—i.e., they would require extensive

mobilization and are not available for immediate combat operations. ’” The Warsaw Pact

forces in the Western TVD are equipped with

close to 30,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery and

mortar pieces. About two-thirds of these tanks

and about three-fourths of all artillery is concentrated in the Soviet divisions, with the remainder in the NSWP divisions. 11 By contrast,

NATO forces comprise far fewer ready divisions in Central Europe, 12 and roughly half as

many tanks, artillery and mortars, armored

personnel carriers and attack helicopters. Figure 4-1 presents some rough comparisons of

NATO and Warsaw Pact strengths in the Central Region as published by the U.S. Department of Defense. There are disagreements,

however, among published estimates due to

differences such as state of mobilization, which

forces are counted, and age of data.

‘See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 2. For an unclassified discussion,

see Laurence Martin, NATO and the Defense of the Wrest, New

York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985, p. 24.

‘“See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 3.

“U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Militar~’ Power, 1986,

p. 12. See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 4.

“Unclassified estimates vary on the number of NATO and

Warsaw Pact divisions in the Central Region, and there are many

differences–in personnel and equipment–between NATO and

WP divisions. These numbers, therefore, provide the basis for

a rough force comparison, but should not be viewed as a comparison of equivalent units. See Soviet Military Power, 1987,

estimates from the International Institute for Strategic Studies

(11SS), London, and L. Martin, NATO and the Defense of the

Wrest, pp. 24-25.
58 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 4-1 .—NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisonsa

Fighter-bomber

ground-attack

aircraft

Total military

including naval forces

KEY

570

380

Reconnaissance

aircraft

Division

equivalents

75

0

Bombers

Main

battle tanks

41,000

18,600

Artillery/mortar

WARSAW PACT

forces and rapidly forces and rapidly

deployable forces deployable forces

aE~tlmate~ vary ,n the “n~la~~,fled IIterature regarding all of these force comparisons The above should be taken onl Y as a 9ulde as viewed by ‘he u s ‘epartment ‘f

Defense The chart reflects U.S est!mates of 1985 data NATO estimates exclude France and Spain

SOURCE Sov/ef A4///fary Power, 7986, pp 89, 91
Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 59

Phofo cred~t U S Deoartmen( of Defense

Soviet missile launchers.
60 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The main elements of the Soviet ground forces

are the tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions.13 Each of the tank and motorized rifle

divisions contains a similar complement of artillery, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, tactical surface-to-surface missiles, and support

units, with the chief difference between them

lying in the number of motorized rifle regiments

and tank regiments in each: a Soviet tank division (estimated at about 11,000 men) includes

three tank regiments and one motorized rifle

regiment; the motorized rifle division, slightly

larger (an estimated 13,000 men), has three

motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment14 (table 4-l). An important point to note

with regard to FOFA, however, is the overall

ratio of armored to non-armored vehicles: in

both tank and motorized rifle divisions, there

are more than twice as many trucks and other

light vehicles as there are armored vehicles15

(table 4-2). The airborne divisions include three

airborne regiments and combat support and

service units. In addition to the regular airborne divisions, the Soviets have also formed

air assault brigades and battalions.

According to preliminary research from the

Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, the Soviets may now be moving toward a more flexible organization of their forces as well, by turning more toward the corps/brigade structure

as a possible alternative to the focus on divisions and regiments. Researchers at Sandhurst

believe the reorganization of some Soviet divisions into corps may presage a larger reorganization of the Soviet force structure overall.

Such changes would only reinforce the belief

of the U.S. DoD that these forces have been

——.

‘

3 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 5.

“See Soviet Mih”tary Power 1986, p. 65, and U.S. Department

of the Army, Soviet Army Operations, April 1978, IAG-13-U78, pp. 2-10-2-13.

‘KSee vol. 2, app. 3A, footnote 6.

and are being expanded and reorganized to create a larger, more capable and higher-speed

fighting force for a conventional or nuclear battlefield.

Table 4-1 .—Structure of Soviet Motorized Rifle

and Tank Divisions

MR Tank

Total personne l 12,695 11,470

Division HQ & HQ company 245 245

Tank regiment s 1 regiment 3 regiments, each

1,145 personnel w/1 ,575 personnel

MR regiments (BMP ) 1 regiment 1 regiment

2.225 personnel 2,225 personnel

MR regiments (BTR) 2 regiments, each

w/2,31 5 personnel

Artillery regiment. 1,030 1,030

SAM regiment (SA-6) 480 480

FROG battalion 170 170

Multiple rocket launcher

battalion 255 255

Antitank battalion 195 —

Reconnaissance battalion 340 340

Engineer battalion 395 395

Signal battalion 270 270

Motor transport battalion 370 370

Maintenance battalion 230 250

Chemical defense battalion 225 225

Medical battalio n 175 175

Artillery command battery 70 70

Mobile field bakery 45 45

Helicopter squadron 200 200

SOURCE Oefense Intelligence Agency Sowel DwmorM/ Orgm/zaf/on Gude OOB-I 100333-82

July 1982, repr(nted May 1985 pp. 9 80

Table 4-2.—Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized

Rifle Divisions

Motorized Rifle Division Tank Division

Total combat vehicles 1,029 976

of which

Tanks 220 238

Armored personnel

carrier s 649 488

Artiller y 108 108

Air defense 52 52

Truck s 2,501 2,427

SOURCE Oefense Intelligence Agency Swef L7w/s/ona/ Orgamzahon Gude OOB-1 100-33382

July 1982 repr(nted May 1985

PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET STRATEGY

In assessing Soviet strategy, the extent to saw Pact: all Warsaw Pact armies are orgawhich the Warsaw Pact is dominated by the nized along the same lines, have highly standU.S.S.R. means that what the Soviets think ardized equipment, and have largely the same

and do will generally apply to the entire War- tactics and doctrine as in the U.S.S.R. During
Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 61

wartime, the NSWP forces would be completely

subordinated to the Soviet Supreme High

Command through intermediate-level theater

commands.

Soviet writings outline a number of principles which would govern the use of these forces

in any Warsaw Pact conventional offensive

into Western Europe. The overriding principle would be to adopt a strategy, operational

plans and tactics that would allow Soviet forces

to penetrate and neutralize NATO’s defenses

very quickly, while at the same time: 1) minimizing the risk of escalation to a nuclear catastrophe, and 2) keeping the conflict off the territory of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet aim would

be to get rapidly into NATO’s depths and seize

key objectives–NATO’s nuclear arsenals, C3I

assets, air force assets, logistic elements,

etc.—before NATO would have a chance to

fully mobilize, before reinforcements would be

able to arrive from the United States, and before NATO could reach a decision to use nuclear weapons.

Of key importance in achieving this principle, the Soviets emphasize, are the two factors

of speed and surprise. In order to reach their

objectives quickly—i.e., before Western countries could prepare their defenses fully or agree

to use nuclear weapons—the Soviets believe

that a European war must start suddenly, taking NATO by surprise. This does not necessarily mean total surprise, or even military surprise, but political surprise—i.e., an offensive

which would catch off guard those NATO

leaders who make the political decision to mobilize, prepare defenses, or release nuclear weapons. Although there could never be total surprise,

a reasonable degree is regarded as essential,

largely as an important force multiplier: a certain degree of surprise would make it possible

to reach objectives with fewer forces than

would be needed against an enemy prepared

for battle.

To achieve this speed and surprise, a Soviet

offensive would probably be accompanied by

some kind of deception scheme to make troop

movements and mobilizations appear to be

occurring for reasons other than planned aggression. Many believe that NATO would be

far less likely to react if any Soviet preparations for war were ambiguous. And once an

offensive is initiated, the Soviets emphasize

the importance of speed—i.e., of seizing and

holding the initiative, retaining the offensive,

and maintaining a high rate of advance. The

Soviets place overriding stress on the offensive as the only “decisive” and therefore the

only possible form of war.

In an initial offensive, the Soviets would

likely concentrate their efforts along certain

fronts, attempting deep, heavy thrusts along

narrow sectors, and would look to exploit the

enemy weaknesses. The purpose would be to

confront NATO with an overwhelming attack

on a few small areas which NATO would not

be able to match. With the different NATO

corps at different states of readiness, the Soviets

are expected to exploit the gaps in NATO’s

defense, and to place the main weight of attack on the more vulnerable areas-i. e., on the

U. K., Belgian, Dutch and Danish contingents.

(The U.S. and German corps are considered to

be the most formidable forces in NATO, so it

is considered unlikely that the Soviets would

attack them head-on. ) This concentration of

power in narrow sectors would be conducted

as part of an overall plan that would be designed to lead to a rapid penetration of NATO

defenses and NATO’s collapse.

The Soviets would divide their forces into

theater level forces—consisting of fronts and

armies-and tactical units, consisting of divisions, regiments, battalions, and smaller. In

other words, fronts would be comprised of armies; armies are comprised of divisions; divisions, of regiments; regiments, of battalions;

and battalions, of companies and platoons.

Fronts have no fixed organization. Anywhere

from one to six fronts might be put together

to participate in a specific strategic operation

in a TVD (Soviet military theater).16 Armies

consist of two main types: the Tank Army,

(comprised of mainly tank divisions), and the

“For a fuller description, see Soviet Army Operations, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security

Command, and U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis

Center, IAG-13-u-78, April 1978.
62 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Combined Arms Army, (with more motorized

rifle divisions). When tailored for combat operations, either type of Army would normally

include: three to seven divisions; SSM brigade;

several artillery brigades; antitank units; AAA

units; SAM regiments; signal regiment; combat engineer units; pontoon units; assault

crossing units; transport units; supply facilities; evacuation and repair units; medical units

and facilities.17 Soviet forces are also divided

into corps and brigades; corps are generally

comprised of two or three divisions, for operations which would not require a full army.

In order to threaten a quick breakthrough

and a rapid, continuous penetration deep into

NATO territory, these forces have been organized into successive waves, or echelons, dispersed in great depth. The purpose is to be able

to bring fresh forces against the adversary at

the right times to buildup pressure and force

and sustain a breakthrough. Thus, Soviet forces

throughout the entire force structure down to

the battalion level are divided into “echelons”--

first, second, and perhaps even third-and reserves. Each regiment contains first and second echelon battalions; each division, first and

second echelon regiments; each army, first and

second echelon divisions; each front, first and

second echelon armies; and the entire theater

of operations would likely have first and second echelon fronts. As figure 4-2 illustrates,

NATO Central Region ground forces in their

main defensive positions would likely have to

contend with three different “second echeions, ” or waves of enemy forces following the

lead divisions of the assault armies: the Second Tactical Echelon, or the follow-on divisions

of the assault armies; the Second Operational

Echelon, or the follow-on armies deploying

from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Western Military Districts; and the Second Strategic Echelon, or Second Echelon Front, consisting of the

follow-on armies from the western military districts (WMD). As illustrated below, however,

the Soviets have demonstrated a good deal of

flexibility in how echelonment may be carried

out, and these “waves” would not necessarily

be of equal weight or significance.

“Ibid, pp. 2.7-2.10.

Each Warsaw Pact unit would probably be

assigned a sector to attack and, if of division

size or larger, a main and secondary axis of

advance within that sector. In addition, all

units of brigade size or larger would be assigned a depth of attack which contains an immediate and subsequent objective or mission.

In this sense, therefore, second echelons would

not be reserves in the usual sense, but rather

would act as precommitted reserves that would

have been assigned their pre-planned missions

before the offensive begins. The reserves, a

small proportion of Warsaw Pact forces,18 would

be contingency forces to use against unanticipated threats and to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

To exploit these breakthroughs, the Soviets

have revived the World War II concept of mobile groups, which would take advantage of any

breakthrough to move into NATO’s rear. It

is believed that these independent divisions,

armies, or regiments-with their new capabilities, now commonly called Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs)—would be assigned to

operate on their own to capture key objectives

in the NATO rear that would both pave the

way for the follow-on forces and neutralize

NATO’s theater nuclear threat. In this way,

their task would be to create the conditions

for turning a tactical success–i.e., an initial

breakthrough of NATO defenses–into an operational success, by paving the way for the

second echelons of the army or front of which

they are a part to achieve their preassigned

objectives.

The Soviets expect a battlefield that would

be very confused. There would be no clearly

discernible front line, forces would mingle in

depth and would engage primarily in battles

of encounter (i.e., when both sides engage while

on the move).19 The Soviets plan to win a decision quickly, but are prepared to fight a long

war if they have to.

‘*See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 7.

“see Christopher N. Donnelly, “The Warsaw Pact View of

the Future Battlefield, 120A National Security Report (Royal

Military Academy, Sandhurst, A68), pp. 11-14.
Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe 63

L

Figure 4-2.— Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment

-

KEY

XX Division boundary XXXXX (Front boundary)

I

XXXX Army boundary XXXXXX Theater boundary

In place forces

NOTE It IS Important to keep In mind that this diagram is highly schematic, fOr IIlustratlve PurPoses only The Warsaw Pact forces have demonstrated flexlblllty In

echelomng forces Ftrst and second echelons— whether tactlcali Operational. or strate91c —would Ilkely not be of equal we19ht or slgnlflcance (See text]

SOURCE General Bernard W Rogers, Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) Myth and Realltles, ’ NATO Rev/ew, No 6, December 1984 p 2

Soviet planners believe that their system of size a “top down” command and control syscommand and control, or ‘troop control, has tern, with commanders at the TVD establishbeen structured in the best way to meet the ing concrete strategic goals, and then moving

demands of such an offensive. The Soviet the- particular missions and requirements down the

ater command structure is highly centralized, hierarchy, to the front, the army, division, and

with all Warsaw Pact forces under a single, so on (figure 4-3). The Soviets also engage in

centralized military command authority, the a good deal of “pre-planning” of operations,

Soviet Supreme High Command (VGK) and i.e., anticipating what future operations might

the Soviet General Staff.20 The Soviets empha- look like, and providing specific “norms” by

which commanders would make decisions. Thus,

“)For a comparison of the Warsaw Pact and NATO command less initiative would be expected of Warsaw and control systems, see John Hines and Phil Petersen, 4

‘ Is

NATO Thinking Too Small? A Comparison of Command Struc- Pact commanders at the tactical levels than

tures, ” Znternatimml Defense Review, No. 5, 1986, pp. 563-572. in the West.
64 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 4-3.—Soviet/Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Organization

Supreme High Command (VGK)

(Moscow)

I B f

Soviet General Staff

■

Strategic Forces

Aviation

Missiles

Naval

Air/Space/Missile

Defense

1 J

I I

I Battalion I

Operational

Forces

In time of war, the NSWP forces would be brought

Soviet fronts.

acounter a[r and deep Interdiction

bcounter alr and deepInterdiction and air SuPPOrt for front

cAir support for army

under direct Soviet command and integrated with the various

SOURCES Adapted from Phil Petersen and John Hines, “Changing the Soviet System of Control,” /rrterrratiorra/ Defense Review, No 3, 1966, and Science Applications,

Inc., SovieV?Varsaw Pact EJatflefleld Planning Procedures, Draft, SAIC-W6064—FSRC, May 26, 1966.
Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 65

SOVIET/WARSAW PACT GROUND OFFENSIVE INTO EUROPE:

A NOTIONAL SCENARIO

Although there is a good deal of uncertainty

about how the Soviets might put these principles into practice should war in Europe occur,

the following notional scenario suggests what

a Soviet offensive into Europe might entail.

Should hostilities be initiated, the organization of forces in the Soviet Western TVD would

probably include three first echelon fronts: a

Northern Front, comprised mainly of Polish

forces, with its headquarters drawn from the

Polish Ministry of Defense; a Central Front,

formed from the GSFG, NGF, and East German forces, with its headquarters staff drawn

from the staff of the GSFG headquarters; and

a Czech Front, consisting of Czech forces and

the Soviet CGF, with its headquarters drawn

from the Czechoslovak Western Military District headquarters.21 During wartime, the Northern Front would likely be deployed to the northern GDR, tasked to attack northern West

Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark and,

along with airborne and amphibious operations, to take the Danish straits. The Central

Front would conduct the main theater attack

across West Germany and into Belgium, the

southern Netherlands and Luxembourg. The

Czech Front’s mission would likely be to attack from Czechoslovakia into the southern

FRG to the FRG-Swiss-Austrian border. In

addition, a Danube Front, formed from the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary and from the Hungarian Army, might be

tasked to attack through Austria into the

Southern FRG. Soviet forces in the Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts might

comprise two second echelon fronts, with the

Baltic Military District providing theater reserves.

As discussed above, the Warsaw Pact ground

forces vary widely in their peacetime levels of

readiness, with a good number of divisions

manned at levels well below their wartime authorizations; these forces would require extensive preparation for war. The preparation

would include mobilizing personnel, training

and preparing them to conduct combat operations, moving units from their dispersal locations, making final preparations, and, finally,

deploying units to combat.22

Because the Soviets would likely want some

of their follow-on forces to be prepared to exploit any successes at the FLOT, it is expected

that they would mobilize partially and begin

deployment before they would attack NATO.

Most of the Warsaw Pact’s first and second

operational echelons are at high states of readiness in peacetime. Accordingly, these units

can be rapidly deployed from their peacetime

locations into assembly areas. For many of

those forces in the rear, however, it would take

a good deal longer, depending on what level

of proficiency the Soviets would want them to

reach before hostilities begin. Because of the

Soviet emphasis on surprise, and on depriving NATO of any unambiguous warning of an

attack, NATO planners believe that the bulk

of Soviet forces would be well back from the

border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact

before hostilities would start. According to one

source, NATO’s strategy for meeting a Soviet

conventional attack is based on the assumption of at least some 96 hours warning time, ”

although some believe it might well be shorter.”

Soviet doctrine for deploying these forces

would pose some demanding requirements on

the timing of movement of the second echelon

divisions, armies and fronts. These would be

deployed according to a carefully coordinated

plan, where each succeeding echelon would be

committed at the time and place considered

most effective for exploiting the success of its

predecessor and advancing deeper into NATO

territory. Thus, second echelon divisions of the

first echelon armies would start at a particu21 However, estimates vary on the number and composition

of fronts, and how they would likely be deployed during war.

22 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 8.

23 Laurence Martin, op. cit., p. 50.

24 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 9
66 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

lar distance behind the forces at the FLOT,

to be committed to battle to achieve objectives

a certain distance beyond the FLOT according to schedule. Second echelon armies would

be scheduled to arrive a few days later, having started some distance behind in Warsaw

Pact territory and with an objective deeper into

NATO territory. Second echelon fronts would

likewise start even farther back, with a schedule for attaining objectives even farther into

NATO’s depths. OMGs—parts of armies or

fronts designed to carry out deep penetrations

and raids as the opportunities arise on the main

axes of the attack—would be committed early

and would operate well into NATO’s rear areas

on their own, without the support of the usual

supply lines.25

Thus, depending on levels of readiness and

how they fit into the overall Soviet offensive

plan, the follow-on forces would start anywhere

from just behind the initial attack forces, to

farther back in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and then the U.S.S.R. itself. Those

farthest back would be transported across a

relatively sparse highway and rail network in

eastern Poland. According to one set of calculations, the Soviets might bring forward an

average of two divisions per day by rail,26 and

up to one division per day by road.27 It is estimated that at least 140 trains would be needed

per day to transport forces across the seven

25 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 10.

*’The actual number may well be higher.

“Those forces being transported by train would arrive at transloading complexes near the Russian/Polish border, where they

would change from broad gauge to narrow gauge before starting across most of Poland. There are about eight complexes along

the Russian/Polish border where equipment is off-loaded from

Russian broad gauge to East European narrow-gauge; time for

transloading is estimated at about 4 hours per train.

East-West rail lines in Poland. According to

these calculations, this would suggest about

20 trains departing along each rail line per day,

departing just about every hour with an average maximum spacing of about 35 kilometers

between trains. 28 After crossing most of Poland, units would proceed to Forward Assembly Areas.

Closer in, the follow-on forces would group

into combat units and continue under their own

power toward the battle. Tanks and other armored vehicles would first be loaded onto tractor-trailer transporters before being unloaded

to move under their own power. An armored

combat division would, if possible, move on

two, three, or four parallel routes; thus, any

one division moving over roads could stretch

well over 40 kilometers.29

A division on the move would stop from time

to time in assembly areas: to reorganize, maintain vehicles, and rest. Soviet doctrine calls

for short or long stops, depending on the reasons, the distance from the FLOT, and the division’s schedule. Upon arrival in the immediate battle area, a division would assemble in

“final assembly areas, ” or “departure areas”

before forming into a tactical march formation

to be committed to battle. At this point, the

majority of support vehicles would move away

to their own assembly areas, so that columns

moving forward from this point on would consist mainly of armored vehicles. Having been

committed, a division’s regiments would again

stop closer in—somewhere in the range of 5

to 30 kilometers from the FLOT—in regiment

assembly areas for their final move forward

into battle.30

‘

aSee vol. 2, app. 4A, note 11.

*

e

See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 12.

30 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 13.

SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT VULNERABILITIES

The above scenario implies some potentially

serious vulnerabilities in the Warsaw Pact

system—such as rigidity in Soviet planning,

their C3 system, the vulnerability of large

columns of Warsaw Pact troops on the march,

and the fact that Warsaw Pact troops will have
Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 67

to move through critical “chokepoints”--

which could suggest important targets for

FOFA.

For example, some argue that the large number of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, and the

precise timing with which they would move

forward, would leave little room for flexibility

in a Soviet offensive; if this is true, a changing situation in the movement of follow-on

forces, such as might be caused by FOFA,

could significantly disrupt the Warsaw Pact

timetable for war.31 Likewise, they contend, a

highly structured plan could strain Soviet command and control, whose disruption would also

cause Warsaw Pact planners serious problems.

The size of the Warsaw Pact columns could

comprise another major weakness, leaving

Warsaw Pact forces vulnerable to air attack.

————.————

“See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 14.

And potential chokepoints, such as at bridges

over the Oder and Elbe Rivers, would also be

potentially major vulnerabilities; creation of

these chokepoints would delay and disrupt

Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, and as the delayed forces bunch up, would offer good targets for follow-up attacks.” As Soviet rear

services centrally control all logistic support

activities and supplies, disrupting ammunition

resupply and delaying the arrival of the second echelon could also disrupt Soviet operations.

Thus, within the framework of this general

scenario, key targets for FOFA might include

not only fixed targets-such as bridges across

the Oder and Elbe/Vltava rivers, railyards,

depots, etc.–but the Warsaw Pact forces themselves, including columns of second-echelon ar-

“See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 15.

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Soviet tanks.
68 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

mored and support vehicles (moving both by tacking these targets would likely delay the

rail and by road), units in assembly areas, enemy reinforcement and resupply at the FLOT,

chokepoints, and Warsaw Pact headquarters and might so erode morale in the rear, that the

and command posts. Identifying OMGs prior Soviet offensive would be degraded and made

to their commitment to battle is also some- more manageable for NATO forces at the front.

times considered a major task for FOFA. AtAREAS OF CONTROVERSY AND UNCERTAINTY

This overall scenario, however, has raised a

number of serious questions among Western

observers. In general, these questions concern

how flexible the Soviets might be in implementing this overall plan, and thus what it would

take to delay or disrupt Warsaw Pact followon forces enough to have a significant effect

on the overall war. In the above scenario, the

value of FOFA would depend on two important

conditions:

1.

2.

that there will be follow-on forces, and that

these follow-on forces will be important

to Warsaw Pact strategy; and

that NATO’s attack on the follow-on forces

can have a significant effect on their utility

—i.e., enough losses can be inflicted to

matter; delays cannot be sufficiently compensated for; Warsaw Pact C2 can be degraded enough to make a difference; morale can be eroded enough to significantly

affect the cohesion of Warsaw Pact troops.

Each of these conditions, however, is controversial.

With regard to the first, although Soviet doctrine may call for the echelonment of forces,

there is not necessarily a prescribed formula

or particular mix of forces necessary for this,

and the Soviets have demonstrated a good deal

of flexibility in how echelonment may be carried out. In an offensive into Western Europe,

the Soviets may well “frontload” their forces

in the first echelon, and Soviet field commanders

may well echelon their forces differently from

each other. These decisions would probably depend on: 1) how ready the NATO forces are

facing them, and how much surprise they could

expect; and 2) over what kind of terrain they

would have to deploy. Especially given long

mobilization times, the Soviets could “front

load” their forces, enhancing the threat at the

FLOT and reducing the importance of the follow-on forces33 (figure 4-4).

The question is how much the Warsaw Pact

might “front load” its forces, and what this

would mean for the value of the follow-on

forces. However flexible Soviet planning may

be, it still makes sense that any “front loading” of forces would be limited by certain physical and doctrinal constraints. Terrain is limited; and placing a good deal more forces up

front would complicate logistics problems, reduce the amount of surprise, and would make

Warsaw Pact forces more vulnerable to NATO’s

nuclear or high-accuracy conventional weapons. Thus, it is expected that there will always

be a certain number of follow-on forces coming up behind. As stated by General Rogers:

. , . critics . . . err in assuming that we are unaware that under certain circumstances the Soviets might press their second echelon forces

up against, or among, those forces of the first

echelon. Not only are we aware of this possibility, we also take account of the fact that terrain can only accommodate a finite number of

Warsaw Pact battalions abreast, thus causing

the rest to be out of contact, i.e., to be followon forces.34

Indeed, some contend that the Soviets would

find it difficult to significantly front load their

forces beyond those already in place without

exceedingly long mobilization times.35 It is

likely that if the Soviets were preparing to initiate an offensive, they would provide a good

33 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 16.

“General Bernard W. Rogers, op. cit., p. 4.

35 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 17.
Ch. 4—The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe ● 69

Figure 4-4.— Example of Soviet “Front-Loading” of Forces

Structure in anticipation of no surprise

1st Army

2nd Army

Structure in anticipation of surprise: “Front-Loading”

I

I

1st Army

2nd Army

3rd

4th

Army

Army

SOURCE’ Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK

deal of training for newly mobilized, “not ready”

units, and conduct relatively comprehensive

preparations before bringing them up to the

FLOT. But doing so would take a good deal

of time.

Physical constraints, however, would still allow the Soviets to place many more forces forward than are now estimated to be there,36 and

‘

bAccording to one observer, current Warsaw Pact organization and operational doctrine suggests that there would likely

be around 20 to 25 divisions in the first echelon of an attack

against NATO’s Central Region. Analysis of the terrain in Western Europe, however, suggests that this region could support

well over 30 divisions in the first echelon. In order to increase

many Western observers contend that doing

so might well lower the target value of the

follow-on forces for the overall offensive–not

just quantitatively, but qualitatively. This was

reflected by U.S. Air Force’s Headquarters in

Europe, in a briefing which spelled out the following concern with FOFA (as distinct from

interdiction):

the combat power of the first echelon by at least 20 percent,

therefore, this observer suggests that the Warsaw Pact need

do little more than make changes in operational plans-”a relatively ‘quick fix’ option. ” See Boyd D. Sutton, et al., “Deep

Attack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe, ” Survival,

March/April 1984, pp. 64-65.
Soviet doctrine calls for the wave, or echelon, attack arrangement. We here at USAFE

do not believe this is the only possible scenario.

A minor shift in Soviet employment concept

and/or change in their reinforcement plan may

leave us with attack capabilities for which

there are few targets. Few targets, that is, that

will produce tangible returns in a limited span

of time.37

Others have pointed out similar concerns.

For example, some point out that a concept

that considers attacking forces in transit across

Poland tacitly assumes that those forces would

be mobilized and moved after D-Day. Should

these forces be mobilized earlier, however, and

thus be in East Germany when the war starts,

interdiction in Poland would be futile. Even

if follow-on forces are present, many believe

their value would be limited in terms of affecting the overall war. “It is the extended first

37FOFA: USAFE View, Briefing to OTA staff, HQ USAFE,

Apr. 16, 1986.

echelon that is now critical . . . The reinforcing formations from the Western military districts . . . serve a vital function, but they are

redundant in numbers and they are mostly not

first-line combat units . . . It is the GSFG itself that must be destroyed . . . If these are not

contained, they will collapse NATO’s ability

(and will) to defend.”38

These questions are complicated by uncertainties over what it would take for attacks

on individual follow-on forces to have a significant impact on their effectiveness. How precisely timed would a Soviet offensive be? If

a Soviet second-echelon division is delayed a

certain number of hours, would its mission

have been obviated? Or might it make up that

time elsewhere, for example, by staying for

shorter times in assembly areas? At what level

38 See Steven L. Canby, “The New Technologies, ” November,

1983, p. 25. These sentiments were repeated to OTA staff by

West Europeans in the FRG and Belgium, April 1986.
Ch. 4— The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 71

of damage would the performance of a Soviet

unit-at any level—be degraded enough to significantly affect the overall war? And what

would it take to target OMGs or command

posts?

As mentioned, some suggest that Warsaw

Pact operations are so precisely timed that disruption of that plan could throw their entire

operation off course. 39 But Soviet writings suggest that the Soviets may build a good deal

of slack time into operational plans—for example, into waiting times in assembly areas—

to compensate for delays. Similarly, it is uncertain how critical delay of logistics support

might be, given that the Soviets keep a good

amount of their stocks already forward.40 While

delaying the follow-on forces would clearly

have an effect, therefore, there is a good deal

of debate concerning how high a level of damage there would have to be for delaying these

forces to have a significant effect on the overall war.

A similar debate surrounds the relevance of

the OMG to a follow-on forces attack concept.

The OMG has commonly been viewed as comprising a specialized formation, specific in its

structure and mission, so that an OMG might

well be an identifiable target in the enemy’s

rear.41 According to General Rogers:

We consider the OMG to be a high priority

target for FOFA . . . Much of the new target

detection and sensing capability we seek to acquire is necessary for us to identify which follow-on forces are organized as OMGs so they

can be attacked early on.42

But others emphasize that the OMG may

also be considered as a task, a concept of operations, without necessarily any definite structure. In this sense, the OMG would not comprise something that could be targeted in

depth, but rather something that would not

be identifiable until deployed–i.e., until relatively near the FLOT. Viewed this way, individual divisions or armies would not neces-

%ee vol. 2, app. 4A, note 1 8

“]See VO1. 2, app. 4A, note 19

“See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 20

“General Bernard Rogers, op. cit., p. 4

sarily be structured in advance to work as an

OMG, but rather resources would be allocated

as necessary to exploit breakthroughs and get

into NATO’s rear. The Soviets may be providing capabilities in such a way that perhaps any

group of regiments, combining fire power, air

assets, and mobile forces, could be put together

as an exploitation force, or “OMG,” as deemed

necessary.

There is also debate over the degree to which

disruption of Warsaw Pact C3I in the rear

might disrupt Soviet forces as a whole. The

inherent difficulties in detecting and targeting Warsaw Pact command posts are many:

1) Soviet command posts are well defended and

camouflaged; 2) they are dispersed widely; 3)

there is a good deal of redundancy in command

posts and in various communications modes;

4) command posts at the front and army level

are largely prepared in advance and therefore

are bunkered or hardened; and 5) because transmitter antennas are generally several kilometers from command posts, it would be difficult

to determine the precise locations of command

posts. 43

Aside from these difficulties, there is difference of opinion over how much damage could

be done should certain units be “decapitated,”

and how much flexibility may be worked into

the Soviet decisionmaking process. Some argue that because the Soviet command and control system is so highly centralized—where

commands pass down a strictly hierarchical

system and where, at the tactical level, information is limited and initiative discouraged—

disrupting command and control would be the

most effective way to stop a Warsaw Pact offensive. But Soviet writings also reflect a good

deal of effort to introduce more flexibility into

their decisionmaking process to take any potential disruptions into account.44 It is unclear

how flexible Soviet troop control would prove

to be in combat.

A final area of contention concerns the effect of FOFA on the cohesion among Soviet

and Warsaw Pact forces—i.e., the effect of

43 See v~ 2, app. 4A, note 21

44 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 22
72 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

FOFA operations on Soviet and Warsaw Pact

morale, and how that might affect the capabilities of their troops for implementing Soviet

operational plans. FOFA could well have a profound psychological effect on the enemy’s

forces, by extending the battlefield into the

enemy’s depths. According to one military historian, “hitting units while they are still on

the line of march, and do not expect it, will have

a far more serious effect than hitting them

harder later, when they are deployed and expecting casualties.”45 Most people, this historian suggests, can face terrors, such as going

into battle, on a predictable basis; they become

psychologically prepared. But FOFA would

make the line of battle unpredictable. And with

a military doctrine that emphasizes the importance of taking the offensive from the first

shot, Soviet troops might quickly acquire a

profound loss of confidence or sense of defeat.

“It is by using indirect fire to breed this fear,

it is by killing the morale of 90 percent of the

enemy in addition to killing the bodies of 10

percent of his soldiers, that we can make our

most effective contribution to the defence of

the Central Front.”46

Many believe that these psychological effects

might only be compounded in the Warsaw Pact,

given the already questionable loyalty among

many Soviets and East Europeans toward

Moscow. Questions have been raised as to

whose side the East Europeans would fight on

should hostilities begin, and whether FOFA

would further erode the cohesion of an already

tenuous alliance. Likewise, demographic change

in the U. S. S. R., and the growth in the number

and proportion of non-Russians in the Soviet

armed forces, has raised important questions

about loyalty and performance in the USSR’s

“Richard Holmes, “The Psychological Effects of Artillery

Fire, ” lecture presented to a DRA (Director Royal Artillery)

tactical seminar, June 1983. Quoted with permission of the

author.

“Ibid.

own forces. For example, the fact that an estimated one-fourth to one-third of all Soviet conscripts are projected to be of Muslim descent

within the next 10 to 15 years-with lower educational and technical training, often severe

lack of Russian language skills, and questionable loyalty-has raised serious questions

about the potential performance of the nonRussian nationalities in combat. Evidence of

recent “riots” among Soviet conscripts who

refused to go to Afghanistan, and defections

of Central Asians and Russians within Afghanistan itself, have only highlighted these

concerns.

But the Soviets are also aware of these problems, and have taken steps to deal with them.

Moscow has tightened institutional controls

over its Warsaw Pact allies-e. g., by creating

peacetime TVD High Commands in the late

1970s, which creates a clearly defined, preplanned wartime command structure in which

Eastern Europe is clearly subordinate to Moscow; and by assuring that procedures, C2 systems and equipment are all standardized, and

that Russian is the language of command. At

home, Soviet discussions focus on the need to

train all of their nationality groups to be better soldiers—e.g., through increased Russian

language training, better technical training,

and retaining mixed nationality units for better control—and for restructuring their own

forces to take account of the changing composition of the conscript pool. On the evidence

available, it would be impossible to gauge their

level of success on either count.

All of these questions remain complex and

controversial. Several efforts are now underway to attempt to resolve them, or at least to

narrow the margin of uncertainty, but many

of the answers cannot be known. At present,

these questions remain at the heart of the debate over how much emphasis should be placed

on FOFA in the West, and how it should be

implemented.
Chapter 5

Objectives for Attacks of

Follow-On Forces
CONTENTS

Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44....C.0.+.. ... ... .....$

“Delay, Disrupt, and Destroy’’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Targets: Soviet Divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Range and Desired Military Effects.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,..$,...,..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,$.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table

Table No.

75

76

77

78

78

78

78

79

80

5-1. Objectives for Attack of Follow-On Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ’78
Chapter 5

Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

STRATEGY

NATO’s strategy for attack of follow-on

forces is a result of the growth of conventional

military power of the Warsaw Pact and of the

improved mobility of Warsaw Pact ground

forces. At present, one might offer the superficial argument that NATO’s forces, though

smaller than those of the Warsaw Pact, could

probably defend successfully against an attack

spread equally across the front. But the implication of this argument is that the Warsaw

Pact would attack NATO’s strength, when it

makes much more military sense to attack

NATO where it is weakest. The Warsaw Pact

surely would not distribute its attack assets

uniformly across the theater. Rather it would

use the minimum force sufficient to pin down

NATO’s defenders, and concentrate its forces

to break through NATO’s weakest sectors.

Once through, the attacking elements and

follow-on forces would move rapidly and devastatingly through NATO’s rear.1

NATO is not likely to increase significantly

the size of its forces to meet this threat, or to

add a reserve which could be used to counter

Warsaw Pact breakthrough operations. Equipping and operating this large force, even if it

could be manned, would be enormously expensive. Nearly all of the Allies, including the

United States,2 agree that manpower requirements of even the current forces are considerable. For these and other reasons, the option

‘The Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy and posture is discussed in greater detail in ch. 4.

‘For example, the Federal Republic of Germany foresees a

serious problem of manpower shortages:

owing to [numerically] weak age groups coming up for induction,

the number of young men liable to military service will drop so

drastically in the next decade that, beginning in 1994, there will

be a deficit of 100,000 men per annum in the I?undeswehr’s yearly

replenishment requirement of 225,000 conscripts, If no remedial

action were taken, the strength of the [3undeswehr would decrease

[from 495,000] to barely 300,000 by the end of the nineties.

[Source W’hlte Paper 1985- The Situat)on and the Ikt,t.loprnent of thr F’ederal ,trmeci

Forces, ‘1’he F’edera] Mmlster of Defence (F’ K(; }, ,Jurw, 19 1985

Photo credit U S De[)artmenl of Defense

U.S. 3rd Armored Division in Germany,

of increased numbers of ground forces is not

politically open to discussion. ’

Another logical approach to the situation is

to exploit technology. Simpler, more lethal

weapons might be enough to blunt a Soviet

offensive. Such new technology might be applied to strengthen the close-in defense forces,

but increasing the close-combat capability of

every division enough to withstand a Warsaw

Pact massed assault could be prohibitively expensive.

Thus, there has been great interest in technologies that would improve NATO capability to impede the Warsaw Pact ability to concentrate forces, or to neutralize them if they

do concentrate. As stated recently by NATO’s

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),

General Bernard W. Rogers, “Allied Command

Europe can prevent the attacker from maintaining the momentum of his assault by tar-

.—

Wee also Stanle-y R. Sloan, iV.4 TO ‘.9 Future.” Towards a Neur

Transatlantic Bargain (J!’ashington, DC: National Defense

University Press, 1985), pp. 139-149 for further discussion of

NATO’s options.

75
76 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

geting these follow-on forces . . . before they focused on primary ground combat elements

hit our General Defensive Position.”4

such as tank and motorized rifle5 regiments and

The term “follow-on force” can cover a great divisions that are not “engaged,” or in active

many types of force elements, but interest has combat with NATO forces at the battle area.

———-.— 4Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, “Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA):

Myths and Realities, ” NATO Review, No. 6, December 1984,

p. 2. See also vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 2.

5Motorized rifle units have a mission and composition generally similar to U.S. Army mechanized infantry units.

“DELAY, DISRUPT, AND DESTROY”

The basic concept of FOFA is to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy’s follow-on forces

before they can be brought to bear effectively

against NATO forces. 6 Precise definitions of

“delay, disrupt, and destroy” prove a bit elusive under close scrutiny. None of these three

terms is defined in a NATO- or DoD-wide publication. “Delay” and “destroy” are defined

respectively in Allied Command Europe publications, in terms of slowing down enemy operations and inflicting sufficient damage to render enemy forces ineffective.’ However, no

definition of ‘disrupt is given. Further, even

in the definition of “delay” there is reference

to inflicting damage. Proposed doctrine for the

deep battle in defense emphasizes denying the

enemy the ability to concentrate combat power

against forward divisions by disrupting the

tempo of follow-on forces.

It is worth noting that U.S. Air Force and

U.S. Army discussions of disrupting enemy

follow-on forces emphasize somewhat different effects. Air interdiction is carried out to

disrupt the enemy’s scheme of operation and

control of operations, while Army deep attacks

aim to disrupt the tempo of commitment of

follow-on forces. Although these Air Force and

Army concepts are not inherently contradictory, they are different: the emphasis in the

first is on disrupting plans; the emphasis in

the second is on disrupting timing.

The objectives of “delay,” “disrupt,” and

“destroy” are perceived as being progressively

harder to achieve for a given force. For exam-

‘%ee vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 3 for a more detailed discussion

of these terms from a NATO perspective.

‘See vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 3 for details.

pie, disrupting a division is more difficult than

delaying it, and destroying it is harder still.

In any case, NATO attacks on Warsaw Pact

follow-on forces can only directly cause attrition to elements of a unit or damage to bridges

and other such structures or facilities needed

by the unit. Whether such damage will cause

delay or disruption, or whether such attrition

should be considered destruction of the unit

as a whole, is open to considerable interpretation.8

NATO cannot always guarantee a particular result from its attacks of follow-on forces,

even at a given level of damage. “Destruction”

is usually defined in terms of the fractions of

combat vehicles, personnel, or supplies that

must be “killed’ in order to render a force element ineffective. 9 “Delay” can be imposed either through obstacles which take the enemy

some time to remove, or by damaging necessary equipment. But the enemy’s response to

the creation of obstacles or damage cannot be

controlled by NATO, so it may be difficult to

ensure a given amount of delay. For example,

a minefield may cause a Soviet column to go

around or halt until it is cleared, or it may

cause the Soviet commander to decide to “bull

through” and accept some damage instead of

a delay.

8For more detail, vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 4.

Whe concept of “killing” vehicles is commonly analyzed in

U.S. military terms of “firepower kill” and “mobility kill. ” In

the former, a vehicle is damaged so that its weapons cannot

be used; in the latter, a vehicle’s propulsion capability is destroyed. Both kills can be further elaborated in terms of the

time it would take to repair the damage.
Ch. 5—Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 7 7

The objective of “disruption” is the most elu- ply that disruption often involves underminsive of the triad. Disrupting the enemy’s plans ing unit integrity, for example by degrading

or timing depends on delaying or destroying some critical element (such as a command post

critical force elements. Usage appears to im- or communication system).

TARGETS: SOVIET DIVISIONS

The attack of follow-on forces focuses on

ground combat units that are not yet engaged

with NATO forces, but are to join the attack

at some time in the future. This section describes the targets presented by the basic combat unit or the division, and outlines some of

the ways it can be delayed, disrupted, or destroyed.

The structure of the Soviet combat divisions

is described in chapter 4. A division on the

move (or halted in an assembly area) consists

of vehicles, both “armored combat vehicles”

(ACVs)10 and trucks, clustered in some fashion according to their organization for march.

In a recent study, the Institute for Defense

Analyses (IDA) has analyzed this typical organization, and concludes that a division on the

march normally includes about 55 march units

with an average of 60 vehicles each (nominally

battalion-sized), and about 15 smaller (company-sized) units. 11 About 25 of the larger

march units along with the smaller units contain nearly all of the division’s ACVs; the other

30 or so march units are nearly all trucks. The

units containing ACVs are about 50 percent

ACVs and 50 percent trucks; the overall division is about 30 percent ACVs. These march

units are the potential targets for attacks on

a follow-on division, both while on the march

and while in assembly areas (the grouping of

vehicles in assembly areas is much the same

as for road march).

As the division moves forward toward commitment to battle, its component regiments

“’The term ‘armored combat vehicle’ refers to tanks, armored

fighting vehicles (AFVs), armored personnel carriers, armored

cavalry vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and surface-to-air missile

(SAM) launchers.

“M’.J. Schultis, et al., Follow-On Force Attack (U) (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, Report R-302, draft

final version, April 1986), vol. II, p. 11-20, table 11-10.

go into final assembly areas, or “departure

areas. ” When the regiments leave these areas

on their final move to battle, the combat components go first, and much of the support

equipment and personnel stay behind. The division rear elements12 also stay behind. Therefore, as the unit moves to battle, a much higher

fraction of its vehicles are ACVs.

Regiments and divisions can be affected by

attacks in many possible ways. Damage to vehicles can be catastrophic or repairable. One

way of disrupting a division or regiment is to

damage specific “critical” elements, especially

the command posts (CPs). Damaging the CP

(and possibly killing some of the command

staff) may seriously disrupt the functioning

of the unit, by degrading the decisionmaking,

planning, and coordination of activities. On the

other hand, given the level of reliance on drill

and routine procedures, the “scientific’ planning of operations and doctrine,13 and the inherent momentum of attacking rather than defending, the Warsaw Pact forces may be less

disrupted by CP attack than, for example, U.S.

forces would be.

Another type of attack that can delay (or possibly disrupt) is to create “chokepoints,” which

restrict or prevent the forward movement of

forces. The most often-discussed chokepoint

results from damaging abridge, preferably just

before (or as) a unit starts to use it. Bridges

across rivers are seen as particularly important, because the river provides a barrier to

further movement. The Soviets have planned

for this eventuality by procuring extensive tactical bridging equipment for its ground forces,

and by pre-positioning replacement bridges in

some areas.

1 ~T~e division rem includes the combat service support units,

such as transport, supply, maintenance, and medical services.

1 ~ As discussed in ch. 4.
78 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

RANGE AND DESIRED MILITARY EFFECTS

The concepts of “delay, disrupt, and destroy, ”

when applied to the echelons of Warsaw Pact

forces, can give objectives for FOFA in terms

of range of attack and desired military effects. 14

Taking into account SHAPE objectives and

the various enemy echelons to be attacked,

FOFA objectives can be grouped into five categories, as shown in table 5-1.

The important features of the target categories are the size of the enemy unit (e.g., regiment, division) and its location in the Warsaw

Pact rear (e.g., 30 to 80 kilometers east of the

Forward Line of Own Troops, or FLOT). The

term “second echelon” is shorthand for both

the second echelon of the initially deployed

Warsaw Pact forces and all follow-on units of

the same size as they move into similar positions. For example, ‘‘second echelon regiments

of engaged divisions” (category 1) includes

both the second echelon regiments of the first

echelon division at the beginning of the assault,

and the regiments of all follow-on divisions as

they move into the same range band (5 to 30

kilometers east of the FLOT).

Category 1

In this category, follow-on regiments of engaged divisions would be attacked from just

beyond the range of direct-fire weapons,15 or

about 5 kilometers from the FLOT, out to

about 30 kilometers, the region of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).16 The desired

effect of the attacks would be to ‘kill’ the regiment, that is, damage enough of the regiment

combat assets (vehicle, personnel, essential

supplies) to render it ineffective.17 That is not

“see vol. 2, app. 5-A, notes 5-7.

“Direct (or observed) fire weapons include small arms and

other infantry weapons, tanks, helicopters, and close air support aircraft under the control of a forward air controller.

leThe F$JCL is established by the ground commander to coordinate air- and ground-based fires against targets closer than

the line. It usually corresponds roughly with the range of artillery weapons.

“The precise amount of damage that constitutes a kill cannot be established with certainty, but it is certainly less than

100 percent. It relates to the amount of damage that would render a unit incapable of accomplishing its mission, and requiring reconstitution as a new unit. The U.S. Army view of the

relevant level of damage is shown in vol. 2, app. 5-A, table 5-A-1.

Table 5-1 .—Objectives of Attack of Follow-On Forces

Approximate

Desired range (km)

Category effect Target echelon (east of FLOTa)

1 Destroy 2d echelon regiments of

engaged divisions

2 Destroy 2d Tactical Echelon (2d

echelon divisions of

1st echelon armies)

3. Disrupt 2d Tactical Echelon

4. Disrupt/delay 2d Operational Echelon

(2d echelon armies of

1st echelon fronts)

5. Delay 2d Strategic Echelon

(2d echelon fronts)

‘Forward Line of Own TcOOPs

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1987

5 to 30

30 to 80

80 to 150

150 to 350

350 to 800

to say that delaying the regiment, particularly

at some critical time, may not be a useful objective.

Category 2

In this category, follow-on divisions of firstechelon armies would be attacked and destroyed

while they move on roads from their concentration areas’* (divisional assembly areas) forward and into departure areas (regimental assembly areas). The range of such attacks would

begin at the region of the FSCL, about 30

kilometers, and go out to about 80 kilometers,

stopping short of the concentration areas. This

region would include the departure areas. The

objective in this category, like the previous one,

is destruction of the enemy force, only here the

attack is directed against divisions rather than

regiments. These attacks would be well within

the area of responsibility of the NATO corps.

Category 3

In this category, follow-on divisions would

also be attacked, here with the objective of disrupting or delaying their movements and disrupting the operations of the first echelon armies. The range of such attacks would begin

‘

aContrary to the appearance of this term, enemy vehicles are

likely to be more dispersed in “concentration areas’ than when

on the road. The term derives from the process of bringing the

whole division together in one area at one time, not from any

process of increasing the density of vehicles within the area.
Ch. 5—Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces 79

Categories of Objectives for FOFA Operations

.

NATO I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I I

I

I

I

I Armies I Fronts

I 1

5 30 80 150 350 *

km east of FLOT, not to scale

SOURCE Off Ice, of Technology Assessment 1987

approximately 80 kilometers from the FLOT,

and go out to approximately 150 kilometers

from the FLOT, the limit of the NATO corps’

area of responsibility. This region would include the concentration areas (division assembly areas), which would probably be the farthest

forward that Warsaw Pact armored forces

would be transported on vehicle carriers. The

creation and maintenance of such a barrier

could delay the division and perhaps disrupt

the division’s movements, and disrupt the

operations of the army to which the division

belongs, by making the division unavailable

for its designated mission. Also in this area

would be the divisional and army command

posts, the attack of which might also disrupt

operations.

In considering the desired effect of disruption, it may be that enough delay would accomplish the purpose. The amount of delay

sufficient to do so might be the difference between the expected time of arrival of a unit

and the expected time of arrival of the next

highest echelon, because imposing such a delay would prevent the division from being employed in its usual echelon as planned.19

Category 4

In this category, follow-on armies would be

attacked in order to disrupt or delay their

movement forward. The range of such attacks

would begin at about 150 kilometers from the

FLOT, beyond the area of responsibility of the

corps, and would go back to about 17° east

longitude, 300 to 400 kilometers east of the

IGB and extending through central Poland.

This region would include the Oder and Neisse

rivers (at the border between the German

Democratic Republic and Poland), which could

also be used to create a barrier by attacking

the bridges. Units would move into this region

‘This criterion results in a certain number of days of delay

constituting disruption, as discussed in vol. 2, app. 5-A, note 8.
80 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

from the east generally by train and off-load

onto roads, on which they would travel either

on transporters or under their own power.

Category 5

In this category, elements of follow-on fronts

would be attacked in order to delay their arrival at the main battle. The area of these attacks would range from about 170 east longitude to and perhaps across the Soviet border,

which is 600 to 850 kilometers east of the IGB.

This region contains the Vistula and Dunajec

rivers and the rail transloading areas at the

Polish/Soviet border where the rail gauge

changes. Movement of forces through this area

would be primarily by rail. The amount of delay necessary is not established, but it appears

reasonable that a delay similar to that for category 4 attacks would be operationally significant.
-.

Chapter 6

Operational Concepts for

Attacks of Follow-On Forces
CONTENTS

Approaches for FOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Category 1–5 to 30 Kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Category 2–30 to 80 Kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Category 3–80 to 150 Kilometers.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........,.

Category 4-150 to 350 Kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Category 5-350 to 800 Kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Functional Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Surveillance and Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Situation Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Target Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Attack Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Weapon Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Target Kill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operational Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Target Type... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Target Disposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Platform and Weapon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Target Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operational Concepts for SOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns: Category 1 (5 to 30 km) . . . . . . .

Stand-Off Air Attack of Division Columns: Category 2 (30 to 80 km). . .

Missile Attack of Division Columns: Category 2 (30 to 80 km) . . . . . . . .

Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted Units:

83

83

84

85

87

88

89

89

89

90

90

92

92

92

93

93

94

95

96

97

97

97

98

99

Category 3 (80 to 150 km) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100

Cruise Missile Attack of Deep Rail Network:

Category 5 (350 to 800 km) . . . . . . . . . .

Tables

Table No.

6-1. Summary of Targets and Objectives for

6-2. Options for FOFA Operations . . . . . . . .

Figures

Figure No.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Page

FOFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,. 94

Page

6-1. Typical March Formation, Soviet Tank Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

6-2. Stand-Off Air Attack of Division Columns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Chapter 6

Operational Concepts for

Attacks of Follow-On Forces

This chapter discusses those concepts for

achieving the objectives presented in chapter

5 that OTA has been able to identify as feasible and under serious consideration by the military. According to DoD, a‘ ‘concept of operations” is defined as:

A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent

in regard to an operation or series of operations . . . The concept is designed to give an

overall picture of the operation. It is included

primarily for additional clarity of purpose. ’

A concept of operations defines the requirements for systems and organizations. For that

reason, a concept of operations can be used as

a framework for acquisition strategies to develop, acquire, and deploy equipment (and develop procedures) to provide the needed capability:

‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1, 1 June 1979. This

document incorporates NATO STANAG 3680, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use (AAP-6). ”

Only with the use of explicit concepts of

operations can one provide a basis for the

identification of the component parts, whether

they be surveillance systems, assessment

centers, control centers, delivery systems,

weapons, or munitions. z

There are many different possible concepts

of operations for FOFA, involving various

weapons and attack schemes. The discussion

below details several approaches for achieving

the objectives discussed in chapter 5 and describes the concepts of operations for the approaches that appear feasible. The approaches

require certain target acquisition and weapon

capabilities, which are discussed subsequently.

Some of these target acquisition and weapons

needs apparently cannot be met, for reasons

given below.

‘Lt. Gen. Glenn A. Kent, USAF (Ret.), Concepts of Operations: A More Coherent Framework for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: The Rand Corp., Rand Note N-2026-AF, August

1983), pp. 11-12.

APPROACHES FOR FOFA

The categories of FOFA objectives (as defined inch. 5) depend primarily on the echelon

of force to be attacked and on the range of the

attack. Each objective can be achieved through

one or more approaches. These different approaches–summarized in table 6-l–are outlined below in terms of the targets and kinds

of attack for each approach.

Category 1—5 to 30 Kilometers

The objective of category 1 FOFA operations is the destruction of second-echelon regiments. 3 The most feasible approach to destroy- —

‘As explained inch. 5, the term “second echelon” denotes both

the second echelon of the initial deployment and elements of

follow-on forces that are in the same range band and disposition, as the follow-on forces become deployed and engaged.

ing these targets appears to be to attack them

while they are moving on roads on their final

approach to battle.4 These regiments will be

moving in battalion columns of approximately

40 to 50 vehicles, with the combat battalions

in the lead. There are about eight battalionsized column targets per regiment. In these

columns the fraction of armored combat vehicles is roughly 70 percent. The support elements of the combat regiment are not likely

to leave the departure area with the combat

elements.

‘Details of march considerations for Soviet units on the attack are discussed in U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Soviet Army Operations (Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, IAG-13-U-78, April 1978),

pp. 3-20 through 3-31. Unit sizes and compositions were discussed in ch. 5 of this report; see in particular table 5-2.

8 3
84 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 6-1: Summary of Targets and Objectives for FOFAa

Range (kilometers beyond FLOT)

Targets 5 to 30 30 to 80 80 to 150 150 to 350 350 to 800

Moving columns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2

Units in assembly areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2

Command posts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2

Chokepoints and halted units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2

Units transported on roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Units in off-loading areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Units transported on rails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Rail network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Levels of damageb 1 “Destroy”

2 “Disrupt”

3 “Delay”

aThl~ ~holce of ~bje~tive~ for FOFA ~perati~n~ is based on i nformatlon received from SH ApE, IJ S Army, and IJ S Air Force sources, as discussed i n ch 5 Th!s choice

of taraets and oblectlves IS for OTA analysis only, and IS not intended to be exhaustive or definitive

bsee c} 5 for discussion of desired levels of damage

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987

According to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),5 each column will be on the road

for only about 30 to 60 minutes, and it will take

the entire regiment between 1.5 and 2.1 hours

to accomplish the move forward. In a single

day, a corps facing a Warsaw Pact main attack may see seven such second-echelon regiments moving forward,6 and their movements

may span a total of 9 hours of the day.

The amount of time a target battalion is moving is so brief that it may not be feasible to

reattack it. Therefore, individual attacks should

be “sized” to destroy a battalion in one attack.

Category 2—30 to 80 Kilometers

The objective of FOFA operations in this category is the destruction of second-echelon divisions. Within this range, divisions will be

moving between their division assembly areas

(concentration areas) and the departure areas

and then occupying the departure areas.7

‘Institute for Defense Analysis, “Follow-On Forces Attack,

Volume II: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Architecture To Support FOFA, ” IDA Report

R-302.

‘Ibid., pp. II-4 through 11-10. The number of regiments moving per day is derived assuming that the corps faces an initial

deployment of three first-echelon divisions plus one follow-on

division entering the battle in 24 hours.

‘For more detail, see vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 2.

While on the move, the division marches by

regiments along two or more roads. The organization for march is illustrated in figure 6-1.

Compared to category 1 attacks, a smaller fraction of the vehicles will be armored combat vehicles. Of the 55 or so battalion-sized columns

in a division, about 25 will contain armored

combat vehicles, and these 25 will average

about 50 percent armored vehicles.8 Overall,

about 30 percent of the vehicles in a Soviet

combat division are armored. In one day, a

NATO corps facing a Warsaw Pact main attack will see a single division moving in this

range.

This portion of the division’s movement will

last about 6 to 8 hours; any one battalion-sized

column will take about 1.5 to 3 hours to traverse this distance. Compared to Category 1,

there will be more opportunity to attack each

target and perhaps opportunity to re-attack.

Another approach to destroying second-echelon divisions is to attack their component regiments in their assembly areas.9 These areas

will be occupied for at least several hours, while

the units perform final preparations for battle (including maintenance, supply, and rest).

Although the term “assembly area” may give

an impression of a concentrated target set, in

fact the clusters of vehicles maybe rather dis8See ch. 5 for further details, especially table 5-1.

‘See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 4 for details.
Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 8 5

Photo credit U S De~artrnen( of Defense

Tanks traveling on West German Autobahn.

persed in a large area. Further, units are likely

to take every possible advantage of cover and

concealment; wooded areas and urban areas

are preferred. However, there may not be

enough areas with good cover available to meet

the needs of all the units moving through, and

those areas that are used may not provide good

cover after a few days of combat.

Category 3—80 to 150 Kilometers

At this range, the objective of attacking

follow-on forces is limited to disruption. In

addition to the types of attacks discussed

above, other approaches are also under consideration.

Second-echelon divisions can be attacked

directly while they move in this range, and perhaps while in assembly areas. ’” They move on

roads, with the tracked vehicles either on transporters (“low-boys’ or moving under their own

power. Although the moving targets are predominantly the same as in the previous categories, armored combat vehicles on transporters are “cold” (engines off and cool) rather

than “hot” (engines on and emitting hot exhaust).11

Two other approaches to disrupting secondechelon divisions (and first-echelon armies) are

often advanced. In the first, “chokepoints” are

created in front of moving Warsaw Pact units,

and the units are subsequently attacked while

they are halted trying to clear the chokepoint.

The other approach is to attack command

posts. The classic concept for chokepoint attack is to destroy bridges across a major river

just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit. In

this range, the Elbe, Saale, and Vltava rivers

provide a major north-south barrier. Other possible chokepoints include narrow roads through

towns or natural defiles, tunnels, and dikes.

The advantage of this approach is that the target division will be halted at the chokepoints,

simplifying the problem of target location because targets will not be moving. Further, the

density of vehicles (and personnel) will be

greater than for either moving units or assembly areas, making area munitions more destructive.

A recent major study considered destruction

of the bridges over the Elbe river for a period

of up to 10 days as a means for creating a barrier that would delay the introduction of followon forces into the battle. The expected impact

of these attacks was unclear, and the effort

needed to enforce an effective barrier was seen

as being potentially very large.12 This is because the ability of the Warsaw Pact to repair

roads and bridges is often quite high, and the

Warsaw Pact forces are thought to have large

‘“See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 5 for further detail.

‘‘Whether engines are cold or hot is important to certain kinds

of smart anti-armor munitions, because some detect and engage

warm targets by the infrared energy they emit. See ch. 11 for

further discussion.

“Institute for Defense Analysis, “Follow-On Forces Attack,

Volume I: Summary, ” IDA Report R-302.
86 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 6-1 .—Typical March Formation, Soviet Tank Division

m 15-25 km 9

I 4

Flank

party

x

x

xx Division Ill

t

20-30 km

I

LEGEND

Regiment II Battalion I Company

(about 450 (about 60 (about 10 ● 00 platoon ~ Motorized rifle unit

vehicles) vehicles) vehicles)

(about 3,500

vehicles)

~~ Tank unit ~ Reconnaissance unit [+] Reinforced [ -1 Light (understrength)

SOURCE: U.S Army Intelligence and security cornrnmd, soviet ~r~y omra~lom (Arlington, VA: us intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, IAG-13-U-78, April 1978),

PP 3.24
quantities of mobile tactical bridging equipment and stockpiles of temporary bridges at

prepared crossing sites. Attacking road bridges

may have the same problems, and the dense

network of roads in central Europe may often

offer alternative routes.

The other approach to disrupting secondechelon divisions (and first-echelon armies) is

to attack their command posts. ’3 It is likely

that a command post can be destroyed if its

location is known, but the effect on combat effectiveness of destroying the command post

is not clear.14 Further, the Soviet practice is

“See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 8 concerning CP locations and dwell

times.

“This relates to the question of tactical flexibility (and rigidity) of Soviet forces, which is discussed in ch. 4.

Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . 87

to have several command posts available at

division and army levels, typically a main post,

an alternate, and a rear.15 Thus, it is difficult

to predict the effect of destroying one or more

command posts in the division.

Category 4—150 to 350 Kilometers

The objective here is to disrupt and delay

second-echelon armies. General approaches are

attacking units moving on roads, and creating chokepoints and barriers to their further

movement forward.

“While moving, there may be additional CPs (e.g., forward).

Also, other division command and control centers such as the

artiIlery fire control group might assume the CP function, if

necessary.
88 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Military unit transported by rail.

Divisions of the second-echelon armies will

move toward this region from the east on rail,

and move onto roads at off-loading areas

(OLAs) in this region. From that point they

will move forward on roads, with the armored

vehicles either on transporters or moving under their own power. The possible targets for

direct attack include trucks and armored vehicles in the OLAs, trucks moving forward

with armored vehicles on transporters (’ ‘cold”

tanks), and armored vehicles moving under

their own power (“hot “). Divisions will be moving with their full combat services support and

rear support complement.

Chokepoint attack could take advantage of

the Oder and Neisse rivers by attacking road

bridges over these rivers. Also, the units halted

behind dropped bridges could be attacked directly. 16 For this approach to be effective the

bridges must be attacked just as or before the

enemy division uses them, and the subsequent

attack of forces would have to follow closely.

Due to the Warsaw Pact capability to rebuild

or replace road bridges, the rivers would have

to be under surveillance every 12 to 24 hours

to discover new bridges. Pontoon bridges just

below the river surface would present a particular problem for surveillance systems.

Category 5—350 to 800 Kilometers

In this deepest region, the objectives of

FOFA operations are to delay the secondechelon fronts during the 10 to 20 days after

D-day in which the fronts mobilize and move

“See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 9 for additional details.
—

Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 8 9

forward.17 These units originate in the Soviet

Union, and are transported by rail from garrison areas to the theater of battle. Attacks to

delay this movement can be targeted against

the units themselves, or against the rail transportation system being used.

There are a number of rail bridges across the

Vistula river that could be attacked to delay

movement. These would also be more difficult

to repair than most road bridges, due to the

alignment necessary for rail repair and the

loads that must be carried by the repaired

bridge. Reattack of bridges after 10 to 15 days

would allow repairs to be monitored and new

bridges identified and targeted. Also, elements

of the rail network itself could be attacked with

mines that would damage the rails and disable

trains when they approached. Because the

train would be derailed, a delay of 18 to 24

hours could be expected before the rail line

would be clear. 18 The routes for repair trains

“If the J4’arsaw Pact has a sufficiently long mobilization period

prior to war these units may have already moved forward, and

this approach could not be effective.

“The use of mines against vehicles on roads is not expected

to be as effective in damaging forces or delaying movements,

due to the substantial mine-clearing equipment of Warsaw Pact

forces and the flexibility of road vehicles for bypassing mine

areas.

would themselves be mined, further aggravating the delay. The use of such mines and rail

bridge attack could impose substantial delays

on rail movements.

Attacks against units on trains in Eastern

Europe would be aimed at causing sufficient

damage to delay the unit by at least several

days. Attacks would be repeated every 3 to

4 days.

As the component Soviet divisions cross

from the Soviet Union into Poland and Czechoslovakia, because of the rail gauge change,

“transloading” must take place between trains.

There are a number of transloading zones at

the Soviet border, comprising many yards,]’

whose destruction would inhibit this movement, and which could provide especially valuable targets if attacked while occupied. Other

high-value infrastructure targets include the

power stations in Poland that provide electricity to the rail system, and the (relatively few)

control stations that schedule and coordinate

rail movement.

“See vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 10 for details.

FUNCTIONAL NEEDS

Several functions must be accomplished in

order to implement these approaches, including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

suppression of enemy air defenses,

surveillance and reconnaissance,

situation assessment,

target acquisition,

attack control,

weapon delivery, and

target kill.

Because some of these tasks are quite difficult

to accomplish under longer range conditions,

they illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches discussed above.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

In order to find or attack follow-on forces

and survive, NATO tactical aircraft must be

supported by effective suppression of enemy

air defenses (SEAD). Warsaw Pact air defenses

are formidable, particularly in target areas. The

use of stand-off weapons could reduce or eliminate attrition of weapon delivery aircraft in

the target area, but not en route to the target

areas.

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Surveillance is the routine collection of information for situation assessment, target acqui-
90 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

sition, attack control, or cueing of reconnaissance systems. Reconnaissance is the collection

of information about specific areas of high interest for situation assessment, target acquisition,

or attack control. Either maybe performed by

manned or unmanned aircraft equipped with

stand-off sensors, by ground-based sensors, by

ground forces penetrating enemy territory, and

by other means. Most proposals for enhancing Allied Command Europe’s (ACE ‘s) FOFA

capability will require current surveillance and

reconnaissance capabilities to be enhanced.

A number of systems now in development

could contribute to NATO’s capability to find

and track follow-on units; some are already providing limited operational capabilities. Electronics intelligence (ELINT) sensors such as

SENIOR RUBY, TEREC, and PLSS20 could

locate air defense radars.21 Communications intelligence (COMINT) sensors such as SENIOR

SPEAR and GUARDRAIL can monitor radio

traffic used to control unit movements. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) sensors such as

ASARS-II and AQUILA22 could provide radar

and electro-optical imagery of vehicle clusters

stopped in assembly areas. And moving target indication (MTI) radar, such as Joint

STARS, 23 could detect vehicle motion and

measure vehicle velocity, thereby providing a

form of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

Situation Assessment

Fusion (i.e., correlation) of data of several

disciplines (e.g., ELINT, COMINT, IMINT,

and MTI MASINT) may be required to reliably recognize, track, and count follow-on units.

For example, fusion of MTI MASINT and

IMINT can help distinguish moving combat

units from other traffic.24 Analysis of the data

is required to infer enemy activities and intentions for reliable situation assessment. Failure to fully implement all the enhancements

identified by SHAPE25 would limit, but not

eliminate, ACE capability for situation

assessment in the 1990s. That is, while all of

these systems are desirable and would be useful, the lack or loss of any one of them would

not be catastrophic.

Target Acquisition

Additional data beyond that required to detect or recognize a unit is required to “acquire”

it as a target-i. e., to locate it with sufficient

accuracy and timeliness to attack it effectively.

The accuracy required for targeting will depend

on target type and disposition (e.g., moving

or stopped) and on the types of munitions,

weapons, and weapon platforms available for

use.

Stationary Targets

Acquiring stationary targets in assembly

areas requires some form of high-resolution imagery, such as can be provided by electrooptical, forward-looking infrared, or film

cameras, by infrared line scanners, or by

synthetic-aperture radar. This information

must be available to the attacking weapon

when the vehicles are stationary. Targets in

assembly areas are expected to dwell there several hours, so timeliness of target location data

does not appear to be a critical problem in this

case. COMINT data will not usually be sufficient for attack of enemy combat units, because a unit may use communications antennas several kilometers away from itself.

‘“SENIOR RUBY and TEREC are operational systems; PLSS

is in development. See ch. 10 for details.

*’The units could depend on the area air defense radar network for long-range coverage and tactical warning of attack

by NATO tactical aircraft.

‘

2 ASARS I I is in production, with a limited operational capability already fielded; AQUILA is in development. See ch. 10

for details.

“Joint STARS is in development; see ch. 10 for details.

“Interspersed throughout the Warsaw Pact rear will be a great

deal of military traffic, mostly trucks, re-supplying and otherwise supporting engaged and forward units. Armored elements

are expected to comprise only about 10 to 14 percent of military traffic in this area, and an even smaller percentage of total

(including civil) traffic. –Model of Vehicle Activity in the Warsaw Pact Tactical Rear During a Conventional A ttack Agw”nst

NATO (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., Rand Note N-1 495-

AF, September 1980).

2KSee vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 11 for details.
Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 9 1

Moving Targets

An attack on moving combat units requires

timeliness on the part of the attacker. Realtime radar coverage could be provided by airborne MTI radar or by electro-optical or forward-looking infrared cameras on unmanned

aerial vehicles. Automated data communications systems could provide the links necessary for timely transmission of target location

data to the weapons platform. For attacks by

tactical aircraft, the target motion during the

aircraft’s flight must be taken into account,

so it may be useful to provide updated target

location information to the aircraft. It may also

be desirable to provide an in-flight update to

an attacking missile, although the missile’s

flight time is much shorter than that of aircraft.

As an alternative, target acquisition could

be provided by systems on board the weapon

platform itself. For example, target acquisition radar on board attacking tactical aircraft

could provide the final target location data to

the weapon launched from the aircraft. This

approach has the disadvantage of exposing the

attacking aircraft to the target air defenses

for the extra time it takes to acquire the target, but allows the attacking platform to operate independently of a separate target acquisition system.

Special Targets

Target locations for permanent bridges can

be determined in peacetime. In wartime, temporary bridges may be built to augment these,

and damaged bridges will probably be repaired

requiring reconnaissance to determine when

they are again active. Information on temporary and repaired bridges might be obtained

from imagery.

Command posts (CPs) maybe very difficult

to detect and identify; there is no known routine, reliable means for targeting them.26 They

are primarily known by their communications

(and other) emissions, but these radiate from

antennas that may be some distance from the

CP itself.” The vehicles in a CP are not in-

“%lee vol. 2, app. 6-A, note 12 for further discussion.

“See Institute for Defense Analysis, ‘*Follow-On Forces Attack, Volume I: Summary, ” IDA Report R-302, Draft Final,

April 1986, p. ES-35.

dividually distinguishable from many others

in a division, although it is sometimes argued

that the vehicles of a CP deploy in unique and

identifiable patterns, allowing their location

by careful analysis of imagery .28

Deep Targets

Reconnaissance systems held at the national

level primarily for strategic reconnaissance

missions might be made available to the theater commander, who could task them to support reconnaissance, surveillance, and acquisition (RSTA) needs. These capabilities, if made

a sufficiently high priority relative to other

missions, could provide a great deal of information about movement in the enemy’s rear.

In particular, this information could provide

cues to general movement activity in given

areas, enough to task attack assets which

would then acquire targets autonomously.

Also, attacks into the two deeper bands could

destroy infrastructure targets that support

movement but are not moving themselves. Although it may be possible to attack combat

units deep in the enemy rear on occasion, these

national capabilities are not likely to be able

to support an overall FOFA strategy based

on this approach.

There is no known system that would provide imagery surveillance of the possible offloading areas (OLAs) with sufficient timeliness

to support attacks while they are occupied. Although such an arrangement could be imagined,

it is not likely to be an efficient use of national

assets to attempt to “catch’ enemy units in

OLAs. The RSTA needs for this approach are

thus apparently prohibitive.

Similarly, creating a chokepoint followed by

attack of halted units can be dropped from consideration at this range. Warsaw Pact road

bridge repair and replacement capability is

sufficient to require reconnaissance of a river

every 12 to 24 hours, in order to maintain a

barrier. This timeliness is not likely to be met

by the national level sensors available. The creation of a barrier for a specific unit, and its

28Examples of command post data are given in “Interdiction

Target Set for Analysis, “ draft, BDM Corp., BDM W-84 -0145-TR.
92 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

subsequent attack, is likely to be even less

feasible.

The Warsaw Pact rail transportation system

could be attacked to delay the movement of

Soviet armies, by destroying bridges and mining segments of railroad. Targeting can be accomplished in peacetime. The Warsaw Pact has

substantial capability to repair damage, and

some revisit of the destroyed rail bridges is

necessary to maintain the barrier they provide.

Revisit within 5 to 10 days is likely to be sufficient,29 and national reconnaissance systems

are likely to be capable of this mission.

Warsaw Pact units moving through the

transportation system can be attacked directly. In this case target acquisition may be

provided by systems onboard the platform (aircraft) or the weapon (missile) itself. Such an

approach depends on there being a high density of targets, so that each attacking platform

or weapon has a high probability of acquiring

a target.

Attack Control

Some form of command and control support

system is needed to coordinate and control attacks within, between, and across NATO command echelons. For those attacks against targets within the Fire Support Coordination Line

(FSCL), close coordination between groundand air-based attack assets is necessary to ensure coverage of targets without duplication

of effort and to avoid damaging NATO aircraft. If a ground-based capability to attack

beyond the FSCL is developed, similar coordination will be necessary at greater range.

Many operational concepts also require new

attack control capabilities. NATO forces must

accomplish quickly the processes of assigning

targets to weapons and of providing final target location updates to platforms in order to

support attack of moving targets.

‘

gNote that the time to repair a rail bridge is substantially

longer than the time to repair a road bridge, due to the alignment necessary for the rails and the larger weight of loaded

rail cars that the bridge must support.

Weapon Delivery

The term “platforms,” the systems that deliver weapons, includes bombers, some fighters,

and transporter-erector-launcher vehicles for

ground-based missiles. Free-fall bombs must

be released near their targets; glide bombs may

be released at a short stand-off range; airlaunched missiles may be launched from a

greater stand-off. All these require aircraft as

weapon delivery platforms. Ground-launched

missiles need only be delivered to a launch site

and launched.

Target Kill

Killing targets requires weapons, which contain munitions and, in some cases, guidance

systems.

Anti-Armor Munitions

Certain munitions embodying “emerging

technologies” show promise of much higher

lethalities against heavily armored vehicles

than current-generation munitions provide.

Two such technologies are self-forging fragment

technology, which is used in sensor fuzed munitions such as Skeet, and terminally guided

shaped-charge technology, which is used in munitions such as the Terminally Guided Warhead (TGW) for the Multiple Launch Rocket

System (MLRS).30 Munitions of either type can

be packed as submunitions into dispensers on

air-delivered weapons or ground-launched missiles or artillery rounds,31 each of which might

kill several armored vehicles.

Other technologies go along with the advanced kill mechanisms to provide multiple armor kills per weapon. These include dispenser

technology, or ways of dispersing submunitions in a controlled fashion such that they give

optimal engagement of vehicles in the “footprint” of the weapon. Also important is the

sensor technology that makes the submunition

“smart,” or able to detect and follow moving

target vehicles.

30 See ch. 11 for further discussion.

alspecific munitions and submunitions programs are geared

to specific platforms, however.
Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 9 3

Weapon Guidance

Ground-launched weapons with dispenser,

sensors, and effective submunitions can produce multiple armor kills only if guided (or delivered) with sufficient accuracy to the target

location. Even with highly accurate target location data, lack of weapon delivery accuracy can

render these weapons ineffective. Missiles

must have accurate guidance in order to engage targets at ranges of 100 to 200 kilometers or more. Various guidance technologies

are applicable to this problem, including fiberoptic gyroscopes for inertial navigation and

miniature Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers for navigation via satellite.

Tactical aircraft can launch weapons at a

“stand-off” distance from the target, staying

far enough away to avoid the air defenses in

the immediate target area, about 20 to 30 kilometers for Soviet regiments and divisions.32 In

~~The primary division air defense units are the SA-6, with

a nominal range of 30 kilometers, and the SA-8, with a nominal

range of 12 kilometers; see U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet

Military Power (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 5th cd., March 1986). Countermeasures can reduce these

effective ranges.

this case the weapon must have a propulsion

system to get it to the target, as well as a guidance system to keep it on course.

For attacks beyond the range of the theater

bombers (Buccaneer, F-1 11, and Tornado), longrange cruise missiles, if developed, could be

used. For attacks of rail bridges, an electrooptical scene correlator (such as presently used

by Tomahawk missiles) could guide the weapon

to the target area, and a laser radar could provide final guidance to achieve the necessary

accuracy. For mining rail segments, the missile could use either present terrain comparison (TERCOM) guidance or GPS, coupled with

some type of infrared or millimeter wave sensor for detecting the rail lines. For attacks of

trains on railroads, a cruise missile would need

a capability to navigate to the neighborhood

of the rail line, recognize the railroad, and then

fly along the rails until it detected a train.33

“Since the tactical vehicles would be on rail cars and “cold,”

and perhaps not loaded with ammunition and fuel, munitions

that would damage the trucks, personnel, and perhaps light armor may give the greatest effectiveness to such attacks.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Sifting through the advantages and disadvantages of different operational concepts is

a complex task. There are many different options for constructing operations concepts,

with different target types, target dispositions,

attack objectives, platforms and weapons, target acquisition systems, and ranges. Table 6-2

lists the various options in each of these areas.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of

all of these options are discussed below, by way

of introduction to those operational concepts

that appear to be feasible and that have been

determined by OTA to have some serious support in military circles.

Target Type

Tanks present the greatest threat to NATO

because of their combination of mobility and

firepower, and the emphasis in Soviet military

thought on attack with heavy armor.” From

this perspective they are high-value targets.

However, tanks are specifically designed to be

highly survivable and resistant to damage.

Light armor includes the other armored combat vehicles, such as armored fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery. These pose a substantial threat

because they have combat capability.

Trucks contain supplies (primarily ammunition and fuel, which are the most critical

supplies for combat capability) and some personnel, and specific support capabilities (e.g.,

engineer, maintenance, and repair). These are

the easiest vehicles to damage because they

are not armored, but the damage does not im34 See ch. 4
94 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Table 6-2.—Options for FOFA Operations

Target type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tanks, light armor, trucks, –

selected high-value units,

bridges.

Target disposition . . . . . . . . fixed, sitting, moving on

transporters, moving under

own power.

Platform and weapon. . . . . . artillery, direct attack aircraft,

ground-launched ballistic

missile, tactical aircraft with

short-range standoff weapon,

long-range cruise missile (airor ground-launched).

Target acquisition . . . . . . . . on-board systems, external

systems.

Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close-in (5 to 30 km),

intermediate (30 to 150 km),

long (150 to 800 km).

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987.

mediately affect combat capability and may

not be felt for several days.

Selected high-value units include command

posts (CPs) and surface-to-surface missile

(SSM) units.35 These units, when they can be

found, are (usually) priority targets, but it is

very difficult to locate and target them. The

impact of destroying a CP is not clear. On one

hand, the rigidity of Soviet command and control suggests that the unit would be unlikely

to exert the initiative of going forward without strong command; on the other hand, the

reliance on extensive pre-planning of operations using routine drill procedures suggests

a tendency to carry the operation forward without the need for further command decisions.

Different target vehicles require different

munitions. Anti-tank munitions may have little capability to kill trucks, because the infrared and millimeter wave signatures (for the

engagement sensor to detect) are different for

trucks and for tanks, and single holes in trucks

are often repairable fairly quickly.36 “Antipersonnel anti-materiel” (APAM or “dual purpose”) munitions are good at putting lots of

holes in trucks (primarily tires and radiators)

that require more time to repair, but do not

‘5SSM units are not necessarily follow-on forces, but they will

deploy in the Warsaw Pact rear to reduce their vulnerability.

SSMs are not considered in detail in this assessment.

“Tank kills often occur because of the spalling of armor inside the vehicle, killing personnel and setting off ammunition

or fuel.

damage tanks. Lightly armored vehicles are

an intermediate case, somewhat vulnerable to

both types of munitions. Bridges usually can

be destroyed only by large unitary warheads

that are accurately delivered.

Target Disposition

Fixed targets such as bridges generally can

be located in peacetime with high precision.

Target location errors are low, allowing high

weapons effectiveness. However, for the same

reasons, these types of targets are hardened,

proliferated, or both. For example, temporary

bridges and repair segments are stockpiled,

and organic repair and tactical bridging capabilities are high in Soviet units.

Sitting targets (e.g., units in assembly areas)

are mobile targets that are not moving when

attacked. These targets are likely to choose a

location that maximizes cover and concealment, but the number of suitable locations is

limited. 37 A tree canopy or urban environment

may conceal sitting targets from the sensors

of smart munitions38 and provide cover which

reduces the effects of A PAM munitions by absorbing blast and fragments. On the other

hand, personnel may be dismounted from and

unprotected by sitting vehicles and more vulnerable than in other dispositions.

Targets on road or rail transporters are moving targets, so target location data must be

updated either by the platform or weapon or

provided to the platform or weapon in nearreal-time. 39 High-value targets (tanks) are more

clustered on transporters (especially rail) than

when moving under their own power or sitting,

and are arranged in regular arrays that may

increase their vulnerability to attacks with particular weapons. But because the vehicles are

37 See app. 6-A (vol. 2), paragraph 13 for further details.

38 For example, see Institute for Defense Analysis, Follow-On

Forces Attack, Volume III: Weapon Effectiveness and Combat Unit Effectiveness, ” IDA Report R-302.

‘gin this context, “near-real-time” means that the time delay

between target location and weapons delivery does not reduce

the accuracy of the weapon so much that its effectiveness is

lost. More generally, “near-real-time” means that only electronic

data processing and transmission delays are involved in data

transmittal, and that no manual action is involved.
Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 9 5

— — —.

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

A portable bridge (this one is American).

not themselves operating, their signatures

(especially infrared) will be different and unrecognizable by some smart weapons. Also,

armored combat vehicles are probably not

loaded with fuel and ammunition, and personnel are not on board, so many weapons may

not have the desired effect.

Targets moving under their own power require that target location updates be provided

to the weapon, either by on-board sensors or

by direct link from some external sensor system, within a few minutes of attack. Armored

combat vehicles are also loaded with fuel, ammunition, and crew, which increases munitions

effects as does being away from cover (such

as trees) that can degrade munitions effects.

Finally, if NATO can make enemy movement

down roads sufficiently risky that the enemy

must go off-road, it will substantially delay

movement forward and contribute to FOFA

objectives possibly without having to attack

them at all.

Platform and Weapon

Artillery now exists, and will certainly continue to be organic to all NATO divisions and

corps. Both gun and rocket-launched artillery

(e.g., mortars and MLRS) are available. Their

range is limited to 25 to 30 kilometers beyond

the FLOT. “Tube” artillery can deliver more

rounds (or pounds) of ordnance per hour than

can missiles or direct-attack aircraft, but has

shorter range and cannot relocate quickly.

Direct attack aircraft delivery capability also

presently exists and will certainly continue.

The bulk of attack aircraft (F-4, F-16) are rangelimited to about 150 kilometers east of the Inner German Border (IGB); the remaining aircraft (F-1 11, TORNADO, F-15E) are limited

to about 350 kilometers east of IGB. Tactical

aircraft (TACAIR) can concentrate firepower

almost anywhere across the battle front, and

relocate quickly and flexibly. But TACAIR

must penetrate into enemy airspace in order
96 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

to deliver direct attack weapons, and penetration usually requires extensive support (escort

fighters, electronic countermeasure pods, standoff jammers, hunter-killer aircraft, and artillery

or other suppressive fires) to reduce attrition,

and attrition may still be substantial.

Ground-launched ballistic missile capability

does not currently exist.40 The expected range

of the Army Tactical Missile System is 100

to 150 kilometers east of the FLOT, including

a setback of the launcher behind the FLOT to

increase its survivability. This range would allow some concentration of fires laterally across

the front, but from any one corps probably only

the adjacent corps could be supported. “Shoot

and scoot tactics are required to enable good

launcher survivability .41 Competing missions

are not defined, except for suppression of enemy

air defense (SEAD), but may evolve later.

Tactical aircraft with short-range stand-off

weapons is now an option using commandguided weapons. However, after launching

such a weapon (e.g., Maverick), the aircraft

must remain within line-of-sight of the target

while the pilot (or another crew member) guides

the weapon to its target. An autonomous airlaunched weapon with a range of up to 50 kilometers would allow the attacking aircraft to

avoid enemy air defenses in the vicinity of the

target, which are likely to be substantial. This

stand-off would reduce TACAIR attrition, but

penetration is still likely for many FOFA

missions.

A new cruise missile or a modified version

of an existing U.S. cruise missile could have

a range of about 1,200 kilometers with a conventional payload of 800 to 1,000 pounds,42 and

would provide a deep delivery capability with40The current MLRS launcher capability is planned to support this type of weapon in the Army Tactical Missile System,

so launcher capability may be considered as already existing.

The Lance weapon system, though it has a nominal conventional

role, is not sufficiently accurate to contribute greatly to FOFA

operations, and is considered a nuclear asset in this context.

“Given the problems perceived by NATO in attempting to

target Soviet SS-21 and SS-23 launchers, these tactics are likely

to achieve good survivability.

“The feasibility of a weapon of this type is discussed inch. 11.

out the need for extensive air defense suppression and the risk of attrition of long-range

bombers. The weapon would be launched from

NATO’s rear (whether from the ground or from

an aircraft); the launcher would, therefore, have

excellent survivability. This weapon would

support rapid relocation and concentration of

fire nearly any place in the theater. Because

of the required range and guidance capabilities,

the weapon may be very costly relative to all

others, but if retired strategic cruise missiles

can be modified for this mission, the cost may

be much less.

Long-range conventionally armed cruise missiles, like strategic bombers used for this mission, could raise a problem of confusion in wartime. Their use in the conventional role might

appear to be escalator, inducing the enemy

to escalate to nuclear weapons. In addition, the

development of non-nuclear cruise missiles to

be launched from B-52s would raise new problems of definition and scope for certain arms

control agreements. Further negotiations concerning these weapons may be necessary.

Target Acquisition

On-board systems are systems with sensors

on either direct-attack aircraft, or the weapons, or both. These systems allow an attacking platform and weapon to engage targets independently of any external target acquisition

system (or associated communication system),

which may fail or be defeated when needed,

rendering the mission ineffective. On-board

systems are generally the most accurate because the target acquisition system continually tracks the target.

External systems could be used for attack

by ground-launched missiles and stand-off aircraft, and could also support direct-attack aircraft. External target acquisition systems

could either stand back behind the FLOT using

long-range sensors, or observe the enemy from

a penetrating unmanned platform. These systems support target engagement from enough

distance to allow the weapons platform to

avoid terminal area defenses.
Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 9 7

Range

At close-in range (5 to 30 kilometers), a large

proportion of the vehicles in target arrays are

armored, allowing efficient destruction of the

enemy’s combat capability. Virtually everything that moves forward from the final assembly area is moving to combat and is a highvalue target for attack. Damaging these forces

is likely to have a nearly immediate effect on

the battlefield. The Warsaw Pact must in general expend resources to bring its forces to the

battle area, and attacking at the “last minute”

means that the greatest amount of mobilization and transportation effort must be made

by the enemy. Other advantages are that the

widest variety of RSTA assets can “see” targets at this range with the least obscuration

by terrain or vegetation, and the greatest number of weapons are available for attacks at this

range (including artillery and stand-off aircraft

that need not penetrate).

The primary operational disadvantage is the

risk inherent in waiting to attack the enemy

forces until they are just about to close with

friendly forces. This approach may still allow

enemy forces to concentrate with no subsequent chance to attack them before they attack. The regiments may dash forward on this

final march, particularly if it is known that

NATO has a very effective attack capability

in this range.

Intermediate range (30 to 150 kilometers) includes targets that are still heavy in armor,

though not as much so as at closer range. A

major advantage is that the time and distance

available in which to engage moving target

units is much greater than for close-in attacks

(6 to 8 hours per division v. 1.5 to 2 hours per

regiment), relaxing the need for very efficient

“conversion” of attack opportunities to actual

attacks. A related advantage is that, for attacks to disrupt, there are several types of targets (e.g., CPs, Elbe bridges) that are not prevalent closer in. At these ranges there is still

a wide variety of attack assets with sufficient

range,43 and the most powerful RSTA assets

(e.g., ASARS, Joint STARS) also have coverage to this depth. However, compared to close

range, attacks at these ranges are more costly.

Long-range attacks (150 to 800 kilometers

deep) would hit targets that are likely to be

high value and concentrated on certain transportation routes. Advantages include the fact

that attacks do not need coordination with

ground forces, and can force enemy units to

posture their moves so as to minimize exposure

to possible attack. Disadvantages of attacks

at long range are both that the cost is high

(in capability, attrition, or weapon cost) and

that the effects on the battlefield are the most

removed and hardest to predict.

“Only artillery drops out relative to closer-in attacks.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR FOFA

Only a few of the many possible operational

concepts will be described here, chosen so that

they illustrate the primary issues without necessarily being exhaustive. These operational

concepts are discussed below, in terms of

generic systems and the approaches already

discussed. 44

44App. 12-A contains a complete list of packages embodying

the operational concepts discussed above; ch. 12 discusses some

of them in detail.

Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns:

Category 1 (5 to 30 km)

The target regiments are probably originally

located well before they occupy their final assembly areas. This location process uses several different sources of data, including

COMINT and ELINT sensors and MTI radar

for location cues, fusion of this data along with

cartographic and intelligence preparation of

the battlefield (IPB) data to identify assembly areas, and high-resolution SAR imagery

for confirmation of the regimental locations.
98 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

This fused and confirmed data is sufficient to

assign resources to attack the battalion columns of the regiment when they move forward.

Within this range, gun and missile artillery

can deliver unguided anti-armor rounds with

substantial potential destruction. A capability for artillery to effectively attack moving

targets would be new, dependent on a target

acquisition system capable of following the targets and a smart anti-armor round. A remotely

piloted vehicle (RPV) target acquisition system that was normally dedicated to artillery

use could be used for this mission. In this concept the RPV would loiter near the assembly

area until the columns started moving, and

then follow each column in turn (providing location data) until it was attacked successfully,

at which point the RPV would find the next

column. The RPV data, which could be MTI

radar or E-O imagery, would be provided directly to the artillery fire-direction center. The

artillery rounds may each have only a fractional probability of kill of an armored vehicle,45 but a barrage of many (6 to 12 or more)

rounds may provide multiple kills per attack.

The primary advantage of this concept is its

use of widely proliferated artillery assets, allowing any NATO corps or division with the

requisite target acquisition system and the

appropriate ammunition to prosecute these

kinds of attacks of follow-on forces. It also does

not require close coordination across corps, because each corps would be attacking within its

own area with organic assets. This allows a

great deal of firepower to be generated. However, the primary disadvantage is closely related: the necessity for proliferating this capability across the whole front, in order to

permit defense in all corps sectors. This concept would require distributing firepower,

without the capability to concentrate this firepower in the critical areas.

Stand-Off Air Attack of Division

Columns: Category 2 (30 to 80 km)

FOFA operations at this depth would attempt to destroy enemy divisions in their

movement forward on roads from division assembly areas, or destroy the regiments of the

divisions in their final assembly areas.

This concept employs RSTA activity cues

to initiate an attack and MTI radar target acquisition data for an aircraft to deliver a shortrange weapon that dispenses smart anti-armor

submunitions. Anti-personnel anti-materiel

munitions may also be used, in order to damage the soft and lightly armored vehicles in

the division that contain personnel, ammunition, fuel (petroleum, oils, and lubricants, or

POL), and other support (e.g., maintenance,

communications). A data link from the target

acquisition system to the aircraft would update the target location immediately prior to

launch of the weapon, which would then use

inertial guidance to fly the 25 to 30 kilometers

to the target. This concept, illustrated in figure 6-2, would probably use penetration by a

relatively large “force package” of 25 to 40

aircraft46 in a less active area adjacent to the

target area, and attack from the side, in order

to minimize relative losses. The force package

includes 16 to 20 attack aircraft, each delivering 2 weapons against target columns.

This concept has the advantage that the attack aircraft need not fly over the target, and

each weapon may be capable of killing several

armored vehicles. Indeed, the force package

would be able to inflict a great deal of damage

in the span of a few minutes on a large portion

of a division. The primary disadvantages of

this concept are that it requires penetration

support, an external target acquisition system,

and lengthy, centralized planning.

‘

bLaser-guided artillery rounds such as Copperhead, when used

with an RPV (e.g., TADARS) that designates targets with a

laser, may have a high kill probability against armor.

46As discussed in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies for NATO Follow-On Forces Attack

Concept-Special Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1986), pp. 81, 96-97.
——

Ch. 6—Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces 99

Figure 6-2.—Stand-Off Air Attack of Division Columns

A. Second Echelon Division Target Set

Targets: vehicle columns

(task-organized

battalions)

Depth (km)

B. Penetrating TACAIR Raid

i

L

ff

SOURCE Inst{tute for Defense Analyses, Fol/ow-On Force Attack, Volume // Reconnaissance, Surve///ance, and Targef

Acqufs/t/on (RSTA) Architecture to Support Fo//ow-On Force Attack, IDA Report R.302. Draft F(nal April 1986,

pp v-4, V.7

Missile Attack of Division Columns: radar. This data would be updated via a fire

Category 2 (30 to 80 km) control data system to the missile launcher just

prior to launch. A setback of one-third of total

This concept uses ground-launched missiles range (a typical artillery rule of thumb), imto attack the same targets (moving columns plies a minimum missile range of 120 kilomeof a second-echelon division), also using tar- ters. A longer range of 150 to 250 kilometers

get location data from the target acquisition would allow coverage from adjacent corps. The
100 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

missile would use a high-quality navigation

system, and deliver submunitions.

The advantages of this approach are: 1) that

no separate support is needed (as it is for penetrating aircraft), 2) the long-range capability

allows concentration of fires from adjacent

corps, and 3) several armor kills per missile are

possible. Disadvantages include the need for

cross-corps coordination and the dependence

on a separate system for target data.

Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted

Units: Category 3 (80 to 150 km)

Detecting and tracking unit movements is

important in this concept. This process would

be accomplished by the same mix of RSTA sensors and fusion capabilities used to track units

for road and assembly area attacks. The chokepoint target, assumed to be a road bridge at

a river or other barrier, is targeted in peacetime and can be attacked without further target location data. High-resolution synthetic

aperture radar (SAR) keeps the area behind the

chokepoint under surveillance, until bunching

of vehicles in the area is observed. This data

is reported to an attack control center, which

matches targets to attacking aircraft and

transmits target location data to the aircraft

(which may be forming up or holding on the

NATO side of the FLOT preparing to penetrate). A force package of tactical aircraft then

attacks with stand-off weapons dispensing

APAM munitions to damage the equipment

and personnel bunched behind the chokepoint.

In addition, mines may be mixed with the

APAM munitions, to further disrupt the attacked units and their subsequent attempts

to seek cover and repair the damage.

The advantage of this concept is that it may

allow the use of munitions in a fairly open area,

where they are more effective, against a target area with a high density of vehicles and

exposed personnel. Also, stand-off weapons do

not require overflight of the target area.

Cruise Missile Attack of Deep Rail

Network: Category 5 (350 to 800 km)

Attacks at this depth will attempt to delay

enemy movements of follow-on fronts.

Attacks of this type can be tasked as soon

as cross-border operations are authorized by

NATO. Heavy bombers would fly to the fringes

of enemy territory, with minimum exposure,

and launch missiles would engage their rail and

bridge targets independently. Each missile

would navigate to the vicinity of its target (either rail segment or bridge), recognize it, and

“engage” it. For bridge attacks this would involve damaging a critical structural member.

For rail segment attacks a “stick” of mines

would be dispensed, that would embed themselves in the rail bed.47

These mines would have a delay before activation, and then actuate (all four at once) at

a random time in a given period (say, 3 days).

This would mean that the rail segment would

suddenly (and uneventfully) become dangerous to a passing train. Were a train to come

by, one or more mines would be detonated.

The advantages of this approach include the

obviation of wartime target acquisition and the

need to penetrate. Risks remain that enemy

redeployment of air defenses would impede

barrier maintenance, or that during a long

mobilization Soviet fronts would deploy so far

forward as to render this concept ineffective.

“Perhaps four mines could be carried by each missile, comprising a stick to close one rail segment with high confidence.
Chapter 7

Soviet Responses to FOFA
CONTENTS

Page

Political Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 103

Military Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................105
Chapter 7

Soviet Responses to FOFA

Soviet writings suggest that FOFA has become an important issue in the U. S. S. R., one

that might generate important political and

military responses. Soviet planners are clearly

concerned about FOFA, both as a strategy for

the West, and as a reflection of a new set of

NATO capabilities they call reconnaissance

(“recce”) strike complexes, or RSCs. The Soviets have launched a propaganda campaign,

at home and abroad, to counter FOFA and to

use the controversy FOFA has generated to

drive a wedge into NATO. They have also discussed changes in military operations that

could well change the threat that FOFA is responding to.

This chapter examines what the Soviets are

now saying about FOFA, what Soviet political and military responses to FOFA may already have been, and what possible responses

we might see in the future. It is important to

keep in mind, however, that the Soviets view

FOFA primarily against the backdrop of a bigger whole, as another piece in the overall U. S./

NATO military strategy. Soviet responses to

FOFA, therefore, should be viewed as responses

to the whole changing nature of a possible

East-West confrontation, and not necessarily

just to FOFA per se.

POLITICAL RESPONSES

The Soviet political response to FOFA has

been strong since the U.S. Army’s adoption

of AirLand Battle in 1982 and the approval

of FOFA by the NATO Defense Planning Committee in 1984. Although FOFA has not become as big a political issue in the U.S.S.R.

as arms control or SDI, the Soviet press, both

domestic and foreign, has been replete with

articles and statements about the destabilizing effects of FOFA and its dangers for all

mankind.

This portrayal addresses several Soviet goals

both abroad and at home. Abroad, it allows

the Soviets to play on already existing European apprehensions about the feasibility and

cost of FOFA and the possible negative impact of FOFA for deterrence and arms control.

By so doing, it works toward two ends: to drive

a wedge between the United States and Europe;

and, by painting the United States as the clear

aggressor threatening world peace, to present

a more peace-loving image of the U.S.S.R. This

“peace offensive “ is laced with threats that,

should such a clearly offensive and aggressive

NATO strategy be adopted, the U.S.S.R. unfortunately would be forced to build yet more

military systems in response. Ultimately, the

Soviets hope to use these arguments to delay

or prevent NATO from acquiring FOFA systems. Within the U. S. S. R., these arguments

justify further military buildup as a necessary

defensive response to U.S. aggression, and aim

to rally domestic support behind the current

Soviet leadership.

Thus, the Soviet press consistently depicts

FOFA as offensive and aggressive; as representing an attempt by the United States to

gain conventional superiority and give NATO

forces a “first strike” capability; and as having the potential to lower rather than raise the

nuclear threshold by bordering on the capabilities of theater nuclear weapons. As discussed in the Soviet military newspaper Red

Star, for example:

In a word, this weapon [recce strike complex] relates to the offensive with the goal of

achieving military superiority over governments of the socialist commonwealth, and securing with military strength a one-sided superiority by the application of sudden strikes

and the conduct of protracted military activities.

103
104 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The arguments of NATO leaders, that with

the application of a new concept they would

diminish the danger of nuclear war in Europe, lack any basis and are deliberate lies. As

shown by the press, the new forms and systems of common types of weapons . . . approach the destructive potential of low-yield

nuclear munitions. Moreover, with the acceptance of these concepts, Pentagon and NATO

strategies do not at all reject the possibility

of applying nuclear weapons first. Witness

the deployment in Europe of American firststrike missiles.1

FOFA is also painted as a “provocative escalation, creating a new and expensive arms

race:

Hiding behind false references to a “Soviet

military threat, ” the U.S. administration is

initiating a new, dangerous spiral in the arms

race, of which the illusory objective is to

achieve superiority over the armed forces of

the socialist fraternity. This is why the Pentagon foresees creating qualitatively new resources of armed conflict, besides improving

nuclear weapons.2

It is painted as militarily dangerous and

destabilizing, in that the Warsaw Pact would

be unable to distinguish between a conventional and nuclear strike and would be forced

to respond with a nuclear barrage:

. . . But the main danger with which the implementation of this concept is fraught for

Europe lies somewhere else: It is utterly impossible to tell the difference between cruise

missiles with conventional warheads and cruise

missiles with nuclear warheads. Therefore,

with the approach of these missiles to “secondechelon targets, ” the side subjected to an attack will have no other option than to launch

a retaliatory nuclear strike necessitating a

switchover to automatic well in advance.3

And in economic terms, FOFA is painted as

clearly American, an attempt by the United

‘Lt. Col. A. Sergeev, “Pazvedyvatel’noudarnye kompleksy:

Rasskazyvaem po pros’be chitatelei” (“Reconnaissance Strike

Complexes: Discussion at the Request of Readers”), Krmmu”a

Zvezda, Feb. 14, 1986, p. 3.

2Maj. Gen. M. Belov and Lt. Col. V. Shchukin, “Razvedyvatel’noporazhaiushchie kompleksy armii S. Sh.A, ” (“ReconnaissanceFire Complexes of the U.S. Army”), VoennV” Vestnik,

No. 1, January 1985, p. 86.

‘Nikolai Portugalov, “FOFA and Other Atlantic Monsters, ”

Moscow IVews, Dec. 30, 1984, p. 5.

Soviet Cartoon Depiction of the “Rogers Plan”

I

*.J

“They are taking aim ., .“

A caption with the cartoon reads: “In Brussels, the Military

Planning Committee of NATO has embraced a new aggressive concept—the so-called ‘Rogers Plan’. The plan foresees

a strategy of striking deep into the territory of the enemy—

i.e., the territory of the socialist countries—in the event of

a ‘crisis situation ’.”

SOURCE Krasrra/a Zvezda (Red Star), Nov 13, 19S4, p 3 Reprinted with permls.

sion of the Embassy of the U S S R , Washington, DC

States to manipulate its NATO Allies into being tied not only to a U.S. strategy, but to U.S.

technology:

Europe has been allotted the role of a figure intended to be sacrificed in another project . . . Rogers declares that this [equipping

NATO with FOFA weapon systems] will require from the European countries an additional military spending of 30 billion dollars . . . The USA will naturally be the chief

purveyor of the new weapons systems.4

Ultimately, FOFA is presented as not just

militarily destabilizing, but politically counterproductive to the overall East/West relationship. According to Mr. A. Kokoshin, of the

USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, “the implementation of the Rogers Plan can undermine

all chances for success of the negotiations on

the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe and seriously hinder a constructive solution to the problem of confidence building measures . . ."5

‘Ibid.

‘A. Kokoshin, “The Rogers Plan: Alternative Defense Concepts and Security in Europe, ” IWonomilm, Politikq 1deolo@”a,

Aug. 13, 1985, pp. 3-14.
Ch. 7—Soviet Responses to FOFA ● 105

MILITARY RESPONSES

Beyond politics, the Soviets view FOFA as

presenting real, if not potentially “revolutionary” military challenges. “Such a qualitative

leap in the development of conventional weapens, ” Marshal Ogarkov writes, “inevitably entails a change in the nature of preparing and

conducting operations."6

Soviet concerns with FOFA are twofold: the

concept itself, and the development of new

weapons systems associated with, but not necessarily restricted to implementing those concepts. The Soviet press indicates that Soviet

responses are also twofold: to modify their tactics and field new weapons to lessen the vulnerability of their follow-on forces to attack—

i.e., by increasing the combat power of the first

echelon, increasing protection of the rear troops,

and focusing more attention in speeding up the

command and control process; and to develop

the capability to preemptively attack these

NATO reconnaissance (“recce”) strike complexes, or RSCs.

As a concept, the Soviets are concerned that

FOFA will extend the battle into their rear:

The emergence in the armies of the developed capitalist countries of new, and especially high-precision weapons, is greatly

changing the “face” of modern combat by

constantly raising the intensity of the fire

struggle. Whereas in past wars the predominant place belonged to a close exchange of

fire, present conditions have seen a sharp increase in the significance not only of the close

exchange of fire, but also of the long-range

exchange of fire-that is, simultaneous fire

against practically the entire depth of the

enemy’s combat formation.7

One Soviet response might be to increase the

combat power of the first echelons by reallocating units from the second to the first echelons,

such as by bringing more divisions forward.

‘Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, “Zashchita sotsialisma: opyt istorii i sovremennosti ” (“The Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and the Present Day’ ‘), Krasnm”a Zvezda, May 9, 1984, pp 2-3.

7Maj. Gen. I. Vorob’yev, “Sovremennoe oruzhie i taktika”

(“Modem Weapons and Tactics”), Krasnm”a Zvezda, June 20,

1984, p. 2.

Indeed, FOFA might well force the Soviets to

mobilize earlier and more overtly. If the Soviets

were convinced that the West had the capability to attack their forces on roads and/or railroads, it would force the Soviets to choose between surprise and an assured ability to bring

their forces forward. Should they decide to

bring them forward before the war starts, the

West would be provided with a more unambiguous warning of their mobilization and intentions.

Alternatively, the Soviets could attempt to

increase the strength of existing units already

forward, such as through changes in organization and equipment, or by placing more Soviet

(as opposed to East European) divisions up

front.8 According to some Western observers,

the Soviets have already been doing the former

over the past several years and might well increase their efforts. The U.S.S.R. has had a continuing program to modernize ground forces

in Central Europe, apparently adding a new

generation of tanks and fielding new artillery,

infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons,

and close support aircraft and helicopter gunships. Some believe this indicates that the Soviet Union already “has quite significantly

downgraded the strategic importance of follow8See Boyd D. Sutton, “Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence

of Central Europe, ” Survival, March/April 1984, pp. 64-65.
106 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit: U S Department of Defense

Example of a camouflaged military vehicle.

on conventional forces precisely at the moment

when some in the West are trying to persuade

us that we should divert large resources to attacking them.”9

In addition, Soviet writings emphasize the

need for “significant changes in tactics”10 and

increased protection of forces in the rear through

increased air defense and camouflage. Previously, Soviet combat forces moving up in the

rear were not in a combat environment. With

FOFA, they would have to deal with being in

a combat situation possibly from the beginning:

High-precision weapons considerably increase troop vulnerability and, accordingly,

generate increased requirements for ensuring

—— . . . . —-—.

‘Col. Jonathon Alford, “NATO, ET and New Conventional

Strategy,” Atlantic Quarterly, vol. II, No. 4, winter 1984, p. 297.

‘“Major Gen, I. Vorob’yev, op. cit.

the survivability

units . . . 11

Soviet doctrine

and reliable protection of

and writings consistently

emphasize the importance of maskirovka--a

term encompassing the concepts of deception,

camouflage, and the masking effects of ground,

smoke, dazzling light, etc. Commanders in the

rear must devote greater efforts to “the skillful utilization . . . of natural features of the local terrain, the careful preparation of field

defenses, the implementation of deception

measures, and to misleading the enemy with

regard to the unit true location."12 Likewise,

the Soviets may also change timing, spacing,

modes of transportation, or build more redun-

“Major General 1. Vorob’yev, “Sovremennoe oruzhie i taktika, ” op cit.

1’Ibid.
Ch. 7–Soviet Responses to FOFA 107

dancy or mobility into their system. They may

well have to operate with troops highly dispersed and camouflaged-as if in a nuclear

environment—so as not to present easily destroyable targets, even though operating this

way might significantly slow down their rate

of advance.13 And the Soviets continually discuss the need for increased protection of their

rear forces through improved air defense and

counter-air capabilities.14

Soviet writings, however, suggest that the

Soviets may be less concerned about FOFA

as a concept than they are about the weapons

systems themselves, and in particular, the potential ability of quick-reacting and precisionguided weapons to act more quickly than their

command and control cycle can respond:

The introduction of super-accurate selfguiding systems combining recce and strike

functions allows for very short times to acquire the target, prepare and fire the weapon,

and hit the target. Systems such as Assault

Breaker, self-homing and laser-guided, infrared or radio-seeking projectiles coupled

with automated artillery fire control systems . . . allow engagement times to be reduced by a factor of 10-15.

The general speeding up of the battlefield has

sharply curtailed the time available to commanders and staff for making and implementing decisions. This has made it most important

to speed up the collection of intelligence, its

analysis, making a decision, giving orders,

organizing cooperation and so on. The guidelines of the past are no longer appropriate. In

the Great Patriotic War, a regiment and a battalion often had up to 3-4 days to prepare for

an offensive—now it is much less. 15

——.— — -. .

‘3See, for example, Gen. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika, Moscow,

1984, and Michael J. Sterling, Soviet Reactions to NATO’s

Emer&”ng Technolo~”es for Deep Attack, The Rand Corp., N2294-AF, August 1985.

“SEW, for example, Col. Gen. I. Golushko, “Tyl v usloviiakh

prirneneniya protivnikom vysokotochnogo oruzhita” (“The Rear

Area Under Conditions of the Enemy’s Use of High-Precision

Weapons”), Tyl i Snabzhem”y, No. 7, 1984, pp. 13-17.

“Maj Gen I. Vorob’yev, “Vrernia v boiu ” (“Time in Battle”),

Krasnaia Zvezda, Nov. 9, 1985, p. 2. According to Vorob’yev,

“six to ten minutes are needed for the ‘search and destroy’ cycle of the RSC Assault Breaker to be performed. This amount

of time limits troop operations. Troops must be able to move

out from under a strike or use other defensive measures during

this short time period. ”

As discussed in chapter 4, the Soviet C*

structure was designed according to certain

norms, and in such a way that the nature of

the process itself would be somewhat adaptive to the time available. But if decision time

becomes too short, the Soviets emphasize, the

quality of decisions will greatly erode. Perhaps

the greatest challenge from FOFA, therefore,

is that it cuts down on the time available for

decisionmaking, leading to a reduction in cycle time for planning and replanning an operation. This may be viewed as only exacerbating

what the Soviets have seen as a long-standing

challenge of improving their troop control system so that it can operate within the time available and still allow for sound decisions.

Soviet writings suggest that the Soviets see

possible responses to this problem in two directions. The first includes “technical’ responses,

in terms of further automation of command

and control systems. A great deal of effort is

being devoted to streamlining and automating C2 procedures both to speed the pace of

decisionmaking and to improve the quality of

decisions. In addition, the Soviets have emphasized “operational-tactical” responses, “relating to the methods of work of commanders and

staffs, their training and the way they use C2

means. ” This may indicate a rethinking of

some of the methods used to make decisions

and plan, so that reactions can take place much

faster.

Included here is the long-standing problem

of initiative. For some time now, the Soviet

system has been pulling in two directions. In

principle, the Soviet military system requires

that a soldier be able to perform simple battlefield tasks in any conditions on the battlefield. These are learned by drill, so that when

“initiative’ may be asked of soldiers, it is generally restricted to initiating the appropriate

drill under whatever circumstances he may

find himself.

With the sharp reduction in time which the

Soviets see for making and executing these decisions, however, Soviet writings are now reflecting an apparent encouragement of greater

initiative at lower levels, for example, for junior officers at the platoon, company, and bat-
108 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

talion level. For example, in addition to the concept of “initsiativa”—which suggests selecting

the right drill in the right circumstances-two

concepts have received renewed emphasis in

Soviet parlance: “smekalka,” which implies doing something unconventional in those situations where no drill may apply; and “tvorchestvo, ” connoting a longer term solution, an

imaginative choice of the correct drill.16

This not only complicates Soviet planning,

but Soviet commanders must also deal with

subordinates who are the products of a society where initiative has always been discouraged, if not penalized, and where reluctance

to take on responsibility is strong. There will

be major social and cultural hurdles to jump

over, not only for reconciling the notion of initiative itself with Soviet command and control, but also to effectively imbue their fighting force with fundamentally new attitudes.

Finally, the Soviets are discussing the need

to preemptively attack the weapons systems

associated with FOFA, or Western recce-strike

complexes (RSCs), and allege that they may

be forced into developing their own “reccestrike” and “recce-fire” complexes17 should

“See, for example, Kh. Grishchenko, “Proiavliaia smekalku

i smelost’ (’‘Displaying Native Wit and Boldness’ ‘), Voermyi

Istoricheskie Zhurnal, February 1986, p. 39.

“The Soviets make a distinction between recce-strike and

reccefire complexes. According to Maj. Gen. Belov, ‘‘if the strike

element annihilates the target by fire (for example with conventional artillery or rockets) the complex is called a reconnaissance-fire complex, while if it does so by a missile strike (tactical and army aviation, tactical and operational tactical missile

launchers, ) it is called a reconnaissance-strike complex. Therefore reconnaissancefire complexes are more of a tactical resource

while reconnaissance-strike complexes are operational resources. ” See Maj Gen A. Belov, op. cit.

FOFA be implemented. As Vorob’yev has

noted:

It is believed that the use of high-precision

weapons will call for significant changes in

tactics. . . . It will be more important to deliver preemptive fire strikes to destroy highprecision weapons systems . . .

Success in a battle being waged with quickreacting, long-range, high-precision combat

complexes demands active reconnaissance in

order to detect the enemy’s preparations in

time to inflict fire attacks, the maintenance of

units in constant readiness to repulse the

enemy’s employment of new weapons systems,

and the concealment of measures undertaken

in preparation for the battle. It is important

to ensure reliable air cover for the units, to undertake protective measures in a timely fashion, and to preempt the enemy in the opening

fire to immediately destroy his weapons . . . 18

As of now, the Soviets are apparently focusing on using existing force elements for these

kinds of missions, combining existing reconnaissance assets with target assessment centers and then having a group of weapons “on

call” to attack the targets as soon as they are

identified. Although apparently less sophisticated than Western efforts, Soviet capabilities

in this area would undoubtedly grow as new

technology becomes available. Although the

Soviets have said that their RSCs area direct

response to FOFA, evidence suggests that

they are an important part of Soviet military

planning as it assesses the overall context of

a potential East-West military confrontation.

18Maj, Gen 1. Vorob’yev, op. cit.
Chapter 8

European Views on FOFA
—

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................111

Current Positions of the Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...112

West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......113

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............115

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............115

The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........116

Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............117

Intra-European Cooperation on SOFA . . . . . . . . . ....................117

The 1985 Nunn Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...118

Initial European Reaction To FOFA . ...............................118

The Political Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......120

The ’’Burden Sharing” Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..+ ..121

Evolution of European Attitudes Toward FOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..122

Factors Underlying European Attitudes Toward FOFA . ...............123

The Role of NATO’s Conventional Forces . .........................124

High Technology and NATO Defense. . . . . .........................126

Options for Cultivating Additional European Support for FOFA .. ......127

Clarify the U.S. Priority for FOFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........127

Set Realistic Funding and Deployment Goals . ......................128

Present FOFA in a More Positive Light . ..........................128

Emphasize Dual-Use, Reemphasize Dual-Capable. . ..................129

Accommodate European Industrial Interests . . . . . . . ........+ . ......129

Clarify Unilateral Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..129

Clarify the Relationship Between FOFA and AirLand Battle. . ........130

Emphasize the Role of FOFA in Enhancing Deterrence and

Improving Crisis Management . . . . . . ............................130

Emphasize the Role of Joint STARS, in Particular,

in Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130

FOFA and the NATO Alliance . . . . . . . . . . ...........................130
Chapter 8

European Views on FOFA

INTRODUCTION

FOFA, when first proposed, appeared to be

quite ambitious and evoked considerable

skepticism—and some outright opposition—

on the part of the European members of

NATO. As this report goes to press, the European attitude has become one of cautious support, tempered by concern over funding limitations and a great reluctance to buy U.S.

weapons or even U.S. weapons technology. The

governments of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the United Kingdom (U. K.)

have taken a cautious approach, emphasizing

that FOFA implementation will be slow and

incremental; the opposition parties have generally declared themselves against the concept.

The smaller nations in the region have generally followed the approach of the German Government.

Clarification and refinement of the initial

FOFA concept–particularly to answer European concerns–led to the November 1984 approval of the Long Term Planning Guideline

for FOFA by the NATO Defense Planning

Committee. While this provided a politicallevel endorsement by the Allies of FOFA as

one of several key mission concepts, commitments did not extend further than to study how

FOFA should be implemented. Much skepticism remained among the Europeans regarding its implementation and the priority it

should have within NATO’s strategy.

Over the past 2 years, the European Allies

have come to understand that some of their

early objections were based on misunderstandings of FOFA, while military planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

(SHAPE) and in the Pentagon have come to

redefine FOFA in ways that are less technically challenging and more in keeping with the

common views of the Allies.

The staff at SHAPE has been working to

define FOFA in more specific terms as a basis

for operational and procurement planning, and

discussions have been proceeding in the Conference of National Armaments Directors

(CNAD) and other fora to define the systems

the nations will procure to support FOFA. As

these proceed and interact, there is movement

toward a consensus: the individual nations are

becoming more supportive of FOFA as a concept, and FOFA is being modified to take into

account their concerns and their existing defense programs.

Currently, the ability to attack follow-on

forces to great depths remains part of the

FOFA concept and a possible long-term goal.

In the near term, however, interest has focused

on shorter ranges. Agreement is emerging to

define systems already in the development

pipeline-e. g., artillery enhancement, MLRS

and RPVs—as contributions to FOFA, and

some progress has been made toward signing

agreements for cooperative development and

production of other systems such as the modular stand-off weapon. As yet, the United

States has obtained no official European interest in what it views as two key systems:

Joint STARS and ATACMS, although within

some nations there is growing interest.

This chapter reviews the current positions

of our Allies and the evolution of those positions, discussing the reasons for their early opposition and why this opposition has so greatly

diminished. It provides insights into some of

the underlying differences in national interests

of the NATO Allies, and into the process by

which these differences can be reconciled, given

an overriding political commitment to keep

NATO working together. In particular, the

chapter:

●

●

discusses the positions of the Central Region Allies regarding FOFA;

presents the principal European views of

111
112

●

● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

FOFA, including those of major opposi- c analyzes the factors that underlie the

tion parties; European positions; and

describes the evolution of European atti- ● identifies ways the United States might

tudes toward FOFA; gain additional support for FOFA. -

CURRENT POSITIONS OF THE ALLIES

In contrast to such issues as Pershing II deployment in Europe, which required the Allies

to make sharp and clear choices, FOFA provides ample room for each nation to define its

contribution in the way it chooses. FOFA could

encompass all systems that reach from just

behind the close battle to as far into eastern

Europe as possible, and thus could include missions that have previously been considered as

traditional close air support and interdiction

fire support within NATO. Although the

United States has favored an ambitious deep

strike effort, the Europeans have a pronounced

preference for shorter range systems. Thus,

European response to FOFA thus far has been

largely a re-labeling of previously planned

short-range weapons, sensor systems, and air

interdiction improvements as contributions to

FOFA, but there also appears to be growing

interest in developing and producing more advanced systems.

The process of defining national positions

and arriving at a consensus within NATO on

major initiatives such as FOFA has traditionally been slow, and may still be in an early stage

of evolution in the case of FOFA. The concept

was originated by SHAPE and refined by the

NATO international staff; it has now passed

primarily to the CNAD to work out the means
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 113

of implementation. The characterization of a

European position on FOFA is further complicated because the concept is still undergoing

development and revision by its two original

supporters, SHAPE and the United States.

Nonetheless, there appear to have been significant shifts in European attitudes over the

past year. Despite two major NATO studies

that found great merit in the FOFA concept

(one conducted by the SHAPE Technical Centre and the other by the NATO Defence Research Group), early 1986 evidenced much

skepticism, particularly among the Germans,

who argued that FOFA should be no greater

than third priority, after the close battle and

the air battle. FOFA was seen as a new dimension of warfare, competing with and detracting from the close battle. There was also skepticism regarding the feasibility of the

technologies needed to implement FOFA.

More recent indications suggest that the initial strongly skeptical attitude has been changing. The Europeans now appear willing to discuss possible development of FOFA systems

with ranges up to 150 kilometers beyond the

FLOT, in distinction to their previous position

which would limit consideration of FOFA systems to a range of about 30 kilometers. Concern for diverting resources from the first echelon battle, and insistence on setting a relatively

low priority for FOFA have become muted.

Emphasis is on cost, cost-effectiveness, comparisons of U.S. and European systems, and

how to produce the necessary systems. Work

is now under way to agree on the systems that

would be candidates to fill the various needs

that fall under FOFA.

These developments were paralleled during

1986 in the activities of the FOFA II working

group, a quasi-official body created by the U.S.

Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Science

Board to explore strategies for cooperation on

FOFA systems with the Allies on a bilateral

basis. Participation of European governmental

and industrial representatives in the meetings

of the FOFA II working group has broadened.

It is expected that the working group will be

able to offer recommendations on five to seven

FOFA-related programs when it reports to

NATO in the spring of 1987.

West Germany

The FRG, as the major European contributor to NATO and the country most likely to

be affected by FOFA deployments, wields considerable influence on the Allies’ views concerning FOFA. While affirming support for FOFA

in principle, the FRG has thus far underlined

that FOFA ranks behind first echelon defense

and counter-air in its military priorities, although the Germans appear to have dropped

an effort to get NATO to assign priorities

among the key missions.1 The German Government views FOFA as a supplement or supporting function for the main mission of forward defense and preventing a breakthrough.

This arises, at least in part, from fundamental political considerations: forward defense is

a cornerstone of membership in NATO for the

FRG with one-third of its population and onefourth of its industry within 60 miles of the

Warsaw Pact. Early German concerns that

FOFA was too aggressive for NATO, and that

rapid advances by the stronger nations would

discourage the weaker nations and put strains

on NATO—although still present—appear to

be waning.

Nevertheless, Germany is procuring some

systems for FOFA, is developing others, and

is at least exploring cooperative efforts on still

others. The Germans believe that killing deep

is more expensive than killing at shorter

ranges, and that therefore only a limited FOFA

capability will be affordable. This cannot be

applied in a “hose” approach, but must rather

be related to finding and blunting the "schwerpunkt, ” or focus of an attack.

——

IFRG officials have consistently emphasized the first echelon threat in commenting on FOFA. FRG Defense Minister

Woerner stated: “It (FOFA) is a concept we support, but there

must not be the slightest doubt that stopping the first echelon

has first priority for the FRG and the Alliance as a whole, because it would make little sense to fight the second echelon once

the first one has reached the Rhine. ” Quoted in Wehrtechnik,

February 1984.
114 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit Messerschm/tt.Bo/kow. B/ohm GmbH

West German Tornado aircraft dispensing KB-44 submunitions.

The Bundeswehr is interested in improving

155mm artillery and buying the Multiple Launch

Rocket System (MLRS), as well as in improving reconnaissance through the CL289 and

other RPVs. For longer ranges, they see ballistic missiles, like ATACMS, as primarily

suited to stationary soft targets, and are developing combat drones to attack tanks.2 For

air interdiction, the Luftwaffe wants to upgrade the combat role of the Tornado fighter

aircraft, which it produces jointly with the

United Kingdom and Italy. The Germans believe that the KB-44 submunition dropped by

the Tornado is the best anti-armor submunition currently available. For the future, they

are investigating the “vertical ballistic weapo n , a sophisticated dispenser for a submunition of greater lethality than the KB-44, and

are participating in the Modular Stand-Off

Weapon (MSOW) program.

The Germans may be slowly developing an

interest in Joint STARS, but they appear to

be very cautious about it. Although they recognize the value of continuous broad area surveillance, they see Joint STARS as going beyond the Army’s needs (out to 75 kilometers),

but not satisfying the Air Force’s needs for

surveillance out to as much as 500 kilometers.

‘The FRG Ministry of Defense has budgeted DM 650 million

for reconnaissance RPVs during 1989-97. Antitank combat

drones are not budgeted until 1997. See Karl Schnell; “Pilotless Small Air Vehicles for the Army, ” W’ehrtechnik, May 1985.

The FRG position appears to be evolving.

Some U.S. observers have linked this to a recently heightened West German concern, frequently enunciated by Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, about the need for defense

against the threat posed by Warsaw Pact conventionally armed theater ballistic missiles

(TBMs). Although TBM defense could involve

a wide variety of active and passive measures

outside the scope of FOFA, an important element might be the development of a conventional missile that could strike Warsaw Pact

TBM launchers beyond present artillery range.

It should be noted, however, that thus far the

FRG has not indicated an interest in the development or deployment of such a missile.

The Germans are great believers in cooperative ventures; roughly 70 percent of their capital expenditures are for cooperative programs.

However, unlike the British and French, their

focus is almost exclusively on systems for use

in the Central Region and they tend to shy

away from exporting military equipment. Consequently, their defense industries are not

nearly as large as the British or French. They

believe that successful development programs

ought to stimulate technology development

among all the partners, but that the partners

ought to be on comparable technological levels.

They see themselves as being advanced in munitions, delivery sensors, and attack drones.
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 115

United Kingdom

While maintaining some reservations about

whether the concept and technology can actually be made to work, the British are quite

receptive to FOFA. From a pragmatic perspective, however, neither the Army nor the Royal

Air Force (RAF) is confident about getting the

resources to implement it. Continued economic

problems in the United Kingdom will sharply

limit Britain’s ability to invest in expensive

new systems. The U.K. defense budget will

likely decline in real terms over the next several years,3 and heavy commitments for the

Trident II program will make it very difficult

for the United Kingdom to undertake any major initiative in conventional defense improvements.

Like the other Europeans, the British are

planning to improve their artillery and buy the

MLRS. Investment in any longer range ground

systems would occur farther in the future, if

at all. The British are concerned about having

the targeting systems to employ even MLRS

in their corps sector. Beginning in 1988, they

will procure the Phoenix Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) for this purpose. They are developing the ASTOR system and keeping an open

mind on the possibility y of a jointly funded Joint

STARS for the entire Central Region. For interdiction, the British are planning to improve

the BL755 anti-armor cluster weapon and procure an improved Harrier aircraft with longer

range. The mainstay of their interdiction capability will remain the Tornado.

The British believe that they have strong

defense industries that can contribute to cooperative programs in important ways. However, they point to difficulties of cooperating

with the United States, particularly on highly

classified (so-called black) programs.

France

Although France is not a member of the

NATO integrated command, it exerts consider3For 1987, the British defense budget is scheduled to remain

flat in cash terms, with a forecast real decline of 3 to 4 percent.

See “Pay Up or Cut Up, ” The Econom”st, Mar. 29, 1986.

able influence on European thinking about conventional defense issues. The French have no

direct involvement in a SHAPE concept; the

French military has expressed some interest,

however, in equipping its forces stationed in

France and the FRG with deep strike conventional weapons. Budget constraints, however,

and a lack of strong interest in such systems

by the French armaments industry will serve

to limit French options. The French take it as

a general principle that their forces should be

light and mobile; they are hesitant to burden

their ground forces with cumbersome systems

for deep attack, and they build small aircraft

that are less capable than those of other nations of carrying the larger ordnance loads necessary for FOFA.

In general, the French are not enthusiastic

about major conventional defense enhancements in NATO, which they see as diluting the

threat of nuclear retaliation on which France

bases its defense strategy. The trend, however,

is toward greater French interest in participation in NATO’s conventional defense, and the

French have been active in technological developments. This may reflect recent efforts at

improving coordination with the FRG on conventional defense matters as well as the desire of the French armaments industry to keep

up with developments that may affect the

NATO arms market.

Because France exports about half of its armaments production, it is extremely sensitive

to the economic and commercial aspects of U.S.

defense initiatives such as the “Emerging

Technologies” program, SDI and FOFA, and

thus has tended to crystallize European discontent with what is perceived to be an unfair

imbalance in U.S. high-technology defense

trade with Europe.’ The recent decline in Middle East oil revenues has sharply affected

French arms exports, and has increased French

‘The threat to French industry from FOFA was noted by a

leading French journal: “. . . it is impossible to ignore the American pressure to sell this new generation of IFOFA] weapons

to its European Allies. The future of the French armaments

industry—No. 3 in the world—and hundreds of thousands of

French jobs are at stake. “ “Can France Defend Herself?” Le

Nouve] Observateur, January 1984.
116 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Photo credft, Messerschmitf-60/kow. Blohm GmbH

Developmental French-German Apache dispensing submunitions.

interest in the NATO market and intraEuropean cooperative production arrangements, including some short-range FOFA systems. The French are very interested in cooperative ventures, but view them as complex

affairs and are skeptical about their potential

success. Protection of French cash flow, defense industries, and technology base will all

be factors in joining cooperative programs.

The Netherlands

The Dutch fully support FOFA as a key mission concept, but within their own forces, place

higher priority on defeat of the lead echelon,

air defense, and air support of the Army. They

support NATO’s current focus on the region

within 150 kilometers of the FLOT, but will

focus their own efforts on ranges out to about

30 kilometers, and on improvements in the ability of the Royal Netherlands Air Force to perform battlefield air interdiction.

The Royal Netherlands Army believes that

greatest effect can be obtained by attacking

ground combat units, particular those regiments of the second tactical echelon that are

moving to join the battle. These can best be

identified when they are 25 to 30 kilometers

beyond the FLOT. To satisfy these requirements, they look to improved 155mm artillery,

MLRS, and improved RPVs with real-time capabilities. The Dutch are buying MLRS directly from the United States to avoid delays in

the European cooperative MLRS program.

They believe that the systems necessary for

deeper attack are beyond their means, al-
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 117

though they might be interested in NATO–

as distinct from national-procurement of systems like Joint STARS.

The Dutch have an all F-16 Air Force which

they are interested in upgrading with better

munitions, self-protection, reconnaissance

pods, and equipment to allow them to operate

at night. Both the Army and the Air Force are

interested in smart anti-armor submunitions.

The Dutch are interested in cooperative programs as preferable to simple purchase of

military equipment abroad, but tend to be cautious. They have withdrawn from some programs which did not meet their needs–e.g.,

the MLRS program because it was too slow,

and some air-delivered weapons because they

became incompatible with single-seat F-16s.

While recognizing the success of the F-16 program, they are uncomfortable with co-production of systems designed elsewhere, because

these do not stimulate Dutch technological development.

Belgium

The Belgians have never doubted the soundness of the military principles behind, or the

need for, FOFA, but their ability to contribute is limited both by funding and by a problem common among small nations–the inefficiency inherent in a small force maintaining

a large variety of systems.

The Belgian Army falls far short of what it

believes it needs to defend with high confidence

against the lead echelon. Future funding is

therefore likely to be directed primarily toward

the close battle. Belgium would like to buy the

MLRS, but that would be at least 10 years into

the future and would require timely RSTA and

C

3 that the Belgian corps currently does not

have. The Belgians are looking toward improvements to their Epervier drone system,

first fielded in 1964, to make it more compatible with MLRS and to programs such as Limited Operational Capability-Europe (LOC-E)

and Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (B ICES). Belgium has the

conventionally armed Lance missile which,

when targeted by Epervier, could be used

against soft targets that do not move often

(although its accuracy is not high). In considering a replacement for Lance, first priority

would be on the nuclear mission. They would

be unlikely to buy a conventional tactical missile system, such as ATACMS.

The Air Force is not likely to invest in hightech, special-purpose weapons anytime soon.

They consider themselves to be too small to

maintain a variety of weapons and supporting systems. Instead, they will concentrate on

general-purpose bombs—including some laser

guidance kits—that can be used to support a

variety of missions. They see themselves as

contributing to delay and disruption, and are

willing to accept a large degree of specialization among the various national air forces.

Intra-European Cooperation on FOFA

While FOFA has contributed to intensifying intra-European discussion of independent

armaments production, it appears that cost

considerations, among other factors, will tend

to limit the range of cooperative interest to

shallow strike weapons and sensors. The Independent European Programme Group currently lists 31 cooperative projects, only 5 of

which have direct FOFA application: RPVs;

Surveillance and Target Acquisition; 155mm

artillery; Maverick D; and third-generation

Anti-Tank Guided Weapons. Most of these

systems are for attack at ranges of less than

50 kilometers. Further, intra-European cooperation on weapons production has been hampered due to divergent national interests and

priorities. Long-range FOFA systems are not

likely to be of priority cooperative interest due

to their high cost and specificity to the Central Front threat, which makes them unlikely

candidates for export to third countries.5

‘The relationship between range, cost and export potential

which influence European thinking about FOFA systems production is evidenced in an article by Emile Blanc, then French

Delegate General for Armaments:

M’hat is involved in the case of emerging technologies that

are repeatedly mentioned are terminal guidance, microelectronics, highly sensitive sensors and the like. These are relatively

difficult to solve, but not unsolvable, As for the danger to ex-
118 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The 1985 Nunn Amendment

In an effort to respond to European industrial concerns, reduce duplication of effort, and

improve the climate for U.S./European armaments cooperation, the 1985 Nunn Amendment authorized DoD funding of cooperative

research and development projects and sideby-side comparative tests of U.S. and European weapons systems. The appropriation for

these purposes for fiscal year 1986 was $145

million, which was increased to $185 million

in fiscal year 1987. To qualify for funding,

proposals must have at least one European

partner. The forum for discussion of Nunn

Amendment proposals has been the CNAD,

in which national armaments directors may indicate initial interest in participating in a cooperative venture by issuing “statements of

intent, which may result in signing of contracts among armaments firms in the interested countries. The first such contracts are

expected to be signed in the fall of 1987.

Although the Nunn Amendment was not

specifically designed to foster cooperation on

FOFA, five of the ten proposals for which

“statements of intent” have been issued thus

far have a FOFA application. These are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

MSOW–Modular Stand-off Weapon (airlaunched, short and long range for fixed

and moving targets, independent

guidance);

APGM—155mm Autonomous Precision

Guided Munition;

ARDS–Air Radar Demonstration System (ground based data systems to demonstrate the interoperability of the U.S.

Joint STARS, the French ORCHIDEE

and the U.K. ASTOR sensors);

NIS–NATO Identification system (Identification Friend or Foe); and

port, I would like to differentiate between medium range and

long range types. Medium range types are unlikely to become

too expensive. For the long ranges it appears that the technological goals have been set very high, Therefore the whole thing

can look expensive.

See, “High Priorities to French-German Arms Development, ”

Wehrtechm”k, February 1984.

5. BICES–Battlefield Intelligence and

Communications Exploitation System

(C’ I and data fusion)

All except ARDS predated FOFA.

European reaction to the Nunn Amendment

initiative has been quite positive but it is not

evident that the positions of the Allies in this

regard have been influenced much by FOFA.

Of the five proposals noted above, only ARDS

appears to have directly resulted from NATO’s

adoption of FOFA as a key mission concept,

and here the concern is to ameliorate what may

be an undesirable duplication of effort on national sensor systems. European North Atlantic Assembly parliamentarians have commented that none of the agreed proposals

would commit the Alliance to a “deep strike”

posture.

The United States withdrew a proposal for

cooperation on ATACMS because no European partner could be found. There has also

been a fair amount of criticism from European

academics about the economic and political

justification for cooperative projects with the

United States, on the grounds that this is a

distraction from essential intra-European technology cooperation, and that Europe is in danger of giving away its technology too cheaply

to the United States. Thus far the Europeans

seem to prefer European-produced systems,

even if that eventually means paying more for

less capability.

Initial European Reaction to FOFA

The concept of striking behind the enemy’s

lines to blunt an attack has been a standard

part of warfare for centuries and an agreed element of NATO defensive strategy since the

founding of the Alliance. Over the years, significant improvements in NATO’s ability to

accomplish this mission with conventional artillery weapons and air forces—including the

capability for deep strike at Warsaw Pact (WP)

airfields and other fixed targets-have been

introduced as a matter of course. Moreover,

the idea of employing NATO’s superior technological capacity for producing advanced
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA 119

deep strike weapons and thereby offsetting the

WP advantage in ground forces received enthusiastic endorsement from distinguished

military experts on both sides of the Atlantic.6

Nevertheless, when FOFA was formally introduced for NATO-wide consideration in 1982

—in the form of a SHAPE recommendation

to the Defence Planning Committee—the concept aroused considerable controversy among

the Allies.’ The following concerns and objections were noted among the Europeans; we do

not know how widespread or strongly held they

were:

The WP first echelon is by far the greatest threat to NATO. In concentrating on

the defeat or disruption of the follow-on

forces, FOFA sets the wrong priorities and

may siphon off resources needed to respond to the more urgent threat.

FOFA presupposes a deep echeloning of

WP forces to achieve overwhelming local

force superiority and breakthroughs by

standard attrition warfare. However, recently observed developments in WP doctrine suggests a greater emphasis on a

first echelon attack, with the creation of

Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs)

designed to penetrate quickly into

NATO’s rear. FOFA also assumes that

a WP attack can be repulsed by delaying

‘The 1983 and 1985 reports of the privately funded European

Security Study (ESECS 1 and 2) which figured prominently in

the evolution of the FOFA concept had extensive participation

of European military experts, including retired Bundeswehr General Franz-Joseph Schulze and retired UK Chief Air Marshal

Sir Alistair Steedrnan. It should be noted, however, that as early

as 1983 General Schulze cautioned:

the strengthening of our conventional deterrence anyway can

only be implemented gradually’, not only for reasons of limited

budgetary funds, established armed forces and armaments plans,

available equipment and weapons, but also for reasons of differences in the national interest situation, For the United States,

the solutions will possibly look quite different simply because

of its obligations outside the ,NATO area.

Speech to the Clausewitz Society, Hamburg, August 1983.

7SACE UR General Bernard Rogers wrote an extensive rebuttal of European criticisms of FOFA: “Follow-on Forces Attack:

Myths and Realities, ” NATO Review, December 1984. However, the major European objections to FOFA are reiterated

in a report of the North Atlantic Assembly, a group of European parliamentarians considered pro-NATO. See Conventional

L)efense in I+;urope: A Comprehensive Evaluation, NAA SubCommittee on Conventional Defense in Europe, Karsten Voigt,

Rapporteur, I)ecember 19R5.

●

●

the arrival of follow-on forces, but observations of WP maneuvers indicate there

is considerable slack time planned in the

movement of forces, and delays occasioned by FOFA deep strikes can be

recouped. FOFA is thus not applicable to

NATO’s current understanding of the WP

threat.8

The FOFA concept, in particular the idea

of deep strikes against moving armored

targets, relies too much on the development of unproven technologies. Deep

strike systems would be costly and vulnerable to WP countermeasures. Even if

individual components of FOFA systems

could be demonstrated to work under ideal

test conditions, there is no guarantee that

highly complex FOFA systems would

function as supposed in a battle environment.9

The deployment of highly lethal deep attack systems on the Central Front is too

aggressive a stance for a defensive alliance

such as NATO. Conventional weapons

that could reach hundreds of kilometers

into eastern Europe are not consonant

with NATO’s goals, and change the character of the Alliance from defense to that

of offense.10

‘One European analyst writes:

{The WP Operational Maneuver Group) is a means to an end,

the end being the rapid collapse of NATO and the limiting of

the war to the battlefield, and the means being a surprise attack

on a broad front with several axes, I f the offensive is in one operational echelon, NATO’s plans for interdiction against a second

operational echelon wilf be in vain. There may be no such second

echelon within Eastern Euro e for several days.

Christopher Donnelly, quote: in NAA Con~rentional Defense

in Europe, pg. 25.

‘Farooq Hussain, Director of Studies at the U.K. Royal United

Services Institute for Defense Studies, commented on the application of “emerging technologies” for FOFA:

,.. vulnerability would considerably reduce the predicted effectiveness of the weapons, requiring that they be bought in large

numbers or expensively re-designed to reduce their vulnerability. These considerations would seem to accord FOFA a far lower

priority than other conventional defense weapons whose characteristics and costs are more familim and predictable.

See, “NATO’s Conceptual Military Framework, ” Armed Forces,

September 1985.

l~The ch~ge that FOFA is an aggressive strategy was the

rallying point of European leftist criticism during 1984 and early

1985. “Concealed behind the name IFOFA) is the further development of a military doctrine which in the years ahead could

saddle the Alliance with a new arms race—thus making the already precarious balance of terror even shakier, opined the

Wrest German mass circulation weekly Der Spiegel, Nov. 26,

1984.
120 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

●

●

●

The presence of FOFA systems on the

Central Front would be destabilizing in

a crisis. Faced with a “use or lose” situation, field commanders may be tempted

to launch preemptive deep strikes with

weapons that may be dual capable. The

WP would be unable to distinguish between a conventional FOFA deep strike

and a tactical nuclear attack during the

time of flight of the initial missiles, and

may respond immediately with a nuclear

barrage.

FOFA would set back prospects for arms

control. The WP response would be to field

a new generation of conventional weapons, for both defense and offense, and fuel

a new round of the arms race. It would

also be likely to make the Soviets more

intransigent on Mutual and Balanced

Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations,

and cause them to further front-load the

WP forces.

The basis of NATO’s defense is the threat

of nuclear retaliation. FOFA is designed

to make a conventional defense of Europe

more calculable, and thereby signals

wrongly to the WP that a conventional

attack might not be met with a nuclear

response.

To some extent, these and other European

objections to FOFA represented differences of

expert opinion, and reflected views of some

U.S. critics of FOFA.11 However, there were

other more general political and economic factors that may serve to explain the Allies’

largely negative reaction during the time the

endorsement of FOFA was under consideration in NATO.

The Political Background

During the early 1980s all of the European

Allies were deeply embroiled in domestic political debates concerning Intermediate-range

Nuclear Forces (INF) deployments. Even

strongly pro-NATO governments, such as the

Conservatives in the United Kingdom and the

“See, for example, The New Technologies: Technological Brilliance or Military Folly? by Steven L. Canby, November 1983.

Christian Democrats in West Germany, felt

the INF issue left little room for maneuver

within their political constituencies for major

new defense efforts, however meritorious. Associated with the INF issue was the rise—for

the first time since the 1950s–of anti-NATO

“peace” movements in most European countries as significant political forces. Having lost

on the INF issue, some of these political movements, such as the Greens and the left-wing

Social Democrats in West Germany, believed

they had found a new avenue of attack in

FOFA. They were aided in this regard by a

commonly held view in Europe that FOFA—

while ostensibly an independent SHAPE recommendation to NATO—was in fact of U.S.

origin, and closely associated with on-going

conventional deep-strike weapons developments of the U.S. Army and Air Force.

Particular emphasis was placed on the alleged relationship between FOFA and the

“AirLand Battle” doctrine recently adopted

by the U.S. Army.12 The charge that FOFA

was a thinly disguised attempt to impose a

new, more aggressive and unpredictable strategy on NATO found considerable resonance

in the FRG that for domestic political reasons

cannot adhere to a declaratory defense policy

which envisages either strategic advances or

withdrawals much beyond the inner-German

border. The West German opposition parties

formally condemned FOFA, and put forward

alternative conventional defense concepts,

such as small and lightly armored anti-tank

units, which they claimed would make NATO

physically incapable of aggressive action.

These ideas were shared in large measure by

the U.K. Labor Party and other European socialist parties.

IZAirLand Battle was promulgated by the U.S. Army in Field

Manual 100-5: Operations in 1982. In envisaging the integrated

use of chemical, nuclear and conventional forces in “rapid, violent and disorienting” operations, AirLand Battle became a

prime target for the European left. The specific charge was that

the U. S., through the “Rogers Plan” (i.e., AirLand Battle and

FOFA), wants to ready NATO for an attack on the WP in the

event of a U. S,-Soviet clash in the third world. See, for example, Angriff als Vertei&”gung: Airhmd Battle, Airl-and Battle

2000, Rogers-Plan, a major study published in 1984 by the West

German Greens which focuses on U.S. plans for “lateral escalation. ”
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA 121

.——

Protest against deployment in Europe of nuclear weapons, such as the ground-launched cruise missile shown

below, formed a backdrop to the initial FOFA debate.

The European left was able to dominate the

public discussion of FOFA, due in part to the

reluctance of pro-NATO governments to engage in polemics on a NATO issue. In the view

of many European political leaders, any publicity about NATO initiatives was undesirable, because it enabled the opposition to draw

on latent anti-NATO and anti-American sentiment. For these leaders, what NATO needed

most was a period of relative calm. As a new

and potentially major departure for NATO,

FOFA thus found few political advocates in

Europe.

The “Burden Sharing” Issue

A further constraint on European acceptance of FOFA was the ongoing debate with

the United States over equitable sharing of

NATO’s defense costs. Due to continued high

unemployment and lagging economic growth,

most European Allies felt it increasingly difficult to meet previous defense commitments

to NATO. Their 1978 pledges to strive for increases in real defense spending of 3 percent

per year had in most cases not been fulfilled.

Likewise, none of the conventional force deficiencies identified in the 1978 NATO Long

Term Defense Program had been adequately

addressed. While the Europeans were unable

to meet past obligations, newer studies—

largely of U.S. origin-pointed to the need for

even greater defense efforts. In addition to

FOFA, other ideas–SDI, Emerging Technologies, Counter-Air 90, chemical weapons and

the 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment—appeared

as politically difficult and potentially costly

new issues.
122 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Faced with what some European parliamentarians called an “acronym avalanche,” the Allies were uncertain where FOFA stood in U.S.

priorities. ” The 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment, 14 while it failed to pass the Senate, sent

a strong signal of U.S. displeasure about lagging European conventional defense efforts,

but was mainly directed at improving first

echelon sustainability. It thus appeared to the

Allies that, whatever priority the United

States attached to FOFA, increased European

spending for FOFA could not be offset by reduced attention to other NATO missions.

“The reaction of many Europeans to U.S. defense activism

in 1984 may be reflected in the following quote from a U.K.

member of Parliament at the time of the November 1984 Defence

Planning Committee meeting: “Governments can’t even meet

their existing commitments. When you add the cost of SDI to

the cost of FOFA and all the other things, it is mind-boggling.”

Bruce George, rapporteur to the North Atlantic Assembly’s

Political Committee; cited in Aviation Week and Space TechIIO]Ofl, Mar. 18, 1985.

“The 1984 Nunn-Roth Amendment called for the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces if the European Allies failed to increase

their conventional defense efforts to:

1. meet the annual 3 percent real defense expenditure increase,

2. meet the NATO sustainability goal,

3. raise infrastructure funding for aircraft shelters and support

facilities for U.S. tactical air reinforcement, and

4. make progress in raising the nuclear threshold.

Although SACEUR General Rogers and

other FOFA advocates initially claimed that

FOFA deployment could be covered by an additional 1 percent real increase over the 3 percent spending pledge, a later study by the

Defence Research Group (DRG)15 reached significantly higher estimates: i.e., $40 billion to

$50 billion over a 10-year period. Assuming

that FOFA implementation would be shared

by the Allies in rough proportion to their overall financial contributions to NATO, this would

have required the major Allies to achieve between two to three times the rates of defense

spending increases they had been able to make

in recent years. Initial European reluctance to

endorse FOFA can thus be understood, in part,

as an unwillingness to make or imply a further financial commitment the Allies would be

unable to fulfill, and thereby exacerbate the

“burden sharing” issue.”

“The Defence Research Group is an advisory body to NATO’s

Defence P1arming Committee. The DRG study of FOFA, Relative Value of Attack on Follow-on Forces, was issued July 10,

1985.

16 FinaI 1984 NATO statistics indicate that, without the United

States, the Alliance failed to meet its 3 percent spending goal,

and that in 1985 fewer NATO Allies met this goal than in 1984.

AP Wire, May 13, 1986.

EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOFA

Despite the Allies’ political and economic reservations about FOFA, they had little desire

to act divisively on an issue which appeared

of high interest to the United States, particularly at a time when the INF debate had taken

on the overtones of a test of Alliance solidarity. The 1984 decision by the Defence Planning

Committee (DPC) can be seen as something

of a compromise solution, in that it provided

a general endorsement of the FOFA concept,

but without an indication of its priority or a

financial commitment regarding its implementation.17 As an additional precaution, on West

German initiative, NATO agreed to undertake

simultaneously a Conceptual Military Frame- ——— —..

“During the DPC debate, some of the European allies reportedly insisted that they could endorse FOFA only on the condition that no additional defense spending be required. See. A viation Week, Mar. 18, 1985.

work study, to place FOFA in the context of

overall NATO defense priorities.

Since the DPC decision, some of the sharp

edges have worn off the transatlantic discussion of FOFA. The successful resolution of the

INF issue has given European governments

some additional political scope to concentrate

on other defense priorities, although budgets

for most of the Allies continue to remain very

tight.

Public pronouncements by NATO headquarters and allied governments have been low key,

emphasizing that NATO would concentrate

first on the shallow strike systems in which

a present capability exists; decisions on deep

strike systems—which aroused particular

European concerns—could be deferred well

into the next decade. The European left, which
—

Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 123 —

had controlled the public debate on FOFA in

1984, has also markedly abated its criticisms.

Opposition parties have found that FOFA

is too complex and abstract an issue to raise

much public attention. Moreover, the rise in

popularity of many of the “peace” movements

was based largely on the scare of nuclear war;

to be now perceived as attacking too strongly

NATO’s conventional alternative would lose

the centrist votes they had attracted. The intrusion of SDI and arms control issues have

also contributed to keeping FOFA off the front

pages.

In contrast to the previous year, the Allies

also sensed during 1985 that there was some

easing of the U.S. posture on FOFA and other

conventional defense issues. European pledges

to increase ammunition stocks and infrastructure spending have responded in some measure to U.S. concerns reflected in the 1984 NunnRoth Amendment,18 and have added weight to

the European argument that financial limitations will necessitate slow FOFA implementation. Another favorable development lay in

the 1985 Nunn Amendment, which provided

a financial incentive for greater U.S.-European cooperation on FOFA systems research.

FOFA was again routinely endorsed at the

May 1985 conference of NATO Defense Ministers, which pledged “special and coordinated

efforts to strengthen conventional defense with

the means available, but without designation

of FOFA as a priority.19

‘“For example, in May 1985, the Defence Planning Committee pledged $3 billion to construct 665 aircraft shelters by 1990.

At the same time, the FRG indicated expenditures for munitions would be 13 percent higher than initially planned for the

period 1984-87. See, Reserves, Reinforcements Stressed at

NATO Defense Conference; Suddeutsche Zeitung, Mar. 18, 1985.

19At tfis~wting, FRG Defense Minister Woerner reporttily

emphasized: “special efforts do not mean special programs.

Quoted in Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 23, 1985.

The European Allies thus appear comfortable with the present trend. Criticism by the

opposition parties has been muted. Allied governments view the on-going studies and consultations within NATO as tending to confirm

their preference for concentrating effort on air

interdiction, reconnaissance and short-range fire

support improvements, which accord with

standard NATO conceptions regarding artillery and air interdiction missions, and which

were well under way before NATO’s endorsement of FOFA.20 There is also the perception

that the United States has scaled back its expectations for FOFA in the light of the GrammRudman spending cap and the present emphasis on SDI. Some European analysts have gone

as far as to state that FOFA, as a definable

initiative, is already over.21

During 1986, the focus of FOFA activity

moved “indoors” to expert military fora such

as the CNAD ad hoc FOFA working group,

the FOFA II working group and the Independent European Program Group (IEPG). Although recent developments within these

groups offer some basis for encouragement, it

will ultimately be the parliaments of the NATO

countries that will decide how, and at what

pace, FOFA will be implemented. Whether current political and economic conditions in Europe will permit the type of broad consensus

needed for a significant FOFA deployment is

still at best questionable.

—20In early 1986, for example, senior Dutch Ministry of Defense officials indicated in a briefing to OTA staff that NATO’s

endorsement of FOFA had not at that time affected defense

procurement planning in the Netherlands.

2*’’FOFA has lost much of the political attention that was

once focused on it to the Strategic Defense Initiative . . The

high technology all-conventional defense of Europe is back on

the drawing boards. ” Farooq Hussain, “Conventional Weapons Have a Long Way to Go, ” New Scientist, July 18, 1985.

FACTORS UNDERLYING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOFA

A common view is that European reluctance to increase their overall defense spending. This

to go as far or as fast on a conventional de- is true up to a point, but is hardly the whole

fense initiative such as FOFA is due largely story. Although the Allies’ ability to raise deto the unwillingness or inability of the Allies fense budgets will vary with general economic
conditions (which at present are not favorable) the divergence of U.S. and European opinion about FOFA also reflects fundamental

transatlantic tensions on two key issues in the

Alliance: i.e., the degree to which NATO defense should rely on conventional forces, and

the role of high technology in force modernization. How these more general issues are resolved will strongly affect the future course

of FOFA.

The Role of NATO’s Conventional

Forces

Since the founding of the Alliance, the linchpin of NATO defense has been the deterrent

threat of a U.S. strategic nuclear strike in the

event of a WP attack on Europe. During the

period in which the United States possessed

strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviets,

the task of defending Europe through the

threat of massive retaliation was relatively

straightforward and did not pose an undue

economic burden. However, beginning in the

1960s, as the Soviets built up their nuclear

forces and attained strategic parity, the situation became considerably more complicated.

In the European view, ensuring that the

United States remained strategically coupled

to the defense of Europe–despite the risk of

annihilation of American cities by a Soviet nuclear response—and convincing the Soviets of

this coupling became of paramount importance.

In 1967, the Alliance responded to the

changed situation by adopting the Flexible Response strategy, based on a triad of forces—

conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic

nuclear-to deter and frustrate the WP across

the broad spectrum of threat scenarios. The

continued presence of large numbers of U.S.

forces on the Central Front constituted the visible guarantee of the coupling of U.S. strategic deterrence to the defense of Europe. While
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 125

Flexible Response does not require NATO to

match the WP tank for tank or division for division (which the Allies maintain is not economically or politically possible), the credibility of the strategic deterrent became linked to

a robust NATO conventional force posture.

The presence of U.S. troops in NATO’s conventional force structure is not only to serve

as a “nuclear trip wire, ” but to aid in deterring an all-conventional WP attack and, if deterrence fails, to ensure NATO’s ability to escalate to a nuclear response if necessary.

Since the promulgation of Flexible Response,

the question of how much conventional defense

is enough has become the source of considerable transatlantic friction. Successive U.S. administrations have urged the Europeans to

greater conventional defense efforts to counter

the rapid rise in WP conventional force capabilities. The lackluster European reaction has

been due, in part, to the greater costs of upgrading conventional rather than nuclear

forces, especially when the latter is paid for

largely by the United States. However, to a

substantial number of Europeans, U.S. pressure for increasing NATO’s conventional

defenses on the Central Front is perceived as

partly motivated by the desire to reduce U.S.

nuclear exposure in Europe, by making a conventional war fought solely in Europe more calculable and thinkable.22

SACEUR General Rogers, in advocating

FOFA, has attempted to bridge the gap between the U.S. and European perceptions by

dramatizing that the credibility of nuclear deterrence has been eroded through the WP conventional force build-up.23 His argument is that

“European fears of the U.S. nuclear decoupling from the defense of Europe has led some Europeans to adopt what they

call the doctrine of “conventional insufficiency. ” This is based

on the assumption that what deters the Soviets is the threat

of nuclear destruction of the Soviet homeland, a consequence

all out of proportion to what the Soviets could hope to gain by

an attack on Europe. Deterrence would actually weaken if NATO

conventional forces became too robust, because this would undermine the certainty of a NATO nuclear strike in the event

of a WP conventional attack. “In the view of some Europeans,

should conventional forces become too strong, deterrence would

be undermined as the risks of war become more calculable. ”

North Atlantic Assembly: Conventional Defense in Europe, p. 6.

““If war breaks out today, it would only be a matter of days

before I would have to turn to our political authorities and reFOFA and other conventional force improvements are needed because the ability of NATO

to exercise its nuclear option is put in doubt

if the WP has the ability to overrun the Central Front in a matter of days. Yet none of the

European Allies have publicly seconded General Rogers’ assessment, reflecting the generally skeptical reaction to U.S. efforts to gain

more public support in Europe for defense increases, such as the DoD annual Soviet Military Power and other public reports. Some

European defense experts have questioned the

factual basis for General Rogers’ scenario,24

while others indicate that U.S. emphasis on

the precariousness of NATO’s Central Front

posture—even if accepted—tends to weaken

political support for NATO.25

The psychological impact of the issue of the

role of conventional defense is most strongly

felt in West Germany, in which one-third of

the population lives within 100 kilometers of

WP forces. To many West Germans, the devastation caused by the outbreak of conventional war on their-soil would be equivalent to

defeat, no matter which side technically

“wins.” The INF issue has so sensitized the

West German populace to the nuclear threat

that many now believe that any change in

NATO’s posture somehow increases the

quest the initial release of nuclear weapons. ” General Rogers,

cited in Conventional Defense Improvements; “Where Is the

Alliance Going, ” James Moray Stewart, IVato Review, 1985.

*’See, for example, Extended Deterrence; implications for

Arms IJnu”tation and Reduction, by Eckhard Lubkemeier,

Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn:

. . . the conventional force balance in Europe is not nearly as

bleak as NATO’s estimates would have it. For many years now,

the International Institute for Strategic Studies has been stating that “there would still appem to be insufficient overall

strength on eithei- side to guarantee victory. (3iven this situation, conventional force improvements are not superfluous undertakings; however, NATO can do without those massive rearmament proposals advanced by SACUER and the ESECS group,

entailing spending increases which NATO governments would

not be able to sustain anyhow.

“The distinguished British historian, Michael Howard, describes the situation as follows:

A certain American tendency to hyperbole, an attachment to

worst-case analysis and some unfortunate attempts to make our

flesh creep with official publications in gorgeous Technicolor

whose statistics have been questioned by our defense specialists,

have not improved matters. Such propagandistic efforts are

widely discounted, and even when they are believed they are

likely to engender not so much resolution as despair.

‘‘Deterrence, Consensus and Reassurance in the Defense of Europe; published in The Domestic Aspects of Western Security,

Christoph Bertram (cd.), IISS, 1983.
126 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

chances of war. In addition, the special relationship the FRG has assiduously cultivated

with the GDR has considerable influence on

attitudes regarding the types of weapons and

forces NATO should have that are capable of

striking into eastern Europe. These concerns

are codified in the doctrine of Forward Defense,

which in theory at least envisages that a WP

conventional attack could be repulsed at the

inner-German border, and that NATO incursions into eastern Europe could be limited to

tactical and operational counter-attacks near

the border.

FRG official policy tries to achieve a difficult balance between the need to provide

declaratory support for FOFA in the interests

of Alliance solidarity, and the requirement to

affirm Forward Defense for domestic consumption.” U.S. actions that might upset the

delicate balance required by the politics of Forward Defense would likely be met with resistance. A senior Bundeswehr General indicated,

for example, that the FRG would reject the

unilateral deployment of deep strike FOFA

systems in the U.S. sectors, on the grounds

that this would demoralize the Allies in the sectors that were less well-equipped, and would

tend to funnel a WP attack into these weaker

sectors.” This argument, which ignores the already great imbalances among the Central

Front corps and the cross-corps support role

FOFA might serve, maybe judged on its own

merits. It is, however, indicative of the difference in U.S. and West German expectations

regarding conventional force improvements.

—— — —.—

‘The compatibility of AirLand Battle and FOFA deep strikes

with the doctrine of Forward Defense seems to trouble the FRG

military. The difficulties in presentation can be discerned in the

FRG 1985 Ministry of Defense White Paper:

In the future, other long-range conventional weapons will be

available to the Alliance, permitting effective operations against

the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces before they can join the battle

once the WP attack gets started. These operations have nothing to do with offensive operations. (p. 29)

. . . the Bundeswehr and the allied forces are not equipped,

organized, trained or prepared for a strategic offensive in the

Central Region. (p. 79)

AirLand Battle . . . is only applicable in Europe in so far as

it is reconcilable with the underlying principles of NATO defense. There can be no question of any intention of the U.S. to

revise the principles of NATO strategy by national operatiomd

doctrines. (p. 30)

271n a 1986 briefing to OTA staff.

High Technology and NATO Defense

The balance of NATO’s nuclear and conventional forces is largely the concern of military

experts and academics; of much more immediate concern to allied governments is the relationship between NATO defense, employment,

high technology, and national economic advantage. The Europeans seem to have, in general,

less enthusiasm than the United States about

the potential for high technology to correct

NATO’s deficiencies. In the broadest sense,

this may reflect the more pervasive view in

Europe that high-technology “fixes” seldom

work as advertised, and almost always cost

more than planned. Contributing to this difference in expectations is the European view that

advanced U.S. systems are frequently developed and tested under ideal conditions, such

as the U.S. desert, which would bear little relationship to a warfighting situation on the Central Front.

For most of the past decade, the Europeans

have been troubled by high unemployment

rates and sluggish economic growth, coupled

with the perception that European high technology is falling rapidly behind that of Japan

and the United States.28 It has also been a

period of increasing transatlantic disputes over

general trade issues and the economic aspects

of NATO defense, including ‘burden sharing,

sanctions and export trade controls. The extraordinary sensitivity of European governments

to U.S. influence in the defense sector was demonstrated in 1985 by the near collapse of the

Thatcher government over the proposed purchase of the Westland helicopter company by

a U.S. firm. In this environment, suspicion of

U.S. defense policies and initiatives runs high.

‘

aEuropean perceptions of U.S. high-technology dominance

appear to be considerably exaggerated. In 1955, for example,

the U.S. export share of the world high-technology market was

35 percent. In 1980, the U.S. share dropped to 18 percent, while

the combined shares of the FRG and France alone accounted

for 30 percent of world high-technology export trade. See Science 1n&”cators, The National Science Board, 1983, p. 23. As

of 1986, the United States became a net importer of high technology.
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA . 127

For example, in February, 1986 the European Parliament voted a unanimous resolution

rebuking the United States for alleged manipulation of COCOM trade controls to obtain commercial economic advantage.29 Recent U.S. defense initiatives such as FOFA, SDI, and

Emerging Technologies have been perceived

as threatening the European technology base

(in part by luring away engineers) and costing

jobs, and have resulted in calls for greater

intra-European armaments development cooperation and demands that the United States

reduce alleged protectionist practices.30

There is also a widespread belief that the

United States enjoys a very large defense trade

balance, on the order of 10 to 1, while U.S.

claims that the difference in the “two-way

street” has grown much narrower in recent

years have not been received with much cre-

‘The European Parliament resolution states that U.S. unilateral defense related export controls:

. . can only be assumed to be intended to restrict Western llurope’s access to American technology on normal commercial

terms and is contrary to good neighborly policy among allies .

A common view in Europe is that U.S. provisions which exceed

those agreed by COCOM are in part motivated by general national commercial practices emanating form political rather than

business circles.

Quoted in Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1986.

30 Francois de Rose, a former French representative to the Atlantic Council and an advocate of stronger European conventional defense, stated:

It is obviously inconceivable that a modernization effort would

be limited to Europe’s purchasing massive quantities of American weapons incorporating new technologies . The United

States should thus face this problem at both the governmental

(Administration and Congress) and industrial levels with a

breadth of vision we are unaccustomed to in this area.

Politique International, summer 1984.

dence. 31 U.S. overtures to allay European concerns, such as funding SD I research contracts

in Europe and the 1985 Nunn Amendment,

have been criticized by some Europeans as attempts to obtain European expertise at bargain prices and interfere with the development

of intra-European high-technology cooperation.

The sensitivities of European governments

to high-technology defense issues have tended

to dampen the desire for the introduction of

advanced armaments in European military circles. European military leaders are acutely

aware that national economic policies make it

risky to request the procurement of foreignproduced, high-technology systems, particularly because the long-term outlook for static

defense budgets implies that expensive new

procurements would divert funds from current

military readiness. This situation may serve

to reinforce an intrinsic conservatism in European military circles about the deployment of

advanced armaments.32

“see, “Two Way Street Balance Falls to 2:1, Most Equitable

Ratio Ever, ” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1986.

“In an article which pleads for more competitive European

buying of weapons as a means to reduce costs, an influential

European journal nevertheless concludes:

Politically astute generals and admirals know the money

saved would probably not come to them: they might not get even

as much as they do now, It is one thing to ask for a ship to be

built in a national shipyard. It is quite another to ask for one to

be built abroad, never mind that it might be better and cheaper.

That is why they tend to cling to the do-it-at-home approach.

“Cheaper Weapons: Europe Does It the Second Best Way, ”

The Economist, June 21, 1986.

OPTIONS FOR CULTIVATING ADDITIONAL EUROPEAN

SUPPORT FOR FOFA

SACEUR General Rogers and other U.S.

military leaders are well aware of European

reservations about FOFA and a number of useful remedial steps already have been taken. In

addition, the following options for further stimulating European support for FOFA have been

suggested. If the U.S. Congress believes that

the United States should try to stimulate

greater European support, it might want to

consider some or all of them.

Clarify the U.S. Priority for FOFA

The Europeans profess to some confusion

as to where FOFA stands in U.S. military priorities. They note, among other signals, the

first echelon priority signaled by the 1984

Nunn Amendment, and question how FOFA

will compete with SDI for scarce U.S. R&D

funds under the Gramm-Rudman spending

cap. Some also seem to believe that FOFA may
128 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

be a “pet project” of SACEUR General

Rogers, and that U.S. attention may wane under his successor. The United States should

again clearly state its intentions regarding

FOFA and, to respond to specific European

objections and concerns, indicate the relative

importance it attaches to shallow strike (i.e.,

up to 50 kilometers) versus deep strike systems. To avoid making FOFA a public issue

again, U.S. views should be communicated

largely through nonpublic NATO channels,

such as the Conceptual Military Framework

study.

Set Realistic Funding and

Deployment Goals

Currently available studies of FOFA, such

as ESECS and DRG, estimate costs for full

FOFA deployment at between $20 billion and

$50 billion over a 10-year period. Some critics

claim these figures are gross underestimations.

But even if they were accepted, it is unrealistic to expect the Allies to cover their proportionate share of the cost through increased defense spending at a time when European

defense budgets are static or heading downwards. If trade-offs are acceptable, the United

States should specify what other NATO missions could take a lesser priority to balance increased European spending for FOFA. The 10-

year deployment goal, including systems that

are now in the research phase, seems too optimistic in light of NATO’s national R&D planning cycles and its track record on force modernization. It might be useful at first to narrow

the focus to a few shallow strike weapons and

sensor systems— such as improved MLRS and

RPVs–which are relatively inexpensive and

are at or close to the production stage, and

which would not require complex data fusion

systems. A demonstration that FOFA is effective at the shallow ranges, and with systems

that could be produced in Europe, could boost

allied support for the more ambitious FOFA

goals.

Present FOFA in a More

Positive Light

The major argument for FOFA by the

United States and SACEUR until now has

been that it is needed to raise the nuclear

threshold to preserve the deterrent credibility

of NATO’s triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. However

necessary this appears to military strategists,

the prospect of spending large sums of money

merely to stave off the collapse of the Central

Front for a few more days is not a strong selling point from the European perspective. A

more appealing approach might be to link

FOFA to crisis stability and deterrence.

A major question mark for NATO has always been the length of time which the Warsaw Pact would need for mobilization before

launching an attack: while obviously the Soviet commanders would need at least a few

days for mobilization and would prefer a few

weeks, short Pact mobilization might well

make it difficult for NATO to decide upon and

implement its own mobilization before the attack commenced. Furthermore, longer Pact

mobilization would provide time for NATO to

demonstrate its resolve (by counter-mobilization) and then negotiate a satisfactory settlement of the crisis.

A strong NATO FOFA capability would call

into question the ability of the Soviets to bring

their forces forward after a war had started,

and therefore increase their need for pre-attack

mobilization. FOFA can therefore be seen as

a means of deterring the Soviets from rushing

to attack before NATO is ready. Increasing

deterrence and negotiating time in a crisis is

a far more popular objective in Europe than

increasing NATO’s staying power in a conventional war.

FOFA might also usefully be linked in the

future to negotiations for withdrawal of

intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe. The immediate reaction of European
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 129

leaders to reports that INF withdrawals had

been discussed by President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev at their October 1986

meeting in Reykjavik was sharply negative,

due in part to the realization that the current

conventional force imbalance would pose an

even greater threat to European security in

the absence of INF missiles. Focusing European public attention on the need to redress

this imbalance as a necessary precondition for

such withdrawals might gain additional support for conventional force improvements such

as FOFA.

Emphasize Dual-Use, Reemphasize

Dual-Capable

The Europeans give highest priority to conventional weapons and surveillance improvements against the first echelon threat. The

United States might clarify to the Europeans

that deep strike weapons and sensor systems

would enhance NATO’s capabilities against

both the first and follow-on echelons. On the

other hand, proposals that tend to blur the distinction between FOFA and tactical nuclear

weapons cause Europeans a great deal of anxiety. An idea tentatively advanced in 1984, for

example, to modify Minuteman missiles to

carry conventional warheads and base them

in Europe to perform conventional missions,

was emphatically denounced.33 Likewise, proposals for conventional versions of the Pershing II or the successor to the Lance missile

have been questioned by the Europeans on the

grounds that they would decrease crisis stability.

Accommodate European Industrial

Interests

The Europeans have made it amply clear

that FOFA implementation cannot be premised on their purchasing U.S.-produced weapons systems. Discussions in NATO have correctly focused on the need to standardize

FOFA systems and reduce overall R&D costs

in the Alliance by eliminating duplication of

effort through cooperative industrial projects

among the NATO partners. In this regard the

financial incentive offered by the 1985 Nunn

Amendment has proved particularly promising in fostering U.S./European cooperative

ventures. Congress may wish to consider continuing Nunn Amendment funding at a level

of $200 million per year to maintain the momentum of cooperative projects now under

study and allow for a number of new starts

each year.

Special emphasis might be placed on reaching agreement on a NATO-wide IFF34 system

in the Nunn Amendment context, because

NATO’s present capacity to carry out deep

strike interdiction relies exclusively on air

forces. If no agreement can be reached on IFF,

which all Alliance partners agree is urgently

necessary and which has been under discussion for the last 20 years, the likelihood of U. S.-

European cooperation on the more controversial elements of FOFA would appear dim.

Clarify Unilateral Deployments

There seems to be some opposition in the

FRG to a unilateral U.S. deployment of deep

strike FOFA missile systems in the U.S. sectors of the Central Front, on the grounds that

this would concentrate the WP thrust into the

other sectors. To counter this argument, the

United States could attempt to provide the

FRG with a better appreciation of the role

FOFA could play in cross-corps support which

would tend to level rather than heighten the

current inequalities among the Central Front

sectors. If, nevertheless, the FRG position

were not to change, the United States might

consider an offer to consult formally with the

FRG on deployments when the deeper strike

systems become available.

SSI n a 1985 pre9s conference, FRG Defense Minister Woerner

rejected stationing of Minuteman missiles in Europe for conventional defense purposes. He reportedly labeled the missiles

“incredible hulks” at the press conference. See, Interview with

Dr. Manfred Woerner, Armed Forces Journal, August 1985.

“Identification, Friend or Foe, A system for identifying aircraft so that NATO’s air defenses do not kill NATO’s aircraft.

Also called the NATO Identification System (NIS).
130 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Clarify the Relationship Between

FOFA and AirLand Battle

While the United States has affirmed that

elements of AirLand Battle are appropriate in

the Central Region only to the extent that they

are compatible with NATO doctrine, the Europeans evince some confusion and concern about

how FOFA would be integrated under this arrangement. One major difficulty is that

AirLand Battle envisages counter-attack by

ground forces up to 150 kilometers beyond the

close battle, which seems incompatible with

the doctrine of Forward Defense, and has been

questioned by the Europeans on political and

military grounds. Another issue is the allocation of air resources for deep strike missions,

since AirLand Battle appears to center control at Corps level or lower, while FOFA would

require multi-corps and multinational coordination.

Emphasize the Role of FOFA in

Enhancing Deterrence and Improving

Crisis Management

One of NATO’s widely recognized weaknesses is that it must mobilize for at least several days before it can put up a credible defense. In particular, the period during which

troops would arrive from the United States by

air, take equipment out of storage sites in the

FRG, and organize themselves into battleready divisions would be a period of vulnerability which might tempt the Soviet Union to

attack preemptively. The possibility of such

an early Soviet attack would not only be threatening in a military sense, but would reduce the

time available for negotiations to resolve the

crisis short of war. FOFA, by threatening the

Soviet forces moving up from rear areas once

a war has started, would give the Soviets an

incentive to defer any attack until after extensive Warsaw Pact mobilization, which in turn

would buy time for NATO mobilization and

for crisis management efforts.

Emphasize the Role of Joint STARS,

in Particular, in Crisis Management

Apart from all the questions and issues

about the survivability and value of Joint

STARS in battle, nobody doubts that it would

greatly enhance NATO’s ability to monitor

Warsaw Pact troop movements during a crisis. Accurate and extremely timely information about such troop movements during a crisis could be invaluable to NATO for crisis

management. Such information would facilitate NATO decisionmaking, thus enhancing

deterrence by discouraging Soviet hopes of

dividing the Allies; it would also facilitate deployment of NATO forces to meet the evolving threat, thus enhancing deterrence by discouraging Soviet hopes of victory by quickly

breaking through maldeployed and unprepared

NATO forces.

FOFA AND THE NATO ALLIANCE

In the light of the history of the FOFA initiative, it is not currently possible to predict

with any certainty its future course in NATO.

There have been a number of plusses and

minuses. On the positive side, it has helped focus attention on recent developments in WP

doctrine, such as the Operational Maneuver

Groups, and contributed to the discussion of

what should be the appropriate NATO response. It has also highlighted current NATO

deficiencies in air and ground fire support,

reconnaissance and C2

, and may ease the introduction of advanced sensors such as Joint

STARS, even if the Allies remain uncertain

concerning the deep strike elements of FOFA.

At the very least, FOFA could add cogency

to U.S. arguments for increased European attention to the first echelon threat, which the

Allies claim FOFA underestimates.

FOFA has also been the object of considerable criticism by the Allies, although this does

not mean that the concept itself is inherently

devisive. FOFA, like any major initiative in
Ch. 8—European Views on FOFA ● 131

NATO, has brought to the surface the longstanding underlying transatlantic frictions

concerning burden sharing, the nuclear threshold and defense trade. The Allies, as a group,

have a fundamental resistance to any major

change in NATO strategy, which, whatever its

defects, has preserved peace in Europe for two

generations. This resistance is manifest in their

skepticism of U.S. “bean counts’ of WP forces,

and in their arguments that substantial change

in NATO force structure would necessarily

weaken the political cohesion of the Alliance.

This conservatism, however, also has its positive points with regard to the future of FOFA.

Now that the Alliance has given FOFA its political blessing, it would be unlikely that the

Europeans would be moved to renounce the

DPC decision, even if the opposition parties

which are now on record as condemning FOFA

win in forthcoming elections, but this is not

a certainty. This does not mean that FOFA

will be implemented as originally conceived or

could not again become a devisive issue if, for

example, the United States decides on unilateral deployment of deep strike missiles in the

U.S. corps sectors.

At the most basic level, the differences in

the U.S. and European views on FOFA, and

all its associated issues, will tend to narrow

or widen depending on the degree to which the

NATO partners can achieve a common perception of the political and military aspects of the

WP threat. In a 1986 discussion with OTA

staff on FOFA, European parliamentarian

members of the North Atlantic Assembly described the current difference in threat perception as follows: “You Americans believe the

situation on the Central Front is like 1938; we

believe it is more like 1914’’–i.e., the greatest

threat to peace is an uncontrolled escalation

of belligerency, not the failure to deter a determined aggressor. This view has historical

merit if the sole criterion of NATO’s success

is to deter the WP from a direct attack on Europe; it has been a long time since the Europeans had to consider this seriously as an imminent possibility. Judged by other factors,

such as denying the Soviets the ability to coerce Europe economically and politically through

the growing imbalance between NATO and the

WP in conventional forces, the record of the

Alliance is not as certain.

The history of the FOFA initiative thus far

suggests there is still some variance between

U.S. and European understanding of some of

the basic purposes of the Alliance. It also suggests that it is possible for the United States

and its Allies to work together, given time and

a willingness to accommodate each other’s

views.
Chapter 9

Current Capabilities
. .

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........135

Targeting Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........136

Delivery Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........................136

Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 138

Tables

Table No. Page

$1. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft . .......................136

9-2. Delivery Systems . . . . . . . ...... . ............................137

9-3. Munitions Fielded by NATO Forces . . . . . . . . ........ . ..........138
Chapter 9

Current Capabilities

INTRODUCTION

NATO’s ability to attack follow-on forces is

provided today almost exclusively by aircraft

operating at depths of 150 kilometers or less

and carrying weapons that are most effective

against fixed targets (guided bombs) or soft

area targets (cluster bombs). Although such

attacks may play some part in impeding the

forward advance of Warsaw Pact forces, they

are only a subset of the operational concepts

that have been proposed for attacking followon forces. In particular, they would not destroy

armored forces.

The implementation of the other operational

concepts runs up against several major limitations in current fielded systems. Perhaps the

most important is that NATO’s current reconnaissance and command, control, and communication systems and procedures are not designed to provide timely information on the

precise location of mobile targets. Although aircraft are partially able to make up for a lack

of precise target data by placing a human observer on the scene, additional time spent over

enemy territory in searching for a target will

increase exposure to the very heavy Warsaw

Pact air defenses.

A second major limitation is that most existing air-delivered weapons cannot destroy armored vehicles in significant numbers. The best

weapon for the task today may be the Tornado

aircraft flown by the British and German air

forces. But its anti-armor submunitions, dispensed in large numbers, are unguided. These

weapons require aircraft to fly very close to—or

even directly over—the target, exposing the

aircraft to fire from terminal air defenses. Cluster bombs, which are effective against soft targets, have a quite low kill rate against armored

vehicles, requiring multiple attacks—and thus

repeated exposure to anti-aircraft fire-to

achieve a given objective. The U.S. Maverick

missile is effective against tanks, but requires

the pilot to engage tanks individually. The Low

Altitude Navigation Targeting Infra Red for

Night (LANTIRN) will support launching two

Mavericks per pass, but the pilot will still have

to find a target for each and point the missile

seeker at it.

Capability against fixed targets such as

bridges and power stations is somewhat better; guided bombs can provide the high accuracy needed to destroy these targets while

allowing the aircraft to remain out of range

(up to 20 kilometers or so) of terminal defenses.

Few NATO aircraft can reach more than 150

kilometers beyond the East German border,

however, where a large number of important

fixed targets are located (railroad bridges, for

example).

Aircraft face several other limitations as

well. Few NATO aircraft are able to operate well

at night or in bad weather, and all face competing demands from other missions, including

opposing enemy air forces, close air support,

and nuclear standby. In the first few days of

a war, NATO aircraft in the Central Region

will be committed largely to fighting the air

battle and to providing close air support, with

little leeway to carry out attacks against follow-on forces.

Ground-launched weapons, which could complement aircraft particularly at times when few

aircraft are available (night and bad weather

and the first days of a war), have little to offer

at present. Artillery and the Multiple Launch

Rocket System (MLRS) now entering the inventory, are of short range (less than 30 kilometers), have a relatively low delivery accuracy,

and carry cluster munitions that are relatively

ineffective against tanks.

135
136 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

TARGETING INFORMATION’

Any plan to use existing NATO forces to attack Warsaw Pact follow-on forces quickly

runs up against the limitation imposed by existing technology for locating mobile targets

beyond the immediate battle area. Current

reconnaissance systems provide data for general situation assessment, especially at short

ranges, but the data are generally neither

timely enough nor precise enough to guide

weapons to specific targets.

The bulk of NATO’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition capability is still

provided by manned aircraft carrying a variety of sensors (see table 9-l). Aircraft penetrating enemy airspace to obtain reconnaissance

photographs are obviously vulnerable to enemy

air defenses, and may be forced to fly restricted

routes; it is difficult for reconnaissance aircraft

to cover broad areas.

Unmanned drone aircraft, currently deployed by German, British, and Belgian armies, are able to perform limited reconnaissance of heavily defended areas. Their small

size makes them difficult to detect and they

do not place a human pilot at risk. Some fly

a preprogrammed route; others can be controlled from the ground. They carry a variety

of sensors, some of which transmit directly to

the ground and others return film or tapes that

must be processed before the information can

be extracted. Compared to manned reconnaissance aircraft, ranges are limited.2

Radars and equipment to pickup enemy radio communications and radar emissions are

carried on a number of U.S. aircraft and permit those aircraft to remain over friendly ter-

‘A more detailed version of this section is found in app. 9-A

in Vol. 2.

‘Jane All the World’s Aircraft, 1985-86 (London: Jane’s Pub

lishing Co. Ltd., 1985).

DELIVERY

Within NATO today, aircraft constitute the

primary means of delivering munitions beyond

the immediate battle area. Ground-launched

Table 9-1 .—Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft

Nation Wartime control

Reconnaissance aircraft:

RF-4C United States NATO

RF-4E Germany NATO

RF-104 Netherlands NATO

Jaguar United Kingdom NATO

Mirage 5 Belgium NATO

OV-1D United States U.S. Corps

United States NATO

RPVs and drones:

CL-8 9 United Kingdom, Germany, Corps

Canada

Epervier Belgium Corps

CL-289 Germany, Canada Corps

ARGUS Germany Corps

SOI.JRCE Otflce of Technology Assessment, 1987

ritory while looking as far as hundreds of kilometers into the enemy’s rear. The systems that

detect radar signals (ELINT, or electronic intelligence) and radio communications (COMINT,

or communications intelligence) may be of

great value for finding command posts, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and surface-tosurface missile radars.

The ASARS-II radar carried on the TR-1 aircraft can provide very detailed images allowing discrimination between tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other vehicles. The

ASARS-II radar is, however, designed primarily for observing fixed objects, and has only

a very limited capability to spot targets that

are in motion. A prototype of this system is

now flying in Europe; full operational capability is to begin in 1987. Although control of

these U.S. systems would be transferred to

SACEUR in wartime, U.S. security restrictions on the disclosure of intelligence capabilities to foreign countries—including members

of NATO—could, unless waived, impede the

timely flow of information from some of these

systems to NATO commanders.

SYSTEMS

artillery and the Multiple Launch Rocket System are short-range weapons (about 30 kilometers), and the munitions they carry-the Im-
Photo credit US Department of Defense

NATO’s current capabilities rely primarily on aircraft

such as F-4s and F-16s (pictured).

proved Conventional Munition, essentially a

cluster bomb—are effective mainly against soft

targets, such as trucks, self-propelled artillery,

and other lightly armored vehicles (including

Soviet BMP infantry fighting vehicles and

field command posts). Although nominally capable of penetrating a portion of the lighter

armored top surfaces of current Soviet tanks,

these munitions in practice would have a very

low kill probability against tanks. Furthermore, these ground-launched systems are not

very accurate.

The ground-launched Lance missile has a

considerably greater range (up to 125 kilometers), but because of its relatively poor

accuracy, its role is mainly carrying tactical

nuclear warheads. The conventional APAM

(antipersonnel, antimateriel) warhead for

Lance is designed for use against soft area targets, such as SAM sites, and is ineffective

against armored targets.

About 1,000 tactical aircraft that could be

used to strike targets beyond the immediate

battle area would be assigned to support the

NATO Central Region in wartime. All have

other jobs to do besides attacking follow-on

forces, however, and an important issue in the

implementation of FOFA is how early in a war

those aircraft would become available. F-16s,

for example, which can carry out both air-toair and air-to-ground missions, would be called

upon heavily in the first few days of a war to

assist in the air battle and for close air supCh. 9—Current Capabilities ● 137

port at the immediate battle area. Long-range

aircraft such as the F-111 are expected to carry

out attacks against airfields and interdiction

targets that may or may not be related to

follow-on forces. Moreover, a significant

proportion of the F-1 11s as well as some other

aircraft will be held for nuclear missions.

Range is another limiting factor. Only a portion of these 1,000 aircraft (140 U.S. F-1 11s,

10 British Buccaneers, and-when full deployment levels are reached-about 430 British and

German Tornados) can reach targets beyond

about 150 kilometers from the FLOT. None

can reach beyond about 400 kilometers without refueling (see table 9-2). Furthermore, few

of the escort aircraft that would be included

in an attack package can operate at these

longer ranges.

The F-ills are the only aircraft fully able

to operate at night and in bad weather. F-16s

are beginning to acquire a night/all-weather capability with the addition of the LANTIRN

navigation and targeting pods. Tornados are

equipped with terrain-following radar which

permits operation at low altitudes even under

poor visibility, and a ground-mapping radar

that could allow them to navigate to and locate

large area targets at night; but they lack an

Table 9-2.— Delivery Systems

Ground-launched:

Country Range (approx.)

Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . all 30 kilometers

MLRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . US, GE, UK 30 kilometers

Conventional Lance. . . . . . . . US, NL, BE 120 kilometers

Aircraft:

Country Range Night/weather

F-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . US,GE short limited

F-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NL short no

F-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . US, NL, BE short no

CF-18. . . . . . . . . . . . . CA short no

F-104 a . . . . . . . . . . . . GE, NL, BE short limited

F-ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . US medium full

Tornado . . . . . . . . . . GE,UK medium good

Mirage 5 . . . . . . . . . . BE short no

Jaguar . . . . . . . . . . . . UK

Buccaneer . . . . . . . UK

Ranges Short up to roughly 150 kilometers beyond the FLOT

Medium up to roughly 350 kilometers beyond the FLOT

aBelng replaced by F.16 and Tornado

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987
138 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

infrared targeting system that would enable aircraft is sufficient to fly from bases in the

them to carry out precise attacks at night. United States to targets throughout Eastern

Some of the B-52 bombers of the Strategic Europe. Whether they can, or must, successAir Command could be made available for con- fully penetrate Warsaw Pact air defenses and

whether existing on-board targeting systems ventional missions; crews are beginning to be

trained to fly such missions.3 The range of these are adequate for the job are critical questions,

however.4

—.—

“’NATO Deploys Boeing B-52s in Deep-Strike Attack Exercise, ” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 9, 1985. 4See vol. 2, app. 9-B.

MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions currently represent the

primary means for attacking combat vehicles

and other mobile targets (see table 9-3). Many

small bomblets—packed into an air-delivered

dispenser, artillery shell, or rocket–are scattered over a wide area (typically a few hundred

meters). This large kill radius compensates for

imprecise delivery and permits engaging multiple individual targets per pass or per round.

Although these munitions are capable of doing considerable damage to soft targets such

as personnel, trucks, field command posts, and

lightly armored vehicles such as self-propelled

artillery and BMPs, their ability to penetrate

heavy armor is small.’ Unless a bomblet happens to strike a tank at a particularly vulnerable spot on its top surface, it is unlikely to

do any serious damage. Because the typical

pattern on the ground of these weapons is one

bomblet per 20 square meters, the probability of killing a tank with these munitions is

quite low. Another drawback of these munitions is that when delivered by air, they require

the aircraft to fly within a few kilometers of

the target-in the case of Combined Effects

Munition (CEM) and Rockeye, which, like ordinary bombs, can be dropped from a distance

in a‘ ‘lobbed’ trajectory-or even directly over

the target (in the case of the Tornado’s MW-1

dispenser, which remains fixed to the bottom

of the aircraft).

5A typical penetration depth is 25 mm of ordinary steel (rolled

homogeneous armor). The APAM warhead carried on the conventional Lance missile has essentially no armor-penetrating

ability.

Table 9-3.— Munitions Fielded by NATO Forces

General. purpose bombs:

Mk-82, Mk-84, others . . . . . . . aircraft

Cluster munitions:

ICM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . artillery, MLRS

APAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lance

Rockeye. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft

CEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft

MW-1/KB-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (German Tornado)

BL755 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (British)

Scatterable mines:

Gator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft

RAAM, ADAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . artillery

MW-1/MIFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (German Tornado)

Guided bombs:

Maverick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (F-16, F-4, F-1 11)

Paveway II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (F-4, F-1 11)

GBU-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (F-4, F-1 11)

TV-guided Martel . . . . . . . . . . aircraft (British Buccaneer)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987

A different type of air-launched weapon, the

Maverick guided missile, has a high kill probability against armored vehicles, but is expensive (over $100,000 each) and is capable of hitting at most one target per round and at most

a few per pass. It also requires the attacking

aircraft to fly to within a few kilometers of the

target.

Other guided bombs, the laser-guided Paveway and the TV-guided GBU-15, provide a significant capability for attacking fixed targets

such as bridges, hardened command posts, and

power stations, mainly by virtue of their high

accuracy. Both also allow the aircraft to stand

off a modest distance (as much as 20 kilometers) from the target.
Land mines that can be delivered by artillery

or aircraft also provide a current capability for

attacking follow-on forces. Unlike land mines

used in the past, which had to be emplaced by

hand and which generally did little damage to

tanks—perhaps merely blowing off a tread,

causing a minor delay—these new mines can

be quickly emplaced where needed and they

Ch. 9—Current Capabilities ● 139

make use of improved lethal mechanisms that

may allow them to be effective in halting or

even destroying armored vehicles. A major

limitation of the current scatterable mines is

that they are easily seen on roads and can be

cleared with the forks and rollers carried by

Soviet tanks or even by machine-gun fire.
. . .

Chapter 10

Technology Issues:

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and

Target Acquisition to Support

Follow-On Forces Attack
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................143

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

(RSTA) Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ....143

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................144

RSTA Requirements for SOFA . . . . . . . . ...........................144

Joint STARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........146

Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................,146

Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............146

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................147

Need for Airborne Moving-Target-Indicating Radar Surveillance. .. ....148

Vulnerability to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..149

Susceptibility to Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................150

Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................,........151

The Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..154

Components and programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....156

Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............157

Problems and Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........158

Operational Utility: The View From USAFE . ......................159

Alternatives to PLSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........159

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................160

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......160

The Aquila RPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....161

Alternatives to Aquila . . . . . . . ,..... . .........................162

The Light Division UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................164

The IEW UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......164

Expendable UAVs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........164

Air-Launched UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........164

Advanced-Technology UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................,.164

Issues and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............164

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........,.165

The Two-Way Street: Opportunities for Cooperative Development and

Production of RSTA Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..165

Interoperable or Co-Produced Airborne Radar Systems . . . . . . .........165

Airbus Industrie A300 Platforms for Joint STARS. . ................166

Figures

Figure No. Page

10-1.Joint STARS Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....147

10-2. Components of the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) . ......155

10-3. The Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle . ..........................162
Chapter 10

Technology Issues: Reconnaissance,

Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to

Support Follow-On Forces Attack

INTRODUCTION

Attacking follow-on forces requires an abilit y to collect intelligence about the enemy situation from which enemy strength and intentions may be inferred. This intelligence may

be collected by routine efforts (surveillance) or

by efforts to obtain more information about

a specific area of interest (reconnaissance).

FOFA also requires an ability to acquire targets—i.e., to detect and identify enemy forces

and to determine or predict their locations with

sufficient accuracy to attack them. At present,

only fixed targets and vehicles which halt for

relatively long times can be acquired reliably.

There will be important improvements—especially in timeliness—as systems and procedures for using ASARS-II radar imagery are

improved, but shortfalls will still remain, especially in the ability to acquire moving vehicles

(“movers”) out to about 150 kilometers.

Several programs that could help are at issue now before Congress; these include the

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) program and various unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. The

Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)–

procurement of which has been deferred by the

Air Force–could also contribute to FOFA if

remaining developmental problems (discussed

below) are corrected. ’

‘Much information about RSTA systems is classified. U.S.

citizens holding SECRET clearances are referred to vol. 2 of

this report and to ch, 5 of OTA, Technologies for NATO’s FollowOn Forces Attack Concept (U), 10 February 1986. The appendices to this chapter contain extensive additional material.

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and

Target Acquisition (RSTA) Functions

Attacking follow-on forces requires:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

detecting, recognizing, and roughly locating targets (surveillance or reconnaissance);

assessing their value and intent (situation

assessment);

choosing the targets to be attacked (command decision);

identifying opportunities and means to attack them (targeting);

planning the attack;

tasking attack and reconnaissance platforms to perform the attack;

accurately locating the targets to be attacked (target acquisition); and

quickly providing target updates to the

attack platforms (attack control). If the

attack is to be conducted by aircraft, information on enemy air defenses must also

be provided.

NATO today has a variety of systems to feed

data into this process. Although it is difficult

to generalize about a large number of very different systems, we can generally observe that

while NATO’s current systems are probably

capable of supporting the attack of targets that

do not move very frequently, they fall far short

of providing continuous, broad, deep coverage

and of being able to provide targeting data on

highly mobile systems-especially those which

do not emit radar or radio signals-without undue delays.

143
144 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Issues

There is concern that the E-8A aircraft proposed as platforms for Joint STARS would not

be adequately survivable if operated as close

to the FLOT as originally intended, and that

if operated farther from the FLOT, their coverage would be inadequate to justify their cost.

The Air Force decided not to request fiscal year

1987 funds for procurement of PLSS, which

is designed to accurately locate and control attacks against surface-to-air missile (SAM) radars, but did request and receive fiscal year

1987 funds for further development and testing of PLSS avionics. PLSS has almost attained specified emitter location accuracy but

has not yet demonstrated specified system

reliability (partly because of TR-1 aircraft

failures). The Aquila remotely piloted vehicle

(RPV) program has suffered cost and schedule overruns, leading some to consider procurement of an existing-possibly foreign-made—

RPV which could be modified to have capabilities comparable to those required of Aquila.2

U.S. procurement of an RPV made by a NATO

partner would visibly reinforce U.S. efforts to

pave a “two-way street” for intra-alliance arms

sales-at the expense of the U.S. trade balance.

RSTA Requirements for FOFA

Ideally, FOFA would be supported by the

collection of raw intelligence of several disciplines-communications intelligence (COMINT),

electronics intelligence (E LINT), image intelligence 3 (IMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence4 (MASINT)–-across the full

breadth and depth of the enemy’s rear area under all weather and lighting conditions. Ideally,

‘The House Armed Services Committee recommended, in its

markup of the fiscal year 1987 Omnibus Defense Authorization bill, that the Target Acquisition, Designation, and Aerial

Reconnaissance System (TADARS) program under which the

Aquila RPV is being developed, be terminated. The Senate

Armed Services Committee approved fiscal year 1987 appropriations for further development but prohibited expenditures for

procurement until the ability of the system to meet all operational requirements has been demonstrated.

‘Including radar imagery and visible and infrared electrooptical and photographic imagery.

‘Including, for example, moving-target indication (MTI) provided by radar.

RSTA systems would be capable of determining and reporting the locations of all targets

with accuracy and timeliness adequate to guide

attack platforms and weapons to them.

OTA has reviewed a number of analyses

which have been performed by or for SHAPE,

the Department of Defense, and allied ministries of defense to estimate the RSTA capabilities needed for FOFA (or interdiction). Most

provide insight into RSTA capabilities needed

for FOFA and the difficulties of estimating

them. These analyses and other considerations

lead OTA to the following observations:

●

●

Reconnaissance and surveillance needs vary

greatly according to the specific operational

concepts to be implemented. Current concepts for FOFA require relatively little

RSTA support; they seek primarily to delay and disrupt follow-on forces by route

attacks intended to create obstacles, and

to destroy follow-on forces by attacking

them when halted at obstacles. Some new

operational concepts—e.g., use of cruise

missiles to mine rail lines and destroy key

bridges–would likewise require little or no

additional procurement of RSTA systems.

The most ambitious FOFA concepts require

some sort of airborne moving-targetindicating (MTI) radar system capable of

almost continuous broad coverage to the

depth of divisional assembly areas (70 to

100 + kilometers) and near-real-time display, because:

–Deep, wide-area surveillance is needed

for situation assessment. To allow

friendly forces time for planning and

movement, massing enemy forces must

be detected while they are still far (100

to 150 kilometers) from the FLOT. Rapid

revisit would facilitate tracking5 and re5Under conditions likely to be encountered in central Germany,

one scan (“revisit’ every 30 seconds would be ideal for tracking small formations (10 vehicles), whereas a 60-second revisit

interval would suffice for tracking larger formations (50 vehicles). Longer revisit intervals would reduce the probability of

successful tracking. See R.K. Little and J.R. Bloomfield, Trade

Stud”es: Tracking With Intermittent Radar Coverage (Minneapolis, MN: Honeywell Systems and Research Center, Aerospace and Defense Group, Technical Report No. TS-01 (Draft),

September 1983); n.b. fig. 3 on p. 24.
Ch. 10—Technology issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 145

duce double-counting of enemy units,

but is not essential.

–Rapid revisit would be needed to track

deep high-value movers to planned engagement zones or between stops where

they could be attacked.

–Wide coverage about once a minute to

a depth of about 80 kilometers would

be needed to track and target units moving forward out of division assembly

areas. Prompt display of target locations would be needed to control attacks

against them. A capability to distinguish tracked vehicles from wheeled vehicles would allow armored units to be

distinguished from supply convoys, etc.

–More frequent coverage (twice a minute)

would be needed to target the more numerous smaller units which would advance from regimental assembly areas

closer to the FLOT; shallow coverage

(to a depth of about 30 kilometers) would

suffice.

Without such capabilities, FOFA would

mainly consist of: attacks against halted,

long-dwell, high-value, soft targets, such

as command posts and SAM batteries,6

attacks to create obstacles and delay moving units, and some attacks against moving

units which might be located accurately

and reported quickly by coordinated use

of diverse RSTA systems, planned well

in advance. Only airborne MTI radar systems can frequently search large areas for

vehicles moving in radio silence at night

or in adverse weather; they cannot, however, detect targets masked by terrain or

vegetation.

—.— —— -..

‘Individual systems such as the Tactical Reconnaissance System could provide infrequent, broad, deep, all-weather, day/night

coverage of fixed targets as well as continuous, broad, deep coverage of emitters to support situation assessment and to cue

limited-coverage target-acquisition systems such as UAVs.

●

●

●

●

Fusion of intelligence from multiple disciplines facilitates situation assessment and

targeting. Hardware, software, and systems now being developed by the ArmyAir Force Joint Tactical Fusion Program

(JTFP) could be used by USAFE and by

U.S. Army corps and divisions in Europe

to automate and speed intelligence fusion,

analysis, and dissemination. These systems and national systems used now in

Europe could interface with the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES), a NATO-wide

intelligence fusion system now being

planned. NATO’s Tri-Service Group for

Communications and Electronic Equipment has established a BICES project

group, which is estimating the intelligence

requirements of Major NATO Commanders (e.g., SACEUR) and Major

Subordinate Commanders (e.g., CINCENT) and considering the designs of interfaces that should be established between their intelligence generation control

elements and national systems, as well as

interfaces that should be established

among the national intelligence systems. 7

It will be necessary to destroy mobile SAM

batteries which would protect all other

follow-on forces from airborne surveillance

and air attack.

It may be necessary to destroy jammers;

if so, it would be important that the weapons used be relatively inexpensive.

Survivability of air bases and command and

control facilities is also essential to RSTA.

NATO and the U.S. Air Force have programs (outside the scope of this report)

intended to reduce the dependence of

RSTA on vulnerable facilities.

“See Loren Diedrichsen. ‘ ‘Toward a Functional Model of N A TO

C’, ” Signal, October 1986, pp. 43-47, and Brigadier A.L. Meier,

OBE, ‘‘B ICE S—A Central Region Perspecti\’e, Znternationa]

Defense Review, October 1986, pp. 1445 ff.
146 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

JOINT STARS

Description

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) is an airborne surveillance and attack control system designed

to detect and indicate8 moving ground vehicles and to guide attacking aircraft and missiles to moving or halted formations of enemy

vehicles. An outgrowth of the Air Force PAVE

MOVER and Army Standoff Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) programs, Joint STARS

is to complement the Airborne Warning and

Control System (AWACS), which detects aircraft. It will scan a broad, deep coverage area

frequently to support situation assessment, attack planning, and real-time control of interdiction attacks by missiles or aircraft. The radar could be operated, and attacks controlled,

by operators on board Joint STARS aircraft

(E-8 As) or in mobile Ground Station Modules

(GSMs) being developed by the Army.

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System will include both airborne and

ground-based segments. The airborne segment

includes the radar system, the Operations and

Control (O&C) system, a communications system, and the E-8A aircraft-a modified Boeing 707—which carries them. These are being

developed and are to be procured and operated

by the U.S. Air Force. A Weapon Data Link

(WDL) is being developed to provide target updates to in-flight Air Force direct-attack aircraft—F-15Es, F-16Cs, and F-16Ds—and to

Army and Air Force missiles equipped with

Weapon Interface Units (WIUs).9 The groundbased segment includes transportable Ground

Station Modules–including Down-sized Ground

‘Any airborne radar can detect moving targets, but in order

to indicate moving targets as such, an airborne MTI radar must

distinguish fixed targets and ground clutter–which are moving relative to the radar-from targets which are moving relative to both the radar and the ground. The signal processing

required for airborne MTI radar is more complicated than that

required for ground-based air-surveillance radars, which do not

move relative to ground clutter.

The services have not requested appropriations to procure

operational WI US, but prototype units are being developed as

part of the full-scale development program to flight test and

verify WDL performance.

Station Modules (DGSMs)-–which are being

developed and are to be procured and operated

by the U.S. Army. A Surveillance and Control

Data Link (SCDL) is being developed to satisfy

Army needs for tactical mobile, in-weather,

anti- jamming communications of all radar data

to an unlimited number of GSMs. The Joint

Tactical Information Distribution System

(JTIDS) will provide C2 communications with

Air Force users and threat warning and air

track information from AWACS and other air

defense elements. The E-8A platform will provide cross-link communications between SCDL

and JTIDS users.

Small, transportable ground beacons are also

being developed for use by Joint STARS aircraft as radio navigation aids while awaiting

full capability of the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS). Thereafter they could

serve as a backup to the GPS. These components are illustrated in figure 10-1.

Status

As of March 1, 1987, Joint STARS aircraft

and GSMs were both in full-scale development.

A total of $715 million had already been appropriated for RDT&E through fiscal year 1987:

$675 million for the Air Force and $240 million for the Army.10 Two FSD models of Joint

STARS E-8A aircraft are being produced for

the Air Force by Grumman Melbourne Systems on a $657 million contract, but these have

not yet been delivered. Norden Systems is

producing the radio-frequency components of

the radar subsystems on a subcontract from

Grumman. Boeing 707 airframes in commercial use with documented maintenance histories will be purchased for about $10 million

each and converted to the EC-18B configuration]

’ by the Boeing Military Aircraft Co. under

subcontract to Grumman.12 Grumman will con-

‘(’In current (i.e., “then-year”) dollars.

“Used by Air Force Advanced Range Instrument Aircraft

(ARIA).

‘*The last new 707 airframes produced cost about $30 million

each. After the last 707 airframes were produced (for AWACS),

Boeing closed its 707 production line.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 147

Figure 10-1 .—Joint STARS Components

Air Force

“beacon”

(transponder)

Weapon

interface

unit for

direct attack

aircraft: Ž F-15E

● F-16 C/D

Under consideration: by Air Force

Army

— .-.

SOURCES U S Army (DAMA CSC ST), U S Alr Force (SAF/LLW), and Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 198/

vert these to E-8As by installing the prime mission equipment at its facility at the Melbourne

Regional Airport near Melbourne, Florida.

Issues

Although Joint STARS has received broad

support within the Army, the Air Force, Allied Command Europe, and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, it has been a matter of

contention in Congress. Opponents claim that

the C-18 is too vulnerable to attack and must

be replaced with a more survivable platform.

They also contend that the radar required for

the more survivable platform could not be developed from the radar now under development. Therefore, they argue, the program

should be canceled and a new one started.

Proponents argue that the E-8A-based Joint

STARS will be “survivable but not immortal, ”

and that when operated in the proper manner,

with proper support, it will be capable of doing what is needed. They further argue that

more survivable platforms will not, by themselves, satisfy requirements, but that they

could usefully complement E-8As as Joint

STARS platforms. The Air Force contends

that Joint STARS may need to be deployed

to areas outside Europe in crises, and that more

survivable platforms could not carry all the

equipment that E-8As could, nor could they be

used to “show the flag’ in peacetime without
148 ● New Technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

compromising the secrecy of design features

on which they would rely for survivability.

Proponents also argue that it is important to

get something into the field as soon as possible so that the troops can learn how to use this

complex capability.

Resolution of these issues will require answering four questions:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Why is the capability promised by Joint

STARS needed?

How serious are the problems of vulnerability to attack and susceptibility to electronic countermeasures (ECM)? Specifically, how would they affect the operational

utility of the proposed Joint STARS fleet?

What are the alternatives? What are their

advantages and drawbacks?

If an alternative is desired, could Joint

STARS avionics systems developed or procured for E-8As be used by alternative systems? What systems could not be used?

Could Joint STARS E-8As themselves

complement alternative systems?

Need for Airborne Moving-TargetIndicating Radar Surveillance

As noted above,13 the most ambitious FOFA

concepts require some sort of airborne movingtarget-indicating (MTI) radar system capable

of frequently “revisiting” (i.e., scanning) broad

deep areas. Only an airborne MTI radar system

can detect vehicles moving in radio silence at

night or in adverse weather and revisit a large

area of interest often enough to track such vehicles moving in it. Joint STARS was designed

to provide the kind of frequent, deep, wide-area

MTI surveillance needed to implement these

ambitious FOFA concepts. The MTI capabilities of other operational, developmental, and

proposed MTI systems known to OTA fall far

short of those needed to support highly effective FOFA:

● The currently operational MTI radar carried by the OV-1D “Mohawk” twinturboprop aircraft is a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR). Its beam cannot scan

“See ch. 5 and the section above on RSTA requirements.

●

●

●

●

and therefore revisits a target only twice

per orbit. It would operate within range

of multiple types of surface-to-air missiles.14

The British ASTOR-I MTI SLAR system

has these inadequacies and others as well:

it has no data link and cannot provide

moving-target indications until after aircraft recovery when recorded radar echoes

can be processed.15

The French ORCHIDEE heliborne MTI

radar system, now in development, will

also operate close to the FLOT at low altitude and will also have inadequate range

and coverage.

The ASARS-II radar has some MTI capability now and, because its platform (a

TR-1) operates at high altitude, it is less

affected by terrain and vegetation masking than Joint STARS would be at nominal stand-off range (or at equal stand-off

range). However, ASARS-II requires a

large ground station to process radar data

before it is transmitted to Army and Air

Force users. This dependence on a ground

station compromises the mobility and survivability of ASARS-II.

The ASARS-II radar could be enhanced

to have even greater MTI capability. It

could also be equipped with an SCDL air

data terminal, so that its MTI data could

be broadcast directly to tactical users.

However, the MTI capabilities of an enhanced ASARS-II radar would be inadequate to support highly effective FOFA

and inferior to those of Joint STARS. Although it would suffer less masking by terrain and vegetation, it would have several

disadvantages: 16

—a minimum detectable velocity about

twice that of Joint STARS,

14FiXed SAM9 could be attacked and others evaded, but evasive maneuvering would interrupt surveillance. In the future,

new mobile SAMs are expected to pose a greater threat to Mohawks as well as other aircraft.

‘5The SCDL developed for Joint STARS has been used experimentally to transmit ASTOR-I MTI data to a GSM.

“See also the Joint STARS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis being completed by the U.S. Army TRADOC

Analysis Center as this report goes to press.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 149

—a detection range two-thirds that of

Joint STARS,

—one-fifth the coverage of Joint STARS

at a comparable revisit rate,

—inferior moving target location accuracy, and

—vastly inferior electronic countermeasures (in MTI modes).

None of the above-mentioned systems has, or

will have, an attack planning and control capability. An integrated surveillance and control

capability, such as Joint STARS will provide,

would greatly reduce the time between detection of a target and engagement of the target, thereby permitting halted vehicle formations to be engaged and permitting moving

columns of vehicles to be attacked by missiles

or aircraft.

To engage units on the move with missiles

armed with wide-area munitions, the units

must be tracked to planned engagement zones,

at which time missile launch must be triggered.

Last-minute confirmation of a target’s approach to an engagement zone is needed just

before launch, with minimal delay for maximum effectiveness. Attack aircraft will also

need in-flight guidance-which could be provided by voice radio or data link-in order to

attack designated moving targets (as distinct

from targets of opportunity). Without in-flight

guidance, they would be more exposed to observation and fire while searching for designated moving targets and they would suffer

higher attrition.

Vulnerability to Attack17

Any of several Warsaw Pact SAMs or interceptor aircraft could destroy an unprotected

Joint STARS E-8A in a hypothetical one-onone engagement. In reality, Joint STARS will

not operate alone; NATO will provide protection to all such aircraft in NATO airspace.

1 Tl~ ~repuing this report, OTA staff were not gr~ted access

LO “Special Access Required” information about programs and

technologies which might be of use in improving the survivability of Joint STARS. It is possible that options not considered by OTA could provide benefits significantly different from

those discussed here.

Joint STARS would benefit from general measures such as air defense suppression and offensive counter-air operations using attack aircraft and missiles, and defensive counter-air

operations by high-altitude combat air patrol

aircraft (e.g., F-15s) and NATO SAMs (e.g.,

Patriots). It is expected that Warsaw Pact

SAMs and interceptors will be increasingly

(but not completely) suppressed as a war

progresses. When Joint STARS is attacked,

it would be forewarned by on-board display of

hostile aircraft data from air defense elements

(e.g., AWACS) so that it could take evasive

action or employ countermeasures. It would

also be protected by other Air Force aircraft

capable of jamming enemy radars and radios.

The addition of on-board threat warning and

countermeasure capabilities is being considered to counter Soviet interceptor aircraft and

SAM threats.

Even with such protection, Joint STARS

would probably be vulnerable to fixed and mobile SAMs and to interceptor aircraft if operated, early in a war, at the setback range originally planned. If operated at a greater range

from the FLOT, its vulnerability would decrease, but so would its coverage. Air Force

planners may want to hold E-8As back from

the FLOT most of the time early in a war and

surge them forward, with suitable support, for

limited periods of intense activity. It is expected that surge periods could be increased

as war progresses and enemy defenses are

depleted.

Operating this way, an E-8A could provide

good coverage to at least the range of an MLRS

rocket, where frequent coverage is most

needed. It could provide valuable coverage

deeper, but deep targets would be masked more

frequently by terrain and foliage and could be

masked more easily by jamming. Its deep coverage would still be useful for situation assessment, but its ability to track units would be

degraded. The resulting increased likelihood

of double-counting units could make situation

assessment less certain, and the ability to engage high-value targets deep would be degraded to an extent not yet quantified. OTA

is not aware of any thorough analysis of the

71-285 () - 87 - 6
utility of Joint STARS as a FOFA system

operating in this manner, although a major

study coordinated by the Army Training and

Doctrine Command’s TRADOC Analysis Center is nearing completion. Smaller studies for

the Army18 and Air Force19 have examined or

are now examining the impact of such revised

operational concepts on selected operational

capabilities.

Susceptibility to Jamming

Joint STARS is designed to have very capable electronic counter-countermeasures, but

its performance could be degraded by severe

jamming. Two types of jamming might be attempted against Joint STARS: sidelobe jamming and mainlobe jamming. Successful sidelobe jamming would require very powerful or

highly directional jammers. The jamming signal must be strong enough so that even if received by the airborne radar when its beam is

pointing away from the jammer,20 it will be

powerful enough to mask received radar

‘

nE.g., by the BDM Corp.

‘

gE.g., by the Rand Corp. for the Directorate of Operational

Requirements (AF/RDQ).

‘“I.e., when the airborne radar receiver is relatively insensitive to the jamming signal.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack . 151

echoes. In principle, the entire area scanned

by an airborne surveillance radar could be

masked by a single jammer, if sufficiently

powerful.” Unless highly directional, a sidelobe jammer would have to be immensely powerful and would probably interfere with enemy

radar systems.

If necessary, the electronic counter-countermeasures of operational Joint STARS aircraft

could be upgraded to counter sidelobe jamming

threats more severe than those which the two

developmental aircraft are required to counter,

Growth capabilities are built into the Full-Scale

Development radar to permit such enhancement without modifying the radar’s design.

Alternatively–or additionally--sidelobe jammers could be attacked. Whether immensely

powerful or highly directional, sidelobe jammers would be relatively expensive and hence

high-value targets for jammer-suppression attacks using anti-radiation missiles or other

weapons.

Successful mainlobe jamming occurs when

the beam of an airborne radar is pointing at

a jammer; the airborne radar is then most sensitive to the jamming signal, which need not

be very powerful. If sufficiently strong relative to the radar echoes from the area near the

jammer, the jamming signal will mask those

echoes, and the radar will be unable to detect

targets near the jammer. However, although

successful mainlobe jamming would require

relatively little power, a single jammer would

mask only a small area. A large number of jammers would be required to intermittently mask

the whole coverage area specified for Joint

STARS; more would be required to mask the

specified coverage area continuously.

If effective mainlobe jammers are developed

and proliferated, lethal suppression may be

necessary to counter them, although relatively

minor upgrades to Joint STARS could provide

a significant amount of additional anti-jam

margin. If, in the future, an effective mainlobe

jamming threat is projected, and if lethal sup-

“App. 10-C in vol. 2 of this report discusses OTA’s assessment of the susceptibility of Joint STARS to sidelobe jamming

by existing and anticipated Soviet jammers.

pression is deemed necessary to counter it,

identification of the least-cost means of killing mainlobe jammers will require further

study .22 A comparison of the cost to NATO

of killing such jammers with the cost to Warsaw Pact nations of producing and operating

them would indicate which alliance would suffer more economically if both were to compete

in a jammer/counter- jammer competition; however, other incentives will affect decisions to

compete in or refrain from such a competition.

Alternatives

There are several alternatives to funding the

Army and Air Force Joint STARS programs

as proposed, or canceling them. These include:

1.

2.

3.

development (if necessary) and procurement of add-on systems to enhance the utility and survivability of Joint STARS

E-8 AS;

development (if necessary) and procurement of an alternative platform more survivable or protectable than an E-8A; and

development (if necessary) and procurement of complementary platforms intended to operate in coordination with E8As, enabling the E-8As to operate in a

more survivable (or protectable) manner.

Add-On Systems

If Joint STARS is procured, its utility and

survivability could be enhanced by procuring

accessories:

● Non-lethal self-defense suites could be procured for E-8As to enhance their survivability. These could include expendable and

non-expendable electronic and infrared

countermeasure systems, some of which

are already used on other aircraft. Joint

STARS E-8As and other platforms could

22Jammers and radars could be attacked by manned aircraft

(e.g., F-4G Wild Weasels) or by kamikaze drones, such as the

air-launched TACIT RAINBOW drone being developed by

Northrop for the Air Force and Navy. TACIT RAINBOW is

expected to complete full-scale development in fiscal year 1988.

During initial operational testing and evaluation, the drones

are being launched from B-52, A-7, and A-6E aircraft. IAerospace Da”lJ’, Jan. 8, 1987; Aviation W’eek and Space Technology?’, Apr. 27, 1987, p. 34.
152 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

●

●

be equipped to tow or dispense expendable decoy emitters23 which could be developed to draw fire and jamming from the

Joint STARS E-8As. The Joint STARS

Program Office is now evaluating several

self-defense suite concepts and will present its findings to the Joint Requirements and Management Board in March

1987 for a decision on self-defense suite

acquisition.

An air-to-air missile system for last-ditch

defense against surface-to-air and air-toair missiles could also be developed and

procured.

Weapon Interface Units (WIUs) could be

procured for ground-attack aircraft. These

digital data links could guide groundattack aircraft to more distant targets

more accurately than voice radio or a

JTIDS data link could, so the aircraft

could find moving columns of armored vehicles with less searching, exposure, and

attrition.

Alternative Platforms

Alternatively, a less observable (i. e.,

‘‘stealthy’ high-altitude aircraft could be used

as a platform for Joint STARS; it could fly

closer to the FLOT with a much lower probability of being detected and attacked, and its

susceptibility to sidelobe jamming would also

be reduced,24 as would masking of targets by

terrain and vegetation.25 The Department of

23 See Marc Liebman, “Expendable Decoys Counter Missiles

With New Technology, ” Defense Hectrom”cs, October 1986, pp.

69 ff.

241f enemy radars could not detect and track a Joint STARS

platform or its antennas, and if enemy direction-finding equipment could not reliably detect and recognize Joint STARS radar emissions and track their source, jammer beams could not

be aimed at the radar. However, operating Joint STARS equipment in a stealthy manner may require operation at reduced

power. This would reduce the power of radar echoes and hence

the power required for mainlobe jamming.

‘

sMasking of targets in central Germany by summer vegetation would be significant: cf. figures 1 and 2 of V.L. Lynn, “Terrain and Foliage Masking for Long-Range Surveillance; A Sample of Measurements in Central Germany” (Lexington, MA:

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory,

Project Report TST-35, June 15, 1979), Defense Technical Information Center accession No. AD-B040205 See vol. 2 of this

report for further discussion of masking.

Defense has considered proposals to develop

a more survivable platform than the E-8A.

However, information about the concept or

concepts considered by the Department of Defense is highly classified and unavailable to

OTA. Some potential benefits and limitations

of reducing the observability of the Joint

STARS platform, radar, and signal are discussed in volume 2 of this report, which is classified. (Authorized readers interested in this

important topic are referred to app. 10-C in vol.

2. However, readers should be aware that there

are facts and concepts that OTA is unaware

of, and that could conceivably change OTA’s

observations.)

The use of a stealthy platform would not,

by itself, guarantee low-observable operation:

the detectability of the radar antenna by a

threat radar would have to be reduced, and the

detectability of the radar emissions would also

have to be reduced. Balanced reduction of the

platform and antenna cross-sections” and the

radar’s signature would be needed: if any one

of these were readily observable, the system

could be readily detected.

Many things could be done to reduce the detectability of radar emissions; some would not

reduce radar performance. However, when all

else has been done, further reduction of detectability, if necessary, would require reducing

the radar’s power, which would require reducing its coverage area or revisit rate, increasing the minimum detectable velocity, or a combination of these trade-offs. It would also

increase susceptibility to jamming. Hence, if

operated in a stealthy manner, a stealthy Joint

STARS would “see” less than an E-8A would.

Although it would be able to view some areas

which would be hidden from a lower, rearward

E-8A by terrain and foliage, its beam could not

frequently revisit the broad area near the

FLOT–where frequent revisit is most

“An object radar cross-section is an index of its observability by radar; it depends on the frequency of the radar signal,

the polarizations of the transmitting and receiving antennas,

and the directions to these from the target.
Ch. 10— Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack .

needed27—without compromising its low observability .

For this reason, some analysts believe that

a significantly more survivable Joint STARS

would not be able to gather all the information “required” by the Joint Service Operational Requirement for Joint STARS. This

does not mean such a system would be

useless—it might be very useful—but OTA

knows of no analysis of the contribution to

FOFA of such a reduced capability. In order

to judge the value of a stealthy Joint STARS,

a detailed analysis is needed comparing the separate and combined contributions to FOFA capability of an E-8A operated for survivability

and a stealthy platform operated near the FLOT.

Rather than reduce power to the extent required to completely avoid detection, deception

could be used to make enemy identification,

tracking, and engagement of a low-observable

Joint STARS platform improbable. Expendable decoy emitters–discussed above–would

need less power to mimic a low-power, stealthy

Joint STARS than to mimic a high-power E8A-based Joint STARS.

Complementary Platforms

The surveillance capabilities of E-8As could

be increased or supplemented by other aircraft

operating in coordination with them; these

could include aircraft of three distinct types:

1. stealthy aircraft with comparable radars

used to observe deep areas;

Z. aircraft with less capable radars, which

could observe some targets masked from

E-8 As; and

3. stealthy aircraft used primarily to passively observe deep areas “illuminated”

by E-8As at greater stand-off range.

“In experiments using simulated imagery, the success rate

of operators tasked to track company-size formations (10 vehicles) for 24 minutes decreased from about two-thirds to about

one-half when the revisit interval was increased from 30 to 60

seconds. Their success rate tracking battalion-size formations

(50 vehicles) decreased similarly when the revisit interval was

increased from 60 to 120 seconds. See Little and Bloomfield,

op. cit., p. 24, fig. 3. Masking of targets by vegetation was simulated in these experiments, and a stationary radar location was

assumed.

153

Development of stealthy platforms to complement (not replace) E-8As would avoid several shortcomings of a force consisting solely

of stealthy platforms. E-8As could be used before complementary platforms are operational.

Thereafter:

In peacetime, E-8As could be used in Europe to provide indications of Pact mobilization and warning of attack. Stealthy platforms should not be used routinely because

their routine use would risk compromising

their security and survivability.

In crises, E-8As could be deployed from

Europe to other theaters where it would

be difficult to deploy GSMs quickly.

Stealthy platforms, if small, would be unable to carry much operations and control

equipment. Joint STARS E-8 As, like

AWACS E-3 A/B/Cs, could be used to

“show the flag”; stealthy platforms, if observed, might be more easily countered

later.

In wartime, the stealthy platforms of a

“mixed” force could view selected deep

areas frequently, or broad deep areas infrequently, with little terrain masking,

whereas E-8As normally at a greater distance from the FLOT could revisit the

close battle area frequently with their

powerful radar beams. The E-8As could

approach the FLOT more closely when

provided extra defense support or after

enemy air defenses have been degraded;

they could also serve as operations and

control centers, complementing GSMs.

Less capable airborne radars could observe

some targets masked from E-8 As; these include ASARS-II, enhanced ASARS-II, Mohawk, ASTOR-I, and ORCHIDEE, which were

mentioned above,28 as well as radars on unmanned aerial vehicles, which are discussed

later in this chapter. These could not replace

E-8As but could complement them; for example, a short-range MTI radar being developed

for the Army’s Intelligence and Electronic

“See also ch. 8, above, and the section below, in this chapter,

on “The Two-Way Street, ” where the NATO Airborne Radar

Demonstrator System (ARDS) program is discussed.
154 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Warfare Unmanned Aerial Vehicle could be

used to monitor targets in areas masked from

E-8As by hills.

In the more distant future, it might be possible to build a bistatic (“two-station”) MTI

radar system employing a powerful transmitter on an airplane or satellite at a presumably

safe distance to irradiate the coverage area

while an airplane closer to the coverage area

receives and processes the radar echoes .29 The

receiver platform would not divulge its location by beaming radar pulses into enemy territory and, if sufficiently stealthy, might therefore escape attack and sidelobe jamming even

if very close to enemy territory. It would still

be susceptible to mainlobe jamming, although

potentially less so than a low-power radar. Its

advantage over baseline or low-power systems

is that it could scan close and deep areas at

a high revisit rate. The platform location determination and signal synchronization and

processing required for such a system would

‘

gGeorge W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar (El

Segundo, CA: Hughes Aircraft Co., Radar Systems Group,

1983); pp. 576-577.

be very challenging. However, if and when it

is feasible, Joint STARS E-8As might be used

to irradiate the coverage area from a safe distance, while a complementary airplane, possibly using most of the avionics components developed for E-8 As, collected and processed

radar echoes and transmitted MTI data rearward to E-8 As, which could downlink it to

Army ground station modules and other users

and service their requests for radar tasking and

attack control.

Potential Commonality of Joint STARS

Prime Mission Equipment for E-8As

and Other Platforms

If a decision were made to develop a lowobservable platform for Joint STARS, it appears that all the radar components developed

for the E-8A except the antenna could be used

on such a platform without major changes, if

that system were to operate in the same frequency band. Operations and control consoles

developed for the E-8A would not be usable

on a small platform, but could be used, if

desired, on other aircraft or in ground-based

facilities.

THE PRECISION LOCATION STRIKE SYSTEM (PLSS)

The Precision Location Strike System

(PLSS: pronounced “pens”) is a developmental surveillance and control system designed

to detect, identify, and accurately locate modern mobile jammers and electronically agile30

radars in near real time.31 Such emitters would

accompany and protect follow-on forces. An

ability to attack these emitters soon after they

are detected in a new location would be very

valuable for protecting allied aircraft that detect and attack follow-on forces. PLSS has

demonstrated a capability to locate and report

more such emitters per hour with greater accuracy and timeliness than can all other U.S.

systems now reporting to Europe combined.

However, development of PLSS has been de-

‘°Capable of quickly changing frequency or emitting brief

pulses after long, irregular intervals.

31HQ TAC, TAF ROC 314-74.

layed by several problems, and the Air Force

decided last year not to begin procurement of

PLSS in fiscal year 1987. This year, the Air

Force reconsidered procurement of PLSS after an operational utility evaluation of PLSS

was completed in April, and recommended cancellation of the program.

PLSS would use electronic equipment carried aloft by three TR-1 aircraft operating together, each communicating by means of an

Interoperable Data Link (IDL) with a Central

Processing Subsystem (CPS), which could be

transportable or based in a hardened PLSS

Ground Station (PGS: see figure 10-2).

To locate emitters both accurately and

quickly, PLSS uses a combination of distancemeasuring equipment (DME), time difference

of arrival (TDOA), and direction of arrival
—

Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack . 155

Figure 10-2.—Components of the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)

The TR-1 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

“ \

. .

‘ .., ?

,.

Artist’s conception of a hardened PLSS Ground Station.

SOURCE Stgna/ (the official journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Assoclatlon} January 1986 Copyright 1986 reprl nted by permission
156 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

(DOA) techniques: The TR-1 aircraft determine

their own locations using DME; TDOA comparisons produce a few very precise candidate

locations for each emitter; and DOA sensing

determines which of them is the correct one.32

The necessity that three airborne receivers

simultaneously detect a radar pulse requires

that each receiver be very sensitive and use

high-gain antennas, because at least two of the

three receivers will be in an emitter’s sidelobes

(or backlobe) when it emits a pulse. To attain

the antenna gain required, each airborne receiver uses a phased array of antennas. A highgain antenna pattern is necessarily directional,

so the phased array is designed to form multiple receive beams which collectively cover the

specified coverage area without scanning; scanning would risk missing the signal of a “short

on-time” emitter.

Emitter locations reported by PLSS, when

correlated with intelligence from other disciplines, could be used for situation assessment

and targeting. These activities could be performed by the proposed PLSS Intelligence

Augmentation Subsystem (PI AS), or in existing intelligence fusion and targeting facilities.

Once targets have been selected and attacks

planned, near-real-time emitter location reports

from PLSS could indicate when missiles should

be launched, and could be relayed to attack aircraft using a variety of communications systems. Attacks against emitters could be controlled from the PGS.

Components and Programs

Components used by or related to PLSS are

being developed or procured under six separate programs:

1. PLSS

2. TR-1

3. IDL

4. ELS

5. ATDL

6. PIAS

3ZR. Hale, “Precision Location Strike System, ” Signal, January 1986, pp. 51 ff.

PLSS

Equipment developed by the PLSS program,

per se, includes the airborne mission subsystem (AMS) carried by each TR-1 aircraft;

the Central Processing Subsystem (CPS), and

the Site Navigation Subsystem. AMS consists

of an airborne intercept element (AIE: antennas, intercept receiver, and control system),

distance-measuring equipment, and government-furnished Interoperable Air Data Link

(IADL) equipment for the IDL. The CPS includes government-furnished Interoperable

Ground Data Link (IGDL) equipment to communicate with the TR-1s, signal and data processing equipment, and a PLSS Interface Module (PIM) for selecting, formatting, and

disseminating PLSS location reports to various users according to their needs. Each Site

Navigation Subsystem (SNS) is a transportable DME transponder.33

TR-1

PLSS airborne mission subsystems must be

carried aloft aboard TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft. Late-model TR-1s can carry either a Tactical Reconnaissance System (TRS) payload34

or a PLSS AMS, but not both simultaneously.

TRS and PLSS payloads can be swapped in

about an hour. During development and testing, PLSS airborne mission subsystems have

been carried aboard TR-1s flying training missions. PLSS could provide a limited operational

capability, if desired, using TR-1s procured for

the TRS, training, or other missions. A greater

operational PLSS capability, if desired, would

require procurement of additional TR-1s.

“Ibid.

34Consisting of an ASARS-II airborne radar system, etc.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 157

.-

IDL

Interoperable Data Link equipment is in production and will be provided to the prime contractor for PLSS as government-furnished

equipment. It includes both IADL equipment

for installation on TR-1s and IGDL equipment

for use by the PLSS CPS.

ELS

PLSS was designed to locate pulsed radars;

the Emitter Location System (ELS) program

is developing software and hardware to give

PLSS the ability to locate non-pulsed emitters.

ATDL

Until 1986, Adaptive Targeting Data Link

(ATDL) equipment was under development for

installation in aircraft or weapons. ATDLequipped aircraft and weapons could be guided

to emitter locations determined by PLSS.

Starting in fiscal year 1990, Block 30P F-16s

were to be equipped with ATDL transponders, which would allow them to receive guidance from controllers in the PGS via relay

equipment in the TR-1s. If equipped with

ATDL transponders, missiles and other weapons could also be guided to emitter locations

by PLSS. Weapons which have been considered (and, in some cases, tested) for this application include the GBU-15 glide bomb,35 airand ground-launched versions of the T-16

Patriot and T-22 Lance missiles,36 the Conventional Stand-off Weapon (CSW) proposed by

the Air Force,37 and the now-defunct JTACMS

(Joint Tactical Missile System) .38 Unlike an an3’Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983, Hearings

before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,

House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, IJSGPO 92-690

0, 1982), pp. 842-866.

“Ibid.

“Ibid.

“Department of Defense Appropriations for 1984, Hearings

before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,

House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Part 4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, USGPO 19-163

0, 1983), p. 725; Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985,

Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d sess., Part

5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, USGPO

34-7740, 1984), pp. 71-76.

tiradiation missile (ARM), which can home on

a radar antenna only when it is transmitting,

an ATDL-equipped missile would attack a radar antenna location and could disable it even

when it is not transmitting.

PIAS

To enhance the intelligence value of PLSS

by improving analysis, exploitation, and

reporting capabilities, a PLSS Intelligence

Augmentation Subsystem (PIAS) is being developed under the PLSS Intelligence Augmentation Program (PIAP). Originally, two subsystems were to be developed. One was to be

located with the PLSS CPS in a hardened PGS

to be constructed in Europe; the other—a

transportable facility-was to be used for training at Nellis Air Force Base under normal circumstances. PIAS would use some equipment

now used by the ground control processor of

the Senior Ruby ELINT system; enhancements

would be made available for use by Senior

Ruby.

Status

PLSS completed Developmental Testing and

Evaluation in 1986 and Operational Utility

Evaluation in April. PLSS was intended to be

operational by now to counter a “circa 1985”

threat. However, its development and procurement have been delayed by several problems,

which are discussed below. Last year, the Air

Force decided not to request funds for procurement of PLSS in fiscal year 1987 and not to

develop ATDL transponders for installation

in F-16s.39 Currently, $675 million40 has been

appropriated through fiscal year 1987 for

RDT&E to procure, for the purpose of development, testing, and evaluation, one CPS, six

391f desired, Joint STARS aircraft could receive target updates from the PLSS CPS (via JTIDS) and relay them (via the

Joint STARS Weapon Data Link) to aircraft and (optionally)

missiles equipped with Joint STARS Weapon Interface Units

( WIUS). The Air Force does not currently plan to procure WIUS

but began reconsidering procurement of WIUS when plans to

procure ATDL transponders— which would have functioned as

WIUs–were canceled.

40In current (i.e., “then-year”) dollars.
158 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

SNSs, and three all-up AMSs and a partial

AMS requiring refurbishment.” No TR-1s

have been procured specifically for PLSS.

The results of the Operational Utility Evaluation of PLSS have been reviewed by the Air

Force, which recommended program termination. The Department of Defense could concur, recommend continued development, or

seek procurement of quantities needed for

some level of operational capability. If so

directed, the Air Force Systems Command

could turn PLSS hardware over to the Tactical Air Command in May 1987 for use in training and to provide a limited operational capability. If TAC desires only a limited operational

capability, the Air Force might choose to have

the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC/AZ)

manage PLSS as a “unique system. ”

Problems and Progress

PLSS has encountered several problems and

delays during its development. It has not yet

demonstrated the system reliability, emitter

reporting rate (’‘throughput ‘), or emitter location accuracy originally specified. Moreover,

during developmental testing, it often reported

each actual emitter detected as several distinct

emitters. However, its performance has been

improving. During developmental testing:

●

●

PLSS achieved an “adjusted” system

reliability of about 0.7; the specified system reliability is 0.83.42

PLSS achieved two-thirds of the originally

specified throughput; meanwhile, the

throughput requirement was reviewed

and reduced by one-third, to the value

demonstrated by PLSS.

“USAF (SAF/LL) private communication.

4The ‘adjusted’ system reliability is an estimate of the probability that 1 CPS, 3 AMSS, and 9 SNSS would have completed

an 8-hour mission without critical failure if 1 CPS, 4 AMSS,

and 16 SNSS had been available and prepared for operation.

It is based on demonstrated CPS, AMS, TR-1, and SNS

reliabilities—0.99, 0.90, 0.87, and 0.99, respectively.

● PLSS demonstrated an emitter location

accuracy which improved during the test

period for which data was available to

OTA and approached specified accuracy

on most days at the end of that period.43

Location errors were very large on some

days; however, a 4-day moving average

of emitter location error demonstrated decreased to 2.7 times that specified.44 Some

specific causes of high location errors (e.g.,

loose connector contacts) were identified

and corrected.

The tendency of the PLSS CPS to report

each actual emitter detected as several distinct

emitters is known as the “association problem.” During the test period for which data

was available to OTA, four emitters were reported, on the average, for each actual emitter detected. This overreporting indicates a failure of the CPS to recognize successive

intercepted signals as coming from the same

emitter. When a “hit” occurs (i.e., when the

AMSs intercept a signal), the signal parameters are reported to the CPS, which logs them

in a buffer. The CPS also estimates an emitter

location for each hit, and logs it with the other

signal parameters. Before reporting a “new”

emitter, CPS software attempts to determine

whether the signal parameters of the new hit

can be well correlated with those of a previous

hit. If so, CPS software would assume that the

intercepted signal was emitted by a previously

reported emitter and would not report a new

emitter. 45 However, because a modern emitter

can vary many of its signal parameters (e.g.,

frequency), CPS software relies heavily on the

emitter locations estimated for each hit in attempting to associate logged hits with specific

emitters. Hence any fault which reduces emitter location accuracy will reduce the probability of correct emitter-hit association and result in overreporting.

43AF/RDPV and AFSC/SDWD private communication.

44A 4-day moving average of emitter location accuracy demonstrated using only two TR-ls—which takes longer—

approached six times that specified.

’51t would, however, refine its estimate of the location of the

previously reported emitter.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 159

Some specific faults causing incorrect

emitter-hit association were identified and corrected during testing. Improvements in the accuracy with which emitter location can be determined from a single hit would further reduce

overreporting. Residual overreporting could be

reduced by increasing the tolerance (i.e., the

allowable distance) between single-hit emitter

location estimates which can be associated

with one emitter. This would, however, decrease the accuracy of emitter location reports.

If a PLSS Interface Module is installed in the

CPS (as originally planned), operators in the

PIM could review PLSS location reports before they are disseminated to users and could

cancel dissemination of obviously duplicative

reports.” The PLSS Intelligence Augmentation Subsystem, if fully developed and procured, might also reduce overreporting by “residue processing”—a more sophisticated and

time-consuming method for correlating reported signal parameters than that used by

the PLSS CPS.

Operational Utility:

The View From USAFE

Until this year, PLSS was an important part

of the program for improving surveillance in

Europe. However, the Air Force has taken the

position that other systems or combinations

of systems can adequately perform the important functions of PLSS. Attack aircraft can

be guided to approximate emitter locations

using ELINT from currently operational systems. The systems and procedures used would

be too slow and inaccurate to guide missiles

to emitter locations, but USAFE opposes

procurement of ground-based missiles-or surveillance

siles—on

and control

the grounds

systems for such misthat they would be too

460verremn-ting is not Deculiar to PLSS, but occurs to some

extent in o-ther in-telIigen~e collection and fusion systems. Human judgment is generally necessary-but not infallible—for

recognizing duplicative reports. Because PLSS is capable of issuing so many reports per hour, overreporting by PLSS would

be particularly bothersome.

—

vulnerable 47 and inflexible.48 These concerns are

valid, and the argument has some merit. However, the concern expressed about vulnerability of critical links could apply to other facilities which support air defense suppression,

air interdiction, and other tactical air missions.

Moreover, PLSS is designed to support air defense suppression, not FOFA; suppression of

enemy air defenses would be important even

if enemy forces were front-loaded.

Others still see value in PLSS, particularly

for targeting modern mobile SAMs. It has already demonstrated an emitter location accuracy which is superior to that of existing theater ELINT systems, as well as a high emitter

reporting rate (“throughput”) which will be

needed to rapidly reconstruct our picture of

the enemy’s “electronic order of battle” (numbers, types, and locations of emitters) at the

outbreak of war if, as expected, enemy radars

shut down, move, change frequencies, and

begin wartime operation in short on-time, electronically agile modes.” Proponents and opponents agree that “association” and reliability must be improved; proponents are more

confident that they can be, soon.

Alternatives to PLSS

Combinations of other systems could do the

job PLSS was designed for, but not as well.

For example:

● ELINT from a Senior Ruby or Guardrail/

Common Sensor system could be used to

4’USAFE has argued that:

systems necessary to feed precision attack ground-based sJs -

tems ., become high priority targets for the enem~. \f”e belie~e

the Soviets might make whatever sacrifice necessar} to destroy

one of these critical links. These same high technology systems enhance the precision attack capability of manned systems, yet without them, man can be given the approximate target location and

rough timing estimates. He then becomes the precision attack

system.

HQ USAFE. FOFA: USAFE View,

briefing to OTA Staff, Apr. 16 1986,

4WSAFE opposes investing in systems designed specifically

to support FOFA. USAFE has argued that if Warsaw Forces

are massed forward (’‘front-loaded”) rather than echeloned,

there would be few follow-on forces to attack, and systems designed specifically to attack them would be largely useless.

Manned attack aircraft could be used for other purposes. [I bid.]

“Private communication.
160 ● New Technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

cue an ASARS-II or Joint STARS radar

to scan a suspected SAM deployment area

in an attempt to recognize and precisely

locate the SAM battery. However, Senior Ruby is less sensitive than PLSS and

might not detect sidelobe or backlobe

pulses from modem radars-it might have

to wait for a mainlobe pulse. The whole

process of emitter location estimation,

tasking of ASARS-II or Joint STARS,

and interpretation of the returned radar

imagery would take much longer than

would emitter location estimation by

PLSS.

Alternatively, AN/TPQ-37 “Firefinder”

radars could be used to locate SAM

launchers as soon as they fire. The nominal range of these radars is less than that

of the above-mentioned systems, although

they might detect large SAMs at greater

than nominal range.

The originally planned ability of PLSS to

provide in-flight target updates to aircraft

and missiles could be emulated by using

Joint STARS aircraft to relay updates

from the surrogate sensors to aircraft and

missiles. To receive target updates, each

attack aircraft or missile would have to

be equipped with a Joint STARS Weapon

Interface Unit.

● An alternative to providing missiles with

in-flight target updates would be to attack

emitters with long-endurance ARMs which

have loiter capability, such as the TACIT

RAINBOW missiles being developed for

the Air Force. Unlike a PLSS-guided missile, an ARM could not attack a radar antenna after it ceases radiating. However,

a TACIT RAINBOW missile could loiter

until a target radar turns on again (or until its fuel is exhausted).

Summary

PLSS continues to be troubled by technical

problems, but its performance is improving

and it could provide unique and valuable RSTA

and attack control capabilities. Some, but not

all, capabilities demonstrated by PLSS could

be provided in the near term by combinations

of other systems such as Joint STARS and the

Tactical Reconnaissance System. The Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces Europe (CINCUSAFE) has judged that the additional capabilities of PLSS are not worth its

cost in resources diverted.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Unmanned aerial vehicles50 could be used to being developed for the Army, Navy, Air

perform RSTA for FOFA. They would be Force, and Marine Corps; others are in develcheaper than manned aircraft and less hazard- opment, production, and use by allied nations.

ous to pilots. Small UAVs could not simultane- UAVs which could be used for FOFA ously provide the coverage and revisit rate that :— -1. --1--

Joint-STARS would. However, they could IIIUuut!;

reconnoiter more limited areas, particularly ●

areas masked from Joint STARS by terrain

and vegetation, and could be used to distinguish armored from unarmored vehicles. They

could support attacks using MLRS or ●

ATACMS; close in, they could be used for artillery fire direction and adjustment. UAVs are

the Aquila RPV, which is being developed

for the U.S. Army51 to perform reconnaissance and target designation functions

primarily in support of close combat;

various domestic and foreign-made “nondevelopmental” UAVs which have been

proposed as alternatives to Aquila;

smaller “Light Division UAVs” of more

limited capability to support smaller

units;

●

‘“Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) include remotely piloted

vehicles (RPVs)—unmanned aircraft which require remote control by human pilots-as well as autonomous aircraft (drones),

which do not. They also include aerial vehicles which permit, _

but do not require, remote control by human pilots. “By the Austin Division of the Lockheed Missiles& Space Co.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 161

●

●

●

●

a larger, longer-range Intelligence and

Electronic Warfare (IEW) UAV which

could perform multiple missions to the

depth of a corps commander’s area of interest;

expendable UAVs for jamming and lethal

attack (“kamikaze UAVs”);

air-launched UAVs for reconnaissance,

jamming, and lethal attack; and

advanced-technology UAVs, in the more

distant future.

The Aquila RPV

The Aquila (figure 10-3) is the airborne platform used by the Target Acquisition Designation Aerial Reconnaissance System (TADARS),

which also includes truck-mounted rail

launchers, recovery nets, air vehicle transporters, maintenance shelters, and groundcontrol stations. The Aquila RPV is intended

to perform reconnaissance, target acquisition,

artillery fire adjustment, and damage assessment, and laser designation of targets for the

Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile

(CLGP), Hellfire and the AGM-65E Maverick52

anti-armor missiles, and laser-guided bombs.

Aquila carries a Modular Integrated Communications and Navigation System air data terminal (MICNS ADT) and a mission payload

system (MPS) consisting of a laser rangefinder/

designator system and a TV camera (for daytime use). It could carry other payloads which

are now being developed—e.g., a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor (for daytime or

nighttime use), or a bistatic radar module for

detecting vehicles illuminated by a Joint STARS

radar or aircraft illuminated by an AWACS

radar .53

52A Marine Corps weapon launched from A-6E Intruder aircraft to provide close air support to Marines, who now designate targets using the hand-held Modular Universal Laser

Equipment (MULE) to assist A-6 crews with IFF (identification: friend or foe).

53Dom Giglio and Phil Emmerman (USA HDL), “Radar Technology/Signal Information Processing, in Symposium, 28-30

January 1986, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA), Compendium of Government Briefings, Volume 2 (Adelphi, MD: U.S. Army Harry Diamond Laboratories,

1986)].

Problems and Progress

The TADARS program schedule and budget have been overrun several times. The program office and the prime contractor attribute major delays primarily to unforeseen

difficulties meeting payload mass constraints,

stabilizing the TV camera and especially the

laser designator, and operating with the data

rate reduction and processing delay incurred

when the MICNS is operated at high anti-jam

levels. 54 Human factors were also cited: in some

early tests, TADARS was operated by contractor personnel or by highly trained aviation

or intelligence specialists. The program has

since been transferred from the Army’s Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) to the

Missile Command (MICOM), and in recent

tests TADARS has been operated by personnel of lower Military Occupational Specialty

(MOS) level (Specialist 4).

The ability of the program to achieve its technical goals appeared doubtful in September

1985, when the Army stopped the developmental test program after test systems failed to

pass 21 of 149 performance specifications. Subsequently, Lockheed’s Austin Division conducted, at its expense, a test-fix-test effort, and

demonstrated correction of most shortcomings, as well as an ability to designate stationary and moving targets for Copperhead shells

and Hellfire missiles.

During Developmental Test 11A, begun in

February 1986, TADARS met all but two system performance specifications: total system

mission reliability (0.75 specified for IOC, 0.62

demonstrated) and probability of autotracking for 95 percent of 3 minutes (0.9 specified,

0.75 demonstrated). TADARS subsequently

exceeded the total system mission reliability

specification during collective training (0.77

demonstrated), and Lockheed reports that an

autotrack probability of 0.92 was demonstrated in subsequent company tests.55

~~A non-secure data link was used in early tests.

“Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., Austin Division, briefing to OTA staff, Dec. 10, 1986.
162 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 10-3.—The Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle

.,”+

SOURCE Lockheed Mtssiles & Space Co Inc (Austin Dlvlslon)

Status

As of March 1,1987, TADARS is in full-scale

development. $820 million56 has already been

appropriated for RDT&E through fiscal year

1987; 12 air vehicles and 5 Remote [MICNS]

Ground Terminals (RGTs) have been procured

for development, testing, and evaluation. The

Army proposes to begin serial production of

air vehicles and Ground Control Stations this

year for an initial operational capability (IOC)

date of 1991. The Army currently plans to procure a total of 376 air vehicles and 53 Ground

“In current (i.e., “then-year”) dollars,

Control Stations. The Army estimates that total program acquisition cost will be $2.2 billion-i. e., appropriation of about $1.4 billion

more will be required.

Alternatives to Aquila

Problems with TADARS have stimulated

suggestions that a domestic or foreign-made

“non-developmental" UAV be procured as an

alternative to Aquila. UAVs which could perform some of the functions of TADARS

include:

● Skyeye (made in the United States

by Lear-Siegler)
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack 163

● Pioneer 1 (made in Israel by AAI/

Mazlat)57

Ž CL-289 (made in Canada by Canadair)

• Heron-26 (made in Italy by Meteor)”

Ž Mirach-100 (made in Italy by Meteor)

Ž Phoenix (made in the United Kingdom by GEC Avionics)

Two of these—Skyeye and Pioneer l–are

now in service with U.S. forces but are not specifically designed to operate in the climate and

jamming expected in central Europe and do

not have the target location and designation

capabilities of TADARS. In fact, none of these

meets all specifications for, or provides the capabilities of TADARS, and modification of one

to have capabilities roughly comparable to

those of TADARS would probably cost more

and take longer than would completing development and procurement of TADARS.59 Now

that TADARS is performing as specified, arguments for procuring one of these UAVs in place

of TADARS rest upon cost rather than performance or schedule: A reconnaissance UAV

with no laser designation capability and little60

or no jam resistance could be purchased immediately and at lower cost, although delivery might take as long as delivery of Aquila.

However, procurement of one of these in lieu

of TADARS would have the following drawbacks:

. None of these meets all specifications for

TADARS, which requires use of components, and assembly, testing, and docu5’The Pioneer 1 is a successor to Mazlat’s Mastiff Mk3 and

Scout-800 RPVs, which are no longer offered for sale.

‘“The Heron-26 is an improved version of Meteor’s Mirach20 “Pelican,” Its manufacturer, Meteor Costruzioni Aeronautiche ed Elettroniche, is represented in the United States by

Pacific Aerosystems.

‘gU.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Aquik RemotelyPiloted Vehicle: Recent Developments and Alternatives (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, report GAO/NSIAD86-41BR, January 1986). This would require installation of the

MICNS ADT, laser rangefinder/designator, and TV (or FLIR)

camera developed for Aquila.

‘OGEC Avionics Phoenix and its ground station both use highly

directional antennas, which would contribute to the claimed jam

resistance of its control and data links, Meteor claims that the

data link of its Mirach-100 is jam resistant. OTA knows of no

analysis that compares the jam resistance of these systems with

that of TADARS. The uplink (control link) of the Pioneer 1 has

anti-jam features; its downlink (data link) relies on terrain masking against ground-based j ammers.

—

mentation practices which meet standard

military specifications.

None of these could provide the target

location accuracy of TADARS without

relying on an operator to identify map features on the TV display. Their target location errors (without such map-display correlation) are too large to locate targets for

artillery and missiles but adequate to

locate targets for aircraft flying armed

reconnaissance missions or to cue sensors

which could locate targets more accurately.

None of these, without modification, could

designate targets by laser. This would seriously limit utilization of Copperhead;61

however, with its range of about 16 kilometers, Copperhead could reach only about

10 kilometers beyond the FLOT.

Some have inferior or nonexistent electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).

For example, the Pioneer-1, entering service with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps for evaluation, lacks ECCM to

protect its data links from jamming,62 as

does the Skyeye RPV, which has been

used by the Army in Thailand and Honduras. Good ECCM will be essential to

counter Warsaw Pact jamming in Europe;

RPVs with inadequate ECCM might be

of little value.

None has a target-autotrack feature; none

is designed to interface with TACFIRE

and AFATADS. Most lack ballistically

hardened ground control stations with

nuclear-biological-chemical protection.63

Some have radar cross-sections higher

than that of Aquila, but the differences

are of little consequence.64

“Unless Copperhead seekers are replaced by autonomous

seekers now being developed. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies for IVA 7W Follow-On Forces

Attack Concept—Special Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1986).

@B. M. Greeley, Jr., “Symposium Display Underscores RPV

Advances, Service Needs, ” Aviation Week and Space Technol0~, Aug. 4, 1986, pp. 124-125.

ogThe qound control station for the Phoenix has nuclearbiological-chemical environmental protection; ballistic protection is not claimed.

“Doubling a UAV’s radar cross-section would increase by only

20 percent the range at which it could be detected by enemy

radar.
164 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The Light Division UAV

The Army is developing a “Light Division

UAV” which is smaller and of lesser capability than Aquila. It could be more easily

launched, controlled, and recovered by Army

division elements operating near the FLOT.

The IEW UAV

The Army hopes to field a larger, longer

range Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

(IEW) UAV by late 1987. The Army plans to

select a non-developmental platform this summer after a fly-off;65 candidates may include

some RPVs which have been proposed as alternatives to Aquila, as well as others.66 It could

fly to the depth of a corps commander’s area

of interest, carrying some of the UAV payloads

now being developed by the Army to perform

surveillance (by means of synthetic-aperture

radar, MTI radar, and infrared or millimeterwave passive thermal imaging); collection of

electronic intelligence, communications intelligence, and meteorological intelligence;

communications relaying; and radar or communications jamming.67 With some of these

payloads, the UAV could be very valuable for

FOFA.

Expendable UAVs

The Army is also developing expendable

UAVs to perform jamming and to support special operational forces, as well as “kamikaze”

UAVs to attack certain targets. Although useful for FOFA, these would not be intended primarily for RSTA.

ebprivate communication.

WDon Dugd~e, { ‘Tapping the Potential of Unmanned Air Ve_

hicles, ” Defense EIectrom.cs, October 1986, pp. 109 ff.

eTDon Kurtz (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory), “The ADEA

UAV Payload Testbed Program, ” in Symposium, 28-30 January 1986, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA), Compendium of Government Briefings, Volume

2 (Unclassified) (Adelphi, MD: U.S. Army Harry Diamond Laboratories, 1986). See also vol. 2 of this report.

Air-Launched UAVs

The Navy and Air Force are developing airlaunched UAVs for reconnaissance, jamming,

and lethal attack. An air-launch capability

could give them great range and simplify their

employment in coordination with strikes by

manned aircraft.

Advanced-Technology UAVs

These concepts do not begin to exhaust the

possibilities of UAVs which could someday

perform RSTA for FOFA. UAVs incorporating advanced technology (e.g., radioisotopepowered heat engines) or merely ingenious design could operate for very long periods at high

altitude.68

Issues and Options

TADARS has been an issue in Congress primarily because its schedule and budget have

been overrun. Congress has several options for

future funding of TADARS:

●

●

Congress could fund procurement of

TADARS and development of a FLIR for

TADARS, subject to the requirement

(stipulated in the fiscal year 1987 Defense

Authorization and Appropriations Acts)

that TADARS meet performance specifications and that the Army negotiate a

contract which limits its liability.

Congress could deny funding for TADARS

and express an expectation that the

Army would cancel the program and make

do without TADARS. This would save

money, and some functions which TADARS

was to perform could be performed by

other systems.69 The effectiveness of artillery and MLRS—which can be used for

‘%%, e.g., R. Dale Reed, “High-Flying Mini-Sniffer RPV: Mars

Bound?” Astronautics and Aeronautics, June 1978, pp. 26-39;

Victor C. Clarke, et al., “A Mars Airplane?” Astronautics and

Aeronautics, January 1979, pp. 42-54; and vol. 2 of this report.

69 For exmple, acquisition of moving targets for MLRS could

be performed by Mohawk now, or by Joint STARS or the Army’s

proposed IEW UAV in the future, if these programs continue.

However, Mohawk imagery is not available continuously or in

real time, and the IEW UAV is not required to locate targets

with great precision or to designate them with a laser.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 165

short-range FOFA— would suffer without

TADARS.

Ž Congress could deny funding for TADARS

and express an interest in considering a

request for appropriations to procure a

non-developmental U.S. or foreign-made

UAV. No such UAV has the capabilities

of TADARS, and many would be too susceptible to jamming or environmental extremes, but some could perform RSTA for

FOFA.

Concern about duplication of effort has

emerged as another issue because of the apparent proliferation of UAV programs. Congress

addressed this in the fiscal year 1987 Defense

Authorization and Appropriations Acts, which

required the Department of Defense to submit

a‘ ‘Master Plan’ for UAVs with its fiscal year

1988 funding request. This “Master Plan”

should justify the capabilities required of the

various UAVs now in development and may

indicate why a diverse mixed force is preferred

over a smaller force of multi-role UAVs.

Summary

Unmanned aerial vehicles could perform

RSTA for FOFA. Small UAVs could not have

—

the coverage and revisit rate of large airborne

radars such as Joint STARS, but they could

reconnoiter limited areas masked from Joint

STARS by terrain and vegetation and could

distinguish armored from unarmored vehicles.

UAVs are being developed for the Army,

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and by

our NATO Allies.

The Army’s TADARS could perform shortrange RSTA for FOFA. It appears that all major problems which have plagued TADARS

have been corrected. Completing development

and procurement of TADARS would probably

be quicker and no more costly than procuring

and modifying a different RPV system to have

comparable capability. Some other U.S. and

allied UAV systems are cheaper but less capable; many are unsuitable for use in Central

Europe, but some could be useful for FOFA.

Some U.S. and allied UAV systems now in development could perform RSTA for FOFA at

longer range; the Army’s IEW UAV may be

particularly useful.

THE TWO-WAY STREET: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATIVE

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF RSTA SYSTEMS

Because of security concerns and technologi- the French ORCHIDEE system. Candidate

cal disparity, development and production of UAVs were discussed above, in the section on

RSTA systems usually provide fewer oppor- UAVs; this section discusses opportunities for

tunities for Alliance cooperation than do de- cooperation with Allies in producing airborne

velopment and production of weapons and mu- radar systems.

nitions. However, the United States has

recently bought some foreign-made reconnais- Interoperable or Co-Produced Airborne

sance systems— Israeli RPVs—and could buy Radar Systems others from its NATO partners. Candidates

include unmanned aerial vehicles, Airbus In- The Airborne Radar Demonstrator System

dustrie A300 aircraft for use as platforms for (ARDS) project is a U.S.-British-French effort

Joint STARS, and equipment which would en- to achieve interoperability70 of airborne surable Joint STARS Ground Station Modules

to receive, process, and display radar imagery ‘“Specifically, level-4 interoperability: compatibility at the data

from allied airborne radar systems such as the link level and below, in terms of the Open Systems InterconBritish ASTOR I and ASTOR C systems and

nection (0S1 ) terminology defined by the International Standards Organization (1S0).
166 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

face-surveillance systems. ARDS is directed

by Project Group 21 (P/G 21) of NATO’s

National Army Armaments Group (NAAG).

Among the airborne platform/sensor configurations being evaluated are:

1.

2.

3.

The ASTOR-I Airborne STand-Off Radar

system71 developed for the British Ministry of Defense. It uses a Ferranti MTI radar on a Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2T

twin-turboprop Islander.72

The ASTOR-C system, which consists of

a British Aircraft Corp./English Electric

Canberra twin-turbojet platform carrying

a fixed-target-indicating Demonstration

Synthetic-Aperture Radar (DEMSAR),

which is based on the design of the U.S.

UPD-7 radar.

The French ORCHIDEE73 radar system—

now in development—which will be carried by Super Puma helicopters.74

The ASTOR-I and ASTOR-C were designed

to record radar data for post-flight processing;

they have no airborne data link. They would

be of much greater utility for FOFA if equipped

with a data link to permit near-real-time exploitation. In one series of demonstrations by

P/G 21, an ASTOR I platform used a Joint

STARS Surveillance and Control Data Link

air data terminal to transmit MTI data to a

Joint STARS Ground Station Module. P/G 21

may also attempt to demonstrate the capability of an SCDL air data terminal to transmit

raw fixed-target imagery (“phase history”)

from a ASTOR-C DEMSAR to a GSM for

processing and display by equipment which

would have to be added to the GSM.

ORCHIDEE platforms will be equipped

with Electronique Serge-Dassault (E SD) data

link terminals to transmit MTI information

to similarly equipped ORCHIDEE ground stations. Army GSMs could be adapted to receive

and display MTI information from ORCHIDEE

“Formerly called CASTOR: Corps Airborne Stand-Off Radar.

“Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1985-86 (New York: Jane’s

Publishing, Inc., 1985), pp. 297-299.

~gob~enatoire Radm Coherent Heliporte d’Investigation Des

Elements Ennemis.

“Anon., “The Orchidee Battlefield Surveillance System, ’ 1nternatiomd Defense Review, June 1986, p. 720.

in a variety of ways. The most straightforward

would be for ORCHIDEE ground stations to

transmit MTI information to Army GSMs via

electrical or optical cable or using the FrenchBelgian RITA mobile telephone equipment now

being procured by the Army. P/G 21 is likely

to attempt a demonstration of ORCHIDEE/

GSM interoperability in this fashion. Alternatively, ORCHIDEE platforms could be

equipped with SCDL air data terminals for

two-way or down-link data communications

with similarly equipped GSMs.

If ASTOR or ORCHIDEE platforms were

equipped with SCDL equipment, GSMs could

receive and exploit the information they collect. With relatively little modification, GSMs

could receive and exploit MTI data from

ASTOR-I or ORCHIDEE; processing and

exploitation of fixed-target imagery from

ASTOR-C would require more extensive modification. These interoperabilities, if implemented, would provide Army users with additional sources of airborne MTI surveillance data

and would provide U.S. GSM equipment manufacturers with opportunities for foreign sales or

production licensing.

Airbus Industrie A300 Platforms

for Joint STARS

It appears that Airbus Industrie A300 jet

transport aircraft could be modified to serve

as platforms for Joint STARS prime mission

equipment. 75 Modifications which the Air

Force would probably require include interior

reconfiguration and installation of militarized

flight-deck avionics, single-point and air-to-air

refueling ports, and a radome.76 A300 aircraft,

if ordered soon for use as operational platforms,

could be modified and “stuffed” with Joint

STARS prime mission equipment as soon as

E-8As could.77

This possibility presents opportunities for

the United States to purchase A300 platforms

“USAF, AFIRDPV, private communication.

7’ANSER Corp., personal communication, July 22, 1986.

“They could not be ready for use as full-scale development

platforms; two E-8As (modified and stuffed EC-18BS) have already been ordered for full-scale development use.
Ch. 10—Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack ● 167

for U.S. Joint STARS aircraft, for Allies to The Joint STARS Joint Program Office has

purchase Joint STARS prime mission equip- proposed investigation of possibilities for Alment for use on allied Joint STARS aircraft, liance cooperation on Joint STARS to the Air

and for co-production of Joint STARS aircraft Staff. Neither the Air Force nor the Departfor U.S. and allied procurement. Allied use of ment of Defense have yet announced a posiJoint STARS would generate sales of GSMs tion on the proposal.

or their components.
Chapter 11

Technology Issues:

Munitions and

Delivery Systems
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................171

Anti-Armor Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............172

Top-Attack Munitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........173

Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 177

Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ... ... ..178

Delivery System Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........181

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........,...181

Missile Guidance Technology . . . . . . . . . . . ..........................181

Box

A. Delivery

Figure No.

11-1. Smart

Table No.

Error Budget

Box

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Submunitions . .............................175

11-1. Anti-Armor Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

11-2. Smart Submunition Sensors . . . . . . . . . . .........................177

11-3. Assault Breaker Results . . . . . . . . . . ............................174

11-4. Missile Guidance Technologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .+ ............182

11-5. Guidance Technology–NATO Conventional Missiles. . ............184
Chapter 11

Technology Issues: Munitions and

Delivery Systems

INTRODUCTION

Munitions currently in the inventory and being procured, as described in chapter 9, are designed mainly to attack soft area targets (e.g.,

formations of trucks or lightly armored vehicles, or field command posts) and hard fixed

targets (bridges, power stations). The technologies embodied in these munitions—cluster

munitions for soft area targets, large unitary

munitions for fixed targets-are straightforward; the munitions themselves are relatively

inexpensive and are considered effective against

their intended targets. An important question

is whether new anti-armor munitions now under development can be made effective and affordable.

New anti-armor munitions under development, called ‘‘smart submunitions, make use

of sensors that autonomously search a target

area for a tank and are designed to strike the

tank on its lightly armored top surface, in some

cases using novel lethal mechanisms. If successful, these smart submunitions will clearly

add a major new capability to attack armored

vehicles beyond line of sight and without direct operator control, but their very “smartness” leads to greater cost, greater technical

risk, and greater risk of being spoofed by countermeasures. Thus, if, as a matter of policy and

analysis, it becomes clear that substantial effort should be devoted to attacking tanks, a

number of technological questions come into

play concerning these new munitions:

• Can they be made to operate reliably, under realistic conditions?

● Can they be made to resist likely countermeasures? Or will the deployment of effective countermeasures impose a substantial economic or military cost on the

enemy?

● Can these goals be achieved at a reasonable cost?

At this stage of development, it is not possible to say with confidence whether such a practical balance among reliability, countermeasure

resistance, and cost can be achieved in the design of smart submunitions, nor which designs

are most likely to succeed. To date, tests of prototype smart submunitions have been carried

out under artificial conditions that make targets easier to detect—clear weather, high contrast backgrounds, and, in some cases, artificially enhanced thermal signatures. Because

of the considerable differences between U.S.

and Soviet armored vehicles (Soviet vehicles

generally are harder to detect) and between the

climates and terrain of U.S. test ranges and

potential European battlefields (more often

obscured by fog, rain, and vegetation), it is essential that testing be carried out with realistic targets, under realistic conditions. A rigorous testing program, such as that provided

now by the Chicken Little and Special Projects

efforts at Eglin Air Force Base, may well be

an essential continuing element in the development and evaluation of these submunitions.

A second issue is the role of mines. Historically, mines have been relatively ineffective

weapons and have received correspondingly little analytical attention. A major limitation was

that they had to be emplaced by hand, a slow

process that allowed little flexibility to react

to changing circumstances. New technologies

that permit mines to be delivered by aircraft

or artillery may allow mines to play a more immediate and responsive role in the attack of

armored units. For example, mines might

quickly be emplaced immediately in front of

177
172 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

a moving unit, creating a concentration of ve- them a high probability not only of halting or

hicles that could then be directly attacked. delaying a tank but of actually destroying a

Such mines are now being procured; however, tank-are farther down the road. Again, the

the lack of a clear doctrine for their employ- role that such a weapon could play in followment appears to be hindering plans for the ac- on forces attack is a key question that needs

quisition of significant quantities. Mines that to be addressed.

incorporate new lethal mechanisms-giving

ANTI-ARMOR MUNITIONS

The development of effective anti-armor munitions for follow-on forces attack is complicated by two facts: First, the number of targets is large, and they are in enemy territory.

An effective weapon will have to be able to engage multiple targets per pass, and will have

to tolerate less than pinpoint delivery accuracy.

Second, Soviet armored vehicles have over the

past two decades undergone substantial improvements in armor protection, a trend that

is continuing. Armor has become thicker, new

materials such as ceramics which offer greater

protection per pound than steel have been incorporated, and add-on reactive applique armors which are very efficient in deflecting highexplosive anti-tank munitions are being installed both on new tanks and as a retrofit on

older tanks.1

All of this has meant that, to be effective,

new anti-armor munitions must be able to penetrate greater thicknesses of armor and must

have a higher probability of hitting the tank

accurately—and ideally at a specific, vulnerable point on the tank’s surface. Because armor protection has been concentrated on the

front surfaces of tanks to meet the primary

threat of direct fire from opposing tanks and

infantry-fired anti-tank guided missiles, it is

the top and bottom surfaces that are the most

lightly protected and thus the most vulnerable.

Almost all new anti-armor munitions designed

to engage armored vehicles at some distance

exploit these vulnerabilities. Increased probability of hitting a target is achieved, first, by

making the munitions smaller so that more can

be dropped over the target area; and second,

in the case of “smart” munitions, by adding

I For more information, see vol. 2, app. 1 l-A, fig. 1 l-A-l.

sensors that can detect the target and guide

or aim the munition for an accurate hit.

There is, of course, nothing magic about top

attack; indeed if the threat against tanks shifts

substantially to top attack, future tanks may

well be designed with added top armor protection. Clearly the most effective course in the

long run–though likewise the most expensive—is to maintain a balanced variety of weapons that attack from all aspects, forcing the

Soviets to make compromises in their tank designs. In the short run, however, top-attack

weapons are likely to prove difficult to counter.

As discussed below in the section on ballistic

countermeasures, existing Soviet tank designs

are not well suited to retrofitting with top armor because of the prohibitively large weight

that effective armor would add and because

of the need to maintain unobstructed air flow

to the engine radiators.

The choice of warhead technology is another

factor in armor/anti-armor competition. Armor

which is most effective against one of the two

principal types of warheads used in wide-area

anti-armor weapons is not generally most effective against warheads of the other kind:

Shaped-charge warheads typically penetrate

greater thicknesses of armor than do explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) but can be

more easily countered; EFPs typically penetrate less armor’ but are harder to counter. If ——

‘Not considered here is another important class of kineticenergy warheads which are less suitable for submunitions: long,

inert, preformed projectiles, such as are used today in armorpiercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot (APFSDS) artillery

rounds. They may be fired by an electromagnetic gun being developed by the Army, DARPA, and DNA. The Air Force’s developmental high-velocity missile (HVM), although powered,

is also a long, inert (i.e., nonexplosive), preformed projectile.
Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 173

a proposed tank were expected to f ace a threat

consisting primarily of warheads of a single

type, its designers could optimize its armor

against that type by trading off protection

against the other type. An adversary’s ability to use warheads of multiple types forces

designers to forego ideal protection against one

type in order to seek balanced protection

against all.

Top-Attack Munitions

Three generations of top-attack munitions

could be used for FOFA. These are cluster munitions (the current generation), and two generations of “smart” submunitions now in development: sensor-fuzed and terminally guided

submunitions.

Cluster Munitions

Current-generation anti-armor munitions are

unguided cluster bombs. They blanket a large

area with a randomly dispersed shower of small

bomblets. The air-delivered Rockeye, the Combined Effects Munition (CEM), the German

MW-1 submunition dispenser system, and the

artillery- or MLRS rocket-delivered Improved

Conventional Munition (ICM, also called

DPICM: dual-purpose improved conventional

munition) all incorporate armor-piercing shapedcharge warheads. The armor-penetration capability of these munitions is, however, small,

so they are most effective against trucks and

lightly armored vehicles such as self-propelled

artillery, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. Against tanks, they

are effective only if one of the bomblets strikes

the vulnerable area over the engine compartment and the turret—which can be as little as

1 square meter out of 15 square meters of surface on the top of the tank. Because the typical pattern on the ground of these munitions

is one bomblet per 20 square meters, the probability of stopping a tank is obviously not very

great.3 But against soft targets, cluster weap3

1ncreasing the density of bomblets so as to increase the number of hits per tank becomes a losing proposition because the

area of empty space between tanks is much greater than the

area of tops of tanks.

ons have the potential to cause multiple kills

per shot;4 they are also relatively inexpensive

(see table 11-1); and the technology and manufacturing experience are well in hand.

Possible countermeasures include the use of

applique armor to add extra protection to

lightly armored vehicles and armor skirts5 to

protect the vulnerable tires and radiators of

trucks, dispersing vehicles, and emplacing vehicles such as self-propelled artillery in earth

revetments.

Sensor-Fuzed Munitions

A second generation of anti-armor munitions–the first generation of “smart” antiarmor submunitions—is now under full-scale

development (see figure 11-1). These submunitions--called sensor-fuzed munitions-employ

autonomous sensors that detect a vehicle and

trigger the firing of an explosively formed

penetrator, also known as a self-forging fragment, at the target. The use of a sensor to replace the random scattering of cluster munitions can increase the kill probability, so fewer

munitions would be wasted on empty space,

and fewer rounds have to be fired or fewer sorties flown to achieve the same result. The

sensor can also select a particular, vulnerable

aimpoint. Thus the air-delivered Skeet submunition uses an infrared sensor to find the hot

engine compartment of a target vehicle; the

artillery-delivered SADARM uses a combination

of infrared (IR) and millimeter-wave (MMW)

radar sensors to locate the center of the tank,

where the turret is.

These warheads are expected to be effective

in top attack against existing Soviet tanks; the

retrofitting of top-attack protection armor to

these vehicles would be very difficult.’ The major lethal effect of the explosively formed

penetrator against armor, however, results

from spalling: bits of metal fly off the inside

of the vehicle’s armor at high speeds when the

4Some submunitions, such as GEM, DPICM, and the A PAM

(anti-personnel, anti-material) also include fragmentation charges

that can destroy a truck without hitting it.

5For more information, see note 1, app. 11-A, vol. 2.

‘For more information, see note 2, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.
174 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 11-1. —Anti-Armor Munitions

—

Status Delivery Targets Representative cost*

TOP ATTACK MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions (small shaped charge; unguided)

Rockeye inv air trucks, self-propelled $100

MW-1 inv air arty, other light armor (20,000)

CEM proc air

ICM proc arty/MLRS

Sensor-fuzed munitions (explosively formed penetrator; sensor)

Skeet FSD air same as above 5,000

(200,000)

SADARM FSD arty/MLRS same plus current

infantry vehicles, some tanks

Terminally-guided munitions (shaped charge; guided)

MLRS-TGW R&D MLRS same plus 50,000

IRTGSM R&D ATACMS tanks (1 ,000,000)

MINES

Scatterable mines

GATOR proc air armored vehicles 500

RAAM proc art y (50,000)

AT-2 FSD MLRS

Smart mines

ERAM dead air armored vehicles 10,000

Army mine R&D arty, helo . -- ----

“cost per ind!vldual submunition (cost per 1,000.lb load)

arty

lnv

I!ght armor

proc

FSD

R&D

artillery

Inventory

armored combat vehicles, excludlng tanks

procurement

full-scale development

research & development prior to FSD

warhead strikes and have a high probability

of killing the crew. Tanks being transported

on trucks or trains to the front, without crews,

fuel, or ammunition on board, may suffer little damage from these munitions. In some

cases the munitions may do little more than

drill a small hole that can later be patched or

ignored.

In the long run, new tanks might be designed

with armors that could defeat munitions of current designs without adding prohibitively to

the overall weight of the vehicle.7 To increase

the penetrating capacity of explosively formed

penetrators to match these improvements

would mean increasing the caliber of these munitions, thereby undoing the key objective of

carrying multiple munitions in each rocket, artillery shell, or aircraft dispenser load.8 But

“For more information, see note 3, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

‘Defense Science Board, Armor Anti-Armor Competition

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, OUSDRE, Final Report, October 1985), p. B-5; T. Hafer, Warhead Technology Options (Arlington, VA: System Planning Corp., Final Summary Report SPC 924, June 1983), p. 13.

these developments in Soviet armor are many

years’ away and of course do not come easily

or cheaply: they will be expensive and will still

likely add some weight to the tank. The paramount issue in considering countermeasures

is not simply whether they are possible, but

rather what cost they impose on the other side

in terms of economics, weapon effectiveness,

flexibility, and so on.

Because the search area of these munitions

is small,10 they are most effective when used

against concentrated groups of vehicles. The

small search area allows relatively unsophisticated sensors to be used, keeping costs down.

But placing the job of detecting the target in

the hands of an autonomous sensor, without

human intervention, raises the obvious possibility that these weapons can be fooled,11 possibly by standard camouflage techniques that

‘For more information, see note 4, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

‘°For more information, see note 5, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

“For more information, see note 6, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.
Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 175

\
176 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

the Soviets are known to practice, such as placing fresh foliage or nets over the vehicle, which

reduces the ability of these simple sensors to

detect them against background “noise” or

‘‘clutter."12

Clutter is a particular problem when vehicles are in wooded or urban terrain, as they

would be when halted in assembly areas; it is

less of a problem when vehicles are on open

roads. Camouflage becomes less practical as

the tanks approach the area of the direct battle; camouflage piled on top of a tank to conceal it from overhead observation by humans

or electronic sensors makes it more visible to

direct line of sight observation. The use of

smoke or metallic chaff to obscure sensors or

decoys to distract them could be effective, but

these methods are, from an operational point

of view, far less practical.

The choice of sensor makes some difference

in which countermeasures are likely to be most

effective; however, both IR and MMW sensors

have their vulnerabilities (see table 11-2).13 Increasing the sensitivity of the sensors can help

to detect camouflaged targets, but also drives

up the false alarm rate. Use of multiple sensors in different wavelength bands (“dualmode” sensors) can likewise help to discriminate between real targets and clutter; but

that greater discrimination is paid for in

greater cost and, possibly, reduced reliability.

Extensive testing under realistic conditions

will be needed to determine whether a practi-

‘ZBriefings from the “Chicken Little” program office, Eglin

Air Force Base, and U.S. Army Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory, White Sands Missile Range.

‘3These are discussed in more detail below in the section on

sensor countermeasures.

Table 11-2.—Smart Submunition Sensors

Sensor Mode

Infrared (IR) Millimeter-Wave (MMW)

advantages aimpoint accuracy performance in weather

disadvantages targets must be hot; jamming possible;

Soviet tanks are multi-domain analysis

I R-suppressed; necessary to reject

affected by weather; simple decoys

decoys possible

cal balance between countermeasure resistance

and cost can be achieved in the design of these

munitions. The Army-Air Force Chicken Little and Special Projects test programs and the

work of the Army Vulnerability Assessment

Laboratory should provide much of this needed

data.

The problem of dealing with countermeasures aside, costs are very uncertain at this

stage. Although the fundamental technology

involves no new concepts, no manufacturing

experience exists for some key elements, particularly sensors.14 Likewise, although the Assault Breaker project of the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency demonstrated that

the basic technology is feasible and available,

it left unanswered the question of how much

it will cost to produce a reliable total system.

As shown in table 11-3, in none of the 14 flight

tests carried out under Assault Breaker were

all functions tested and found successful, although in three tests all functions tested were

successful, including engagement of multiple

targets by submunitions in one test. Successful demonstrations of prototype smart submunitions in Assault Breaker, and since, have

taken place under artificial conditions-in clear

weather, against low clutter backgrounds, and

against targets with enhanced thermal signatures. Again, a thorough, realistic test program

in the development stages could reduce this

uncertainty.

Terminally Guided Munitions

Top-attack munitions, which are now in the

research and development phase, employ sensors to locate the target and guide the munition into a direct impact. The terminally guided

munition is larger than the sensor-fuzed munition, containing a larger, shaped-charge warhead and a more sophisticated-and considerably more expensive-electronics package that

is needed to translate sensor images into steering instructions for the tail fins that guide it. 15

“Defense Science Board, op. cit., p. C-2.

“For more information, see note 7, app. 11-A, vol. 2.
Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 177

Table 11 -3.—Assault Breaker Results

Missil e

Mission functio n T-16 T-22

Test number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ● 9 123 4

Target acquisition (radar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — U U S S S — — — — — S

Target position to missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — U U S S S — — — — — S

Missile launch .,...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... ... ..S S S S S S S S S S SSS S

Precision guidance (inertial) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... .U S S S U S U — S S SSS S

Radar track target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... ... ... ....— — — U U S S S — — — — — S

Radar acquire and track missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ....— — — U U S S S — — — — — U

Radar provide guidance update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... ......— — — U U S S S — — — — — S

Missile trajectory correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ... ... ......— — — — — — S S — — — — — S

In flight dispense.,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... ... ... ....— P S S P S S S S S SSP P

Payload pattern generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ... ... ... ....— P S S P S S S S S us U P

Payload descent functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ... ... ....— U U U S U — — — S UUU P

Payload target acquisition and lock-on . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... ... ......— — S U S U — — — S — — — —

Target engagement (single) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ... ,.. ......— — U U S U — — — S — — — —

Target engagement (multiple) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ... ... ....— — — — U U — — — S — — — —

Target engagement (moving) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ... ......— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

S — successful test

P —partially successful test

U —unsuccessful test

— not tested

. — calibration test for fixed site radar used (n test 9

SOURCE Steven L Canby, ‘The Operational Llmlts of Emerging Technology, /nternat/ona/ Defense Rewew. August 1985, pp 875.880

This larger warhead is expected to have a

greater kill capability than the explosively

formed penetrator; it also has a much higher

probability than the explosively formed

penetrator warhead of causing catastrophic

damage to a tank.

The search area of these munitions is greater

than that of the sensor-fuzed munitions. Countermeasure issues are largely the same, but

weather will be a greater problem because the

terminally guided munitions begin their search

at an altitude of 1 kilometer or so, and are therefore more susceptible to the absorbing effects

of low-lying clouds.

A major issue is whether the larger search

area and greater lethal effect of Terminally

Guided Submunitions (TGSMs) as compared

to sensor-fuzed weapons will justify their orderof-magnitude greater cost.

Mines

New "scatterable’’ mines and “smart’’ mines

could also be used for FOFA. Mines have histonically been used to delay or harass enemy

forces at best. The need to emplace mines by

hand limited flexibility and imposed a large

logistics burden as well. With the development

of scatterable mines that can be deployed by

aircraft or artillery (GATOR and RAAM, now

being procured by the Air Force and Army,

and the MLRS-delivered AT-2 under joint development by the United States and several

European nations) and the incorporation of

more effective lethal mechanisms, mines may

play a more direct role in halting or destroying armored vehicles.

The major weakness of current remotely

deliverable mines is that they are easily seen

on roadways and can be easily cleared from

roadways; in Warsaw Pact forces, several

tanks per battalion have rollers or forks

mounted in front for mine-clearing. The effectiveness of remotely deliverable mines will

clearly be greater when used against a force

moving off the roads.

“Smart’’ mines, which can sense and attack

a tank at some distance, could command a road

from concealed off-road positions.16 They are,

“A more detailed description of these systems appears in

OTA’s earlier Technologies forNATO’s Foflow-On Forces Attack Concept–SpeciaJ Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1986), pp. 33-34.
178 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

however, expensive, and they raise many of

the same countermeasure, reliability, and cost

issues raised by sensor-fuzed weapons. The Air

Force recently decided against proceeding with

full-scale development of its smart ExtendedRange Anti-armor Mine (ERAM) for budgetary reasons; the Army is still studying the

concept.

Countermeasures

The competition between new anti-armor

weapons and increased armor protection is a

continuing one. The critical questions are

whether quick, easy, and inexpensive countermeasures can defeat the new weapon, and, if

not, what cost is imposed on the defender if he

decides to develop and deploy an effective

counter. For example, anew anti-tank weapon

may require the defender to place heavier armor on his tanks, increasing their weight, thus

requiring larger engines which consume more

fuel (increasing the logistics burden or hindering mobility) and requiring a larger vehicle

which is more easily seen and hit on the battlefield. In addition, there is a synergism

among munitions: The greater the variety of

munitions, the more difficult becomes the job

of defending effectively against them all. If,

however, a new weapon could be defeated by

a trivial change in operations or hardware,

there is clearly a strong case against developing it.

Ballistic Countermeasures

A shaped-charge munition penetrates armor

by detonating a precisely shaped explosive

warhead which forms an intense jet of gas and

molten metal. Explosively formed penetrators

(self-forging fragments) are metal slugs which

smash through armor by virtue of their high

speed and mass—i.e., their kinetic energy. Although formed by explosives, they contain no

explosives at the moment of contact with the

target and are called kinetic-energy penetrators. The penetrating capabilities of these warheads are proportional to their calibers (i.e.,

diameters); a shaped-charge warhead can penetrate roughly 10 times deeper into ordinary

steel armor than can a comparably sized explosively formed penetrator.17

On the other hand, shaped charges are much

easier to defeat with current armors.18 In the

early 1960s, the only armors were aluminum

alloys and steel. Increasing the thickness of

such armors obviously increased protection,

but at a considerable weight penalty. The trend

in new armor development has thus been

toward armors which achieve a level of protection equivalent to a given thickness of steel

(usually expressed as millimeters of Rolled

Homogeneous Armor Equivalent) with lighter

new materials, such as ceramics, laminates,

and reactive armors, which contain small explosive charges that detonate when struck by

an incoming warhead, thereby deflecting the

shaped-charge jet. These armors are not very

effective against kinetic-energy penetrators,

however.

Improved armor has been applied primarily

to the front surfaces of tanks to protect them

against the major threat on the battlefield—

direct fire from enemy tanks and anti-tank

weapons.19 The tops of tanks remain relatively

unprotected.

Thus the first-generation smart munitions

(Skeet and SADARM), which contain explosively formed projectile warheads, are indeed

sufficient to penetrate existing Soviet tanks

with a top attack. Retrofitting existing tanks

with additional top-attack protection does not

appear feasible: a steel deck to protect the turret and engine deck of an existing tank would

add a prohibitive amount of weight.20

Future tanks might use more efficient composite and hybrid armors to provide effective

top-attack protection against Skeet and

SADARM at a weight penalty less than that

for steel armor.21 Even so, there is always a

‘7A longer, preformed kinetic-energy penetrator (such as an

APFSDS artillery round) can penetrate a thickness of homogeneous armor proportional to its length; it can be made to penetrate farther by increasing its length or velocity rather than

caliber.

“For more information, see vol. 2, app. 11-A (note 8, table

1 l-A-2, and figure 1 l-A-2).

‘gFor more information, see note 9, app. 11-A, vol. 2.

“For more information, see note 10, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

“For more information, see note 11, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.
Ch. 11— Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 179

trade-off between using more efficient armor

to add protection and using it to build a lighter

tank with no additional protection. The hybrids

and composites are not suitable for a retrofit

to existing tanks because they must be made

as an integral part of the armor; they cannot

simply be bolted on top. Ceramics, for example, are brittle and have to be sandwiched between layers of steel in the manufacturing process. The effectiveness of these new armors

against explosively formed penetrators cannot,

however, be predicted with certainty by existing theoretical models; improvement of models

is needed, as are simple controlled experiments.

Operational Countermeasures

Because the sensors employed on smart munitions can search only a limited area, perhaps

the most obvious countermeasure is to increase

the spacing between vehicles both on the road

and when halted in assembly areas. This would

have a greater effect on sensor-fuzed weapons

than on TGSMs, which can search much larger

areas .22

Another operational tactic that could reduce

the effectiveness of smart munitions would be

to take advantage of terrain that produces high

“clutter” (natural background camouflage),

making it difficult for the sensors to pick out

the target from a sea of confusing signals. Urban areas produce severe clutter in both the

IR and MMW bands; using towns as assembly areas would make an attack with these munitions very difficult.23

Weather may be exploited to counter sensors. Dry snow provides a very high clutter

background that can swamp the signature of

a vehicle. The frequently occurring low-level

clouds and fog in central Europe interfere with

the performance of IR sensors. Rain affects

both IR and MMW sensors. Moving when vis22 For more information, see note 12, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

“Steven Canby, “The Conventional Defense of Europe: Operational Limits of Emerging Technology” Working Papers No.

55, International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, pp. 24-32; also briefing from Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory.

ibility is poor and halting when it improves

results in reduced vulnerability, as well as rate

of advance.

Camouflage, Decoys, and Jamming

There are two basic technical approaches to

fooling sensors. The target can be made to

blend into the background, either by camouflaging the target or by artificially increasing

the background noise or clutter level with electronic jamming, smoke, or chaff; alternatively,

false targets can be created, either by deploying decoys or by broadcasting a carefully tailored signal which fools the sensor into thinking it has spotted a target.24

Counter-countermeasures for dealing with

camouflage and clutter include the use of dualmode (active and passive) and multi-spectral

sensors (which are sensitive in more than one

wavelength band), and the use of more sophisticated “multi-domain” analysis of the information obtained from a single-mode MMW

sensor. For example, analysis of the delays of

the echos of an MM W radar signal from different features of an object can yield information

about the spacing of distinguishing features,

which can help to distinguish a tank from background objects. Use of multiple wavelength

bands increases the chances of finding one

wavelength at which the background clutter

at any given time will not be too bad.

These measures, of course, will increase the

cost and complexity of the submunition and

are not infallible. Multi-domain analysis, for

example, reduces susceptibility to deception

jamming but does not eliminate it, as discussed

below.

Another approach to making target detection difficult is jamming. The aim can be simply to produce so much background noise that

the target no longer stands out. To jam an active MMW sensor would require high power

over a wide band of wavelengths and may be

infeasible if the sensor has good countercountermeasures. 25 The possible use of lasers

“For more information, see note 13, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

“Briefing from the U.S. Army Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory.
180 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Examples of Simple Countermeasures

Camouflage nets

to jam IR sensors has been raised; but tracking a rapidly moving submunition and aiming

a laser at it is likely to be extremely difficult

in practice.

Finally, smoke and chaff are standard deception devices. Soviet tanks are equipped with

smoke generators, and the Soviets have considerable experience in using smoke to mask

ground movements from visual observation.

However, ordinary smokes are relatively transparent to IR and, especially, MMW radiation.

Chaff might also be used.26 To shield tanks

against smart submunition sensors, the chaff

“For more information, see note 14, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

would obviously have to be near the ground

and would have to be renewed at least every

few minutes; at the wavelengths in question,

large quantities would be required. Both smoke

and chaff suffer from the drawback that adequate warning of an attack is essential to their

effective use.

Decoys in general pose less of a problem to

sensors than do jamming or camouflage. Simple decoys, such as MMW corner reflectors,

are easily rejected by multi-domain analysis.

To fool multi-domain MMW sensors, decoys

must resemble full-scale models, which obviously are of limited practicality. Simple IR decoys such as flares or fires can similarly be
Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 181

rejected.27 IR sensors may, however, be susceptible to decoys that more faithfully reproduce the power output and temperature of a

tank engine.28

Even with multi-domain processing, active

MMW sensors are susceptible to deception

jamming–the broadcasting of signals which

resemble the radiation reflected or emitted by

a target, insofar as the sensor and its proces2’For more information, see note 15, app. 11-A, vol. 2.

‘

mAccording to the Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory, such

an I R decoy would require 1 kilowatt of primary power; a small

propane bottle of the kind used for soldering torches or camping stoves could supply this power level for several hours.

sor can determine. Deception jamming is not

an inexpensive countermeasure, and it requires

some knowledge of the operating wavelength

of the sensor and its processing algorithm, but

it is nonetheless straightforward from a technology point of view. The Soviets deploy a

large variety of radar jamming equipment, and

thus have the technical and operational base

for developing and deploying such a system.

Passive MMW sensors are also susceptible to

deception jamming, which would require only

modest power over a wide band of wavelengths

simultaneously; while feasible, this would require several advanced-technology jammers.

DELIVERY SYSTEM ISSUES

Introduction

Aircraft today provide virtually the only

means of delivering munitions to targets beyond the immediate battle area. Aircraft have

a flexibility in deployment that groundlaunched systems do not; they also place a human observer at the scene. They are limited,

however, when used in direct attacks against

follow-on forces: as discussed in more detail

in chapter 9, few aircraft have a night or allweather capability; all of the NATO aircraft

that could play a role in attacking beyond the

immediate battle area have other missions to

perform as well; and the very heavy Warsaw

Pact air defenses could result in significant

losses of attack aircraft, particularly if those

aircraft must fly very close to or directly over

targets in enemy territory .29

The high cost, long development cycles, and

long procurement programs for new aircraft

mean that current aircraft-with the sole addition of the planned F-15E—will constitute

NATO’s ground attack air force at least until

the turn of the next century.

The improvements in delivery capabilities

that will occur over the next two decades or

so can be expected to come principally from

air-to-ground missiles that will allow attack aircraft to remain a safe distance from enemy air

defenses, 30 and from ground-launched missiles

that will complement aircraft in reaching deep

targets, particularly at night and in bad weather

or when aircraft are needed elsewhere. Missiles

can incorporate precision guidance systems

that offer substantial improvements in accuracy

over that attainable with ground-based artillery, unguided rockets, or air-delivered freefall bombs. High accuracy becomes crucial in

attacking hard, fixed targets such as bridges

and the increasing number of heavily fortified

command, control, and communications facilities in Eastern Europe. And regardless of the

type of target, to the extent that precision guidance can increase the probability of a kill, the

use of missiles can reduce the number of sorties or rounds required to achieve a given objective.

Missile Guidance Technology

The propulsion and airframe technologies of

missiles are mature. The chief technology choice

in these systems is between ballistic missiles

and cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles fly faster

and thus can reach moving targets before they

move far; cruise missiles have the potential to

achieve higher terminal accuracy on target,

“For more information, see note 16, app. 1 l-A, vol. 2.

301mproved me~s for suppressing enemy air defenses are

another important approach to this problem.
182 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

though they may take hours rather than minutes to reach their targets and will require inflight guidance updates or special seekers to

hit moving targets. They may also be more vulnerable to interceptor aircraft and groundbased air defenses. The major area where new

technology may play a role in airframe design

is in the application of low-observable techniques to cruise missiles to reduce their vulnerability.

What distinguishes the major differing approaches to tactical missile design today and

what most determines their differing capabilities is the technology used for guidance. Two

different guidance functions-mid-course and

terminal guidance—may be needed. These

might use different technologies:

1. For guiding a missile to the general target area-mid-course guidance-some

form of inertial guidance is almost always

required. The only exceptions are very

short range air-launched missiles that lock

onto their targets before launch using one

of the precision terminal guidance technologies described below,31 or that fly their

initial course in a pure ballistic trajectory.

Although inertial guidance is a welldeveloped technology that has been used

for decades aboard ships, aircraft, space

vehicles, and ballistic missiles, the technology has historically been quite expensive; costs rise quickly with the increas-

————- ——.

“TO deliver such a missile, the aircraft must line itself up with

a near straight-line path to the target. Inertial systems may

be needed by short-range missiles that are to be able to fly to

a target substantially off axis.

2.

ing accuracy that is required for longer

flight times. Thus, the major technical

challenge in applying inertial systems to

conventional missiles is reducing cost.

The precise inertial systems used on

nuclear-armed ballistic missiles or fighter

aircraft, for example, cost far too much

to justify their one-time use on low-cost,

conventionally armed missiles. However,

new technologies promise to reduce the

cost of inertial guidance systems substantially, particularly for short-range applications. Inexpensive miniature inertial

systems using fiber-optic gyros could be

used in short-range weapons—and in

longer range weapons, if complemented

by any of several devices now available

to recalibrate the system in flight (e.g.,

miniature Global Positioning System

receivers). For the specific case of longrange attacks against moving targets,

another important issue is whether the midcourse guidance system needs to include

some means of receiving an in-flight update

of the target’s location.

For attacking hard fixed targets such as

bridges or bunkers, mid-course guidance

alone is not sufficient; precise terminal

guidance, sometimes to within an accuracy of a meter or less, is needed. (For

other types of targets, inertial guidance

will as a rule suffice; if the missile can be

delivered to within 100 meters or so of the

target, cluster munitions can be used to

attack soft area targets and smart submunitions to attack armored combat vehicles. See table 11-4 and, for a more

Table 11-4.—Missile Guidance Technologies

Range

Target Type Short Long

soft area fixed Inertial better Inertial

soft area moving

(unarmored unit) inertial better inertial

( + automatic target recogition or In-flight target update for

cruise missiles)

(armored unit) inertial + smart better inertial

submunitions + automatic target recognition or in-flight target update

+ smart submunitions

hard fixed man in loop or

automatic better inertial

target recognition + automatic target recognition

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 1987
Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 183

Box A.—Delivery Error Budget

Missiles that carry nuclear warheads can

get by with inertial systems, even at very long

ranges (thousands of kilometers for ICBMs)

and even when targeted against hard point

targets, because the kill radius of the warhead

is large enough to tolerate inaccuracies often

of hundreds of meters in delivery. However,

when conventional warheads are used against

hard fixed targets such as bridges, accuracies

on the order of a meter are often essential:

a specific support element of a bridge may

have to be struck. Inertial systems operate

by guiding the missile to an absolute geographic coordinate. Even if the guidance system were perfectly accurate, it would be

limited by the uncertainty with which the

absolute geographic coordinate of a fixed target is known-and that uncertainty is too

large to allow the required one meter or less

accuracy,

detailed discussion of the limitation of inertial systems in attacking fixed-point targets, see box A. Precision terminal guidance on existing missiles is achieved

through the use of a human controller—a

“man in the loop’ ‘—who, for example,

might observe the target through a TV

camera mounted on the nose of the missile and steer the missile into it by radio

control.

A key issue in precision terminal guidance is

how much effort should be given to developing

a next-generation system that can operate autonomously. An automatic target recognition

system could reduce the burden on a human

controller; in the case of air-launched missiles,

for example, it would allow the pilot to launch

his missile and immediately exit the area. In

certain proposed missions that could strain the

capabilities of man-in-the-loop systems (e.g.,

long-range attack of hard fixed targets), automatic target recognition may be essential. Y e t

the development of such systems involves a

high technical risk; so far, none of the many

laboratory efforts or prototypes have proved

reliable enough to justify procurement, and indeed critics suggest that automatic target recognition faces fundamental obstacles that may

prove insurmountable.

Mid-course Guidance

Inertial.—An inertial navigation system continually recalculates its current position by

adding up the many small changes it senses

in the missile’s acceleration and rotation. Even

small errors in those measurements are quickly

compounded, causing the accuracy of the system to decrease with time (drift). Measures to

reduce drift quickly drive up the costs of traditional mechanical inertial navigation systems.

The new technologies of ring-laser gyroscopes and (especially) fiber-optic gyroscopes

promise to reduce the costs of inertial systems

substantially, although not necessarily to improve performance. Such inexpensive and less

accurate inertial systems could have important

applications in short-range missiles (e.g., a

short-range air-launched stand-off missile carrying smart submunitions that have a large

search area to compensate for delivery errors),

and in longer range missiles if used in conjunction with techniques to periodically recalibrate

the inertial system. These techniques include

the Global Positioning System satellites, which

can provide, via an on-board receiver, a geoP/Joto credft U S Deparfmenf of Defense

Air-launched cruise missile uses TERCOM and other

precision guidance,
184 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

graphic fix within 13 meters in absolute coordinates; and various map update systems

such as terrain comparison (TERCOM) which,

at set intervals, compares the terrain profile

below with a stored map to correct any drift

in the inertial system. GPS receivers are likely

to be jammed in the immediate target area,

so terminal accuracy is determined by the drift

of the inertial system from the last ( unjammed)

update. The services have in addition been

reluctant to place themselves in a position of

having to rely on the survival of satellites in

wartime. TERCOM, which is employed on existing U.S. cruise missiles, is an alternative

technique, although mission planning is timeconsuming, detailed maps are required, and

thus retargeting flexibility is obviously very

limited.

In-flight Target Location Update.–At longer

range, a moving target will have moved farther

by the time a missile arrives; this is especially

the case for slow-flying cruise missiles. One possible solution, discussed below, is to equip a

cruise missile with an automatic target recognizer so that it can search for the target as it

flies a course along a likely route, such as a road.

Another approach, employed in the Assault

Breaker demonstration program (and applicable

to both cruise and ballistic missiles) is to relay

updated target location data to the missile in

flight. This data would be developed by a radar

surveillance and target acquisition system such

as Joint STARS, and transmitted to the missile

via a radio link.

Because of cost and technical problems, provision for an in-flight update was dropped from

the design of at least initial versions of the Army

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS); it maybe

added later as a block improvement. Analysis

has shown that the loss incapability due to lack

of update is not severe for ATACMS. Technical

issues that need to be considered are beaming

of an update to a missile while lofted (or acquisition of the guidance signal by the missile at lower

altitude in time to act on it) and the susceptibility of such an update link to jamming.

Precision Terminal Guidance

Man in the Loop. –The current generation of

precision-guided conventional missiles makes

use of technology that was first employed by

the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam some 20 years

ago. Human control of the missile is maintained to acquire and select the target and, in

some cases, to guide the missile throughout

its entire flight. A variety of techniques are

used (see table 11-5); for example, a laser seeker

Table 11-5.—Guidance Technology—NATO Conventional Missiles

Launch mode Targets Status Guidance technology

primarily inertial

conv. Tomahawk sea area

ATACMS ground area, armor

SRSOM air armor

IAM air fixed

precision terminal (man in loop)

HVM air, ground armor

FOG-M ground armor

MAVERICK air armor

COPPERHEAD artillery armor

PAVEWAY 2 air fixed

GBU-15 air fixed

AGM-130A air fixed

precision terminal (automatic target recognition)

LRSOM air(/ground) area

CMAG ground/air all —

proc

FSD

R&D

R&D

FSD

R&D

inv

inv

inv

inv/proc

FSD

R&D

R & D

inertial/TERCOM

inertial (ballistic)

inertial (+ sensor?)

inertial

laser command guidance (“beam rider”)

fiber-optic data link

IIR lock-on before launch

laser designator

laser designator

TV/n R radio data link

TV/n R radio data link

inertial/GPS/TERCOM + terminal seeker

LADAR, SAR, MMW

targets: area: soft area targets (SSMS, SAMS, field command posts)

fixed: hard fixed ta~gets (bridges, power stations, bunkers)

armor: moving armored combat vehicles

status inv inventory

proc procurement

FSD: full-scale development

R&D research and development, prior to full+cale development

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987
Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 185

on the missile can guide the missile to a spot

on the target illuminated by a laser beam, or

a TV camera on the missile can send a picture

back to the aircraft cockpit where a weapons

officer is steering the missile via radio control.32

All these techniques share some common characteristics. High accuracy—on the order of

meters—is possible; the presence of a‘ ‘man in

the loop” may avoid many countermeasure

problems such as electronic decoys or background clutter; the technology is for the most

part mature and involves little technical risk;

and costs are, very roughly, on the order of

$100,000 per missile.

On the other hand, these missiles are all of

relatively short range (tens of kilometers); most

require a clear line-of-sight to the target; and

thus most of the air-delivered models still require aircraft to fly close to their targets and

to remain there throughout the flight of the

missile. A general problem with laser-guided

weapons is that the laser can be obscured by

smoke around the target area; laser-guided

weapons are also somewhat less accurate than

TV-guided models. A general problem with radio data links, used to transmit TV pictures

from the remotely guided GBU-15s, is that

they can be jammed.

Despite these basic limitations, some improvements in this generation of weapons are

possible without going to a radically new generation of technology. Range can be extended:

for example, the AGM-130 has roughly double

the range of the GBU-15 from which it is derived by the addition of a simple (but expensive) solid-fuel rocket motor. Jam-resistant

data links are being developed for the GBU15 and AGM-130. Fiber-optic data links could

provide jam resistance for missiles launched

from the ground.

Automatic Target Recognition.—Automatic

target recognition, if successful, clearly could

increase the effectiveness of missiles in all missions, and could increase the survivability of

aircraft by allowing them to leave the area im-

~ZThese specific technologies are described more thoroughly

in OTA's special report, Technologies for NATO's Follow-On

Forces Attack Concept, July 1986, pp. 24-27.

mediately after launching the missile. However, as indicated in table 11-4, automatic target recognition may bean enabling technology

for attacking hard fixed targets at long range

with nonnuclear missiles.

At long distances, attacking hard fixed targets would strain the capabilities of the manin-the-loop guidance systems that are now the

only means of providing the required precise

terminal accuracy. Establishing radio contact

with the missile as it approaches the target

area is difficult at long range. The control aircraft would have to arrange to be in position

at the right instant to have a clear line of sight

to the missile, unobscured by terrain or vegetation, and jamming of the radio data link

presents an increasing threat at greater range

from the control aircraft. Automatic target recognition, which could free the missile from the

need for human control while providing high

terminal accuracy, is the only practical alternative.

For a second mission-long-range attack of

moving armored combat vehicles whose location will have changed substantially during the

flight time of the missile-a possible solution,

discussed above, is to provide an in-flight update of the target location from a system, such

as the Joint STARS radar, with weapon guidance capability. Alternatively, the missile

could be equipped with an autonomous capability to search for the targets while flying

along a likely route such as a road.

Both of these missions would also require

a mid-course guidance system capable of delivering the missile to the general target area

(see discussion of inertial systems above).

The technology for automatic target recognition has proved problematic to date. The sensor (e.g., a TV camera or radar) must provide

a high-quality image of the target area for recognition; even then, picking out the target from

a complex image, and distinguishing it from

similar objects (e.g., a tank from a truck) is a

very challenging computational task, especially because it must be carried out in real

time. Mobile targets pose a special problem

in that they may be facing any direction-and
186 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit’ McDonnell Douglas Corp

F-15E equipped with LANTIRN pods.

a tank looks quite different when viewed from

different angles.

All sensors are subject to countermeasures,

including decoys and camouflage as discussed

above in the section on smart submunitions;

signatures of fixed targets may be quite variable depending on the season and weather as

foliage and snow cover change. Although elements of an automatic target recognize have

been demonstrated in the laboratory, complete

working systems have remained elusive. For

example, continuing problems in achieving

reliable automatic target recognition in the

Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) infrared targeting system for fighter aircraft may lead to that

feature being dropped from LANTIRN. An

automatic target recognize for an autonomous

missile would have to perform even more reliably: LANTIRN was designed to identify the

target but still allow a human to make the final launch decision; an autonomous missile

would be entrusted to perform the entire job

on its own.

Even if the technology can be made reliable, placing an automatic target recognize on

a cruise missile poses some engineering challenges as well. An imaging sensor and its associated computer processor would add a considerable power requirement over that of

existing cruise missile electronics; this will require heavier generators and, with the extra

heat generation, a cooling system for the electronics.” Advances in the miniaturization of

electronics may solve this problem. The use

of currently available sensor technology—

millimeter wave radar and imaging infrared—

would also pose a packaging problem, because

an additional system would be required for terrain following. A more advanced sensor, CO2

laser radar, is being pursued by several contractors; both target-acquisition and terrainfollowing/obstacle-avoidance functions could

be carried out by this single sensor. Much additional development of this sensor will be required; however, it is also likely to be the most

expensive option.

The lowest technical risk approach to automatic target recognition might involve clever

combination of existing capabilities to perform

a limited mission. For example, low-cost inertial/GPS guidance could be used to steer a

cruise missile close to a road or railroad, and

a relatively simple imaging sensor could identify the road and keep the missile precisely on

track; it could also detect trains or groups of

vehicles. An autonomous capability against

fixed targets might be provided in the near

term similarly by demanding less than complete autonomy or flexibility. A short-range

standoff missile could be guided from a preset

launch point to the target area by a simple inertial system; a sensor system, supplied with

information about the orientation of the target and its general characteristics (e.g., type

of bridge, number of spans), might then be able

to perform the somewhat simplified target recognition task.34

33Capt. R.B. Gibson, USAF, et al., Investigation of the Feasibility of a Conventionally Armed Tactical Cruise Missile, Vol.

1 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Institute

of Technology, report AFIT/GSE-81D-2, December 1981), p. 7.

siThi9 concept is being pursued in the Autonomous Guided

Bomb program of the Air Force Armaments Laboratory.
Chapter 12

Packages of Systems and

Capabilities for Attacks of

Follow-on Forces
CONTENTS

Page

Illustrative Capability Packages for FOFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........189

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..190

Locating Moving Combat Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..190

Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns (at 5 to 30 km) . ..............192

Standoff Air Attack of Division Columns (at 30 to 80 km) . ● . ......193

Missile Attack of Division Columns (at 30 to 80 km). ..,.. ...........194

Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted Units (at 80 to 150 km). . ......195

Cruise Missile Attack of the Rail Network (at 350 to 800 km) . ........196

Flexibility of Systems for FOFA Operations . ........................197

Appendix 12-A: Summary of Packages for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ..l99

Appendix 12-B: Flexibility and Application of Systems for Attacks of

Follow-On Forces

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table No.

12-1. Summary of

. . . . . .

Forces

. . . . . 203

Page

. . . . . 190
Chapter 12

Packages of Systems and Capabilities for

Attacks of Follow-On Forces

In the special report on FOFA,l OTA observed that systems ought to be procured so

as to form complete “packages’ that perform

all of the functions to support operational concepts (such as those described in ch. 6). These

packages could include both existing systems

as well as new developments such as those discussed in chapters 10 (RSTA) and 11 (weapons). This chapter illustrates how packages

could be built to underwrite the operational

concepts outlined in chapter 6.

Several factors complicate any attempt to

specify what these packages might or should

be for attack of follow-on forces:

There are a great many potential packages—many operational concepts, several

choices of systems for certain functions,

and many ways of mixing systems for

each function.

Packages may evolve over time, as new

systems are deployed.

Many choices are subject to complex costeffectiveness trade-offs, particularly for

systems in development.

‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies for NATO Follow-On Forces Attack Concept—Special

Report, OTA-ISC-312 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, July 1986).

Some systems will have considerable “flexibility,” or application over abroad range

of concepts, and can contribute to several

packages.

Many systems will have important applications-to missions other than FOFA.2

The particular packages discussed below are

chosen to illustrate the major issues of development and procurement, and are not intended

to be “preferred’ or “recommended. A more

complete analysis of packages for FOFA is in

appendix 12-A.

The flexibility of systems for FOFA is especially important. Flexibility would allow the

battlefield commander to use the best operational concept for a particular tactical situation—for example, to strike deeper against a

division, and then to strike closer in against

the weakened regiments of the division, rather

than always having to strike either deeper or

closer in.

Unfortunately, the use of many system

names and acronyms is unavoidable in the discussion below and in the appendices; a glossary of system names and acronyms is provided at the end of this volume.

‘Multi-mission capability is likely to be the most common case;

these “general purpose forces” are acquired for the inherently

unpredictable needs of tactical warfare.

ILLUSTRATIVE CAPABILITY PACKAGES FOR FOFA

Table 12-1 presents capability packages for

FOFA. Each package implements a given operational concept (listed in the first column), and

consists of systems to perform the various necessary functions (listed in the remaining columns). For example, the first package implements artillery attack of regiments that are

moving forward from final assembly areas,

within about 30 kilometers of the FLOT.3 This

package includes a suite of systems for reconnaissance and surveillance and situation assessment (R&S/SA), two systems for target acquisition and attack control (TA/AC), two types

of platforms (or launchers), and two possible

3See ch. 6 for a description of this operational concept.

189
190 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 12-1.—Summary of Selected Packages for Attack of Follow-on Forces

RECONNAISSANCE,

OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE & TGT ACQ &

CONCEPT SITUATION ASSMNT ATTACK CONTROL PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

ARTILLERY ATTACK GR/CS +TRS AQUILA MLRS MLRS/TGW

REGIMENTAL COLSa

+ ASARS +J(S)TARSb

+ AFATDS +8-INCH + SADARM

5-30 KM

—

+ASAS

STANDOFF AIR ATKC GR/CS +TRS JS(TA)RSd — MSOW PLSS

DIVISION COLUMNSa+ASARS + J(S)TARS + WIU F-16 + SKEET/TGSMe

+ATACMS

30-80 KM + ENSCE +CEB

MISSILE ATTACK GR/CS +TRS JS(TA)RS ATACMS

DIVISION COLUMNS + ASARS +J(S)TARS + AFATDS MLRS +SKEET/TGSM —

30-80 KM +ASAS + DPICM

AIR ATTACK GR/CS +TRS ASARS F-15E GBU-15 PLSS

CHOKPT+ HLTD UNITf

+ASARS +J(S)TARS +GACC + F-16 + MSOW +ATACMS

80-150 KM + ENSCE + CEB/MINES

CRUISE MISSILE ATK ACTIVITY CUE CALCM-Xg

RAIL NETWORK — (ON WPN) B-52 +GPS/TERCOM —

350-800 KM + RAIL MINESa

NOTES Acronyms used here are defined in the Glossary at the end of this volume.

aREGIMENTAL COLUMNS and DIVISION COLUMNS are targets for attack when they are moving on roads after exiting assembly areas

bJ(s)TARs denotes the MTI surveillance capability of Joint STARS

CSTANDOFF AIR ATK denotes air attaCk from standoff of 25.w km, using a weapon such as the MSOW (Modular Standoff Weapon) now under study In NATO.

dJs(TA)Rs denotes the target acquisition and attack Control capability of Joint STARS

.ssKEET/TGSfJ denOieS the use of either sensor. fu~ed weapon or terminally-guided Submunitlon technology, or both, fOr anti-armOr nlUnltlOnS

fCHOKpT + H LTD UNIT is a target in the concept where a Chokepoint is created by attack (e.g. dropping a bridge) just prior to the arrival of an enemy unit, which, when

halted behind the chokepoint, is then itself attacked

gCALCM.X denotes a conventionally-armed air.launched cruise missile, possibly ALCM.B retired from SIOP duty and modified to have less range with more payload

hRAIL MINE denotes a mine t. damage track and derail moving trains, possibly based on a modified ant! -bunker munltlon and a Mk.75 fUZe

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987

weapons. No particular support measures are

required for the first package; other packages,

which use tactical aircraft that penetrate enemy

airspace, require support for that function.

Each of these illustrative packages is discussed

below.

Overall, several features of this table stand

out. One is the recurrence of the suite of systems for R&S/SA. A suite of this type is essential to many different packages, and has

broad flexibility for FOFA (as well as for other

missions). Another feature is the recurrence

of certain systems in the table. For example,

Joint STARS appears four times for R&S/SA,

and twice for TA/AC. This is an example of

system flexibility for FOFA. A third feature

is the number of different platforms and weapons that can contribute to packages for FOFA.

Command and Control

To the extent that these packages for FOFA

represent new capabilities for which command

and control (C2

) procedures have not been developed, they will generate new requirements

for C2 activity and for processing of information. The discussion of the packages below assumes the capability to process and communicate data as needed. These capabilities may

prove to be very difficult to provide, and could

be critical to successful FOFA operations. Failure to successfully develop the necessary data

processing and communications capabilities

could greatly reduce the capabilities of the

RSTA/platform/weapons packages. In this

case, failure to spend enough resources (especially budget and personnel) on the C2 part of

the problem would greatly reduce the value of

the much larger investments in equipment and

munitions.

Locating Moving Combat Units

The first three of the packages in table 12-1

are for attacking moving columns of combat

units. These packages, as well as the fourth,
Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 191

depend on a capability to detect, locate, and

track moving combat units (regiments and divisions) to a depth of at least 150 kilometers

beyond the FLOT, and benefit from an ability

to distinguish them from resupply or other support traffic in the enemy rear. The capability

to attack preferentially the enemy’s combat

elements, and directly reduce their combat

strength, is essential to the effectiveness of

FOFA operations with limited resources.

The same reconnaissance, surveillance, and

situation assessment suite can serve all of

these operational concepts. The suite includes

SIGINT sensors, radar imagery and moving

target surveillance, and a processing system

for fusion and situation assessment.’

Both the GUARDRAIL/Common Sensor

(GR/CS) system and the Tactical Reconnaissance System (TRS) have integrated SIGINT

suites, containing both COMINT and ELINT

sensors. The COMINT sensors can intercept

radio traffic used to control unit movements

and maintain contact with higher headquarters. The ELINT sensors can locate the air defense radars that protect the moving unit. This

sensor data is not enough to detect and locate

a unit, however. SIGINT, although very sophisticated, can be defeated either by spoofing or by very strict emissions control discipline. For this reason, imagery and MTI

radar data is fused with SIGINT data to provide confident detection and accurate location

of an enemy unit.

The Joint STARS wide-area surveillance capability (indicated by J(S)TARS in table 12-1)

would provide moving target indication over

a large area. This data can be combined with

the SIGINT data to identify potential target

areas. In order to confirm the presence of a

unit, the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar

System (ASARS) can provide high-resolution

‘See James L. Jones and Peter W. Lert, Follow-On Force Attack, Volume 11: Reconnm”ssance Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Architecture to Support Follow-On Force A ttack (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, report

R-302, for an analysis of such a suite of systems, which illustrates a possible structure for the suite and analyzes its capability to locate and track combat units.

radar imagery of specific locations. This is an

example of a “cue and confirm” approach to

RSTA.5 In general, surveillance systems provide cues and reconnaissance systems provide

confirmation.

For example, ELINT and COMINT may

provide indications of a division arriving in an

assembly area and a rough estimate of its location. When MTI data collected over the previous and subsequent hours are studied, they

may show a large number of vehicle “tracks”

which lead into the area and disappear because

the vehicles slowed or stopped. There may also

be characteristic helicopter movements near

the headquarters area. Armed with this data,

the assessment center can task the ASARS

to obtain high-resolution imagery of the suspected assembly area, which can be used to

precisely locate vehicle clusters and identify

characteristic arrangements of vehicles typical of command posts or other high-value

targets.

A fusion capability is vital to this approach

for locating follow-on forces. Table 12-1 lists

two data fusion systems, the ASAS (Army)

and the ENSCE (Air Force), the twin products

of the current Joint Tactical Fusion Program.

These systems will be very similar, with much

commonality between them in equipment and

software. They will accept data from the sensors, and support the situation assessment

process by providing the capability to fuse or

combine the information in appropriate ways

for operator evaluation.

This suite of SIGINT, radar, and fusion systems is expected to provide the capability to

detect, locate, and track follow-on regiments

and divisions. This capability will extend to

a depth of 100 to 150 kilometers beyond the

FLOT. 6 This flexibility of reconnaissance, surveillance, and situation assessment systems

is an example of the flexibility of particular

systems for FOFA, and their ability to support different operational concepts.

51n this example, SIGINT provides initial cues, MTI data provide further cues and tentative confirmation, and SAR imagery

provides final confirmation.

‘See app. 12-A (vol. 2), paragraph 3 for discussion of this range

limitation.
192 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit U.S. Department of Defense

155-millimeter howitzer.

Artillery Attack of Regiment Columns

(at 5 to 30 km)

This package uses the high firing rate of artillery to destroy enemy regiments on their final road march toward the battle area. As described in the OTA Special Report, the Army

approach for deep attack of “decide, detect,

and deliver” would be used. In this approach,

resources are allocated to the mission and the

areas or road segments in which the attack will

be focused (engagement zones) are designated

ahead of time (decided) by analyzing terrain

and possible enemy actions. Surveillance is

maintained to detect the regiment move out

of its final assembly area and the movement

of battalion columns toward and into the engagement zones at which time the artillery delivers its planned ordnance.

The R&S/SA suite for locating moving combat units is basic to this package. The TA/AC

capabilities for this package include the Aquila RPV system and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The

Aquila RPV can loiter in the target area and

provide precision imagery for targeting’ to the

corps artillery Fire Support Element, which

controls artillery operations through the

AFATDS. Both rocket (MLRS) and tube (8-

inch) artillery have smart anti-armor rounds

in development:8 the TGW (Terminally Guided

Warhead) for MLRS, and SADARM (Search

and Destroy Armor Munition) for the 8-inch

gun. This package has no special support re7Aquila imagery can also be used for damage assessment.

‘See ch. 11 for discussion.
Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 193

●

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

quirements, because it does not involve penetrating enemy airspace.9

Standoff Air Attack of Division Columns

(at 30 to 80 km)

This package uses TACAIR with stand-off

weapons to destroy enemy divisions on the

road when they leave their assembly areas. The

F-16 platform attacks with a Modular StandOff Weapon (MSOW) that flies a distance of

25 to 50 kilometers and then dispenses smart

submunitions against targeted columns of vehicles within the division that is moving.

Whe general requirements for C’ and logistics support are

understood, without being specifically called out, for this and

all other operational concepts and packages.

The situation assessment capability to track

follow-on divisions, as described above, is essential. With it, NATO forces can attack just

the combat divisions and not the total vehicle

traffic in the Warsaw Pact rear. The output

of the situation assessment process is provided

to the air command and control element, which

assigns aircraft to attack the division when it

makes its move forward. Joint STARS provides target location data by tracking columns

of vehicles out of the assembly area and down

their routes. The attack F-16s penetrate in a

less well-defended area near the target area,

and fly to a launch point within range of the

target area. Meanwhile, because the targets

move while the aircraft are flying, target location updates are provided to the aircraft in

flight just prior to weapons release. Joint
194 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

STARS transmits this data to Weapons Interface Units (WIUs) on the attack aircraft via

signals encoded in the radar beam, providing

highly jam-resistant data links to the F-16s

over enemy territory. The target updates are

fed into the weapons by the aircraft fire control systems, and the MSOWs are launched

from the F-16s.

In order for this package to be effective, the

penetrating aircraft need support.10 This Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SE AD) could

be provided by PLSS and ATACMS.11 PLSS

would target air defense radars and provide

‘“Penetration support such as escort fighters and electronic

warfare aircraft are also needed.

“This was the subject of Initiative 15 in the “Memorandum

of Agreement on U.S. Army -U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process” between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and

Air Force signed May 22, 1984.

data to the MLRS units that fire ATACMS

missiles. Joint STARS and ASARS may also

be capable of targeting elements of air defense

units (ADUs).

Missile Attack of Division Columns

(at 30 to 80 km)

This package uses ground-launched missiles

to attack the same targets with the same objective as that of the previous package. The

weapon system is the Army Tactical Missile

System (ATACMS), which is launched from

standard MLRS launchers. This package embodies an operational capability generally similar to the Assault Breaker technology demonstration program of DARPA, and is its

closest descendant.
—

Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 195

——

The operational concept again follows the

U.S. Army “decide, detect, deliver” approach

for deep attack. The situation assessment capability detects, locates, and tracks follow-on

divisions, and the corps Fire Support Element

(which controls the attack) allocates launchers

to this mission and determines engagement

zones in which to engage columns of vehicles.

Joint STARS supports attack planning and

control by tracking vehicle columns departing

the assembly area, forecasting times and locations at which they can be engaged, and providing missile-launching batteries with lastminute confirmation that targeted columns are

entering planned engagement zones. Joint

STARS data is passed to the MLRS launchers

via AFATDS, allowing updates of engagement

time and place just prior to launch. When the

missile arrives at the target, it dispenses either smart anti-armor submunitions (Skeet or

TGSM), or cluster munitions with capability

against trucks and light armor (Dual Purpose

Improved Cluster Munitions--DPICM), or

both, also depending on detailed munitions effectiveness. As with the artillery package, no

special support is needed by this package.

Air Attack of Chokepoints and Halted

Units (at 80 to 150 km)

This package attacks follow-on divisions as

they move on roads toward their concentration areas (division assembly areas). The attack is conducted in two phases. First, a

chokepoint is created along a division’s route

by dropping a bridge just before the division

column arrives. Second, after a period of time

sufficient to let enough of the division arrive

at the chokepoint and halt there, the resulting bunches of stationary vehicles are attacked

by tactical aircraft using short stand-off

weapons.
196 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack

Photo credit’ A.4cDonne// Douglas Corp

F-15E carrying a laser-guided bomb.

The situation assessment capability to detect, locate, and track follow-on divisions is

again necessary to identify target divisions and

likely attack times and places. Once these targets are chosen by the air command and control elements, the two phases of the attack are

planned and coordinated. One or two F-15Es

attack the target bridge by delivering one or

two GBU-15 Glide Bomb Units, which can be

guided with sufficient accuracy to drop the

bridge.” After the bridge is dropped, the area

behind it is kept under surveillance by ASARS

to observe the arrival and buildup of elements

of the division. This information is passed to

the Ground Attack Control Center (GACC),

which controls the subsequent attack. When

the GACC determines that targets are (or will

be) there, F-16s in a strike package are given

the target locations and scrambled or assembled to make the attack. This package penetrates with its escort and other support, and

flies to a point some distance from the halted

division in order to launch MSOWs. This avoids

facing the division’s air defenses, which are

likely to be expecting attack (because the bridge

attack can be interpreted as tactical warning).

“The target division has not arrived yet; the air defenses at

the bridge, then, are not likely to be heavy.

The F-16s launch their weapons, which fly

to designated target points and dispense a mix

of APAM munitions and mines to both damage and disrupt the halted division. 13 Because

the targets are relatively dense vehicle clusters,

and the personnel may not be in protective vehicles, APAM munitions are likely to cause

more damage to the division’s fighting power

than anti-armor munitions would; mines will

then make more remote the possibility of recovering from the attack.

Cruise Missile Attack of the Deep Rail

Network (at 350 to 800 km)

This package provides a capability to attack

the rail network across eastern Europe, in order to delay the movement of Soviet divisions

through this area. It does not use the same type

of situation assessment capability as the other

packages. The platform is a long-range bomber, the B-52, based in the CONUS. Over NATO

territory, these aircraft launch long-range

cruise missiles which conduct the actual attack. A B-52 can carry about 20 such weapons.

‘Whe targets are not moving; no target location update, then,

is necessary.
Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 197

.

Once launched, these missiles navigate autonomously (using GPS or some other system)

to the vicinity of the chosen rail line. Upon encountering the rail at the designated location,

the weapon dispenses mines which embed

themselves in the rail bed. These mines activate after a preprogrammed delay, and then

attack a passing train. This attack will blow

a hole in the rail bed and derail the train. Clearing the area and repairing the track will take

18 to 24 hours.

Because the bombers do not penetrate enemy

airspace, no special support is needed for this

package.

Photo credit U.S. Department of Defense

B-52 bomber launching a cruise missile.

FLEXIBILITY OF SYSTEMS FOR FOFA OPERATIONS

The set of capability packages summarized

in table 12-1 is just a small portion of the total

set of packages for FOFA listed in appendix

12-A. This longer list is itself not exhaustive;

it gives only one package for each operational

concept listed.

Appendix 12-B contains a table of the contributions of systems across the full range of

operational concepts outlined in appendix 12-

A. These systems are grouped into the same

four functional areas14 used in presenting the

capability packages:

1. reconnaissance, surveillance, and situation assessment;

2. target acquisition and attack control;

3. platform; and

4. weapon.

Each system is considered for each operational concept, and its capability rated as

“full, “ “limited,” or none for the given function. This illustrates the flexibility of systems

for FOFA operations, by showing the ways in

which a given system can contribute to a num14 The “support” category is not considered here.

ber of capability packages. Further, it indicates

how fallback capabilities may exist in particular areas (e.g., targeting moving columns) if

specific systems cannot fulfill the needs of a

given operational approach. For systems currently in development, these ratings presume

that the system is procured and deployed with

the capabilities presently specified.

The suite of sensor and fusion systems for

reconnaissance, surveillance, and situation

assessment for attack of moving combat units

offers full capability to implement all concepts

for attacks within about 150 kilometers of the

FLOT. This suite–which includes GR/CS,

TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS, and the JTF systems–gives the operational commander great

flexibility to use any concept that fits the tactical situation and can be implemented with

available platforms and weapons. Attacks

deeper than this will need other assets for situation assessment, and on-board systems for

target acquisition.

RPV and UAV systems can provide full or

limited support to situation assessment for all

of the attack concepts out to about 150 kilometers beyond the FLOT. These systems also
198 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

provide great flexibility, although capability

is limited by the lack of wide area coverage.

Joint STARS and ASARS provide full or

limited capability for target acquisition for all

attack concepts within about 150 kilometers

of the FLOT. These systems are also complementary, each providing a fallback capability

for the other. A mixed deployment of both systems would provide a commander with great

flexibility in conducting attacks with available

weapons, and being able to target these weapons effectively. With WIUs, attacking aircraft

or missiles could receive target data updates

directly from Joint STARS, or indirectly from

the systems, via the Weapon Data Link of

Joint STARS. This would provide limited or

full capability for target data communications

for nearly all attack concepts using Joint

STARS target acquisition and would provide

substantial flexibility for the attack control

function.

Tactical aircraft such as the F-16, F-15E, F111, and Tornado provide great flexibility for

attack concepts within their mission ranges,

which extend to about 150 kilometers beyond

the FLOT for the F-16 and up to 350 kilometers for the other aircraft.

The MLRS platform also provides substantial flexibility to about 150 kilometers, considering its capability to launch either the current artillery rocket or ATACMS rockets.

An air-launched stand-off weapon such as

the MSOW and a ground-launched weapon

such as ATACMS together provide excellent

flexibility as well as a capability to execute

nearly any attack concept within about 150

kilometers of the FLOT.

A mix of smart anti-armor munitions (e.g.,

TGSM or Skeet) and APAM munitions also

provides flexibility in attacking effectively the

full spectrum of targets in this range. Mines

can provide a flexible supplement to other munitions. They can contribute limited capability across nearly the full range of operational

concepts, but provide full capability in only

one concept.

Weapons such as the MLRS/TGW, GBU-15,

and AGM-130B can provide important capabilities, but only in one or a few concepts each.

These weapons do not individually provide

flexibility to the commander, although they

may contribute to his flexibility in combination with other weapons.
Appendix 12-A

Summary of Packages for Attacks

of Follow-On Forces

The table below provides a summary of capability packages for attack of follow-on forces. Operational concepts are listed in the first column, and the remaining columns list systems that could

perform the various key functions: reconnaissance, surveillance, and situation assessment; target

acquisition and attack control; weapons platform; weapon; and necessary support (primarily for

penetration of hostile airspace). These operational concepts have all been identified by OTA as being under consideration by the U.S. or Allied military and appear to be technically feasible, but

they do not necessarily represent an exhaustive set of operational concepts for FOFA. Similarly,

the packages (and systems chosen for the packages) are meant to be illustrative, and do not represent a complete list of systems or packages for FOFA.

Many systems names and acronyms are necessary for this table; they are defined in the Glossary at the end of this volume. Specific notes are given at the end of the table.

OPERATIONAL

CONCEPT

DIRECT AIR ATTACK

REGIMENTAL COLSa

5-30 KM

STANDOFF AIR ATKC

REGIMENTAL COLS

5-30 KM

MISSILE ATTACK

REGIMENTAL COLS

5-30 KM

ARTILLERY ATTACK

REGIMENTAL COLS

5-30 KM

RECONNAISSANCE , TGT ACQ &

SURVEILLANCE & ATTACK

SITUATION ASSMNT CONTROL

GR/CS+TRS LANTIRN

+ASARS+J( S ) TARSb +GACC

+ENSCE

JS(TA)RSd

SAME +GACC

GR/CS+TRS JS (TA) RS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +AFATDS

+ASAS

AQUILA

SAME +AFATDS

PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

PLSS

F-16 SFW +MLRS

+F- 4G

MSOW

F-16 +SKEET/TGSMe ---

ATACMS

MLRS +SKEET/TGSM ---

MLRS MLRS/TGW

+8 - INCH +SADARM ---

199
200 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

OPERATIONAL

CONCEPT

DIRECT AIR ATTACK

DIVISION COLUMNSa

30-80 KM

STANDOFF AIR ATK

DIVISION COLUMNS

30-80 KM

MISSILE ATTACK

DIVISION COLUMNS

30-80 KM

DIRECT AIR ATTACK

REGT ASSY AREAS

30-80 KM

STANDOFF AIR ATK

REGT ASSY AREAS

30-80 KM

MISSILE ATTACK

REGT ASSY AREAS

30-80 KM

DIRECT AIR ATK

MOVING COLUMNS

80-150 KM

STANDOFF AIR ATK

MOVING COLUMNS

80-150 KM

MISSILE ATTACK

MOVING COLUMNS

80-150 KM

AIR ATTACK

DIV ASSY AREAS

80-150 KM

MISSILE ATTACK

DIV ASSY AREAS

80-150 KM

RECONNAISSANCE, TGT ACQ &

SURVEILLANCE & ATTACK

SITUATION ASSMNT CONTROL

GR/CS+TRS LANTIRN

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +GACC

+ENSCE

JS(TA)RS

SAME +WIU

GR/CS+TRS JS(TA)RS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +AFATDS

+ASAS

GR/CS+TRS ASARS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +WIU

+ENSCE

IEW UAV

SAME +FTI/E-Of

+GACC

GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O

+ASAS +AFATDS

GR/CS+TRS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS LANTIRN

+ENSCE

JS(TA)RS

SAME +WIU

GR/CS+TRS JS(TA)RS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +WIU

+ASAS

GR/CS+TRS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS ASARS

+ENSCE

GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O

+ASAS

PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

F-16

F-16

MLRS

F-16

F-16

MLRS

F-16

F-16

MLRS

F-16

MLRS

SFW

MSOW

+SKEET/TGSM

+CEB

ATACMS

+SKEET/TGSM

+DPICM

TMD

+CEB

MSOW

+CEB

ATACMS

+DPICM

SFW

MSOW

+CEB

ATACMS

+DPICM

MSOW

+CEB

ATACMS

+DPICM

PLSS

+ATACMS

+F-4G/F-15

PLSS

+ATACMS

---

PLSS

+ATACMS

+F-4G/F-15

PLSS

+ATACMS

- - -

PLSS

+ATACMS

+F-4G/F-15

PLSS

+ATACMS

---

PLSS

+ATACMS

---
Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Fe/low-On Forces ● 201

OPERATIONAL

CONCEPT

AIR ATTACK

CHOKPT+HLTD UNITg

80-150 KM

JOINT ATTACK

CHOKPT+HLTD UNIT

80-150 KM

AIR ATTACK

COMMAND POSTS

80-150 KM

MISSILE ATTACK

COMMAND POSTS

80-150 KM

RECONNAISSANCE, TGT ACQ &

SURVEILLANCE & ATTACK

SITUATION ASSMNT CONTROL

GR/CS+TRS ASARS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +GACC

+ENSCE

GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O

+ASAS +AFATDS

GR/CS+TRS

+ASARS+J(S)TARS ASARS

+ENSCE

GR/CS+TRS IEW UAV

+ASARS+J(S)TARS +FTI/E-O

+ASAS

AIR ATTACK

UNITS ON ROADS

150-350 KM

CRUISE MISSILE ATK

UNITS ON ROADS

150-350 KM

ACTIVITY CUE

LANTIRN

--(ON WPN)

CRUISE MISSILE ATK ACTIVITY CUE

RAIL NETWORK --(ON WPN)

350-800 KM

CRUISE MISSILE ATK PEACETIME INTEL

RIVER BRIDGES (COORDINATES) --(ON WPN)

350-800 KM

CRUISE MISSILE ATK ACTIVITY CUE

UNITS ON RAILS --(ON WPN)

350-800 KM

PLATFORM WEAPON SUPPORT

F-15E

+F-16

F-15E

+MLRS

F-16

MLRS

F-15E

F-ill

TORNADO

B-52

B-52

B-52

B-52

GBU-15 PLSS

+MSOW +ATACMS

+CEB/MINES

GBU-15

+ATACMS ---

+DPICM

MSOW PLSS

+APAM/CBU +ATACMS

ATACMS

+M-74 ---

AGM-130B

+CEB

PLSS

+F-15

CALCM-Xh

+AUTO TGT ---

+CEB

CALCM-X

+GPS/TERCOM ---

+RAIL MINESi

CALCM-X

+GPS/LADAR ---

+WDU-25B

CALCM-X

+AUTO TGT ---

+CEB

71-.?85 () - 87 - g
202 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Notes :

a )

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

g)

h)

i)

REGIMENTAL COLUMNS and DIVISION COLUMNS are targets for attack when they

are moving on roads after exiting assembly areas .

J(S)TARS denotes the MTI surveillance capability of Joint STARS .

STANDOFF AIR ATK denotes air attack from standoff of 25-50 km, using a

weapon such as the MSOW (Modular Standoff Weapon) now under study in

NATO. This weapon would employ a dispenser and either anti-armor or APAM

submunitions.

JS(TA)RS denotes the target acquisition and attack control capabilities

of Joint STARS.

SKEET/TGSM denotes the use of either sensor-fuzed weapon or terminallyguided submunition technology, or both, for anti-armor munitions.

FTI/E-O for the IEW UAV denotes a target acquisition package on the IEW

UAV using either radar or electro-optical sensors, or both.

CHOKPT+HLTD UNIT is a target in the concept where a chokepoint is created

by attack (e.g. dropping a bridge) just prior to the arrival of an enemy

unit, which, when halted behind the chokepoint, is then itself attacked.

CALCM-X denotes a conventionally-armed air launched cruise missile,

possibly ALCM-B retired from SIOP duty and modified to have less range

with more payload. For attack of units on trains, this weapon would have

automatic target recognition (AUTO TGT) ; for bridge attack a laser radar

(LADAR) and the BULLPUP warhead (WDU-25B) would be used.

RAIL MINE denotes a mine to damage track and derail moving trains,

possibly based on a modified anti-bunker munition and a Mk-75 fuze.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987.
Appendix 12-B

Flexibility and Application of Systems

for Attacks of Follow-On Forces

The following table indicates the application of systems to the functions of FOFA operations

outlined in chapters 6 and 12. The range of applicability illustrates the flexibility of these systems,

in being able to support several different operational concepts for attacks of follow-on forces.

Many system names and acronyms are necessary for this table—they are defined in the Glossary at the end of this volume.

LEGEND :

FULL Full operational capability (expected) for specified function .

Limited Limited or partial operational capability (expected) for specified

function .

. . No operational capability ( expected) , or not applicable , for

specified function.

SOURCE : Office of Technology Assessment, 1987, [based on information supplied by sources cited in the full document].

203
204 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

5-30 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

1 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT COLUMNS*

2 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT COLUMNS*

3 MISSILE ATTACKS OF REGIMENT COLUMNS*

4 ARTILLERY ATTACK OF REGIMENT COLUMNS*

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

RS/SA SYSTEM

GR/CS

TRS

ASARS

J(S)TARS

ENSCE

ASAS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ACTIVITY CUE

PEACETIME INTEL

TA/AC SYSTEM

LANTIRN

JS(TA)RS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ASARS

WIU

GACC

AFATDS

PLATFORM

MLRS

8-INCH

F-16

F-15E

F-111

TORNADO

B-52

WEAPON

SFW

MSOW

ATACMS

MLRS/TGW

GBU-15

AGM-130B

CALCM-X

TGSM/SKEET/SADARM

CEB/DPICM

MINES

~

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

-Limite d

Limite d

- -

- -

FULL

Limite d

Limite d

.-

Limite d

Limite d

FULL

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

FULL

Limite d

- -

--

Limited

--

--

FULL

--

--

~

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

Limite d

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

FULL

Limite d

- -

Limite d

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limite d

- -

--

FULL

--

--

--

Limited

--

FULL

Limited

Limited

‘1

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

FULL

Limite d

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

- -

Limite d

FULL

- -

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

- -

- -

-.

- -

--

--

FULL

--

--

.-

--

FULL

Limited

Limited

4

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

FULL

Limite d

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

Limite d

FULL

- -

Limite d

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

- -

- -

- -

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

FULL

Limited

Limited

*Regiment is attacked when it is moving forward after exiting final assembly

area. Individual targets are battalion-sized columns within the regiment.
Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces 205

30-80 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

5 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS*

6 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS*

7 MISSILE ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS*

8 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS

9 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF REGIMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS

10 MISSILE ATTACKS OF REGIMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS

*Division is attacked when it is moving forward after exiting assembly area,

Individual targets are battalion-sized columns within the division.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

RS/SA SYSTEM

GR/CS

TRS

ASARS

J(S)TARS

ENSCE

ASAS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ACTIVITY CUE

PEACETIME INTEL

TA\AC SYSTEM

LANTIRN

JS(TA)RS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ASARS

WIU

GACC

AFATDS

PLATFORM

MLRS

8-INCH

F-16

F-15E

F-111

TORNADO

B-52

WEAPON

SFW

MSOW

ATACMS

MLRS/TGW

GBU-15

AGM-130B

CALCM-X

TGSM/SKEET/SADARM

CEB/DPICM

MINES

5

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

.-

Limited

--

--

FULL

Limited

--

--

Limited

Limited

FULL

--

--

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

Limited

--

--

Limited

--

--

FULL

Limited

Limited

6

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

--

Limited

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

Limited

FULL

Limited

--

--

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limited

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

Limited

--

FULL

FULL

Limited

7

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

--

Limited

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

Limited

FULL

--

FULL

FULL

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

--

FULL

FULL

Limited

8

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

--

Limited

--

--

FULL

Limited

--

Limited

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

--

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

Limited

--

--

Limited

--

--

--

Limited

Limited

9

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

Limited

--

--

Limited

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

--

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limited

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

Limited

--

FULL

Limited

10

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

-.

FULL

Limited

Limited

-.

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

FULL

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

FULL

Limited
206 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

80-150 KM ATTACKS OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

11 DIRECT AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS*

12 STANDOFF AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS*

13 MISSILE ATTACKS OF DIVISION COLUMNS*

14 AIR ATTACKS OF DIVISION ASSEMBLY AREAS

15 MISSILE ATTACKS OF DIVISION ASSEMBLY AREAS

*Division is attacked when it is moving towards its assembly area. Individual

targets are battalion-sized columns within the division.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

RS/SA SYSTEM

GR/CS

TRS

ASARS

J(S)TARS

ENSCE

ASAS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ACTIVITY CUE

PEACETIME INTEL

TA/AC SYSTEM

LANTIRN

JS(TA)RS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ASARS

WIU

GACC

AFATDS

PLATFORM

MLRS

8-INCH

F-16

F-15E

F-Ill

TORNADO

B-52

WEAPON

SFW

MSOW

ATACMS

MLRS/TGW

GBU-15

AGM-130B

CALCM-X

TGSM/SKEET/SADARM

CEB/DPICM

MINES

11

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

- -

FULL

Limite d

- -

- -

Limite d

Limite d

FULL

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

FULL

Limite d

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

- -

Limite d

Limite d

Limite d

12

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

--

Limited

--

--

--

FULL

--

Limited

Limited

FULL

Limited

--

--

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limited

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

Limited

-.

Limited

FULL

Limited

13

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

--

Limited

--

--

--

FULL

--

Limited

Limited

FULL

--

FULL

FULL

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

--

Limited

FULL

Limited

14

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limite d

- -

.-

FULL

- -

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

- -

FULL

Limite d

1 5

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

--

Limited

--

--

--

Limited

--

FULL

FULL

FULL

--

FULL

FULL

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

FULL

--

--

--

.-

--

FULL

Limited
Ch. 12—Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces ● 207

80-150 KM ATTACKS

(CONTINUED ) 16

17

18

19

*A chokepoint is created

arrival of an enemy unit.

RS/SA SYSTEM

GR/CS

TRS

ASARS

J(S)TARS

ENSCE

ASAS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ACTIVITY CUE

PEACETIME INTEL

TA/AC SYSTEM

LANTIRN

JS(TA)RS

AQUILA

IEW UAV/FTI-EO

ASARS

WIU

GACC

AFATDS

PLATFORM

MLRS

8-INCH

F-16

F-15E

F-ill

TORNADO

B-52

WEAPON

SFW

MSOW

ATACMS

MLRS/TGW

GBU-15

AGM-130B

CALCM-X

TGSM/SKEET/SADARM

CEB/DPICM

MINES

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

AIR ATTACK OF CHOKEPOINTS AND HALTED UNITS*

JOINT ATTACK OF CHOKEPOINTS AND HALTED UNITS*

AIR ATTACK OF COMMAND POSTS

MISSILE ATTACK OF COMMAND POSTS

by attack (e.g. dropping a bridge) just prior to the

Resulting bunches of halted vehicles are attacked.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

16

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

Limite d

Limite d

- -

- -

Ful l

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

Limite d

- -

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

FULL

Limite d

- -

-Limite d

FULL

Limite d

17

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

FULL

- -

Limite d

Limite d

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

FULL

- -

FULL

- -

- -

Limite d

FULL

Limite d

18

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

- -

- -

Limite d

- -

FULL

FULL

FULL

FULL

- -

- -

- -

FULL

FULL

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208 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

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20 AIR ATTACKS OF UNITS ON ROADS

21 CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS

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22 CRUISE MISSILE ATTACKS

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20 21 22

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Chapter 13

Summary of Recent Studies

of Follow-On Forces Attack
CONTENTS

Page

Institute for Defense Analyses FOFA Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...212

NATO Defence Research Group Panel Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..214

SHAPE Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........214

SHAPE Technical Centre Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............214

European Security Study . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............................215

U.S. Army Studies . . . . . . . *, *****-.. . .....***+*****.. ● +* **** ... ...215

Rand Corp. Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........+ .. ... ... ...216

Earlier Studies . . . . . . . ....4.... .. ... .O. ... ....W . .................217

Table

Table No. Page

13-1. Studies Reviewed by IDA in 1983 . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........218
Chapter 13

Summary of Recent Studies

of Follow-On Forces Attack

Several recent studies have considered the

broad technical, operational, and cost issues

involved in attack of follow-on forces. These

studies, summarized below, have provided essential background to this OTA assessment.1

Some studies have attempted to analyze the

effects of military improvements on a possible conventional conflict in Europe; these have

been of particular interest to OTA.

Several conclusions about FOFA are common to most or all of these previous studies:

Current NATO conventional defense capabilities are not adequate.

Improving capabilities for FOFA would

make an important and substantial contribution to NATO conventional defense

and to deterrence.

Improved FOFA should be based on attack capabilities by both aircraft and

ground-launched missiles. No study has

argued for a “pure” ground- or air-based

capability.

Improvements in FOFA capabilities

should be deployed throughout the Central Region. Improvements in the U.S. sector, if not reflected in related improvements for the other corps defending the

Central Region, would not provide sufficient enhancement to NATO’s capabilities.

Critical technologies for improved FOFA

are anti-armor munitions and stand-off

target acquisition sensors. Of particular

importance in the munitions area are sensor technology to guide munitions against

individual vehicles, and improved lethality against armored vehicles. A stand-off

sensor which several studies consider essential is the U.S. Joint Surveillance Tar-

‘Earlier studies were reviewed by the Institute for Defense

Analyses in a 1983 review summarized at the end of this chapter.

●

●

●

get Attack Radar System (Joint STARS),

which is being developed to provide wide

area surveillance and attack control capabilities against moving vehicles. Remotely

piloted vehicle (RPV)-based sensors are

also mentioned in several studies as capable of providing important capabilities.

With improved sensors and munitions,

one approach to FOFA, preferred by

nearly all the studies, is to attack enemy

combat units after they have left assembly areas and are moving byroad toward

the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT).2

Another related approach is to block

chokepoints such as river bridges just before moving units would use them, and

then attack the halted units. A third approach advocated by some studies is to

create a barrier in the enemy rear by dropping the bridges across a major river line

such as the Elbe-Vltava or the OderNeisse. Other approaches seen as less attractive include: attack of roads to delay

movement, attack of enemy command

posts to disrupt operations, and attack of

logistics.

Nearly all of the studies conclude that attacks of follow-on forces less than 100 to

150 kilometers from the FLOT should be

emphasized. This includes attacks of

follow-on regiments and divisions moving

forward from assembly areas. Attacks

within this range will have the most immediate effect on the ability of NATO’s

front line forces to maintain a successful

defense.

Before enemy combat units can be attacked, they must be located by a situation assessment process that uses sensor

data of many different types. This proc-

‘Division assembly areas are expected to be located at depths

of 70 to 150 kilometers, and regiment assembly areas at 30 to

70 kilometers.

211
212 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

. ——. - —.

ess operates on a time scale of several

hours. The enemy units must be kept under surveillance until subsequent attacks

can be made. To attack moving combat

units, the attacking forces need target

location and prediction information within

minutes before the attack. Command and

control centers must be capable of performing both these situation assessment

and attack control functions.

Some divergent views emerge in these

studies:

● One study argues against deep attack,

which is interpreted to mean beyond artillery range. Attack of follow-on regiments would fall within this range, and

would be supported.

● Another study supports for very deep attack, using conventionally armed cruise

missiles launched from B-52s over NATO

airspace. This approach would attempt to

slow the Soviet reinforcement of Warsaw

Pact forces. The resulting capability

would be useful only if there was not a long

mobilization prior to war, and thus is seen

as serving as a deterrent to a shortmobilization attack.

The individual studies reviewed by OTA are

summarized below.

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES FOFA STUDY

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)

recently completed an extensive study of

FOFA for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.3 The purpose of the project was ‘to provide an integrated conceptual structure for

assessing NATO’s defense requirements and

the detailed technical/cost information necessary for organizing and managing Department

of Defense (DoD)-wide efforts to create an effective follow-on force attack capability.”4 The

analysis considered weapon effects as well as

unit-level operations (e.g., a tactical fighter

wing attacking an enemy division), and used

a full theater-level simulation (IDA’s TACWAR model).

IDA finds that “The FOFA concept is technically feasible and potentially operational

within the 1990s,”5 with a mix of sensor and

weapons systems allowing considerable flexibility of employment. The cost, though high,

is seen as much less than the cost of armored

divisions providing equivalent capability to

halt a Warsaw Pact attack.

31nstitute for Defense Analyses, Follow-On Force Attack

(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, report R-302,

April 1986). This report is in five volumes and is referred to

hereinafter as the IDA FOFA Study.

‘IDA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. iii.

5

1DA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. ES-10.

More specifically, IDA finds that the primary technology requirement for FOFA is sensor systems capable of providing information

for situation assessment, target acquisition,

and attack control.6 Also, advances in antiarmor munition and terminal guidance technologies are considered essential. A new

ground-launched missile system (e.g., the

Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS)

for FOFA should have a range of 150 to 200

kilometers, even if used to only 50 kilometers

or so of depth, in order to provide sufficient

stand-off from the FLOT and to provide crosscorps support. In the C3 area, IDA finds that

“the situation assessment and attack control

functions must be separated and the time for

C

2 processes reduced”7 relative to current

practice.

IDA estimates a “basic system cost” at

about $20 billion. This 15-year life cycle cost

does not include weapons, which adds another

$10 billion to $30 billion. The effectiveness of

these systems, in various combinations and

employment concepts, is assessed in terms of

the average Warsaw Pact advance in 30 days

of combat (as calculated in the TACWAR

Wee app. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 3.

‘IDA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. ES-15. See app. 13-A

(vol. 2), paragraph 4.
Ch. 13—Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack 213

model). Without FOFA this advance is typically 300 kilometers; with 30 billion to 50 billion

dollars’ worth of FOFA systems the advance

could be reduced to less than 50 kilometers. s

IDA considers a broad range of options for

attacking armor. The attack strategies deemed

the best are to engage combat units (regiments

and divisions) when they are moving forward

from assembly areas. For regiments these

moves are generally within about 30 kilometers of the FLOT; for divisions, between 30 and

90 kilometers of the FLOT. These units are detected and tracked by a situation assessment

process using sensor data from many sources.

Also, a capability to distinguish truck columns

from armored columns within unit formations

can reduce the weapons requirement by one

half, and would thus be highly desirable. Attacking units in assembly areas is not deemed

effective for the cost involved.

Other types of targets are also considered.

Dropping the bridges across the Elbe and

maintaining this barrier for 10 days or more

has a good payoff, but substantial numbers

of air sorties are needed and precision delivery

is required. Attacking command posts (CPs)

is unattractive, because no means of effectively

targeting CPs is available and the delays

produced, even if CPs were destroyed, do not

noticeably affect the results of the theater

simulation.

Emphasis is given to a ground-launched missile (ATACMS). Attacking at short range

against regiments is compared to attacking

deep against divisions. The shallow attack approach is more effective at slowing the enemy

advance, but the deeper attack approach runs

less risk of saturating the firing rate or target

handling capacities. A Warsaw Pact advance

‘IDA does not argue that attrition and FLOT movement are

accurately reflected in an absolute sense in their model; rather,

the model results should be used only to compare system alternatives within the assumed constraints.

—-

can be halted with about 4,000 missiles used

shallow or about 10,000 missiles used deep.9

“Some mix of each kind of attack should be

planned so that commanders can make best

use of the situation assessment they are presented with and their own concept of operation.”0

Other weapons systems are also considered

in this study. Penetrating tactical aircraft delivery of precision guided munitions is evaluated as an effective tactic, especially after a

few days of ATACMS attacks on moving combat units, and especially with ATACMS also

used to suppress enemy air defenses. According to IDA, using about 1,800 ATACMS missiles against enemy SAMs over 30 days of

conflict can reduce aircraft attrition per sortie from about 13 percent to about 4 percent

(for attacks out to about 100 kilometers beyond the FLOT) and from 2 to 1 percent for

close air support. Upgraded artillery is also

considered for FOFA, but has the disadvantage that large numbers of rounds must be procured and deployed across the whole front in

order to have them available in sufficient quantity where and when needed. However, greatly

expanded purchase of Multiple Launch Rocket

System (MLRS) Terminally Guided Warhead

(TGW) (50,000 to 100,000 rounds in NATO)

and the use of large numbers of guided gun and

mortar rounds11 (200,000 to 400,000 rounds)

can be highly effective against the enemy attack. In fact, upgrading the artillery with these

anti-armor munitions appears to be among the

least costly options considered, and can also

improve the close-in combat capability of

NATO forces.

Whese numbers of weapons relate to usage across the entire

Central Region.

‘“IDA FOFA Study, op. cit., vol. 1, p. ES-22.

“Such rounds include the Sense and Destro~’ Armor (SADARM) artillery round for 155mm and 8 inch howitzers, and

the Guided Antiarmor Mortar Projectile (G AMP).
214 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

NATO DEFENCE RESEARCH GROUP PANEL REPORT

A panel of the NATO Defence Research

Group produced a report in mid-1985 concerning the value and costs of various approaches

to FOFA.12 It draws heavily on analyses done

by IDA and by analysis agencies in the United

Kingdom and NATO. The report of this panel

is summarized in appendix 13-A (vol. 2), paragraphs 5 through 9.

“An Analysis of the Relative Value of Attacks on Warsaw

Pact Follow-On Forces in the NATO Central Region: Report

by Panel VII/RSG.14 on the Value of Interdiction of FoUowOn Forces and the Cost-E ff~tiveness of Possible AugmentaSHAPE

Personnel at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) have also been

studying FOFA concepts and requirements.

tions of the Current Capability, Defence Research Group, Panel

on the Defence Applications of Operational Research, AC/243

D/1022, AC/243 (Panel VII) D/99, June 1985.

STUDY

A report of this work is summarized in appendix 13-A (vol. 2), paragraphs 10 through 16.

SHAPE TECHNICAL CENTRE STUDY

The SHAPE Technical Centre (STC) has sponsor, SHAPE. This effort has been reported

been conducting a study of Follow-On Forces recently, 13 and is summarized in appendix 13-

Attack in Allied Command Europe for their A (vol. 2), paragraphs 17 through 19.

‘

g

’* Results from the STC FOFA Study (Project 84-2) With 2, Issue No. 2 (Draft), ” SHAPE Technical Centre, STC

Particular Reference to the Central Region, Working Paper No. 9980/OR/S.27/86, March 1986.

INDUSTRIEANLAGEN-BETRIEBSGESELLSCHAFT STUDIES

The Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft

mbH (IABG)14 of Munich, FRG, has studied

alternatives for improving conventional defense, using analysis and simulations up to the

theater level. Unclassified discussions of some

of these studies were held with OTA personnel, and an unclassified paper by the study

leader was made available to OTA.15 This paper concludes that “there are several reasons

for not supporting the concept of combat in

141ABG is a major ~~ytic~ establishment that works for

the Ministry of Defense and for the military/aerospace interests of the FRG.

““Zum Kampf in der Tiefe, ’ Klaus Niemeyer, IABG M-SO2125/13, December 1983. “This manuscript only reflects the

personal opinion of the author and in no way represents the

official views of The Industrieanlagen-BetnebsgeseIlschaftmbH

(IABG) or the Federal German Ministry of Defence. ” However,

it is consistent with other analytical work performed at IABG.

depth.’’” One area of concern is resources: the

costs of systems will go up with effective range

and required accuracy and survivability; and

the “qualitative manpower requirement” will

go up as systems become more complex. On

both of these grounds, deep attack systems

will divert resources from other important

areas. In particular, the application of new

technologies to improve close-in defense “can

be done more efficiently, with less risk and for

less cost than battle in depth."17

The notion of deep battle considered in this

study is unclear, but it appears to emphasize

attacks well beyond the range of current artillery weapons. Thus, it is not clear whether

‘e’’Zum Kampf in der Tiefe, ” p. 15.

“Ibid.
Ch. 13—Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack 215

IABG studies would support an emphasis on within about 30 kilometers of the FLOT). It

FOFA at the nearest ranges (attacking follow- appears to OTA that this emphasis would be

on regiments during their final move forward supported by IABG.

EUROPEAN SECURITY STUDY

The European Security Study (ESECS)

sponsored by the American Academy of Arts

and Sciences has published two reports on

“Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in

Europe.” 18 19 A capability for attack of followon forces is considered necessary (among other

missions) for successful deterrence and defense. In the initial study (ESECS I) the emphasis for FOFA is on attack of fixed targets

to delay and disrupt enemy formations. In

ESECS II, attack of both chokepoints and

units on the move is considered for FOFA, but

the emphasis is still on delay and disruption

rather than on attrition. The most effective and

practicable NATO attacks would be from

about 30 to 150 kilometers from the FLOT,

but deeper attacks for special purposes (such

as destroying rail and road bridges across the

Oder-Neisse River line) could also be important. 20

Long-range conventional weapons systems

are considered critical to a successful FOFA

‘“Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe; Proposals

for the 1980s, Report of the European Security Study (ESECS)

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983).

“Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: A Program for the 1980s, European Security Study Report of the Special Panel (E SECS II), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

The Special Panel consisted of General Andrew J. Goodpaster,

General Franz-Joseph Schulze, Air Chief Marshal Sir Alasdair

Steedman, and Dr. William J. Perry. The study was supported

by the EIDM Corp.

‘

[

’ I’;SF:CS II, p, 71,

U.S. ARMY

The U.S. Army has recently completed

studies supporting both development of doctrine for Deep Attack23 and a proposed program for enhancing conventional defense

capabilities 24 that is “consistent with U.S.

“Corps Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1.

24Andj~sis of US Armj Conventional Capabilities, HQ U.S.

Army DAMO’FD, May 20, 1986.

capability .21 The suggested (or “exemplary”)

program for modernization to improve FOFA

capabilities includes ground-launched missiles

with a range of perhaps 200 to 300 kilometers,22

and stand-off weapons for air delivery with

ranges from about 10 to 150 kilometers. Both

types of weapons would dispense anti-armor

munitions such as Skeet. In addition, aircraft

would have capabilities to deliver improved

anti-armor mines (also using stand-off dispensers) and improved laser-guided weapons capable of destroying bridges. The ESECS II exemplary FOFA program procurement costs are

estimated at $5 billion (in fiscal 1984 dollars),

and the program includes 1,800 ground-launched

missiles, a total of 5,300 air-delivered dispensers of various types, and 400 laser-guided

bombs. These weapons costs are in addition

to surveillance and target acquisition system

costs. The exemplary program to improve target acquisition capabilities (for both FOFA and

close-in defense) includes procurement of five

real-time stand-off imaging radars and 48 realtime RPV-based optical systems per corps, and

associated ground stations and processing capabilities; it would cost NATO an estimated

$2.85 billion.

2’ESECS 11, p. 70.

“Specifically, the T-22 (Improved Lance) missile of the Corps

Support Weapons System then in development by the U.S.

Army is recommended. The current successor to this program

is the ATACMS program.

STUDIES

Army doctrine (AirLand Battle), NATO’s

FOFA sub-concept, and U.S. Army long-range

plans and development processes."25 The work

on deep attack doctrine included simulations

of corps operations with the CORBAN model

‘5Anal~rsis of US Arm~~ Conventional Capabilities, p. 1
216 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

developed by the Army.26 The later study of

Conventional Capabilities built on the corpslevel simulation with theater-level studies

using the Army’s CEM simulation model and

IDA’s TACWAR simulation model.

The Deep Attack study focuses on the objective of disrupting the enemy’s attack

“tempo.” 27 According to this new Army doctrine, attacks against follow-on forces should

employ a “decide, detect, deliver” approach. 28

This approach has separate situation assessment/planning and target acquisition/engagement phases. Battle planning, including decisions to commit resources to deep attacks, is

accomplished at the corps headquarters using

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

(IPB) and fusion of data from a number of

sources. The planning is oriented toward time

blocks of 4 to 6 hours. Engagement opportunities are predicted some 12 to 36 hours ahead,

and sensor and attack systems are tasked to

coordinate operations for attacks in the appropriate time blocks.29 Sensors are then focused

to detect predicted enemy activity in the

preplanned target area.

The detection of this activity, and its subsequent confirmation (if necessary), serves to

trigger the planned attack process, using either ground-launched missiles or offensive air

support (OAS) provided by tactical aircraft.30

2’CORBAN was developed by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Studies and Analysis Activity (TRASANA),

supported by the BDM Corp.

2“Corp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. 2-13. See app. 13-A

(vol. 2), paragraph 20 for certain details.

‘8Corp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-2.

‘gCorp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-6,8.

‘°Corp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-9,1O.

Appropriate sensors for this function include

Joint STARS, PLSS, the Tactical Reconnaissance System (TRS), Guardrail Common Sensor system, and the corps Intelligence and

Electronic Warfare (IEW) RPV system.31

Then, when the weapons are prepared and the

target is properly oriented, the sensor provides

final target location update to the attacking

unit and the weapon is launched or released.32

In its broader study of conventional enhancements, the Army found that a balanced investment in close and deep combat capabilities was

optimal. The deep attack systems considered

included the ATACMS, and Joint STARS and

other sensors.33 Improved anti-armor munitions for artillery and rocket systems, such as

MLRS/TGW and SADARM, were included in

close combat systems. This approach, of making current forces more capable, was considered preferable to other possible approaches,

including increasing NATO’s combat forces,

creating barrier defenses in the FRG, deploying light infantry or militia-based area defenses, or maintaining a posture of counterinvasion to deter aggression. The conventional

enhancements proposed by the Army involve

accelerating the development and procurement

of the indicated systems (and others) such that

they can be fielded by 1993.34

‘lCorp Deep Operations, FC 100-15-1, p. B-9.

szcert~n weapons ~d sensor requirements are summarized

in app. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 21.

330ther sensors included the Guardrail Common Sensor and

the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (UAV/IE W). In addition, the Army component of the Joint

Tactical Fusion program, the All Source Analysis System

(ASAS) was listed as a deep battle system.

siThe enhancement Pro=m for FOFA is summarized in aPP.

13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 22.

RAND CORP. STUDIES

The Rand Corp. has several studies under- ered include several ways of attacking followway for the U.S. Air Force, considering vari- on forces.

ous aspects of conventional defense of Europe.

One such effort focuses on intelligence support Another Rand study is analyzing a concept

for a range of operations concepts to support for deep attack of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces

the defense of Europe.35 The concepts consid- using conventionally armed cruise missiles

for Effective Defense of Central Europe, ” briefed to OTA staff

““A Critical Time Evaluation of USAF Intelligence Support and FOFA Study Advisory Panel, June 18, 1986.
Ch. 13—Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack ● 217

launched from B-52s.36 Both studies have been

presented to OTA in briefings, but reports have

not yet been published. These studies assess

the feasibility of several operations concepts

and the value of carrying out such attacks

against Warsaw Pact forces. The latter study

includes a theater-level simulation to quantify

the value of such attacks in terms of the overall ground war.

The first study finds several approaches attractive for attacking follow-on forces, because

the United States is expected to have substantial end-to-end capability to attack worthwhile

targets. These attractive approaches include:

●

●

●

attack of second-echelon regiments moving to battle from their final assembly

areas, which are 30 to 50 kilometers behind the FLOT;

attack of maneuver elements of follow-on

divisions moving forward on roads about

30 to 250 kilometers behind the FLOT;

and

attack of follow-on division elements

queued up behind blocked chokepoints, 30

to 250 kilometers behind the FLOT.

Approaches that are considered marginal or

unattractive include:

. attack of division elements while halted

in assembly areas,

• attack of bridges to create a north-south

barrier at major rivers, and

• attack of divisions moving toward assem-

““ Interdiction of the Soviet Armies With B-52s, ” briefing

by (;.1.. Donohue, Rand Corp., to OTA Staff, 19 August 1986.

bly areas on roads more than 250 kilometers beyond the IGB.37

The second Rand study sets forth a concept

for interdicting Soviet divisions moving by rail.

The concept uses B-52s based in the United

States to launch conventionally armed longrange cruise missiles from friendly airspace

deep into the Warsaw Pact rear. These weapons deliver mines that will damage trains at

given points in the rail net and cause links in

the rail net to be closed for periods of time.

Similar weapons are also used to drop key rail

and road bridges. The total effect of these attacks is estimated to reduce by 50 percent the

quantity of forces arriving at the FLOT during the 2 to 3 weeks of the attacks.

The resulting reduction in forces available

to the enemy is analyzed in a theater-level

simulation. Although the proposed improvement in capability is not sufficient to stabilize the FLOT near the IGB, it is seen as making an important contribution to NATO’s

defense. One limitation of this approach is that

it would not be as effective if, prior to war, there

were a Warsaw Pact mobilization long enough

for follow-on Soviet armies to move forward

to western Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East

Germany. However, it is argued that this long

mobilization scenario would be the best case

for NATO. From this perspective, the proposed

deep attack capability can be viewed as a deterrent against a short mobilization attack,

which is seen as the greatest threat to NATO.

“See app. 13-A (vol. 2), paragraph 24 for other approaches

considered for FOFA.

EARLIER STUDIES

In late 1983 IDA published a review of Of 77 studies surveyed at that time, 20 were

earlier studies of issues relating to FOFA.38 selected for review and summary. These se-

‘“lnterdicting 1%’arsaw Pact Second Echelon Forces–A Re- lected studies are listed in table 13-1. The re-

\riewr of Selected Studies, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1 DA

Paper P-1 731, october 1983. Referred to below as IDA 1983

suiting summary of results is discussed in apReview. pendix 13-A (vol. 2), paragraphs 25 through 30.
218 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Table 13-1 .–Studies Reviewed by IDA in 1983

Date Author Title

1981

1980

1979

1982

1981

1981

1982

1979

1976

1982

1981

1981

1981

1980

1983

1981

1981

1981

1980

1979

U.S. Air Force

Scientific Advisory Board

Directorate of Aerospace Studies

Tactical Fighter Weapons Center

U.S. Army

CSWS Special Task Force

Field Artillery School

Concepts Analysis Agency

Other U.S. Government Studies

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Accounting Office

Defense Science Board

NATO and European Organizations

SHAPE (NATO)

Defence Research Group (NATO)

Defence Research Group (NATO)

Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (U. K.)

Advisory Group for Aerospace

Research and Development

(NATO)

Other Analytical Studies

IDA

The Rand Corp.

The Rand Corp.

The BDM Corp.

QUEST Research Corp.

The BDM Corp.

Non-Nuclear Armament

Employment of Antiarmor Munitions Against 2nd Echelon Moving Armor

Joint Close Air Support/Battlefield Interdiction Mission Area Analysis

Corps Support Weapon System Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (Preliminary)

Fire Support Mission Area Analysis

Forward of the FEBA Weapon System Cost Benefit Study, Phase I and

Phase II

JCS Interdiction Study

Progress in Strengthening Interdiction Capabilities in the NATO Central

Region

Summer Study on Conventional Counter Force Against a Pact Attack

SHAPE Study to Attack and Destroy Second Echelon Forces

Interdiction—An Aspect of Air Campaign in the 1990s

Implications of New Technologies for Land Operations in the NATO Central Region

UK Analyses Related to the Value of Attacks on Second Echelon Forces

Project 2,000 Overview

Indirect Fire Support, Phase I and II

Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Tactical Rear: Summary Report

Air Interdiction: Lessons from Past Campaigns

The Military Utility of Delaying and Disrupting Warsaw Pact Second Echelon Forces

Historical Effects of an Interdiction Campaign

Holding Pact Second Echelon Forces at Risk

SOURCE IDA 1983 Review, tables 1 and 2
Glossary of Terms

and Acronyms
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

8-INCH: Used in this report to denote a U.S. Army

artillery gun which fires 8-inch diameter shells.

A300: Model designation of a jet transport aircraft

made by Airbus Industrie, a consortium of Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German, and Spanish companies.

A-7: The Corsair 11 light attack aircraft, produced

in several versions for the U.S. Navy and Air

Force and other nations. The Air Force is developing improved avionics and engines (for longer

range) to upgrade its A-7s to a version unofficially called the “A-7 +.”

AAA: Anti-aircraft artillery.

ACE: Allied Command Europe.

Activity Cue: As used in this report, indication of

enemy movement provided by a surveillance or

reconnaissance system, used for planning an

attack.

ACV: armored combat vehicle. A tank, armored

fighting vehicle (AFV), armored personnel carrier (Ape), armored cavalry vehicle, self-propelled

artillery piece, or a mobile surface-to-air missile

launcher.

ADAM: Area Denial Artillery Mine. A scatterable

antipersonnel mine produced for the U.S. Army.

A 155mm artillery shell can dispense 36 ADAMs.

ADDS: Army Data Distribution System. A data

communications system now being procured by

the U.S. Army to provide timely secure communications among corps commanders, their intelligence, fire support, and other staffs which

would plan deep attacks, and the surface-to-surface missile batteries and tactical aircraft which

would perform deep attacks. ADDS includes

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

(JTIDS) terminals, Enhanced Position Location

Reporting System (EPLRS) terminals, and net

control stations. Formerly called PJH [PLRSJTIDS Hybrid].

ADT: MICNS Air Data Terminal for the Aquila

RPV; the Aquila uses an ADT to receive commands from, and transmit television imagery to,

a MICNS Remote Ground Terminal (RGT) of

a TADARS Ground Control Station (GCS). See

MICNS, TADARS.

ADU: Air defense unit.

AFATDS: Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data

System. A U.S. Army follow-onto the TACFIRE

artillery fire control system.

AFV: Armored fighting vehicle.

AGB: Autonomous Guided Bomb. A glide bomb

in preliminary development by the Air Force,

to be capable of recognizing and steering toward

a vulnerable point on a fixed target.

AGM: Air-to-ground missile.

AGM-65: The Maverick air-to-ground missile (any

of several versions: AGM-65A/B/D/E/F/G),

AGM-65A: TV-guided Maverick. [In inventory]

AGM-65B: TV-guided Maverick with greater magnification for use against smaller targets or at

longer range. [In inventory]

AGM-65D: IR-guided Maverick for use at night or

in adverse weather. [Being procured]

AGM-65E: Laser-guided Maverick for U.S. Marine

Corps. [Being procured]

AGM-65F: Navy Maverick. Anti-shipping–IRguided with alternate warhead and selectabledelay fuze. [In development]

AGM-65G: “Alternate Warhead Maverick. ” A

modified AGM-65F with a heavier warhead for

use against ships, armored vehicles, and overburdened fixed targets. [In advanced development]

AGM-88A: The HARM High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (q.v.).

AGM-130: A short-range, rocket-powered, air-toground missile derived from the GBU-15. The

AGM-130A uses a unitary 2,000-lb Mk-84 warhead. The AGM-130B, which is not presently

funded, is a version of this weapon with a submunitions dispenser as the payload.

AI: Air interdiction. A tactical air mission.

Air Attack: As used in tables in this report, an operational concept using penetrating tactical aircraft (TACAIR) as weapons platforms. Direct

air attack uses TACAIR flying directly over, or

within sight of, the target. Stand-off air attack

uses a weapon such as the Modular Stand-off

Weapon (MSOW) launched by tactical aircraft

at a standoff (distance) of 25 to 50 km from the

target.

ALB: AirLand Battle. U.S. Army doctrine (endorsed by the U.S. Air Force as appropriate) for

the conduct of Army operations.

ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile.

AMS: Airborne Mission Subsystem of the Aquila

RPV.

AMTI: Airborne moving-target indicating (radar

system). Detects and indicates objects (e.g., vehicles) moving with respect to the ground.

AN/TPQ-37: “Firefinder” radar system for tracking missiles and projectiles to locate missile

launchers and artillery batteries.

AOI: (1) Area of interest: in NATO and U.S. Army

doctrine, the area including, but extending be221
222 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

yond, a commander’s area of responsibility

(AOR, q.v.), in which the commander must monitor enemy activity which could affect the future situation in his AOR; (2) Area of influence:

the area in which a tactical commander has a

capability to fight the enemy.

AOR: Area of responsibility. A specific zone or sector assigned to a commander in which he is responsible for fighting the enemy. Also called

area of operational responsibility in NATO

doctrine, and area of operations in U.S. Army

doctrine.

APAM: Anti-personnel anti-materiel. A type of

submunition usually designed as a small grenade or bomblet that damages unarmored vehicles and people. Examples are the Army M-74

grenade and the Air Force BLU-61 and BLU63 bomblets.

APGM: Autonomous Precision-Guided Munition

for 155mm artillery.

Aquila: U.S. Army-developed remotely piloted

vehicle.

ARDS: Airborne Radar Demonstrator System, A

NATO project to make certain U. S., British, and

French airborne ground-surveillance radar systems compatible.

ARIA: Advanced Range Instrumentation Aircraft. A modified Boeing 707 jet transport (designated EC-18B) used by the U.S. Air Force.

ARM: Anti-radiation missile.

Artillery Attack: An operational concept using

artillery guns or rocket-launchers as weapons

platforms.

ASAC: All-Source Analysis Center, which supports the intelligence function at division and

corps tactical operations centers.

ASARS: Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (specifically, ASARS 11). A U.S. Air Force

high-resolution ground-surveillance imaging radar system, which can detect stationary objects.

The ASARS 11 can be carried by the highaltitude, long-endurance TR-1 aircraft.

ASAS: All-Source Analysis System. An intelligence

fusion system being developed by the U.S. Army.

Both the ASAS and the U.S. Air Force’s Enemy

Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) are being

developed under the Joint Tactical Fusion (JTF)

program and will use some common equipment.

ASIC: All-Source Intelligence Center.

Assault Breaker: A technology development program sponsored by the U.S. Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in which

T-16 (Patriot) and T-22 (Lance) missiles were

guided, by the Joint STARS-like Pave Mover

airborne radar and weapon guidance system, to

concentrations of armored vehicles, where they

dispensed Skeet sensor-fuzed smart submunitions.

ASTOR: Airborne STand-Off Radar (formerly

called CASTOR: Corps Airborne STand-Off Radar). Either of two airborne ground-surveillance

radar systems developed for the British Ministry of Defence. ASTOR-C indicates fixed targets; ASTOR-I indicates moving targets.

AT-2: A scatterable mine being developed by the

Federal Republic of Germany for MLRS rockets.

ATACMS: Army Tactical Missile System. A ballistic missile currently in development by the

U.S. Army. ATACMS missiles will be launched

from unmodified MLRS launchers.

ATAF: Allied Tactical Air Force (of NATO).

ATARS: Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance

System (also called Follow-On Tactical Reconnaissance System). A program to develop a TV

camera and digital data link for use on either

manned aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles.

ATDL: Adaptive Targeting Data Link. A proposed

radio data link which could transmit target location data from Joint STARS or PLSS aircraft

to weapon delivery platforms such as F-16 fighter

aircraft equipped with ATDL equipment or possibly to advanced weapons—such as ballistic or

cruise missiles-which could be equipped with

ATDL equipment.

ATF: Advanced-Technology Fighter being developed for the U.S. Air Force.

ATR: Automatic target recognition.

AUTO TGT: A notional automatic target recognition capability for attack of units on trains

using CALCM-X.

AVSCOM: Aviation Systems Command of the

U.S. Army.

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System

(E-3A/B/C) used by the U.S. Air Force and

NATO.

B-52: A heavy bomber operated by the U.S. Strategic Air Command.

BAI: Battlefield air interdiction. A tactical air

mission.

BICES: Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System, a NATO project.

BL775: A British anti-armor cluster weapon.

BMP: A Soviet-made infantry combat vehicle.

BN-2T: A twin-turboprop aircraft (the Turbine Islander) made by Pilatus Britten-Norman; see

Turbine Islander.

BTR: A series of Soviet-made armored personnel

carriers. Some are used for command, control,

and communications.

Buccaneer: A British fighter-bomber.
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms ● 223 — —.

Bullpup: U.S. Air Force AGM-12C commandguided weapon, designed to attack hard fixed

targets. It includes a WDU-25B 974-pound

warhead.

Bundeswehr: The West German Army.

C2 (or C’): Command and control.

C3 (or C’): Command, control, and communications.

C3I (or C3I): Command, control, communications,

and intelligence.

CALCM-X: An acronym used in this report for a

proposed conventionally armed, air-launched

cruise missile, possibly ALCM-Bs retired from

SIOP duty and modified to carry more payload

to a shorter range.

CASTOR: Corps Airborne STand-Off Radar. Now

called ASTOR (q.v. ).

CBU: Cluster Bomb Unit. A class of Air Force

weapons consisting of a dispenser filled with

(usually 200 to 600) bomblets, designed to attack an area target by dispersing the bomblets.

CEB: Combined Effects Bomblet. U.S. Air Force

submunition (denoted BLU-97/B)

CEM: Combined Effects Munition. U.S. Air Force

weapon (denoted CBU-87/B) consisting of a TMD

containing 202 CEB bomblets. CEM weighs 945

lbs, can be carried by F-16, F-Ill, and F-15E

aircraft, and is effective against personnel and

unarmored and light armor targets.

CENTAG: Central Army Group of NATO’s Allied

Command, Europe.

Central Region: The region for which NATO’s Allied Command, Europe, is responsible, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

CGF: Central Group of Forces. Soviet Forces stationed in Czechoslovakia, consisting of about

five divisions.

Chicken Little: A joint Army-Air Force program

for testing advanced anti-armor munitions.

CHOKPT: A contraction used in this report for

“chokepoint an obstacle to the advance of

Warsaw Pact forces, either preexisting (e.g., a

bridge) or created by NATO forces (e.g., a mined

road).

CINC: Commander-in-Chief

CINCENT: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces,

Central Europe

CINCNORTH: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces,

Northern Europe

CL289: An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) made

in Canada.

CLGP: Cannon-launched guided projectile.

CMAG: Cruise Missile–Advanced Guidance. A

program to develop sensors (LADAR, MMW,

and SAR) and software for automatic target recognition and precision terminal guidance of

cruise missiles.

CNAD: Conference of National Armaments Directors of NATO.

COCOM, CoCom: Coordinating Committee on

Multilateral Export Controls.

COMINT: Communications intelligence. Information gained from intercepting enemy electronic

communications signals, either voice or message.

Command Posts: Groups of trucks and lightly armored vehicles used by commanders of Warsaw

Pact regiments, divisions, and armies, and their

staffs; possible targets for attacks against follow-on forces.

Compass Call: Air Force EC-130 aircraft designed

for jamming enemy radio communications.

Copperhead: The M712 cannon-launched guided

projectile, a U.S. Army 155mm artillery shell

that homes on a target illuminated by a laser

designator.

Copperhead 11: A developmental autonomously

guided artillery projectile which does not require

that its target be designated (i.e., illuminated)

by a laser. A Copperhead II shell would be made

by replacing the laser seeker of an M712 Copperhead shell with an autonomous seeker now

in development.

CP: Command post.

CPS: Central Processing Subsystem (of PLSS).

Cruise Missile Atk: An operational concept using

cruise missiles launched from airborne platforms

(in friendly airspace) to penetrate and attack targets deep in the Warsaw Pact rear.

DAACM: Direct Airfield Attack Combined Munition.

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency. An agency of the U.S. Department of

Defense.

D-Day: As used here, hypothetically, the day on

which NATO is overtly invaded or attacked by

Warsaw Pact forces. In general, the first day

of a real or hypothetical war or a military operation during a war.

DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik: East Germany. Also GDR: German Democratic Republic.

DF: (Radio) Direction-Finding.

DGSM: Down-sized Ground Station Module for

Joint STARS.

DIRECT AIR ATK: See AIR ATTACK.

DIV: Division.

DIV ASSY AREAS: Division assembly areas, also

known as “concentration areas, ” for Warsaw

Pact divisions. These areas are usually within

the range band of 80 to 150 km from the FLOT.
224 New Technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Assembly areas are large enough that the density of vehicles is relatively low, and are chosen

by the Warsaw Pact forces to take maximum

advantage of cover and concealment.

Division Columns: Groups of vehicles moving on

roads, which comprise a division on the march.

The actual groupings of vehicles are usually

battalion-sized, about 40 to 60 vehicles per

column, with spacing between columns using

the same road.

DME: Distance-measuring equipment. Radionavigation equipment consisting of transponder

units and interrogator units which can determine how far away the transponders are. In

some radionavigation systems, such as that

used by PLSS, the interrogator units are carried by aircraft and the transponder units are

at surveyed locations on the ground. In other

radionavigation systems, the transponder units

are carried by aircraft and the interrogator units

are at surveyed locations on the ground.

DNA: Defense Nuclear Agency. An agency of the

U.S. Department of Defense.

DOA: Direction of arrival. A technique for determining the direction from which a radio signal

is being received—i.e., the direction toward the

radio transmitter.

DoD: U.S. Department of Defense.

DPC: Defence Planning Committee (of NATO). It

is composed of the representatives of member

countries participating in NATO’s integrated

military structure. The DPC meets at either the

Ambassadorial or Ministerial (Defense Minister)

level.

DPICM: Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional

Munition. An APAM munition used in artillery

shells and rockets.

DRG: Defence Research Group (of NATO).

E-3: The AWACS Airborne Warning and Control

System. A modified Boeing 707 jet transport

carrying air surveillance radar and communications equipment. Several models (E-3A/B/C) are

currently used by the U.S. Air Force and NATO.

E-8A: The Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar

System (Joint STARS). A modified Boeing 707

jet transport carrying aground surveillance radar and communications equipment. In development for the U.S. Air Force.

EC-18B: The Advanced Range Instrumentation

Aircraft (ARIA). A modified Boeing 707 jet

transport used by the U.S. Air Force.

ECCM: Electronic counter-countermeasures.

ECM: Electronic countermeasures.

EF-111A: An Air Force airborne jamming system

for jamming radars; also called “Raven.”

EFP: Explosively formed penetrator. A type of

anti-armor munition.

ELINT: Electronics intelligence. Intelligence obtained by interception of non-communications

signals (e.g., radar signals).

ELS: Emitter Location System. An upgrade which

would allow PLSS to locate non-pulsed emitters.

ENSCE: Enemy Situation Correlation Element.

An intelligence fusion system being developed

by the U.S. Air Force. Both the ENSCE and the

U.S. Army’s All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)

are being developed under the Joint Tactical Fusion (JTF) program and will use some common

equipment.

EO, or E-O: Electro-optical. Employing vacuum

tubes or semiconductor devices to convert optical (visible, ultraviolet, or infrared) radiation into

electrical currents, to serve as a TV camera.

Epervier: A Belgian remotely piloted vehicle used

for reconnaissance.

EPLRS: Enhanced Position Location Reporting

System, a component of ADDS.

ERAM: Extended-Range Antiarmor Mine, partially developed, then abandoned, by the U.S.

Air Force.

ESD: (1) Electronic Systems Division of the U.S.

Air Force Systems Command; (2) Electronique

Serge-Dassault, a French electronic systems

manufacturer.

ESECS: European Security Study. A study of options for increasing the combat capability, and

hence the presumed deterrent effect, of NATO’s

non-nuclear forces in Europe. The study was

sponsored by the American Academy of Arts

and Sciences; its findings were published in two

reports known as ESECS I and ESECS 11.

ESM: Electronic warfare support measures. Radio

direction-finding and signals intelligence (COMINT

and ELINT) activities performed in support of

electronic warfare (jamming, etc.).

EW: Electronic warfare.

F-4: The Phantom fighter-bomber; developed in the

United States; also used by the Federal Republic of Germany.

F-4G: The version of the F-4 fighter designed and

equipped to attack enemy air defenses, dubbed

the “Wild Weasel. ”

F-15: The top-line air superiority fighter of the U.S.

Air Force, dubbed the “Eagle.”

F-15E: The ground-attack version of the F-15 Eagle, dubbed the “Strike Eagle, ” now in devel-
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . 225

opment by the U.S. Air Force. The primary mission of the F-15E will be air interdiction.

F-16: The dual-role (air- and ground-attack) fighter

of the U.S. Air Force and several other NATO

countries, dubbed the “Fighting Falcon. ”

F-ill: A U.S. Air Force long range interdiction

aircraft.

FARRP: Forward area re-arming and refueling

point, for helicopters.

FBA: Fighter bomber aircraft.

FEBA: Forward edge of the battle area. The approximate line along which opposing ground

forces are in contact; compare FLOT (q.v.).

Firefinder: A tactical radar system (designated

AN/TPQ-37) used by the U.S. Army for tracking missiles and projectiles to locate missile

launchers and artillery batteries.

FLIR: Forward-Looking InfraRed. A TV-like camera sensitive to the infrared radiation emitted

by all (especially warm) objects; useful at night

and less affected by fog, smoke, or haze than TV.

FLOT: Forward line of own troops. Unlike a FEBA

(q.v.), a FLOT (e.g., Inner-German border) can

exist in peacetime.

FOG: Fiber-optic gyro. In development for missile

inertial attitude reference and navigation systems.

FOG-M: Fiber-Optic Guided Missile. In development for the U.S. Army.

FRG: Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

front: A Soviet command echelon above “army.”

FSCL: Fire support coordination line. A line established at approximately the range of fire of

NATO artillery, or about 25 to 35 km into enemy

area across the FLOT.

FSD: Full-Scale Development.

FTI: Fixed target indicator. A type of radar useful for surveillance of stationary objects such

as shelters or parked vehicles.

fusion: Combining intelligence information from

multiple sensors or disciplines (e.g., SIGINT and

IMINT) to assist interpretation.

GACC: Ground Attack Control Capability (or Center). For controlling air attack of ground targets,

now under development by the U.S. Air Force.

GAMP: Guided Antiarmor Mortar Projectile. Partially developed, then abandoned, by the U.S.

Army.

Gator: Air delivered anti-tank and anti-personnel

mines.

GBU-15: A Glide Bomb Unit, which is “thrown”

by an attacking aircraft and guided toward the

target from the aircraft, but which has no propulsion of its own. The GBU-15 weighs 2,500

lbs, including the Mk-84 2,000-lb warhead, and

can be carried by the F-4, F-111, and F-15E

(when available).

GDR: German Democratic Republic. East Germany. Also DDR: Deutsche Demokratische

Republik.

GPS: Global Positioning System. A system by

which a user vehicle can determine its position

on the ground to high accuracy. GPS will use

a constellation of NAVSTAR satellites to allow

a terminal on the vehicle to compute its location in earth-fixed coordinates.

GR/CS: GUARDRAIL/Common Sensor. An upgrade to GUARDRAIL.

GSFG: Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.

GSM: Ground Station Module. A mobile ground

station being developed by Motorola for the U.S.

Army for use with the Joint STARS airborne

radar system.

GUARDRAIL: A communications intelligence

system.

hard: Highly resistant to damage by weapon effects (e.g., blast), either by design or inadvertently,

harden: To make highly resistant to damage by

weapon effects.

hardened: Highly resistant, by design, to damage

by weapon effects.

HARM: The AGM-88A High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile. An air-launched missile used by the

Navy and Air Force to attack radar antennas

by homing on the signals they emit.

HAVE QUICK: An Army-Air Force program to

provide or upgrade the jam resistance of certain

tactical radios.

Heron-26: An Italian-made remotely piloted vehicle which can be used for reconnaissance.

HLTD UNIT: a contraction used in tables in this

report to denote a halted enemy unit which is

the target of an attack against follow-on forces.

HTM: Hard Target Munition. A bomb being developed by the Air Force to attack hard fixed

targets (e.g., bunkers).

HVM: Hypervelocity Missile. An air-launched antiarmor missile being developed for the U.S. Air

Force. It will use CO, laser command guidance

and kill by kinetic energy.

IABG: Industrieanlagen Betriebs GmbH (Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung). A West German corporation which performs research, development, and operations analysis for the West

German Ministry of Defense and for West German industries.

IADL: Interoperable Air Data Link. IDL equipment carried by TR-1 aircraft used as Precision

Location Strike System (PLSS) platforms.

IAM: Inertially-Aided Munition. A developmental glide-bomb program.

ICM: Improved Conventional Munition, An APAM
226 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

munition used in artillery shells and rockets.

Also called DPICM: Dual-Purpose ICM.

IDA: Institute for Defense Analyses (Alexandria,

Virginia).

IDL: Interoperable Data Link. A radio data link

used by the Precision Location Strike System

(PLSS).

IEPG: Independent European Programme Group,

composed of European members of NATO.

IEW UAV: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. One of the family of

UAVs proposed for development by the U.S.

Army.

IFF: Identification–friend or foe. A system for

identifying aircraft as friendly or other (foe or

neutral) e.g., using coded radio signals.

IGB: Inner-German border. The boundary between

West and East Germany. Sometimes called the

inter-German border.

IGDL: Interoperable Ground Data Link. Groundbased IDL radio equipment used by the Precision Location Strike System to communicate

with IADL radio equipment on TR-1 aircraft.

IIR: Imaging infra-red (adj.). Using a TV-like camera which is sensitive to long-wavelength infrared radiation and can “see” in the dark and,

to some extent, through fog.

IITS: Intra-Theater Imagery Transmission System. A facsimile system used by U.S. forces in

Europe.

IMINT: Image (or imagery) intelligence. Intelligence

obtained from photographic imagery, electrooptical imagery, radar imagery, or other types

of imagery (e.g., radiometric).

INF: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

IPB: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

IR: Infrared. Electromagnetic radiation having

wavelengths longer than those of visible light

but shorter than those of radio waves (i.e.,

0.0007 to 1 millimeter).

I

2R: Imaging infrared. See IIR.

IRTGSM: Infrared Terminally-Guided Submunition.

Islander: A twin-engine aircraft made by Pilatus

Britten-Norman in both piston and turbine versions. See Turbine Islander.

Jaguar: A British aircraft used for reconnaissance.

Joint Attack: An operational concept using both

ground- and air-launched weapons. For example,

an air-launched weapon (GBU-15) could be used

to destroy a bridge and create a chokepoint, and

ground-launched missiles (ATACMS) could be

used to attack units that halted and bunched

up at the destroyed bridge.

Joint STARS: Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System. A developmental airborne radar

system carried on E-8A aircraft intended to

locate moving (and certain fixed) targets on the

ground and to control attacks against such targets using tactical aircraft or guided missiles.

JSTARS: See Joint STARS.

J(S)TARS: Used here to denote the MTI surveillance capability of Joint STARS (q.v.).

JS(TA)RS: Used hereto denote the target acquisition and attack control capabilities of Joint

STARS (q.v.).

JTF: Joint Tactical Fusion.

JTFP: Joint Tactical Fusion Program.

JTIDS: Joint Tactical Information Distribution

System. A joint (U.S. Navy/U.S. Air Force) jamresistant radio system used to send digital messages between aircraft and between aircraft and

ground stations.

KB-44: A small shaped-charge anti-armor submunition developed to be dispensed from the

MW-1.

LADAR: Laser Detection And Ranging. A system

for determining the position of an object using

visible-wavelength radiation, analogous to radar (which uses radio-wavelength radiation).

Lance: The T-22 dual-capable (nuclear or conventional) missile used by NATO corps.

LANTIRN: Low-Altitude Navigation/Targeting

InfraRed for Night. A system designed to give

tactical aircraft low-altitude all-weather navigation and targeting capabilities.

LCS: Low-Cost Seeker (for the HARM High-speed

Anti-Radiation Missile). Under development by

the Navy and the Air Force. Also called LowCost Anti-Radiation Seeker.

LOC: Lines of communication.

LOC-E: Limited Operational Capability-Europe: a

U.S. intelligence fusion system in Europe, derived from the Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) testbed.

LOCPOD: Low-Cost Powered Off-boresight Dispenser: NATO development project for airlaunched standoff submunition dispenser.

LPI: Low probability of interception.

LRSOM: Long-Range Standoff Missile: a proposed

long-range cruise missile being considered in a

tri-national feasibility study by the United

States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal

Republic of Germany.

Luftwaffe: Air Force [viz., “air weapon”] of the

Federal Republic of Germany.

M-74: An Army APAM submunition to be used

in ATACMS missiles for attack of unarmored

targets.

Martel: A British TV-guided bomb.
.. —

MASINT: Measurement and signature intelligence

—e.g., a measurement of a target’s closing velocity obtained using moving target indicating

(MTI) radar.

Maverick: A guided short-range air-to-ground antiarmor missile used by the U.S. Air Force (designated AGM-65, q.v. ).

MICOM: U.S. Army Missile Command.

MICNS: Modular Integrated Communications and

Navigation System—used by the Target Acquisition Designation Aerial Reconnaissance System (TADARS).

MIFF: An air-delivered anti-tank mine made in the

Federal Republic of Germany to be dispensed

by MW-1 dispensers on Tornado aircraft.

Mine: A destructive device detonated after its emplacement, usually by some action of its target.

Mirach-100: An Italian-made remotely piloted vehicle which can be used for reconnaissance.

Mirage 5: A Belgian aircraft used for reconnaissance.

Missile Attack: An operational concept using groundlaunched missiles such as ATACMS.

Mk-82: A general-purpose 500-lb bomb.

Mk-84: A general-purpose 2,000-lb bomb.

MLRS: Multiple Launch Rocket System. An artillery system now in procurement by the U.S.

Army and several other NATO nations.

MLRS/TGW: Terminally Guided Warhead for

MLRS. An anti-armor TGSM, now in development by the U.S. Army.

MMW: Millimeter-wave. Sensing or using electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths between

one millimeter and one centimeter.

MNC: Major NATO Commander (SACEUR,

SACLANT, or CINCHAN).

Mohawk: A U.S. Army airborne ground-surveillance radar system carried by OV-1D aircraft.

MOS: Military Occupational Specialty designations used by the U.S. Army.

Moving Columns: Groups of vehicles moving on

roads as part of a combat unit on the march.

The actual groupings of vehicles are usually

battalion-sized, about 40 to 60 vehicles per column, with spacing between columns using the

same road.

MPS: Mission Payload System for the Aquila

RPV.

MR: Motorized rifle.

MSC: Major Subordinate Commander (e.g., CINCENT, CINCNORTH)

MSOW: Modular Stand-Off Weapon. An air-launched

weapon now in concept development in NATO.

This weapon would provide 25 to 50 km of standGlossary of Terms and Acronyms . 227

off, and would employ a dispenser and either

anti-armor or APAM submunitions.

MTI: Moving target indicator. A type of radar useful for surveillance of moving objects such as

aircraft or ground vehicles.

MW-1: Multipurpose Weapon, a submunition dispenser made in the Federal Republic of Germany

for the Tornado aircraft; it can dispense several

types of submunitions.

NAA: North Atlantic Assembly. An organization

composed of selected members of the parliaments of NATO member nations.

NAAG: National Army Armaments Group (of

NATO).

NGF: Northern Group of Forces. Soviet Forces stationed in Poland, consisting of about two divisions.

NIS: NATO Identification System. An IFF system being considered for adoption by NATO.

NORTHAG: Northern Army Group of NATO’s Allied Command Europe.

NIMROD: An airborne early warning system developed in the United Kingdom for the Ministry of Defense. The United Kingdom has since

decided to procure U.S. E-3 AWACS aircraft

instead.

NSWP: Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact,

O&C: Operations and control (for Joint STARS).

OLA: Off-loading area.

OMG: Operational Maneuver Group.

ON WPN: On weapon. Used here to describe autonomous target acquisition systems installed

on weapons (e.g., cruise missiles).

ORCHIDEE: Observatoire Radar Coherent Heliporte d’Investigation Des Elements Ennemis.

A developmental French airborne ground-surveillance radar system which will be carried by

Super Puma helicopters to indicate moving

targets.

OV-1D: The U.S. Army “Mohawk’ observation aircraft equipped with an airborne ground-surveillance radar system.

OUSDRE: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Engineering, in the U.S. Department of Defense.

Patriot: A modern surface-to-air missile system

used by the U.S. Army in Europe; it uses a

phased-array radar and fires T-16 missiles.

Pave Mover: An experimental airborne radar and

weapon guidance system carried by an F-111 aircraft and used in DARPA’s Assault Breaker

program; Joint STARS will use similar but improved technology.

Paveway: A series of laser-guided bombs used by
228 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

the U.S. Air Force, built around the Mk-82 (500-

lb) and Mk-84 (2,000-lb) bombs, denoted GBU12B and GBU-10C, respectively.

Peacetime Intel: As used here, peacetime intelligence which can be used to locate certain fixed

targets (e.g., bridges, power stations, and rail

segments) with high accuracy.

PGS: PLSS Ground Station. A hardened facility

in Europe proposed (but no longer planned) to

house a PLSS CPS.

Phoenix: An unmanned aerial vehicle made in England by GEC Avionics.

PIAP: PLSS Intelligence Augmentation Program.

An Air Force program under which the PLSS

Intelligence Augmentation System (PI AS) is being developed.

PIAS: PLSS Intelligence Augmentation System,

A proposed facility for augmenting the analysis, reporting, and exploitation of data collected

by PLSS.

PIM: PLSS Interface Module. A proposed facility

within a PLSS Central Processing Subsystem

for selecting, formatting, and disseminating

PLSS location reports to various users according to their needs.

Pioneer-1: An unmanned aerial vehicle made in Israel by AAI/Mazlat.

PLSS: Precision Location Strike System. An airborne surveillance and control system developed

for TR-1 aircraft to detect, identify, and accurately locate advanced (pulsed, frequencyhopping) enemy radar transmitters and some

types of jammers in near real time and to guide

weapons or aircraft to such targets with sufficient accuracy to destroy them.

PLSS GS: PLSS Ground Station.

POL: Petroleum, oil and lubricants.

RAAM: Remote Anti-Armor Mine, produced for

the U.S. Army.

RAF: Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom.

Rail Mine: Used here to denote a hypothetical mine

designed to damage track and derail moving

trains. Such a mine could use a modified antibunker munition and a Mk-75 fuze.

Raven: The Air Force EF-111A aircraft, which is

equipped to jam enemy radars,

R&D: Research and development.

RDT&E: Research, development, testing, and

evaluation.

recce: Reconnaissance (slang).

reconnaissance: As used here, collecting information about specific areas or activities of particular interest using any of several types of sensors.

Regimental Columns: Groups of vehicles, which

comprise a regiment moving on roads. The actual groupings of vehicles are usually battalionsized, about 40 to 60 vehicles per column, with

spacing between columns using the same road.

REGT ASSY AREAS: Regimental assembly areas,

also known as “departure areas, ” for Warsaw

Pact divisions. These areas are usually located

within the range band of 30 to 80 km from the

FLOT, outside of the range of NATO artillery.

Assembly areas are large enough that the density of vehicles is relatively low, and are chosen

by the Warsaw Pact forces to take maximum

advantage of cover and concealment.

RF-4C: A reconnaissance version of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber, used by the U.S. Air Force.

Some carry TEREC equipment.

RF-4E: A reconnaissance version of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber, used by the Luftwaffe.

RF-104: A reconnaissance version of the F-104

Starfighter, used by the Royal Netherlands Air

Force.

RGT: (1) Remote [MICNS] Ground Terminal for

TADARS; (2) regiment.

RITA: Mobile radio-telephone equipment made by

a consortium of Belgian and French companies;

being purchased by the U.S. Army for use in

Europe.

RLG: Ring-laser gyro. A laser device that can provide rotation rate measurements for navigation

and guidance systems; it has no rotating parts

but can substitute for a gyroscope, which previously was required for this purpose.

Rockeye: A U.S. cluster bomb which dispenses 247

unguided anti-armor shaped-charge bomblets.

RPV: Remotely piloted vehicle: an unmanned vehicle which is guided by operators in a control

station, where television imagery or other information transmitted by the vehicle is displayed.

In this report, the term refers only to aircraft.

See also UAV.

RSC: Reconnaissance-strike complex. A Soviet military term for integrated surveillance/attack systems such as those demonstrated by DARPA in

its Assault Breaker program.

R&S/SA: Reconnaissance and surveillance/situation assessment.

RSTA: Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition.

SAC: Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air

Force.

SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

SADARM: Search and Destroy Armor, Smart

anti-armor submunition for surface-to-surface

weapons.

SAM: Surface-to-air missile.

SAR: Synthetic aperture radar. A type of airborne
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . 229

or orbital radar used for obtaining high-resolution radar images of stationary objects. A SAR

can obtain imagery much more detailed than

that obtainable by a real aperture radar having

an antenna of comparable size.

SCDL: Surveillance and Control Data Link (for

Joint STARS).

SEAD: Suppression of enemy air defense.

SENIOR RUBY: A tactical ELINT system.

SENIOR SPEAR: A tactical COMINT system.

SFW: Sensor Fuzed Weapon. A U.S. Air Force

anti-armor weapon now in development, consisting of a Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD)

containing ten BLU-108 Skeet dispensers, each

of which releases four Skeet submunitions.

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, —Europe.

SIGINT: Signals intelligence. Consisting of both

communications intelligence (COMINT) and

electronics intelligence (E LINT).

SINCGARS: Single-Channel Ground-Air Radio

System. A jam-resistant voice radio system

used for communications between aircraft and

ground units of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S.

Army.

SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan. For

U.S. use-of strategic nuclear weapons.

Skeet: A “smart” puck-shaped anti-armor submunition developed by the Air Force to sense a target and discharge- a high-velocity explosivelyformed penetrating projectile at it. “Skeet” is

a trademark of Avco Corp.

Skeet/TGSM: In this report, denotes smart antiarmor munitions: either Skeet or TGSM or both.

Skyeye: An unmanned aerial vehicle made in the

United States by Lear-Siegler.

SLAR: Side-looking airborne radar.

SNS: Site Navigation Subsystem of PLSS.

SOTAS: Stand-Off Target Acquisition System. A

heliborne MTI ground-surveillance radar system developed by the U.S. Army. The SOTAS

program has been canceled and superseded by

the Joint STARS program.

SRSOM: Short-Range Stand-Off Missile; NATO

feasibility study.

SSM: Surface-to-surface missile,

Standoff Air Atk: See AIR ATTACK.

STARS: See Joint STARS.

STC: SHAPE Technical Centre.

surveillance: As used here, routine monitoring

using any of several types of sensors (e.g., airborne radar).

T-16: The Patriot missile.

T-22: The Lance missile.

TA/AC: Target acquisition/attack control

TAC RECCE: Tactical reconnaissance, A tactical

air mission.

TACAIR: Tactical aircraft, air forces, or airpower.

Tacit Rainbow: A long-endurance missile (an expendable lethal air-launched unmanned aerial vehicle) being developed in the United States to

attack radio emitters such as radars and jammers.

TACMS: Tactical Missile System (see ATACMS).

TADARS: Target Acquisition/Designation Aerial

Reconnaissance System. A reconnaissance and

target acquisition- and designation system being developed for the U.S. Army. It includes the

Aquila unmanned aerial vehicle as well as truckmounted rail launchers, recovery nets, air vehicle transporters, maintenance shelters, and

ground-control stations.

target acquisition: Detection and recognition of a

potential target and estimation or prediction of

its location with sufficient accuracy to permit

attacking it effectively with available weapons.

TBM: Tactical ballistic missile.

TDOA: Time difference of arrival. A radiolocation

technique–used by the Precision Location Strike

System (PLSS)–by which a network of radio

receivers can determine the relative location of

a transmitter. Also: a related technique—used

by other military and civil radiolocation systems

such as LORAN—by which a single radio receiver can determine its location– relative to

those of synchronized radio transmitters,

TERCOM: Terrain Comparison. A system and

method for high-accuracy navigation, presently

employed on certain cruise missiles.

TEREC: ELINT reconnaissance equipment carried

by some RF-4C aircraft.

TGSM: Terminally-Guided Submunition. Smart

anti-armor submunition under consideration for

ATACMS missiles. The TGSM has the capability to search an area for the target vehicle and

then fly toward the target and kill it by detonating a shaped charge on contact.

TGW: Terminally Guided Warhead. A developmental warhead for MLRS rockets which will

release TGSMs.

TLE: Target location error.

TMA: Theater of military action. Also known as

TMO, TSMA, and TVD.

TMD: Tactical Munitions Dispenser. A U.S. Air

Force system (denoted SUU-65/B) to dispense
230 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

submunitions over a given target area. Many

different types of submunitions can be used in

the TMD, including the CEB, Gator, and Skeet.

TMO: Theater of military operations. (Also TMA,

TSMA, and TVD.)

TMSA: Theater of military strategic action. (Also

TMO, TMA, and TVD.)

Tomahawk: A cruise missile manufactured by General Dynamics in several versions: some armed

with nuclear warheads, others with non-nuclear

warheads.

Tornado: An advanced air interdiction aircraft in

production and being fielded by the FRG, Italy,

and the United Kingdom.

TR-1: A high-altitude, long-endurance aircraft used

by the U.S. Air Force for surveillance and reconnaissance. It is used by the Tactical Reconnaissance System (TRS) and by the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS).

TRIGS (pronounced “triggs”): TR-1 Ground Station. A buried, hardened facility designed to receive, process, and exploit data from Tactical

Reconnaissance System sensors carried by TR1 aircraft, When operational, TRIGS will replace

or augment the Tactical Reconnaissance Exploitation Development System (TREDS); it will

provide additional capabilities such as dynamic

(i.e., in-flight) retasking of TRS sensors.

TRAC: (1) the TRADOC Analysis Center of the

U.S. Army; (2) Tactical Radar Correlator. A mobile ground station being developed by the U.S.

Army for receiving, processing, exploiting, and

disseminating data from airborne radar systems.

TRADOC: The Training and Doctrine Command

of the U.S. Army.

TREDS: Tactical Reconnaissance Exploitation Development System. A developmental transportable ground station for the Tactical Reconnaissance System (TRS). TREDS includes: 1) a

Mission Control Element (MCE), 2) an Interoperable Ground Data Link (IGDL), 3) a Tactical Ground Intercept Facility (TGIF), 4) a

Ground Control Processor (GCP), 5) a SAR

Ground Facility (SGF), 6) a Wide-Band Communication Element (WBCE), 7) a TREDS Communications Element (TCE), 8) an ASARS-II Interface Device (AID), and 9) a TREDS Support

Facility (TSF).

TRS: Tactical Reconnaissance System. An airborne

reconnaissance system which includes the ASARS11 radar system.

tube artillery: Artillery guns, as distinct from missile artillery.

Turbine Islander: A twin-turboprop aircraft (designated BN-2T) made by Pilatus Britten-Norman

in several versions; one—the CASTOR Islander

–has been modified to carry the British ASTOR1 side-looking airborne radar (formerly called

CASTOR-I).

TVD: Teatr voennykh deistv. A Soviet military

term variously translated as theater of military

action (TMA), theater of military strategic action (TMSA), or theater of military operations

(TMO); see ch. 4.

UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles, including remotely

piloted vehicles (RPVs), which require remote

control by human pilots; autonomous aircraft

(drones), which do not; and aerial vehicles which

permit, but do not require, remote control by

human pilots.

UHF: Ultra-high frequency. Radio frequencies between 300 megahertz (million cycles per second)

and 3 gigahertz (billion cycles per second).

UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain.

UMV: Unmanned vehicle. Refers only to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in this report.

USAFE: U.S. Air Forces, Europe.

USAREUR: U.S. Army, Europe.

VGK: The Soviet Supreme High Command (transliteration of a Cyrillic acronym).

VHF: Very-high frequency. Radio frequencies between 30 megahertz (million cycles per second)

and 300 megahertz.

WASP: (1) a now-defunct Air Force air-launched

mini-missile development program; (2) an airborne computer system being developed for the

F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft.

WDL: Weapon Data Link of Joint STARS, using

the Joint STARS radar to transmit target data

and a Weapons Interface Unit installed on an

attack aircraft or missile to receive it.

WDU-25B: See Bullpup.

Wild Weasel: U.S. Air Force TACAIR hunter-killer

system (denoted F-4G) for attacking enemy air

defense units.

WIU: Weapons Interface Unit. A component of

Joint STARS which would be installed on attack aircraft or missiles to receive target data

updates from Joint STARS aircraft via the

Weapon Data Link. A WIU is being developed,

and the Air Force is considering procuring it.

WP: Warsaw Pact.

WW: Wild Weasel.