BY 

GeneralFieldmarshalComr ALFREDVON E%X

TEE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL@‘RESS 

FORT LEAVBWWO~E, KANWS 

1525-S-l-31--1M 

I.931 
STAFF COLLEGE PRESS 

In September 1991, the commandant 

Army Command and General Staff Col

Leavenworth authorized the establishm

Command and General Staff College (CGS

CGSC Press has the following missions: 

0 To provide an outlet for the 

publication of monographs and book-length 

subjects of interest to professional officers. 

0 To aid in professional military edu

levels of the U.S. Army and other milita

foreign as well as domestic. 

l To promote and support the advance

theory, history, and practice of the mil

professional officers and other military expe

0 To promote and support the 

development of the CGSC faculty and facu

institutions of higher military education 

States and abroad. 
necessary ingredients that culminated in these a

victories. The flaw in this procedure, however, was 

failed to consider the preponderant number of cases 

armies fought outnumbered and lost. A widened focus 

have eliminated a number of possible false conclusions. 

A similar exercise was conducted eighty years ear

Count Alfred von Schlieffen, the revered chief of the G

General Staff. Convinced that Germany, surrounde

powerful enemies, would have to fight outnumbered an

Schlieffen believed the key to victory could be discovere

account of the Battle of Cannae, written by the G

military historian Hans Delbrtick. Therefore, Sch

ordered the historical section of the General Staff to pro

set of “Cannae Studies” that would demonstrate th

principle of double envelopment practiced by Hanni

Cannae was the master key to victory in battle. 

During the interwar years, the Command and G

Staff School Press published two editions of a translat

Schlieffen’s classic study. The current printing by the 

formed Command and General Staff College Press is m

afford a new generation of army officers an experience 

famous work of military theory. In so doing, it is proba

remiss to caution readers that Hannibal’s victory at C

still did not produce a strategic success, even though it 

tactical masterpiece. Hannibal lost the war with 

Likewise, Schlieffen’s operational concept collapsed in 

War I in the face of logistic and time-space realities 

chosen to discount because he believed they were inconv

to his needs. The lesson to be learned from Schlie

experience is that history misapplied is worse than no 

at all. 

kfiiLLJ@k 

RICHARD M. SWAIN 

Colonel, Field Artillery 

Director, Combat Studies Inst
CHAPTER I 

THE BATTLE AT CANNAEL __.____ __ ..___._.____.____.__.-..--...“.. _ _____ _..___._____

_ ___

CHAPTER II 

FREDERICK TBE GREAT ANTJ NAPOLEON............................. __..__

CHAPTER III 

TEE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 

The Prussian and Austrian Concentration ._.. _ _.._...__ .. ..__. _.._ I_.._...._

The Campaign of 1866 in Germany........_____ _._...._......_.... _.._ ._.__ .._.__ _.

The Campaign in Bohemia of 1866 untii the evening of June 3&

KSniggratn. _._..___ _.____...__.___._.___..~.~....~~~...~ ____ ._......._ . . . . . . . . . . . _ ...__. _ __..._ _.._

CHAPTER IV 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 181Wil 

From the concentration of the armies to the retreat of the F

acrossthe Moselle __.________.__ _ .._____.___._ ____ _........_..__.. _._._.__. __..___ _....__ ._

The advance of the Germans to and across the Moselle. The B

of Colomky-Nouilly, and Mara la Tour.. _._._.__..I._.___.__

 . . . 

The Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat __.___ _____.___.__._._.____ ____.____ ___ ____

The Battles of Beaumont and Sedan.............______ ____._.._ _ .______ __.~ __._
y y p

visit to the German armies in 1915 and 1916. It 

sequently translated at The Army War College 

vidual officers in attendance there sought copies. A

times efforts were made to have it published in 

The stumbling block, both commercially and offici

the necessity for reproducing some one hundred 

sketches and without these t,he text would lose mu

military value. Furthermore, it was necessary 

the authority of the heirs of the author as well a

the publishers. Thanks to their courtesy this 

satisfactorily arranged. This School has now un

this task, without any expectation of profit, in 

make available in English to the officers in attenda

a truly great modern military book. It is great b

the position and prestige of the writer and its 

on the conduct of the World War. It is modern 

one can attempt an understa,nding of many of th

of the last war without the background of the 

theories herein presented. Furthermore, these 

must be weighed, whether accepted or denied, in 

in part, in the major conceptions of a future wa

unhappily, such occur. I have read and re-read 

copy from the War College days with a set of 

maps, certainly to my advantage because of the c

cise statements of the military campaigns which 

the background and occasion for the presentation 

author’s theories. Whether the theories are correc

each one must judge for himself. In any case the

be known and understood by offcers attending thi

STUART KEINTZELMAN

Briyadier Genera.E, U. S. 

Commandant. 
The work of General Field Marshal Count vo

fen, as Chief of the General Staff of the German a

place remote from publicity, Since the World W

ever, his name is mentioned by all, It came to 

that it was his spiritual heritage which, at the be

the war, brought to the German arms their great 

Even where his doctrines were misapplied, his sc

the General Staff remained, nevertheless, a pricele

sion * * * * * 

Strictly, the Cannae studies of Count Schlieffe

presentations from Military History. They 

rather, a conversational document of instruction, 

the Field Marshal, in his activity as Chief. of th

Staff of the Army, always endeavored, during th

riod of peace, to keep alive in the General Staff, 

in the army at large, the idea of a war of annihi

likewise, is this expressed in his writings. Germa

tion demanded a quick decision. Though the 

great store on the efficiency of the German army

nevertheless, always preoccupied with thoughts o

leaders would acquit themselves when the time cam

in his writings he often attributes his own ideas to 

ers of the Past-among them Moltke-when he 

prove that to achieve a decisive victory of annihil

jZanKrzg--preferably from two or three sides-mu

sorted to, as Hannibal did at Cannae. In everyth

Count Schlieffen wrote the two-front war which 

Germany hovered before him. In such a war we 

victorious only if soon after its outbreak we su

obtaining an annihilating defeat of France. M

tles Count Schlieffen characterizes even more th

battles as a “struggle for the flanks.” Therefore 

the necessity, in case parts of an army have ma
‘7’1. However, he explains their conduc

Napoleonic traditions in the absence of w

their own generation. Notwithstanding 

judgement, the writings of the Field Ma

appreciation of true military art, for withi

ed an incomparable military fire. The re

offensive of our Infantry he emphasizes a

to victory. 

Notwithstanding the sharp dchneatio

doctrines Count Schlieffen was no sehema

in war many means lead to the goal. H

knowledge of the achievements of mode

and however constantly he had furthered 

in our army, his opinions remained stead

this domain, because the possibility of tes

of new weapons on a large scale was want

Before the war we ah could only surmise t

ground and in the air. Reconnaissance, 

suit, the paving of the way for a Cannae, a

tration, all evinced more than ever befor

higher degree, that they depended on the 

ons of the enemy. This explains partly 

Tannenberg, a real Cannae did not occur 

That one did not occur in the west at the 

war is the fault, in the first instance, of 

mand. Indeed it was the Schiieffen pl

operations were based, yet in their actua

departed from. His constant exhortation 

army flank as strong as possible was not 

As in this respect, so also the appreh

of the Field Marshal in his composition, 

Present Time,” came true. The long dragg

world industry. The frontal juxtapositio

vlll . . . 
of his day, Prince Bismarek. In the work: Be

Ieadership of the army from the newest researche

Schlieffen’s purpose is to point out where an unluc

tion of a Commander-in-Chief may lead. This is 

exhortation. 

The Field Marshal shows in his writings that h

aspired to the ideal, well knowing that one must 

demand for this to attain anything of high stand

this, at least, we were successful in the World Wa

the publications of our enemies we know now how 

were, several times, to firm1 success, in spite of ou

cal inferiority; and that is not a trifle. The an

doctrine has not died in the German Army. Coun

fen was the one best fitted to further Moltke’s ar

He drew the most pertinent deductions from the 

growth of armies and the enlarged conditions of the 

The fear of mass armies we have overcome, thanks 

and in the handling of the weapons we have shown 

to the last superior to our opponents. If the W

constitutes a high title of honor for us, General F

shal Count Schlieffen has a rich share therein. 

BARON VON FREYTAG-LORING

The maps and the list of same are likewise from that e

General of Infantry, Ret

German Amzv. 

NOTE:-The 

been made from 

translsbtion of the body of this English 

part of the 1913 edition of the “Collected 

introduction and some of the footnotes have been taken fr

the 1926 Edition of “Gannae.” 
Map 2. 

Map 3. 

Map 4. 

Map 5. 

Map 6. 

Map 7. 

Map 8. 

Map 9. 

Map ‘10. 

Map 11. 

Map 12. 

Map 13. 

Map 14. 

Map 15. 

Map 16. 

Map 17. 

Map 1X. 

General Map. 

BRTFLE OF CANNAE 

2 August, 216 B.C. 

Position before the Battle, and Cavalry Engag

BATTLE OF CANNAE 

2 August, 216 B.C. 

Collision of the two Armies. 

BATTLE OB LEUTHEN 

5 December, 1757. 

BATTLE OF Z~RNDORF 

Movements from 23 to 25 August, 1758. 

BATTLECJFZORNDQRF

25 August, 1758. 

BATTLEOFZORNDORF 

25 August, 1758. 

BATTLEOF ZORNDORF 

25 August, 1758. 

BATTLE OF KUNJZ-ETDQRF 

12 August, 1759. 

BArrhE OF KUNERSDORF 

12 August, 1759. 

CAMPAIGN IN ITALY 

1800. 

CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY 

1805. 

ADVANCE ON JENA 

7 to 13 October, 1806. 

BAWLE OFAUSTERLITZ 

2 December, 1805. 

BATTLE OFAUSTERLITZ 

2 December, 1805. 

CAMPAIGN OF PRUSSIAN-EYLAU 

January, 1807. 

CAMPAIGNOF PRUSSIAN-EmAu 

4 to 8 February, 1807. 

CAMPAIGN OF REGENs~URG 

April, 1908 

Situation on 17 April, 1809. 
Map 22. 

Map 23. 

Map 24. 

Map 25. 

Map 26. 

Map 27. 

Map 28. 

Map 29. 

Map 30. 

Map 31. 

Map 32. 

Map 33. 

Map 34. 

Map 35. 

Map 36. 

Map 37. 

Map 38. 

Map 39. 

Map 40. 

Map 41. 

Map 42. 

xii 

CAMPAIGN OF REGENS~SURG 

Movements on 21 April, and Situation 

CAMPAIGN OF REGEKSBUIZG 

Situation at Noon, 22 April. 

CAMPAIGN OF REGENSBUP,G Situation on the Evening of 22 April. 

BATTLE OF TORGAU 

3 November, 1760. 

CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDUND-TILSIT 

June, 1807. 

MOVEMENTSFROM THE MIDDLE OF AU

SEPTEMBER,1813. 

MOVEMENTS FROM THE END OF SEP

THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG. 

BATTLE OF LIEGNITZ 

15 August, 1’760. 

CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS 

1815. 

BATTLE OF LIGNY 

16 June, 1815. 

BATTLE OF LIGNY 

16 June, 1815. 

BATTLE OF BELLE ALLIANCE (WATER

18 June, 1815. 

GENE%L MAP OF THE AUSTRO-PRUS

1866. 

SITUATION ON 20 JUNE, 1866, AND MO

SITUATION ON 21 JWNE, 1866. 

SITUATION ON 22 JUNE, 1866. 

SITUATION ON 23 JUNE, 1866. 

SITUATION ON 25 JUNE, 1866. 

SITUATION ON 26 JUNE, 1866. 

ENGAGEMENTAT LANGENSALZA 

27 June, 1866. 

SITUATION ON THE E’IIENING OF 27 JUN
Map 46. 

Map 47. 

Map 43. 

Map 49. 

Map 50. 

Map 51. 

Map 52. 

Map 53. 

Map 64. 

Map 65. 

Map 56. 

Map 51. 

Map 53, 

Map 59. 

Map 60. 

Map 61. 

Map 62. 

Map 63. 

Map 64. 

Map 65. 

ENGAGEMENTATTFUUTENAU, 27Jum 

ENGAGEMENTATSULETZ,~$JLIME. 

ENGAGEMENTATBURKERSDORF,~~JUNE. 

OPERATIONSFROM~~JUNETOTHENIGFITOF~~ JUN

ENGAGEMENT ATSCHWETNSCHADEL,~~ JUNE.

ENGAGEMENTATGITSCHIN,~QJUNE. 

PROBABLESITIJATIONONTHEEVENINGQF~JULY,

DIRECTIONS (TELEGRAM IN TEIE NIGHT OF 30 

JULY, O~C~IONE~ BY THE CHANGES IN THE S

THAT Day) HADBEENFOLLOWED. 

LOCATION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES ON l-2 JULY. 

THE PRUSSIAN MOVEM:~~ENTS ON 3 JULY, EN AZO

WITH MOLTKE'S INSTRUCTIONS. 

GENERAL~MAPOFTHEBATTLEOFKONIGGRATZ 

3 July, 1866. 

BATI%EOF KONIGGRATZ 

Movements during forenoon. 

BATTLEOF KONIGGRAT~ 

Situation in the afternoon. 

BATTLEOF K~NIGGRATX 

Situation in the evening, 

SITUATION INTHE EVENINGOF~~ JULY, 1866, 

SITUATIQNATOLMUTZONTHE EVENINGOF 14 Jtm,

ENGAGEMENTATTUBITSCHAU,~~JULY,~&~~. 

SITUA~ON OF THE PRUSSIANS ON THE EVENING OF 

1866, AND RETREATOF THE AUSTRUNNORTH

DOWN THEVALLEY OF THE WAAG. 

SITUATIONONTHEEVENING 0~2lJu~~,1866. 

THEFRANCO-PRUSSEANWAR,~~'?~.

PROBABLE CONCENTRATION AREAS OF THE FRE

ORIGINALLY PLANNED CONCENTRATION AND 

OF THE EER&iANS. 

MOLTICE'S SCHEME FOR THE ADVANCE OF THE 

ARMIES FROI THEIR POINTS OF DETRAINMEN

THE RHINE. 

ACTUAL CONCENTRATIONS AND ADVANCE OF THE 

PRIOR TO THEBATTLESQFWORTHANDSPICH

POSITIONSON THE EVENING OF 5 AUGUST. 
Map 68. BALEOFWORTH 

6 August, 1870 

Map 69. MACMAHON'S SITUATION ON THE EVE

PO%XBLE OFFENSIVE OF THE THIR

Map 70. BATTJJZOF SPICHERN 

6 August, 1870. 

Map 71. RET$~;~O&~EFRENCHAFTERTHBBAT

. 

Map 72. PLAN FOR THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST 

TO AND BEYOND THE MOSELLE. 

Map 73. MOLTKE'SPLANFORTHEADVANCEOFT

ARMIE~ TO THE MOSELLE. 

Map 74. FRENCHPOSITIONSON~OAUGWST. HEAD

OPERATIONSBYTHESECONDARM

Map 75. SITUATION ONTHE EVENING OF~~AWGW

Map 76. SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF 12 AUG

FIJRTHERADVANCETOTHEMOSE

Map 77. BATTLEOF COLOMBEY-NOWILLY 

14 August, 1870. 

Map 78. SITUATION ONTHEEVENING OF~~AUGU

0~16 AUGUST. 

Map 79. SITUATION ATNOON, 15 AUGUST. 

PROBABLE ADVANCE OF THE FXRST AND 

THE AFTERNOON OF 15 AUGUST AN

CASE MOLTKE'S PURPOSE TO ADVA

WITH THE FIRST ARMY, SHOULD BE 

Map 80. MAR~LATOUR" 

16 August, 1870. 

Map 81. SITUATION ONTHEE~ENINGOF~~AUGU

UNTILTHEEVENING 0~17 AWGWS

Map 82. PLANFORTHEMOVEMENT OFTHE GER

ruxwS~ 17 AUGUST AND FOR TH

Map 33. SITUATION ON THE MORNING OF 18 AW

OF THE GERMANS. 

Map 84. BA~LE OF GRAVELOTTEST.PRIVAT 

ia AUPS~, 1870. 

Movements and engagements from the b

till about 3:00 PM. 

xiv 
Map 88. 

Map 89. 

Map 90. 

Map 91. 

Map 92. 

Map 93. 

Map 94. 

Map 95. 

Map 96. 

Map 97. 

Map 98. 

Map 99. 

Map 100. 

Map 101. 

SITU;TI;N&;;F NIGHT 18-19 AUGLVJT, AM

SITUATION ON 22 AND 25 AUGUST. MARCRE~ O

h;A~~~yx$xz ADVANCE OF THE GERMANS F

. 

SITUATION ON AUGUST 26. MARCHES ON 27 AN

SITUATION ON THE EVBNIEFG OF28 A~GVST, M

29 AUGV~T. 

SITUATION OF THE GERMAN ON THE EVENING O

MOVEI~ENTS OF THE GERMANS AFTER 30 AUG

ING TO MOLTm'S PLAN. 

S~vy;z-y EVENING OF 29 AUGUST. Msv~

. 

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT 

30 August, 1870. 

Movements and combats until about 3:00 PM. 

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT 

Situation about 3:00 PM. Movements and 

evening. 

Srrv~~~s~ THE NIGHT 30-31 AUGUST. Mm

. 

BATTLE OF SEDAN 

1 September, 18’70. 

Positions of the French on 1 September. A

Third Army based on the order from gen

ters. Moltke’s plan for the advance of the 

BATTLE OF SEDAN 

Movements and engagements up to noon. 

BATTLE OF SEDAN 

Engagements and movements in the afternoon
CHAPTER I 

The Battle of Cannae 

The army of Hannibal, fronting west, stood 

gust, 216 B.C., in the Apulian plain to the left o

(Ofanto) in the vicinity of the village Carmae,@

near the mouth of the river, and opposite the troop

sul Terentius Varro. The latter, to whom had b

ferred by the other Consul Aemilius Paulus the d

nating commandership, had 

55,000 heavily armed men, 8,000 lightly armed men, 6,000 mounted men, 

on hand and, in the two fortified camps, 

2,600 heavily armed men, 7,400 lightly armed men. 

10,000 men. 

at his further disposition, so that the total streng

Roman army amounted to 79,600 men. 

Hannibal had at his disposition only 

32,000 heavily armed men, 8,000 lightly armed men, 10,000 mounted men. 

60,000 men. 

His position, with a considerably superior en

front and the sea in his rear, was by no means a 

one. Nevertheless, Consul Aemilius Paulus, in co

““First published in the VI and X annual volumes of t

jarshifte fiir Truppenfiihrung und Weereskunde” (1907-

&littler and Son. Berlin. 

@)Hans Deibriick, “Geschichte der Xriegskunst” (His

Art of War) I. 
p; ,

men as against the 32,000 hostile oxs, con

12,000 Carchagiciecs acd of %,O!X Iberians 

in equipment and training, could not be cons

iaries af full value. In order to gire increased 

attack, Terentius gave his army a new battle 

The cavaky was placed 012 the wings. The 

troops, destined to begin the combat, to env

and to support the cavalry, were not much 

either side, 

Hannibal opposed to the enemy’s frort 

Iberians and Gauls, which Tvere probably 

The grea;ter part cf his enva!ry under Hasdru

on the left wing and the light Kumidian on 

rear of this cavalry the 12,050 heavily arme

infantry were fcrmed equally divided between 

Eoth armies advanced against each oth

overpowered the weaker hostile cavalry cm 

The Roman knights were overwhelmed, tlv

h~~ds,2 Aufidus er scattered. Tha eonqr:eror tacked 

fantry and advanced against the Roman cava

which, until then, had only skirmished with 

light horse. Attacked on both sides, the Rem

‘3’The heavilv armed men (temnIstes) would h

according to regulations, in three &es, in close f

foremost, lines in equal strength (hastat and principe

in the front, and a total of 12 files, * * the thircl 

half the strength in 165 equally distributed columns 

the front and 6 in dept,h) immediately in the rear. 

18 files, appearing too broad to the commander, was 

files with a front of 1600 men * * *. 

The heavily armed men (hoplites) were genera

helmet, breastplate, legplates, round shie!d, spear 

The Iberians and Gauls had, as defensive equipmen

and a large shield. 

The formation into lines was not made in one 

in six-file manipel cohzmns with short intervak. 

Both formations, the broad as well as the de

men, There Ia&ed, consequently, 2,600 men of the r
y 

at the impact not so much on account of the strength 

attack c*f the 36 Roman files as on aeeount of the 

armament and the lesser training in close combat. 

vance of the Romans was, however, checked, as soo

Carthaginian flanking echelons, kept back SQ far, c

and attacked the enemy on the right and left, and as 

Hasdrubal’s cavalry threatened the Roman rear. 

arii turned back, the maniples of both wings moved o

A long, entire square had been forced tcr halt, front

sides and was attacked on all. sides by the infantry wit

swords acd by the cavalry with javelins, arrows, an

shots, never missing in the compact mass. The 

were constantly pushed back and crowded together. 

out weapons and without aid, they expected death. 

bal, his heart full of hatred, circled the arena of the 

work, encouraging the zealous, lashing on the sluggish

soldiers desisted only hours later. Weary of slaughte

took the remaining 3000 men prisoners. On a narro

48,000 corpses lay in heaps. Roth Aemilius Pau

Servihus had fallen, Varro had eseaped with a few e

men, a few of the heavily armed and the greater par

lightly armed men. Thousands fell into the hands 

victors in the village of Cannae and in both camp

conquerors had lost about 6,000 men. These were 

Iberians and Gauls. 

A battle cf complete extermination had been 

most wonderfully through the fact that in spite of a

ries, it had been won by a numerical inferiority. Cla

said %oncentric action against the enemy behooves 

weaker” and Napoleon taught ‘%he weaker must n

both wings simultaneously.‘” The weaker Hanniba

however, acted concentrically, though in an unseem

and turned not only both wings, but even the rear 

enemy. 
tions have taken the place of slaughter. 

conditions of warfare have remained uncha

tle of extermination may be fought today 

same plan as elaborated by Rannibal in long 

The hostile front is not the aim of the prin

is not against that point that the troops s

and the reserves disposed ; the essential t

the flanks. The wings ought not to be s

vanced flank points of the front, but along 

and extension of the hostile formation. T

is completed by an attack against the rear o

cavalry plays here the principal role. It 

“intact infantry,” but may wreak havoc a

masses by long range fire. 

A condition of success lies, it is true, in 

of the hostile forces with shortened front 

of reserves, thus deepening the flanks an

number of combatants forced to remain 

was Hannibal’s good luck to have opposed 

Varro, who eliminated his superiority by 

fantry 36 men deep. At all times there ha

of his school, but not during the period w

have been most desirable for Prussia. 
None more than Frederick the Great was so ap

a battle of extermination with a numerically 

strength. He was, however, unable to attack a

with his “unequal force” of 35,000 men, howeve

might have made it, the wide front of Prince Charle

raine with his 65,000 warriors. He would not have 

troops left for the surrounding of the overpoweri

riority of the enemy. He directed the main attack 

one flank, as had already been attempted at Soor 

cuted at Prague. He succeeded in deeeiving th

turning him and bringing up the Prussian army p

ularly to the lengthened front against the hostile 

The extreme left wing, thus placed in a precarious 

was broken. The Austrians turned their masse

the threatened flank; however, they were unable t

in their haste, their original long front in the new 

but fell unintentionally into a formation 40 men d

similar to the one assumed by Terentius Varro. 

tion, in general, corresponded to that of Cannae. 

row Austrian front was attacked by the not mu

Prussian. Cavalry was assembled on both wings

lacked, however, the two echelons of Carthaginfsn 

of 6000 men each. The numbers on hand did n

for their formation. The littIe that was left was 

cient to turn in to the right and left, The entire d

opment had to be replaced ; on the right-by a

drawing up of a few battalions against the hostile 

on the left-by placing a battery acting in a sim

The preponderance of cavalry was likewise lackin

true that Zieten had thrown back the hostile caval

right. IIe was, however, prevented f ram advancin

the infantry by the dificulties of the terrain. O
toward Lissa, was changed into rout by p

The disproportion of strength was too 

too unequal. Leuthen could be only a m

The problem of fighting a battle of exte

strength half that of the enemy was, how

certain degree. What was lacking during 

extermination in turning, enveloping, and 

at least, partially compensated for by the 

the lef’; flank. If, during the further purs

Fouque, they could have acted “with more 

“closer on the heels of the enemy,” the re

been greater but were still considerable. 

Imperial army which crossed the Queiss 

90,000 men, scar&y one fourth left the s

returned over the frontier of Bohemia in 

jection and discouragement.” This cam

extermination, 

The turning movement at Zorndorf w

in a still more effective way. Fermor, with 

invested Kiistrin in August, 1758, on the 

Warthe and the Oder. Frederick the Gre

the other bank of the Oder, at Manschnow 

army of 36,000 men with the troops broug

and those which advanced with Count D

Prussia and Pomerania. To lead these tr

Map 6. fortress against the Russians did not prom

The King marched downstream and on 2

the Oder at Gtistebiese, for the purpose of 

my against the river and the fortress and 

him entirely. Fermor met this turning m

up position in rear of the Mietzel, ‘at Qu

impossible for the Prussians to deliver an 

Russians over the marshy little river, diff

new turning movement was to be made and 
well as over the Langengrund. The turning move

continued over Batzlow and Wilkersdorf against 

and when the head of the columns reached the Zabe

they marched to the right: The advance was 

against the rear of the enemy and not against his fla

carding to this, Fermor made a countermarch w

regiments, making them turn back, pla,cing the se

in the line and the first line in the second. The 

the front was not narrowed but maintained the sa

fore. The attack, was, consequently, not rendered 

cult. Only after a victory would it be seen that an 

situated in the rear of the Russian army and difficu

mourn,, would prove of great advantage. Should 

sians be vanquished, they would Iikewise be d

Fortunately, the battlefield was divided. The Russi

drawn up near Quartschen, fronting Zorndorf, th

wing between the Znbern and the Galgengrund, th

and left wing between the Galgen and Langengru

mass of cavalry under Demiku, to the left and in 

near Zicher. 

The flanks of this position were securely protec

wings could not be surrounded. The King decided 

upon the right wing, separated from the rest of t

with superior forces, then to attack the eenter and 

from the west. Per this purpose, the advance guard 

talions) under Manteuffel and, fallowing at 300 p

left flank (nine battalions of the first and six batta

the second line) under Kanitz advanced between th

and Galgengrund, the right wing (eleven battalion

first and four battr,lions of the second line) unde

kept back to the east of the Galgengrund, were to 

right flank; Seyd!itz wit.h 36 squadrons on the left

lemer with 20 sqiradrons on the right were to secur

vance march and take part in the combat, if necessa
sian artillery, however, was not yet dead

fire was likewise murderous. The thinne

Manteuffel closed and relinquished the po

berngrund. There were no reserves to fill 

ranks, Kanitz, accustomed to maintain 

munication with the lines, before all thin

Dohna on the right and advanced, east of 

against the Russian center which was still 

battalions strong. When he and Manteuffe

enemy, they saw themselves enveloped on 

hostile line. The advance of the 14 battalion

left wing against Kanitz, stopped Dohna’s 

ing artillery which had been kept behind. 

rushed .with 16 battalions and 14 squadron

flank and the front, of Manteuffel. The 

thrown back with great losses. The pu

however, left their flank uncovered and S

in crossing in three places the Zaberngru

then was deemed unpassable. At the sam

goons of the reserve advanced. Twenty sq

the front, and the flank and rear were attac

rons each. The Russians, shaken by the 

scattered during the heat of pursuit, defe

obstinately. After a long and bloody hand 

remaining men fled over the Galgengrund 

to the Drewitzer Heide. In spite of the in

Russian right wing, attacked on three sides 

nihilated. It was, however, impossible fo

low up his victory, to advance over the G

port the frontal attack of the infantry by 

The attack of Kanitz was repulsed by supe

the Russian center was well able to hinde

over the Galgengrund. 
with the aid of Schorlemer, rout the Russian left 

possible, after which they were to turn left to a

center which was to be simultaneously pressed b

from the south and Seydlitz from the west. 

seemed doomed. While ninety-seven guns were 

the combat and Dohna advanced to the half right 

the Langengrund, Demiku rushed unexpectedly with 

airy against the great battery of the right wing, a

right flank of the infantry and against Schorlemer’s 

The battery was lost, one battalion was surrounded 

down its arms, others were confused for the momen

Russian cavalry was finally repulsed by the fire 

fantry and retreated before Sehorlemer’s cavalry 

Zicher. This enemy was eliminated. In spite of 

he succeeded in gaining considerable advantages. 

sian left flank, though not touched by Demiku’s at

so shaken by the previous unfortunate combat an

couraged by the expectancy of anew catastrophe, th

seized with panie and fled, being arrested onIy at 

dorf in its flight and brought to a standstill. 

marched with his 56 squadrons to the evacuated 

advanced principally left of the Steinbusch, whil

advanced with his right wing, along the Lang

against the closely massed 38 Russian battalions. 

hot hand to hand fight, the Russian left flank retrea

In order to avoid being pushed into the Hofebruc

tempted to escape towards Quartschen. This left 

wing of the Russian center unprotected. Dohna 

the left. Attacked on two sides, hemmed in on 

by an insurmountable obstacle, the center was 

pushed back over the GaIgengrund. It took up po

the hills on the other side. 

It was absolutely necessary to avlnihilate the 

to his last man. The King wanted to fight another 

the evening. The cavalry, however, after two mast 
pieees. Forcade alone could not possibly e

The Eussisns held tlneir position. The

nevertheless quite critical. They had onl

out of the 44,000 with which they went 

Warthe, the Oder and the Mietzel formed

remnant of troops which had escaped an

of rivers, the only passage over which w

the fortress of Kiistrin. An army, wh

greatly and appeared incapable of attack, 

front of them, The Russians could move 

nor backward. They could not remain in 

Jacked ammunition and food. The primary 

King-to surround and bottIe up the ene

tained. The victorious Prussians were, h

continue the attack immediately, They 

however, as their losses were much smal

the enemy. They were now superior in 

23,000 men, and would soon be abie to 

battle. The latter would doubtlessly b

complete success. Yet considering the o

for resistance of the Russians, the victor

be bought at the cost of greater sacrifice

could for the moment afford. It was nec

go back, without loss of time, to Silesia o

to check the advance of the Austrians. H

a golden bridge for the enemy and march

afternoon of the 26th, beyond the Lang

Zither. The enemy took advantage of th

and marched early in the morning of the Z

the south of Zorndorf and Wilkersdorf, t

in order to occupy a fortified position t

went into camp at Tamsel. With natural 

in their rear, the two adversaries remain

other untii 30 August. On the 31st, Fer

wards Landsberg. Followed by Dohna, h
armies for the continuation of the war. The diffic

countered in the mode of procedure, chosen by F

the Great, came dearly to light.. It was proven in t

tles, and still more in others, that it is not easy to 

tially annihilate one’s enemies with ~~rner~~a~~

strength, At Prague,<41 the enveloped enemy had 

to form a new front almost on a similar extension 

front, At Kolin, the Austrians had onIy to move 

tlze right in order to frustrate the turning moveme

intended flank attack was transformed into a fr

tack, an attack which was opposed at. Kolin by grea

rior numbers ~~0~00~ against 35,000 infantry) 

much mare extended line. In the first battle it was 

to execute a surrounding movement, while in th

Zieten was not able to cope with the di%cult problem

it be impossible to succeed in deceiving the enemy 

tain extent, to conceal the turning movement, the 

would be more than doubtful. A certain surprise w

sary, at least where the Austrians were concern

stolid Russians could be treated with less ea.&io

couId help themselves in another way, The ~~~~~

Russians who defended themselves at Kunnersdorf 

40,000 Iprussians, had transformed their strong pos

a fortress by means of entrenchments and ditche

wouId be, however, entirely cut off by a turning m

via Goritz. A victory was still necessary for ann

This could not be attained vvith 40,000 men again

well entrenched enemies. The Leuthen program 

cuted insofar that i?!Ehlberg, the supporting poi

left wing, was captured, In a further attempt 

back the enemy from the left to right, the Prussian 

‘*‘It was the Fieldmarshal’s intention to include the 

Prag~~e’~ in the bock edition of “Cannae.” The descripti

battle may be found in the second volume of ““Collected W

the study entitled “‘Frederick the Great.” 
erick the Great, that his aim was to attack 

beginning a flank or even the rear of the enem

if possible against an insurmountable obsta

annihilate him by enveloping one or both of 

4; t x * * 

A similar intention will be found in Nap

movements, executed by the King in the imm

of the battlefield within a few hours, were 

Corsican days and weeks in advance and ext

areas. A surprise could not be thus attained. 

necessary, however. The mass of troops at 

of NapoIeon assured victory and ehminated f

with similar fronts, the venturesomeness of F

bats. 

We find the first example in the cam

Melas, the Austrian commander-in-chief in 

Map 11. 

sena be besieged in Genoa by Ott with 24,0

posed on the Var 28,000 men to Suchet’s 12,0

35,000 men, divided into numerous small de

to secure the passes of the Alps in a wide sem

Nice and Bellinzona. Genera1 Bonaparte m

tain Melas as long as possible, caused Turreau 

to make a demonstration over the Mont Cenis 

in the valley of the Dora Riparia and the divis

to cross the lesser St. Bernard in the direc

while he himself led the reserve army fr

Geneva, i,ausanne, and Martigny over the gre

and reached at Ivrea the North Italian lowla

men. Indescribable obstacles were overcome 

of the commander and the zeal of his officers a

did the same thing as Brince Charles of Lor

mor had done in their time: He turned aga

who was turning him, left Elsnitz with 17,00
turning movement by Vercelli and Turbigo to Mila

order to unite, at this point, with 15,000 men under Mo

who had crossed the St. Gothard, a portion of them ha

also crossed via the Simplon. After Suchet had ro

EIsnitz, he pushed the enemy, stat,ioned along the PO, t

Mincio, pursued him as far as Brescia, Crema, and Piac

barred the communication with the rear over the St

thard to Zurich and occupied the crossings over the 

the right bank of the latter was won at Stradella. In 

meantime, Melas endeavored to unite his forces at Alles

dria. The opponents confronted each other with a to

changed front. Neither one nor the other had succeed

assembling an army corresponding to the total stre

Melas had only 28,500 men, while Bonaparte had only 2

men out of 69,000 on account of numerous flank and 

detachments. He was, however, forced to advance 

wished to prevent the enemy from crossing the PO 

northerly direction and cutting the French line of comm

cations over the St. Gothard, or from rushing sou

Genoa which had just been evacuated by Massena. A

vanced Austrian detachment was thrown back at Monte

Melas himself did not seem as yet to want to leave Alle

dria. The French troops extended to the right towards 

Bormida. Melas crossed the river early on 14 June. 

Frenchmen, surprised at Marengo, could not hold out 

The Consular Guard was vainly sent into action as a res

All lost ground. The retreat, almost a flight, was in 

swing. The Austrians followed in two long columns. 

saix, sent with 5,000 men to Rivalta to protect the flan

rived there and threw himself on the nearest column. 

surprised enemy, in unfavorable position, could not 

advance. Kellerman rushed in with his brigade of drag

and decided the combat. The head of the column was th

back upon its center and rear. The Austrians retreate

confusion. Still the victory was not a decisive one. 
py

eral was in a desperate condition. Only 

could relieve him. But he could not ho

Bonaparte could count upon considerab

while he could get none. An agreement 

which Melas was allowed to lead his troops 

on condition that they would not take part 

operations in this war and of giving 

Bonaparte did not annihilate his enemy, 

and made him harmless, and attained, at 

aim of the campaign-the conquest of N

owed this success not so much to a batt

almost lost, but to the turning of the fla

the hostile line of retreat; in a like mann

Great owed the retaking of Silesia, and 

left bank of the Vistula, to the turning mo

and at Zorndorf. It is true that this wa

the turning movements. A battle and 

necessary. But a decisive victory is pos

rear or at least one flank of the enemy is 

attack, 

In 1805 Napoleon was at war with E

to be vanquished not only on the high se

Map 22. The threatened insular realm attempted t

by entering into an alliance with other 

Naples, Austria, Bavaria, Russia, Prussia

mark were to advance concentrically an

on his own territory. The plan was e

smallest part. Prussia remained neutra

side of the enemy. Naples, Sweden, and 

seriously be considered. Austria and Rus

The principal army under Archduke Ch

into Italy behind the Adige. A secondary 

duke J&n in the Tyrol, while another 
Charles, but sent against him a small army under M

while he advanced himself with 210,000 men agains

who had only 60,000. The movements and distribut

troops of the enemy were not immediately recognized 

Austrians. But had they been known, this eircum

would not and should not have caused a retreat, tho

opposing forces were three times as strong as the Au

The position on the Iller, with its right resting on U

very strong. The crossings of the Danube below th

were secured by 16,000 men under Kienmayer. Sho

impossible to hold the Iller, Mack could have cros

Lech, from position to position until he could join t

sians. This could have been executed if the attack h

a frontal one. The enemy would have grown wea

weaker as he advanced, would have reached the decis

tlefield with greatly decreased numbers, encounterin

not only the Russians, but the Austrian reserves a

sibly, also the armies of the Archdukes. Napoleon, h

made only demonstrations against the front, advanc

four army corps and the Guard from the Rhine, 

the Neckar between Stuttgart and Neckarelz, two c

vaneing simultaneously from Mainz and Frankfo

Wurzburg, and the Bavarians from Bamberg, by 

berg. He wanted to Cross the Danube with his le

depending on the position of the enemy, either a

stadt, Regensburg, or still farther down. He cou

striking the Austrians, if not in the rear, then pos

the right flank, push them to the west, or at leas

south and force them to give battle. Mack, relying 

definite, conflicting, and improbable information a

advance of the enemy, did not wish to give up his 

destroy the wisely combined plan of action and ex

armies in ItaIy and in the Tyrol to a flank atta

wanted to be clearly informed of the situation 

abandoning the post entrusted to him. When, on ‘7 
covered the right flank on the left of the 

Ulm. Kienmayer had abandoned the cross

retreat beyond the Isar via Aichach and 

.was too weak for an attack against the 

riority of the enemy as the French column

to each other and too well prepared for 

Since Ingolstadt was closer to Munich 

could be no thought of breaking through, 

far south the movement might be directe

French troops, advancing southward from th

have sooner or later surrounded Mack’s 44

nihilated them. 

After a weak attempt to attack the ho

by one after they had crossed the Danube a

attempt to escape via Augsburg, which wa

Mack desisted from all operations an the r

and returned to Ulm on the lOth, fighting 

the way. A success might have’been thoug

the longingly expected Russian troops ha

Napoleon had taken proper steps against 

also. 

The French left wing (two corps and 

had been pushed to the Isar for protection 

sians. Two corps and the Guard took up 

Lech in the vicinity of Augsburg in order 

road to Vienna and to serve, simultaneously, 

the left wing. Murat, with the reserve ca

vision of infantry, went later towards Ulm

were, -however, gradually reinforeed, unti

division remained on the left bank on 1

division sufficed to frighten Mack sufficien

desist from breaking through on that da

was to be repeated on the 13th, in severa

foremost, (16,000 men under Werneck) su

ing Herbreehtingen, while Mack remained 
, 

troops penetrated from here agai 

via Memmingen and Biberach, a 

which was already invested on the e 

men were forced to capitulate. 

earlier with 5,000 men west of the 

as not to Ieave his commander-inwanted to go back to Uhn, but 

duke Ferdinand, and was caught at ~~~cbte~ 

and Dupont. 33s troops were ~~~~e~~~ a 

to lay down their arms. Archduke Ferdina 

with 2000 cavalry. Of the ~~,~QO 

had advanced to the Iller, more tba 

ated. Even this could have been avow 

resolved to break through on the left ban 

the 11th or 12th. $he Freneh had done 

enemy on the right bank of the Danube 

for protectian against the Russians, e oth

not enough for surrounding Maek. 

been attained best by a quick surround 

numerical superiority Napoleon could 

emy for days the possibility of breaking through. 

not to have counted too much on 

false reports. 

one year Iater @I the 

tion with about 100,000 men to the 

forest, principally between the Saale 

aflel with Weimar and Erfurt. N 

000 men in three columns, via ~ayr~ut~ 

Franconian forest and the Upper SaaJe 

of turning the left hostile flank a 

could be reached by turning the three 

cording to the position of the enemy. 

inite information concerning this 

cs)See W3iW and “Jena” in Vol. II of the ~‘~~~~~~t~ 
confusion to the battalion square formatio

French army was marching and which was 

for the march to the front as well as to the 

flanking movement had to be executed on 

found that at each of the crossings of Kose

was one corps, while the main forces were 

Jena, although according to the position t

the enemy on the line : Jena-Weimar-Erfurt, 

forces ought to have been directed to the c

burg, Kosen, and Freiburg. Napoleon tho

responding to his own distribution of forces

likewise assembled his army opposite Jen

detachments or no troops at all at Kosen 

Consequently he wanted to attack the ene

hold him in front until the corps had come 

and Dornburg in order to throw him into 

forest. This plan did not correspond to the 

the Prussian main forces were marching o

a secondary corps under Hohenlohe, suppo

army reserve, was to block the passes at Ca

burg, while the remaining forces were to s

out allowing themselves to be drawn into a 

i.e., retreat when attacked. This problem 

been executed in one day, at least, insofa

superior enemy was gradually allowed to 

Apolda. This would give the Prussian ma

strike an annihilating blow to the vastly w

Kosen. Three French divisions could be h

Prussian divisions and thrown into the Saa

serve still available. That this did not ha

the fact that the Duke of Brunswick, the com

who was well informed of the battle conditio

verely wounded and that the King, on who

had devolved, had not the nerve to continue 

ing been’left in the lureh by all the assista
gg, 

ing to the problem entrusted to him, but had bee

into a eombat with changed front against forces a

times as strong as his own and via5 compietely b

was also Rtichel. 

Napoleon’s battle plan could not succeed, acc

ordinary human caiculations. He had turned too so

principal attack had been dire&ed against a second

in a not very effective direction. Nevertheless he 

annihilating victory because the at~tack was still 

against the original frank, and hence, the retreat to 

could be executed only in a wide curve along the sh

dius of which the pursuer could reach, undisturbed a

ly, the same objective. 

It would have been strange if Napoleon’s a

erick’s turning movements, flank and rear attacks, 

been imitated by their opponents. Prince van Hildb

sen bad received full recognition in 1’751 for the 

Prague. The commander-in-chief of 64,000 Impe

French troops thought that he could easily turn a

a crushing victory upon the 21,600 Prussians at R

The turning movement, however, encoumered anoth

ing movement and the planned attack met with a 

attack. Covered by a ridge, the Prussians came 

surprised and threw themselves from all sides on 

of the narrow marching columns, while strong bat

against the deep flank prevented deployment. F

himself had shown that his turning movements co

be parried by an attack. Napoleon acted in the sa

The allied Russians and Austrians thought t

would find Napoleon with 15,000 men on 5 Decemb

in a position difilcult to attack, on the Erunn-Olmutz 

in rear of the Goldbaeh (Goldbrook) between Kritsc

Kobelnitz. They decided to keep the hostile front on 

road occupied by a demonstration by Bagration 

men) from Holubitz, by the Russian reserve unde
Prybyshevsky from northeast, Kolovrat from 

60,000 men in all, and attack the hostile 

Schlapanitz and Turas. This turning move

been successful had Napoleon not left 

Prince Charles of Lorraine at Leuthen or 

mor at Zorndorf, and if the fords of the 

have been crossed without resistance. Nei

the other condition was fuhilled. Napoleo

ing:s ot Telnitz, Dorf, and Schloss-Sokoln

Margaron with five battalions and twelve 

decided to attack with Soult (one half of L

at Kobelnitz, St. Hilaire at Puntowitz an

Jirkowitz), Lannes (the divisions Caffarell

the Olmutz road), and Murat with the res

inforced by Kellermann between Soult an

first line, with the grenadier division (Ou

St. Hilaire, and Madotte’s corps (divisi

Rivaud) in rear of Vandamme in the 

with the Guard, in the t.hird line, striking 

Aank of the turning columns, after having 

immediately opposite them. The plan was 

tirely as he had thought it’ out. Kienma

Langeron, and Prybyshevsky had already 

reached the Goldbach with the heads of the

wrat, however, had been held back by Kutus

commander-in-chief, and had just begun his 

nitz via Pratze when Soult ascended the com

north of the village and surprised him by 

wrat’s column was attacked in front by S

flank, by Vandamme. In spite of the unf

in which he was thus placed, the Austrian 

in deploying his troops and resisting the 

Map 15. hours, He was forced to retreat via Zbe

only when Rernadotte’s Division Drouet a

flank. Threatened in the left flank, the 
by the Divisions Rivaud and Caffarelli; and last

d-ion, who had opposed an obstinate resistance to 

suing Lannes in the pass at the Posorwitz post, i

move on unmolested to Austerlitz, while Liehten

Grand Duke Constantine reached at Krzenowitz, 

bank of the Littawa creek, 

Of the three turning columns, Kienmayer 

turoff had, in the meanwhile, forced a crossing

lengthy combat, over the GoIdbaeh at Telnitz, La

Dorf, and Prybyshevsky at Schloss-Sokolnitz, an

cupied with part of their forces the height situa

west. They were, however, prevented from adva

ther by Davout, who had arrived to reinforce 

with the Division Friant and the dragoons of 

from Great Raigern. Only a numerically inferior 

Frenchmen was opposed here to the mass of the 

it succeeded not only in maintaining its position, 

in gaining advantages. For this compressed m

not gain ground to deploy and make use of its s

The full disadvantage of their position came 

only when Napoleon had forced Kolowrat to re

sent Soult with two and one half divisions, fo

Oudinot, against the right flank of the turning 

while himself occupying with the corps of Berna

the Guard, the heights of Pratze. St. Hilaire and 

who had been directed towards Sokolnitz, placed 

column under Prybyshevsky in the worst position

Russian battalions were thrown hastily against 

ing attack, but were annihiIated by the superi

Others endeavored to escape to the west across 

bacb and came under the cross fire of Davout’

Hilaire’s artillery. The entire column was eithe

nated or taken captive. Langeron, however* obta

through these battles, to save, via Telnitz, 

battalions which had remained east of the cree
witz, via I*ieudcrf and Ottnitz. 

Napoleon boasted that he had broken 

in the center at Austerlitz and scattered 

directions. It is, however, difficult t.o rec

through ix scatterirng of the enemy fro

2 December. The allies were assemble

south of the Lit&ma. The French army

was divided into two parts. The main for

the defeated enemy between Monitz and 

a smaller force (Lannes and Murat) was 

Olmutz rm.d nea,r the post office of Posorw

written to Souit early on the 3d : “The Em

himself in person to the heels of the enem

nothing has been achieved in war as long 

something to be done. A victory is not com

can be achieved.” Napoleon did not pay 

this rule hi:mseif. Touch with t,he enem

Iosl on the 2d. It seemed that Napoleon h

in the belief that he had scattered the en

tions. hccording!y, he let Sou!t and Ber

3 December in a southern direction, and L

in the direction of Blmutz. The pursuit i

tion proved soon to be an airy notion. T

suit thus lost its importance. This, how

consequence. The defeated enemy was s

Emperor Francis arrived on the 4th, in p

on’s camp and sued for an armistice. The 

litz would have sufficed, even without a pur

of the field, not only the allied Russo-Aus

also the advancing Archduke Charles, the 

ments, and the Prussian army. 

A similar picture to the campaign of 

ed us by that of Prussian-Eylau, althoug

different.(G) 

‘8’See “Campaign of Prussian-EyIau,” Vol. 2 
of the OmuleE and the Passarge. The positions wer

occupied, the quart,ers not yet taken up, when Benni

commander-in-chief of the allies, broke camp. 

sen on the Narew and a weak detachment under Se

ky at, Gonionds, he marched in two columns betw

Mazurian lakes, accompanied on the right by the P

under L’Estocq, against the left wing of the ene

French, standing in deep and extended formation

surprised, but retreated in a southern direction 

many losses, The allies followed d reached by 31 

the line : Freystadt - Deutsch- au - Osterode 

stein. They bad succeeded, as well as N lean o

oeeas1ons, in completely gaining one of the 

The position seemed most favorable. d they 

to attack successfully, they would throw the enem

the Vistufa, the Bug, and the neutral Austrian 

His complete a~~~h~~atio~ could then be hoped f

Eeennigsen was neither strong nor bold enough for 

enterprise, He hoped to be 

tre.at beyond the Vi&la by 

self and the hostile right wing by 

ever, did not go back, but answered one tur 

by another, a threatened attack by a real a 

ered himself with one corps (Lannes and Beker) 

Essen, and turned with the rest against the prin

emy. This movement was greatly facilitated by 

sition and distribution of the troops in cantonme

the beginning of January, the advan French li

on the line : Nlyszgniec-~~rillenberg ho~zel~e~

burg-Xeumark. The French had turned the 

well as he had turned them. Whichever attac 

conquered the other, would throw the enemy in 

case against the Vistula and the Bug, in the other

the Haff. Bennigsen would not permit this. Hi

had not yet been cut off. could go back to Ko

or, via Wehlau, to TiEsit. was, however, app
October. The enemy stood, not left of the 

the Alle. Napoleon could, by advancing 

in his battalions-in-square formation, brin

standstill at the first serious obstacle, even 

succeeded in evacuating in time the recen

tion on the Alle, could turn him and attac

most favorable circumstances. The ene

not seem desirous of abandoning his positio

On 4 February, he was to be attacked 

the left flank as well as in the rear over 

situated below him. Bennigsen did not 

but started to retreat in the night. The roa

threatened too much. He therefore went 

and wanted to reach the road to Wehlau by 

Wolfsdorf, Landsberg, and Friedland. N

Of his six corps commanders, Lannes had b

cover the right flank against Essen; Berna

cover the left flank and secure Thorn, had 

too long. Ney, Augereau, and Soult pursu

enemy on two sides and fell on his rear, tho

intended to do so. Davout aIone remained 

the entire army ought to have taken to “cu

the enemy and “press against his left flank

sent to the left also in pursuit of the Prus

L’Estocq. All attempts to push Soult over 

to Davout remained unsuccessful. Augere

ciently strong to break the resistance of 

guard. This would not have been importa

Hannibal’s point of view, if, Augereau, u

had even to recede a little. The flanking 

and Soult would then have been more effe

called Soult time and again to the main ro

suit. The enemy, whom he wanted to “cut 

had to be driven back more rapidly. 
sions at Beisleiden and one at Bartenstein. Bennigs

that, on account of the sharp turn to the east of t

land-Wehlau road, from Prussian-Eylan, he wou

able to ward off an attack against his left flank 

continue on his march. He decided to accept the 

attack not on the march but in a good position. 

Napoleon did not intend to make use of the a

offered him by the peculiarities of the road, but 

continue the pursuit, as heretofore, with advance 

guard combats. Ney was, consequently, sent ag

the Prussians. Only the sight of the Russians 

come up to the heights east of Prussian-Elau, made 

tion clear. The position was still very favorable. 

emy stood, like Terentius Varro, with a narrow 

deep formation. Had Napoleon assembled his f

would have been able to attack the enemy, who 

almost equal strength to his own, with Augereau 

Guard in front, with Soult and perhaps also with N

right, and with Davout on the left flank, while Mu

faI1 upon the rear. Chances for the annihilation 

emy were as good as at Cannae. Napoleon, how

tended differently. Augereau was to attack the f

vout the left flank, while Soult was to cover his o

the Guard and Murat remaining behind as reserv

two corps were designated for the conquering o

strong position. These forces were insufficient the 

as they did not attack simultaneously, but one co

the other. The dense masses, led by Augereau, un

of a snow storm, almost reached the Russian pos

were thrown back by a devastating canister fire 

tered by infantry and cavalry. Murat saved only 

A new advance against the front was impossibIe. 

had to limit himself to repulsing a counterattack. 

succeeded, however, in gaining some advantage 

lively and costly attack of the Russian left flank. 

was, in the meanwhile, not sufficiently occupied 
or the desire to renew the attack. Napol

calied Ney ; and Bennigsen had called L

Prussians. One of the two was to bring t

one or the otker side. Ney did not com

though bringing but few troops, arrived 

hour. The right wing of Davout was t

later his center, with the assistance of the 

armies stood in the evening opposite eac

the same position as in the morning. Ther

and no vanquished. On the following day B

his retreat towards Konigsberg. Napole

slowly. However, unable to continue the 

went back soon. 

The day of Prussian-Eylau marked a 

Napoleon’s life as a general. The series of 

tles-Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena-doe

The campaign of Pultusk, planned in a sim

of Jena, had miscarried completely. This c

by extraordinarily dif%cult circumstances. 

Eylau had likewise not succeeded. Nev

land(7) (14 June, lW?) may still be con

cessful battle of annihilation. But Napole

not attribute the victory in full to his own 

had prepared the success too weli. The Rus

aimiessly, even blunderingly, inadvertently, 

land, took up a position with their rear to t

accepted t’ne attack of the enemy, twice a

Qn account of numerical superiority of the 

attack developed of itself an attack against 

An attack against the other Wank might like

place, had not too great forces been placz

Nevertheless the result was a powerful o

to this, the Russians set on fire the suburb 

and the bridge over which they had to pa

“‘See “Campaign of Friedland.” Vol. II “Co
piaced in his hand by the enemy himself. 

Napoleon seems to strive to maintain in his 

paigns, the method to which he owed many b

cesses. It was so in the Regensburg campaign of 1

Austrians intended to surprise the hostile armies

of Frenchmen and the troops of the Rhine Co

before their junction. On 10 April, Archduke Ch

ed, with 120,000 men in round numbers, the Inn 

and below it; on the 16th. forced a crossing over 

Landshut, against a Bavarian Division, and adva

direction of Kelheim in order to reach the right 

Danube, and unite there with two army corps (5

which were maxching from Bohemia under Be

defeat all the hostile detachments, situated to t

the river, and by marching upstream to rende

the position which the hostile main forces inten

cupy beyond the Lech. This was the answer to 

campaign against &!Caek. The French had to b

the south and, if possibIe, to the east. 

When Napoleon arrived on the 17th, at the 

war, he found the Bavarians, under Lefebvre, in 

the lower Abens. Behind them and further along 

the Division Demont was at Ingolstadt; t.he Ca

sion Mansouty at Neuburg, the Wurttembergians 

damme at Donauworth; the Division Rouyer (th

the smalI Rhine states) at Nordlingen; Massena 

not on the Lech, between Augsburg and Land

Davout north of Regensburg. The advanee of th

did not give much promise, considering the cond

fairs. Ingolstadt and Regensburg were invested 

emy, the bridge at Kelheim was destroyed; it w

the construction of a new bridge somewhere be

two points would be opposed by hostile troops on 

‘*‘See Mayerhoffer von Vedropolje. K. & K. Kriegsa

1809. Wienna 1907. Vol. I. Regensburg. 
let could be found only through a rapid ret

plete overpowering of one of the three enem

duke saw the situation eiearly when, marchin

columns, he reached on the 13th, the locality 

sena was still too distant for an attack ag

Bavarians, advancing against the Abens an

their reserves, would have rendered the po

Map 19. emy still worse. The Archduke decided to m

vout with his main forces and to annihiiate 

sistance of Bellegarde. The plan would hav

if the bridge over the Danube at Regensbu

cessible to Bellegarde. This necessary cond

ist. Davout had crossed over to the right b

ube and marched from Regensburg on t

holding the fortified city with a garrison. B

fight for his crossing. Until then the Arch

pose Davout with his own forces only. O

were availabie. After the crossing of the 

sent with 26,000 men to Ma&burg to cover t

Vecsey with 6000 men to GeiseIhoring for 

the right wing. Archduke Ludwig, with 

despatched to Siegenburg, and General Th

via Ogenstetten against the Abens. There 

men to fight Davout’s 57,000. This was a 

riority far from adequate for the solution o

is apparent that the Archduke had greatly e

essary limits, by sending out the flank cover

and, in weighing the fighting power destine

emy, had fallen short just as much. It may 

excuse that other generals in similar situa

Napoleon, had done scarcely better in 181

however, did not help him over the fatality o

ought to have had a far greater force than 63

a decision. The problem here was to anni

best of the French Fieldmarshals and one o
perate. Fortunately, the enemy was not willing to 

advantage of this desperate situation. 

Moltke has said : “The junction of separate a

the battlefield I consider the greatest feat which 

leadership can achieve.” Napoleon succumbed u

high demand on the leader four years later at Leips

second time, six years later at Waterloo. He ough

felt the effectiveness of such a junction, yet he 

wish then to use this means. He remained faithfu

method of leading the entire army against the fla

rear of the enemy. Supposing that the Archduk

turn against Davout at Regensburg, the central arm

deploy left of the Abens, Davout on the right of the 

(9) advance from Regensburg to Neustadt and Oud

the right wing from Augsburg, via Pfaffenhofen. 

himself soon doubted the possibility of executing 

march to the front in the vicinity of the enemy, a

its conforming to his purpose. Massena had reac

the head of his long column (Oudinot) Pfaffenhofe

Igth, and dislodged from this point a hostile det

Would it be better to send him on the following da

stadt or would it not be more simple to push him str

Au against the rear of the enemy? Napoleon d

the recourse of letting Massena’s coIumn deploy on 

near Pfaffenhofen, although the twisted skein had 

ravelled again on the following day in some dir

other. 

The Archduke wanted likewise to advance on Re

on the 19th, in order to annihilate Davout with 

tance of Bellegarde. Davout, however, without c

(*‘Bringing Davout on the left bank towards Ingolsta

been pIarmed, would have robbed Napoleon of all the advant

position and saved the Archduke from all his difficulties. 

could have joined Bellegarde on the right or left, according 

sire and gained secure communications. Davout’s march 

right bank was absolutely necessary. However, he oug

been directed straight against the enemy, whom Napole

weaker than he was in reality, and not ordered to turn his f
Austrian side the following were to march : 

Hausen and Teugn; Rosenberg with a flank 

Schne art to Saalhaupt and with the mai

ling; htensteixa via Ssnding; Veosey fr

Regensburg. The Archduke hoped to rea

~Olker~~g-Abba~h~ ahead of the enemy an

oint imtil the arrival of Bellegarde. 

quicker, made the two columns turn to the 

proach of the enemy so as to reach the Reg

berg road via Teugn and Lower Saal. T

vision (Morand) reached this road witho

The second (&din) reached the goal on

combats, though not severe ones. The tIzi

however, was forced to turn to the left at T

2oIIern was advancing via IIausen. The Fr

mediately sent his entire force into battle, 

lern used only his advance guard, reinforci

by regiments and battalions, but could do 

the wider front of the enemy and was, in the 

the right wing by the fourth division, of F

heavy losses, he was forced to retreat to 

as far as the southern edge of the Fvooded ri

had to sustain with his two columns tedious, 

combats in the wooded terrain, which wa

serve, against Montbrun and against the 

out from Saalhaupt, allowed himself to be d

his main forces back. Lichtenstein, marc

Rosenberg, did not reach Sanding in the e

Schierling; and retreated, without combat, 

Veesey on the Regensburg road toward Hiih

‘iO)It: seems that Napoleon did not think that 

advmced quite so far on the 18th, but that be w

Eggmiihl road against Davout. So much the mo

for the latter to march against the enemy and bar 

burg. Should the offensive seem too hazardous 

could have awaited an attack in a position near W
, g p

Reissig, aad Schambaeh. Be&garde’s arr;-y had 

on the left of the Danube after a vain attac

Regensberg. 

Davout had skilfuliy avoided a general v

could not get out of the way of 8 partial one. 

obeyed the artificial order of the ErazperorU~

lowed the instinct of the soldier, he would not h

his two cohmns from Teugn and Saalhaupt to th

wards Lower Saal, but would have gone straight 

emy and defeated Rosenberg with two divisions 

had thrown back Efohenzo!lern with the same. 

latter had to retreat to Hausen, the other would 

to go at Ieast as far as Wellring and Paring, D

Lames would have resumed the attack on the 

day, while Napoleon with Lefebvre, Vandamme

and Namoutg would have advanced via Siege

burg, and Abensburg against Archduke Lr

Thierry, while Massena wauld have marc

Pfaffenhofen or, if possible, from Au (which 

have easily reached in the morning of the 19th) 

hausen. The campaign could have been ended 

ning and, at the latest on the 21st. Through push

to the side and holding back Massena the danger 

trians of being surrounded, was eliminated. T

pnents stood facing each other through in wide@ 

g+roups. Surrounding could no longer be thought 

H&enao&yn’s corps was threatened between D

Eannes in a rather critical position. An Austrian 

this wing, which was later urgently ~e~a~~e~d~d

no success. It is true that Dav~ut could have 

(“)Naooleon had brought his army, with the assis

~out’s flan*king march, to a strength of %S,OOL? men. Sinc

with this mass, on the following day, only the 24,500 men 

Ludwig and of General Thierry, the advantage obtaine

great lmpartance. It was far more important that Arch

had been delivered from the threatened attack of his Bank 

the possibility of joining BelIegarde. 
could have reviewed the entire situation in t

19th. He knew, however, that only under 

concentrating all his fighting strength wo

defeat an opponent who, as the previous b

had troops superior in numbers and in trai

urgent thing was to open a crossing at Rege

over Bellegarde with his 50,000 men. Unti

duke intended to be on the defensive. Rose

back Davout at first, Hohenzollern was to g

dorf over the Great Laaber, Thierry and A

join them in the night, and Hiller more to 

reached Mainburg, come up to cover the f

hausen. Archduke Charles thought that 

would be able to withstand, in a good posit

the left hostile flank. Lichtenstein was se

to open access to the Danube to Bellegarde. 

to attack the left hostile flank with 50,000 

The plan was surely not without hope of suc

tion not unfavorable. It shaped itself stil

on account of the measures taken by Na

translated Davout’s message of the 19th: 

tained the field of battle after severe figh

nemi bat en retraire a toutes jambes.” The 

in full flight, was to be pursued not only 

reins,” but cut off. Should this not be poss

the Isar, it should surely take place on the 

ceived the order to march to Freising on the 

reach Braunau, by s1 shorter route, befor

Not quite in conformity with the purpose 

not, who stood with Massena at Pfaffenho

taneously sent in an opposite direction to N

tial plan of assembling there the entire arm

ried out, at least in part, in spite of the s

situation, Massena and Oudinot were thu

of the French forces, placed out of the sco

at least two days. The Archduke would 
his better knowledge of the situation and on the r

corps commander to make independent decisions, 

want to give up the protection of the Landshut 

leave his position on the Abens. Contrary to the 

ceived, he remained there during the night and als

the foIlowing morning. When he began to under

the forenoon of the Z&h, the difficulties of his pos

was on the point of retreating, Lannes with the div

Morand and Gudin was already starting from Sc

Lefebvre with two Bavarian Divisions and Nanso

starting from Abensberg, Vandamme with Wr

Wurtembergers and Dumont were marching from 

in all, 75,000 men against the 24,500 Austrians 

as a cordon to the right of the Abens. Many of t

detachments were cut off and annihilated. The re

retreated towards Pfeff enhausen. Hiller, intendin

store the combat by a counter blow, marched by t

to Rottenburg, came here upon Lannes, and ret

Turkenfeld. The enemy followed by both road

Gieseltsehausen and Ludmansdorf. 

Napoleon still believed that the hostile main for

whose left wing he had just marched, were still r

towards Landshut and thought that he had scattere

guard covering this retreat. He hoped that, by t

an immediate pursuit on the 2&t, he would force t

hostile army to halt at the Landshut bridge. Mas

to advance from Freising on the right bank of the 

complete the annihilation. Lefebvre, with the Div

Demont and Deroi, was placed at Bach1 to reinforce 

and to protect the left flank against a possible attack 

legarde. 

In order to escape the threatened daom, Hiller a

duke Ludwig continued their retreat during the nigh

found at Landshut the roads and the entrances to 

completely bloeked by trains. OnIy with great diffic

loss of time could the task be overcome. Before t
after further retreat had started in orderly 

rear guard had left the heights situated o

The Austrians succeeded, though with grea

tinuing their march unmolested towards the 

Napoleon, seeing the enemy before him

messages sent him by Davout, was now co

had followed for two days with the grea

troops only a secondary army and that t

forces stood in his left rear. He decided 

pursuit of Hiller and Archduke Ludwig to 

15,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, to leave 

shut, and to march with 60,000 men on Eg

to surround Archduke Charles and annihila

On the ZOth, the latter had taken the II

zollern) beyond the Great Laaber without b

the enemy. Lichtenstein had succeeded in 

the capitulation of the weak garrison hold

which was threatened from both banks. 

with the left bank was thus restored. It mi

that Bellegarde would now cross the river 

attack with 50,000 men the left flank, 

Charles with 60,000 men would attack Davo

in front. In a most surprising manner on

under Kolowrat was on the spot while the 

distant, marching toward Neumarkt. Even 

did not cross the river, but started on the m

The order, given days before, to cross ov

bank of the Danube, is said to have been lo

not favorably impressed by recent events, 

ing the original plan of operations; he wa

Archduke on the left of the Danube in ord

enemy behind the Lech. Should it be impos

Map 22. cross, he couId do nothing better than forc

retreat by a diversion on the left bank. 

against Regensburg was considered a s

When the mistake or misunderstanding was 
order to annihilate or capture them. The fol

was sent, at the same time, to Lefebvre : “Pursu

the sword against their ribs.‘” In conformity wi

Davout marched on the Zlst, from Teugn to 

thence with Friant, via Hellring, to Paring and 

aire to Lanquaid. Lefebvre directed his march 

point from Bachl, Hohenzollern retreated, f

guard combats, beyond the Allersdorf creek s

Schierling. Rosenberg marched from Dinzling 

At the positians of Lindach, Upper Laichling, Up

on the one hand, and Allersdorf creek, Schierfi

the edge of the woods, on the other, serious 

place until dark with thrust and counter thru

Archduke Charles knew nothing on the ev

Zlst, of the retreat of Archduke Ludwig and 

Napoleon’s advance to Landshut. He was still 

the reinforcement of his left wing by the corp

generals and wanted to attack Napoleon with th

wrat, expecting the advance of the enemy from 

downstream along the Danube. Upon receiving 

in the night of Archduke Ludwig’s and Hiller’s 

not deem his position greatly damaged since a 

the French troops would be hampered by the 

Rosenberg was to maintain, on the ?Zd, his p

site Davout and Lefebvre, Vucassovieh to cover 

gade the left flank south of the Great Laaber, th

to remain in reserve at Xooshof, Kohenzollern 

from Alt-Eglofsheim to Dinzling, Lichtenstein 

kofen to Peising, KoEowrat from Upper Ming 

where there was only a small hostile detachme

the latter off by frontal attack. A success co

for if the projected movements had been begun 

ing. But, since it was necessary to await Kolo

possible to break up simultaneously only in the 

the time when Napoleon with 60,000 men, ma
g

the attack made by Lefebvre from Schierling, 

from Deggenbach, by Lannes via Rogging and 

cavalry which forded the stream at several po

to cross the Laaber and then recross it. Rose

ed on two sides by greatly superior num,bers

from the throttling embrace only through 

and great losses. Hohenzollern, as well as Lic

Map 24. to be called in, cavalry had to be opposed to the 

til it was possible to assemble the entire army 

night on the heights of Grass and at Burgwei

was no staying at that point either. A retre

bank of the Danube had to be effected in the ni

and with the aid of an emergency bridge. T

not yet completed when the morning dawned 

moved again. The Austrian cavalry, which h

riously the day before, was again forced to d

order to keep the enemy from the ponton brid

On the 25th, Archduke Charles has as

garde, Kolowrat, Hohenzollern, Rosenberg, 

stein at Cham behind the Regen. Killer and 

wig were at Alt-Otting behind the Inn, Na

against this part of the enemy. During t

fighting the Austrians had lost 40,000 me

opponent had lost only 16,000. 

To cause losses of one third of its streng

of 120,000 men and to scatter them in two 

point to the other, b;r an army of 180,000 m

been an enviable thing for any general. For 

had in his hands the means of completely an

army and “to close the matter with German

two to three days,” this was hardly sufficient. 

stood on the 17th with three armies of about 6

near Augsburg, along the Danube with the 

stadt and Regensburg. All he had to do w
ship could achieve. On 18 April, Massena reach

hofen. Lefebvre assembled his troops on the Ab

crossed the Danube at Regensburg. Massena 

reached Au on the 19th, Lefebvre could have clos

Davout coufd at least have occupied the position

Wolkering, on the right bank of the Danube, 

20th all three could have advanced against the e

ever he might be. The Archduke was, it is true

sition to turn against any one of the three opp

his entire force. Yet it would have been imposs

to assemble a greatly numerically superior force 

of his army was held back by the Bavarians p

Abens. He would have succeeded, at any rate, 

back one of his opponents. This would have a

little as it helped Terentius Varro at Cannae to 

the Iberians and Gauls. If it were impossible 

annihilate one of his opponents or to put him 

of the field, even a victory would not have save

being completely surrounded. Napoleon rejected 

measure of a concentric advance. He wished t

the tried method of assembling his entire army 

or on the Rank of the enemy. This method wh

him brilliant success at Marengo, Ulm, and J

could have achieved it at Prussian-Eylau, failed 

The enemy had already advanced too far to a

plete execution of the difficult advance. Hamp

plans, Napoleon was forced to make new plans 

because of the false information received by h

misleading ideas he formed about the enemy, 

duke acted in a similar way. Napoleon finally 

contest. And this is no wonder. He had a force 

perior in numbers in his favor. His troops we

dinarily fit for marching, superior to a11 other

in covered and broken terrain. His marshals 

orders, putting all their power into their exec

the Austrian commanders lacked in genera1 t

discipline for effective action. Above all, Nap
p

not only cut off the exit via Landshut too 

a new one via Regensburg. 

The final results of the April campaign 

trians had suffered severe losses, but were 

Four weeks later they opposed Napoleon a

him over the Danube at Aspern. Since Napole

ed to wage the offered annihilation battle, he 

plete the matter in Germany within two to 

required a campaign of several months, a w

only to the valley of the Danube, but extend

Italy, Poland, North Germany, and Holland, 

through the exhaustion of all forces, which 

attained with one blow. 

Napoleon several times more had the o

an annihilation battle. The attempt failed 

because of the length of his marching colum

ment and deployment of which took up too m

ing the days before Dresden he gave up timidf

had been elaborated with genius. Once mo

of the victor of Marengo awaken before Mo

leon gave up the turning of one flank, the cu

of retreat and the combat with changed fro

time on he went directly at his aim. This 

frontal attacks and attempts at piercing, 

tles, Borodino and Hanau, may be considere

purely frontal battles. He owed it to his a

was the victor in these combats. Notwithstan

es he suffered himself and inflicted on his op

Hanau did he reach actual success and further

paign. He succeeded here, though losing 19

ing 60,000 across the Rhine. At Borodino he 

off one kilometer backward. On the following 

the Russian general was able to continue an 

and Napoleon to continue an advance which 

disaster, both without molestation. 
success which could hardly have been obtained 

in masses against the Austrian front. The same 

have happened at Gross-Gorschen if the allied 

awaited the 3d of IVIay, left of the Elster. Suc

however were too small. At Wagram, the ex

both sides, more than the victory, brought abo

treaty. Striving after the best, Napoleon was fo

sembling on the battle field the scattered deta

proceeding which he had scorned at Regensburg. 

nothing new. Frederick the Great had come up

pedient” as early as 1760. 

On 2 November(l%, Daun had occupied, 

Austrians and a ‘“formidable artillery,” a positi

Siiptitz and west of Zinna. The ridge, only 800 m

sloping gently southward to Rohr-Graben, northw

Dommitzseher Heide and to the plain of the Elb

sidered impregnable in front, according to prev

ences. A special corps under Laesy was stationed 

of Torgau to cover the line of retreat, established 

flank. The King, whose 44,000 men were encam

gen Reichenbach, intended on 3 November, to hav

tack the hostile front with 18,000 men, while he 

the position in three columns across the Dommitzs

and deliver a rear attack. The march over the s

ha,mpered by the artillery, was very slow. Th

of the short November day had already come w

vance guard debouehed in the open near Neiden. 

too late for the columns marching on the left to 

ward Zinna over the difficult roads of the plain 

The King thought to have sufficient time to go 

with the brigades, in echelons, as they came up o

other. The unsuccessful attacks were repulsed o

ot.her and severe losses sustained. The army 

the evening beyond the Strienbach. Zieten, unea

‘“Z’See SuppEtsment to MilitSir-Woehenblatt 1897, 

Battk of Torpau. 
by another. Suptitz was occupied and the 

after this the storming brigade was forced 

case shot. All success seemed impossible. 

however, had suffered likewise and were sh

that Zieten’s artillery fire hit them from the 

that of the King struck them from the sou

rear. It was found advisable to draw the tro

ern flank, after dark, out of the encircling 

Zinna. This movement was noticed by Gen

taken advantage of by him on his own resp

other attack. Zieten made the other troop

the other front, generals and staff office

brought their troops against the flank and 

trians engaged in combat with Zieten. Tw

ions, assembled at the last moment, pushed 

and more against Zinna. The following m

treated from Torgau to Dresden. The Au

annihilated, but put aside for a long time. 

emies of the King, the Imperial army and t

appeared in a similar way. The field was 

important thing, however, was that the opin

vail in Vienna that it was impossible to fin

versary. The King owed this brilliant su

pendent zeal of his officers, which no mish

their desire to conquer, to the fighting lus

and most of all, to the fire against rear an

attack from two sides, which even the brav

stand for long. 

The Russian General Bennigsen had 

ored to assemble several separate army un

field. In the first days of June, 1807, Napole

corps of Bernadette and Soult behind the 

Davout south of Allenstein-O&erode, wit

Map 26. army in rear of the latter up to the Vistul

with Ney’s corps as advance guard in the 
q g, g

ticipate the attack of his adversary and annihilate 

lated Ney. On 5 June were sent forward: Remb

one division of the secondary corps against the br

of Spaden to keep back Bernadotte, and Dochtor

two divisions against the bridgehead of Lemitten 

Soult. The former was repulsed, the second took th

head of Lemitten; both sustained great losses, but 

their order to draw off the two marshals. Since Da

too far away to join in the combat, the annihilating 

against Ney could be undertaken. For this purp

advance on 5 June was to be as follows: Saeken w

divisions and strong cavalry, followed by the G

Wolfsdorf via Arnsdorf ; Bagration with the advan

from Launau via Gronau to Altkireh; Gortschak

half a division to Guttstadt along the right ban

Alle; Platow with his Cossacks and half a division 

genthal via Bergfriede. When Bagration reached 

nothing was to be seen of the other columns. He d

await them before beginning the attack. This g

time to assemble his scattered detachments and, w

ken appeared two hours later at Wolfsdorf, he ha

on an orderly retreat. It would still have been p

cut off the Marshal if Sacken had led his column

superior in numbers to that of the enemy, via W

Deppen or Heiligenthal. Sacken however, joined B

The guard had been withdrawn some time before t

dorf via Petersdorf; the entire army was then a

and the advance to Queetz begun. Platow had, in t

while, broken into the retreating French trains. T

ever, did not deceive Ney. He halted at Ankend

awaited the attack which the adversary, exhausted 

marches, had no longer the strength to deliver. 

“Slowly and unbelievably cautiously” did the 

advance toward Ankendorf on the 6th. When they 

ed both flanks with their superior numbers, Ney 
g

attack and because Sacken had been afra

dependently against his flank or rear and h

the center, thus arriving likewise before hi

ter was considered as the most guilty, was 

martial and sentenced to dismissal, but w

and reinstated. This measure had not mu

too many generals were not afraid to comm

takes as Bragration and Sacken. Even now 

detachments have the beloved habit of pres

fore the enemy’s front before stnrting the 

to countera,ct this, it behooves the superior 

the inevitable disparity in time between t

unit before the front and of the other in 

as short as possible and give orders adeq

pose. 

Even Napoleon had never solved this 

He endeavored to assemble his forces on t

only threatening the enemy on his front, 

unit was advancing from afar for a flanki

could succeed when the enemy attacked 

army unit arrived rapidly. It did not suc

emy preferred to await the attack and the 

held back by a hostile detachment. It wa

to overthrow without much ado the check

if the latter did not yield to that “without 

time was lost, the entire plan of junction 

tack speedily recognized, the decision not a

treat of the doomed enemy took place, befo

be drawn tight. This happened almost ide

berg(l3) and Dresden(l3) with the intended 

Ney and Vandamme, When, however, at 

‘la’See “1813” in Vol. II of the “Collecte

Marshal intended to include in the projected book 

1813, beginning with the armistice, as “this cam

great Cannae.” 
recognized : a frontal attack must take place simult

with a flank attack. The enemy must be fully oc

as to be wholly unable to avoid the flank attack. 

tack is made by the enemy who is to be turned, like 

Marengo, Hohenlohe at Jena, Napoleon at Wat

much the better; if not, the other side must decid

the burden upon itself. 

The manner of turning or surrounding a’t 

Lowenberg, and Dresden depended on the maneuv

the enemy to the rear. If the throwing back of t

in the direction contrary to natural communica

Marengo, Urn, and Jena was fatal, yea, annihilating 

vanquished, the maneuvering backward in the dir

natural communications was more injurious for t

than for the defeated, The victories of Gross-Gors

Bautzen and the long drawn out retreat of the alli

Napoleon to detach numerous units and flank gu

solved gradually the army of recruits and oblige

make an armistice which was just as welcome to 

but who could have done without it more easily tha

endeavored to take advantage of two vietorious b

an uninterrupted pursuit. 

After the end of the armistice the situation had 

completely. The problem which devolved on Nap

the spring, or which he had chosen himself: i.e., th

bring of separated armies on the field of battle, de

August en the Allies. They had surrounded Napole

ing bet,ween Dresden and Liegnitz, with the Northe

in Berlin, the main army in Silesia and the Austri

in Bohemia, although they were at a respectful dist

would have been a simple matter for the great wa

draw out of the threatened surrounding and then 

one of the hostile armies with numerical superiority 

This is what Frederick the Great had done in 1760 

more dangerous situation. The King stood on 
, 

the main army against the right flank, La

left flank, Lascy against the rear and to h

front with the light troops of Generals Rie

the very same night, however, the King ma

Liegnitz and rested east of the city near 

Panten in order to continue the march early 

The approach of Laudon who was crossing 

three columns in close vicinity of the Prussi

ly reported during this rest. There was t

occupy a hill-the Rehberg, situated oppos

vance, to ward of? the first impact and th

Austrians while they were winding slowly 

cult defiles of the Katzbach. Before they c

were thrown back across the river in spite 

cal superiority (30,000 against 14,000). I

the main army under Daun, which was to c

was held back at the Schwarzwasser by Zie

The force at his disposition did not suffice 

served profiting by the victory. Enough w

the Russians recrossed the Oder and the th

Austrians forces modestly retreated perm

to march off and to join Prince Henry. 

NapoIeon(l4) was in a much more fa

than Frederick. The ratio of his forces to th

was not less than 1:3, but more than 4 :5. It 

easy.for him to execute an operation simila

battle of Liegnitz. To retreat, even for 

vanquishing, seemed below his dignity. 

remained between the three adversaries

could do it unhesitatingly. The allies ha

,true, to advance from three sides against 

That army, which was to attack Napoleon 

fall back while the two others were to att

(lalSee “1813” of Vol. II of the “Collected W

Sup. to MilitSir-Wochenblatt 1906, No,. 6, The Ba
y g p

danger threatening him. Schwarzenberg, conside

forced from Silesia, intended, not exactly to mo

the enemy, but to turn him in a wide curve, to im

certain degree the maneuvering at Marengo, Ulm, 

certainly not with a determined intention to attac

a modest one of threatening, of making a demon

diversion. This would have placed the cautious 

great danger if the sun of Austerlitz were still sh

rays. But he was already beginning to go dow

leon did not keep the main part of his army in one 

mass in order to strike a decisive and annihilating 

favorable point, but divided his strength pret

among his three opponents. All the mistakes o

no matter how many, could not render this fatal m

less. Whatever opportunities might have prese

selves to renew the days of Marengo, Ulm, and 

forces were lacking which would have inspired t

of decision and which would have allowed the exec

ingenious plan. All attempts to wage a battle of 

tion were abandoned. The eombats on the p

French were limited to what Napoleon called fo

“ordinary battle,” to frontal attacks and attempts 

ing through the enemy. The piercing detachme

against the enemy, suffered reverses. The allies 

Hesitatingly, timidly, it is true, but they advance

ever the Emperor appeared in person, they retre

personality alone kept back every attack. W

turned his back to attend to another side, the o

afiairs was resumed. Tired and exhausted, he 

Dresden. He thought, in resignation, to await 

storm. This show of weakness gave courage to 

Blucher crossed the Eibe to march with the Crow

Leipzig for the junction with the main army. 

thing which Marengo, Ulm, and Jena had pre
leon could not possibly await the result of th

centration in Dresden. In the beginning h

of deciding upon the operation which has b

the battle of Liegnitz or upon another proce

was forced to follow the example given by 

ought to have rushed between the two ene

desirous of turning him on the right and the 

repulse the one and to annihilate the other. 

have the time to withdraw in a brilliant m

destruction threatening him, taking into c

slowness and indecision of the allies. He, h

to use another means. Like had to be oppos

cher and the Crown Prince wanted to cut off 

munications to the rear. Well and good, he w

to them. The calculation had not entirely m

Crown Prince was immediately ready to esc

ed surrounding by a hasty retreat. BIucher

by his decision, pulled the Crown Prince in 

achieved thus the junction with the main 

formed the hostile turning movement into a 

When Napoleon realized his mistake, the mi

There remained for him only to seek to br

enemy at some point or other. A lucky cha

ing resolutions of the enemy brought him t

a victory and with it “le monde va tourner e

could be seized with the hand, as it seeme

necessary was to defeat, early on 16 Octob

138,000. This was a problem, the solution 

surely have been entrusted to Napoleon. Ho

utterly. All that he achieved was the holdin

reserves which were used one by one wher

pared, as well as a frontal attack which was 

after the enemy had been reinforced and al

had thus been eliminated. Instead of placin
pp

g

trophe had overtaken him, The second followed in 

campaign of 1815 which shows up as none other 

culiarities of Napoleon’s strategy of the later peri

The allied powers of Europe intended to penet

France with the right wing from the Netherlands, 

left. from Basle in a concentric movement. Napole

ed with 122,000 men and surprised the nearest and 

pared right wing of the enemy. Here stood in 

positions the army of the Duke of Wellington wit

men (36,000 Germans, 32,500 English, 24,500 Dutc

the base in Antwerp to the right of the Seheldt up to 

Brussels and Binehe (east of &Ions), as well as the 

army under Blucher of 123,000 men with the corps 

Pireh, and Bulow along the Sambre and the Me

above Charleroi down to below Liege with the 

ThieXmann in the bend of the Meuse at Dinant, Na

Andenne. The French army, assembled between 

ville and Beaumont, crossed the Sambre at Chatel

leroi, and Marchienne on 15 June. The advanced 

detachments retired to Fleurus. An advance guard 

them as far as Lambnsart, while another went to 

The former saw the Prussians immediately before 

latter had to wait to find the English on the road fro

rebras to Brussels. With the available strength it w

the question to defeat the two opponents. The 

could consist only in annihilating first one adversa

least defeating him decisively and cutting him off 

allies entirely, while remaining on the defensive 

to the other opponent in order to deal with him in 

manner after extermination of the former. A do

whom to attack-the Prussians or t,he English-co

arise considering the nearness of the former. It w

ble that they could not come up in full strength on t

ing day. According to Napoleon’s principle of 

strong as possible in combat, it was imperative to 
for defeating BIucher. Napoleon did not s

the opinion of his subordinate. On the 16

to throw back the Prussians with the corp

and Gerard, the cavalry of Pajol, Excelman

41,600 men, while Ney was to march fro

Quatrebras with the corps of ReilIe and Erl

alry of Lefebvre and Kellermann, 53,000 m

attack the English, should this be necessary

wanted to follow Grouchy with the guar

Lobau with 10,000 being left at Charleroi un

He did not count on any stubborn resistance. 

get together 40,000 men at the most. The

drive on the 16th, beyond Gembloux and 

Grouchy for complete destruction, while h

the night with the Guard, join Ney, and m

to which the English would flee at break

thought to enter the Belgian capital as ea

The proclamations to be issued there were 

These were beautiful thoughts, reminiscence

forth by a vivid imagination, throwing into 

the seriousness of the moment. At closer 

it seemed doubtful to him that Grouchy’s 4

if 16,500 of the Guard were added to the

for a decisive combat. The impending ba

Prussians had to be considered as such. 

more than 40,000, all depended upon separa

the English, delivering them an annihilating 

veloping the rest of the Prussian army in t

when Blucher had been entirely eliminated, 

turn with all his strength against the Eng

Brussels. He would surely have encountere

ther resistance. 

According to this estimate, the Divi

Reille’s Corps-5000 men-was added to 

forces were thus brought to 46,000 men. 
, , 

all 16,000 men. The decision of two battles which 

begin in the afternoon was expected from these 

which were in rather extended positions. 

The Prussians, left to Zhemselves, would proba

done best to eontinue to retreat with their advance

until all their troops had been assembled on the ba

But even a short retreat would have caused the E

take the road to Brussels and to their ships. The P

dared not retreat, even if Wellington had not prom

support and appearance on the hostile flank for the a

of the IGth, and even had the fulfillment of this prom

still more improbable. Gneisenau wanted, there

halt at Fleurus. He consented, after urgent appe

the Corps of Zieten be taken to the hill between the 

of Lingy, St. Amand, and Brye. It was difficult 

more unfavorable position. It is true that it allowed 

of artillery to advantage and counted in its zone 

lages, large villages at that, indispensable for th

tactics of the period. This, however, did not com

for the disadvantage of a narrow front and a de

The position was worthy of a Terentius Varro. 

bound to be surrounded, whether the adversary wan

not. Oue flank he was forced to envelop, to enve

was an easy matter. Should the latter take place

fense was lost. Should there also be a Hasdrubal 

tacking the rear, for which no less than three caval

ought to have been made available, the highest ai

have been attained. On the eve of his fall, Napo

given an opportunity for a battle of annihilation suc

not arisen during the 19 years of his career. 

Zieten occupied the position, Pirch was posted in 

as a reserve. Thielmann was to secure the heights 

Sombreffe and Tongrinne. He formed here a rese

lon which seemed able to protect Zieten’s left flank 
He was out of the battle. Ouly Pajol, Excel

Gerard’s divisions were designated to cut h

other divisions of this general were to atta

at Ligny, while Vandamme and Gerard at

at St. Amand. The Guard and Milhaud 

serves, at Fleurus, and still further in rear w

the battle itself 60,000 men were design

almost equal force of the enemy. The Pru

deed be beaten in that way, but not annihilat

from the English. In order to attain that, 

first of all, to attack the right flank. Whe

forced to recognize this neeessity, he ordered 

up. Souit was to write to the Marshal : “Yo

envelop the enemy’s right flank. That arm

attack vigorously. The fate of France rests 

and then: “take direction on the heights o

Brye.” Ney was already fighting the Englis

He could not break loose from them, even ha

the ambiguous order to attack the opposing 

sion, rout him, and then hasten to give a dec

Prussians. The Marshal was not in a pos

enemy. On the contrary, one of his divisions 

to retreat. He attempted to bring the co

still by a desperate cavalry charge. How

the support of fresh troops to attack again 

my and defeat him. The corps of Erlon 

The latter had, however, by direct order o

sent marching toward Brye. Ney sent hi

to return immediately. Erlon obeyed, 

Durutte continue the march toward the 

reached Ncy when the latter had retreated 

advent of darkness. Durutte also reached 

Amand when all was at an end at Ligny. 
other brigades were fighting at Ligny against Gera

divisions until, finally, the ereek marked the frontier 

friend and foe. Bleacher hoped to decide the battle b

tack against tine left flank of Vandamme. Two brig

Pireh occupied Wagnelee and after a combat fluc

baek and forth, occupied Le Hameau. They could n

trat.e farther, after Yandamme and Gerard had be

forced by three brigades of the Guard. The cav

Jurgass and Marwitz was also checked by Damon an

vie. When neither Ney, Erlon, nor Durutte appea

the Prussians had sent their last reserves into battle 

evenFnw came on, Napoleon led the rest of his Gu

Milhau> back to Ligny. The two Prussian brigades

order, could not withstand the fresh forces and the 

numbers. The riflage, enveloped from two sides, wa

The entire positicn could no longer be held. D

cavalry attacks could not save the day. FortunateI

was unoccupied. The troops could retreat through 

lage and past it in t.he direction of Tilly without much 

The execution of the initial plan of halting here 

newing the battle of the following day, had to be ab

on accourat of the condition of the troops. Zieten an

continued in the night their retreat toward Wavre. 

were protected a.gainst all attack by a rear guard w

eupied Brye and by the Thielmann Brigade which 

position at Sombreffe in the evening, Bulow comin

Liege, reached Ardanelle with his advance guard, 

left his main forces at Souveniere. Thiehnann mar

3 $0 AM, on the following day to Gembloux. Both 

only the main body of the army on the next afternoon. 

Ney was forced to retreat at Quatrebras before W

ton, while Napoleon had won a victory at Ligny. T

however, what Napoleon himself deemed, onIy an “o

victory.” A general, however, who desired to reconq

Iost dominion of the world, could not ma.ke anything 
, pp, 

Antwerp and to his ships. The campaign 

quickly to an end at tlnis junction. Everyt

on a battle of annihilation at Ligny. C

as favorable as possible for it. For the p

close as possible to the promised English 

sians had selected a position in which the

pended solely upon the judgment and pl

my. If Napoleon could not or would not 

the position in full, there remained to h

urgent problem of separating the Prussia

glish and of attacking the former on the 

Guard and Lobau would have sufficed he

sent early enough in the decisive direct

counterorders did not prevent Napoleon 

at Ligny, but they did keep him from annih

the Prussian army and from entirely sep

sians from the English. On the contrary, 

separated armies to join each other. Until 

its line of communications toward Bruss

the other toward Liege and the Rhine. N

in the same direction toward Brussels. 

this two weak and divided enemies. At 

ded with a greatly superior and almost 

Such was the actual situation. Another 

Napoleon’s mental view. According t.o t

in his mind’s eye, not two, but four Prussia

been beaten and had retreated either to L

appeared entirely from the battle field, or 

sels, beaten and greatly shaken, not to be ta

ation for several days. From this erron

he drew the following extraordinary conc

my, who has completely disappeared or be

less, must be pursued by more than one t

the other opponent, who had just repulsed 

be beaten with the remaining insufficient 
y y g gp

forces, beating him a second time or attempting 

him to absolute dissolution and then by turning 

Wellington who had been observed and kept busy 

lesser part of the troops. Should Napoleon have w

go immediately against Wellington, he ought to ha

the greater number of his soldiers, detaching only 

part for the pursuit of Blucher. The former mov

have brought about a battle at Wavre, the latter a 

battle of Waterloo. The outlook for the former w

since half of the Prussian. army had been shake

poleon could have used so much the greater prepon

of troops, as Wellington employed disproportionately 

bodies of troops for unjustifiable secondary aims. 

the prospect was good. The circumstances grew wo

at Wavre and at Water-Zoo, when Blucher arrived at 

point and Wellington at the other for the suppor

threatened comrade. Blucher showed that he was fi

problem. It is doubtful if Wellington would have 

his line of communications and the immediate prote

Brussels and Antwerp, had these been threatened 

little, which was doubted, at the time, by Gneise

mareh on Wavre promised quickest success. 

Napoleon had placed before himself a difficult 

when he crossed the Sambre at Charleroi on 15 

order to beat BEucher and Wellington. His victory 

on the l&h, did not lessen his difhculties, on the co

increased them. By making Grouchy follow Bluche

17th with a good third of his fighting contingent, by 

5000 men aimlessly at Fleurus and seeking a decision 

WeIlington with less than half of his army, he jeo

the chances of success. 

Wellington had assembled in the course of t

first a few, then gradually sufficient forces for the re

Ney’s attacks and stood with the greater part of h

at Quatrebras in the evening. Upon receiving info

-. 
men. thus voluntarily affording the 70,000 

versary an unmerited superiority. The latte

with his vanguard, while his main body 

in great depth beyond Genappe. 

The position south of Mont St. Jean, sele

along the Braine L’AIIend-Chain road, had 

Map 33, of fire. The narrow crest of the hill afford

forces kept in rear. Several farm buildings 

struction reinforeed the front. Wellington 

here a defensive battle. Napoleon, who ha

victories, Borodino and Hanau excepted, by 

flank or by pushing his opponents away from 

of retreat or by both, wanted to make at thi

frontal attack. The enemy, standing perpe

line of retreat, was to be vanquished not throu

but. through the force of the impact, the su

French soldier. The cbstinate will was to d

had but one fear-the despised enemy might 

resistance. The army had to be brought, m

advance ma,rch from the deep echelon form

soft ground along the road. This took up 

the 18th. Only at about U.:OO AM, did E

sions take up a. position on t.he right and Re

sions on the left of the Brussels road; in 

L&au; while the Guard and the reserve cav

reserve in position of readiness. The start 

by taking Hougomont. The left wing div

was designated for this operation. It cou

task even with the aid of a large part of the n

sion of Foy. At the end of the battle a rem

fenders had remained in the burning farmh

of this hopeless combat could not be awaited 

of the Prussians against the right flank, th

great dfstance had already been reported. 
(Brigade Quiot) by La Haye-Sainte. Only two an

echelons reached the main position. Deeimated by 

fire, they were received by the English infantry w

aimed volleys. In vain was the ponderous endeavo

ploy so as to bring more rifles and more combatant

front. They were attacked with sabre and bayone

flank and were forced back. An attempt was ma

deep valley offering cover to bring order into the

ments. Durutte fought on and, after a combat flu

back and forth, occupied Pappelotte, La Haye, and S

Quiot, likewise, did not give up his fight for La Haye

But time was pressing. The Prussians were appr

First Domon and Subervie, with their cavalry, the

with his corps were sent against the threatening 

tack. In the meanwhile the enemy at the front h

thrown back. The cavalry was to achieve what the 

could not do. Milhaud, Lefebvre, Guyot, Kellermann, 

one after the other against the hostile center. Squa

dispersed, the cavalry thrown back. Yet in spite 

greatest heroism, the 9000 cavalrymen could neithe

back the entire English army nor resist it for a 

period. Ney came too late on the idea of letting the 

take advantage of the first success. The only avai

vision, Bacheln of NeilIe’s Corps, of the seven divi

the first line, was brought up. It succeeded in ta

Haye-Sainte in joint action with Quiot. Nothing, 

could be changed in the fate of the French cavalry. 

forced to retreat as the infantry had previously bee

to do. 

Bulow’s Corps of Blucher’s army had come u

meanwhile, encountering the resistance of Lobau’s 

Plancenoit. The fight for the village wavered back a

After having been lost by Lobau it was retaken by th

Guard,’ again lost by the latter and retaken by three 

ions of the OId Guard. This unconquerable troop 
men of the Old Guard would be able to a

are acquainted with the battle of Cannae, w

the success of these attacks could not help N

everything hinged on the elimination of Bu

or at least on repulsing them. According to 

was formed and to others,-two mighty, dee

all had joined that could be found of Erlo

corps in the swales of the battIefieId. The 

to break under the case shot of the artillery 

of the infantry, as all such attacks had d

six years. The enemy’s hasty retreat and 

was brought about by Zieten who had com

with at least one brigade, taken Smohain

Papelotte and now swept the battle field w

Even the Old Guard couId not withstand 

rear. The fortune of the day had been d

reserves rolled back. It was not possible to 

in safety. The Fifth Prussian Brigade, 

Corps of Pirch, following Eulow had. reta

Bulow’s batteries commanded Napoleon’s 

The dissolution caused by their fire could 

greater. Nevertheless, Wellington, who 

fleeing enemy, desired t’o give a worthy fin

and demanded that the presumably strong 

Alliance be stormed, requesting that firing b

were thus able to escape destruction, even 

Brigade further stormed from Plancenoit t

and Vieux Manans. After the Duke had oc

French position he returned to his camp an

to Blucher. 

Of the Prussian army only Bulow’s C

gade each of Zieten’s and Pirch’s Corps had 

battle. This was surely not due to lack 

will, but to inadequate marching orders
ppg

this way. The crossing of the Lasne brook neces

halt, the deployment caused another. No wonder t

Thielmann was still to be found in the vicinity of W

the evening whence Bulow had marched early in the m

Thielmann was on the point of marching off along 

bank of the Dyele when Grouchy appeared on th

The French Marshal had started in the afternoon of 

from the battlefield of Ligny and reached Gemblou

night. After wavering HS to the direction of the ho

of retreat, he took the road to Wavre, strengthened 

order of the Emperor, When the thundering of W

guns was heard, Gerard, one of his corps command

vised him to leave Blucher alone and to hasten at on

battle field and to join the decision. Grouchy refused

he could have done of his own free will and, mayb

right time, he was ordered to do most urgently by a

who arrived too late. He was to stop Bulow and c

main army from a flank attack. Attempting to fu

order as far as possible and then to cross the Dyele

courrtercd the resistance of Thielmann. He succeed

ever, in crossing the river higher upstream. Nig

on before he had been able to repulse the enemy on 

flank. This much had been shown by the events: 

shal, even with the expenditure of greater energy, co

have stopped by a pursuit. on the right of t,he Dyele, B

entire army coming to the support of Wellington. H

have operated more effectively had he accompa

French army along the Dyele and foreed BEueher an

on their march to Plancenoit, to face him and giv

proposed flank attack. That this was the only 

employment of Grouchy was shown by Napoleon

to this marshal to come up rapidly and ward of

How the battle was to be conducted later may be s

the Emperor’s admitting at St. Helena, that it had 
night of the lath, that the attack might ta

opport,une moment. Then Grouchy might 

cient to halt that part of the Prussian arm

have come up, long enough to allow a victory 

ton. The attacks, foliowing one upon the o

one half infantry divisions, three cavalry 

men of the Guard in the most unfavorable 

formation against the hostile center, could 

crowned with success. 

It is impossible to recognize the Napoleo

and 18307, in the Napoleon of the June day

general who wavered on the 15th and 16th, 

be sent hither or thither, right or left, was n

the eagle eye, who, after a long .march, sta

ning in order to rush at Friedland like a tig

The Emperor who, in the forneoon of the 

stored the order of battle and found time t

was not the man of will power and energy 

to his marshals ‘“activite, activite, vitesse” a

of 14 October, 1807, torch in hand made his 

the steep Landgrden-Hill! The master o

sent first the infantry, then the cavalry, and 

against Wellington’s front, was not the God 

at Austerlitz, swept down with his entire a

flank of the enemy. Assuredly not. For 

said in 1797 : “One ages rapidly on battle fiel

time he said it, he was in the second yea

as a fieldmarshal. Since then, in the cour

many things had happened, bound to shake 

ture of this colossus. A mass of indebtedne

lated, gnawing at the marrow of this Tita

turning back was impossible. He was driven 

forward, against ever increasing forces. 

them he lacked the strength. His fall was i

on I.8 June, then later. It was inevitabIe. 
(16)EIehad made an attempt at Elba to poison himse

: 
Napoleon had gradually turned from t

hilation, had left the road which brought 

victories. His opponents took hold of the a

hesitatingly and cautiously. The roles we

Katzbach, Dennewitz, and Kulm do not re

extermination battles. The advance in th

emy, his surrounding on all sides would h

plete Cannae from Leipzig, had not the te

the formidable man counselled them to 

open. With Waterloo we returned again 

the lapse of 15 years. Doubtful, yes, mo

was the combat at the front. Then came 

against the flank. A part of Cannae, no

but still a very successful part. One bat

“the anteroom through which Ceasar enter

hall.” The other led to St. Helena. Th

the separated armies on the field of battle 

often vainly striven after, fortunately so

tles. What had been forgotten was taken 

century later. The thread spun in Bluehe

was again picked up. 

THE PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN CON

From the very first months of 1866, Pr

facing a war with Austria alone for the pre

doubtful whether the German Central States 

with the one or the other or whether they 

tirely out of the struggle. The frontier lin

berg, formed by a mountain ridge, separat

nents which were preparing for war. The 

to advance toward this line from the north 

Strategic authorities insisted upon t

the Prussian army in Upper Silesia. From 

60 
py, p

the short blow would be struck, it was necessary fo

sembling arm$es to take the longest possible ro

Prussian advance demanded a longer time than 

through Silesia and none required so short a time 

vance march of the Austrians through Moravia. 

emy, at all events, had the chance to bar the way a

the blow against his heart. The attacking army w

come upon the entire hostile force latest at Olmut

would then oppose mass. Should the Prussians be 

they would be in danger of being ‘“thrown back on 

Should they win the battle, the Austrians would, 

be free to retreat on Vienna and beyond the Danub

ble reinforcements and even up the losses suffered. 

tors could hope for a Wagram, but should be prepar

Aspern. The campaign was apparently leading 

affording the powers, which had remained outside 

Aict, the opportunity and time to enter it and rob the 

the fruit of his success. The problem was, eviden

short blow against Vienna, but the throwing back o

tile army on Vienna and beyond the Danube. Suc

tions and views proved objectless. The foundation 

tire plan was faulty, an advance into Upper Silesia 

only tedious, but hardly possible. The VI and part 

Army Corps might reach by marching the region 

per Oder. The remaining seven or eight corps, wh

be transported by rail, would have been limited, in 

to .one line: Breslau-Ratiber, were they coming 

nigsberg or Wesel or Trier. The single track br

Liegnitz-Frankenstein, would not have materially 

overburdened main line. The enemy would scarce

waited the concentration necessitating more 

months, but would have scattered <the half-comple

centration. Moltke wisbed the advance to be mad

per Silesia only in case Prussia could get there mo

and stronger than the enemy. However, no one co
yy 

but made considerable detours. These, h

to the ffank or rear of the enemy. This co

ed there only if the Austrians had done the 

impossible, i.e., directed their march to B

they remain in Moravia, the turning move

lesia would have been brought up exactly ag

Another route of advance had to be c

Prussians wanted to ascribe the “burden o

to the enemy, it was necessary to prepare 

It was easiest to oppose from the Lausitz 

Austrians, should they advance against Be

hemia or through Silesia. Should, howeve

cumstances give the initiative into the hand

and reserved policy, it would be easiest to p

na by Gor1it.z with the view of cutting off th

ing from Bohemia or Moravia, from the cap

ube. All the advantages, however, were 

advance in the Lausitz was connected with 

than that in Upper Silesia. To carry nine 

one railway line to the region af Gorlitz, wo

time than the enemy would concede. It wo

possible to feed the assembled masses, ab

in the sterile heathland, and the forcing o

through the narrow passage via Gorlitz, S

land, and Reichenbach, into Bohemia, wou

It was clear that the entire army could 

in a mass and by means of one railway li

mountain ridge could not be crossed on one 

able railway lines were to be used for the 

the troops. Of these there were only two: 

Lissa-Breslau and Frankfurt-Kohlfurt-Gor

branch lines from the rear and to the front. 

of troops in the Lausitz, another in Silesia

tain ridge in front, not much had been gaine

ment in the situation took place when it wa
their goal at least partly on foot, there iiere 

corps to transport by each of the five available line

advance could take place proportionately quick

June. The army stood now in a long line from 

Wakenburg-Schweidnitz. The attack could not 

in this cordon formation. It was, consequently

intention to cross the frontier immediately after 

of the last transport train, and to seek junction in 

not at one point, but in such manner that the c

upon encountering the enemy, give mutual suppo

other. It was, first of all, necessary to penetrate 

ony, win the passes of the Lausitz and Erzgebirge 

right army wing and to advance into Bohemia 

directions-from Saxony and Silesia, thus effe

junction. The concentration was thus to be m

hemia. The road to Vienna thence was not fa

from Upper Silesia. ‘Berlin was in t~he rear and 

possible for the Prussians to be pushed toward 

the same time, there was the possibility of cutti

enemy, who had selected his central point at Olm

Vienna and the Danube. This march could 

effected easily at the time. Scarcely an appreciab

was to be expected, The army could have effect

tion before coming to battle or even to appre

counters. Political reasons forbade the cross

frontier and forced a situation which was though

easily surmountable transition. In order to sho

what the long line, the corps detraining at Zeitz 

(half of the VII and VIII), were sent to Tor

between the Elbe and the Lausitz Neisse, assemb

or by marching (II, III, and IV Corps} to Hoy

Spreeberg, Muskau; t.he Guard Corps, in rear o

Kottbus; the I Corps from Gorlitz to Hirschberg, 

and VI Corps to Landeshut. They could advanc

hernia from these positions as follows : the right w

of the Elbe) along the left bank of the Elbe; 
g gg 

the army could not be more closely concent

upon the Saxon army from the south was 

tially jeopardized by giving up Zeitz. 

In a similar way, as the experts on the 

the Prussians to assemble in Upper Silesia, 

that the Austrians advance through Bohemia

advantages of a short blow on Berlin could be 

ing quicker and stronger than the enemy. 

was as impossible to fulfill for the Austrians 

for the Prussians in Upper Silesia. For the 

seven to eight corps could not be transported 

line, Breslau-Ratiber, for the former bec

corps were too much for the single-track 

Bohmisch-Trubau-Pardubitz. It would h

ble to reinforce the troops, stationed in B

peace time, and the expected Saxon corps 

The region for the massing of troops, howe

mined by the railway lines running from 

Vienna, Ganserdorf, Lundenburg, Brunn, 

likewise, but over separat.e tracks, via Ganse

denburg and further via Olmutz to Bohm

from Galicia the line joining at Prerau. 

Moltke designated in 1870, exactly whe

army would concentrate. In order to do th

paid numerous spies nor bribed high officials

fathom the state secret he limited himself t

passable railway map, In the age of railway

of each army is dependent on and determined 

lines. It may be Iaid a little forward or a l

But in the main it is immutable. Even today 

ever a thick network of railway Iines covers 

it was all the more the ease in 1866, when but 

to the frontier. Criticism, hence, of the Pru

trian advance was unduly excited, ranting a

tering of the one and the holding back of th
that “the Prussian army, considering its rapid 

could be at the frontier prepared for combat bef

army would have finished its concentration, poss

fore the war formations had been compIeted.” 

not wish to be hindered and surprised, they had 

concentration toward the rear, as was done by 

four years later in directing their advance beyon

Should the hesitancy and irresolution of the ene

initiative in their hands, in an unforeseen way, 

movement on their part would be more success

via than in Bohemia. In the latter place, they 

ened from the beginning with being surrounded 

to go through separate mountain roads in the fa

emy, while in Moravia they could make an at

the left flank of the long drawn out Prussian 

The Austrians were far from taking advantage 

abIe situation. In the knowledge of being th

numbers and organization, they deemed themse

to adhere to the defensive which they accepted 

able, but settled fact.” They preferred to await 

shouId he come up from Upper Silesia, in a po

mutz-Mahrisch-Trubau, Should no enemy a

they would march to Bohemia and occupy a posit

stadt-Koniginhof-MiIetin. 

The intentions of the Austrians were 

differently by the inhabitants of the neighborin

province of Silesia. The advance posts place

cinity of the frontier of Upper Silesia and th

Glatz, left no doubt in their minds that the inv

province and the burning of Breslau were imm

commander-in-chief of the Second Army thoug

prehensions, confirmed by numerous reports, 

taken into consideration and decided, for the 

the threatened country, to advance to a positio

the Neisse between Patschkau and Grottkau, 

-
serve in rear of the First Army, was transp

Brieg. The rest of the army advanced as 

Corps to Lowenberg, Friedeberg, and Wi

IV to LCaubau and Greiggenberg ; the PI to 

bath, Gorlitz, and Seidenberg; the Cavalr

region of Lowenberg. If anything could 

these were thus the measures taken for h

Austrians were firmly decided to remain o

but such a separation of the enemy--one 

Torgau and Gorlitz, the other more than 

that point on the Xeisse-was sure to sh

resolution. If the Austrians did not th

strong enough to deal with the entire Prus

were surely capable of encountering the sm

attack of the isolated Second Army, how

have been so easy and simple as it looke

chosen position was pretty strong, the num

ity of the attack not overpowering, a tur

rendered difficult through the mountains 

tress of Glatz. Should the position prove u

proposed to draw back the Second Army 

damage so far that it could be received by 

danger, to which the Second Army had e

advancing to the Neisse, was not to be cons

It was far worse that the general offensive, 

had become doubtful. The execution of th

of the right wing through Saxony up to the 

tier, penetration into Bohemia from there 

lesia, seeking the enemy with a united arm

corps with the intention of cutting him o

would have protected Silesia and Bresiau 

position and would have given the possibility 

annihilat,ion. At present not fully five co

able for the advance into Bohemia. The 

the manner of a joint operation of the tw

army depended upon the measures which 
duty could be fulfilled very well by an offensive 

and very badly by a defensive in Silesia, was 

ing. The authority of the Chief of the Gener

still small at the time and personal influence 

political considerations were so much the mo

More than once, in this war, a carefully ela

by Moltke was spoiled in preparation, mobilizatio

centration. It was left to him to assemble th

and construct something new. In spite of a

placed in his way, he adhered to the offensive. 

cided to enter Bohemia with the First Army an

of the Elbe. As soon as this had taken plac

trians would, notwithstanding any plans they 

made, turn to that point, at least with their 

sending a smaller part against the Second Ar

tory over this weaker enemy would be rendered 

Second Army and a possibility given for the 

of the two units. The Prussians hesitated an

long to do this that the Austrians prevented th

by an offensive in Silesia. The resolution of t

Commander-in-Chief, Benedek, could be count

to allow himself to be enticed baek by a late

fensive into Bohemia. All that would then b

would be to go tvith the First Army to the a

the Second or to receive it and advance in the 

the Neisse. The hope, not of victory, but of an 

victory, would have to be given up. The defeate

might, without considerable molestation, retrea

-Olmutz, behind the Danube. 

THE CAMPAIGN OF‘ 1866 IN GERMA

It was lucky that Austria made a break ea

the circumstances in Silesia had been elucida

advantages of an offensive movement there 

known. As she knew herself to be inferior to 
had hoped either to intimidate by the nu

emies, thus determining her to desist fro

or to obtain, through negotiations, the ne

mobilization and completion of the equ

armies. This, however, proved to be an 

saw that it was the highest time to leave 

serve behind. An ultimatum was sent as 

to Saxony, Hanover, and The Hesse Ele

on the same day, upon its rejection, by 

war and on the next day by the beginni

against the three powers. This forced A

In the Federal Diet on the 16th) the Vie

clared that ‘“on account of Prussia’s adva

ony, Hanover, and the Hesse Electorate, 

Emperor would assist those powers with 

and, accordingly immediately begin operat

military forces.” This immediate action 

in a stay in Moravia or a penetration into 

in an advance into Bohemia, if troth sho

the trustiest of the allies-Saxony, and 

support of the next powerful ally-Bavaria

Wurttemberg and Hesse obtained, Only 

or 50,000, Bavarians could Austria hope 

over Prussia. This advantage weighed en

ance to allow overlooking the disadvantage 

threatening of the right flank in the ma

from Moravia to Bohemia. It was not k

was the number of the hostile troops in S

trians were informed for quite a long time 

positions and movements of the enemy. 

however, be cognizant on the 16th) of t

transportation of troops taking place in 

18th. Vienna knew of the two corps whi

the vicinity of the Neisse and Glatz. Bu

surely that the Prussian main army was s

gau and Landeshut. They could not allo
-- 

territory was situated between the eastern a

haIves of the monarchy, couId not be left in re

to war against Austria and the South Germans. 

attack against the rear might be expected, on

in combat against the Austrians. The Hanoveria

sian contingents must likewise not be allowed 

the south and increase the already superior fo

enemy. It was necessary that they should, 

within the Prussian zone of power, “be placed 

tivity by disarmament or attack.” A further 

Prussia consisted in drawing the fighting stren

South German powers, especially of Bavaria, 

hemia. Austria desired to fight at the head of 

man Central States against an isolated Prussia

wished to isolate Austria at the price of three 

In order to solve these two problems the follow

were available : Beyer’s Division (18 battalions

rons, 18 guns) (16) at Wetzlar, the 13th Divi

Goeben (12 battalions, 9 squadrons, 41 guns) 

Manteuffel’s Division (12 battalions, 8 squadron

(16) at Altona, the two last named ones under c

General von Falckenstein. These three divisio

on 16 June, the hostile frontiers in the direction 

and Hanover and already on the folIowing da

was occupied by the 13th Division. The Han

we11 as the Hessians had withdrawn before the 

tack. The former were transported by rail to 

the latter to Hersfeld. From this terminal, th

some 4000 men strong, continued their retreat 

fort and escaped. 

The Hanoverians remained first at Gottinge

to somewhat prepare for combat after a hurri

AS Goeben’s Division followed on the 19th, ther

time to retrieve what had been lost. Though 

(lB’Formed by detaching the ninth regiments of 

Corps and two mere regiments from the IV and V Co
start on a campaign in North Germany, 

won a single success against the yet wid

emy, but would have gone under in the 

of ammunition and the numerical superior

Views wavered at the headquarters betw

Gottingen,” “ opening of negotiations” an

lying between the two. The difficulties of 

out hope of success, reserves, or reinforc

The necessity of seeking reserves, paid f

the capital and the greater part of the 

to the resolution of “an immediate depa

Bavarians and to an avoidance of serious 

danger of being attacked by Goeben in the 

in the rear hastened the execution of the 

via Kassel was already occupied, that via 

ened. 

It was decided to take a third route 

Wanfried, and Treifurt to Eisenach. W

24 squadrons, 42 guns, about 17,000 arm

armed men, the march was begun on th

treat was too well founded on the existin

not to have been foreseen in Berlin. The 

started. According to Napoleonic princip

troops had to follow the enemy “‘l’epee da

other head them off on the shortest lin

reached on the 20th, Alfeld-Bodenburg, 

with a, brigade near Hanover, with anothe

had entered Kassel with the main forces 

taken a short road to Eisenach when the 

tingen. Another still shorter road was b

schweig, Magdeburg, and Halle. 

Moltke’s simple plan was as follows: 

via Otmannshausen to Eisenach; Manteuf

Map 35, be transported to the same point by rail

against the enemy wherever he might be

follow as before and attack him in the 
stein rejected the transportation of Manteuffels 

to Magdeburg. Me wanted ‘“to avoid a divisi

fighting strength, which seemed inexpedient to 

not to let part of it get entirely out of his hand

It was, however, isnpossible to avoid a d

forces. For it existed already in the highes

Beyer’s lai;t battalion was on the 20th st,ill a

Manteuffel at Luneburg. The Prussian troops, 

by the HanoverIans, lay in a long line between 

points. The problem was not to avoid such 

but to remedy it. This could not be effected in 

or simpler way than by Moltke’s plan. The su

of the Hanoverians and the junction of the three 

would have taken place at one stroke. Before 

one campaign might have been ended and the 

sembled to begin another. Sinee, however, F

ordered that Manteuffel’s Division should not go 

over and Cel!e via Magdeburg to oppose the e

via Braunschweig and Seesen, should follow the 

vision, battalion by battalion, the scattering of 

mained, Manteuffel’s Division removed from th

activity for a time and the surrounding of the 

ians was rendered doubtful. 

Moltke had taken pains to replace the falling 

division. The Coburg-Gotha regiment, three 

some cavalry, two sortie guns from Erfurt, w

under the command of Colonel von Fabeck and t

to Eisenach. If Beyer continued his march fr

kappel to that pofnt. and Goeben followed the Ha

it would be possible to do without Manteuffel. 

All began well on the 21st. Fabeck had re

enach, Beyer, subordinate to Falkenstein, held K

out detachments to Munden and Allendorf, an

Reichensachsen and Lichtenau with his main bo

reached Einbeck-Qppershausen and two Land

talions from Magdeburg under General von S

reached Bleicherode. Within this wide circle, 
between Norten and Gottingen, and had h

attack them at that point on the 23d. T

ceived an order to turn toward the front fo

battle did not bring about any disadvan

spurred on the 13th Division to greater ra

M8p 37* toward Gottingen. More doubtful was th

Beyer to cut off the retreat of the enemy. 

After all kinds of reports and inform

eral had to assume that the departure of 

from Gottingen was, at least, highly proba

therefore fulfill his task in the simplest wa

his march to Eisenach. The wording of 

ever, seemed to indicate clearly an attack 

of the “Hanoverians, standing between 

Norten.” Beyer, consequently, held Kasse

and sent the advance guard from Munde

the main body from Reichensaehsen and L

zenhausen, the reserve to Kaufungen. A 

contrary to the preceding was assumed. T

from all threatening flank attack, seeme

continue unmolested his march to the Sou

The appearance of Beyer’s troops on th

dorf, of patrols on the right of the Werra

of the Prussians occupying the crossing o

east of Wanfried, Treffurt, and Miehla on 

the Hanoverian General von Arentschildt 

the march from Heiligenstadt to Wanfried, 

one from Muhlhausen via Langula to Eisena

via Langensalza. With this detour Eise

reached by the Hanoverians, who stood o

the 22d between Dingelstadt and south of 

much earlier than by Goeben, who stood 

Gottingen, and by Beyer, standing with the 

reserve at Allendorf, Witzenhausen, a

Should some resistance be shown in the de

Beyer might come up in time via Otma
be able to reach him. Moltkes zealous endea

procuring that one day. 

Since by the Hanoverians’ march to M

Gotha was likewise threatened, the five battalions

disposable at Eisenach, could not suffice. More 

to be called. Seckendorf was ordered with his 

wehr battalions from Bleicherode to Gotha, by 

Royal command two battalions of the 4th Regim

Guard were placed in a train, two batteries from 

two to three reserve and Landwehr battalions 

dered from Dresden, and Fabeck with his five 

was sent to Gotha. Qn the 23d, when the H

reached Behringen with Bulow’s Brigade, Reiche

the reserve cavalry; with the terrain north an

Langensalza, Knesebeck’s and de Vaux’s Briga

mer’s Brigade-Gross-Gottern, the rear gu

hausen, they found Fabeck in front of them n

Seckendorf on their left flank near Urleben, 

consider Eisenach occupied, according to all i

received. They could not go on without a comba

against inconsiderable forces. They seemed a

to give battle. Early on the 24th, the troops 

pared for attack against Gotha. Fabeck was lo

The attack was not executed, however. 

contrived to have a parliamentary sent with th

cal request that the entirely surrounded enemy 

arms. The Hanoverians were surrounded, it i

by weak detachments at long distances. They 

cognizant of the condition of affairs, knowing 

numbers of Fabeck’s troops. But the demand, 

such firmness and calm assurance, did not fail 

its effect. The Hanoverians entered upon nego

the hope of obtaining free departure in exch

promise not to take part in the war for a certain 

time. The coming and going of the parliamen
connaissance, occupy the city if it were fr

and thus assist in breaking through the 

the meanwhile, Colonel von der OstenSac

rived with five companies of the 4t.h Regime

at the threatened point and left no doubt t

tary sent to him, that he would defend to 

his small unit, the post entrusted to him, 

of success against an infantry armed w

though scarcely one third their own stren

firing against a peaceful, wholly unconc

knowledge of being left to themselves alon

called for mixing in of a Hanoverian par

did not wish to have his negotiations distu

the council of war and the brigade comm

from an attack and to conclude an armistic

morning. This rendered all attempt at b

impossible, and more than one day had 

pursuit ought to be quite close. The dis

be started on the following day. 

The pursuit, which, according to Na

have been executed toward Gneisenau 

reins” and “until the last gasp of man 

interrupted by Goeben after four days o

23d, by one day’s rest. Only a weak adva

Wrangel was sent to Siemerode and brou

prising report that the enemy had contin

Beyer had, it is true, received orders to ma

hausen. But he alone reached it with 

The main army and the advance guard, le

cient orders and elucidation of the situa

give a decisive blow in the “battle of Gott

to Friedland and arrived in the evening, 

of all misunderstandings, in Hohengandern

and Allendorf. 

‘“‘Three companies had occupied the crossing 
was to reach Munden, Manteuffel, Gortingen, and 

semble at Otmannshausen. Falkenstein left thus 

overians unmolested in his rear, gave free ha

Bavarians to take part in the impending decis

in Bohemia, and turned against an enemy wh

from being prepared for war and who could hav

unnoticed. As Silesia could have been best protec

invasion of Bohemia, thus could the Rhine Pro

be guarded by the disarmament of the Hanoveria

such a success no South German would have dare

the Nahe. The Hessians and Nassauers would h

that they could not then invade the countries 

but wouId have to protect their own skins. The 

Frankfort could not be permitted. If it were d

to give up everything, or to open the war with a 

aster, it was necessary that the King take the m

sonally in hand. His first order to transport 

troops as possible via Kassel to Kosenaeh was 

by a curt “Impracticable.” The railway track 

was destroyed. A second order received early o

to bring one of ManteuflYel’s brigades, via S

Magdeburg, to Gotha, showed the seriousness of 

will. The impossible became possible. 

Goeben made a forced march to Kassel and 

there six battalions with corresponding cavalry 

lery. Beyer received orders to march to this p

of Manteuffel’s brigades went under General Flie

via Magdeburg to Gotha. Part of the troops rea

goal as early as the night of the 25th. The res

pected in the course of the day at Eisenach and 

spite of the loss of two days, Moltke’s original 

still to be put into execution to a certain extent. 

tion to Fabeck’s and Sacken’s troops, two mixed 

were ready to oppose the enemy at Eisenach-Got

3d Division, which was to follow via Gottingen, 

ing. Of the brigades, which might have forme
pp

the VIII Federal Corps. Goeben, to whom 

over the troops assembled at Eisenach and 

entrusted, was not ready for attack on the 2

of the battalions were on hand. Many of 

were still at a distance on the march. The 

unit were to be expected earIy on the 26th, 

had arrived were exhausted by the long ma

tice of 24 hours, which Adjutant General v

sent to the Hanoverian headquarters, had 

most welcome. It was of still greater ad

Hanoverians. After the latter had desisted 

through the enemy and the hope of marchin

had dwindled, their principal faith lay in 

through the Bavarians. In order to secu

to win time. It happened that the beginni

the armistice had not been fixed and that th

ing known the latter had not been settled. 

trouble had it been possible to settle the 

make known the armistice, and set the Prus

10 :00 AM on the 26th. The Hanoverians s

the 25th, the quarters taken up two days e

road : Gross-Lupnitz - Behringen - Lange

Gottern-Muhlhausen. Since the localities 

not offer much after two days, it was hop

possibility of extending the occupied locality 

hausen, trusting to the concluded armistice. 

about movements of troops which would 

possible had Mantueffel, instead of remain

and Gottingen, advanced on the 24th and 

genstadt to Muhlhausen. These movemen

preted by the population: “Hanoverian tro

ing against Muhlhausen,“-followed by “T

army is marching through Muhlhausen,” a

lin as “The Hanoverian army has marched 

hausen.” 
attacking it on the following day. He did not w

vance against the enemy like Hannibal, keep him 

on the front and then turn against his flanks with 

that had been kept back for this purpose. He 

tend like Frederick or Napoleon to turn a ho

with his entire army. He placed in the even

25th, the brigade of the 13th Division under K

Waltershausen, Langenhain, and Sondra ready f

ing attack, while Beyer was to advance for a 

tack from Hotzelroda. It is easily understood 

enemy did not await forthe artfully laid noose to 

tight. Bulow took his advance troops from Gro

and Mechterstadt before midnight and prepared 

further before the advance of the enemy. The 

the retreat of the Hanoverian advance troops 

the night of the 26th simultaneously with a mes

Berlin in which Councilor of the State Wintzig

nounced the passage of the Hanoverian army thro

hausen. The disparity of these reports was appare

theless none doubted them. None deemed it ne

ascertain their correctness by the sending out o

Moltke might have believed or not. At an

saw a liberation from the binding agreement of 

tice. It was possible now to attack immediate

pursue. He telegraphed, consequently, to Falken

had arrived, in the meanwhile, at Eisenaeh: “

mediately and instruct Manteuffel in Gottingen 

the same time. Part of the troops in Gotha may

be transported by rail to Nordhausen. General F

receive a copy of this telegram. It would be 

considering your superiority, to leave the necess

for the observation of Bavaria, etc., and in con

of operations to come.” The last sentence was 

stood as it was meant. Moltke wanted to lea

small detachment in Eisenach. Falkenstein, hav

the rumor that the Bavarians had already reach
Aliendorf. The attack of the Bavarians 

an extended position: Berka-Eisenach. 

would twelve battalions be assembled for 

alone received orders for “immediate pursu

intended the joint action of all forces at on

stein held fast to the division into thr

measures were adopted to attain no succ

and perhaps defeats at many. The mo

were in full swing when the foilowing info

in the afternoon: from Berlin-the Hanov

at Langensalza: from Vacha-nothing w

the Bavarians. The movements ordered 

But nothing could be changed on the 2

alone had, acting independently, sent the 

from Gottingen to Duderstadt and the 

gradually by rail from Munden, Kassel, 

to Beienrode and Siemerode. 

The Hanoverians, as a matter of c

from making a retreat via Muhlhausen to 

At the conclusion of the armistice, an att

Waltershausen, and Eisenaeh seemed impe

not wish to await it at Langensalza in a po

a turning movement. The commanding 

entschildt ordered consequentIy : “The Pru

advancing. Resistance will be offered t

gade shall retreat fighting in the direction 

sen,” There should concentrate for this p

gades of Bothmer at Grafentonna; that o

of Langensalza ; that of Bulow at Schonstad

the reserve cavalry between Sundsha.usen 

The movements of these two latter unit

salza to the heights on the left bank of the 

served by one of the many Prussian parliam

to and fro between Gotha and Langensalza, 

“*‘2 battalions of the 4th Regiment, of the G
stein held on to the retreat to Sommerda, based m

rumors, ‘although Fliess, who had advanced as far 

ningsleben, reported that the Hanoverians were a

at Langensalza. Falkenstein maintained just as firm

the Bavarians were advancing in the valley of the 

though rumors alone reported that they were first 

ingen, then at Wernshausen. On the basis of t

tended condition of affairs: retreat of the Hanove

Sommerda, and advance of the Bavarians through 

ley of the Werra, Falkenstein decided to await, with 

the Bavarians in the position E Berka-Gerstungen-Eis

ach, which was over 20 km. long. Fliess did not 

attack the Hanoverian “rear guard” at Langensa

remain at. its heels, in case it should return. M

had to stay in Gottingen in case of emergency. The 

adhered to this resolution although the King h

manded by telegraph in the evening to bring the 

rian matter to an end, cost what it may. It is cert

Falkenstein had the right and the duty to change 

given by the King from a distance, according to 

of affairs on the spot, However, it must be suppo

the despised order should be replaced by something 

In view of two real or supposed enemies, to remai

ing with three separate troop units could by no m

something better. Since Falkenstein disregarded 

ders of the King, it was logical and clear for the 

commanders to disregard the orders of Falkenstein

received from Berlin copies of the King’s order an

of the state of affairs not from afar, but like th

mander-in-chief, on the spot. Manteuffel, who had 

advanced on the 26th, at his own initiative, to Du

and Beienrode, wanted to advance again on the 27

pendently, to Worbis and Dingelstedt, and Fliess 

according to the Royal order, to bring the affair to 

cost what it might, and to attack the Hanoverians 

of their forces being twice as strong as his. He c
in the beginning as a principle to eseap

encounter, to South Germany, as well 

hope of the Bavaria.n support, kept the

the only measure which could bring the 

able end. It was decided to await, beyon

both sides of the road leading from La

dershausen, the attack of the Prussians 

the Bavarians. The following positions h

Bulow and the reserve artillery at Tham

at Merxleben, Knesebeek, in his rear; B

stedt; the reserve cavalry at Sundhausen

Fliess, who had fallen back for th

hausen-Warza, could attack this position 

merically superior enemy, only by cros

perhaps at Grafentonna and then turning 

tile left flank. He ‘advanced, however, o

the center of the line and drove out the 

h&p 41. left at Langensalza. Two of Knesebeck

out for support by way of Merxleben, we

back and the Judenhugel was occupied. 

not give any special advantage for furt

Prussians found themselves before a long 

berg-and a river, bordered by dams. 

occupied. The crest of the Judenhugel 

true, the Kirchberg, situated opposite, but 

in the direction of the enemy that the f

teries could be placed only in echelon form

quite impossible to fight down the supe

lery, to penetrate then through the nar

maybe across the river. To hold fast 

seek a crossing at another place, the for

The defensive was assumed, unintentiona

4-pounders and fourteen smooth bore g

which was not entirely sufficient, on the 

posed twelve rifled six-pounders and th

guns on the Kirchberg, six rifled 6-pou
gy 

mained on the former. In spite of the great 

superiority of the enemy, the Prussian artillery 

to maintain its positions. The Prussian infantry 

first the Baths, the Kallenberg Mill and the rig

the Salza from Graesers factory as far as the Z

later on, the Erbsberg also. Thus there staod t

ers, a weaker south of and stronger north of th

The stronger was constrained against his will, 

This seemed very simple to execute. De Vaux 

tack from Merxleben, Bulow from Thamsbruck

by Knesebeek and the reserve cavalry from 

The battle of Cannae would thus have been repe

simplest way. Bulow, as well as Bothmer had

gone from the right and the left toward Merx

rendered thus their advance difficult. The fo

ceeded, however, in crossing the river at the 

Knesebeck followed. Their attack against the 

Ziegelei did not need to be successful, in spite o

merical superiority. But when their right wing 

into Langensalza, the Judenhugel could no long

Since troops advanced also from Merxleben, th

especially the units who had decided upon ob

sistance in various localities, were in great stres

feat would have been complete if Bothmer ha

crossed the Unstrut and attacked the enemy i

He had, however, desisted from all crossing a

tempt at Taubenhorn had faiIed. The reserve c

sembled according to Napoleonic principle, in 

center, crossed with difficulty over bridge and da

to pursue the retreating enemy. The attacks 

broke, however, against the good behavior of th

the Landwehr and were soon abandoned. 

The victor was content with the occupat

hostile position. The road via Henningsleben 

open and in the evening Fliess was able to occup

near Westhausen and Warza which he bad left in 
portant that Goeben, after the defeat of 

longer remain idle at Eisenach. He had 

mander-in-chief for the 2i’tln (Falkenstein 

se1 on administrative business) and had re

all day long at Eisenach-Gerstungen in 

attack by the Bavarians. The thundering 

Langensalza did not trouble him much si

an insignificant rear guard combat. Th

cupied his mind less than the imaginary 

graphed in the evening to Beyer, stationed 

“I let the alarm be given. Hostile colum

towards the heights opposite, they are de

defend Eisenach if the enemy is strong.” 

umns were only phantoms. Had these p

flesh and blood and had the Hanoverians 

at their head, Fliess would have been a

27th, and, on the 23th, Goeben, for whom 

have been prepared by a frontal attack 

and in rear by the Hanoverians. It would 

that it was wrong to offer defensive battle 

while another was in the rear. 

Goeben was first awakened from his t

by a royal telegram directed to Falkens

order you to go immediately and directly 

overians. No attention shall be given so 

rians and the South Germans, but, accordin

my opinion, the Hanoverians shall be en

Battalions were now sent by rail to Goth

ate support of Fliess; Beyer was called 

and, finally, in the afternoon of the 28th

march to Langensalza was begun. Goe

vanced far when a parliamentary reach

information that the Hanoverians desired 

A council of war was held early in th

headquarters in Langensalza, In front wa

had been defeated the day before. A se
, gpy, 

rians would have only the defeated enemy to d

Should they attaek him immediately they might d

probably, as far as Gotha. But little would be 

this. After using up the rest of their munitions, 

overians would have fallen unarmed into the han

enemies advancing on all sides. In order for them 

such a fate, Fliess should have been annihilated. 

let slip the opportunity to do so on the 27th. It 

probable that they would be able to retrieve on 

what they had lost the day before. Should they b

do so, they would win free retreat to South Germ

without am-munition, without the possibility of 

armed with weapons a little better than sticks an

they could give no aid to their allies, but would bur

with provisioning and caring for their 20,009 men

ever they might come, they would find unfamilia

guns, and ammunition. It would take a longer 

tile war would, presumably last, to prepare for 

Nothing would have remained, but to place the me

contingents and to disband the Hanoverian army. 

soldier’s point of view, it would have been desirabl

another battle on the 28th. The King demande

The generals opposed him. They evidently con

last battle of desperation not consistent with the l

cal situation. 

The success, obtained by the Prussians on 

after overcoming numberless difficulties, committ

takes and misunderstandings, after numerous ma

countermarches and after the loss of a bloody bat

have been attained on the 24th smoothly, unhes

and without bloodshed, if Moltke’s simple plans 

adopted. But the Prussian generals, notwithstandin

prominence and excellence, could not enter into th

ideas of the grayhaired theorist who had never co

even a company. They held to the views they had 

from Napoleonic principles, which they had misun
retreats. The victor allows him to go his 

to the problem of the following maneuve

endeavored calmly and indefatigably to reb

cycle. In the beginning he limited himself 

suasion He was forced in the end to reso

mands of the most peremptory character. 

least of his achievements that he carried 

brought everything to a fortunate conclusi

A battle of Cannae was fought on the 

initiated and planned. Initiation and plan

cient to convince the enemy of the futility 

and to place him out of the sphere of activity

ing to the ancient program of the battle o

victory of Arendtschildt over Fliess similar 

by Terentius Varro over the Iberians and 

ceded the turning and surrounding, On

victory was the victor placed in the fatal p

about his destruction. 

The next result of the modern battle 

the constitution of a North German Con

united Germany, at least as far as the Ma

Kings of Saxony and Hanover and the E

had disdained to belong. The other prince

many declared themselves ready to place t

at the disposition of the new commander o

tion. 
German Central States at the Federal Diet agains

sia, and on the 15th the latter declared war on 

and Hanover. On the 16th, Herwarth advanced w

Army of the Elbe (14th, 15th, and 16th Divisions) 

Torgau along the left bank of the Elbe into Saxo

that same day, Austria promised, at the Federal D

support to the Central States. She had thus ente

war against Prussia and had to shoulder the onus 

gression. Prussia could consider herself as attack

forced against her will to a counterattack. Even t

eautious of policies had to be abandoned, in regard 

tria and action had to be taken. 

The armies were still engaged in concentration. 

The Army of the Elbe reached Dresden on th

also Kesselsdorf and Tannesberg. The Saxon ar

gone before it to Teplitz over the Erzgebirge, not h

like the Hessian and Hanoverian armies, but w

pared and equipped with all that was necessary for 

paign. To the left of the Army of the Elbe, the Firs

had entered Saxony with its right wing and stood 

the Spree near Bautzen and the Bober near Low

A mixed brigade of the 1st Corps had been left at 

shut-Waldenburg. The rest of the Second Army cam

the l%h, on the Glatzer Neisse. The position, 

which Silesia could be saved, had, before it could be 

and occupied, become objectless. Austria would 

(*) War organization : 

Prussia:

Army of the Elbe: VIII Army Corps, 14th 

Guard-Landwehr Division; First Army: II, III, IV Army Corps, Cavalr

Division Alvensleben’s, Division Hann’s; Second Army: Guard Corps, I, V, VI Arm

Hartmann’s Cavalry Division. 

Austria : 

Austrian Army of the North: I? II, III, IV, 

X Army Corps, 1st & 2d Light Cavalry 

lst, 2d, 3d Reserve Cavalry Divisions. 

Saxon Army. 
invade the country. Whatever might hav

plans and intentions and whatever plans 

she should have had, after what had tak

14th, l&h, and 16th on the one and the 

remained for a general, who was not exa

nothing but to lead the army assembled in 

hemia. Prussia was to go against this arm

it was decided in Berlin to invade Bohemia

It would have seemed adequate to a

three armies, to have the Second Army join 

of the mountain ridge, in order to penetrate 

territory in one irresistible mass. But th

found sufficient roads to cross the mountai

few leading elements that fortunately re

side would have become an easy prey of 

skillful enemy, The mass, coming slowly 

unmolested, through the mountains, would 

ing more than the enemy, opposing it in a 

favorable condition. In spite of the dist

the First Army from the Second, Moltke he

junction at the front of the enemy’s count

to other advantages, he obtained a greater n

though not too many. The roads were all h

the only considerabIe passage was closed by 

Iser Mountains. 

No doubt could remain as to the mod

the First Army. It had to march from B

Lauban, via the Lausitz ridge towards 

route for the Army of the Elbe had been pl

Dresden along the left bank of the Elbe, c

river at Tetschen and marching further 

Leipa to the Iser. This march, however, 

by a flank attack, the Saxons being at T

trians having joined them at that point an

being expected to advance at any momen
gy py p

space available for the advance march of these 

men was narrowed on the right by the Elbsandstein 

tains, on the left by the Iser ridge and barred in f

the Lausitz Mountains. NevertheIess five passab

were found : 

1. Neustadt - Schonlinde - Kreibitz - Haida - B

Leipa-J’ungbunzlau ; 2. Neustadt - Rumburg - Zwickau - Niemes - 

3. L%%z’- Zittau - Grottau - Pankraz - O

Bohmisch-Aicha-Podol;

4. Go$i:lie (left bank of the Neissej-Hirschgelde-W

- Kratzau - Remhenberg (west} - Lle

Turnau; 5. Gorlitz (right bank of the Neisse)-Seidenberg-

land, Einsiedel - MarkIissa - Raspenau - Re

(east)--Gablons-Eisenbrod. 

These five routes, to which might be added a s

Hirschberg - Warmbrunn - Schreiberhau - Ne

Hochstadt to Semil, were very close to each oth

they must and could be sufficient since the expecte

could not be very strong, not strong enough, at a

to bar all five roads. Did he oppose one of the 

the others would soon come up to its assistance. 

disadvantageous only that the Army of the Elbe 

eral days’ march in rear of the First Army and t

one road was available for it from Dresden to N

The First Army was thus forced to stand still seve

until the neighboring army had come up with it. 

The I Corps of the Second Army was immediat

via Schweidnitz to Landeshut in order to join t

Army from this point or, if possible, from Hirschbe

VI Corps was to “demonstrate” south of the N

wards Moravia, in order to hold part of the Austria

forces and prevent them from marching to Bohem

two remaining corps (the V and the Guard) were 

close to the First Army that they could be echelone

roads via Frankenstein and Glatz. Their employmen
an encounter with the hostile main army 

soon after the latter had crossed the El

Army would then be in readiness with th

Guard Corps to attack the flank and rea

while he was occupied with the First A

had to be abandoned because the First 

advance, awaiting the Army of the Elbe. 

junction of the three armies was ordered 

take place on the road to Gitschin. This, 

favorable conditions, would bring about a

the main forces of the enemy, which w

trated as far as Gitsehin, by the First Arm

by the Second Army from the Upper E

favorable circumstances, an attack against 

would have come up only as far as Jo

gratz, by one army over the Elbe, by the 

Aupa and Mettau, maybe also from Glatz, 

attack from three sides-a battle of annih

The Second Army, to which the I 

been attached, advanced first along the d

On the 25th, the I Corps reached without 

bau; on the 26th, the Guard Corps reach

Politz ; and the V Corps, Lewin. The latt

from Glatz by the VI for covering the left 

On the 22d, the First Army had ad

gth, 7th, !jth, and 6th Divisions to Zitta

Seidenberg, and Marklissa, while the Army 

three days’ march had reached, with one c

dorf and Schluckenau. From this point 

be continued first over six then over five 

bunzlau-Eisenbrod. The commander-in-ch

Army, however, intended to open the c

brilliant success. With this object, an 

decided upon obstinate resistance, at Reic

lected. In order to attack him on the 2
Raspenau and Phillippsgrund. The II Corps fo

Zittau and Hirschfelde on the heels of the 7th 

On the following day, the 7th and 5th Division

attack the front and the 8th, after a second as

Jeschken ridge, the rear of the Reichenberg posi

ever, before this could be done, the enemy (3 

had marched off. Two belated Radetzky hussa

brought before the victor. The entire First Arm

men, was assembled in a narrow space in front 

enberg. The “calamity of concentration” of wh

had warned, made itself felt. These masses co

quartered, fed and, most of all, moved. Of the t

leading via Liebenau and Gablonz, from the mo

ley, the first was barred by the enemy, the seco

easily closed. It seemed desirable to await the 

the Army of the Elbe to extricate itself from this 

latter assembled only on the 25th at Gabel and 

dorf. 

After the two armies had reached the sam

following advance began on the 26th: the 15th 

Divisions from Kummersdorf to Niemes, the 

Gabel to Oschitz, the 8th from Kichicht to Lie

7th from GabIonz via Reichenau to Turnau. T

Jungbunzlau had been given up and both ar

crowded into the narrow Iser strip : Munchengratz-

The advance guard of the first column drove ba

hostile force at Hunnerwasser and followed the 

to Plauschnitz. The second reached Oschitz. 

Liebenau and Sichnow the third encountered E

Cavalry which was driven, after two lengthy art

bats, via Preper to Podol beyond the Iser. T

umn reached Turnau and repaired the destroye

not occupied bridge. The 8th Division was fo

the 6th as far as Liebenau, the 7th was follow

5th as far as Gablonz. On the same day, the F
, y gg

Josefstadt on the left. There should 

vance: the I, ‘61, and Guard Corps from 

tenau to Neuschloss (Arnau), from Ditte

litz, via Eipel and Kosteletz to Koniginhof 

via Skalitz to Schurz and the Elbe; the 

follow the V in echelons for the cover of th

The further march of the Army of the 

First Army had to take place, according 

gram, from Gitschin as a general objective 

for the left wing to halt, in the mountain

cient. The northernmost road leading to 

the mountains went from Eisenbrod via L

Map 44. stadt. The left column had to take it. Th

ing routes were : Turnau-Gitschin, P

Kosteletz - Munchengrstz - Unter-Bautz

Kopidlno, Jungbunzlau-Domausnitz-Bossdalaw

columns, of two divisions each, on these 

hardly expect to meet any resistance from 

or Saxon Corps, taking their numerical 

consideration. The enemy, who attempted 

or the other column, would soon have 

surrounded by the others. 

This could have been executed more 

taking the cavalry along. At that time it 

sible to think of using the cavalry corps 

First Army and the cavalry division atta

ond, outside the battlefield. The masses 

taken along by the trains as articles de &

it is true, of little use at the front for re

mountainous regions. The first defile occ

emy would have put a stop to their adv

cavalry was sufficient here for the support 

On the right wing of the Army of the Elbe 

reconnoitered the terrain south of the L

Bemsen and Bohmisch-Leipa, as far as 
soon as the invasion of Saxony had been ordere

to have gone close to the Army of the Elbe, follo

advance and, as soon as the mountain passe

won, taken up position close to its right colum

the latter was marching to Jungbunzlau, the ca

ought to have taken the direction of Brodetz a

and accompanied it on its march via Mrinetz t

and Chlumec. It would thus have prolonged t

the First Army and the Army of the Elbe w

have reached Gitschin--n’eubidschow--Chlumec 

the time that the Second Army reached the U

Had the enemy, as expected and supposed 

marehed over the Elbe sector between Josefstadt 

gratz, he would have had to turn sooner or la

his forces against the Second Army, threatening 

in order to throw it back or at least to check it

question whether there would be a su%cient 

corps left to master the First Army and the A

Elbe. It was to be expected that the First A

su%ce for the attack of the hostile front, the A

Elbe and, possibly the cavalry corps, turning 

left hostile flank, would win the road: Gitsch

gratz, while the cavalry division of the Second 

ported by the VI Corps, would endeavor to cu

stadt from the east. 

The Austrian Army had hardly begun its 

Bohemia, when on the l%h, word came that the 

could not effect a junction with it, but were fo

fend their country on the Main in the north 

enemy advancing from the north, Falkenstein’s 

visions though still at a distance, had apparently 

their effect. This report was disturbing, but 

could be made in the intention to go against 

who was known to be at Gorlitz and in Saxony, 

beyond the Elbe “near Josefstadt, Koniginhof, 
pg 

been sent to Hirschberg for immediate jun

main army, which had to await its arrival 

of Gorlitz. The Guard and V Corps were sa

march to Landeshut, the VI between the Ne

The former disposition had to be reassume

changes; one corps at Glatz-Neisse, two at 

at Hirschberg, the main army at Gorlitz-B

Army of the Elbe no longer at Torgau b

Should all these positions be won, the invasi

could be expected. The enemy, however, wa

centrated and this fact could be taken adva

Since the head of the Austrian right colu

ed Zwittau on the 20th, and that of the 

Zwittawka, an advance against the enemy, 

on a flanking march from the Neisse to 

Hirschberg, could scarcely be thought of. 

if he could be reached in time at the moun

Liebau, south of Landeshut. But the Upper 

Josefstadt and Arnau, formed a strong ba

occupied by a sufficient force, would check 

the enemy from Landeshut and Glatz. T

directed on that point. It was aeceIerated 

The 1st Reserve CavaIry at the head of the 

formerly destined to Gross-Burglitz, turned 

from Jaromer to Dolan and Skalitz, sent o

to Dobruschka, Neustadt, Nachod, Kosteletz

touch with the Dragoon Regiment, for a long 

teir duty, at Trautenau. The X Corps adv

Josefstadt-Schurs. On the following day 

this corps advanced to Kaile and Deutsch-Pr

the IV Corps marched past it to Koniginhof. 

on the Upper Elbe was thus occupied. The 

cW)An exchange of telegrams between the Pr

Second Armies was intercepted on the wire. 
thing was organized in the best way. Farther in 

arrived on the 26th: the VI Corps at Opochno

and 2d Light Cavalry Division at Senftenberg, th

at Koniggratz, the VIII at Tynist, the 3d and 

Cavalry Divisions at Wildensehwert and Hehen

formation was brought in the evening of the 2

at Liebau, enemy at Politz advancing via Hronow 

and enemy at Lewin. These were probably the 

expected from Landeshut. Only one had march

The other crossed the mountains more to the so

columns and intended to join the other at Nacho

these advance farther, as might be expected, a

the Upper Elbe with two corps at the front and 

via Hirschberg and Starkenbach on the left flank

expected as early as the 29th. At the same tim

tile main army, advancing from Saxony and t

might already be not far distant. A battle m

with the latter on the 30th, after completed co

in the locality: Horitz-Miletin, while the battle 

per Elbe would be in its second day. 

How would it be possible to fight for victory 

enemy when another, close by, directly threatene

and flank? It was impossible to allow ‘them 

close. The forces at hand did not suffice to 

and drive them back. A success might be hoped 

enemy were held with the weakest possible force 

other were attacked with the greatest possible 

was enticing to attack the enemy, advancing fr

with the II, VI, X, and IV Corps, then at han

tracted defense against the other enemy seem

only on the Iser. The corps at that point, how

not sufficiently strong and there was no time t

them. The attack had to be made against th

defense against the other side, the Silesian. H

was not on the Elbe, but at the mountain pass
discretion of the two generals to await th

sition or, according to circumstances, “go 

not to pursue the defeated enemy too far. 

information” concerning only two corps a

vicinity, were correct, Gablenz and Rammi

be suf-llcient. In war there is, howeve

dangerous than reliable information. It 

events. What was adequate yesterday, 

tomorrow. Here likewise, not two, but t

into consideration the VI which was soon 

corps were to be expected. Had greater 

ercised, the IV Corps could have been sent 

to Trautenau and the V to Eipel and Ko

quite comprehensible, however, why it was 

en the intended offensive against the enem

using three corps. It was sufficiently thre

emy might come up in that direction, be

on the right of the Elbe had been compl

advance and deployment from endless dept

the principal evil which rendered all bold 

possible. Under this stress a telegram 

Crown Prince of SaxonyI commander-in-ch

the Saxon Corps, on the 26th “to hold M

Turnau at any price.” Two corps, the VI 

to throw the hostile army back into the S

passes or keep them from debauching from 

others, the I and the Saxon, were to hold 

Iser, the rest executing their deployment o

of the Elbe. 

The Saxon corps and the Austrian 

sheim had been called from Teplitz-Aussig 

to the Iser, had effected there a junction w

I Corps under Clam-Gallas and jointly oc

at Jungbunzlau-Munchengratz, while th

sion Edelscheim guarded the road from 
ready been lost and Podol was threatened. 

that only small advance guards were at these 

the Crown Prince resolved to retake Turnau and 

Podol the heights of Swigan, situated in front 

in the evening of the ‘26th, advance further on th

occupy the narrow passes and prevent the e

debauching from the mountains. The plan w

succeeded 24 hours earlier, now it was too late. 

sians had meanwhile reinforced their weak advan

A few Austrian battalions, advancing hastily f

were after initia1 success thrown back over t

Bose’s Brigade of the 8th Division and were 

abandon the bridge to the enemy. After this 

operation against Turnau was likewise abando

was decided to limit the defensive to Munchengr

decision might have brought on a catastrophe if 

sian armies had crossed the Iser in five column

Jungbunzlau and Eisenbrod. It was, however

within 24 hours, because the Army of the Elbe 

advantage of this time for a day of rest and the 

for preparations and dispositions for the att

had been postponed to the 28th. Not these p

decided the Crown Prince to retreat on the follow

ing (the 28th)) but the rumor that the enemy 

march from Turnau to Gitsehin, which decision 

firmed by an order from Benedek. 

While a relative rest and inactivity was en

on the 2?th, sharp fighting took place on the oth

two points. On the 2&h, the v Prussian Corps 

era1 von Steinmetz had reached Cellenau with 

Lewin with the advance guard, the main arm

Reinerz and the reserve at Ruckers. Steinmetz

for the next day was to gain and hold the pass 

Since this point had been reported occupied by 

General von Loewenfeld went forward with th
the enemy, for a battle, a decisive battle, 

pared for it but seek it in order to beg

promising manner. Napoleon, such as w

Jena, would have taken not only the vangu

tire advanee guard through the Nachod d

ning or in the night, occupied a position o

and taken care that early the following da

corps had begun to cross over the Mettau br

made the various echelons, maintaining 

break camp at the usual hour of 6 :00 AM 

made half of the march, halted for one half 

to custom. Consequently it was not surpr

van- and advance guards were opposed 

hours by a numerically superior enemy a

complete defeat. 

The VI Austrian Corps under Lieutena

al v. Rammig was posted on the 26th no

between Dobruschka and Metzritz. The fo

to march thence by four different roads to W

and Stalitz in order to occupy there a posi

They had not yet reached their goal when 

reported on the hills northeast of Wenzelsb

wing brigade, which had taken the road fro

Schonow, turned to the right at this villag

for attack. Four battalions in three eche

division(zl), the others in battalion colum

mishers in front, a battery coming up on 

against the 2d Battalion of the 37th Regim

pany of rifles and a battery of the Prussian 

which had taken up a position northeast of 

half way up the slope between the Waltche

and a thicket, situated much more south. 

battery was soon silenced. The five battalio

the bands playing. They were brought t

““One division-two of the six companies fo
--- 

column against line ; “of the entire man, 

against “the fool, the bullet”; of the muzzle 

the breech loader; of the target against the 

Once again the two battalions of the third 

against the front and one battalion, advan

cinity of the Neustadt road, against the le

enemy. The failure was identical The E

disappeared. Only two battalions had tak

in Wenzelsberg and in the church of that 

talions of the Prussian advance guard, comi

Branca hill, took part in the last fights. I

enemy, they penetrated on the right into the 

the left to Sochors and the assistant forester

now stood in an extended line : three and one 

in Wyschow, four and one half in the west

Waldchen, the 2d Battalion of the 37th Reg

the woods and the thicket, situated more to 

batteries and four squadrons to the left of 

companies at Sochors and the assistant fo

two companies in reserve at Altstadt and tw

stadt road. All could advance for a con

against Wenzelsberg. 

But the Brigade Jonak was now adva

interrupted its march to Kleny at Domkow

advanced in three lines through the no

Schonow on Wenzelsberg. Fire from the 

Waldchen, fire from the right out of the ass

lodge forced it to divide. Four battalions 

right against the forester’s lodge, three to 

the western edge of the Waldchen. A bat

attacked simultaneously from the Skalitz r

gade Rosenzweig entered into the open spa

two parts of the Brigade Jonak. Two o

were sent into the woods, into which the 

Wenzelsberg’s garrison had turned, so that 
tte batteyee adaced past t

church. The 2d Battalion repulsed their 

right Aank being threatened from the wood

to retreat. The twelve guns, which resiste

against the 24 Austrian guns were forced 

After the five battalions of the Prussian adv

escaped the double surrounding of the si

battalions, they halted with their two batte

on the Neustadt road, their right wing at th

and the left in the vicinity of Bracetz. 

The Austrians followed on the right 

forester’s Iodge and Sochors, in the center 

former position of the 2d Battalion of the 

on the left as far as the eastern edge of t

ther to the left went the Solms Cavalry B

the wood and Wysokow, but retreated towar

a skirmish with the Wunck Cavalry Brigade

of the Austrian infantry to advance from th

the Prussian position were repulsed by a ho

well as by flanking attacks of the infantry 

The Austrians however, held the gained pos

main forces of the VI Corps reached the b

battalions of its leading Brigade, the 19th

Wysokow and four against the wood. T

drive the enemy, greatly shaken by many r

and unable to deploy on account of lack of 

out of the wood, but aIso out of Wenzelsb

him to retreat as far as Prowodow and Sch

trian right wing at the forester’s lodge and 

this movement, although it had not been 

advance of the Prussians from the west e

and through Wenzelsberg stopped the fire 

artillery reserve which had arrived from Sk

position on the heights east of Kleny. 
against the weak hostile front from the line : 

Prowadow, and the Skalitz highroad. The thre

were, however, unnt for such action or, at least

SO. The two battalions of Waldstatten’s Brigade

western end of the wood, could not re-establish 

attack of the three brigades, and brought a

new failure, weakening the flank attack. Th

three batteries of the corps artillery reserve we

to Waldstatten’s command, was of no advan

situation as a whole. Until then the powerful 

serve held the entire field under its fire. After 

weakened by 24 guns, the Prussian artillery b

the upper hand; stationed as it was between th

Wysokow as well as in Wenzelsberg, it could pre

tack south of Wysokow for the execution of wh

Brigade, at least, had to be awaited. 

Waldstatten reach the Wysokow pIateau 

talions, 4 squadrons, and 1 battery, soon reinfo

and one half batteries. The rest of his artillery 

west or northwest of the village without going 

The attack against the center of the long exte

took place first with two battalions. As the t

half battalions, designated for the defense of 

were extended along its entire length and as 

and buildings favored the attack, the Austrians 

in occupying a portion of the houses. This s

however, of short duration. The occupied b

well as the coming reinforcements were attack

in the front, but also on the left flank by two b

the 20th Brigade, led by General von Wittich, 

right flank by the garrison of the western par

lage. The enemy, surrounded on three sides, 

confusion through the wood in rear of the rai

artillery which had suffered much from infantr

attacked, when about to drive off, by several s
The victor limited himself to the oc

heights on either side of Wysokow. The t

sidered too exhausted and tired for purs

victorious army were not exhausted and t

of a victorious battle and as if, notwithstan

tion, pursuit were not required.as the only 

the victory complete. 

The pursuit, desisted from, may be 

fact that the Prussian army had only tw

strength at the end of the combat on hand 

two thirds were entirely scattered. The re

this unfavorable situation Iies entireIy at 

Prussian eommander. The commanding gen

self at Nachod in a similar situation to th

at Jena. However, he did not follow the 

master who caused our greatest defeat. 

there, a defile had to be traversed in orde

on the following day at the other end. Na

no effort, no obstacle, no difficulty to brin

evening, in the night, sufficient troops to ta

on the heights beyond the defile. Here a

the enemy wore himself out by vain fronta

poleon let him do so, did not waste his stren

suit of small successes, did not divide his f

berless small detachments. The deployment 

ly advancing troops had to be completed fir

might fifl in the time by slowly Iosing blood

forward with a wide front and extended e

in an annihilating attack against the en

hausted, and almost incapable of resistance. 

of itself. The needle gun and the firing tac

the shock tactics of the other at Nachod, ha

condition of things to a certain degree. Bu

had not been won. 

The I Army Corps reached south of 

early as 25 June. After one day’s rest, it 
y y g, q

visable to go around Trautenau with at least pa

troops and to endeavor, at the same time, to tak

emy in flank. For this purpose the 1st Division 

reserve cavalry was to go via Freheit to Pilsdorf

Division from Liebau with a brigade via Schatz

the other via Bernsdorf to Trautenau. This m

completed by the 1st Division of the Guard which 

ceived the order to march on the 27th, from Di

via Weckelsdorf, Adersbach, Qualisch, and Parsc

thence to Eipel, also by the 2d Division of the Gua

was to advance from Kosteletz to Korika. Sho

Corps encounter the enemy at Trautenau, the latt

be attacked by the 2d Division in the front, by t

the left and by the 1st Guard Division on the rig

Should the enemy be farther south, the march 

continued, under cover of the reserve cavalry, in 

umns-from Pilsdorf to Deutsch-Prausnitz, fro

tenau to Kaile, from Parschnitz to Eipel. Should 

columns meet the enemy, the others would be read

the threatened point. Should no enemy be fou

Corps would take up position in echelon betwee

and Trautenau for the continuation of the marc

folIowing day to Arnau, while the 1st Division of 

went with one brigade to Eipel-Raatsch, with 

by the shorest road, to Koniginhof via Bausnitz 

Rognitz. All this could be seen several days a

couId have been arranged by giving proper march 

and cantonments on the 2&h, or in case of need 

march the afternoon of the 26th. However, the 

ing general would have nothing to do with such 

tions. He went with the 1st Division from Lieba

2d from Schomberg, that is, on two roads, but on 

joining at Parschnitz, immediately at the defiIe o

nau. Bonin intended to advanee from there in o

up the narrow valley of the Aupa, on the high 

edge of which the enemy was to be expected. 
that the bridge over the Aupa at Trautenau 

by a few dismounted dragoons. These wer

back, the march through and beyond Traute

continued and no steps were taken to find 

more of the enemy was to be encountered beyo

ful of cavalry. The division commander, vo

let the matter alone and did not receive the 

that Mondel’s Brigade had already reached 

south of Trautenau as an advance guard of th

Corps and occupied the Hopfen and Kapellen 

reached Parschnitz two hours later than Cla

on learning that the bridge over the Aupa 

by the enemy, he sent the advance guard (1s

drive the dragoons from the bridge over the 

continue the march via Trautenau to Pilnikau

Hardly had the advance detachments left 

the road to Pilnikau, when the troops whieh 

ceived a hot fire from the southern heights, Th

ing column had only to turn left and close the 

in order to be quickly ready for the attack of 

flank of the hostile position. But the surprise

knowledge, the invisible enemy, the contrad

confused the five battalions. Considerable tim

fore action was taken according to some ki

But the attack was difficult and no cover was 

hostile skirmishers were well posted. Two b

and a half squadrons, and two guns, marchin

flank guard via Schatzlar and from Nieder

eastern Weigelsdorf against the left flank o

hurried to Trautenau, the focus of the co

creased there the confusion and the mass 

taking part in the battle. 

We should think that the artillery wou

tively prepared, by fire, the attack against 

But it had not succeeded or at least it h
gg 

cended. The greatest losses were caused to the d

the Jagers who sped their well aimed bullets from 

stories and the roofs of the Trautenau houses. 

trians might have held out a long time if eight 

of the Prussian main body under General van Bud

had not come up, partly crossing the Aupa, in the 

climbing through Parsehnitz, partly through the 

brock defile, partly over the roadless, steep, wo

rocky Parschnitz ridge in the direction of Hopf

Katzauerberg. Two battalions of Mondel’s Brig

thrown against the enveloping troops. The other 

uated the position in time. All fell back gradua

regiment of the Prussian advance guard remained 

tenau, the ot’her followed slowly in order to first 

the battalions of the main body, but later, at 

of “Assembly” given in Trautenau, decided to retr

a few companies, the commander of which did no

obey the signal of retreat in the face of the en

tinued the advance. Thus, ten companies of the 

guard and the main body under Buddenbrock, 

Hohenbruck, sixteen gained the wooded heights 

this village and Alt-Rognitz and nine, the flat are

this point. 

The exhausted troops could not advance furt

the heights commanding Neu-Rognitz, they met 

artillery which the one Prussian battery, coming 

untold efforts, did not dare to attack. All that 

done was to hold the occupied positions until the 

the corps, which had stayed behind, could come up 

to go on to vietory. The movements, effected by 

denbruck’s eight battalions toward Hohenbru

Rognitz, were still under way when General von 

ported the arrival of the 1st Guard Division ea

schnitz and offered to use these troops. Bonin de

offer. He had deployed only eight battalions. T

---. 
vision rest for two hours east of Parschnitz. 

it remained there, for some time as a reserve

Since the enemy seemed to have retreate

bruck, Bonin intended to draw his troops o

and let the head advance as far as Pilnikau

were being prepared when it was reported t

was advancing from Neu-Rognitz. General v

was then instructed to support Buddenbrock 

vance guard, reinforced by three battalions 

body. This could be executed only by bri

available battalions from Trautenau in a w

tion and then sending them to attack the ene

The attack against the right flank fell, of it

of the 1st Division of the Guard. It could n

the narrow valley of the Aupa unconcerned, 

tle was raging on the heights on its immedia

Hiller was forced to ascend the edge of the 

his troops or, at least with part of them, a

for the purpose of forcing the refused suppo

but for his own security and in conformity 

elementary rules of warfare. Should this ta

the attack of the hostile right flank would re

ter of course. The battle seemed to be be

follows : Buddenbrock to halt at Hohenbruck-

and even to retreat if necessary until Hiller 

from the one side and Grossmann from the 

perior ,numbers. At all events Barnekow’s 

tioned at Wolta, ought to have crossed th

Trautenau and occupied the hills in the sout

Only this one disposition was carried o

sent to General Grossmann never reached 

was never repeated, and was not replaced b

of the advance guard commander. Ten b

kept out of the combat. General Hiller supp
g

tion was of marching away from the sound of can

and of a peaceful march along the edge of a b

Both can hardly be justified. Buddenbrock’s e

talions were placed in a precarious situation by t

tion of Grossmann and Hiller. The battalions 

panies were completely mixed up by a march ov

tains, wooded and very difficult terrain. The mou

cers had to leave their horses behind and, being 

could not overlook the terrain or control their 

orders. One battery of the main body was the 

tillery. Two more batteries went into position 

Kapellenberg later on. Of these, one was soon wi

followed by the other after it had expended all the 

tion in its limbers. The eight battalions with no 

whatever, were thus exposed, to the fire of at least 

The situation seemed not favorable when Gab

the order to Grivicic’s Brigade, which had just a

attack Alt-Rognitz, about the same time as Hiller 

on his march from Parschnitz to Eipel. The a

rected against the front of the nine Prussian c

west of Alt-Rognitz, by seven battalions formed 

echelons, took place as similar attacks at Nach

nine companies, however, retreated when the at

renewed simultaneously with an attack against the 

left flank. This uncovered the left flank of the 

groups. The right wing in the lowlying Hohenb

not oppose any considerable resistance to the 

Wimpffen’s Brigade which followed shortly, and 

retreat as the center had done. It was continued 

eight battalions without serious encounters as fa

Aupa and beyond it. The advance guard and m

were thus as good as eliminated. There remaine

serve-four and one half battalions under Gen

Barnekow. of these, two battalions of the 43d 

were placed in position from the Galgenberg v
ing the pursuit and three more attacks w

Knebel’s Brigade, arriving in support, would 

the fate of Wimpgen’s Brigade if Grivicic’s 

vancing via Katzauerberg and Krieblitz, had 

the flank and rear of the 43d and forced its r

the northern part of Krieblitz, across the Aup

tion of Wolta. Grivicic now encountered the 

who had occupied hill 353, the wood north of 

the slopes of the Parschnitz Berge and held 

until Trautenau and the valley above Parsch

evacuated by the Prussians, and the troops 

Kommandeur Hill, had also begun to retrea

began to withdraw through the Buddenbroc

across the Aupa, where they joined the 1st R

Thus the occupation of the principal position 

river was of no value whatever. It had lo

prepared on the Kommandeur Hill. At le

guns, so painfully missed in front, were d

Three battalions and four squadrons, which 

have been reinforced, were ready to defen

impregnable position. It seemed during the 

day that the real battIe would be waged at 

was impossible to foresee how the enemy c

bulwark with exhausted troops. Still the las

evacuated before the more advanced ones h

doned. Seemingly too exhausted to make a st

streamed back as darkness set in, in order 

quarters left that morning, and that after 

less than eight miles. 

The outlook for the I Corps the evening 

good as one could wish. If the enemy were 

or advanced thither, he exposed himself to a

completely as could be desired, especially if 

Guard Divisions were not entirely held back. 

via Liebau and Schomberg wrecked the adv
feating the enemy. Bonin would have been satisfie

were not beaten. Such contentment with little was 

the face of an enemy who was resolved to stop at n

fice to obtain victory. To defeat such an enemy 

nerve must be strained and not small detachments s

for attack. In the series of combats, constituting t

tle of Trautenau, the troops were sent into the 

driblets. Three, at the most four, battalions fought 

the Kappellenberg, and Hopfenberg. Only two we

serious encounter at Hohenbruck and Alt-Rognitz. 

repulsed the attack of Wimpffen’s Brigade. Two 

half held the position at Aupa. Out of the 96 guns 

few went into action for a short time. During the 

part of the battle, positions were taken up which, 

well defended, must sooner or later fall a prey to 

rounding movement, on account of their very narrow 

The only possible end of such a course of action was 

eral retreat. The commanding general could not o

not utilize his forces to obtain a victory; all that w

for him to do was to withdraw from the battlefield. 

The results of the 27th appeared in no way to 

favorable to Austria. At Trautenau, a decisive victo

won, at Nachod it must be admitted an attack h

repulsed, but the position of Skalitz on the posse

which Benedek had laid the greatest stress, had be

The enemy had made no progress whatever on t

Nevertheless the day had brought a great disillusio

The shock tactics, on which Austria had built suc

had not verified in the least their expectations. Atta

three times greater hostile forces were repulsed in 

time. The superiority of the needle gun had been 

beyond all refutation. Not only the vanquished of 

but also the victor of Trautenau was discouraged

losses were disproportionately great and so much t

felt as the efforts of the last ten days were quite exh
alternated with short marches. The troop

slowly to reach after dark the desired enc

found there scarcely any water or food. The 

mands were soon increased. Finally the ma

day and night with short halts for rest, l

water, in the hope of soon reaching the 

crushing the enemy with a weighty blow. D

followed so much the greater upon the frustr

the latter had been so exalted. Rammig 

his corps was incapable of either attack or d

the victorious X Corps was in a depressed 

The Austrian condition of affairs was 

ever. Benedek had called the VIII Corps 

IV to Dolan. It would have been better t

these two corps not in rear of the VI, but 

Map47. right, the other on its left. Nevertheless, t

Corps, stood near Skalitz the morning of the 

site these, as already said, there stood only 

Corps-the V. The VI was marehing furthe

was doubtful if it would arrive on the 28th. 

doubt that Austria would be numerically the 

It is true that a new enemy had been repo

But he could have been held in check by the 

one day at least. Though no great feats cou

from the VI Corps, it still could withstand a

strong position at Skalitz left of the Aupa, 

the VIII Corps could be brought up on the l

on the right, according to Hannibal’s and Na

od, in order to encircle the flanks of the ene

ing his heart blood in attacks of the position

Prussian Corps not attack, the three Austrian 

advance together in order to annihilate, by 

brace, the enemy wherever he might have to 

end. Such victory would have brought de

front. It was, at least; to be hoped that, aft
tions of these two armies, no surprise or quick a

be expected from them. It seemed, on the co

improbable that, should the 2d Army begin to 

First Army and the Army of the Elbe would no

Iser. An attack on the 28th, against the Prussia

with his three corps, offered a favorable prospe

dek. The Austrian army commander did not wis

to drop his former plan ; defensive with two c

east, offensive with six corps to the west. He h

to take advantage of the victory won at 

He had drawn the VIII and IV Corps to Skal

order to delay, under any circumstances, the 

vancing with great force from Nachod. 

When no attack was made during the foren

28th, two corps were more than enough for t

It is commendable that a commander does not e

don the plan decided upon, but it is still more lau

utilizes the lucky chance of the moment to strike 

blow. On the eastern front, the IV Corps was 

at Dolan, the X to march to Deutsch-Prausnitz 

get ahead of the Guard Corps, both to cross t

the following day. The VI and VIII Corps rece

to start, should no attack take place before 2:0

second order, issued at’ 11:OO AM, commanded 

mediate departure. The VIII Corps had reliev

in the position near Skalitz. The latter was th

to march. When the VIII Corps was on the p

lowing, the enemy attacked. The corps had n

its position. After ten forced marches and the 

of a position, it dared not turn back as soon as 

advanced and, moreover, it dared not pass throu

defile of Skalitz without apprehending a deci

from the pursuing enemy. 

The position on the heights of the left b

Aupa, north and south of Skalitz, was very stro
The V Prussian Corps, reinforced by a 

VI, stood, early on the 28th, in expectation 

with the advance guard north, Hoffman’s 

the main body and the right flank detachmen

enfeld east of Wysokow. In this position, Ste

to await the support of the 2d Guard Division 

asked, in order to attack with the advance g

with the Guard and Loewenfeld, who had 

Studnitz, the left flank of the hostile positio

was to remain in reserve and cover the le

corps. Upon receiving information that the 

vision had to be utilized at another point, 

cided to attack even without this support. 

guard was to advance south of Starkoc in a 

tion, the main body to follow north of the Wy

road, then debauching to the left to supp

while Loewenfeld was to turn to the left tow

berg and thence surround the left flank of th

man, with the reserve, to act according to 

ment. It was impossible to see how the int

ment of the well secured left flank could 

whole affair ended in a frontal attack on a 

sition. It would have been more to the pu

the principal attack against the left flank, 

two brigades on the right bank of the Aupa

gade via Zlbow and the southern Zlitsch on 

while one brigade went through the Eichwal

one south of the railroad against the front. 

Even the slimmest hope of success of a 

was eliminated by the right flank detachm

from the Schaferie not in a westerly dire

Dubno and through the Eichwald, by the ad

koc taking the same road and by Hoffma

west, sending at least two of his battalions 
Starkoc, Dubno, and Kleny. It was impossible to t

the jumbled up half-battalions, companies, and p

were to be led in a joint attack out of the wood 

the hostile position, The enemy, however, remo

difficulty. One of his battalions was sent into the oa

It was forced to retreat before the Prussian numer

periority. General von Fragnern, commanding t

wing, sent one battalion for support and later led f

the remaining six of his brigade. Since the enem

not be seen and could be recognized only by his fire, 

gade, turning slightly to the right from the north, 

the locality next to the wood-Gehege. Hostile 

ments, which had come thither earlier, were repulse

ther south, the brigade came upon the locality of t

way guard’s house where it met two of Loewenfeld’

battalions which had taken up a position behind t

road embankment. To the rapid fire against the fro

soon added rapid fire against the flank from the Ta

and finally against the rear from the Gehege, After 

its commander and several officers, the brigade re

partly to Skalitz, the lesser part going to its form

sition. 

In order to pick up the remnants, Kreyssern’s 

in position north of Skalitz, advanced against the 

track and the Gehege. Its fate was very similar to 

its predecessor. It streamed back to Skalitz also, 

remained nothing for the corps commander, Archduk

pold, but to order the retreat, which was started by 

Brigade which stood untouched south of the town

two other brigades followed under the protection of 

battalions, posted near the railway, in the custom 

and in the railway depot, as well as of a strong artill

sition east of the city. A few Prussian companies

rushed against this position, met with a bloody repu

united, to a certain degree orderly, pursuit by the m
less attack over an open field against the Aus

position, He preferred, after leaving one reg

koc, to advance with the right wing, via Zl

the Ieft through the Eichwald. The right w

southward from the north, gradually drove 

troops still in position. The left wing, whi

by the troops in the wood, arrived, after cro

way line, under a most effective fire of the h

against which only a few batteries had been 

Austrian rear guard, however, was forced to 

battalions of the Prussian right wing pene

town near the Aupa, while some even crossed 

threatened Klein-Skalitz. The pursuit wa

tended across the Aupa. Steinmetz was sat

occupation of the heights on the left bank. 

It might have been expected from Gablen

take advantage of the victory of the 27th a

should he follow the defeated opponent, the e

at Eipel, would attack him in the rear. Sho

Map 43. against the latter, he would have to take into 

vanc.ing troops of Bonin and new ones comin

south. A continuation of the offensive movem

or the other direction was fraught with ris

be undertaken and was advisable only for 

like Napoleon, knew himself to be master of 

The victor of Trautenau, who had tested the 

the enemy’s arms, could not have this conscio

did he possess it, it would have been impossi

continue the offensive, if it were not joined 

Map48. ously from Skalitz. For the retreat, which 

start, the surest road would have been via Kot

he could have barred the enemy in time at 

the right or left bank of the EIbe. But in that 

have left the road to Skalitz open to the Guard 

annihilation of the detachment probably fig
at Burkersdorf, Wimpffens Brigade to advan

heights of Kaile, Mondel’s Brigade as rear guard

the proper distance, lastly Grivicic’s Brigade to ad

the Katzauerberg via Alt-Rognitz and Rudersdorf 

Raatsch in order to occupy there a position as adva

facing Eipel. As the army order was received at 

and the trains could start only later, the orders c

ecuted only if the enemy halted at Eipel. The wis

existed at least. On receiving the false report t

columns were advancing from Deutsch-Prausnitz 

tenau, the 1st Guard Division wanted to await th

tion of the I Corps in a position behind the Aupa

reports that the enemy was marching in an oppo

tion decided the commanding general to give the 

Division orders to advance via Staudenz. This 

could have been supported effectively if on the day 

2d Division of the Guard, instead of halting at 

had gone to Horicka and had advanced to Kaile 

the 28th. To make a detour, via Horicka, at the 

not considered advisable. Another road via Liebe

found impracticable. The 2d Guard Division 

condemned to follow the first and play a secon

When the advance guard of the 1st Guard Division 

touch with Staudenz, Gablenz ordered the trains, 

not yet passed Burkersdorf, to turn to Pilnikau an

Brigade as well as a few batteries of the artillery 

deploy between Neu-Rognitz and Burkersdorf, 

The deployed Prussian advance guard went a

position, drove off a far advanced battalion, but ha

this in order to await the main body which had 

behind, When the latter came on a line with th

guard, Mondel’s Brigade had also reached Ne

Thus two almost equally strong forces opposed each 

the Austrian troops had no reason to avoid a com
latter had to withstand an attack of the 1st 

before it could follow the two others. It suf

siderable losses. The Prussians would have 

success only if they had pursued the enemy a

to Pilnikau. But the commander as well as 

kept, back from such an operation by firmly r

considerations. The enemy was retreating

“Halt all !” was given. Even under serious 

these peace customs were maintained, althou

taught that pursuit in war was one of the 

tions. 

Long before the question arose as to whe

suit should take place, Grivicic’s Brigade, a

ders received, had reached Alt-Rognitz. One 

2d Guard Division, following the 1st Divisio

was directed against the enemy appearing 

It fought a very bloody battle south of Rude

Stein Krenz. A second battalion brought t

standstill. A pause took place in the fig

hesitated to advance and awaited the order t

the other brigades had already received. Th

battalions were too weak to attack. The co

eral did not deem it necessary to support th

mnnder-in-chief held the opinion, “we will s

tic’s Brigade) all captives this evening at Tr

the more surely, if we have greater succes

This was quite right. But success at the 

be achieved by advancing as far as the Pil

could not be obtained by a bivouack at Bu

commanding general was at Iast prevailed 

eight companies forward to Alt-Rognitz. T

tack forced the Austrian brigades to retre

wounding of their leader, the cohesion of the 

A few severe encounters between separate d

took place, Then the Austrians endeavore
been directed at once to Kaile and if both divisions 

vanced, without loss of time, by the Trautenau-Praus

road up to the Trautenau-Pilnikau road. 

The following troops of the First Army and 

Army of the Elbe were to advance on the 28th for 

tack of the position at Munchengratz: the 15th and 1

visions from Huhnerwasser to Munchengratz, the 1

Liebitsch to Mohelnitz, the Landwehr Division of the 

to Huhnerwasser, Horn’s Division (8th) and that o

stein (6th) from Podol to Brezina, Fransecky (7th

Mockry-Wschen to Zider, the Cavalry Corps with 

brigades to Dauby and Lozan, the II Corps to Sichro

rest of the Cavalry Corps to Liebenau-Reichenau, 

Tumpling’s Division (.5th) to Rowensko. Without a

this attack the Crown Prince of Saxony ordered a ret

follows : Ringelsheim’s Brigade via Podkost, Posch

Pirte’s, and Abele’s Brigades via Furstenbruck and 

to Gitschin, the Saxon Corps via Trentsin, Nasilnitse

Brezno to Domausnitz, the Saxon cavalry to Unter-Ba

the Saxon heavy artillery and the trains to Jungbunzl

east thereof. Since the Army of the Elbe had to cov

siderable distances and the attack therefore could no

until 9:QO AM, the Austrians and Saxons could hav

drawn without any loss if Leiningen’s Brigade, left 

guard near Kloster, the other side of the Iser, had no

ed the attack of the 15th Division and if two horse b

and some infantry had not been placed on the Mus

north of Musky to receive that brigade. 

Hence ensued combats between Leiningen’s Briga

the advance guards of the 15th and 14th Divisions, as 

between Fransecky’s Division and the troops posted 

Musky hill. After some not inconsiderable losses and t

ture of prisoners from the Italian reserves, the Au

retreated on Abele’s Brigade via Furstenbruck. 

Prussian side almost all their forces had been conce
about 120,000 men, was united immediately 

of its commander, but sudered under “the 

centration,” lacked the most needful things, 

ployed only with difficulty. 

Although there was no pursuit, army h

well informed by the cavalry as to the locati

The march of a long column from Sobotka 

been observed, strong Austrian cavalry had 

this town as well as a rear guard near Pod

ninig. It was not difficult to guess where th

would be in the evening. Reports concer

were 1erJs satisfactory. The patrols had m

far from Jungbunzlau. Nothing, howeve

served of a departure from Bakow to Unter-B

headquarters deduced from all this that, 

hostile army, then at least the Saxon Corp

again a position at Jungbunzlau and would 

tacked there. For this purpose, in the aftern

the following should be in readiness : the 15t

right and the 16th on the left bank of the I

the 14th and the Landwehr Division of the 

rear at Munchengratz. The II Corps was 

Dambrow via Zehrow to Martinowitz by the 

lau-Ober Bautzen, Tumpling’s Division to 

maming troop units to remain where they we

the attack was to take place against an uno

Benedek’s situation thanks to the victor

and in spite of the unfortunate combats of 

and Barkersdorf, was not very unfavorable 

of the 28th. The IV and X Corps were und

of preventing the Prussian Second Army fr

Upper Elbe for two, even three days. Altho

VIII Corps of the six remaining ones had 

erably, there were still sufficient forces 

offensive against the Prussian First Army 

____----
tory was by all means necessary to the Austrians. A 

retreat of the enemy or an undecided battle wou

brought from the one side the Second Army, from th

the Army of the Elbe and a doubtful victory wou

been transformed into a sure defeat. However, it wa

lematic if the Austrian army leadership was cap

fighting a battle of annihilation, taking into consid

the proofs given so far. There was no inclination t

that attempt. The unfortunate messages from Ska

Burkersdorf, as well as the false report that the ene

penetrated into Gitschin, affected Benedek’s confid

himself and his troops so deeply that he abandoned 

tended offensive and wanted to seek salvation in the 

Tosefstadt (II) t Jaromer (IV), Salnai (VIII), 

(X), Lancow (VI), Miletin (III), Horitz (I), M

(Saxon Corps). Benedek gave up the possibility o

tory by adopting this decision. The naturally stro

sition : Josef&ad&-Miletin, was so strongly occup

six corps that the Prussian Second Army had little 

of taking it soon. But so much the weak& was th

in the locality: Horitz-Milowitz, facing west, for 

fense of which against the First Army and Army 

Elbe, the I and the Saxon Corps were not sufficient

narrow flank had to be pushed back against the 

the much wider Prussian armies, while the cavalry 

crossed the Elbe below this point, Hartmann’s Cava

vision crossing the Mettau in order to complete 

pending “Cannae” by the occupation of the fords b

Koniggratz and Josefstadt. 

The question was not* .-will the Austrians be 

back, as was the highest aim of army headquarters, 

they be surrounded on the left bank of the Elbe, as 

had wished. In other words, shall the campaign 

tinued step by step, i.e., from the Elbe and the Nain 

Danube and, maybe, across the Danube ; will the pow
Map 44, 

Map 49. 

Map 60, 

for the solution of these questions had alre

or might be made up for in the next few 

essential thing to be done, however, fell to 

other armies. Had these started originally 

without caring about the enemies, who eit

or were too weak for serious resistance, 

reached Jungbunzlau-Eisenbrod on the 2

on the 29th, could have reaehed Gitschin w

and Neubidschow or Chlumec with the right 

pened. After this a short pressure only w

put into execution Moltke’s plan on the 30th

longer be done since the 28th had been sp

Battle” in which “everything had worked 

and could no more be thought of when on the 

of Jungbunzlau had been prepared, to be exe

30th. It was high time that Moltke shou

the 29th, by a telegram that the great aim c

attained. The Second Army needed no ot

It wanted to proceed on the 29th with the 

kau, the Guard Corps of Rettendorf, the a

Koniginhof, with the V Corps to Gradlitz, 

Skalitz. This intention led to new comba

General von Steinmetz at Skalitz had 

the road from Josefstadt to the Walowski va

of the Austrian IV Corps. He did not wan

my “lure him to Jaromer,” but planned to t

by marching off via West&z, Wetrnik, an

without having much to do with him. B

vance guard ascended the plateau southwes

tween Chwalkowitz and Miskoles, it encoun

who had occupied an advantageous position 

schadel and Sebuc between the Aupa and 

The march could not be continued unless 

that the flank or rear should be exposed to 

vance guard jointly with a left flank detach
repulse the first onset of the enemy and then only s

retreat. A combat took place with the usual A

counter thrusts of individual troop units, repulses 

attacks by rapid fire, around Schweinschadel, the 

near the Schaferei and the Ziegelei and near Sobuc

a breaking off of the fight on the part of the Prussia

a retreat to Jaromer on the part of the Austrians. 

the fight began in the afternoon, the first troops o

Corps reached Gradlitz only in the night. 

The X Corps and Fleischhacker’s Brigade of th

trian IV Corps were to march on the 29th from Neu

via Koniginhof to Dubenetz. Wimpffen’s Brigade al

sent over the nearest and best, but also the most thre

road via Ketzelsdorf. It reached Koniginhof without 

come into touch with the enemy and continued its m

Dubenetz. The remaining brigades, the artillery 

the ammunition park and the trains had to make a 

on the right bank of the Elbe, cross the river immedia

front of Koniginhof and thence return to the righ

To cover the march through the town, ten companie

Coronini regiment were sent to the eastern exit, t

them occupying the brick kiln. The trains, the amm

park, the artillery reserve and Knebel’s Brigade had 

the southern bridge, two battalions (the remnants o

tic’s Brigade) rested on the market place when the 

guard of the Guard Corps appeared at 2 :00 PM, fro

kersdorf. The three companies in the brick kiln w

inforced by three companies of the reserve. The s

panies could not long resist the two batteries and 

one half battalions of the advance guard. They fo

retreating, the northern bridge barred by a Prussia

pany. The two Grivicic battalions, two battalions 

del’s Brigade covered by the ten Coronini companie

forced to retreat over the southern bridge after 

fighting and serious losses in casualties and prisoner
above Jaromer was evacuated by the Aust

the Prussians. Of these there stood the 

Corps with Hoffman’s Brigade near Retten

and Gradlitz, the I Corps near Pilnikau, 

litz, the Cavalry Division near Kaile. O

in a very strong position formed by the e

of the Elbe between Kaschow and Doubraw

VIII, and X Corps, the 2d and 3d Reser

sions in readiness, The right flank betw

Kaschow was covered by the II and IV Corp

and the 2d Light Cavalry Divisions while t

ed by the III Corps in the region: Miletin-Z

-Chrostow-Tetin. The Second Army did 

sible to attack this numerically superior a

a position. An attack by the Austrians, 

seemed to have a good chance. In their ha

crossings above and below over which th

flank attack against the concentrated Pruss

since four of his corps had been defeated w

Benedek abandoned all thought of attack. 

in repulsing an attack against the long know

position. In order to be as strong as poss

bat, an order had been prepared early on 

Crown Prince of Saxony to effect a junctio

army without becoming engaged in any o

The defensive battle against the Second A

place before the First Army and the Army o

have time to come up. The Second Army, 

given its consent to this plan. It did not w

to rest on the 30th. 

The AusGian and the Second Armies 

wait. It was so much the more urgent to ca

It was, however, impossible to advance rap

enemy out of the “calamity of concentration” 

of Horitz-Koniggratz and strike at his flan
Division) from Zehrow to Gitschin, Herwarth (4t

sion) from Zidar and Alvensleben’s Cavalry Divisio

follow the former, Fransecky (7th Division) from 

via Sobotka, following the latter. After these d

there should start in the evening, Horn (8th Di

Manstein (6th Division), and Hann’s Cavalry Div

Lower and Upper Bautzen to serve as a reserve for t

sions marching to Gitschin as well as for the Army 

Elbe remaining opposite Jungbunzlau. Not in spite 

because the commanders always endeavored to keep 

forces firmly and resolutely together, they could send 

the enemy only two divisions instead of ten. The tw

sions of Herwarth and Fransecky, following in sec

were at too great a distance from Tumpling and We

be able to take part in a combat on the same day. 

a decision had to be reached on that very day, 

Poschacher’s Brigade and Edelsheim’s Cavalry 

had reached Gitschin already on the 28th. Piret’s, 

gen’s, and Abele’s Brigades followed to that point 

afternoon of the next day, Ringelsheim’s Brigade 

Lochow, Stieglitz’s Saxon Division reached Podhrad

Schimpff’s Division arrived at Gitschinowes only 

evening. Through these marches the intention, give

army order of the ZSth, “to prevent the enemy from p

ing between the main forces and your troops,” se

have been fulfilled. By another report “Army Headq

at Miletin on the 29th, at Gitschin on the 3Oth,” the 

advance of the army seemed to be in view. The 

Prince decided, consequently, to remain at Gitschin

enemy had not followed. Only Tumpling’s Divisio

since the evening before, near Rowensko. In order t

the position against these, Count Clam-Gallas had the 

berg occupied by Poschacher and Markt-Eisenstad

Piret, placing Leiningen as a reserve in rear of Pos

and begged the Crown Prince to send a brigade to 
defenders retreat, the victorious attack cam

of the other defender. If both parts advan

be entirely separated. It was also unfortuna

and Ma&t-Ejsenst.adtl were situated in a lo

occupied, according to ancient custom, only b

villages. 

Unexpectedly came the report at 3 :3O P

my was advancing on the Turnau road. T

of iMarkt-Eisenstadtl, the northern edge of 

and the edge of the wood south of Klein-Gin

occupied. Stieglitz’s Division was called up

nated for it being occupied temporarily 

Brigade of WaIlis north of Dieletz, the artillery 

The enemy came partly from Ober-Knischnitz 

road and partly via Cidlina to Zames. T

Wallis’ Hussars, who had ascended on foot 

324 west of Zames, as well as the two right 

between Brada and Die!etz, to retreat. We

enemy occupied the northern Podulsch, Gino

south of Jawornitz and advanced via Bres

The enemy halted on the edge of the wood 

Podulsch and marched against Dieletz. Tw

had already penetrated into the village when 

gade came up and won back what had been 

sian artillery, which had come in a south

western direction from Ober Knischnitz, a

far as Zames and forced part of the Austrian 

teries to go from east of Brada to north of K

was the situation when at 7 :OO PM Benedek 

to continue the movement for the junction 

avoiding the more serious encounters. In 

Crown Prince would have maintained his po

if Ringelsheim had not sent the exaggerated 

had been attacked with forces four times 
made on this village. Part of the still fighting 

were cut off. Piret wanted to tear from the ene

vantages obtained and crossed the Cidlina back at t

mil! with three battalions each against the northe

Dieietz and against Zames, The attack in column 

executed with band playing, broke at both points 

scathing rapid fire. After losing one sixth of its 

the brigade abandoned Markt-Eisenstadtl and we

Gitschin. Posehacher had also undertaken a suc

tacli: against Klein-Ginolitz with a few battalion

before retreating. The retreat through the wood 

the villages was rendered more difficult by thi

Several companies were cut off when Tumpling 

dulseh and Brada, by an encircling attack at 8 :30 

wounding of the General brought the advance t

still. Before General Kaminsky had taken ove

mand at lo:00 PM, and ordered the continuation 

vance, Piret, Stieglitz, and Wallis had departed 

and Leiningen, Poschacher and the mass of the ar

cavalry through Gitschin. 

Ringelsheim’s Brigade had taken up positio

Wohawetz, that of Abele north of Prachow. De

had been sent forward to Lower and Upper Locho

the road and into the wood toward Bresea. Werd

ed against these positions from Sobotka. The 

detachments of the enemy were driven back by h

guard, Lower Lochow, the wood to its north and 

kapelle were taken. Upper Lochow, however, wa

garrisoned, the meadow strip east of Lower Lo

hard to cross and the Austrian artillery on heigh

very effective. General Januschevsky was entru

turning the difficult position via Wostruschno 

battalions and one battery. The goal had not 

reached when the Austrians made a counteratt

Upper Lochow with two, and from Wohawetz with 

--. -.-
come up in the meanwhile over the meado

Lower Lochow. The order to retreat arrive

tion and was executed without much distu

roads, via Holin and Wohawetz, were availa

suit took place. Only the flank detachment 

was pushed back in part. 

As there was not sufficient water at Wo

Schmidt decided to march further, althoug

already set in. He rode at the head of the 

staff before the infantry could follow. C

he was met by fire. A battalion which follo

one of the gates unoccupied and entered the 

sheim’s Brigade, designated in the beginning 

for holding the town, was no longer in a con

this task, and had retreated through the st

Brigade, called as a substitute, arrived alm

time, (10 :30 PM), from the northeast as th

talion came up from the west into the town. 

had to go back. Another attempt to penetra

was repulsed. The Saxons occupied the t

Division went into bivouac west of and clo

Shortly before midnight the advance guard 

5th Division arrived in front of the town. 

likewise repulsed. The Saxon Brigade eva

and retreated to Smidar, only when Lieuten

Gaudy advanced with three and one half 

Dieletz east of Kbelnitz, crossing the Cidlina 

from the north. Gitschin was then occupi

sians. 

Desisting from the time honored proc

were undertaken on that day. The effect 

Map 49. show itself. Count Clam-Gallas in Gitsch

point of giving orders for further retreat wh

Prussians penetrated into the town. He wa
First Army Headquarters demanded after thi

days of rest, later on the reserves were drawn fro

and Lower Bautzen to Gitschin and, after the de

of the phantom of Jungbunzlau, the Army of the 

brought to Liban. Thus the First Army was ass

Gitschin. The pursuit was begun from there in 

noon in the direction of Miletin: by Manstein (

sion) as far as Chotez, Tumpling (5th) as far as 

in the direction of Horitz: by Fransecky (7th) 

Konetschlum in the direction of Smidar : by Horn 

far as Miletin. The II Corps remained at Gits

Podhrad. The Cavalry Corps, which had asked p

to go in pursuit of the enemy, was refused its req

sented at an inopportune moment, and sent to Dv

Robus. How much would it not have been able to 

the appearance alone of a cavalry regiment befo

decided Clam-Gallas to continue his retreat from 

Sadowa, from Miletin via Gross-Burglitz and Mas

Koniggratz. The left flank of the Austrian army 

entirely uncovered. An insignificant cannonade t

on the‘Elbe, but on the morrow an attack must follow 

the front and, via Horitz and Miletin, against the r

result of this could not be awaited. At dark the re

begun in silence: by the III and X Corps via Lancow

Burglitz, Cerekwitz, Sadowa, to Lipa; by the V 

Dubenetz, Choteborek, Zizelowes, Horenowes, to 

by the VI Corps via Dubunetz, Choteborek, Welch

schitz, Sendrasitz, to Nedelitst; by the II Corps v

and Jezbin to Trotina ; the Saxon Corps in Sm

asked to join via Neubidschow and Nechanitz. 

This was a success, but not the success Moltke 

tended it to be, as he had thought it out. His plan 

ations was simple enough. He let the widely sca

mies march to the point to which, according to hi

tions, the Austrians must decide to go. To friend 

my the same rendezvous had been assigned. From 
ppgg y 

sides, the former to take advantage of the i

ter of the outer lines. By exerting their utm

Austrians were the first to come to the re

length of their marching columns extended 

over five days. Five long days must they 

intended offensive could be undertaken aga

main army advancing against the Iser. Wa

for this main army, which was to be attacked

tack before the end of this period, and was 

that the Silesian army9 which had arrived 

mountain passes, might appear earlier on t

The Austrian army would then have been fo

possibly immediately after the completed c

struggle with the Prussian army in the vic

for the decision, while, close by, two corps 

gun to ward off attacks against flank and r

tion on the upper Elbe was strong. But so

left wing must be turned. Then the flood w

the left flank and rear of the Austrian arm

how many attacks might have been repulse

my not been annihilated, the Austrian army 

tion. * 

Such a situation must be avoided, the two 

must be kept farther apart. The Crown Pr

received the order to prevent the enemy at 

crossing the Iser. Gablenz was sent to Traut

mig to Skalitz’and Nachod to hold back the 

pected from Silesia, near the exits of the m

Both measures were inadequate, considering 

opposing each other. Nevertheless, they were 

ful. The enemy was not held back at the 

but he stopped of his own accord. Gablenz 

ponent out of the field. Rammig, at least, 

position at Skalitz, and was reinforced by t
dayseede, oee, dd ot ute te ad

which was already in his hands. He wanted to a

his old plan and leave two corps at the Upper Elb

preparing with the remaining forces at his disposit

an offensive on the Iser. He. thus jeopardized all 

success. Four corps might have achieved a great 

on the eastern front on the 28th. Two corps were n

cient to ward off a defeat, which they wouid have 

as early as the 27th without the great mistakes m

Bonin and Hiller. The Prussians had advanced 

columns. The Austrians had been able to oppose o

corps to each pair of these columns. Had these conqu

opposed successful resistance in one position, the

still exposed to a turning of the rear by one of th

Prussian columns. The advantages which thus acc

the enemy and the disadvantages which fell to the

lot, were soon recognized by the Austrians, but w

comprehended by the Prussian generals, or at any ra

were not utilized. Steinmetz was not able to acc

much more at Nachod than to repulse the attacks 

enemy. Still Bammig went back as far as Skalitz 

he took it for granted that the 2d Guard Division wo

remain at Kosteletz, but would attack him in th

Hiller had only to cross the Aupa at Bausnitz to de

blenz most decisively. Recognizing this danger, the A

Fieldmarshal left Trautenau on the day following his 

At Eurkersdorf, however, he might have opposed su

resistance to Hiller had he not believed that the only 

able operation for the 2d Guard Division was to 

against his rear. The retreat from Munchengratz wa

ed because the advance towards Gitschin of the P

corps which had arrived at Turnau, appeared immin

account of the situ.ation. A Prussian att.ack at Ska

not necessary. Archduke Leopold would have re

without it. But he should have been directed aga

enemy who was advancing in the rear from the Ise
army and corps commanders known their 

The idea of annihilating the enemy, w

absorbed Moltke, was not fathomed by the s

manders. They understood the problem be

in the junction of the separated armies. In t

with Moitke. But he wished to see the oppo

circle of the united armies, while they were 

it to the enemy to concentrate his forces wh

Once the armies were concentrated, no m

could then be decided whether to accept batt

the commanding generals, the principal aim 

250,000 men at Gitschin or Miletin in a sin

enemy who sought to oppose the concentratio

means be pushed aside, unless one were willi

the march on the designated point without 

nearby adversary, as was attempted by Boni

and Steinmetz at Schweinschadel, and actual

by Hiiler at Parschnitz. This was easily 

The commanding generals of the Second Arm

sidered, had not received the order to fight 

to reach Arna, Koniginhof, and Schurz on 

this task they were permitted to deviate as l

Moreover, an attack of considerable importan

easiIy executed, as the troop units were sepa

very beginning. Steinmetz could repulse the 

hod, but could not attack him, because his c

was on the ground, was scattered in small u

field. At Trautenau, General Grossmann 

carry forward with him into the attack, alon

ten battalions, the eight of Buddenbrock. It 

never received the order. But even had he 

would have been impossible to lead into the 

battalions, scattered as they were into sma

At SkaIitz the greater part of the Prussian 
of Kirchbach at Skalitz encountered only a weakly 

position and that of Hiller at Burkersdorf an al

treating enemy. 

The First Army at least started orderly attacks

ever, instead of letting the corps which encountered 

my, attack him, and the remaining corps march 

they had reached the hostile flank or rear, a halt 

ordered, then everything prepared for an attack aga

and flank. Before these movements were executed

my, if there was any, had already retreated. The 

tious were too thorough and took too much time. 

advance and deployment must go hand in hand wa

be necessary. But the longer the marching colu

greater were the difficulties encountered. The cor

time had not yet been brought to the strength of th

corps in artillery and transportation, but they ende

replace their lack, on the march at least, by great 

between the van-, the advance guard, the main 

reserve infantry, the reserve artillery, and the res

alry. These overlong columns advanced but slo

Nachod the last reserves reached the battlefield 

PM. Bonin might have reached Trautenau ahe

enemy, had he not required the infantry, according 

lations, to reconnoiter carefully the slopes along 

behind houses, bushes, and mounds, to see if conc

mies were not lurking there. To cross the Iser 

dense concentration at Reichenberg, the infantry of 

Army needed four whole days. The chief of staff

von Voigts-Rhetz, complained of the terrain being 

row for the deployment of all the troops. It lay in 

to widen the narrow terrain right and left in ord

breathing space to the compressed masses. The

collld not be found in the movements of the Fir

the restlessness and impetus with which Napoleo

his columns onward. The battles were decided 

artillery. This much was known of the wars of t
last to be made, the infantry stood perplexed 

in front of the long Austrian battery lines. 

It might be suppcsed that the Austrians 

easy wori: under the circumstances. Rut the

ing did not lack considerab!e peculiarities. T

pute over the problem whether soldiers ar

should be deployed in line, where they may 

their weapons, or extended in depth where 

able to use them had been settled by the Aust

treme latter sense. There stood at Nachod 

one behind another, each in three lines, twe

columns of the two foremost battalions were 

tend against one battalion deployed in one 

that this battalion was armed with the need

importance; the fight of the attacking colu

standing line had long been decided at P

Waterloo and recently, on the Alma, in favo

It is true that the devasting fire of the ne

formed the repulsed attack into a bloody d

tack in deep columns, feeding the combat by 

conjunction with the invention of the locks

man Dreyse, had shaken the defeated co

and Archduke Leopold to their very found

much as had the victorious corps of Gablenz

however, rested in the turning movements

Moltke’s plan, which were not executed th

threatened the enemy. The battles of the 2

June, should have, in total, brought about 

of the enemy on the part of the Second Army. 

effected a victory. The many mistakes and 

of the commanders could not, however, rem

suk It was well that the company command

leaders were imbued with initiative and th

coming to a decision and that the rank and fi

with the highest spirit and a readiness to 
p

The troop leadership of the other army, t

a rule, appeared sufficient, as at Gitschin there 

for lengthy preparations. A success was the

inferior numbers which was converted into a 

by pursuit. A column encountered a stronger 

fought indecisively. The neighboring column m

opponent, threw him back and advanced agai

of the stronger, doing what the Second Army o

done in every battle. This brought about the de

Austrian position became untenable, the intend

battle could not be fought. However, an imme

attack by the Second Army against the hostile 

advance of the First Army against Horitz-Konigg

not made so as to take advantage of the vi

could not be executed with two divisions. The 

and the Army of the Elbe, instead of having re

me? with the right wing, stood with eight division

background. The enemy had time to escape fr

rounding movement. The battle of annihilatio

by Moltke, was transformed into an “ordinary 

KONIGGRATZ 

On 27 June, 1866,. one Austrian corps at Na

the 28th two others at Skalitz and Burkersdo

crippled that their further use for either attack 

seemed doubtful. Consequently, Benedek formed 

defensive with two corps against the enemy who 

from the east, and for an attack with six corps a

ponent marching from the west, which was im

execution. The forces at his disposition wer

suf?icient for the simultaneous solution of two 

cult problems. However, since the enemy fro

was advancing very slowly, he could be left 
mediately called up. Eight corps were to be 

the four corps of the Prussian Second Army. 

the possibility of utilizing three of the eight co

ful, much could bc said in favor of the succ

plajr. The Prussian First Army was, in rea

to allow itself to be held up two or three days 

an enemy existinq only in its imagination 

needless to consider it. The last corps of the d

ing column of the Austrians had arrived on 

others came up on the same day, having remain

on the left bank of the Eibe, though not wit

losses and having encounters in rear of the p

Six corps were assembled there in the evening

ed sufficient, in a strong position, for the suc

of an attack by the Second Prussian Army on 

Crown Prince of Saxony could come up on the 

on 1 Juiy, it would have been possible to pa

whelming attack on the repulsed enemy. 

But this plan had hardly been adopted w

tion after another, necessary for its succes

Early on the 29th the Prussian First Army 

by Moltke to leave alone the self-created en

immediately to the assistance of the Second A

ed the orders as well and promptly as it was 

the narrow area to which it was confined. The 

of Saxony, who had remained in Gitschin acco

viously received order, was ordered to come 

at a time when he had already been drawn 

combat. The Prussian Second Army did not 

30th, and, consequently, could not be repuls

opponents were occupied by an aimless can

stead of the desired attack, the following wa

ing the day: The Crown Prince of Saxony had 

the evening of the 29th at Gitschin, the 1st 

Division and the Saxon Corps had retreated 
gppp

Thus Benedek had only the six corps assemble

Jaromer and Miletin. With these he had to face 

lowing day, not only the hoped for attack of 

against the front, but a very undesirable one of f

flank and rear. He then probably considered 

given by Clausewitz “what was left him of the ma

might still be called available, i.e., which had not 

like extinct volcanoes.” He must have also consid

stood it ,with the security of his rear” and must h

t&t he had about five extinct volcanoes on his ha

three corps were still available and that the secu

rear was quite defective. From the results of thes

ations, then arose the decision to abandon the 

The III Corps was brought in the afternoon 

tin to Lancow, the trains sent out in advance in th

at 1 :OO AM, of 1 July, six corps, four cavalry divi

the army artillery reserve started the march. The 

of the retreat was not easy. The enemy, whose c

caught up with I Corps about noon of the 30th, c

pected any moment from the line: Horitz-Neubidsc

it were desired to avoid a flanking attack from tha

by crossing the Elbe, it must be expected that 

Army would attack from the direction from th

The march was resumed in the night in four col

narrow strip between the Lancow road, Gros

Sadowa, and the Elbe. As the numerous trains o

ed the road, the march columns were very long a

could not be avoided, and it is not to be wondered 

10:00 AM, the III Corps was still at Lancow, th

guard with some artillery was seen at Liebthal (3 

of Koniginhof) and that only late at night, abou

the last troops reached their designated bivoua

region : Sadowa-Koniggratz-Elbe-Trotina. 

Corps and the 1st Light Cavalry Division had been 
coming under the eyes of the commander-in-chie

retreat, robbed him of the rest of his confidenc

and in himself. He telegraphed in despair abo

lst, upon his arrival at Koniggratz: “I urg

Your Majesty to conclude peace at any priee; 

to the army is unavoidable.” A catastrophe 

have taken place, had the enemy followed eve

alone, if the retreat had been transformed i

dissolution, But since no enemy was to be 

encounter had taken place at any point, som

again in the heart of the unfortunate general. 

sent out in various directions in order to bring 

about the inexplicable absence of the enemy. 

arriving from Vienna in the afternoon: “

conclude peace. If unfavorable, I order you 

the best order. Has there been a batfle?“, f

more composed. He prepared the positions 

was greeted by them heartily, spoke words 

ment, ordered fortifications to be built on the 

enemy between Ncdelist and Lipa and express

sions and intentions in the following telegram: 

Corps have suffered terribly, the VIII very m

the Saxon Corps have likewise suffered and 

days to assemble, the IV Corps also had so

eight corps, without a battle, and only wit

counters, but two are intact, and these, as w

alry, are greatly fatigued. The great losses 

caused by the needle gun fire, all who have 

battle being greatly impressed by its murdero

this forced me to retreat to this point. I 

road the massed trains of the army, which 

sent to the rear and if, under such circumsta

emy had delivered an energetic attack, bef

Saxon Corps were again in order and the ar

rested, a catastrophe would have been unavoida
g p 

retreat on the 3d to Pardubitz. If the enemy doe

cept me, I shall be able to count again on the troo

occasion for an offensive movement arise, I s

the blow, otherwise I shall endeavor to bring th

well as possible, back to Olmutz and to obey Your 

order in so far as it lies in my power, yet alway

hesitating readiness for sacrifice.” 

Had this telegram reached, in some way or ot

headquarters, it would have been considered as 

possession. And still, it did not contain anythin

not been known so far. The Second Army boaste

defeated four hostile corps, and the First of having 

two. What could have become of these ruins af

march undertaken hastily over a narrow strip? 

the cavalry, in spite of its urgent request, had bee

security in rear of the infantry, Hartmann’s Ca

sion sent in a direction opposite to that of the 

although the Prussians had cut off themselves wi

all information about the enemy, yet this much w

the defeated enemy had retreated hastily and s

been pursued without delay. One part of the a

have marched behind him along the Elbe. Two 

should have accompanied him on the right and le

towards his flanks as soon as he halted and took 

fensive, A fourth part, especially the cavalry, 

tried to intercept him, to bar his road, to hold hi

other parts arrived. Thus had Hannibal acted 

thlls Napoleon at Jena, thus could it have been 

since the enemy c.ould move or rest only in de

An order from Moltke, received during the night 

gave moreover, information concerning the m

direction of the pursuit. It read as follows: “T

Army must remain on the left bank of the Elb

wing ready t,o join the left of the advancing Firs

Koniginhof. The First Army must march witho
Gits2hin had been evacuated and the Sec

awaiting an attack by Benedek. After the 

ha3 withdrawn, Moltke’s instructions ough

adapted to the changed situation. The left b

should no longer have been occupied between 

Jaromer, but wherever the enemy might h

position on the other bank. Since the enemy 

to the south, the advance of the First Army s

in a more southerly direction, the Army of 

have been shifted toward the right. 

From this it is deduced: the Army of 

march in the direction of Chlumetz and Pard

Map 62. about as far as Konigstadtl and Gross-Hlus

Neubidschow), the First Army, awaiting t

army, advancing only as far as Neubidsc

Gross-Jeritz. The right wing of the Secon

join the left of the First Army, the I Corps, 

to Aulejow, march on Miletin and Zabres

Lititsch and Salnai. The left wing of the sa

go to Skalitz and Kleny. In the evening of the 

last hostile troops had entered the narrow 

gratz between the Elbe and Bistritz, the 

armies would have stood on the line : Kon

The Prussian Royal headquarters could not 

the Austrians would make a stand on the Zd 

draw before the attack ; therefore, all measu

been taken for a continuation of the pursuit. 

of the Elbe, the Koniggratz-Hohenbruck-Tin

could have been reached on the Zd, on the 

right wing of the Army of the Elbe cou

reached Bodanetsch (northwest of Pardubi

road leading from Koniggratz via Pardubitz, 

Holitz would have been available for the 

Austrians. For the retreat from the Upper 

Koniggratz, and Tratina six corps needed 
, 

of the miles-long columns would have been 

the. corps of the First Army and the Army o

marching on parallel roads. The Austrians 

had to halt and take the defensive. Even the 

umns might have been prevented from escaping 

sian cavalry had been utilized correctly and, 

had been armed for the purpose. Had the ca

taken from the start a place on or in front o

wing of the Army of the Elbe, had Hartmann

Division accompanied the left wing of the Se

the former would have been able to block in 

the crossing at Pardubitz and Sezemitz, the latt

from Holitz. The Austrian army would have 

rounded in the evening of the 2d, no matter whet

forward, backword, or remained stationary. 

It was quite out of the question for Moltke

be executed in this manner or any other. Both 

quarters did not think of pursuing the enemy, 

surrounding or annihilating him. All that had 

so far was considered by them as an introduction 

The battles waged so far were not to be ascribed 

or other side as considerable gain or loss. Streng

tested and weighed on both sides. The troops 

have to be assembled into one mass and a dec

fought. But the “decisive battle” had already 

on the 27th, 28th, and 29th. During these thre

right wing and the center of the Austrian arm

thrown beyond the Elbe, after hot fights. Molt

ceeded during the last day in bringing forward a

of the numerous reserves, in throwing back 

hostile left wing and thus forcing the remain

Austrian army to retreat. The battle had no

as had been desired and expected. It was not 

annihilation, but it was, at least, a battle ren

greater part of the hostile army unavailable 
for such a pursuit. The fact that the Secon

ed on the left bank of the Elbe especially a

the cutting 08 of the retreat, as was attained 

in similar campaigns of 1’757, 1800, and 1

headquarters opposed strenuous objections 

ing on the left bank of the Elbe. Separate

from the First Army, it thought itself expos

and. defeat.” This apprehension was in g

the existing condition of the Austrian army, 

encounters and combats. Had the latter b

bank of the Elbe, it wouId have been necess

First Army and the Army of the Elbe to that 

to take the Second Army to the right bank. 

Moltke succeeded with the greatest d

keeping three corps on the left bank on 1 J

Map 53’ Corps went as far as Prausnitz and its ad

far as Aulejow. However, he could not pr

Army from going after the enemy to Horitz-M

of Neubidschow-Horitz, or the Army of 

turning toward Hoch-Wessely instead of go

tion of Chlumetz. It was impossible to re

request for a day’s rest on the 2d. Only t

Elbe was expected to march to Smidar. Th

abandoned and a new campaign had to be co

Many believed the enemy to be behind t

Koniggratz and Josefstadt, while others 

Pardubitz, still others at Kolin. But Moltke 

something more definite before preparing fo

the Second Army was ordered to clear up 

a reconnaissance across the Mettau. In the 

Army of the Elbe was to march on the 3d t

First to the line Neubidsehow-Horitz, the I 

Bu.rglitz and Cerekwitz, the remainder of th

remaining on the left bank. Moltke’s orde

there remain any strong hostile units in fro
Vienna : 

The army will remain tomorrow in its 

at Koniggratz ; the day’s rest and the abundant fo

had a good effect. I hope no further retreat will b

sary.” The Emperor’s question: “Has there bee

tle?” induced the general, 24 hours after he had 

his army as exposed to a catastrophe, to prepare fo

in a position in which he was absolutely sure to be s

ed. 

However carefully the Prussians had avoided m

ing touch with the enemy, the immediate vicinity of 

trians could no longer remain concealed during the 

rest. The outposts of the Prussian advance guard 

witz and those of the Austrian rearguard at Dub c

be more than 2 km. distant from each other. A

from headquarters of the First Army, having boldly 

through the outposts, reported : II Corps at Sadowa, 

at Langenhof ; in rear of these toward Koniggratz

and the Saxons near Problus. Another officer, who 

den beyond Gross-Burglitz, had found Benatek occu

a cavalry regiment advancing toward Josefstad

Miletin had observed large bodies of infantry. It 

concluded with a great degree of probability that th

Austrian army or at least its greater part, was still 

of the Elbe behind the Bistritz. The right wing 

extend beyond Benatek, the left reached at least a

Problus. The latter case, foreseen in Moltke’s or

thus happened. The enemy, still in front of the El

be immediately attacked “with as great a numeric

riority as possible,” i.e., with all available forces, T

of the order would have been obeyed had the First A

vanced against the supposedly 12 km. long front: P

Benatek, the Army of the Elbe and the Cavalry Co

longing the right wing and the I Corps and the Gua

the left. These overlapping wings would have pu

enemy in his narrow front and deep formation, ag
wehr Division of the Guard had made on t

from Kopidlno to Nechanitz, the younger an

troops could have fulfilled the request in the 

If not a complete, at least a partial surround

been made on the 3d. It would not have 

easier had the First Army stormed forward 

beginning. It would have been more advant

the coming up of the wings. Should it so 

was hardly to be expected, that the enem

through across the Bistritz, he would find h

the quicker and surer in the annihilating, a

surrounding movement. Such a deployment 

tack corresponded to the ideas of Hannibal 

Napoleon at Jena, but in no way to the view

days. Mass attacks against the front and 

reserves were considered more important th

movements and flanking attacks. 

Headquarters of the First Army was th

the reports concerning the whereabouts o

troops on the right bank of the Elbe. It is d

Map 64. independently the measures for the executio

ordered. According to the picture evolved 

enemy occupied “with very considerable 

corps), the “position of Sadowa,” and with 

of Problus. Against the former, five divisio

Army were to assemble at Milowitz, one o

join them at Sadowa, after coming from 

Cerekwitz and Benatek; against the latte

Army of the Elbe was to assemble at Nech

The position of Sadowa was to be so

Bistritz on the heights of Lipa and Langenh

tack, even of 70,000 or more men, against 

strong position, defended by a numerous a

tillery, promised no success. The situation 
p

Army of the Elbe. In spite of the disadvantage o

conditions, headquarters of the First Army was sure 

cess, held that its mass attack of 70,000 men would b

sist!‘ble and the “annihilation” of the enemy assured

possibility of a flanking attack from Josefstadt alone 

concern. Headquarters of the Second Army was req

to parry such a flank attack with the Guard Corp

Koniginhof. The request was granted. The VI Cor

sent to demonstrate at Josefstadt, the V Corps and the 

were placed beyond the Elbe in reserve, the I Corps 

ing via Miletin to Gross-Burglitz and Cerekwitz. T

divisions were held fast in front of Josefstadt, the 

number at Sadowa, three at Nechanitz (facing a 

probiem), while two marched alone to an indefinit

and an indefinite fate. 

The Prussian successes were won so far throu

“needle gun fire” and by “outflanking.” The needle g

was now to be limited as much as possible by mass a

formation and outflanking to be met by shortening the 

The strength of the Austrians lay in the long artillery 

well and effectively posted, their weakness lay in the 

tactics. The Prussians had thus to accept these and 

them in the front. 

If the picture, evolved by the First Army, were 

reality, the 3d would probably have brought no results 

for the one or the other side. Since, however, not fo

eight Austrian corps had remained this side of th

the plan of battle, issued from the common laboratory 

two army headquarters, contained dangers for the P

arms. Fortunately, the chief of staff of the First 

went on the evening of the 2d to the Royal Headquar

Gitschin to report what had been reconnoitered and o

As the troops of the First Army were already on the 

the orders issued for the attack against the front c
attack as soon as possible.” Since the que

hours only, it was impossible to cause pa

Army to advance on the left bank of the 

corps were crowded together in the narro

the Elbe and the Bistritz. This limited the 

against the rear of the enemy to the possib

bridge below Josefstadt or of restoring one. 

could be ascertained only during the co

Moltke’s next endeavor was to execute an a

left flank of the enemy, even if this should 

to a breaking through. 

Considering the proximity of the ene

pected an attack on the 3d or on the 4th at 

troops should then take position as follows: 

the heights of Lipa and Chlum; to its right 

the heights between Chlum and Nedelist; 

in the space between Nedelist and the Elbe

the III Corps, the X Corps was to take posit

and the Saxon Corps on the heights east o

Popowitz. According to the representation 

Prince of Saxony that on these heights h

posed from Hradek, the Saxon Corps was s

lus and Nieder-Prim and the VIII Corps wa

in addition to the 1st Light Cavalry Division

reserves were : the I Corps at Rosnitz, the V

2d Light Cavalry Division south of Nedelist 

3d Reserve Cavalry Divisions at Briza. 

As all others, the front of this positio

points and disadvantages. Thanks to the n

cellent Austrian, and the insufficient and 

Prussian artillery, these would scarcely ha

So much the greater care should have been gi

The left was entirely in the air. The VII

brigades strong, defeated at Skalitz, was n
position here was untenable if even a part of th

Army advanced on the left bank. Should that arm

on the right bank and near Nedelist encounter serio

tance, part of the troops would have penetrated, 

army orders, with elemental force to the unoccupied 

bank and would have f arced the hostile right flank to 

Should the Austrians remain stationary, they w

crushed, almost entirely surrounded, and annihilated

of success lay in the offensive alone. Should Bened

firm on the right wing and in the center, and adva

four or five corps and as many cavalry divisions v

witz, Nechanitz, Kuntschitz, etc., against the weak 

the Elbe, and against the right flank of the First 

victory lay entirely within the scope of possibilities, 

however, that the Austrian army was capable of su

fensive. Above all, it was an essential condition 

right wing should maintain its position. This pre

was ehminated when the commander of the IV Corp

Festetics, found the position assigned to him, betwee

and Nedelist, unfavorable and advanced to the h

Maslowed which seemed better, and when the co

of the II Corps, Count Thun, in executing his order 

the right flank of the IV Corps, followed to Maslow

nowes and left only Henriquez’s Brigade at S

The Austrian Army stood thus between Horeno

Problus, instead of between Benatek and Problus, a

made it appear, though it amounted almost to the sa

The advance of the First Army and of the Army of 

against this position led to three separate battles 

chanitz, Sadowa, and Benatek. 

The Army of the Elbe started at 3 :00 AM, fro

Smidar, Chotelitz, and Hoch-Wesely in three co

Prasek, Kobilitz, and Lodin. From these points 

have reached the left bank of the Bistritz, via 
General von Scholar, had already sent out tw

Kuntschitz, one via Komarow, and had thus o

driven off the weak enemy and advanced with 

talions to the line : Hradek-Lubno. Covered 

one division could cross after the other. T

tion, whose left flank was believed to have be

ed at Nieder-Prim, was to be attacked from 

appearing to be the most natural and logical 

vance guard, its left wing resting on the B

could remain stationary for the present, the le

(Canstein’s), could join the attack by the rig

the wood of Stezirek via Ober-Prim, the follo

(Munster’s and Etzel’s) and the Cavalry C

extending the right flank. Moltke absolutely 

a flank attack. Herwarth, on the contrary, 

vance against the front. Canstein was to 

Prim and the Fasauerie to Nieder-Prim, and 

vance from Lubns through the Popowitz wo

So much would be conceded to Moltke that o

brigades would be directed through the woo

Ober-Prim. More could not be done, with t

will, for the old man. Cannonading soun

from Sadowa. The battle there seemed to b

if it were not receding. It was a sacred du

rescue of the First Army.” It was still mo

hold Etzel back west of Nechanitz. He shou

in case the two other divisions were driven b

1000 meter defile by the numerical superiority 

Herwarth’s instructions were fraught with 

should the enemy fall upon Canstein’s right w

ous reserves, and with his right wing and t

the X Corps, attack Munster’s left flank. 

Of the hostile troops, the Saxon 2d 

touch with Gablenz between Stresetitz and 
southeast of Problus by Schulz’s Austrian Brigade

had sent its two batteries into position north of th

and finally by Roth’s Brigade near the Briza wood. 

quently there were, considerable forces at hand t

them taking a general offensive against the enemy s

later and to surround him on both sides. Such mov

however, did not belong to the spirit of the times. 

ble piercing of the evening’s position seemed mor

point. Scholer’s advance guard was an excellent m

that end, advancing in front of the two divisions, on 

through the woods of Stezirek, in the center throug

Prim and the Fasauerie and on the left toward the P

woods. The Life Guard Brigade with one batte

brought up. It was to advance over the meadow 

south of Nieder-Prim against Neu-Prim, Schulz’s 

covering its left flank. Six companies of the gar

Nicder-Prim joined it. Two battalions were drive

the Fasauerie and Neu-Prim were taken. At this 

Scholer’s right flank battalion arrived. It had dri

Austrian battalion from the Waldvon Stezirek and a

against Ober-Prim opening fire against the left flan

Life Guard Brigade. The piercing was not continue

flank and rear had first to be secured. The six co

from Nieder-Prim returned to their posts. The Life 

Brigade drew closer to the village. The 2d Brigade 

to its support from the extreme right wing and Ro

gade was sent to the support of Schulz’s The cava

sions were to go around the woods on the south. 

Brigade drove the Austrian battalion away from Ob

and pursued it south through the woods. Within th

it encountered Canstein’s right brigade. Of the left 

only six companies continued the march to Neu-Pr

rest entered the woods through a misunderstanding 

unexpectedly on the flank of Schulz’s Brigade eng
into the mass of the four brigades. Confusio

ensued under cover of a few steadfast battalion

to prevent a spread of the rout,” the 1st Briga

behind an abatis at the edge of the wood ea

three reserve batteries drove up on the east i

of the southern edge of Nieder-Prim. Schulz 

cupied the western edge; Wober’s Brigade w

arrived, occupying the southern edge of the 

Canstein’s Divisior: had to stop its pursuit b

front: Nieder-Prim-Briza woods. Headqu

Army of the Elba might now have had a 

Molt.ke was not so very wrong, that Munster 

been on the right and not on the left of Can

no more effective support of the First Army c

given than by driving back the enemy from 

Nieder-Prim to Stresetitz, Langenhof, and Li

now wait until Munster should come up, and 

Canstein, by a concentric attack, should drive 

a position farther cast. 

The troops of the First Army, opposite 

already been put in readiness during the ni

AM, the advance guard of Horn’s Division 

Klenitz in deployed front. Dub was evac

Zegelei west of Sadowa, was occupied. A com

at this point. An Austrian battery, in positio

Holawald and Swiepwald took part, As so

shot was heard, Fransecky started his division 

from Cereltwitz towards Benatek. At about 

the 5th and 6th Dcvisions deployed at Klenitz. 

AM, Herwarth (4th Division), followed by the 

1~r-y of the II Corps reached Mzan via Stratsc

Zawadilka via Lhota and the Cavalry Corps

villages on the Bistritz from Popowitz to Sa

of the Zuckerfabuck south of Sadowa and the 
reserve to Sowetitz and crossed the brook at the Skalka

enemy evacuated Sadowa. Horn sent two battalions 

Fransecky and turned with the rest toward the Ho

Herwarth had engaged early at Mzan in an artillery 

marched against the Zuckerfabuck and Unter Dohal

crossed the Bistritz, Roth divisions, Herwarth and 

penetrated into the Holawald and occupied the southe

as well as Gber Dohalitz keeping twelve battalions 

of the woods. Werder’s Division succeeded in occ

Dohalitzka and Mokrowous. A success was achieved

advanced hostile detachments on the Bistritz were 

back. But on the heights of Lipa and Langenhof, a

Tresowitz stood a long line of 160 guns. The smoo

guns of the Prussians could do nothing against the

were withdrawn; the rifled guns, few in number, w

room for deployment and not under united command

at a decided disadvantage. In the lowland, guns in 

the ridge and their elect could not be observed on 

of the fog and powder smoke. Their shots, blindly fir

not prevent the enemy from concentrating his fire 

Holawald and Upper Dohalitz. 

On the southern edge of this point, on a front 

meters, stood first seven, then nine and finally elev

talions crowded into adjacent columns. They prese

impenetrable wail to all attacks, a wall which, howev

greatly damaged by ceaselessly exploding shells, 

branches and falling trees. A strong line of skirm

well posted, one or at the most two battalions, as ha

done with the well known 2d Battalion, 37th Regim

h’achod, would have afforded greater security and s

smaller losses. But, most important of all, it woul

been able to gradually work up to effective range. A 

number of battalions stood in rear of the wood and o

Sadowa. They were not in security. For at will and 
eyes for the favorable moment to attack. S

sian columns attack, they would suffer Aug

Preussisch-Eylau, should the Austrian mass

fate of Hertweck’s Brigade at Nachod would s

But of all means to attain victory, only pierc

is worthy of a great general. The hour of a 

Austerlitz must strike at last. “Not yet,” sa

will not succeed and, should it succeed, the tw

flanking attacks will fail in their effect.” 

Baumbach, Benedek’s chief of staff, on the ot

battles last, at least, two days. Tomorrow 

batants will have fought to utter exhaustion, 

to send forward Claim’s and Rammig’s Corp

He might also have said : “If we should suc

back the Prussians in front of us, the flank 

wreak our destruction so much the quicker

manders were content. Prince Frederick Ch

await the arrival of the Crown Prince. Be

that “his old soldier’s luck” would grant him 

moment. Thus they waited and waited. 

Fransecky’s Division had come under art

Horenowes and Maslowed at Benatek. The 

hostile right wing on the line : Lipa-Maslowed-H

thus showed itself. The march of the Division

Franseeky was directed against this part of t

Sowetitz and Benatek and, against this pa

have advanced, to hold the enemy at this po

warth and Werder solved a similar problem 

side of the road, Manstein and Tumpling lengt

at least as far as Nechanitz, six divisions atta

front, leaving the Army of the Elbe free for 

tack. But obeying the rule of assembling 

turned toward the Holawald, Fransecky wishi

same goal via the Swiepwald and Cistowe

march by Fransecky along the front of two 
from being surrounded on the south and east. The s

part of the wood was lost to him, though he held ou

northern part and in the houses west of Cistowes by 

ing all his forces, 

Lieutenant Fieldmarshal Mollinary, who had tak

the command of the IV Corps in place of the wounde

Festetics, wanted to follow up the advantages gain

proposed to Count Thun to advance with his right win

Horenowes. Fransecky was to be driven off by an 

from all sides, after which the entire Prussian pos

the Bistritz would be rolled up. This was splendidly 

But 38 Austrian battalions took the longest time to ov

14 Prussian ones. It is doubtful if five fresh batta

Horenowes and six others in the center would have 

for the execution of the magnificent project. Howev

might have been, Benedek’s order put a stop to the o

which had hardly begun: “the IV and II Corps will 

to i;he position Chlum, Nedelist, Elbe, to which they w

signed.” MolIinary’s personal representation was 

avail. A telegram from the Commandant of Josefst

arrived, saying: “@@The VI Prussian Corps appare

tends to operate against the right flank of our arm

Gradlitz via Salnai, etc.; strong columns are marchi

here.” 

The Prussian Second Army which, it was hope

remain inactive on 3 July, as it had been during p

days, had begun to move. Mollinary’s proposition to 

the new enemy with the I and VI Corps, did not insp

fidence. Now that the entire Second Army was adv

the execution of the offensive movement was impossib

had the I and VI Corps come up in time. All that 

undertaken was the defense either of the foremos

Maslowed-Horenowes-Trotina-Back or the line, 

‘“‘Compare Map 56. 
To take troops out of a serious and bloody 

to declare them defeated, means to tell the

not able to cope with the adversary. This w

the more critical as the Austrians had arriv

battles of the foregoing days, at the conv

were unable to cope with the better arms o

It was doubtful if the II Corps would have 

cute a long flank march and to form “a def

tween Nedelist and the Elbe. The two co

wing began to retreat and from this retreat 

urally the retreat of the entire army. 

The Brigades of Saffran and Wurttem

Corps were taken back to Maslowed from th

Swiep-Wald, having to march thence towar

cover this march, Thorn’s Brigade moved f

to the hill between Maslowed and Sendrasi

40 guns and a weak infantry detachment 

fronting north. Henriquez’s Brigade was h

and the wooded bank of the Trotina, with tw

cupying later a position, Trotina village with 

Of these, one kept the space between the cre

under observation and the other secured the 

chenitz and Predmeritz. These were loo

easily surrounded and easily rolled up, who

posed the advancing Second Army. 

The latter had not hurried. Moltke’s 

sent at midnight from Gitschin, reaching 

Koniginhof about 4 :00 AM, and only at 7 :30 

Division of the Guard, stationed there, rece

begin the march. At 8 :30 AM, the advanc

division at Doubrawitz received orders to o

there, entrench itself and await further o

von Alversleben did not allow this order to 

answering Fransecky’s call for help, which 
not yet reached Gross-Burglitz. The VI Corps was ins

to start from Gradlitz, the 12th Division leaving at 6 

the 2lst Brigade at 7 :00 AM, and the 22d Division 

AM, in order to make a demonstration against Jos

after having crossed over to the right bank at 

Stangendorf, and Kukus. The columns, already on th

had only to be diverted to their new points of dest

Thus marched the I Corps, followed by the Cavalry D

via Gross-Trotin and Zabres to Gross-Burglitz, the 

via Doubrawitz, Dubenetz, and Choteborek to Jeric

Lhota, the 11th Division followed by the V Corps, v

jed and Lititsch to Welchow, the 12th Division via 

Westetz, and Ertina. Continuing the march, the 1

sion of the Guard reached Choteborek, the 11th Divis

the right bank of the Trotina, the heights north of Ra

the 12th Division, Habrina, all at 1l:OO AM. The 1s

Division and the 11th Division had in front of them t

battery of Horenowes, the 11th and 12th encount

Ratschitz and at the hill east of the Trotina detachm

Henriquez’s Brigade. At Wrchowitz, as well as north

Ratschitz, 48 guns were brought into action. The 

advanced at this juncture. Ratschitz and the hill 

other bank of the Trotina fell into the hands of the Pr

The advance guard of the 1st Guard Division fina

ceeded in taking Horenowes from the west and in forc

hostile battery to retreat. All three divisions a

further, with some fighting: on the right to the hill 

enowes, then to the plateau east of Maslowed, in the 

to the south of Ratschitz and further to Sendrasitz, 

left via Rodow against Trotina Village. 

Again they met in their front an artillery line, ex

from north of Chlum to Nedelist. Under cover of 1

three brigades of the Austrian II Corps retreated 

the defile of Maslowed to Nedelist, left one brigade 
Trench III. The remnants of the Brigade

stein and Poekh sought security farther 

hacker’s Brigade was still occupying Cistowes

sian side the 12th Division was held back 

Henriquez’s Brigade. The 11th Division co

from Sendrasitz in the direction of Nedelist 

hot artillery fire. Only the 1st Division of th

8 battalions) succeeded, under cover of art

rived at Maslowed, in descending southward 

and, covered by fog and powder smoke, pos

tall wheat, in climbing the steep slope oppo

trian infantry, exhausted by march and co

on the protection of their strong artillery. 

ever, was kept occupied by that of the en

talions of the Guard came up unexpectedly fr

swept the nearest batteries and unsuspiciou

Joseph’s Brigade, with rapid fire, forcing 

Brandenstein’s and Poekh’s Brigades were 

The IV Corps retired in the direction of S

Division advanced now also against Nedelis

Brigade, threatened in flank, withdrew, follo

Division, toward Lochenitz. The remaining 

of the II Corps had lost the cover of their left 

parture of the 4th Corps, and evacuated Ne

position east thereof. The entire Corps att

the Elbe at Lochenitz and Predmeritz. The 

further near Chlum in an easterly direction 

wise this weakly garrisoned point. Countera

dek’s Brigade from the south were repulse

Rosberitz was occupied during the pursuit, 

Lipa woods and Lipa, under cover and with 

the advance guard of the 2d Division of the’ G

Almost at the same time, about 3 $0 PM

attack of Canstein and Munster against N
gg g 

against their attack. Two Saxon Brigades were d

while still endeavoring to resume order. One of th

still greatly shaken by the affair at Gitschin. Th

Corps, according to the report of its Chief of Staff, 

stroyed. It was necessary to escape the threatening 

hilating surrounding movement. The gradual retreat

cover of the 3d Brigade and the artillery, was now o

Munster and Canstein found only rear guards. 

“In close formation and in truly imposing at

Schwarzkoppen’s Brigade emerged from the Popowitz 

Problus was taken with the first rush. Hiller’s 

followed south of the wood as right echelon. It 

Nieder-Prim already occupied by Canstein’s troops, 

tillery gone and it continued against the Briza wood. 

The attack of the 1st Division of the Guard fr

one side, of Canstein’s Division from the other, sh

entire structure of the enemy. Here and there was 

sary only a little assistance to make it crumble up. 

The Second Army had taken Lipa, Chlum, Nede

northern part of Lochenitz, an advanced detachme

occupied Rosberitz, and the Army of the Elbe occupie

lus and Nieder-Prim, while the First Army maintai

former positions. On the Austrian side, the II and IV 

and Benedek’s and Appiano’s Brigades were retreat

Sweti and Wsestar. The two other brigades of the III 

as well as the infantry of the X Corps, felt themse

much threatened in their positions between Lipa an

setitz and also started on the retreat, with the exce

,a few detachments, in the general direction of Kon

‘Fleischhacker’s Brigade of the IV Corps attempted 

escape from Cistowes north of Chlum, turned ba

wanted to join the stream of the retreating troops v

genhof near Lipa. Schimpff’s Brigade of the Saxo

had taken the direction of Rosnitz and Briza, while 
setitz, against the Koiawald, thus holding 

Army. Another artillery line had formed b

hcf, Wsestar, Sweti, and beyond this village

halt any advance of the 1st Division of the 

of it Sweti, Wsestar, and Rosnitz were still 

fantry. 

Benedek was occupied almost entirely 

with the enemy at Sadowa during the first ho

noon. He awaited an opportune moment t

cution the great offensive blow. Archduke 

mander of the III Corps, had attempted inde

tack with one brigade the Holawald, but was 

dck, still thinking about a repetition of the a

force, only learned what was taking place o

in his rear, when Chlum had already been ta

ed to restore the battle or, at Ieast, to cover t

his reserves, the I and VI Corps, which had 

the space between Rosberitz and Bor. Pire

the I Corps was sent to Problus, Rammig 

retake Rosberitz and Chlum with the VI C

brigades of the I Corps were kept in reserve. 

Although 24 and then 12 more Prussian 

at Chlum, the 1st Division of the Guard w

situation. Its eight battalions were distr

large extent of terrain. About 120 guns took 

Rosberitz and Chlum, as well as the batteries 

under a devastating fire. Hard pressed, the 

battalions seemed unable to oppose any re

attack of an entire corps. Nevertheless Be

ed attack had no prospect of enduring succe

attacks had so far ahvays failed and, should 

in the beginning, it was bound to come agains

troops coming from the rear and break up 

2d Division of the Guard and the I Corps we

moment from the north, while the First Arm
With the mass of two corps, supported on the right 

Division of the Guard, it would have been possib

to prevent the Austrians from crossing the Elb

bridges above Koniggratz, but also the troops 

been sent across the Elbe to invest the eastern fr

fortress. Should the army of the Elbe advance 

Qber-Prim to Charbusitz with Etzel’s Division, b

at last, toward Stosser, and the Cavalry Corps 

vance to Kuklena, the retreat to Pardubitz would 

been cut of?. Only a few Austrians would have e

greater part would have been hemmed in, and th

the reserves would only have increased the disast

Such a result of the day was prevented by the 

ta.ken by the Prussian army and corps command

2ci Division of the Guard had turned left from 

nowes- Maslowed-Chlum road in order to take 

between the 1st Guard and the 11th Divisions. 

commander had sent it, however, to t,he other wi

against Fleischhacker’s unfortunate Brigade whi

from the rest of the trocps, sought only an outle

plight and could no longer be caught up with. T

ing column of the I Corps was drawn from the 

that of the V Corps from the left, toward the ce

army commander. They were to march straig

“historical lindens” of Horenowes and form a str

some, but entirely ineffective reserve. Only th

guard of the I Corps had freed itself and reached 

ened Chlum from Benatek. Of five divisions 

to inactivity, only one could have followed the ro

by the course of events, could have advanced betw

and the Elbe, and could have barred the way to 

of fugitives, at least north of the main road. 

commander was restrained from such decisive p

easily explained feeling of having to assist the ha

,Guard. The 11th Division received orders to t
unmolested and all available forces were em

against the two reserve corps. Of these the 

advanced first. Even the narrow front of a 

could have executed an enveloping attack agai

weakly garrisoned southern point of Rosbe

to three battalions, which occupied the village

driven back to Chlum. On the southern edge 

and near the defile leading to Nedelist and o

Rifles, the attack came to a halt, then changed 

A second attack, executed by brigades of the 

ments of the III Corps, had the same result

vance guard of the Prussian I Corps had r

sent in support of the Guard. The retreating 

threatened at Rosberitz on the one hand by 

of the 11th Division advancing from Nedelist

by one brigade of the Cavalry Corps. 

The Austrian artillery, between Lipa 

held out a long time. EnveIoped by the Arm

the left wing at last retreated. On the right, 

ies held on; continuing their fire until the rapid 

laid low first the horses, then the men. When 

the First Army started, taking along at its 

brigades of the Cavalry Corps which were at 

fcremost of these reached Rosberitz, when 

brigades of the Austrian I Corps were seekin

attack of the 11th Division, The Reserve Cav

of Prince Holstein (1st) and Coudenhove 

to cover the hard pressed infantry. Comb

tween this cavalry and the brigades of Hann’s 

later, between it and the leading regiments o

Division(23) which were hurrying from Nec

setitz. Success hung in the balance, but rath

‘“‘The Division “Alvensleben” was assigned to 

~~dol$~sion ” Iiann von Sucha” was moved to th
needed time to escape from their pursuers. The lo

ing artillery did not fare so well, losing part of its 

fire and falling helplessly into the hands of the en

soon as the cavalry combats had ceased, the infa

tinued its advance. The VI Corps occupied the fa

ings on the main road south of Sweti, as well as 

and Briza. The Army of the Elbe had, in the m

repulsed the attack of Piret, had taken the Briza 

occupied Stezirek with a brigade of Etzel’s 18 infa

3 cavalry divisions. The dream of the comman

realized. The three armies were assembled in on

mass in the narrowest of space. They might advan

close formation. But a hostile line confronted the 

on an equal front. 

The Austrians had again placed in position 

maining, but still quite numerous artillery, with 

wing on the Koniggratz-Josefstadt road near th

Sweti-Plotist, and the left wing in the vicinity o

This artillery apparently was resolved to oppose 

resistance. Yes, it might even seem that the enem

ed to execute a counterattack. For southwest 

there appeared new batteries and forced, with 

Etzel’s Brigade to retreat from Stezirek to O

Moltke might charge the Army of the Elbe, the c

of the Second Army might charge the V Corps 

mann’s Cavalry Division with the pursuit, but fi

the strong barrier, opposing all advance, would h

broken. The First Army had found it impos

morning to advance straight against such a line of 

A flanking attack, an envelopment or a turning m

studiously avoided, would be found unavoidable

were abundant masses for the execution of such a m

200,000 men assembled on one narrow little spot, 

wonderful sight which, however, made Prince 

Charles exclaim: “What wouldn’t I give if I could 
pg g

Napoleon or Gneisenau would have done. T

a superfluous question as neither the one no

these men would have placed himself in suc

This much was gleaned from the pros and con

nothing more can be done today. 

This negative result was unavoidable. 

to envelop, surround, and annihilate. For th

Map 58. wings should have been made strong and bro

The right wing of the entire army should h

dixction of Chlumetz, Pardubitz, Holitz, the 

that of Tinist across the Mettau. The essen

to prevent the enemy from marching to Vien

Map 54. i.e. in an easterly, southeasterly, or southerly 

commanding generals held different views: t

strengthen not their wings, but their center, 

wings, forward, but keep them away from 

against the enemy’s flank and draw them towa

The right wing should not go to Chlumetz, Pa

against flank and rear of the enemy, but to Nee

the front, the left wing should not advance to 

the Mettau, but across the Elba to the right ba

not think it necessary to prevent the enemy 

Olmutz and Vienna, but wanted to drive him 

the eastern and southern sides of the hostile p

be reached, but it should be attacked from the 

north. The consequent execution of these prin

sembled the three Prussian Armies ‘into o

brought it directly opposite the hostile front

which the theorists had created was attained. 

to break through the enemy with 200,000 m

enemy did not move from the spot and cont

his fire into them. Thus was the Austrian a

the sacrifice, it is true, of 44,000 men (24 per 

guns, A success, even a very great succ
a merit that should not be underestimated. It s

not fortunate that the general accepted the battle 

Elbe in his rear, that he wished to gain the victory 

attack against the hostile front, and that he allow

lence the right wing to wheel from the line: Chlu

list-Elbe, to the line : Chlum-Maslowed-Borenowes. 

when misfortune seemed to befall him, he showed 

true leader. By the attack of his reserves against 

and Chlum, the attacks of his cavalry and the plac

artillery he surmounted the greatest evil as well a

He saved at least three fourths of his army. Th

was then spoiled in the most unexpected way. 

The troop units had become badly mixed, 

after the II and IV Corps, as well as the 2d Light 

Division, attempted to cross the Elbe above K

while the 8th and the Saxon Divisions together 

remaining cavalry divisions tried to cross below 

tress. The principal stream of the fleeing tro

directed towards the fortress itself. The troops 

naive belief that Koniggratz had been built for th

of assuring them an unmolested crossing of the E

Commandant on the other hand, insisted that he h

the fortress for his Emperor against friend and 

and that Austria could not perish as long as Konigg

out, He closed the gates. The troops found th

in front of impregnable walls, flooded ditches an

fields. Wedged in a labyrinth of water courses 

rasses, pressed from behind, they could proceed ne

ward nor sideways. A mass of vehicles and 

thrown into the waters, mounted men, pushed to 

of ditches, fell in and drowned. The Commandant 

to Vienna: ‘“Entire Corps are intermingled in an

the fortress, climbing the palisades, swimming a

ditches and the Elbe, scaling the walls of the prin

eeinte, and the defense is entirely crippled. I 

orders.” Fright and confusion increased when 
toward Holitz. 

From there, Benedek telegraphed at 

“Catastrophe to army, apprehended day bef

completely overtook it today.” A catastrophe 

taken place, but the battle of annihilation, plan

with such promise of success, had again m

third attempt could not be made in a simila

Map 58* Austrians were no longer in the center betwe

sian armies, advancing from different sides

’ armies were standing facing each other, 

could evidently, without being greatly moles

Vienna or Olmutz. Benedek decided on the 

The road to Vienna was long. The army wo

dissolved before reaching the right bank of th

Olmutz the troops would be able, after a sho

regain their strength and capacity for resistan

tal, moreover, could be better defended fro

from behind the Danube. By taking up a fla

on the march, the enemy would be forced t

yearning after Vienna and to accommodate him

less siege. 

But this plan did not find favor with the V

Immediately upon receipt of Benedek’s telegra

Ist, a decision was reached to give up the Italia

to bring up the thus disengaged Army of the 

tinue the war against Prussia with increased 

order, however, to refrain from humiliating 

suppliant before the vanquished of Custoza, E

cis Joseph odered to cede Venice to Emperor 

demanded as compensation the extension of 

with Italy. Napoleon was pleased to put th

ated sister country under a new obligation 

gracious gift, but he was still more pleased to 

Prussia who was already sure of being victor
and courteously offered to obtain an armistice no

Italy, but also with Prussia, to hear the demands 

parties and then to pronounce from the magisteria

verdict and to levy all the dues. But an armist

serve neither Austria nor Prussia, The one wan

gain what had been lost, the other wished to se

had been won. Both, however, accepted the 

Austria did not wish, after Koniggratz, to refus

friendly hand stretched towards her, while Pruss

want to make a new enemy. Both tried to delay 

tor. Prussia dared not conclude an armistice w

assent of allied Italy and without knowing of the 

ditions. Austria did not want to surrender Venice 

had expressed herself, but she needed to bring up 

of the South and secure its junction with the Ar

North. The Minister President, Count Mensdorf

Imperial Headquarters and attempted in vain to m

dek abandon his illusions. All he accomplished 

the X Corps was designated to be transported 

Vienna and four cavalry divisions were directed 

marching. Benedek continued his road to Olmutz 

Corps and one cavalry division. 

The Army had been divided for this march 

the 4th into three columns, within which the scat

gradually found their own corps. The main colu

VI, and X Corps, the army reserve) was to march 

Hohenmouth, Leitomischl, Zwittau, Mahrisc

Gewitsch, and Konitz, and all to reach Olmutz on 

llth,---a right column (II, IV Corps, 2d Light C

vision) via Hohenbruch, Wamberg, Wildemschwe

skron, Hohenstadt, Muglitz, and Littau, a left col

and Saxon Corps and four cavalry divisions) fro

bitz via Chrudim, Chrast, Politschka, Zwittau, 

day’s march in rear of the main column, via Mah
the line: Saar-Zwittau, to march in four c

Vienna via Trebitsch and Brunn. 

Prussian Royal Headquarters were not 

the 4th as to the magnitude of the victory gain

my had retreated on the preceding afternoon 

but had remained immobile in front, of the 

battle had been stopped in uncertainty in th

was quite right to suppose that the enemy w

‘t,he right bank of the Elbe by the next mo

that he would continue the retreat on the 

seemed impossible to make a frontal attack 

behind the Elbe. A turning movement, und

strong protection for the left flank, must be 

and below Pardubitz. Only when Gablenz 

afternoon of the 4th, from Holitz, declaring 

mien %hat his Emperor no longer possessed 

begging for an armistice, did Royal Headqua

realize the scope of the success achieved. O

for the time being, been eliminated. The Sec

entrusted with his pursuit. The King want

against the new enemy, who could at any mom

Vienna, with the First Army and the Army of 

fcllowing troops reached the Elbe on the 5th w

ing elements: the Second Army at Pardubitz

Prelautsch, the Army of the Elbe at Kaldrub. 

point,s the Second Army was to turn towa

Trubau, the First Army and the Army of the 

go directly towards Vienna. The latter rea

Brunn-Nahrisch- Butwitz, on the 12th with 

via Chrudim and Politschka, with the right, 

Brad and Iglau. They had come in touch, 

encounters, with the four retreating division

trian cavalry. 
not receive ancient Italian territory as a gracio

from the hand of her protector, and maybe hav

shameful price even beyond Nizza and Savoy. 

tice would be granted, but the Southern Tyrol wa

in addition to Venice, and General Cinadlini w

to cross the PO in the night of the 7th. The Aus

of the South was held fast and could not march 

The Capital was entirely unprotected. Only th

the North could be counted upon to save it. Th

was thus greatly changed. Moltke had suppose

that Benedek would assume the offensive after 

and recovery in an entrenched camp. Therefore 

Army was to advance to the line : Konitz-Littau, 

of Olmutz. Should Benedek advance against it, 

dered to retreat toward Glat, drawing the enemy 

away from Vienna, possibly giving an opportun

First Army of attacking him in the flank and rea

however, the Army of the North endeavor to marc

burg or to Vienna, the Second Army should fo

mediately, while the First should bar its way v

burg in the valley of the March, the Army of the 

upon itself security against Vienna. 

At the moment when the probability of a 

Olmutz and the impossibility of an Austrian off

made clear, Moltke approved the proposition of t

army commanders to march to Prossnitz, Plum

Urtschitz instead of to Littau-Konitz. He, of 

supposed that the Second Army would try to 

cut off the retreating enemy, driving him to th

northeast. Nothing of the kind was in the mind 

commander. In his judgement, the wisely selec

would keep the enemy from any retreat. Shou

be the case, it would not be expedient to attack 

superior Austrians “on account of complete sepa
, py 

spiring fear, it must be reached in time. 

had had the advantage of three marches, 

to take the straightest and shortest road, 

corps, if possible, on one line. There wer

separate roads, if the crossing of the Elb

were not chosen for the entire army, but i

(the VI remained for the time at Koniggratz 

were allowed to cross the Elbe over three se

the left bank. A right column could march 

via Hrochow-Teynitz, Lusche, Leitomischl, 

Lettowitz to Urtschitz, a central column 

via Holitz, Hohenmauth, Leitomisehl (sep

right column), Mahrisch-Trubau, Gewitsch, 

nitz, a left column from Opatowitz via 

schwert, Landskron, Muglitz to Ollschann. 

Army preferred, first in a column of thr

four corps, to take the road from Pardubitz 

Leitomischl, Bohmisch-Trubau to Landskron 

Mahriseh-Trubau, Gewitsch, and Konitz. 

not repaid by greater celerity. On the 12th

Army and the Army of the Efbe reached B

-Budwitz, the Second Army had covered 

of the distance, reaching Gewitsch with its 

This march time did not correspond to the z

opposite side. 

Austria wanted to disengage the Army 

any cost. Napoleon did not acquiesce in he

French army and fleet would render Italy m

especially by the occupation of the ceded Ve

Fcrtunately, though energetic orders were 

they were not energetically executed, than

French influence. The crossing of the PO 

not very dangerous. It would be possible to 

general in check with 86,000 men, used mos
p, 

first of all, the Army of the North must be draw

point. As early as the 9th, on his arrival at Olm

dek received orders to send first the III Corps by 

the Saxon Corps. The remaining corps were now 

to Vienna. Benedek created difficulties, not bein

abandon his beloved plan of operating against th

the enemy, fearing also that forced marches would 

ly exhaust the army. An order to go to Vienna 

further objection” by rail and on foot via Press

him no choice. The Saxon Corps continued by r

dek was going to start the march to Vienna with 

five corps, the 2d Cavalry Division and the reserve 

on the 14th or 15th via Pressburg. This great op

Prussia was going to be joined by another. 

Napoleon had suffered a defeat at Sadowa, 

through Victor Emmanuel’s distant attitude. Hi

3s the arbiter of Europe and the Chosen of the N

suffered a severe blow. It was absolutely necessa

to restore his old authority should he wish to c

hold his court in the Tuileries. Benedetti was sen

to Prussian Headquarters in order to bring abou

necessary pressure, first an armistice, then pea

Prussia must not be permitted to grow too powerful

main point. Should it not be possible to strip 

of all advantages, the increased power obtained w

his due should be compensated for by an equivale

of territory to France. Napoleon was neutral o

pearance. In reality he belonged already to the be

He would seek, in the beginning, to reach his a

force of arms, but by negotiations and more or less 

threats. The difllculty for the diplomats lay in the 

Prussia was very willing to conclude an armistice, 

Austria meet her demands, but that this must de

t,he approval and acquiescence of united Italy, tha
must recross the Elbe,” was Moltke’s answe

never come to pass. We must try to hold bac

her demands as far as possible, and, in the m

Austria, by a new defeat, to accept our m

The army, assembling at Vienna must be 

Benedek has time to reach it.” Again a let

the Second Army on the 13th, reading as 

consequently, your task to prevent, under all 

the junction of the Austrian Armies of the No

On the 13th, the Second Army stood 

Cavalry Division at Konitz; of the I Corp

guard at Wachtel ; Buddenbroek’s detachmen

2 sauadrons, 1 battery) at Hrochow ; the 

Stepranau; the V Corps at Gewitsch; the G

Marisch-Trubau; the VI at Landskron. On 

the hostile troops were at the following point

Cavalry Division at Littau, the II Corps at 

at Schnobolin, the Saxon Cavalry Division 

roar of it the V and the not yet transported 

Saxon Corps at Olmutz, the VIII Corps at N

Prerau. On the 14th it was to march as f

Corps via Weisskirchen to the valley of the W

Cavalry Division and the IV and II Corps t

Tobitschau, the 2d Light Cavalry Division 

field trains via Prerau, Moschtienitz and be

left bank of the March. A long column wou

row, move therefore along the right bank of 

Littau via Kronau and Schnobolin to Tobit

jetein. It was the highest time for the S

ccmmence its main task, that of cutting off t

North. 

Before Hartmann’s Cavalry Division re

Map 59. in the morning of the 14th, extensive cloud

noticed from the heights of Hrochow arising 
brigade had marched in the morning through Kralitz

eral Hartmann wanted to make an advance via Dub 

bitschau in the direction of Prerau for which he 

the support of the infantry, and rode in person 

Corps to Keustift (southeast of Konitz) in orde

sonally urge his demand. Steinmetz found the pl

lent, but believed that he was too far away to be a

operate in it. The I Corps was nearer and would 

ready to give the necessary assistance. Hartmann 

an order from the Crown Prince who happened to 

unexpectedly : “The I Corps will send this evenin

fantry brigade with a battery to Tobitschau to oc

crossings between Tobitsehau and Traubeck.” It 

ning before Hartmann reached Bonin at Plumen

these orders : “It is too late today,” was the answ

early tomorrow a brigade will start.” In the me

General von Borstel, Hartmann’s second in comm

started with the cavalry division to Prossnitz and 

1st Cuirassier Regiment to Tobitschau. This regi

countered two outpost companies at Biskupitz and 

them. The square formed by these companies wa

into two parts, many men being wounded. The 

was, in the end, forced to retreat after losing 6 off

14 men. 

In the evening, on the Austrian side the 2d Li

o,lry Division was at Kronau, the VIII Corps at 

(south of Blmutz), the 2d at Tobitschau, the IV at 

the I at Prerau. On the Prussian side the Cavalry 

and the detachment of Buddenbrock were at Pross

I Corps at Plumenau, the V at Neustift (southeas

nitz), the Guard Corps at Gewitseh, the VI Corps at 

Trubau. The Second Army was widely scattered, t

were far in the rear, but the Cavalry Division, the 

Corps were close enough to prevent at least part of 

of the North from marching off, to drive it back, o

sue it. In view of the order to prevent, under any 
received the Army of the North has retreate

of pursuing the enemy was, consequently, 

still existing, likewise ordered, task of formi

with the First Army remained to be solved

Corps and the VI Corps were to start immed

Brunn on the 17th. The V Corps was to oc

first, to billet behind it at Plumenau, the I Corp

tions at Weischowitz, Urtschitz, Ottaslawitz, 

guard at Kralitz, to cover the road to Brunn

were charged to observe the supposedly eva

and “should information concerning the retre

my be confirmed,” were to march to Brunn 

First Army. The junction of the two hostile 

prevented, “under all circumstances,” is not 

allowed to take place; but the junction of 

Second Armies was to take place, be that w

Moltke’s sanction. The plan did not succee

the supposition that “the Army of the North 

Off," was not correct and the order “one br

Corps to march to Tobitschau,” had not been c

Map60. On the 15th, the Austrian IV and II Corp

tinue their march from Kojetein and Tobitscha

March, the VIII following them from Neus

maining in Prerau, while the Saxon should 

train at the latter point. Count Thun conside

on the right bank of the March as fraught 

decided to take the road crowded with trains o

and started, before an order to the contrary c

at 2:00 AM with the II Corps via Traubeck 

Kremsier. Thus the VIII Corps started, co

lated, on t,he flank march at 4 :00 AM, in the fo

three squadrons and 150 led horses, 60 vehicle

Brigade, trains and vehicles, Roth’s and Kirc

gade?, the 2d Light Cavalry Division. Weber
direction of Tobitschau. The three squadro

horses and the 60 vehicles had passed the town, 

contact could take place. Two companies of 

occupied the latter, when a combat took place, 

advance guard companies on the one side and t

tachment on the other, in the vicinity of the Wi

The Fusilier battalion of the 44th Regiment, drov

out of the wood northeast of the Hof and occu

44th Regiment supported at this point, deploye

battery, as well as the two batteries of Hartmann

which had just arrived, went into position at 

and engaged Rothkirch’s battery, gradually reinf

the artillery reserve, in the vicinity of Wiero

march column of the Austrian infantry turned 

fronting along the road. As soon as the 44t

had deployed, the 4th Regiment followed it on th

Malotki gave the order to advance. The hostile 

regiment, Toscana’s, attacked by an enveloping 

retreated partly east, partly north. Lieutenant 

Bredow with the 5th Cuirassiers had found a cr

den from the sight of the enemy, over the B

Biskupitz and attacked unexpectedly the Austrian 

at Wierowan. Seventeen guns were taken, sixte

via Rakodau, seven via Dub. Benedek, who had 

his staff on the hill, was forced to ride off 

Rothkirch’s Brigade threatened by Malotki from 

and by Bredow from the north, retreated to L

tachments, which had returned to Tobitschau, w

back by seven companies of the 4th Regimen

Mulelenflies, the March and the Beczwa until th

ceived by detachments of the I Corps at Hen

Malotki went into position with the rest of his 

Wierowan. Archduke Leopold appeared opposit

Roth’s and Kirchmayer’s Brigade at Dub. Wobe
y y , 

Prussian I Corps came up via Hrubitsch an

arrived via Kralitz. 

The retreat was now begun via Dub a

with one Brigade to Olmutz. Malotlri re

March. The I Corps followed as far as the 

did not wish to take further part in the c

left to Hartmann with the Hussars Brigade

of Uhlans, one battery and one company in w

out the planned attack on Prerau. 

To receive the Austrian VIII Corps, th

Corps had sent forward from Prerau the fo

Poscha,cher’s Brigade north of Roketnitz, o

Leiningen’s Brigade into that village, two 

Dluhonitz, one to the southeast (between the 

railroad), one to the west of Dluhonitz, and 

a battery between the two villages. This b

two last named battalions were attacked by 

crossed the Beczwa at Wrbowetz and occupi

with one company. He succeeded in forcing 

trian units to retreat. The battalions stand

Dluhonitz were carried along in this retreat 

marching on the Roketnitz-Prerau road we

hopeles,s confusion. Meanwhile, an attack a

talion which was starting from Roketnitz faile

Poschacher’s Brigade turned to the left, ad

the few squadrons of Hussars and brought 

action, Hartmann sounded the assembly an

Wrbowetz. Three squadrons of the Landweh

had remained a little behind, were charged by 

sars, forced to retreat and to deliver their bo

and provisions wagons. Nevertheless, the I 

continued their retreat toward Prerau. 

Map 61. Malotki and the 5th Cuirassiers had b

last intact Austrian Brigade, Rothkirch’s a
railway and forced to cross over bad roads thro

mountains into the valley of the Waag. The VI 

be followed by the Sa,xon Division was to continue t

from Leipnick via Weisskirchen, the I Corps and 

Saxon Brigade to march via Holleschau, Wisowit

Pass, and Nemsowa, the VIII Corps and the 2d L

alry Division likewise via Holleschau and Wisow

continuing via Boikowitz, Hrosenkau, and Kostoln

Corps from Kremsier via Ungarisch-Hradisch, Str

Neustadtl, the IV Corps and the Saxon Cavalry Div

Zdaunek, Ostra, Welka, Migawa, and Verbovce to 

on the Waag. Benedek could still reach Vienna 

detour via Tyrnau and Pressburg. He should of 

have been pursued anew, thrown back, or at lea

to retreat via Komorn. This would have destroyed 

entirely and would have given the Prussians time 

portunity to overwhelm the position at Vienna on 

ube, be it ever so strong and be the river ever so w

receipt of the first, though premature information 

the morning of the 15th, that Benedek had mar

Moltke had ordered the Second Army to follow up th

ing enemy with the V and I Corps in direction of 

and Napagedl. The First Army was to assemble a

burg to block the valley of the March to the fugitive

pursuit would have to be directed toward Krem

Napa.gedl and not toward Prerau. Had the Cava

sion of the I Corps taken this road early on the 15t

V Corps had followed them, then on the 17th one 

of the former could have reached Ungarisch-Brod 

other one Ostra. On the same day the 8th Divisio

Holitseh, the 5th at Tscheitsch. On the 18th, on

could advance to Strany, one to Welka, one to Ty

one to Pressburg, the V Corps following along the 

the March. It is hardly doubtful but that Bened
found approval. The evening of the 15th, 

Malotki were at Tobitschau and Wierowan, t

between Hrubsehitz and Biskupitz and the V 

Steinmetz not acquainted with the events of t

to complete on the 16th the “advance” to Pre

been planned on the 14th. He desired for th

of one of Bonin’s divisions, which he suppose

ing to the army order, at Plumenau and 

learned accidentally, that the I Corps was in 

front and found it simpler to leave the adv

The latter was now quite ready to do what he 

done the day before, but decided to cook di

started at 2 :00 PM, in company with Hartman

ed Prerau toward evening, found there provis

but no enemy. The latter had found plenty 

3:00 PM to start 40,000 men on the road 

Bonin, in order to do at least something, dire

to Moltke’s orders, that the railroad bridge o

be blown up, thus making impossible the on

tion with Silesia for further operations. He 

to bivouac for the night behind the Blatta. 

the question all pursuit by the Second Army, 

mitted the junct.ion of the enemy, which was 

at all cost. By order of the commanding 

Corps remained at Prerau and Tobitschau to 

Olmutz, while the V Corps and Hartmann’s 

a day’s rest, marched down the March, and th

and VT Corps reached Brunn on the 1’7th. 

The day of Tobitschau must have been fe

a day of painful failure. Only the III and 

assembled at the capital ; one Saxon Brigade a

divisions would arrive, it is true, in a very 

the 50,000 men expected from Italy could n

fore the 22d. Even with their support no s
burg, demanded considerable time. The delay wo

creased should this detour via Pressburg be bar

longer one via Komorn be rendered necessary. T

Blumenau, leading from the valley of the March 

burg, was occupied by Mondel’s Brigade of the 

Tha.t brigade could not resist a determined attack

the nearest corps of the long column marching th

valley of the Waag, was ordered to reinforce it. 

of wagons and a horse tramway the corps was to 

fast as possible to the threatened point. 

Prussian headquarters had evolved a differen

It was not known how many corps had reached 

rail from Olmutz. It appeared certain, however

larger part of the Army of the South had alread

The strength was estimated at 150,000 men ready 

oflensive. Their attack from the Florisdorf for

might be made simultaneously with an attack of th

the North from Pressburg as soon as the latter ha

that point. It is, consequently, most important 

Pressburg. The two hostile armies could be separ

And from there it would be possible to attack the 

of the Army of the South marching behind the D

we!! as the left flank of the Army of the North 

down the valley of the Waag. In order that th

might succeed, the Army of the South must be at

hind the Danube and in the Florisdorf entre

whereas the Army of the North must be attacked 

ley of the Waag. For the former problem would 

able the Army of the Elbe, and that part of the F

which was not used against Pressburg. For the l

destined the I and V Corps as well as Hartmann’s 

as Moltke’s order gave them the direction to Kre

Napagedl early on the 15th. The Second Army 

dained to take up this problem and eliminated i
flank attack on the left bank of the Danube

Army and the Army of the Elbe were availab

Corps and the VI Corps, at least, must be 

thinking of fighting a decisive battle. In o

for the latter, the direction from Brunn, v

Holitsch, down the March to Pressburg wa

left wing of the First Army, and the directio

via Laa and Wilmersdorf, to’ Vienna, was giv

wing of the Army of the Elbe. 

On the 21st, The Army of the Elbe stood 

dorf, the advance guard at Wolkersdorf, 

Map 62. ment, two squadrons under the Prince of H

erau; of the First Army, the II and III C

Alvensleben’s Cavalry Division (1st) w

Weiden-Bach, to the left as far as Angern, an

far as Spanberg, IIann’s Cavalry Division 

egg, the 7th(24) and 8th Divisions under 

Stampfen and Marienthal. The Second Arm

VI Corps (11th Division) at Wilfersdorf, th

at Drosing, the V Corps far back in the vic

nitz and Wesely, Hartmann’s Cavalry Divi

Skalitz. 

On the Austrian side, there stood at the 

brigade of the III Corps at Krems, two at Tu

and one brigade of the V, arrived from Ita

in the fortifications of Florisdorf, the three 

of the latter corps in Vienna, the IX Corps, a

Italy the day before, at Schwechat, one Sa

Modling. The 1st Light Cavalry Division 

tween the III and X Corps. The three Rese

visions observed the Danube between Hainbu

chat. Henriquez’s Brigade had already jo

car)It had exchanged with the 2d Division. 
Division and in the rear of it the head of the long 

Column, at Neustadtl. All these troops were s

to four days’ march distant from Pressburg; th

little to be considered for the next few days as the 

hind the Danube. They were too weak for an attac

the Prussians behind the Weiden-Bach or the Rus

strong enough to repulse an attack against the 

works or to prevent the crossing of the Danube. 

22d there was only the question whether or not Co

with 24 battalions, 11 squadrons, and 40 guns coul

pass of Blumenau against Fransecky’s 19 batta

squadrons, 78 guns. Everything was risked on 

Should it come out well, the junction of the Arm

South and North would be assured. If it came 

Austria was probably lost. Fransecky would rec

forcements the fallowing day. Benedek would t

if he were not pursued, decide on a retreat via Ko

the position on the Danube could be attacked from 

and from Pressburg. Austria could not afford to 

happen. She showed herself inclined to accede t

ings of France and to accept an armistice of 5 d

ning at noon on the 22d. Prussia also “was willing 

this sacrifice of five days, disadvantageous from 

point of view to please Napoleon.” The forenoon 

the 22d were not sufficient to finish a combat begun 

secky with much circumspection and well condu

the appointed hour the combat had to be interrupted 

troops had to retreat to the assigned line of demarka

junction of the two Austrian armies was thus se

Prussia placed in an unfavorable military situatio

Austria and France wanted to utilize the success 

each in her own way. 

Negotiations opened on that day at Nikolsbur

tria being already outside of the German Con
mia, moreover the losses suffered during 

years of bitterness-the unreturned Ansbac

Eastern Friesland-were demanded by him 

was also part of Saxony. These demands 

positive refusal from Vienna, Neither Aus

territory should be ceded. Better by far t

honcr than to cede one foot of territory. T

other hand, would rather abdicate than retu

without the provinces rightfully belonging 

could consist, besides Schleswig-Holstein, o

Hesse, and Nassau, the implacable enemie

German Confederation. 

Napoleon had other interests to guard 

tria. The terrifying ghost, frightening 

other Great Powers for centuries, was a U

It was of not much importance who should 

this centralized power. It was equally dang

if it were threatened by a Great Germany 

inhabitants under the Emperor of Austria o

tria, under the King of Prussia. Since the G

of unification by the inventor of the principle 

could no longer be entirely crushed, a North 

federation seemed the lesser evil. With a 

Confederation, supported by France, perhap

pendent German State on the Rhine, it woul

create a rival for the enlarged Prussian. 

German Kings and Princes within the North 

federation would become the vassals of Pru

importance. Thus all parties concerned, s

to a North German Confederation under th

Prussia and to the elimination of Hanover, th

Hesse and of Nassau from among the inde

It was necessary for Prussia to come to a co

basis before any other powers could mix in

other secondary demands, such as the integ
negotiations, but a quick result in order to accep

the demands, to end the war or to continue it. S

fore the expiration of the armistice, there lack

conclusion of the agreement only the acquiesce

Vienna Cabinet. 

The greatest delay was resorted to for the 

of this formality. The armistice had done what 

expected. During the period of five days Be

crossed the Danube at Pressburg with his army 

and IV Corps had followed him. Masses of res

arrived. An army of 276,000 men and 840 gun

as the world had ever seen, was assembled b

Danube. It stood in a very inaccessible position f

it could proceed to the right or left, according t

against the eompressed mass of 218,000 Prussia

victor of Custozza, who had solved the difficult p

defeating with a small army a vastly superior one

able to solve the smaller problem of defeating one 

ical inferiority. A council of war was held at the 

The spirits were high as was natural after the nav

of Lissa, which had taken place a few days ago. 

Fieldmarshal John, Archduke Albreeht’s Chief of 

plained briefly the advantages of the situation, b

at the conclusion that these advantages could no 

utilized. On 1 July, the Army of the North, 

cording to Benedek’s judgement, immediately on 

its dissolution; according to Gablenz’s opinion, 

existed on the 4th. Since then it had been driven 

into the valley of the March, across the Carpath

the valley of the Waag, through Pressburg and 

Danube to Vienna. What it had escaped in the 

had suffered from the haste of the leaders. This 

at an end. The troops were entirely exhausted, dis

unnerved and unavailable for an attack. The war

drawing his sword for the wielding of a mighty b
g, 

The peace preliminaries between Austria and 

be completed. The document was ready 

Benedetti then made the agreement of Fran

torial acquisitions of Prussia dependent up

tion, hinting at the left bank of the Rhine. 

rupted him with the words : “Do not make 

munications of this kind to me today.” Th

signed, Benedetti disappeared. He will 

more opportune moment. 

Twice could a Cannae have taken plac

a complete surrounding and annihilation of 

too foreign to the Prussian generals to allow 

and grand plan to succeed. The enemy w

back, It is true that he was entirely broke

he find some rest, he could regain strength, 

draw in reinforcements and regain capability 

even of attack. The longed for rest should 

given him. The Second Army shouId hav

During a long period of peace nothing muc

pursuits. It was known, from many mane

beaten enemy was, after a lost battle, as fres

and dangerous as 24 hours earlier. The 

must have lost almost one third of its effectiv

ing the series of encounters and battles. 

was materially stronger than the Second Arm

by a general who was considered as the perso

idea of the offensive and to whose love of ent

olution anything could be ascribed. It wa

comprehensible that the Second Army, imb

prevalent in peace time, followed only cauti

who could, at any moment, face it and mete 

to it. As far as Olmutz it might have been p

tain the fiction that the Austrians retreated 
of the Second Army was closer to these points than t

of the Austrians. A situation, similar to that of Je

established. Moltke ordered by telegraph, quite 

Napoleonic mind, that pursuit be undertaken in the 

direction. However, 60 years had sufficed to oblite

but the names of Jena and Prenzlau, while the sense 

the memories. Moltke’s order was simply not und

and could not be executed because it was not understo

was due only to the initiative of one general that 

was achieved with a handful of troops, a success w

entire army dared not attempt to achieve. Und

circumstance no battle of annihilation or annihilatin

suit could be thought of. It had to be left to the e

gradually exhaust himself. Other generals also had 

tend with the lack of understanding, training, and 

of their subordinates. They tried to eliminate these 

by the infallibility of their authority and the dec

their orders. Moltke, being no commander-in-chief, 

the Chief of the General Staff, lacked the necessary a

and was not vested with the right to speak with 

surance of a man in command. He had to content 

with polite advice, pleasant expostulations, suggesti

similar means, and only rarely could he avert the 

mistakes by a Royal “I order.” The power of his 

was sufficiently great to achieve, if not the highest, y

things nevertheless. 
THE RETREAT OF THE FREN

THE MOSELLE 

Instead of taking home the left ban

Belgium from the campaign of Sadowa

lost a goodly portion of his power and 

to obtain better results, the Emperor ha

less hidden threats, but he dared not util

was afflicted with all the defects caused 

Should he, however, desire to mainta

France at the head of the European State

cation of Germany must be prevented a

forced back within the boundaries becom

was, consequently, unavoidable and, in 

was necessary to win allies and to re

from its very foundation, yes, even 

Zealous negotiations took place with 

friends of the later years. The infantry 

a rifle superior to the Prussian arm. 

reform and improvement were still in th

attempts to bring a politica defeat to the 

on the war. 

Pursuaded that “he would be numer

300,000 men,” Napoleon thought “to offs

bers by the rapidity of movements,” Th

ly from a man who was often compelled 

by fits of illness and for an army whi

formed and which had to be equipped w

sary things. Only the plan of campa

ready. 

The Rhine was to be crossed at Ma

hlap 63* South Germans were to rally around the 

180 
However, before the French Army could begi

ing the Rhine, it had to be assembled on the le

This could be effected, on account of the then existi

way net, only in two groups, one of two corps in 

and one of five corps in Lorraine. One corps wa

formed at Chalons in order to follow as a left ec

the general advance. Of all the suppositions, on w

plan of campaign was based, none was realized. Th

Germans decided not for the Rhine Confederation, 

the German flag. They assembled, as did the Nor

mans, on the Rhine between Coblenz and Karlsruhe

French plan of campaign was thus greatly simplifie

crossing of the Rhine would be necessary. The 

would be found already on the French side. Th

powers would not advance alone on the other sid

stream: the great coalition, which had not yet b

cluded was already broken. Germany and Franc

stood opposite each other. 

With the knowledge of being superior to the o

in organization, mobilization, railway transportatio

consequently in rapidity of concentration, the Germ

tended to attack before the French could be as

The First Army (VII and VIII Corps) was to asse

the Moselle at Wittlich, the III and X Corps of the 

Army on the railroad on the left bank of the Rhi

Bingen to Neunkirchen, the Guard Corps and the IV 

by Mannheim to Homburg, the six corps after tha

vance by Merzig-Saargemund, seek the as yet unp

foe and beat him. A reserve army of which the 

half of the IX Corps assembled north of Mayence, t

half of the IX Corps at Worms, was to follow the 

Army at a few marches interval. The Third Army 

XI, Bavarian I and II Corps, Wurtemburg and Ba

tingents) were to emerge from the Palatinate and d

enemy, assembling in Alsace, in a southerly direct
in a few days in Lorraine a fighting stren

become dangerous, not to the First or Th

to the Corps of the Second Army which w

Neunkirchen by battalions. It was fou

transfer the intended detraining at Neunk

and Mannheim. Time was lost in this man

was gained, The two Corps of the Res

XII and IX) were detrained at Mayenee 

Map 64. most opposite the corps of the Second Arm

Mannheim, thus being able to advance w

line. There was hope even that the cor

ported only to Berlin (I and II) might 

enough, after the freeing of the line of t

Bingen and Mannheim, to join the genera

two corps did not have to be awaited by t

in the bend of the Rhine south of Mayen

have been brought in complete safety by s

advance of the rest of the army, as far as 

Homburg. Then there would have been 

corps available for the attack across the 

Merzig-Saargemund could be strengthene

and be prolonged to the right as far as Sier

as far as Finstingen. 

After the surprise and sudden atta

French, who were believed to be hastiIy co

found to be impossible, it seemed advisab

tain victory by the straining of all forces ev

be at the cost of a few days’ delay. The p

First and Second Armies remained the s

given in the beginning-to find the enem

him. Its execution was facilitated by the 

of corps and a broader front. 

The Third Army joined the Second on 

brought to the strength of six corps throu

of the VI Corps, transported as far as 

had to await the departure of the V C
Neiderbronn to Ingweiler and Buchsweiler. Two 

crossed the Lauter between the mountains and the H

forest, two others advancing south of this forest. I

to obtain a separate road for Werder’s Corps, as

at Karlsruhe (Wurttemberg and Baden Contingent) 

tempt would be made to build a bridge across the 

between Rastatt and Selz or further upstream. 

way, the problems, entrusted to the Third Army, 

southward the enemy reported to be assembled at 

and in Lower Alsace, and to support the Second A

an attack from the east, would be easiest of executi

The entire German army would thus advance 

available roads between the Moselle and the Rhine, 

the enemy. It was known about the latter, that 

group had advanced from Metz and had occupied 

advance guard (II Corps, Frossard) the heights s

Saarbrucken and the town itself, the main body (B

III Corps) standing between Saargemund and St

the reserve (Guard) advancing by the Metz road a

the German Nied ; the IV Corps (Ladmirault) , divid

divisions and brigades, covered the left flank as 

Sierck, the V Corps (Failly) the right flank between 

mund and Bitsch. The Alsatian group had been divi

assigned to the I Corps (MacMahon) and VII (

along the Rhine from Belfort to Hagenau and north 

latter. One division of the latter corps was still a

Both groups, however, were in constant movement

day could evolve a new situation. Only four corps 

considered as sure-with their main forces betwee

brucken and Metz, one corps in the vicinity of Bits

in Upper Alsaee ; one, which could be reinforced 

moment by the two preceding ones, was being conc

in Lower Alsace. 

If now the German line, extending from Per1 

tatt, was to seek the enemy, the wings of the arm

ing nothing or little in front of them, were to mak
could come from Per1 to south of Die

wing of the Second Army and the right 

as far as Saaralben, Ormingen, Rahl

Rederchingen, the left wing of the latter 

geim and close to Bischweiler. Thus atta

selves being prepared against the hosti

true that the German wings were threate

on the right by Diedenhofen and Metz, on 

burg. These fortresses were, however

risoned that they could exert only a negl

outside and be nothing more serious than 

stacles. Much more serious would have b

of the army reserve (VI Corps, Canrobe

to Nancy or Metz. One part of the tu

would have been occupied by it and its fl

weakened. 

The question was as to what woul

reached at French Imperial headquarters 

ning of 9 August, a mass of contradic

information were brought in. The decis

mediately was not to be considered. Fo

ready the press had written and the cr

shouted : “On to Berlin!” Should a retr

soon as the enemy showed himself at a d

a shot was fired, the Emperor would lo

marshals and generals their posts, and t

Moreover, a retreat toward Metz would h

a battle under unfavorable conditions, on

have exposed the scattered divisions an

IV Corps as well as those of the II to co

It could thus be taken as probable that 

Corps had gone into a position near Kade

reconnoitered and well known (south of 

west of Saargemund) and that the flanks 

(*‘The 9th of August had been designated 

First and Second Armies to cross the Saar. 
at Jena, Bennigsen at Friedland, and Benedek at 

gratz. On 10 August, the Germans would have co

their march along the entire line, the right wing 

First Army east of Metz, the left of the Second Army 

Saar, the right of the Third to Zabern, its left to 

sweiler and Hochfelden, Many columns would me

opposition, with some very obstinate resistance, by 

emy in more or less good positions. But the columns

ing no enemy, could not be held back on this account

could not more efficiently support the neighboring 

whether attacking or attacked, than by continuing 

march on the roads assigned them in order to fall 

the flank or the rear of the enemy in case this were 

However the results of the fighting in Lorraine m

pictured, in the evening of 10 August, the wing c

the German First and Second Armies would have 

on the right the vicinity of Metz, on the left w

.Finstingen and then the French, however great the

cess or defeats might have been, would have to retr

the purpose of escaping the threatening turning mov

the Germans starting immediately in pursuit, reach

the right Nomeny and Delme, and on the left, 

Maizieres, and Roxingen. In order, however, to cl

ring entirely, the 3d, 5th, and 6th Divisions were atta

the First Army; the Guard and the 12th Cavalry D

to the Second, which, hurrying ahead of the right a

wings, in order to block the crossings over the Se

tween Marsal and Lanfroicourt or those over the M

and the Rhine-Marne Canal between Nancy and E

would have brought to a standstill the entire ret

mass and forced it to accept a new battle from th

mans, pressing upon them from all sides(26). 

‘18’In 1870, the cavalry was so poorly equipped and arm

the problem entrusted to it could be only incompletely solv

After the number of batteries had been increased, mach

intfoduced and the rank and file armed with carbines, the 

z;~;;mms were better able to fulfil1 more effectively the deman
from the mountains, on the other side by t

from Hagenau and the south, and find his 

by the lst, 2d, and 4th Cavalry Divisions a

Ingweiler and Hagenau and the Bavarian Ca

on the Moder or on the Zorn and the Rhine-

The V Corps, even if it were not drawn 

I, would find it difficult to escape being surr

How far the French armies and corps c

surrounded and annihilated need not be d

greatness of the success depended on purp

defatigable pursuit by the German armies a

even should many enemies escape annihilation

then remain of the French army would, ne

be available for any great deeds. The Fren

might be considered as set aside. Only Paris 

fortresses would then remain for the German

Such a result was practically placed in 

the Germans by Moltke’s original instruction 

beat the enemy on the line: BIerzig-Saarge

execution of the plan was opposed by the ide

commanders in regard to assembling the fo

Map 65. the troops before battle, and keeping back un

reserves. Benedek’s measures in regard to t

Moravia to Bohemia in 1866, have been seve

As if it had to be so and could not be otherwis

Army marched again in the Benedek marc

four corps (the IV, Guard, IX(W, and X

main road via Kaiserslautern to Homburg, t

III and X) from Gingen by another road to 

although there were plenty of good roads on 

left. From Neunkirchen, the III Corps wa

via Sulzbach, the X from Bexbach via St. In

brueken, the Guard Corps from Homburg 

““The IX Corps took advantage of the permi

main road only for o=e Brigade. It marched with 

along a parallei road more to the north. 
quarters and independent ideas, the First Army s

VIII Corps from Ottweiler via Fischbach, the 

Lebach to Saarbrucken. Thus four corps in the 

and two in the second, took this one town as their 

while another corps was sent to the deeply cut li

Saar, St. Arnual-Saargemund, so difficult to c

still another was directed against the latter tow

was easily defended. Should the plan be execute

manner, six to seven army corps would be asse

the narrowest strip in front of the Kadenbronn 

and the enemy, after the departure of the troops 

for the defense of the position and of Saargemun

have had sufficient forces left to attack the wes

the crowded German troops, left open between 

and Kadenbronn. As a matter of fact, such attac

French was as improbable as was a great and 

victory on the part of the Germans. As at Sa

much more could be expected here than the confro

two unwieldy masses. 

The Third Army followed the same principle

First and Second. For the protection of Alsace, M

had selected a position near Worth, facing eas

cured for him, as he deemed, communications 

main army, and threatened in flank an advance o

mans against Strassburg. The latter would be 

to attack the strong position, for the defense of 

V and VII Corps could also be drawn in. In ord

the principal crossing of the boundary stream (the 

a detachment was sent to Lauterburg, Douay’s D

battalions) to Weissenburg, and covering detach

Klimbach, Lembach, and Sulz. 

The German Third Army had received ord

Royal Headquarters to cross the frontier on 4 A

drive MacMahon back in a southerly direction, a

vance across the Vosges Mountains toward the up

somewhere between Saaralben and Finstigen. 

reach this point in time to cooperate with the Sec
Whether it would be successful in inducing the 

to adopt the role of the Army of the EIbe and 

tack on the hostile left flank, appeared very 

view of Genera1 von Steinmetz’s independen

Moreover, on account of the great distance o

from the Saar, and of all the obstacles to be 

on this road, the smooth execution of the pla

way assured. This was apparent as early as 

On that day the Bavarian II Corps was to re

berg from Bergzabern, the V Corps St. Rem

Map 66. hauschen via Kapsweiler, the XI Corps the Bl

hutte via Schaidt, and Werder’s Corps Laute

the Bavarian I Corps followed as a reserve. T

of the marches were reached by the three c

much difficulty. Only the Bavarian II Co

Weissenberg an obsolete, but well preserved a

fortress with high walls and deep moats, a

Douay’s Division in a strong position on the 

excellent obstacles in front. Fortress and 

not easily to be overcome without strong artil

up by the cannon thunder, the V Corps came 

on the left, and the XI on the right of the 

former crossed the river at Altenstadt. Un

attack of the three corps in front and flan

evacuated the position, after a bloody resista

appeared from the sight of the victors along 

Klimbach. The quick and effective cooperat

and XI Corps in the battle of Weissenburg 

testimony as to the spirit of the leaders and 

had the Third Army, for the purpose of over

resistance and opposing real or phantom m

endeavored to assemble three corps, it would 

small success and suffered relatively great los

never have reached the Saar in good time. 

the war of 1866, each marching eolumn of 

army should undertake, by itself alone, to ta
point. On 5 August of the four assembled co

Bavarian II Corps marched via Klimbach to Lemb

9th Division via Kleeburg, Drachenbronn, and Lo

Preusehdorf, the 10th Division and the XI Corps p

partly by marching and partly by rail to Sulz, fol

the Bavarian I Corps to Ingolsheim; Werder’s C

brought to Aschbach, and the 4th Cavalry Division 

proceed along the highroad to Hagenau. At Sulz, 

where the roads to the west and south intersect, 

two divisions of the XI Corps, on the left and 

corps each at Lembach and Aschbach, and one in 

at Ingolsheim; the V Corps was sent forward as 

guard to the west; the 4th Cavalry Division recon

in a southerly direction. 

The Cavalry found in that direction only a 

emy, while near Worth beyond the Sauer the en

found in a strong position. On 6 August, a turnin

ment to the right was to be made, the Bavarian 

advancing to Lampersloch and Lobsann, the V 

Preuschdorf, the XI to Holschloch, and on the 7th 

Corps were to attack the front of the enemy almost 

extent. The right flank was to be covered by the 

II Corps at Lembaeh and Wingen, the left by 

Corps at Reimersweiler, the rear by the 4th Cav

vision at Hunspach. These orders did not book 

ing of the enemy to the south and an advance thro

mountains in order to reach the Saar on the 8th 

take part on the 9th in a concentric attack of th

German army against the French main army. B

tack against the strong hostile front, with flanks 

tected, hardly anything better was to be accomplish

the driving beyond the mountains against the Saa

cult pursuit, and a tardy arrival at the great batt

even the most modest victory was not assured

Mahon had for several days been given the dispo

not only of the VII Corps (Douay) ,but also o
p

it would have sufficed to hold back the en

division, which would make two divisions 

airy divisions available for a turning attack 

senburg and Nieder-Rodern. In fact, MacM

sidered an attack on the flanks, at least with 

He lacked, however, confidence of success a

necessary for its execution. By indefinite o

division of the VII Corps was brought up p

tle on the 6th, and one division of the V C

continuance. These small forces were not u

but were employed as covers for the flank a

On the French side also, great importance w

security of the flanks. On the 6th the two 

face each other in two squares. Neithe

opponents seemed to think that the best s

own flanks was an attack against those of th

The development of the Third Army, a

not executed. The German outposts were a

to the hostile ones, the zeal of the troops a

Map 68. altern commanders to go into combat was 

battle developed of itself. It was soon fou

tack against the strong front, be it with tw

three corps, would bring no decisive succes

front of the French and the zeal of the Ge

about of itself the attack against the fron

Map 6% flanks, to which MacMahon seemed to hav

self on purpose. A still greater success m

achieved had the advance been made in the 

many columns across the mountains and 

north and south of the Hagenau woods. 

The First and Second Armies were al

of their difficult situation through the init

Map 70. subaltern commanders and the zeal of the 

on 6 August, the 13th Division of the VII 

turn, via Volklingen to Forbach as a right f
Division Commander, General von Kameke, deci

tack the strong position, The very insufficient fo

reinforced by the leading troops of the next co

cially by the 16th and 5th Divisions. The troops 

by their impetuous courage, in taking the edge 

sition and advancing also on the Forbach road 

Stieringen-Wendel. This success of the Germa

probably have induced Frossard to retire at least 

Kadenbronn. The report, however, that the e

attacked Forbach( settled the matter. The re

started in the night to Saargemund. 

The French army was as good as disperse

victories of Worth and Spichern. MacMahon w

five divisions (four of the I and one of the VII C

Zabern to Saarburg. One division of the VII 

Mulhausen thought itself threatened in rear by t

ment of the Wurttemberger, Colonel von Seubert

to be in South Baden, and retreated, almost in 

Belfort, where the 3d Division of the Corps of 

also gone. Failly who had gone first to place him

the protection of the guns of Lutzelstein, later jo

Mahon at Saarburg. On the 7th, two divisions 

Corps joined Frossard at Purtlingen. The two 

visions of that corps were at St. Avold; in rear of 

the Guard at Lubeln, the IV Corps at Bolchen, 

and Busendorf. All these scattered units had 

sembled and this seemed possible only at Chalon

longer behind the Moselle. Corresponding ord

already sent on the 7th to the corps, insofar as 

be reached. According to these, the II, III, and I

Guard Corps were to assemble at Metz and then

jointly to Chalons, MacMahon and Failly via Nan

(VII Corps) by rail to the same point, Becaus

(IsbIt was the 13th Division which the Commanding 

the VII Corps, von Zastrow, had sent via Volklingen as 
tion, scarcely fit for service. 

Only an immediate pursuit on the 6

August could have increased the confusion 

A pursuit was attempted by the Third Arm

enemy had disappeared from the battlefleld 

4th Cavalry Division was brought from its 

in reserve and, since it was not known wh

had gone, it was sent on a false track. N

division reached the French rear guard at 

7th. The enemy had, in the meanwhile, com

senses and had so much artillery on hand 

a cavalry attack to throw him into the m

The pursuit in Alsace had thus come to an e

Army followed the defeated enemy slowly a

Saar, not on the 8th, but on the 12th, betw

and Saarburg. 

The left wing of the Second Army a

7th and 8th between Bitsch and Saargemun

Saar and the mountains. As a matter of co

could any longer be seen. The naive hope

false information, that MacMahon would 

treat via Bitsch and eouId be thus cut of

disihusioned. 

A pursuit from the battlefield of Sp

simple and easy. The troops, which had 

6th, were, however, quite exhausted by 

marches and badly mixed up. The masses

had to be disentangled and brought more t

fore they could again become lit for service

days of uninterrupted work were necessary 

troops from the dangerous defile and much m

be required to place the trains, which were 

fusion, on the roads they had to take. F

enemy was too widely scattered. He need

semble and had not yet gained any apprecia

pursuit on the part of the Germans could be 
After the battle of Spichern, the I Corps on 

wing of the First Army reached on 7 August, Leb

day’s march from Rehlingen, and the IV Corps 

left wing of the Second Army reached Lorenzen

kilometers east of Saarunion on the 8th. Rehlin

Saarunion were thus the extreme flank points on 

of the Saar, between which the ten corps of the 1s

Armies could be brought and formed by evening 

9th, in order to start from there, according to 

orders, “To seek the enemy and defeat him!” Thi

did not fall back to Saarbrucken as had been sup

the German side in the beginning. There he wo

been cut off. He did not go, as had been advised 

French side, to the plateau between Toul and Nan

rounded by the Moselle and Meurthe rivers. He wo

been surrounded there. He took, as reported by 

alry, the natural line of retreat via Metz, Verd

Chalons. If the 300,000 Germans advanced from 

with a somewhat held back center on Metz, with s

advanced wings on Bertringen (south of Diedenhof

Dieulouard, they might count on driving the 

French beyond the Moselle and into Metz. But wha

have to be done after the river had been reached 

the 13th, depended on the attitude of the enemy. 

the French army march in several columns throug

and right and left past Metz towards the Meuse, n

harm could be done to it. The pursuit would ha

continued as heretofore. 

Every army on the retreat, which does not fee

enough to face the enemy, is attracted involuntaril

fortress in which it hopes to find rest and safety 

dangers and fatigue which it has undergone. Sh

French army take the longed for rest and security 

only until the heads of the hostile columns appeare

Moselle, the o?ily road which would remain open 

continuation of the retreat would be that to 
and by the cczvalry, hurrying ahead to bar the 

But an advance of the Germans across 

both sides of Metx could not be executed at th

headquarters, which had placed on the mar

four corps one behind the other on the sam

drawn six corps into a front of a few kilo

not have been moved by any directions in 

take with the ten corps as many roads on th

the river and a narrow front of 40 to 50 kil

wanted to march in a much deeper and clo

but, most of all, not to be separated by Met

slightest possibility to the concentrated enem

the separated armies with united forces. Mo

at the time to make allowances for such id

from his simple “seek the enemy and bea

the surrounding and annihilation of the enem

sooner or later through the numerical sup

German troops. Since the turning of both 

too risky, Moltke had to be satisfied with the 

wing-the right. The enemy was not to be 

the Moselle by an attack from both sides, 

driven to the north towards the frontiers o

Luxemburg. 

The Second Army was to reach the le

Moselle in three columns (the III, IX, and II 

Avold, Falkenberg, and Nomeny ; the X and X

mund, Gross-Tannchen, and Delme; the Gua

Map 73. via Saarbrucken and hlorchingen), while t

in two columns (I Corps via Kurzel and P

VIII, via Lubeln and Remilly) was to cover th

‘Za’The strength of the army was given by the 

after the arrival of Canrobert. Since one division 

the troops, led by Bazaine out of l\letz on 14 Augu

to 164,000 men. 

‘““Since the Third Army was still far behind, 

taken advantage of the crossing at Saarunion, a

then, and took thence a separate road, via Chateau
men (First Army), but would meet in their f

vance, the Second Army and possibly, also the Th

The danger of a hostile attack was, consequentl

minent, that of a hostile retreat would be grea

success of the pian depended on the untarrying 

march of the Second Army and the longest possi

the enemy at Metz. 

Such a stay was in no way among Napoleon

tions. Very soon after the defeats of Worth and 

he had decided on a retreat to Chalons, where 

hope to assemble all his available forces and b

the enemy who would have to considerably w

strength for the investment of fortresses and fo

his communications. 

The Empress-Regent had, however, asked he

to obey the will of the people and not give up 

bulwark of the eastern frontier. Canrobert’s 

sent thither by rail as a reinforcement. Should 

hold Metz, Napoleon wanted to hazard a batt

French Nied with the fortress as a point of sup

rear. 

The First Army, which on the lOth, reache

I Corps Kreuzwald, with the VII Kalingen, with 

Lauterbach, had to advance against this position. 

be justified in not pressing forward at once, but 

stationary on the 11th to await the arrival of t

Army for a joint attack. But that the latter on 

four whole days after Spichern, was still on the 

did not take advantage of the enemy’s halt to ma

advance and reached, on the llth, with the III C

enberg to be sure, but with the remaining co

first line only Hellimer, Geblingen, and Harskirc

with the IX and XII only Forbach and Saargem

in no way justified. 

This army headquarters now believed that 

to the Moselle had lost its importance. Since 

had occupied a strong position, it entertained no
who had adopted as an immutable principle

the first to attack,” only Frederick the Gre

attacks against a twofold stronger enemy an

ways with success. And now, an old, sick ma

in generalship, with an already shaken army 

take a risk, which after even a possible initial 

lead him to utter annihilation. If Moltke saw 

up of the position by the enemy, only a temp

of it, as might be comprehensible, were his 

too pressing, the voice of Prince Frederick 

had emerged from two campaigns a general 

glory, whose excellent plan of attack agains

on the Saar was crossed only by Steinmetz 

of ten corps commanded seven, ought not 

heeded. 

The Prince, however, awaited or hoped 

and desired to prove in a brilliant manner t

of the principle “strategically offensive, tac

sive.” While preparing for battle, the III 

seek a “defensive position,” near Elkenberg, t

to advance with the I and VII Corps on th

German Nied between Bolchen and Mohring

Corps to follow as far as Niederwiese and B

IX to follow the III to Hubeln, the II to go 

Army headquarters thought to make a turni

to the right with the remaining corps to the 

berg-Verny, by the evening of the 15th, 

its forces.” On the 16th, the patiently expec

could make an attack against the Bolchen-Fa

sition and be annihilated by a flank attack 

Falkenberg-Verny, 

Unfortunately Napoleon knew nothing 

concocted against him. Otherwise he might h

his army behind the Seille, attacked the Ger
heads of the hostile troops were seen in the dista

went on the 12th to a new position in the rear, with 

near Magny resting against the Seille and reach

Moselle via Peltre and Colombey as far as Chieuille

The marches of the Germans on the 11th a

had been in vain. In vain were the troops of the rig

assembled over bad roads under a pouring rain, 

trated in a narrow space without shelter or pr

suffering a lack of everything. These hardships, 

disappeared and paled before the fact that the en

marches of the Second Army, from which the fina

was expected, had been stopped. Only the X Co

advanced one division at least to Delme. All the re

corps were still far behind. On the 13th the march 

the Moselle was resumed. The III Corps advance

main road to Pont-a-Mousson as far as Buchy, the I

as Herlingen, but on the 14th, the former halted 

head at Louvigny, the latter at Luppy and allowed 

Corps to come as far as Solgne to the south. It 

so easy to abandon the hope of a hostile offensive 

apparently believed that the enemy had retreated 

the guns of Metz only in order to obtain a better 

fore his spring forward, Such a spring would now

believed, be made in a southerly direction along 

to Chateau-Salins. It would then strike at the cro

Saarbrucken-Pont-a-Mousson the strongly posted 

and XII Corps, which could be supported in the 

on the sides by the II, IV, and Guard Corps, w

First Army of which the I and VII Corps had cro

German Nied on the 13th, and the VIII had reac

stream, was to undertake Blucher’s problem at W

The roles should be reversed if the enemy chose 

from Metz to Saarbrucken for his attack, 

‘S”Foe&eT “Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia. 

events of his life.” II, 136. 
tain troops of Canrobert’s Corps. It was n

think that the army reserve, the nucleus, aro

army was to be organized at Chalons, had be

Metz only to be shut up with the Army of 

the fortress or, hardly detrained, would hav

difficult retreat to Chalons, from where it 

rived in all haste. These transports must 

meaning. The intention of an offensive bec

the enemy reinforced himself, while the G

ened themselves. Should the right wing c

Seeond Army continue to march on Pont-a-

First Army would be gradually isolated 

could easily arrive at the idea of utilizing the 

between the Moselle and the Nied for an at

174,000 men against the unprotected right 

First Army. 

The turning movement of the Second Ar

be arrested, but the right wing column co

given another direction. As soon as the de

of roads south of Metz permitted, the III 

Map ‘76. have turned off from the main road and move

tion of Champey or Arry and the IX towa

order to secure as many crossings over th

possible. To these could be added almost im

VII Corps on the road to Pange; the VIII 

Kurzel and Teunschen; the I, via Ste. Barbe 

1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, marching alon

There would then have been five corps on h

Napoleon’s offensive no matter with how m

might be undertaken, or to halt the enemy 

made a move to retreat further. In other 

the Second Army was turning the right win

emy, the First Army should attempt to hold 

supported in this operation by the right wing 

Army. Had this plan of operations been 
Long ago, at the time when tine Germans were 

paring for the great battle on the Nied, Napole

thinking of resuming the retreat to Chalons, in spit

Empress-Begent, the Ministry, Parliament, and 

opinion. Uhlans had been seen at Pont-a-Mouss

Dieulouard which seemed to proclaim: the entire 

army will soon cross the Moselle and to remain w

to be surrounded. The execution of the retreat, 

necessary, would cause a storm of wrath in Paris 

was urgently necessary to avoid. Therefore, the E

relinquished the command, transferring it to Baz

the evening of the 12th, with directions to start 

treat immediately. This was a very wise measur

Emperor could feel absolutely in unison with his 

after laying down his command, and it was to be 

that Bazaine’s appointment would meet with the a

of the editorial rooms of the boulevard newspapers

however, did not remove all difficulties. 

If the new commander-in-chief executed the c

of his Sovereign and brought the army safely to 

across the Meuse and to Chalons, he would fall un

versal condemnation, would be branded as a trait

ruined forever, For he would have left, faint-hea

the bulwark of the east in the lurch. A similar fate 

him if he dreaded the difficulties of the retreat, r

in M&z, and were there surrounded. For then h

have criminally neglected to unite his army with 

MacMahon into one unconquerable host. Bazain

count only on extenuating circumstances if, after a 

resistance, he should be forced by the numerica

riority of the enemy, to retire to Verdun or Metz. 

himself to be invested in Metz without a battle 

appear as shameful as to free across the Meuse to 

A battle was unavoidable. Bazaine needed not to 

lest it take place as soon as he started on the march 

dun. 
and would cross the river on the following da

man army stood, consequently, on the Moselle 

the French at Metz, mostly on the right bank

might retreat by one road or be distributed 

three roads, the columns would nevertheless 

not to be overtaken. It was doubtful whethe

succeed in passing by the pursuer, forming 

Verdun, repulsing the closely following enemy

the necessary time for the crossing of the M

much more probable that an encounter wou

half way between the two fortresses and tha

would be either encircled by the overpowerin

superiority or driven north toward the frontier

burg or Belgium. Bazaine would then be wh

and not he alone would be ruined, but Fran

The difficulties were great; they increased 

Marshal knew not how he could contrive the 

Metz to Verdun of 164,000 men with the hors

vehicles belonging to them. He could also 

hend how to lead an attack with such an arm

should accept the battle should one be offered. 

with the difficulties of a retreat to Verdun, the 

St. Quentin (321 enticed him to stay at M

trusted that he could best oppose a victorious 

a superior enemy in a strong position, resting 

fortress. Should the enemy be repulsed, th

time to take the offensive or to march to Chalo

had to come to a decision, but at the end of 

might take was posted the death warrant o

He was awakened from endless doubts and s

ing by the report “Pont-a-Mousson is occupi

men (19th Division) .” The enemy was, con

the point of crossing the Moselle. 

cen)Mountain 4 km. west of Metz with a fort of th
Circumstances would show, once there, if it were 

to attack the isolated hostile columns and throw t

the Moselle, if the assembled army should conti

march to Verdun or lastly, if, resting against M

attack of the enemy should be awaited. The mo

the 14th was designated for the start. 

Bazaine could consider unmolested how to e

march to the left flank. A numerous stad was, it 

at his disposal. Yet all the mistakes, committed 

were ascribed to him personally, By his march or

had brought only confusion and evil. If the Marsha

but littIe about the editing of march orders, still he 

that he Fould do it better than the strategic assista

tailed to help him. 

The good advice, which was then withheld fro

was given to him later in profusion. Five roads: v

la Tour and Fresnes, via Conllans and Etain, via 

via Fentsch, and via Diedenhofen were open to him 

to disappear rapidly with his five corps. This wou

been a flight, which wouId have brought him eterna

and opprobrium, scattered his army to the four 

exposed it to separate defeats and brought it to 

in small units, only increasing the confusion at tha

With such advice, Bazaine was not served, s

considered a battle unavoidable and for this battle he 

his entire army united. He decided to use for the 

only the two southernmost roads via Mars la To

via Conflans, the one with three and the other w

corps. Unfortunately both roads formed but a sin

as far as Gravelotte. All five corps with their tra

all belonging to them, had to be started over this o

in one monstrous column. The impossibility of ex

this was soon apparent. In this perplexity, there w

covered another narrow, steep deeply cut road, whic

be used only to a very limited extent, leading via 

vile-Messy-Chatel St. Germain-MaImaison and 

ing into the road to Conflans. After long seeking, 
Mars La Tour, Doncourt, and Gravelotte, fo

of attacking, retreating, or defending itself. 

very Eth, the Second Army, which had to 

selle on the 13th, was to be expected south 

lotte-Mars la Tour road. A battle must be 

latest, on the 16th, the First Army being ab

in it effectively from the Moselle below Me

neither the one nor the other party appeared 

rendezvous. The Second Army did not co

reached the Moselle not on the 13th, but on 

French Army did not appear because it was 

the right bank of the Moselle. 

General von der Goltz had advanced with 

fantry Brigade ahead of the VII Corps to Laq

he received the report of the Cavalry at 

hdap77. French were on the point of evacuating the 

ny-Chieuilles, and of retreating across th

reahzed the necessity of detaining the ene

possible to give the delayed Second Army tim

Mot a moment was to be lost, as the II Corp

right2 as well as the IV Corps, forming the le

French position, had already disappeared, th

Fort Queuleu beyond the Seille, the other ac

of Chambiere beyond the Moselle, while the 

Corps, as well as the Guard Corps must ha

gun the march through the city had the cr

streets with vehicles not blocked their way. 

reported to his division commander and in

quarters of the I Corps, General von der G

3:30 PM with seven battalions, three squad

batteries on the march against the center 

position at Colombey. Vallieres Creek wa

village taken by the advance guard. Further 

ever, was checked by strong hostile forces d

opposite plateau. The III French Corps ha
right flank was later covered by Montaudons D

(lst), north of Grigy facing southwest. The Guard 

took up position west of Borny. Bazaine allowed this 

ment to be completed, but ordered that it be lim

defense, that no advance whatever should be mad

that the troops shouId withdraw as soon as it we

sible. 

Naturally, General von der Goltz’s Brigade co

do much against the great superiority. Only gra

hour by hour, did reinforcements come by all roads, 

stein’s Brigade (2d), of the I Corps from Maize

Montoy, Memerty”s half-brigade (3d), from Reton

Noisseville, lengthening the front from La Planch

Lauvalliere and thence to Nouilly. The 25th Brigad

via Coincy for the immediate reinforcement of v

G&z’s Brigade so that the entire 13th Division, su

by the corps artillery, occupied the space between L

chette and Colombey, while the 28th Brigade took 

the combat south of this point, the 27th south of Co

reserve, and only late in the evening the advance g

the 18th Division came up from Orny via Mercy le 

Grigy. This deployment, Iasting severa hours, w

awaited by the troops that had already arrived. 

newly arriving reinforcement gave rise to- a new 

to ever more energetic advance. The French we

pushed back in the center as far as Borny, on the w

far as Grigy and Bellecroix. It was impossible 

Germans to advance further. Their left wing was 

immediate vicinity of Fort Queuleu which was pre

from sweeping the front of the VII Army Corps w

guns only by the advent of darkness and by its own t

In the meanwhile, another combat developed m

the north. General Ladmirault, on hearing the thu

the guns, took the IV Corps back across the Mosell

ing one division near Fort St. JuIien and occupied 

mer position with two others, the position reaching fr
strip between Nouilly-Servigny, crush the r

wing, and roll up the entire battle line eng

combat. There was not sufficient infantry o

yet to meet the threatening attack. The pro

flank had to be entrusted to the artillery which 

up. A few batteries were placed at Poix and 

greater number on the heights on each side 

and orders were given to Memerty’s Brigade

just come up, to hold the ground at Nouilly at 

on the 4th Brigade, brought from Tennschen

Servigny, the 1st as far as NoisseviIEe and 

taken from Poix to the heights of Failly. All th

taken to escape a threatened surrounding mov

unnecessary. General Ladmirault had not 

MoselIe to attack the enemy or wreak evil u

wanted only to occupy his old position at 

1’0rme and to hold it for the purpose of prot

yet unfinished Fort St. Julien and to preven

from gaining the high right bank of the M

he could get a glimpse of the camp of the gr

the French army between Metz and Woippy

4th and 1st Brigades of the Prussian I Corps a

in the evening to undertake an attack agains

IV Corps, the combat of the two opposed 

would have been limited to an artillery due

newed attacks by a few companies against 

of Ladmirault’s strong position, had not be

repulsed, as might well have been expected. 

felt elated by such cheap successes, althoug

drew in the dark, and though these feelings 

shared by the soldiers. Troops, obliged to retre

after a bloody battle, feel not victorious, but d

courage of the Corps, which as yet was fre

heightened by the battle, but depressed. The 

forward to new encounters without confidence 
The success might have been far greater if ar

quarters, on hearing of the retreat of the enemy, 

forward the entire First Army and had occupied 

evening the position in which the French had be

in the morning. This would have resulted by it

decisive offensive across the Moselle below Metz

headquarters was, however, far from making su

ward movement. It had sent, on the contrary, du

battle, and finally in the evening, repeated orders 

the engagement and to return to the previous 

The commanding generals of the VII and I C

Zastrow and v.. Manteuffel) , found themselves u

obey. They could expose their troops to the los

difficult attack, but not to the greater ones of a 

The soldiers had to be strengthened in their conf

themselves and in their leaders, and not weakened

von Manteuffel let himself be pursuaded, howeve

treat in the night, while General von Zastrow r

ready for combat, in the positions taken during th

held the battlefield alone until morning, and left o

the French had disappeared from the right bank. 

Had the battle of Colombey-Nouilly brought 

ing else it would have at Ieast clearly shown the 

of a position as narrow as possible, as deep as poss

with reserves as strong a5 possible. Only weak 

guards could be detached from the narrow fron

support, detachments could be brought up only g

Absolute confidence had been placed on compresse

and it was found that this compelled attacks of s

sitions occupied by superior numbers to be made 

~detaehments and with the thinnest of lines. It h

discovered that the enemy, whom it was desired 

back, deployed on a wider front and threatened a 

envelopment, The reserve, whose problem it was 

such a danger and itself make such an envelopment, 

itself posted too far to the rear to be able to give 
Since the French withdrew to the west 

mans to the east, an ever widening space for

them, An order from Moltke was to put a

Map 76. unwholesome state, which would have sent th

back to the victoriousIy gained positions, a

parently, further beyond the Moselle. In th

the King had ridden forward with his suite. 

seen from the heights of Flanville, that the 

of Metz was free. On the other side, howeve

ley of the Moselle, around St. Quentin and u

toward Gravelotte, clouds of dust were rising. 

that the enemy was retreating by the road to 

head of the 100,000 men, who had fought th

at Colombey, might go one day’s march forwa

rear would still be in Metz in the evening an

go by before this column, and possibly those 

French Army which had gone before, woul

shift from the Moselle to the Meuse. The en

prevented from completing this march. He m

to stand and accept battle. The simplest and 

to this end was to send the First Army acros

below Metz and the Second above that city 

the protection against the eastern side of th

the IL Corps. This means had to be aband

First Army could not be entrusted, at least in t

with an absolutely separate and independe

Thus, the problem of pursuit fell to the share 

Army. Its right wing was to be followed 

(the VII and VIII) of the First Army. The 

entrusted with the observation of the eastern 

On the French side, on the 14th, the retrea

as we11 as was possible, in view of the general 

Map 78. to what should be done, the perplexity and d

roads which were overcrowded and in bad co

late in the night of the 15th, did the last units 

ing corps reach the objectives assigned them. 
Corps thence along the railroad as far as Woipp

on the l&h, they were to march as follows: Forton 

la Tour, du Barail to Doncourt, the II Corps to R

and as soon as the VI had reached the latter point

to Mars la Tour. The following had found their w

evacuated camps : the Guard to Longeville and Mo

III Corps to Plappeville and Devant Ies Ponts, t

Woippy and east as far as the Moselle. These th

had received orders to continue the march as soo

sible. The crowded condition of the roads as we

utter exhaustion of the troops kept them from 

Only the Guard could be taken in the evening to t

of Gravelotte, in rear of the VI Corps. Two division

III Corps succeeded in working through via Plapp

Verneville and La Folie. Two other divisions, a

the IV Corps remained in the valley of the Mosel

the night of the 16th. These five divisions had to b

before an offensive could be undertaken or the 

Verdun continued. The rear of the French army 

still at Metz and its head had come to a standstill 

had been anticipated. 

For days Holtke had urged the Second Army 

the mass of cavalry to the left bank of the Mosel

connaissance. Only Rheinbaben’s Division (5th C

and the 3d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard had 

response thereto, though late, utilized for this purp

remaining two and two thirds divisions were kep

that they could be on hand in the ultimate attac

hoped for battle on the Nied or in the vicinity of I

The patrols ascertained that the French c

tween Magny and Chieuilles had remained u

throughout the 13th. In confirmation of these r

German brought news from Metz that, up to the e

the 13th, no retreat of the French in a westerly 

had taken place. About noon on the 14th patro

the Metz-Verdun road at Vionville free of troops 
Rheinbaben received orders to advanee 

far as the Metz-Verdun road. After the d

flank detachments and of the covering de

of the 36 squadrons and one battery unde

Redern reached the vicinity of Mars la T

tery entered into an artillery duel with th

Forton’s Division. Redern gradually rece

ments attracted by the thunder of guns. W

reinforcements, he was going to attack the 

But before the attack could be executed, th

alry retired to Vionville. The II Corps thu

Rezonville and joined at this point the V

wing reached as far as St. Marcel, thus fo

mass, increased in the evening by the arrival 

Corps near Gravelotte. Naturally these pa

not be learned by the German cavalry, but it 

the strong hostile forces had stopped their 

Rezonville and east of the latter on the 

road, North of this road German patrols h

strong cavalry, not immediately followed by 

picture might have been completed if the F

ascertained by patrols on the left bank of 

low Metz or on the high right bank of the r

of the French army had remained in the 

Moselle between Metz, St. Quentin, and Pla

even without such reconnaissance, it was clea

that the French army, in its march to Verdu

vanced beyond Vionville and Malmaison. Its 

between these points and Metz. On the 16th 

ably again advance, extending to Mars la 

ther west; no great ehange, however, shou

Should part of the army have marched b

Briey, the French forces would thus only be 

the impending battle. 
sary to add in the evening of the 15th: The fruits 

victory (on the 14th) are to be harvested by 

offensive of the Second Army against the road fro

to Fresnes as well as from Etain to Verdun,” and 

“according to the present point of view the decisio

campaign rests in driving the main forces of the 

escaping from Metz, in a northerly direction.“’ 

There was, consequently, no doubt as to w

Second Army must do at noon on the 15th. The 

army, whose right wing stood today at Vionville, 

stand on the morrow at Mars la Tour or further w

was to be driven northward. For this purpose th

and perhaps also the so far unreconnoitered left w

to be turned, the one pushed away from Verdun, t

from Metz. In order to reach this goal, all availab

had to be used, all existing or to be established c

of the Moselle must be utilized. Of the six corps

was with its head at Peltre advancing to the battl

the 14th, the III was at Louvigny. The 20th Div

the X was at Pent-a-Mousson, the main body of 

Division at Thiaucourt, Lyncker’s half-brigade at 

The Guard Corps, at Dieulouard, had sent an 

guard as far as Les Quatre Vents, the IV Corps wa

vance on that day to Marbache, the XII to Nomey, 

Han on the Med. The further advance of the IX 

was to be via Corny and Ars to Gravelotte and W

of the III via Arry to Vionville, of the X, followed 

XII, from Thiaueourt at Mars la Tour, of the Gua

and the IV to Hannonville and Latour. The cor

at various distances from their objectives. In th

noon of the 15th the IX Corps could march to Co

III across the Moselle, the X beyond Thiaueourt, th

6orps to Flirey. On the IBth, three Corps could 

be brought against the enemy, the VII, VIII, XII, 

following as reserves. The reserves would not ha
was to advance by tine two roads leading 

Verdun. Where the enemy was on these r

ascertained by the cavalry as well as circumst

It is, however, wrong to think that r

from the cavalry are of a,ny importanee o

The higher leader generally makes himself 

friend and foe for whose delineation perso

the principal work. ShouId reports received 

these wishes, they are laid aside with eompfa

they contradict them, they are considered 

and justify the f?nal conclusion that the ca

more failed entirely. The Second Army, 

from the Saar to the Moselle, regarded its t

the enemy only as a secondary one. Its prin

to prepare itself for an unlikely attack by th

having arrived at the Moselle, the enemy c

escape and had to accept battle. The Second 

attention to him, taking heed only of anot

who was said to have escaped, in the greates

the Moselle to beyond the Meuse and who m

in order to be forced into a battle on the M

ports of the cavalry were considered absoIut

ing on imagination and on pessimistic views

the 14th had not been waged by a French 

three corps, eight divisions, 100,OQQ men, b

rear guard, which, after heroic resistance ag

forces has perhaps reached only Rezonville o

task of the Second Army is, consequently, a 

Meuse. 

For this purpose, the XII Gorps must 

&J&J 78. lkIousson on the 16th, its advance guard to R

Guard Corps to Berneeourt, its advance to 

the IV Corps to Les Sezerais, its advance 

Toul; the II to Buchy, the III and the X Corp

main Metz-Verdun road, and with this o
decisive battle. 

If only these two corps had at least been utiliz

jointly! Each however, follows its own promptings 

misleading “orientation” given it from army head

Of the X Army Corps Schwarzkoppen’s half divis

the 3d Guard Cavalry Brigade (Brandenburg) w

from Thiaueourt to St. Hilaire. Probably so that 

still catch a few stragglers. Half of Lehmann’s 

was to advance from Thiaucourt, Lyncker’s half 

from Noveant to Mars la Tour, the former to 

Rheinbaben, the latter to join Lehmann. Kraatz 

20th Division was to march from Pant-a-Mousson t

court and serve as a strategic reserve for the other

All these units, led by true soldiers and bra

though scattered to the four winds, were to find th

united on the battlefield. But this was not yet suf

wage a successful combat with the French arm

greatest merit for having fought one of the most 

battles of the century, belongs to General von Alve

and to the III Corps, commanded by him. Conv

the correctness of Moltke’s plan of anticipating th

on the left bank, the general had looked on with im

and doubt at the attempts, on the part of army h

ters to fight and win victories on the right of the 

“strategically offensive and tactically defensive” 

As soon as the report of the battle of CoIombey-N

had arrived, he did not allow himself to be kept b

longer and marched independently toward the 

Although he was again held back en route for some 

army headquarters, he still succeeded in carrying 

intention and stood in the evening of the 15th w

6th Division at Pagny and south of it to opposite C

with the 5th Division at Noveant on the left and 

6th Cavalry Division at Corny on the right bank 

Moselle so as to march early on the 16th with the tw
if repulsed by superior strength, to retir

Verdun, hoping that the X Army Corp

other parts of the Seeond Army, might 

a stand and force him to retreat to Metz

The III Corps was stil1 at the beginn

when the Chief of Staff of the X Corps, 

Caprivi, arrived at Rheinbaben’s Div

“Something ought to be done to ascertain 

alry was right in reporting that the 

Rezonvifle and Metz or, as army headqu

already on the Meuse.” The question co

a simpIe calculation: the enemy was stil

the 14th. Since noon of that day, no Fr

in the direction from Metz to Vionville, 

consequently, at least inasmuch as the m

used, be between the latter point and M

tion, however, was not considered as su

alone can give the desired information. 

vanced, brought his artillery into action 

airy camp at Vionville, where the men 

feeding and watering their horses, etc. 

were: disorderly retreat of Forton’s Divi

of the nearby trains, but also the deploy

of the infantry at Rezonville. The line: 

ville, was occupied by the 1st and 3d Divis

(VI Corps), Frossard’s 2d Division (II 

the line sauth of the road, while the 1s

passet’s Brigade turned south where H

Cavalry Division had shown themselves

4th Division remained at Rezonville, the 

lotte, Thus the III Corps found an alrea

in its front. The St,h Brigade, at the he

sion, had to fight its way from Gorze 

tasrOf Canrobert’s Corps only the lst, 3d, 

one regiment of the 2d had reached Metz. The 

from continuing the rail journey by the Germ
deployed from Sauley with the 12th Brigade on e

of the road to Vionville and with the llth farther 

After hours of fighting, Vionville, the height e

Flavigny, and the northern edge of the woods of V

and St. Arnould were taken. A weak point was 

the new French position where the front facing we

the front facing south and where an attack was 

from two sides. This was taken advantage of by 

Brigade, reinforced by Lyncker’s haIf brigade, and 

Brigade, opposing it, was driven in a northerly 

on Bastoul’s Brigade. As the other Prussian brig

tacked simultaneously, Frossard”s entire Corps (II) 

retreat in disorder. Cohn’s Brigade of the VI Corp

the retreat north of the road. 

In order to protect these two brigades from 

Canrobert had the other brigade of the 3d Divisio

nay’s, turn half left and ordered the 1st Division (T

advancing from St. Marcel, to join in the extensi

annihilating flank attack threatened the 24th Regim

one battalion of the 20th which, so far, had alone 

the weak Ieft flank north of the road to Verdun. B

Cavalry Brigade (three squadrons of the 7th Cu

and three of the 16th Uhlans) was thrown against 

tile troops along the old Roman road. The first line 

den down, the artillery line was pierced, the men an

cut down. The second line could not stop the 

cavalry. The batteries on the heights farther in r

bered up and fled. After a charge of 3000 paces 

French cavalry detachment opposed the exhausted 

The long road had to be covered once more. 

The results were: Bredow’s Brigade lost half 

bers, ten French batteries left the battlefield, Can

3d Division declined to take the offensive. It forme

now on the right wing of the position taken by Can

4th Division, by the Grenadier Division’ of the Gu

by Lapasset’s Brigade, cutting through the Roman 
defeated Corps. 

The front of this position, occupied b

haIf divisions, could not be attacked with 

cess and forces were lacking to turn it. Bu

against the two Prussian divisions would 

infantry and artillery fire and mostly by 

sistance of the leaders and troops. A mo

combat was continued by the artillery of 

the other hand the combat in the afternoo

Prussian left wing north of the Verdun r

ier’s Division (1st) of the VI Corps had 

Marcel at the old Roman road. To the 

Bruville, Leboeuf (I Corps) would come 

ville, as soon as he had assembled his three 

ther to the right, Ladmirault (IV Corps}

advancing since early morning with three 

Woippy via St. Privat and Amansvillers t

expected. Should these seven divisions adv

one beside the other, the III Corps, held 

a strong force, would be absolutely anni

X Corps would not suffice to stop for any m

broad flank attack. The French would win 

on the 16th and would have the choice 

victory on the following day or, at least, o

molested across the Meuse. 

However, two divisions, one of Leboeuf

one of Ladmirault’s (III) Corps deploye

their deep, compressed march columns. Th

were absent from the battle. The remainin

were sufficient to carry out the overpowering 

The weak left wing of the 6th Divisio

ier, had to be withdrawn north of the Ve

hill east of Vionville formed from then 

point in the line of battle. It ran thence t

Bois de Tronville, occupied by Lehmann’s ha
Leboeuf with his two divisions became but sligh

gaged in a fire fight. He had received orders in the m

among others, to ““hold strongly,” and, he would 

this order now where he should have quickly driv

weak enemy. Deep formation of his forces, keepi

strong reserves, seemed to him the best means to 

the powerful flanking attack and to cooperate in an

taking which was to decide the fate of the two arm

concentric attack of one part of Tixier’s Division 

Grenier’s s&iced however, to force Lehmann’s half 

to retreat. It gradually evacuated first the northe

then the southern part of the woods and retired 

ville which was prepared for obstinate resistanc

how long could this point be held situated as it wa

rear of the II Corps position? 

At this moment of danger the 20th Division (

appeared, It had started from Pont-a-Mousson 

morning, marched from Thiacourt to the sound 

cannon, detached a few battalions .to the sorely 

5th Division and arrived with nine battalions at T

after a march of 24 miles. The advance of two b

thence against the Bois de Tronville sufficed to brin

a change of the situation. Ladmirault saw himself 

ened in the front and believed himself menaced in t

flank by an ((army of infantry.” Grenier’s Divisi

taken back, Kraatz following into the Bois de Tron

long combat took place there. But the danger, wh

ier, Leboeuf, and Grenier had evoked with four 

seemed averted for the time being. 

1n the meanwhile, Cissey’s Division which ha

second place in Ladmirault’s marching column h

up. It received orders to attack the enemy in rear 

bring about the decision. The prospect of succes

the best. Should Cissey march west of the Bois 

ville, Grenier would be freed. Kraatz’s Division w

treat and should Leboeui and Tixier join, it would 
gade, the 16th and 57th Regiments). It h

morning from Thiaucourt to St. Hilaire 

sound of the cannon, to Mars la Tour. 

there to attack the right flank of the 

been indicated to it as such was probab

flank but not Cissey’s, hidden from sight 

it came upon the latter’s center. 

The long march, made in the fierc

gust day, had completely exhausted th

thirsty troops. But the cry “there is th

all trace of fatigue from the Westphalian

hearts, but resolute courage they advanc

perior enemy who had taken position o

ville in rear of a deep ravine. The att

for a short while in the ravine after whic

steep slope. At the upper edge rapid f

paces met them. They answered with 

lines, about six files deep, two immense 

tinually pierced by short streaks of ligh

ing noise and nothing to be seen until the 

drops alongside. Impossible to halt. 

sounds the order. The voice dies. But 

the leader brandishing the sabre, wavi

One man calls to the next. The line sto

now the overlapping wings of the enemy 

ward and pour infernal fire on flank and 

ing Germans. Back, what is left, back i

up the hill, ever pursued by the bullets 

tillery attempted to protect the fleeing troo

rons of the Dragoons 1st Regiment of th

against the enemy. They found a low s

they could approach unseen and fell o

But it was still too broad for the small c

and the foremost troopers broke the li

right into the midst .of bullets and bayone
gy 

8outhern edge of the ravine. The effect, produce

attacks, was too impressive. The French were 

,new and stronger enemies would renew the attac

they had luckily repulsed. “You can not make u

that your regiment would have attacked us with s

if it had no army corps in its rear,” was said the 

day to an officer of the 16th Regiment who had bee

ed and taken prisoner. Since he did not fee1 strong 

for the attack by another Wedell’s Brigade, La

found it advisable to take Cissey’s Division back 

ville and Doncourt, being followed by Grenier an

the still absent Division of Lorencez arrived at da

The audacious attacks of Wedell’s Brigade an

1st Dragoons of the Guard, though repulsed, deci

mirault to retreat and by this retreat, the battle 

cided in favor of the Prussians. 

A cavalry combat on the extreme left wing 

the Yron brook in which General van Barby with 

ments repulsed Legrand’s Division and France’s 

as well as the occupation of the Boise de Tron

Xraatz’s Division could not inerease this decision, 

confirm it. The French right wing, Ladmirault, 

and Tixier had evacuated the battlefield or kept 

appearances” sake, a gradually slackening rifle f

left wing still held the position at Rezonville. 

was too strong to be overpowered. But reinfor

were arriving. 

At the head of the VIII Corps was the 32d 

which had been joined voluntarily by the 11th Reg

the IX Corpsts4 and which had crossed the M

Corny in the afternoon, still wishing to reach th

field. The Division Commandert General von B

had his nine battalions deploy along the road to Go

of the Bois des Ognons intending to strike the f

(a4”TheIX Corps had subsequently received the order 

the III Corps and to cover it on the road to Metz. 
cess, to retreat, repulsed by the rapid fire o

serves. After three attempts and three failur

sians were forced to retreat to the heights 

north of the edge of the woods while the Fre

the heights north of the Maison Rlanche. 

The 25th Division had likewise erossed 

Corny. At its head, General von Wit&h w

Brigade (4 battalions, 4 squadrons, 3 batteries

Bois des Ognons, drove back a battalion of 

of the Guard, reached the northwestern edge 

thence his fire against the reserves retreatin

vihe. Further advance was barred by hostil

holding out in the eastern part of the woo

10 90 PM, was the battle ended at this point a

occupied in a clearing. 

This much had been accomplished, that 

which bad been assembled at Rezonville, marc

lotte and beyond in by no means an orderly w

road had been shown by which great succe

achieved and on which it might have been 

General von Barnekow been permitted to 

his nine battalions through the Bois des Og

the enemy’s line of retreat between Rezonville 

lotte, and had the 25th Division joined this a

east of the Mance ravine. The French woul

ably, have been driven in a northerly direction 

the frontier of Luxembourg and Belgium as 

Moltke. 

Such aims, however, were far from Prin

Charles who, on hearing that the III Corps 

in a serious battle, bad hurried to the batt

afternoon. EIe thought that he had an ind

before him. In order to win a victory, he o

eral attack in the evening, i.e., to do what 

had been attempting far 10 hours by straining 
y 

whieh had been assembled at dark and of two 

gades went to pieces in face of the rapid fire o

French battalions. Rad it succeeded, the en

have been driven back in the direction which he 

for the retreat. 

The order of the Prince was inspired by a 

feeling of proud courage, but caused the glori

end in a failure. That more had not been achie

bat must be attributed to the inferior numb

troops and neither to the leaders nor to lack 

Nothing, however, could change the result, lea

a frontal attaek with quite inadequate numbe

was every cause to be satisfied. What 60,000 

achieve against, 164,000, had been achieved in 

degree. It was sufficient that the inferior n

forced the superior ones to abandon all ofTenshe 

and to retire to more or less distant positions. 

to Verdun was thus rendered impossible an

mained only the choice of a retreat in a norther

or back to Metz, 

It can scarcely be said that the French pla

whether thaught out by Bazaine or imposed 

stanees themselves, wouEd have rendered the su

Germans easier. The intention of holding the 

in a strong position, of safeguarding the left fl

all envelopment, and of attacking with a very 

wing, was very promising of success. The 

, through the mode of execution and through the 

of Bazaine and his corps commanders that they 

them not a small force, but a vast superiority 

This was not overrating the enemy. Accord

exaggerated calculations the mass of the Ge

could and must be on the ground if not in the ea

then at least during the course of the day. T

suaded the French to take this view and belie

periority of the enemy is the great feat of G

.<a:.“; : .,<..I. ,, 
would have been annihilated without being 

by a great success for their sacrifice. Attack 

attack, recklessly and without consideration, 

unparalleled losses but had aiso brought v

may well. be said, the decision of the campaign

For, although the last repulsed attac

Bazaine a shadowy right to report officially: “

army, defeated at all points, retreated,” he 

secret thoughts by t,he words directed to his 

that “The French army must be saved.‘” 

army into safety across the Meuse was no lo

if the Germans, as was to be expected, shou

northerly direction. To act according to M

and to allow themselves to be driven to the B

embourg frontier, wouEd have been courting 

Nothing remained to do but what Bazaine 

continuation of his words, ““and therefore ret

This was salvation, at least for a time, during 

things might happen ; possibly a better del

that which might be vouchsafed by the junctio

of the beaten and pursued Army of the R

remnants of MacMahon’s troops and with the 

battalions, arriving from Paris. To go to Me

ly was not expedient since claim had just be

brilIiant victory and since the enemy was to

Ieft wing. A new battle, but one without pr

cess, must be fought. 

THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE-~T. P

The night of 16-17 August was passed b

Army as follows: the three divisions of the 

Doncourt, two divisions of the III and the 

Map “* CT’ixier) of the VI Corps between St. Marce

Bois, and the Romer Strasse, the remaining 

half divisions, two of the III and two of the 
pqy g

Qgnons aIong the northern edge of the Bois de 

half way between Rezonville on the one side, F

Vionville on the other side toward the Bois de 

which encompassed them on the north. In rear 

stood the 25th Division in the Bois des Ognons, 

on the Gorze-RezonviIIe road, the III Corps at 

the X at Tronville with a Aank guard against Mars 

In the night the IX Corps started to the heights 

Gorze, the XII, via Thiaucourt, the Guard Corps v

St. Benoit, and ChambIey to Mars la Tour. Im

in rear of the IX Corps the VII was to follow a

Moselle to Gravelotte, the VIII, leaving Gorze to 

to Rezonville. 

Bazaine believed that on the 17th he had bee

with the First and the Second German Armies 

certain that on the 17th, the Third Army would 

enemies. This assumption was not based on the im

of a mind which saw everything through black 

the three German armies might have been easily 

at that time between the Moselle and the Meuse

keeping only to the undisputabIe facts, that th

army had retreated on the 16th, that the enemy s

opposite, and that the reinforcements from th

were advancing, Bazaine was forced to believe th

facing a superiority, if not in numbers, at lea

ciency. It may thus be easily understood that h

wish to attack. This had not succeeded on the 

would have been a complete failure on the 17th

not want to remain stationary, for he had to e

he wouid be surrounded on the right and Ieft a

back in a northwesterly direction. He could no

army to the right in order to march in a too le

umn along the hostile front via Conflans to Ver

the left via Gravelotte to Metz. He would soon 

halted and would have found himself in the same 

as before. 
siderably shortened. Nevertheless they wou

long that, to avoid being attacked by the enem

have to start on the march in the evenmg of t

however, was not possible. The troops, with 

of the XV Corps which had maintained its s

most disbanded, greatly mixed up and all in 

and discouraged spirits of a defeated army. 

narrow columns in the night or even in the m

l?th, for the retreat over the Orne, out of 

crowd, was impossible. Should this, howeve

during the day, it would result in an imme

partly via Conflan s, and bring about the d

French to the Belgian and Luxembourg fro

sired by Moltke. Even if the pursuit were b

peated rearguard actions would have taken p

would have been no sense in taking the dis

shaken army on a retreat, resembling a fligh

ing it entirely, on the long detour to Chalon

join there MaeMahon’s remnants of troops, 

Germans would have appeared at that point 

road almost simultaneously, to give a decisive 

prospect was not consoling to Bazaine. It 

take the left wing out of the threatening turnin

from Rezonvilie via Gravelotte to behind th

vine and to execute from the front: Gravelott

a face to the rear toward the Moselle. On 

of the Mance and west of the ravine was an 

position” where an attack eouEd be awaited 

without any fear, After this had been ac

would be possible, after another face to the 

the Metz fortifications and enjoy the well 

The attempt to make the double facing at on

have brought a complete dissolution of the a

had to be made in the strong position and a 

This was the least that could be demanded f
repulsed and annihilated enemy. Thus read the o

tentions. As a matter of fact, the retreat to M

fully decided, if not earlier, at least in the evenin

16th. This retreat must lead in any event to a 

downfall. 

In 1757, more than one hundred years ea

Austrian Army under Prince Charles of Lorraine, 

bloody battle had been thrown back to Prague and 

The information caused great terror in Vienna

eIoser investigtition of the circumstances, it was r

that this investment was of greater advantage th

treat bordering on flight. Prince Charles was i

to undertake attempts at breaking through th

without, however, allowing them to succeed. Si

were sufficient provisions, Prince Charles was to 

Prague and keep the greater part of the Prussian 

front of this fortress. 

It was hoped that sufficient troops could be a

against the rest. The battle of Kolin showed the 

ness of this speculation. 

The state of affairs in 18’70 was somewhat 

from that of 1757, The energy of a Maria Theresa 

felt in Paris, nor was there at the head of a re

the wisely calculating Count Daun and, instead o

Prussian battalions which bled to death at Kol

wouId still remain, after the investment of Metz, 

field army of 250,000 men. But, since a French a

be invested in a fortress, there arose therefrom c

not very different from those of 1757, to take adv

which there was no one to compete with Moltke. 

The critique of the war was just in maintain

it would have been best for Bazaine to beat with hi

men the 450,000 of the German army. Since he, 

did not feel able to solve this problem and since h

wish to be driven to the Belgian and Luxemburg 

or be received at Chalons as a completely defeate
position1 Hardly, should the enemy advance 

ing morning. A panic, a sudden flight, so tho

might occur. Fortunately, the dreaded enemy 

throughout the entire day of the 17th and 

mained ‘“to save the army.” 

One Guard Division and the II Corps 

the 25th German Division through Gravelot

division of the Guard and the III Corps via M

IV via Verneville to the ridge the other side 

MaP &L The VI Corps was to follow as a rearguard 

Sinee there was no adequate position to be f

was sent to the right wing. The entire movem

difficult, the regiments had first to reform, 

gades, and lastly, the divisions. The separa

umns had to cross each other in the most vari

Night had come long since when the last t

their objective, only 10 km. distant, but w

molested in any way by the enemy. On the 

there stood : the VI Corps on a ridge betw

and hill 321, some 1000 m. south of St. Privat; 

hill 322 north of the railway to Montigny la 

III joining on the left to the bend in the ro

Hubert; the II thence to Rozerieulles, Lapas

at Jussy and Ste. Ruffine, the Guard Corps at 

Bazaine had succeeded, not only in with

army from a very serious situation, but also 

in position whence he could give the enemy a 

probIem to solve. 

MoItke’s first thought, upon receiving in

Map 81. the events of the 16th, was renewed attack 

On both wings the nearby line of retreat, vi

Verdun or via Gravelotte to Metz, must be re

defeated enemy driven to Briey or Diedenhofe

intentions were decidedIy opposed by headqu

Second Army whose reckless enterprising s
It would be serious enough should they be forced 

themselves. Anything that might “entice” the 

an attack, should be avoided. 

This could scarcely have been the view of G

Alvensleben. His aim on the 16th was to hold 

whom he had attacked, until other troops ca

annihilate him. He was wihing to undertake 

step by step, even to Verdun, should this be neces

on the l’ith, he would not have feared a retreat

knew that the Guard and XII Corps were advanc

side and the VII, VIII, and IX Corps on the oth

purpose of transforming the pursuit into a decis

Such reasons, however, were not considered. 

tastic ideas of the old Hotspur could not preva

the objections of army headquarters and repre

of experienced and sensible generals, like Goeb

must see that his plan would crumble if those 

have to execute it should refuse to support it an

to the King to delay the attack until the 18th. 

At 1:45 PM, the following orders were iss

Second Army will start tomorrow the 18th, at 

and advance, in echelons from the left wing b

Yron and Gorze brooks (in general between VilIe 

and Rezonville) . The VIII Army Corps will 

movement on the left wing of the Second Army. 

Corps will, in the beginning, secure the general 

of the Second Army against possible attacks from 

tion of Metz.” 

The limits, set for the advance, Yron and Go

had already been passed westward, since the left 

of the Second Army had been directed on Hann

was found advisable to adopt this small widen

space, much too smaI1 for the six corps, and t

earIy as the 17th, the echeloning of the troops 

from the line: Gorze-Hannonville. Every gen
for instance, whether the enemy had not sta

the 17th on a retreat with the IV Corps vi

shouId t.he cavalry bring information as to w

at noon, in the afternoon, or in the evening, 

be too far off to take advantage of the situ

18th so as to drive the enemy toward the fron

embourg and Belgium as desired by lMoltke. 

quently, necessary to advance with the six 

flans-Rezonvihe, on the 17th. Then the righ

directly follow the enemy retreating via Bri

left would follow in a turning movement in th

Longuyon-Montmedy-Stenay, 

Early on the 17th, the III and X Corps w

a condition to attack. It was necessary first to 

in the thinned units, bring up ammunition, a

for the batteries. But toward noon, when 

the enemy could no longer be doubted, a short 

have been undertaken for the purpose of spar

the view of the battlefield and to give the 

water, of which there was none on the platea

and Vionville. It might also have been pos

farther objective to the corps then coming u

the efforts required of the troops today would 

tomorrow in battle. It was strictly within 

possibility for the troops to reach the foElow

Map 82. the 17th : the Guard Corps, Confians via Ha

XII, Jarny via Mars la Tour; the X, Bronville 

ville ; the III, St. Marcel from Vionville ; the 

from Gorze ; the VIII, Rezonville from east 

VII, the northern edge of the Bois des Ognon

de Vaux via Ars; the 5th, 6th, and 12th Cava

past the Guard and the XII Corps, Briey an

would then have been Iearned: the enemy ha

the Orne, but was standing in superior forc

&lance ravine, east of Gravelotte. Should 
, 

between those roads with the entire army in his 

The French Army would, consequently, if it 

ready done so, occupy a position on the ridge 

Mance ravine and the Momveau ravine, what

have been its previous intentions. Its left w

hold the heights at Point du Jour and Rozerieu

far the right extended was not known, because 

of the 17th not all the troops had reached th

signed them and because the wings of a positio

variable quantities. Whoever did not know this 

tary history, could have learned it on the 16

morning of tha,t day the French right wing h

certained to be at Rezonville. In the afterno

found to be at Mars la Tour, with the cavalry 

west beyond the Yron brook. On the 18th the F

wing stood at Roncourt. In order to ascertain th

not have sufficed to find St. Privat and Roncour

It had likewise to be ascertained that Montois 

cupied and that no echelon had been.left at 

Had the eavalry found all this out, a rather d

the morning of the 18th, still it could not gua

these points would not be occupied during the d

To be prepared for all eventualities, the G

to assume: that the entire French Army of 1

is in position on the heights east of the Manee 

Ste. Ruffine to the Orne near Montois and has 

oppose obstinate resistance. Should this be ove

opponent, all the better for the attacker. Ac

this supposition and in conformity with Molt

the Guard Corps would advance on the 18th from 

to Briey and Moyeuvre la Grande, the XII C

Jarny along the Orne via Auboue to Montois, t

Bruville via Graumont to Ste. Marie, the III from 

via Doncourt, Jouaville, Batilly, St. Ail, and via 

to St. Privat, the IX via Calure and Verneville 
the army was so extended, and the left wing 

if necessary, advance still farther to the n

turning and surrounding of the enemy coul

complished. This turning movement had to 

by the Guard, the 5th, 6th, and 12th Cav

which hurried forward to the left on both 

Orne ahead of the infantry, and by the 1st 

were to cut off Metz, and, if necessary take 

road to Verdun at Ste. Ruffine and Noulins. 

Each corps, in advancing, had to march 

This formation had been forced upon them 

from the Rhine to the Saar and from the Saa

through lack of available roads. At the pr

close to the enemy, it was necessary that 

corps, but each division and brigade form se

which could march abreast of one another, 

roads, at greater or smaller intervals, over 

as to deploy into battle formation without los

necessity arose. Since the enemy extended 

only as far as Roncourt, he could be overtake

by two to three corps. These should have ma

the X via Montois to Marengo, the XII via 

Marengo, and the Guard to Semecourt, 

woippy, 

It was not probable that the enemy wo

impregnable position up to the last man,, 

surrounding movement be developed. He w

treat via Saulny, Lorry, and Chatel St. G

would be all the more difficult for him, sho

of the German right wing, as well as that 

violent. 

Considerable marches were necessary fo

of this plan. These might have been spare

the First Army had crossed the Moselle b

the l&h, 16th and 12th. They were greatly 
breaking up and reaching Caulre with the IX C

Jarny with the XII. And the Guard Corps, marching 

the XII, had not yet reached Doncourt, in complian

an order of army headquarters. 

A decision had to be made. Certainty of vic

until then in a strong left wing by which the host

wing could be overlapped, no matter how extensive 

be. Army headquarters rendered this doubtful 

ing the HI and X Corps, as well as the cavalry d

according to the Napoleonic model, as reserves in 

the center, thus barring them from all useful act

the left wing, which, according to Moltke’s pIan, mu

about the decision, was thus shortened by as man

In order to preserve, if not the assurance, at least t

ability of a victory the four corps-the VIEI, IX, th

and the XII-must fill up the space between the 

Verdun road and the Orne in the hope that the hos

wing would not reach to that river. Since the m

Gravelotte and Malmaison fell to the share of 

Corps, the Second Army should have gone with the 

from Caulre to Verneville and Anvilhrs, one Gu

sion from Doneourt via Jouaville and Habonville 

Privat, the other via Batilly and Ste. Marie to R

the XII along the Borne via Coinville and Auboue to 

and Malancourt. This march would have fulfilled 

order of echeloning on the left and of the turn to 

by the right and would have forced the right Fren

to retreat in two or three hours. 

Deceived by whatsoever reports, observations 

lations, Moltke assumed the hostile right wing 

Montigny la Grange, while Army headquarters th

at la Folie. ft was practically impossible to place 

of 150,000 men between Point du Jour and la Fol

a rearguard could be in this narrow space. Pn 

drive back the latter, the intended direction of m

the Second Army could be adhered to. Royal Head
Corps to attack the right flank and to march

pose, the former from Caulre, the latter from 

Vernevihe, Assembled there at one point, w

sibility of deploying, they were probably 

achieve decision in the rearguard combat b

of their mass.” The XII Corps was to fohow 

It took that direction with one division, but w

with the other on the right bank of the Orne

The commanding general of the IX Co

stein, had marched since crossing of the Rh

other troops and ever and anon had to occu

Map 34. sitions. As late as the 16th, he had been p

the First Army from the Moselle crossing a

Only by hearsay did he know anything of v

others won far away. At last he was at the 

eagerness to take his part in combat and 

army headquarters had said that the enemy 

ing partly to Metz and partly to the northw

was to be lost, When he arrived breathless 

ride, on the height west of Verneville and 

his glass the white tents of a French Camp 

Grange, he exclaimed with pleasure : “All ar

the road is not yet open for them; they are 

was in fact the enemy retreating to Briey, 

was to be reached, if at all. Whatever was 

had already escaped the attack unless the G

Corps had reached them in time. The IX C

tack, hold, and annihilate as quickly as poss

who had fallen into its clutches. The two 

battalions of the 18th Division were left on 

Folie assigned them, the artihery of the divis

corps was hastily sent to take up positions 

from right to left on the ridge sloping dow

villers to Verneville, batteries, whose tired h

gallop and were rewarded with hard words. 
“Assailed from the front, from the left, and from 

not only by violent shell, shrapnel, and mitraille

but by a murderous, rapid rifle fire, the artillery 

enormous losses from the very start.” 

The two advance guard battalions, reinforced 

companies, were entirely occupied at Chantrenn

right wing of the French III Corps and could giv

assistance to the hard pressed artillery as the six 

at Verneville, still engaged in deploying, while 

talions placed in the eastern part of the Bois d

could not do much more. It seemed that only 

pressure forward would suffice to crush the meage

forces by an all annihilating superiority. Still 

manding general wanted to hold out and continu

tillery combat as well as could be done until t

should appear on his left. Then the attack w

place exactly as army headquarters had ordere

that the extended front would be attacked not o

VIII Corps, but by the 18th Division also, the fla

25th Division, called up from a position in rese

Bois de la Cusse, and by the Guard Corps. It was

impossible to continue the artillery combat until 

tion of these plans, A French skirmish line, co

far by a ridge, came forward. Four guns were 

rest of the Corps artillery was saved, in spite o

men and horses, through the sacrifice of one batta

since the French did not pursue their success an

advance, practically nothing was changed in th

situation. The eleven advance guard comp

Chantrenne covered the right flank against the 

sion (Montaudon) of the III Corps. West of Ch

four batteries fought against seventeen French 

at Montigny and Amanvillers. On the left the 

vision and three battalions of the 18th served 

cellent bullet stop in the Bois de la Cusse. Th
-- 

de la Cusse, partly at Verneville, in readine

with the Guard for the decisive attack. 

The latter, upon receiving information t

right wing was not at la Folie, but north o

had marched to Habonville instead of Vern

the 1st Guard Division reached that point, 

General von Pape, found these reports c

the hostile front was not at Amanvillers, b

yond St. Privat to Ste. Marie. The most 

for the division would have been to prolong 

the X Corps, to deploy between the Bois de 

St. Ail and then to attack the enemy betw

and Ste. Marie with artillery. Had the 2d G

then turned to the left and surrounded St

the west, the XII Corps could have marche

that village, but against Coinville and Aubo

easily attacked the enemy’s rear and thus dec

General von Pape, however, believed G

vensleben’s assertion that the effect of the 

the mitrailleuse had been materially underr

attack against a French front was very diff

it was necessary to maneuver. The genera1 

low this excellent advice most faithfully, tu

keep marching via Montois and MaIancourt 

French in rear. 

He, therefore, led the division into the rav

from north of Habonville to Auboue so as to 

toward Montois. The French would not ha

ever. They advanced with skirmish lines 

St. Privat to St. Ail-IIabonvilIe. To cover t

eral von Pape sent first, the divisional artil

corps artillery between HabonvilIe and St. 

Privat and his four advance guard battalion

against the weakIy occupied Ste. warie. 

The nine batteries of the Guard artille

adequate to cope with the French artillery 
field, but nevertheless they held them at a great 

and, after hours of cannonading, achieved only 

vantage of making the enemy expend his already 

supply of ammunition. 

In the meanwhile, the 1st Guard Division sho

continued its turning movement, at least until it 

tack Ste. Marie from the west and northwest, w

advance guard attacked it from the south. Had 

ceeded, the division would have stood ready for 

attack on the right wing of the French position 

Roncourt and St. Privat, while the 2d Guard Divisio

ing up, would have been ready to make an atta

St. Privat to the railroad north of Amanvillers. Th

hostile front between Roneourt and Montigny la 

could have been attacked, and the XII Corps co

proceeded, unmolested with the decisive envelopin

ment via Coinville and Auboue, Montois, and Malan

This simple development, conforming to Mol

der, was spoiled by army headquarters, which assi

3d Guard Infantry Brigade to the IX Corps and thu

ly weakened the attack against the front south of 

vat; also by headquarters of the Guard Corps wh

the enveloping movement of the 1st Guard Division 

west of Ste. Marie, and by General v. Pape, who, 

litical considerations,‘” begged the 47th Brigade 

hors 2d Saxon Division for support in the attack 

Ste. Marie, although he had twelve battalions of 

The attack undertaken from the south and the w

pared by the Saxon batteries and two batteries of th

succeeded in the first assault. Rut a timeIy depIoy

the 1st Division of the Guard was prevented and t

wing of the XII Corps had gone too far south for t

ing movement. 

The French battalions, driven out of Ste. Mar

reinforced by troops from the St. PrivaLRoneourt 

but both were repulsed by the advance guard of 
The 45th Brigade in the woods of Aubo

the left wing, the 47th Brigade northwest 

the right wing, of the XII Corps. Between 

sembled the Saxon batteries, two infantry 

still on the march. The infantry of the 1st 

was in and around Ste. Marie, the 4th B

sembled at St. Ail. The batteries of the 

position between St. Ail and Habonville. 

that they had silenced the French batteries. 

latter had only ceased firing in order to ke

ammunition for the decisive moment. 

The deployment had shifted entirely. T

did not stand any more before the front 

(1 km. southwest of St. Privat) to Roncourt

could no longer envelop the hostile position, 

gades of the Guard and the XII Corps assem

against the strong front. The Crown Pri

saw for himself that his left wing (45th B

rected straight from the west against the se

ly occupied Roncourt. He wanted to corre

and sent orders to the 48th Brigade, coming 

to advance via Auboue and Montois to Ronc

of little avaiL An army of 150,000 men, o

fensive position, would have sufficient rese

the attack of one brigade against one of h

court, moreover, fronted the flank attack 

come from Montois. Not much was needed t

between the village and the quarries of 

effective flanking attack should have exten

least via Mallaneourt, and required more t

brigade. As matters stood, the Guard Corp

Hill 321-St. Privat, the XIX Corps to mak

tack on the position between that point and 

hand of a leader was needed to restore orde

ment which had wandered from its way. 
would have assembled all available forces on right a

and advanced with an all-encircling left wing. Molt

he been on the spot, would have had the Guard C

ployed between the woods of Auboue and St. Ail, 

have replaced the infantry lacking on the right 

artillery Iaeking on the left, by troops of the X 

and brought back the XII Corps to the roads of 

and Malancourt, designated for it in the beginnin

three of these generals have conquered or wished to 

by outflanking. 

Second Army headquarters held to the end, the 

that the enemy wanted to retreat via Briey. W

been seen of him at Amanvillers, St. Privat, and R

were evidently echelons of the great retreating arm

ing for a long rest in order to gather strength for 

ried march ahead of them. It would be sufficient 

them in their march. It was scarcely necessary 

them back to Metz in disorder and confusion, or to c

off entirely from the fortress. Should the individual 

ing echelons want to remain at their halting points, a 

attack would be sufficient to force them, in their we

to resume their march. Apprehension was caused 

the main forces, with which the IX Corps had app

come in contact, as these were strong enough to 

to break through. This was the point where the 

should have been sent. The 3d Guard Infantry 

and the III Corps were ordered up for support or 

as reserves. The X Corps was also to foIIow to the 

vous of the great decision, but was held back. T

measures was limited the leadership of army headq

after the purpose of striking with a powerful attack 

order by two corps, the hostiIe flank at la Folie, h

to naught. What should be done on the left wing 

to the discretion of corps, division, even of brigad

manders, who, without agreement as to purpose 

jective, would hinder rather than support each othe
that he would start at 5:00 PM to attack R

an hour had passed and nothing was to 

Saxons at Montois. They would march un

take Roncourt before the Guard had started

time to attack St. Privat. The French a

ported by Prince Hohenlohe, was silenced. 

thought to be seen moving from St. Privat t

It was evident that the weakly occupied S

being evacuated. If the Guard should not ge

the ripe fruit, the Saxons would do it and t

Corps whose duty it was to undertake the 

problem. Permission was obtained from a

ters to attack immediately. The 1st Guard 

to advance north and the 2d south of the main 

against St. Privat. 

The latter (five battalions of the 4th Brig

at St. Ail and started immediately. The 

French skirmishers was to keep out of th

needle gun fire, to retreat if necessary, but 

the approaching German infantry rapid fire 

range chassepots. The pIan was somewhat 

artillery of the 1st Guard Division which d

at least partly, against the hostile skirmish

latter were retreating. Nevertheless, the lo

Brigade, advancing in deep formation with 

in the first line for prolonged combat, were 

The simple men with narrow minds could n

that they somehow served King and country b

selves be kihed in the second or third line. 

not harm Germany if, before being stricken w

death of honor on the field, they should strik

of the hereditary enemies. 

They did not want ta die in vain and r

to form a single long line of skirmishers. T

cient space between the highroad and the B

and the chassepots took good care that it 
Konigin Regiment (4th Grenadiers of the Guard) 

battalion of the Alexander (1st Grenadiers of the 

It was the endeavor of Count Waldersee, Comm

the Konigin Regiment, to encircle the enemy in the 

position on the ridge between St. Privat and Hill 3

the right. The attack succeeded with the aid o

tillery. Hi11 321 was won by an assault according 

lations. The greatly superior enemy retired partl

Privat, partly in an easterly direction. 

Soon, however, things were stirring everywher

the southeast another enemy approached for a c

tack. General Cissey (1st Division of the IV Co

left only his foremost line opposite the 25th Divis

advanced with the remaining troops against Hill 32

masses could not be withstood by the thin line of s

ers, exhausted by the combat for the occupied 

Captain von Prittwitz climbed with his battery up 

slope into the line of skirmishers and, though on

guns could fire at 600 meters a few well aimed shot

to bring the advancing columns to a halt. The gu

had remained behind and the other batteries of 

Guard Division hurried up and their fire succeeded 

ing the reserves and Cissey’s Division to retreat, 

mer to Marengo, the latter to Hill 322. The batte

the Alexander Battalion, covered the right flank fr

on. The greater part of the Konigin regiment t

St. Privat and drove the enemy from Hill 328 with 

of the Franz half battalion. It was impossible 

weak forces to take St. Privat from the south. T

rounded in a semicireIe the southwest slope and H

The two and one half battalions of the Franz R

forming the left wing of the 4th Guard Brigade, 

straight on St. Privat and came into the hottest 

the village which was enveloped in a white cloud o

smoke. They sought refuge in the deep ditches an

the trees of the highroad, There they massed 
Division of the Guard north of the highroad. 

had no artillery, no shot had as yet falIen 

and it was impossible to defeat the enemy 

range needle gun. ColoneI von der Becke, 

dentally there, proposed to bring the artil

Corps up in twenty minutes. He was told 

no more time for this and that artihery was 

sary, as the artillery of the Guard Corps h

hour ago the hostile guns and the enemy wa

uating the position. General von Pape was 

Prince of Wurttemberg to hurry the attac

ways so SIOW.” General von Dannenberg, 

gave him as objective the highest houses 

exactly like the point of direction shown i

neuvers-the church tower of Templehof or B

it was no brigade maneuvering, but an at.ta

tion: St. Privat-Roncourt, which must be 

its entire extent, if it were not desired to 

Corps. Should only the point of the Ieft win

the hostile right wing would turn left and sw

ing column with flanking fire, or, at Ieast, wi

while there would be a sufficient frontal fire 

In order to start the ordered attack, it w

simplest to advance with the advance guard 

from Ste. Marie along the highroad, with t

Guard Regiments, standing in and west of t

march to the left with the 1st Brigade of t

the Guard, standing southwest of this point, 

of it follow in echelons, should this be necess

(the corps artillery of the X Corps, that of 

Division and 47th Brigade) could still be h

fire on St. Privat but aIso on the line of skirm

help the infantry to cross the entire spac

would be exposed to the chassepots without 

use the needle gun. General von Pape eared 

ing about such a deployment. The advance g
It had stood under cover in the ravine of Ho

but was taken out and sent, so that everything s

prettily put together, to the heights into the Ion

fire of the chassepots and guns. The men lay fla

ground, and suffered great Iosses. Like salvation 

insufferable situation, after two hours of standi

came the orders to rise, advance, and turn to the ri

an enduring attack there advanced from the dep

thin line of skirmishers, four company columns, 

battalions, four half battalions of the second, two b

of the third line, As soon as the eastern end of St

had been reached, the deep ditches along the highro

crossed facing halfway to the left, even entirely to 

and, in order not to get in rear of the 4th Brigad

more marching was done after which they turned 

talions and companies to the right. It was soon 

that the tallest houses of St. Privat did not suffic

jectives of attack. The brigade was forced to depIoy 

the long line of white smoke, extending from S

to Roncourt. 

The losses which were comparatively small du

two hours’ halt, increased as soon as the brigade 

on the march and reached an awful number at th

ing of the highroad, hardly decreasing during t

march. A monstrous cloud of dust surrounded t

column into which a ceaseless rapid fire was pour

the right, shells smashing into it, while small wh

hurled their contents on the parading soldiers of t

dam pleasaunce, marching undisturbed by the terrors 

at them in unchanging cadence “right, left, righ

Were it only possible to save enough out of this f

able to start the combat with the needle gun. Gen

Kessel, the Brigade Commander called continuousl

ward, forward” ; and “forward Y’ beat the drum

ward)’ sounded the bugles, and forward went the 
strength had reaehed that point. The 2d G

Map 86. had advanced to the most dangerous zone, in

tween the highroad and the right wing of t

The 4th Regiment of the Guard was to p

wing. One battalion of the Alexander 

Konigin and Franz Regiments, the Zd, 3

Guard Regiments formed something Iike a 

mishers, reaching from the left wing of the 

far as Roncourt. This village also was ta

treme left wing (two companies of the 1st G

1st Company of the Guard Pioneers, and 

battalion of the 3d Guard Regiment). 

from hill 321 to Roneourt was in the hand

The troops were not formed entirely acc

they were very much mixed up among eac

were great gaps here and there. Only a fe

echelons were in rear. 

The enemy was already shaken by th

16th and lost confidence in himself and in h

cleverly elaborated plan to annihilate the e

less rapid fire before he could approach suff

use of his inferior weapon, had failed. N

chassepot were now of equal power, the fo

superior in the hands of experienced men

could not be opposed for any length of time

had scarcely any ammunition left. The in

began to feel the consequences of ceaseless 

man after the other had exhausted his supp

and Ieft the trenches. Marshal Canrobert 

it possible to hold the position long under the 

the report that new masses were advancing 

and the woods of Auboue, accelerated his 

treat was ordered. St. Privat alone, with 

to the right along the road to Chateau Jaum

held by a strong rearguard. Two battalions 
high walls between gardens a,nd fields in front o

and trenches in all the gaps, formed an impregnab

tress. The attack was brought to a halt a few 

meters in front of it and was transformed into a f

between the covered and uncovered sharpshooters

St. Privat would be invested as soon as the two 

wings should advance. But the Guard was no long

to do it after the terrible losses suffered. Howeve

reinforcements were coming up. The XII Corps a

from the left from Auboue, on the right stood the IX 

at St. Ail. By the retreat of the one enemy to St

and Marengo and of the other to Hill 322 a great 

formed near the railway line in the French order o

The X Corps could penetrate here, break through, 

one enemy to the north toward the XII Corps and th

to the south. Unfortunately, the X Corps had bee

nated only as reserve, and as such was not to be u

the purpose of converting a doubtful victory into 

but to be kept untouched and unscathed by all the 

and vicissitudes of battle! Thus all hope had to b

on the XII Corps. 

It had supported in the beginning with a few 

the advance of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. Af

the 47th Brigade advanced into the woods of Au

rear of the 45th, and the 46th in rear of the 47t

48th advanced but slowly over the dusty limestone h

from Auboue and Montois. In rear of this village d

this brigade, joined the likewise deployed 45th Briga

fired against Roncourt which was already occupied 

Guard. 

An orderly officer of General von Pape’s staff 

the XII Corps to request the support of the batte

the 1st Guard Brigade. Through his initiative, 

five and one half battalions of the leading brigades 

to St. Privat. The rest continued the march to Ro

But the rear brigades and the mass of the artille
together with the Guard before the stron

Privat, The much smaller part turned to 

flanking attack, relieving the Guard which w

it, and saw itself, t.o its great surprise, op

by an enemy who had advanced north of th

Jaumont road, but aIso threatened on its 

the woods and quarries of Jaumont. Instea

ing, it was itself outflanked and was too wea

this flank attack alone. 

From the highroad to the wood of Jaum

faced each other. On the right was one 

curved forward, on the left, the other wa

ward, holding the southern part of St. Pr

the latter, the few companies of the Konig

Regiments could do nothing. 

St. Privat had been bombarded for so

artillery of the Guard and XII Corps. Fi

out at several points. The situation of the 

talions was growing intolerable. Many troo

lage. It would not be possible to hold ou

and, should the enemy come up from right 

garrison would be lost. Canrobert ordered 

treat beginning from the south and the we

flames, breaking over St. Privat, seemed like 

ing the storm. The companies of the Koni

Regiments first followed the beacon and cha

weakIy defended south side of the village. 

of the Franz Regiment stationed on the h

not stay behind but rushed up from the we

tachments up the exit leading toward Mareng

ern part of the village fell into the hands o

The northern .part, cut off. from the highr

longer be held alone. General von Pape had 

rapid advance given. From the heaps of 

the few whom the bullets had spared. All, 

Saxons, stormed forward. The western fr
fenders. Only when the last, obstinately defende

had been surrounded on all sides, did the desp

fenders cease fighting. Numerous captives were ta

under cover of these fights, the VI Corps succeed

treating almost unscathed and unmolested. 

The moment seemed ripe to send in the reserv

20th Division had started from St. Ail. Ignoran

condition of affairs, it wanted to advance in a north

direction in order to deliver via. Roncourt the deci

against flank and rear. But events changed the 

the division toward St. Privat. One brigade 

through the viIlage, and took over the outposts w

been thrown forward on the heights of Marengo 

the retreated enemy. In the meanwhile the entire 

had come up; the Hessian batteries on the righ

Bois de la Cusse, north of the railway. They we

by all the Guard ba,tteries with a few of the X 

the Ympregnable” position south of St. Privat. 

of the village followed a few Prussian and all th

batteries as far as the quarries of Jaumont. Th

monstrous artillery line which naught could have 

had it been formed earlier. Now it did scarcely a

t.o the enemy, and only damaged its own advanced 

while it was most effectively answered by the Fren

reserve batteries, located in the quarries of Jaumon

had found a convenient mark in the burning and i

ing St. Privat. 

Almost 250 guns firing in one line form an 

spectacle and finale for an attack which, executed 

army corps against front and flanks, should h

crushing and annihilating, but which, undertaken 

brigades (one of which had no artillery whatever) 

against the front of the strongest point of the ver

position, gave no results, in spite of all subsequ

forcements, further than to accelerate by a few h

retreat which the enemy had already decided upo
failures of the leaders and the superiority of t

numbers and arms, reached their objective, 

victory that it placed the German army for a 

the head of all European hosts. This was t

success of St. Privat. The other which forced 

VI Corps, but the entire French Army to with

its “impregnable” position, is not to be so high

The situation of the IX Corps at 5 :OO 

EAap85. reinforced by the corps artillery of the III Cor

almost unchanged. On the right wing at Chan

to five battalions with four batteries, repulsed 

attempts of Montaudon’s Division (1st of the 

Ten batteries with some infantry held the he

center against Grenier’s and Lorencez’s Divisio

3d of the IV Corps). On the left wing the 2

in the Bois de la Cusse was assembled for the 

attacking Cissey’s Division (1st of the IV Co

as the Guard Corps had started. As a result 

hours of artillery fire, the 25th Division had su

ly. Nevertheless the IX Corps had nothing t

an enemy who had never utilized any occasion 

offensive. General von Manstein requested rein

These were sent to him in the form of the 3d 

gade, but at the same time the cover of his le

thus considerably weakened. There remained 

Guard Brigade for the attack of the strong po

heights south of St. .Privat. Should it be rep

one and one half divisions of the defense, an

latter, in conjunction with Cissey’s Division ma

attack, the left flank of the IX Corps would b

to the utmost. It would have been advisable 

Map 86. 3d Guard Brigade on the left wing. As later ev

it, in conjunction with the 25th Division, wo

have defeated Cissey’s Division and rolled up t

However, such artificial methods were not in 
Division (1st of the IV Corps) ; the 3d Brigade, b

out the cumbrous artillery impediment was sent to at

two Divisions of Grenier and Lorencez in their very 

position, well reinforced by trenches, west of Ama

The attack did not take place in a line already d

but the deployment was made during the comba

Guard Rifle battalion, at the head of the troops, los

officers and more than half of the rank and file and 

during the last phase of the combat by a luckily 

ensign. The losses of the other battalions, two of th

ander Regiment (1st Grenadiers of the Guard} a

of the Elizabeth Regiment (3d Grenadiers of the 

were, though considerable, somewhat less, and eac

to the right and entered the zone of rapid fire of the 

pots. The six battalions held their own, in spite of 

losses against the hostile firing line. When they 

the advance after nightfall, they had the satisfac

finding the position evacuated. It had become u

after the VI Corps had started to retreat and th

flank of the IV was threatened. 

The First Army fought its battle only in loo

with the Second. It was instructed to attack the 

the enemy between la Folie and Point du Jour w

VIII Corps, and with the VII his left flank betwee

du Jour and Ste. Ruffine. The latter task was fa

by the heights southwest of the stone quarries of 

Jour, but was rendered more difficult by the wood 

situated in front of the flank that was to be attacke

a few narrow and steep paths led up the hills and 

the dense thickets of the wood. Infantry could g

these paths only in single file, the artillery not at 

If the army headquarters had remembered th

of Jena, the manner in which the Landgrafenberg h

rendered accessible and Napoleon who, torch in h

the work himself, it might have rendered the im
y g

this wing would soon have come to an e

headquarters kept away from such ventureso

Since the attack against the hostile Ieft flan

many difficulties, the action was limited 

which had been recommended by Moltke o

ginning. Six battalions, one squadron, and o

left at Ars to protect the German commun

an advance of the French in the valley of th

five and one half battalions were sent to 

Bois de Vaux. The rest of the VII Corps 

right bank of the Mance south of Gravelott

operate from that point in the frontal at

VIII Corps was to undertake from Gravelo

through the deep ravine, the woods of the M

vaux up the slope against the French posit

Jour-Leipsig. 

To meet such an attack, the 1st Divis

the II Corps had strongly occupied an almos

trench along the main road extending from 

bend southeast of the quarries of Point du 

east of St. Hubert. In rear of these stood 

(Bastoul) of the same corps, and on the 

Divisions of Aymard (4th), Metmann (3

(Zd) of the III Corps extending as f

Beyond the position infantry had been 

woods on either side of the main road an

Hubert. There was plenty of cover, a clear 

plenty of infantry, and there would have 

artillery if the principle of maintaining str

this arm had been disregarded. It was thu

the artillery of the VII Corps south, and 

north of Gravelotte to silence the French ba

them to withdraw. The combat was to be 

tillery duel, such were the orders from Roya

until the IX Corps could make itself felt 
slowly extended its front. It was thus possible 

trate, after a hot combat, into the Mance wood, 

the eastern edge after heavy losses and to hold ou

far as the quarries of Point du Jour on the right, 

meters from the main road on the left. After a blo

bat, St. Hubert, situated immediately in front of 

tile position, was frnally taken. 

The brigade commander commanding the ri

thought that after “turning” from the Bois de V

height would be taken. Such ideas seemed absur

eral von Steinmetz. According to his opinion not 

the artillery been silenced and St. Hubert taken, 

the enemy had been defeated and forced to retr

that was left was the pursuit. In order to solve 

lem, one infantry brigade, the artillery of the V

and the 1st Cavalry Division, halted south of M

should advance via Gravelotte and the Mance ra

drive the enemy into the Chatel St. Germain ravin

four batteries succeeded in threading their way th

turmoil on the main road as far as the far side of t

Two of these did not succeed in unlimbering and 

the batteries of Hasse and Gnugge opened fire an

up even against the newly appearing mitrailleuses. 

Horse Battery however, suffered enormous loss

one gun remained in the end, for whose service th

commander and the only surviving officer had to 

When the ammunition boxes of the limbers had b

tied, the battery received orders from Gravelot

turn. Impossible! All the horses lay on the grou

teams were brought up by the battalion comman

the guns and limbers, with the wounded on the ch

led back at a walk through the ravine. Gnugge’

covered by the garden walls of St. Hubert, was ab

out a little longer. 

Of the cavalry division, only the 4th Uhlan 

which was in the lead, succeeded in reaching the f
and partly in the night, it rejoined the d

dor. The infantry brigade did not depl

regulations. The individual companies, de

groups hurried to where they hoped to f

foremost line, stormed independently aga

firing Iine, were repulsed, but still advan

beyond the edge of the wood and threw th

mixed up among each other, at 300400 

of the hostiie entrenchments. Thereupon c

in the combat. 

How should the battle be renewed and 

brigade of the VIII Corps stood as yet in 

of Gravelotte. One regiment of the latter 

as a covering detachment against the Fre

which threatened the left flank of the VIII 

Bois de Genivaux, as well as the right flank 

eral Goeben advanced with the last regim

Hubert. It could not be expected that this 

turn in the situation. Some help might com

flank. General von der Goltz was on the 

wing with the 26th Brigade, had advanced 

taken Jussy, but could go no further agains

sition : Ste. Ruffine-Rozerieulles, although 

the I Corps had sent out its skirmishers o

of the Moselle as far as the red house o

Although both brigades had come quite clo

retreat to Metz, still they had no effect up

Moscou and Point du Jour. In order to ma

General von Steinmetz found nothing else t

in the II Corps which at 2:00 AM had left 

and at 5 :00 PM reached with the 3d Divisio

Before this corps could start, a Frenc

was made. Batteries, taken from the rese

Map 86. then came the infantry. The advanced 

ments were driven back, but the attack w

by the fire directed from the edge of the woo
y y p

and the French their trenches, when the 3d Division 

.and worked its way through the seething mass 

horses, and vehicles. The advance guard (2d Jag

the 24th Regiment) upon reaching the height, pe

somewhat beyond the former line and advanced b

-detachments to the center close to the bend of the h

east of St. Hubert, and on the right as far as qua

Point du Jour 150 meters from the hostile entrenc

To the left, towards MOSCOU, the walls of St. Hube

crossed but not very far. Behind and into this Iine 

the main body of the 3d Division. Soon dissolved 

constituent units, it mixed up with the detachments 

VIII Corps. In the meanwhile, darkness had com

positions of the enemy could be distinguished only 

burning buildings of Moseou and Point du Jour. 

French likewise could not see their opponents, on

them. As soon as a movement was audible on the par

Germans, the fire of the defense flared up again, 

answered, not only by the leading troops of the atta

also, to their serious prejudice, by their own rearm

tachments. 

For the purpose of bringing some order into ch

troops of the VIII Corps were sent back to Gravelo

since this did not eliminate the confusion, it was 

well to relieve the 3d Division by the 4th. The fire

by this movement, was silenced only after considerab

Battle outposts could be placed, the line of which e

from Jussy to the northern edge of the Bois de Va

the southwest corner of the quarries, thence for so

tance along the highroad, turning north of St. 

around the southern part of the Bois des Genivaux

no reports had come in concerning the result of th

of the Second Army, considerable apprehension w

at Royal Headquarters in regard to the situation 

First Army. The genera1 opinion was that it w
A similar process to that of the Germ

on the French side. As the VIII Corps and 

had returned to Gravelotte, so had the men

trenches at Point du Jour and MOSCQU, left 

one by one, then in groups and later in deta

were replaced by new troops who, like th

opposite them, awaited the renewal of the 

did not have long to wait. 

Bazaine had already returned to his qua

of Canrobert’s aids reported.the retreat o

He consoled the despairing bringer of bad ti

that the retreat of his chief had accelerated 

treat onIy by tweIve hours. The orders, elab

pared in the morning by the General Staff, w

issued. They were for the purpose of taki

the “second position,” the II Corps to Longev

Quentin and the Moselle, the III to Sty, Le

the IV to Plappeville and le Sansonnet, the V

Moselle, the Guard, the cavalry, and the art

the narrow space within the surrounding c

to Metz was open. On the other side only the 

the road to freedom. To push this obstacle 

have been difficult, according to von Goeben’s 

ever, having all the German armies, includin

the rear, this breaking through to freedom w

in being surrounded on the Rhine at the late

The retreat was begun in the night with 

III Corps. When day dawned, only weak 

mained behind. Short fire fights took plac

and the Germans at Point du Jour and the q

Through one of the bloodiest battles the 

that a retreat which had been already decide

advanced by twelve hours. That it would h

sooner or later was due to the conviction of B

erals, and his army, that it was impossible t
pg

of his great victories of Marengo to FriedIand, but 

period subsequent to the Russian defeat. It wa

heeded that Ulm had been won by a tremendous 

movement, Jena-by wide encircling wings, Auste

Friedland by attacks against one flank and Maren

tacks on both. Imagination was excited by the gi

tack of Leipzig on October l&h, against the cen

enemy and by the repeated attempts at Waterloo 

the English front. It was forgotten, through t

magnitude, that these attacks had miscarried and 

about the tragic end of the Corsiean hero. Since 

an incontrovertible condition of victory was the m

the troops before battle. Marches to be executed 

dense eolumns, the army assembled in narrow, dee

What was done in this manner in 1870 is wond

won at the time the admiring recognit,ion of Goebe

corps of the First and Second Armies, a quarter of 

soldiers, marched on a narrow front to the Saar. 

that everything, coming in the way of this gigantic 

would be ground to pieces under its thundering trea

A French corps remained nevertheless on the 

the left bank. In order to punish this temerity, the 

guard attacked, The position was too strong, t

rapid fire too murderous to allow the attack to 

Reinforcements had to be brought up. But only 

couId be taken from the narrow front, led one after 

to the frontal attack, which could ehange nothing 

ficulties of the problem. One commanding general 

other took command, but each stood helpless before 

lem. Late in the evening, there appeared, brought 

accident than by intention, one division in the flank 

of the enemy and showed, unwittingly, to the assem

erals how strong positions have been taken since 

of Leonidas. Whoever wanted to see could see: 
ever so little the gigantic tangle and bring 

across the Saar. In the meanwhile, the de

tered enemy had had time to assemble and 

opponent in an orderly retreat. The excess 

somewhat mitigated in further advance m

system of narrow front, deep formations a

ing corps was maintained. To this system 

degree the monstrosity of sending, on 16 Au

corps out of sixteen a,gainst the hostile army 

from an army of five corps, of despatching 

gades against an impregnable position. 

Such mode of warfare Moltke had opp

He showed that compressed masses, from 

being expected, can neither be quartered no

is still worse, not even moved. He calculat

a division and a corps in marching column 

the latter would need almost an entire day t

tlefield and deploy, that it could be sent 

gradually, never in its entire strength, and 

impossible to ever count for that day on a 

following another. He therefore exacted f

least one road. 

The corps should not follow each othe

but -over several, over at least as many p

there are corps. The interval between the 

on the conformation of the network of roads

vated lands averages from 7 to 8 km. A cor

day constitution, organization, and equipmen

tion, can be deployed to a width of front o

develop fire power which would be vain to 

For rapid deployment, according to M

the march columns were still too long and 

day, having been considerably increased, th

longer. It is impossible to shorten them on 
such an army of six corps, cross the Saar with 

umns on a front of 50 km., between Merzig and Sa

seek the enemy, who was considered to be.weaker, 

him. When it was found that the French army 

semble in Lorraine in greater strength and in a sh

than supposed, Moltke awaited the eompIetion of th

before advancing with eight or ten corps to secure 

ty of numbers and to surround the hostile army 

tension of the army’s front. The victory he wished 

be annihilating, could be gained not by an attack a

front alone, but in conjunction with attacks ag

flanks, as at Koniggratz. These flanking attacks a

ed more easy if the enemy forms into narrow, de

units for a long combat. In the end, the wider 

win, since it makes possible the outflanking of the 

has supposedly, the greater and more numerous ar

The first problem of the general is to obtain 

army. It was easy for the Great Napoleon to sol

as the most powerful soverign of his time, it wa

cuIt to form a large army. If superiority in num

lost to him at the end of a long campaign, he pause

Prussian-Eylau or Aspern, brought his forces to 

mal, and continued the war against the befoole

Moltke did not have such rich resources at his com

he held together the forces at his disposition and 

point, in spite of all advice to the contrary, that o

armies should be posted neither on the Rhine in 

in 1870 in Silesia and that the war should be limi

actual opponent and not to possible ones. This 

self a feat greatly contributing to bring about th

For Bazaine would scarcely have retired on 16 A

he not hourly expected the attack of a larger an

army. It is comparatively easy to attack the enem

and flank with a stronger and larger a.rmy. Ho

efforts to assemble this great army and bring it to 
point was the front, and assembled against it 

siderable forces. An heroic, a superhuman a

nihilating piercing should be executed. The f

ed on it, it had to decide if “the world was to 

turned upside down.” The monstrous attack 

many of those preceding it had done. And th

table occurred. The man, who did not wish to 

surrounded on both sides, pressed together, 

would have been annihilated if pale fear had n

door open to the terror inspiring one. This m

be he the stronger or the weaker-he who doe

turn both flanks, will or can be turned on bo

he who limits himself to attacking one flank 

himself to the danger of being attacked on 

Hannibal, consequently, did not reinforce the 

nae, but brought its strength down to one thi

the enemy. This caused the weak front to b

by the great pressure of the hostile mass. So m

er was it for the outflanking Carthaginian wing

to turn the opposing Roman Flanks and to s

retreat and pursuit. 

Frederick the Great saw himself facing s

tions and wide fronts with his small army. 

the latter would have brought defeat more quic

ly to him than to Napoleon. He turned the po

vance against a. Aank or even the rear of an 

latter endeavored to direct his forces to the thre

The King saw himself facing a new position, af

tion of the turning movement, the front of w

wide at Kolin, too strong at Kunersdorf, and 

at both points were invulnerable. At 

movement brought him likewise before a new 

‘“‘A hostile flank may be secureIyprotected and 

Measures to ward off the danger of being attacked by 

theless be taken by the aggressor. 
the one and then the other flank was attacked and t

nate enemy could be driven back after a diEcult and 

struggle. NIore decisive was the battle of Prague, w

victory was principally due to the extreme thin

the left half of the battle line for the purpose of r

the turning movement possible. 

The example of Leuthen and Zorndorf is difficu

low by an army counting millions of men. Not 

can rise on a foggy December morning and turn 

flank with some twenty eorps. But the weaker m

to a Cannae or Prague if he will refute Napoleon’

“the stronger conquers” and annihilate the enemy 

of it. 

Today also, as at Cannae, can the center, with 

inforcements-though with a large number of eart

be reduced and still attack as the 4th Guard had do

August, with success, even today can the flanks, as a

extend for an annihilating embrace and stil1 it is p

hope that the enemy, like Terentius Varro at Canna

leon at Leipzig, Benedek at Koniggratz, will assem

or less in mass. 

However, it should not be forgotten that the en

take countermeasures against such turning movem

flank attacks, Hence a modern battle will be m

ever a struggle for the flanks. At Koniggratz, the t

of the Austrian right wing wanted to attack the 

of the Prussian army. They encountered the resis

Fransecky’s Division. Before the latter had been v

ed, the Prussian Second Army threatened their o

flank. They went back to cover the frank of the

This defensive flank was driven back by the 1st Gu

sion which, in its turn was forced to retreat before 

rounding movement of the Austrian reserve until i

ceived by the advance guard of the I Corps and c

up resistance at the front, while the VI Corps turned 
Corps by an attack against the flank and fro

ceived by the Guard and part of the VI Co

part of the latter, two divisions of the III Corp

IV, went in echelons against the left Germa

were forced to retire one after the other by 

brigade, the 20th Division and Sehwarzkopp

sion. 18 August would have shown a similar 

French taken the offensive with their reserv

wing. Thus the turning and counter turni

were limited to the flanking of the extreme 

the French detachments in the wood of Jaum

In the struggle for the flanks, he wins 

serve is not behind the front but on the ext

can not be brought thither when the eagle 

mander recognizes the decisive point in the m

moil raging over many square miles, but it m

there during the march into battle, the marc

loading stations, directed there from the railw

It could not be foreseen whether the gre

battle would be waged at Koniggratz. But 

recognized that the VIII Corps on the right a

left would ensure the decision, when the form

Saxon frontier and the latter demonstrated 

It is claimed that it is quite unnecessa

such envelopments and struggles for the fla

my will assemble his reserves, pierce with 

front which had meIted, in the meanwhile, 

put an end to everything. This was the pla

Varra that served him so badIy. 

Let us take Koniggratz again. It was 

sary there to mass the greater part of the Firs

the center of the Austrian position and offe

stop to the hostile artillery. It was likewis

to use part of the Army of the Elbe against th
g 

Prussian corps back, four corps brought from 

and three from the south against the flanks would 

ed the inevitable catastrophe earlier and more 

than the one that happened in reality. 

The Germans marched to the Saar and to 

according to Napoleon’s mass tactics. They we

wheIm the hostiIe position by continuous, well f

shock after shock. They tried to achieve this als

lotte and accomplished nothing but complete f

St. Privat, however, the deep columns saw lon

fore them against which they could do nothing. 

In the shortest time the linear tactics of in

artillery, condemned since Jena, were again assum

in a rough form. Line fought against line and i

bat the one who with greater front, could turn 

flank, won the victory, Instinctively did they re

old mode of warfare, commended by Frederick 

“Attack them bravely with our heavy guns, fire 

at them and then gain their flank.” 

THEBATTLESOFBEAUMONTANDSEDA

The 16th and 18th of August did not bring a 

to the Germans. Bazaine had not been driven to 

and Luxembourg frontiers for annihilation as Mo

but had returned to Metz. The 170,000 men, sa

city, could be considered as eliminated from a field 

but since it was considered that 200,000 men w

for their investment, the calculation, as far as n

considered, was not in favor of the Germans. 

What was left- the Third Army with five a

corps (the V, VI, XI, Bavarian I and II Corps, 

temberg Division) and two cavalry divisions (2

in the vicinity’ of Nancy, as well as the newly fo

of the Meuse with three corps (Guard, IV, and XI
treat, and finally from a11 that could be gathe

This army was not able to oppose successful res

advancing German army and still Iess to open 

seIf through the hostile troops to the gates of 

relief of Bazaine. OnIy a march for the relief 

appeared to remain. Not so well by reinforcin

son as by threatening the hostile flanks migh

binder, or at least for some time delay, the inve

great fortress. Still before the beginning o

he only wanted to know whether Bazaine had 

breaking through the ring which encircled 

the latter have succeeded in doing so, MacMaho

gone, under any circumstances, to the assistanc

rade. 

The Germans considered it necessary, if po

vent the Army of Chalons from retiring on Paris 

it back in a northerly direction. Thus the 

Meuse was to advance with its right wing 

along the Etain-Verdun road to Chalons a

Menehould on the 26th, while the Third Army 

Vitry with its left wing. It was intended 

attack against the front and right flank of th

sition from the line : St. Menehould-Vitry. 

The German columns were far from thi

MacMahon started on the 21st for Rheims. 

that he would be abIe to assist Bazaine from 

well as to reach Paris in time without being e

Chalons, to an overpowering attack. The Marsh

leon, who happened to be at Imperial Headquar

the liberty of decision. The leadership had lo

surrendered into the power of public opinion. 

tions, inspired by the press and voiced by it, 

transmitted by Parfiament, the Council of Mini

Empress-Regent to Napoleon, MacNahon, or B
President of the Senate, who personally brought t

sion of the people’s will. A march to the east w

the army into unavoidable defeat, all the more, 

was known of Bazaine’s intentions and plans. 

march to Paris on the 23d, should no news come 

from Bazaine. Rouher returned to Paris with 

intention of impressing the people favorably, 

proclamation, towards MacMahon’s return. Na

he left when a telegram of the 19th was rece

Bazaine, sent on the day of his retreat to Metz. 

with: “I still count on moving to the north and fi

way via Xontmedy on the road from St. Menehou

Ions if the road is not strongly held. In the lat

shall go to Sedan, and even Mezieres, to reach 

After this information, which should not have b

very seriously, MaeMahon believed that Razaine w

on the road to Montmedy and resolved to meet him 

right or wrong. Soon a telegram reached him fr

the Minister-President, in which it was urged that 

tion with the Army of the Rhine take place as so

sible. 

On the 23d the French Army started from 

the Suippe between Dontrien and St. Masmes. 

The two German armies which reached on tha

the right wing the locality east of Verdun and wit

St. Dizier, found out, gradually that the enemy h

camp at Chalons, that he had marched to Rheims 

a position there. A telegram arrived from Lond

25th announcing ‘“MacMahon seeks junction with 

confirming current rumors, the information co

captured letters, and newspaper reports. 

In order to meet the enemy marching from R

Vouziers and Stenay, Attigny, Le Chesne and, 

possibly via Rethel, Tourteron and Mouzon towar

was not possible to march in the direction hitherto 
leading elements on the line: DombasleVitry

each corps a separate road. On the 26th, 

forming the pivot, could advance to Charny, 

could reach the line Dombasle-St. Meneh

On the same day, the German cavalry r

Vouziers and Buzancy what was seemingly th

wing. From this point the enemy could c

following days, the march to Metz or turn 

proaching Germans or, IastIy, escape an enc

superior hostile forces by a retreat. 

All these possibilities could be met by se

of the investing army from Briey and Confla

and Narville, the XII Corps from Charny 

Guard Corps along the right bank of the Me

two corps of the Third Army between the 

Aisne, the remaining three and one half co

latter river, cavalry divisions marching ahe

front and especially in front of the left wi

enemy march toward Metz or advance for 

the Meuse and the Aisne or await there an at

able position, he still would have been attack

and on one or both flanks and driven agai

frontier. Only a French retreat would be d

it be started so early that the left German 

reach Mezieres ahead of the enemy, The 

then have to seek to advance to the south by 

left or facing left. 

An advance, as pictured on Hap 90, and 

29 August, i.e., by the evening before the e

of Beaumont, corresponded to the instruct

Moltke on another occasion “seek the ene

him.” Moltke discarded here such an opera

wanted, more than anything eIse, to oppose 

ber of corps as possible to the threatened 
jg

tainous terrain rendered the provisions of the s

umns most necessary. 

For the security of the march and to support 

alry advancing to Veziers, Grand Pre, and Buzancy

Corps started to Varennes on the 26th. It was 

by the Guard Corps, the IV, and the two Bavarian 

the direction of Dombasle, Nixeville, Verdun. Th

ing corps of the Third Army prepared to advan

following days in a northwesterly and northerly 

Should the enemy continue his mareh to the east

hardly be possible to reach him west of the M

superior numbers. He could gain the right ba

river in two days. It was necessary to try and 

there. According to Moltke’s plan, the XII Corp

ing by way of Dun, the Guard Corps via Montfau

Consenvoye, the XIV via Charny should concentra

region of Damvillers by the 28th, two corps of 

of investment via Etain and Briey would be draw

right wing, the two Bavarian corps would follow to 

Then no matter whether the hostile army, after cr

Meuse, should turn to Damvillers or continue t

to Longuycq there was still cause to hope that it 

driven to the Belgian frontier by one of the seve

corps. 

The reports, brought by the cavalry, showed 

Mahon’s march to Metz had come to a halt. T

German corps at Damvillers wouId have no ene

them on the 28th. Endeavors should be made to 

superior forces on the left bank of the Meuse for 

annihilation. For this purpose the corps of the fir

vanced on the 27th to the Iine : Stenay-Dun-Montfaue

Clermont-St. Menehould, on the 28th to the line: 

Dun-Bsntheville-Varennes-Vienne le Chateau

It was very probable that the army which had 

from Stenay to Cernay would likewise find no en
to Grand Pre and one to Buzancy. The V C

advanced on the 26th to Le Chesne, the I (Ducr

and Attigny, the XII (Lebrun) to Tourteron

man cavalry, which showed itself during th

Buzancy, Grand Pre, and Vouziers, made G

Map 91. think that an attack was impending. Re de

at Vouziers and Buzancy. MacMahon started 

with the entire army to his assistance, but turne

no enemy, except cavalry, was seen. 

A decisive offensive, a rolling up of the ad

of the Heuse was afterwards recommended t

Such an offensive could not have taken place be

when it would have met the XII Corps at D

Corps at Bantheville, the IV, sent from M

Cierges, the Bavarian I Corps north of Varenn

have found all other roads west strongly occu

following day the right German wing would ha

left would have been sent forward. A compl

ing of the French army would have taken place 

at Sedan. Being unable to disregard these c

good reports to the contrary notwithstanding, 

found it inexpedient, in view of the German nu

riority, either to await an attack or to ventu

part. 

Ne expected still less from the continuation 

to Mets, since no news bad come from Bae

pected that part of the investing army would m

the mass of the armies of the two Crown P

take him in flank arrd rear. If he would save h

annihilation, all that remained for him to do w

to Mezieres. Since the Germans had held b

wing and had not sent even cavalry to the left 

and since a suf%ient number of roads was at h

the retreat, ordered the evening of the 27th, mi
jgp

Mahon in answer to his report concerning his de

retire : “Should you leave Bazaine in the lurch a re

will break out in Paris-Your prompt junction with 

seems urgently necessary.‘” A further telegram c

the decided demand of the Council of Ministers to 

Bazaine’s relief. There no longer remained a choice

Mahon decided to resume the march he had abando

to continue it as well as possible until he should be 

by the numerical superiority of the enemy. He un

clearly that this check would coincide probably w

complete annihilation. Officers were despatched on 

to divert toward the east the units which had receive

to go west. Many corps were reached after they 

ready started on the march. The turning back an

about of the long columns, the unavoidable crossi

others caused troubIes which were doubly felt in 

and on the bad roads. Only late in the night of 

did the last troops come to rest, On the Attigny-Von

Beaumont road, the I Corps had reached le Chesne, 

la Besace, its cavalry, Beaumont. On the Vouziers-S

road was the VII Corps turning from Quatre-Cham

Boult-aux-Bois. General Failly had not dared to 

with the V Corps the march via Bar to Buzancy on 

of the hostile cavalry, but had turned via Sommau

bivouacked in the evening at Belval and Bois des Da

The reports coming in to the German Royal He

ters during tie 28th, hinted at a retreat of the enem

northwest. At ?:OO PM, a turn to the right betwe

and Cernay was ordered for both armies on the line 

-Vouziers. New reports coming in the evening p

Moltke that the enemy had not abandoned his plan o

ing Metz and that he would cross the Meuse at Ste

below. He would find Stenay occupied and would b

to turn against the Army of the Meuse on his righ

As long as the latter was without support it would 
from Cernay to Grand Pre. With these thre

corps, which were to be followed on the Ie

Monthois and the VI to Vienne le Chateau, 

intended against the road : Buzancy-Stenay. 

This calculation of Moltke would have b

any other enemy than MaeMahon, who carrie

given him by public opinion and must, und

stances, make an effort to cross the Meuse 

if possible, a combat with a superior enemy. 

Upon hearing that Stenay was occupied 

mans, MaeMahon gave up crossing at that p

ed that on the 29th the XII Corps should ma

the I to Roncourt, the V to Beaumont, the V

The XII and I Corps with Margueritte’s a

Cavalry Divisions executed this order and 

outposts to the roads to Carignan and Stenay 

The VII Corps, deceived by many false reports

Boult aux Bois only as far as Oches and 

Since the officer carrying the order to the V 

captured by a patrol of Uhlans, General Fa

divisions, according to a previous order, to 

Beauclair to await there MacMahon’s orders 

on Stenay. 

On the German side, the XII Corps we

29th via Dun across the Meuse and occupied 

tween that town and Ainereville. The reports 

said nothing of an impending attack, but mu

retreat of the enemy. It seemed necessary 

with the enemy, all the more since a Royal o

ning before read--” Continue the offensive ag

Vouziers-Buzancy-Stenay. Its prompt 

the army of the Meuse is enjoined should it 

inferior hostile forces.“’ Since this condit

be fulfilled according to all reports receiv

Prince of Saxony sent the 1st Division of th
Corps. The combat which took place at this 

broken off by the Saxons in order to avoid isolate

ters, after the superiority of the French had been 

ed. When the Saxons reached the height between N

TaiUy on their retreat the French Corps, having 

ceived the army orders, marched off in an opposite 

Two brigades, remaining as rearguard, covered 

drawal until during the night the patrols of the 12

Division reported the retreat of the entire corps in 

tion of Beaumont. The Guard cavalry ascertaine

the night that the rearguard of the VII Corps had 

at Pierremont. 

Royal Headquarters had some other reports o

morning and forenoon hours. It was not known 

they were still good or had been rendered wo

events. Moltke assumed, in the meanwhile that t

were advancing toward the Meuse by two roads v

Le Chesne, Stonne, La Besaee and Beaumont

Vouziers, Buzancy, and Nouart. They could no

southern road because the Army of the Meuse ha

Buzancy and Nouart and had been obliged to take 

ern. The march would not be possible on this o

It was, consequently, probable that the French wo

a battle in a good position between Le Chesne and 

reported to be the extreme points occupied by t

part of this position east of the Buzancy-Raucou

should be attaekeed by the Army of the Meuse, sup

the two Bavarian corps. 

The strip west of the above road to Le Chesne 

share of the Third Army. It was left to army hea

how the attack should take place. Since, howe

were scarcely more than three corps for the attac

the front I La Besace-Beaumont, including the t

rian units, it was expedient to send two corps of 

of the Meuse across the river to turn the hostile 

Had the left flank of the Third Army been ex
Roth armies, however, preferred not to 

enemy, but to persuade him to retire by com

attacks, although retreat bad been his intentio

they transIated the information received from 

quarters: ‘“The enemy stands between Le Ch

mont” into “the enemy stands at Le Chesn

Mrrp 94. mom.” According t,o this view, the Army 

would attack the enemy supposed to be at 

the XII, IV, and Bavarian I Corps in the firs

Guard and Bavarian II Corps in the second 

Third Army would advance against the ene

not at Le Chesne, with the IX Corps and the 

Division in the first, and the VI Corps in t

The enemy, whose presence was ascertained 

St. Pierremont and Oches, was taken as non 

V Corps, which had been sent via these points 

to maintain communications between the a

turn, according to circumstances, against the 

Chesne or reinforce the overstrong body of 

Beaumont. The fiction that the road to S

of the enemy could not be lastingly enterta

than that Le Chesne was strongly occupied

found that there was not a man in Le Chesne, 

reported at Oches, had gone to Stonne and 

strong position with at least a rearguard. In 

a,rmy headquarters decided to send the XI 

Wurttemberg Division to La Berliere. It mig

in the afternoon of the 30th that three corp

the enemy at Beaumont and two and one 

Stonne. Three corps were to be kept intact 

It had been decided that for the first 

Corps should advance with one division via La

highroad, with the other from Beauelair thro

the IV Corps west of it by two roads through 
advance, the two eastern ones came close to the hig

front of Beaumont’, so that only three roads opene

city : the Stenay- Beaumont road, taken by the X

and the 7th Division, the road from Sommauthe, 

the Bavarian Corps; and between these was a path 

the woods for the 8th Division. Aeeording to the 

isting views and principles, the march order, issue

Army of the Meuse, was beyond criticism. A mass 

narrowest front and of the greatest depth could b

by the three corps in front of Beaumont. The enem

much weaker, could, by deploying on a wider front

as great if not greater firing strength against them

he retire, he could be pursued only by small deta

so that he would be able to continue unmolested o

treat should he have taken care to provide sufficie

ings over the Meuse. A strong reserve of two corp

was to be held intact, could hardly compensate ah t

vantages of such an attack. At any rate a chang

have been made in these orders, when late in the 

the cavalry sent across the Meuse, reported the ad

the enemy from Mouzon to Inor, t,hus confirming 

mation which had been received through a captured 

army order, It was evident that the situation, acc

which Moltke had worded his order on the 3Oth

longer the same. The enemy, apparently, did no

accept a battle between Beaumont and Le Chesne 

crossed the Meuse with part of his forces and wou

with the rest of his troops to the other bank on the 

day. Moltke had foreseen this and also ordered a 

of the Meuse. It was, consequently, advisable th

surplus forces at the disposition of the Army of th

at least two corps be sent across the river in ord

the advance of the enemy in the narrow space bet

Meuse and the Belgian frontier and force him into a 

where he would have to weather an attack from 

and eventually be annihilated. Army headquarte
Orders were given so that the surprise 

take place against Beaumont immediately 

hour. That the enemy was still found there 

Map 95. patrol, which had captured the order sent b

the V Corps. This bad luck was the cause fo

starting in the morning but in the evenin

reaching Beaumont in the night and requiring 

for the recuperation of the exhausted streng

the continuation of-the march. 

The officers and troops were sitting at the

south of Beaumont between the road to Sten

to Beausejour, when the advance guard of t

(4th Jagers) emerged from the wood betwee

the farm of Belle Volee. It was intended no

carefree soldiers, but to have the division 

cover. But when a peasant rushed to the Fre

the cry “the enemy is here” and the cauldron

abandoned, the division commander, Gene

believed that he had to take advantage of the 

batteries which had just come up. A few 

into the dense mass had their effect. But t

soon formed a swarm of skirmishers which 

of the far-reaching long range arm and ca

siderable losses not only to the Jager battali

the two batteries, that almost all the gunne

The situation changed when the French adv

skirmish lines followed by units in close order 

entered into the zone of effective fire of th

showered with bullets in their turn, were fo

A second French attack was directed a

Regiment which, supported by four batteries

the head of the 7th Division via Belle Tour 

This attack was likewise repulsed. In the 

deployment of the 8th Division on the height 

de Petite Foret had made but little progress. 
able, although the infantry had emerged from the w

almost complete formation, with three batteries of 

Division from the south and southeast for the attack 

French camp, which was soon evacuated after a com

which great losses were infEcted by the chassepots, 

a few prisoners and guns. 

The 7th Division stood, during the fight, south 

&nay-Beaumont road. Neither the 66th Regime

the 26th, following the former, had noticed the height 

east of Beaumon% which dominated the camp, the ci

the route of retreat. The consequence was that the 

who stood there or went there, nestled in the ditch

hind the road embankment and fired on the right w

the 66th. A few companies turned to the right, an

a hard fight drove the enemy out, who then retreated 

tanne, pursued by weak detachments of the German

The 66th Regiment was followed from Behe T

Beaumont by the 26th, and the latter by the 14th B

To the same point streamed the greater part of th

Brigade and the 7lst Regiment, via Petite Foret. O

to two battalions of that brigade and the ‘i’lst Regime

the direction to the height west of Beaumont. W

they turned, long lines of artillery confronted the G

extending to right and left north of Beaumont. To 

them, the 14 batteries of the IV Corps went into p

south of the city with the right wing on the hill south 

tanne, the left beyond the highroad to Sommauthe

line was extended on the right by the 23d Division 

had advanced with six battalions and ten batteries, c

the Wamme Creek partly at Wamme and partly at B

and came on the hill east of Beaumont. The left wi

lengthened by the three batteries of the Bavarian 

which had been sent in advance. The fire of 25 b

achieved nothing but that the hostile artillery, after c
and ten batteries, was on the hill south of 

Wamme Creek. 

The Bavarian I Corps had accelera

hearing the thunder of the guns. Gen

commanding the 2d Division, the leading 

ried to the battlefield, had the proposition 

general staff officer of the IV Corps to tak

the farm La Thibaudine, as the enemy, retre

mont, could be best taken in flank from t

point. 

The general accepted it willingly. 

alry, however, was fired at from the woods 

of La Harnoterie and in retreating, aIso fro

The former fire came from a French det

Corps which had retreated from Beaumont 

the latter from the advance guard of Cons

vision, marching from Oches and La Besac

General Douay had cautiously taken tbe 

.Remilly via Stonne and Raueourt with th

sions of the VII Corps. 

When the 4th Brigade, at the head o

Division, depIoyed and advanced to La Th

directed against it from Le Grand Dieule

to turn partly left. Another part contin

La Thibaudine, drove off the enemy who 

the woods east of the Yoncq Brook north o

Beaumont road. After a short fire fight n

the main road the French were driven off

tack, to Warniforet, so quickly that the 3d B

to make a flanking attack from the south 

Dieulet, met only a few isolated Frenchme

talion had, in the meanwhile, covered the 

La Harnoterie. Jointly with a battalion 

ment, which had come by the ravine situat
The 7th Division, in deep formation with two b

in front, advanced east, the 8th Division west of th

Mouzon. The Bavarian I Corps was directed by H

ters of the Third Army to advance against La Be

as great a strength as possible in order to fill “the 

isting in the line between Beaumont and Stonne.” 

fore only a detachment of four battalions and two 

under Colonel Schuch, was left on the left wing o

Corps. The rest of the 2d Division followed up from 

foret, the enemy retreating to the north, while the 

sion was started on the road to La Besace. Thus 

vance was organized on the left wing in a more orde

ner. There might have been sufficient time also on 

wing, after the taking of Beaumont, to send the X

to Pouilly and the Guard Corps to Stenay aeross t

in order to achieve some success with the former at 

But army headquarters insisted on Ieaving the X

in rear of the right wing and sending the Gua

by the paths through the woods previously use

IV corps. 

The two battalions of the 13th Brigade at the 

the 7th Division went along the narrow ridge bet

main raad and the Meuse, drove out the hostile re

from La Sartelle and the Bois de Givodeau, but s

selves facing a strong position on the northern ed

wood. 

The two hours’ pause ensuing during the clos

the IV Corps, assembling it in a very narrow fron

at Beaumont, reforming the mixed units, and ord

troops for a new advance, might have given Faill

start that he could have crossed over several bridg

right bank of the Meuse with but a few rear gu

mishes. But since he could hardly count on such a 

did not wish to be thrown across the river in dis

P 
the Meuse occupied between Warmonterne 

farm by Lacretelle’s Division. The Ieft wi

position was thus formidably reinforced, 

by the fact that the hostile artillery could n

de Givodeau at all and the infantry c&y 

ments. 

Army headquarters thought to obtain 

by enveloping the left wing from the valle

The 45th Brigade was ordered to advance 

ning along the bank. Pressed into the na

was showered by Laeretelle’s Division w

leuse, and chassepot fire. It was impossi

strongly occupied heights of Villemontry, 

enemy in the rear. The plan to envelop the 

abandoned, the brigade takeu back to La Sa

companies, which had succeeded in occu

eastern corner of the Bois de Givodeau. we

The question now was, what should be d

be sent, as at Gravelotte, into a continuous 

after battalion, regiment after regiment, b

gade, all mixed up in a crowd, from the 

French batteries, to suffer unlimited losse

of all the units and boundless confusion, or 

ous reserves, as at Sadowa, and the Bois de 

as a target for the never missing hostile 

one nor the other means seemed tempting. 

to some, especially to corps headquarters, th

belonged on the right and not on the left ba

It might drive thence the enemy by taking 

fire and bar the line of retreat through Mo

enemy who had occupied an impregnable po

German front. The road seemed too long 

far advanced for the execution of such sple

consequences of such a model army order, 
west of the woods, was strongly occupied. He order

14th Brigade, following the l%h, to advance to the 

the main road to-take, in joint action with the 8tb Di

the supposed bulwark of the enemy. When the brigad

crossed the road, it filled the entire space between the 

and the Yoncq Creek and was able alone, with the ba

attached, to take the hill, occupied only by a reargua

an attack from the south and southwest. The 8th Di

which had remained behind, found itself excluded and 

ed to go with its greater part and the detachment of C

Schuch into the valley of the Yoneq and the other side 

Yoneq Creek, while the smaller part pushed in betwe

13th and 14th Brigades, Thus the IV Corps obta

more extended, though still a very modest, front whic

mitted its forces to have some effect. The advanc

tinued, in about the following order : from right to 

battalions of the 8th Division, the 14th Brigade, 8 batt

of the 8th Division, 4 battalions under Colonel Schuch

de Brune was taken by attacks against the front and 

the hill north of Pourron was occupied through the co

turning of the wing, the left flank was extended to 

court, a descent made down the valley of the river 

cover of the batteries in position on the heights, the 

of .Mouzon captured, the enemy driven into the Meu

the cofumns, retiring on the opposite bank were taken 

fire. Counterattacks and cavalry charges-as custom

such situations-took place. They only increased t

feat. The enemy could no longer hold the position at 

montry against the 13th and 45th Brigades. He was 

to the Meuse. Not all reached the opposite bank, som

in the river, others were captured, others still hid 

thickets of the bank, as darkness had already set in. M

and the bridge over the Meuse remained in the hands 

French. An attempt to take the city under cover of 
ma&he to La Besace and further toward 

forced the French rear guard at Stonne 

It was caught up with north of Raucourt 

to Remilly after a fierce combat. After 

from St. Juvin (Map 94) to Raucourt, af

and fights, darkness stopped the pursuit. 

went into bivouac. 

The roar of guns from Beaumont and M

V Corps and the 4t.h Cavalry Division to m

Buzancy-Raucourt, so that in the evening 

Map 97. Bavarian 1st Division at Raucourt, the 4th 

at Flaba, the Bavarian 2d Division north, t

of La Besace, the Bavarian II Corps at 

XI Corps had reached Stonne, the 2d 

Aches, and the Wurttemberg Division, Verr

rately from the army, as if forgotten, sto

at Vouziers, and the 5th and 6th Cavalry D

teron and Le Chesne. 

Casualties of 1300 dead for the French 

Germans in the battle of Beaumont would s

ably for the former, if the loss of 3000 miss

2000 unwounded prisoners, and of 42 gun

complete discouragement of the entire a

pressed, had not been added to them. 

French had escaped luckily enough. T

MacMahon wanted to avoid as long as po

place without being, as had been feared, a 

tion. It would have been such if the diffe

quarters had left fewer corps in reserve an

front, if their armies were less eompressed 

more extended on the wings and if the corps

the enemy, had not remained stationary bu

vanced. The battle of the 30th, and a pu

would have caused a complete encircling of 
able in a western and two in a southerly direction 

carps each: from Remilly on the feft bank of the M

Donchery and Flize, from Mouzon via Sedan and M

from Stenay along the Meuse via Verdun and from C

via Montmedy and Fresnes. 

Ry such a retreat directed to opposite sides, t

would have been split-in two and naturally become 

combat, But it was desired to avoid a battle. This 

attained by retreating over as many roads as possibl

different directions. Should the movement be starte

evening of the 30th and so much attained in the ni

the troops should be outside the reach of the en

retreat wauld have succeeded as that at Worth and 

and, with the aid of railways, Ducrot, Faifly, Lebr

Douay would have met in Paris as, a few days earlie

Mahon, Failly, and Douay met in Chalons. If the ar

be kept together, a retreat or the continuation of 

treat to the south offered better chances and great

dom of movement than a march to the west. Ma

however, did not wish to use the road, unexpectedly 

to him but to continue the retreat to Mezieres as h

planned, 

Although the troops were very mueh discoura

greatly exhausted by the strain and the lack of pro

the night march to Sedan was effected in good orde

V Corps, in front, reached Fond de Givonne, via Do

Bazeilles, and the northern glaeis of the fortress. T

divisions of the XII Corps followed at intervals of 

one half hours and occupied the right bank of the 

from Bazeilles to Daigny. The rear was formed by t

sions of the I Corps, covering the retreat east of Do

lengthening the left wing of the XII Corps to Givonn

smaller portion of the VII Corps had reached Mouzo

while the Iarger crossed the Meuse at Remilly in the 
special march road and using it at least as far 

he turned at Sedan into the one road which had 

to the entire army. He reached Floing du

where his remaining units joined his corps. 

day the army was assembled near Sedan. 

Ducrot with two divisions of the I Corps and 

Cavalry Division were still southeast of Carig

and advanced only in the afternoon to the p

Givonne. 

It was not necessary to await him for th

of the retreat. Had the advance guard started 

ing of the 3lst, followed by one corps after the 

would have come up early enough to join th

column as rearguard. But the troops were to

marches of the 30th until late in the night o

been too long without nourishment to continue 

the morning. A rest until noon was urgentl

not critical. 

Assembled in a narrow space, immediate

Sedan, the French Army could be consider

was protected by the Meuse and the Givonn

south and east, whence the enemy might be exp

north was the inviolable Belgium. No attack 

pected from that direction, those from the tw

could be easily repulsed. Even a retreat to 

Mezieres was considered safe. 

The road leading to Mezieres was narrowe

Menges and Vrigne aux Bois by the bend of th

Iges on the one side and the almost inaccessib

of the Bois de la Fahzette on the other to a na

a narrow bridge. This defile had to be cross

men with horses, guns, vehicles, and baggag

reach at Mezieres the other bank of the Meuse 

The habit of the German army of forming a m
for the security of eommuncations in the rear. 

could be fully reassured as to Mezieres even had 

Vinoy reached it in the night of the 30th with 

XIII corps. 

He likewise did not worry much about the 

tween Frenois and Mezieres, the strip between 

and Flize. He did not deem the Germans ca

great a turning movement. He thus underrated 

nent considerably. The flank on the Meuse ought t

secured. It was not sufficient to destroy th

bridges. It was more important to prevent the

tion and the building of new ones, as well as their 

enemy. As soon as the troops had rested some

the strain of the foregoing days, the VI Corps s

undertaken the defense of the strip of the Meu

Frenois-Flize. The XIII Corps (Vinois) which 

ed Mezieres in the evening of the 3Oth, took up a 

Boulzineourt-Poix. North of the main road 

roads which were joined by short cuts and brid

second marehing road, debauching at Charlev

corps could thus start simultaneously. A third 

position on the Givonne and followed on both 

the same, parallel with the latter, the VII Corps

stroying the bridges over the Meuse, moved from 

over the bridge at Les Ayvelles in. the direction 

court, and lastly the XIII Corps. The retreat in 

or southeasterly direction could be made in fou

marching side by side over a sufficient number 

If the time between the noon of 31 August, and th

of 1 September, were not much overdrawn, all 

worthy of the name, would be excluded. 

No column roads were designated. The VII 

not go to Donchery and the XIII remained at Mez

the order to destroy the bridges between Sedan an
luckily. The engineer of the locomotive, som

by the proximity of the enemy, pulled out his t

barrels of powder and necessary tools had 

The company did not think it essential to 

means of destroying the bridge. 

Even without the destruction of the bridg

the retreat might have been made had it bee

enough. 31 August passed, however, with n

MaeMabon could hardly have understoo

ness of the situation, was the criticism. It 

clear to him, It was quite clear to him when 

the march from Rheims on the 23d, and it was 

the 23th when he continued it again by the 

from Paris “to avoid a revolution.” After th

30th he believed himself justified in abando

plan and starting the retreat. If the self-sa

bat, the heroic courage of the troops and the d

the brutal strength of numerical superiority ha

in true colors, public opinion would have had s

tion, approved the retreat and postponed som

break of the revolution. Unfortunately, Na

recognize the lucky gift brought him by the 

mont. Made stupid by the habit of a long rei

every misfortune, every failure, showing the 

good light, he could not grasp the idea that to 

in so many words would serve the purpose, and 

to the Empress mentioned only a “quite insig

bat.” It was impossible for MacMahon to 

diverted from an important problem by an 

combat,” the problem which the Nation had 

hands. That he had gone as far as Sedan ma

ed as a treachery. Only under coercion which 

stem, could he dare to start on the retreat. 

had to be fought. The situation was not des
measures, the apathy, relaxation, and resignation to th

itable had gone too far. MaeMahon may also have th

that an extension of his position along the Givonne a

Meuse to Mezieres was too long. He wanted to ke

forces more eloseIy together. The position, selected b

was defensible. The front was formed by the Meu

the fortifications of Sedan. The left flank on the 

cut Givonne from BazeiIIes to north of Givonne was c

by the XII and I Corps, the right flank and the rear 

VII Corps on the Floing Creek. The V Corps remai

a general reserve close to the fortress. Thus three 

had been formed, all difficult to attack. Their weakn

irr that the attack against one of them would be, at the 

time, an attack against the flank and rear of the 

The Germans might have, on the 30th, outflanked

rounded, and crushed the weak enemy. They thou

solve this problem by coming as close together as p

At the moment when they ought to have cut off the retr

enemy entirely by a wide front, they formed as if th

to deliver a blow into the heart or break through 

wall in its center. Moltke tried to repair what ha

spoiled. On the 31~4 it was ordered to “continue the 

enveloping both flanks.” The Army of the Meuse was 

ed to bar the French left wing from escaping in an e

direction and therefore advance with two corps on th

bank of the Meuse. The Third Army was ordered 

against the front and right Rank of the enemy. 

Sn compliance with this order, the Guard corps 

Army of the Meuse went to Pouilly and the XII at L

across the Meuse. The former took the road via Ca

had reached Pouru-aux-Bois and Poru St. Remy. T

ter remained on the left bank of the Chiers and o

Tetaigne, &evilly, Douzy, Mairy, and Amblimont. 

Corps remained at Mouton on the left bank of the 
ppg 

be destroyed and occupied and had therefore 

to advance only as far as the river and to tak

moving troops in the opposite valley unde

But when the advance guard of the XI Cor

chery, it found the bridge intact, the point 

from the hill of Frenois, the 4th Cavalry D

white tents of the camp north of Sedan. 

The French were still at Sedan. It m

surmised that they would march along the 

morning, at the latest, to Mezieres, protected 

It did not seem necessary to cut off their w

The Third Army would cross the Meuse at Do

other bridges, prevent the enemy from m

force him to fight and throw him back on t

tier. The XI Corps occupied Donchery w

guard, Frenois with a flank detachment, 

Cheveuges, the V Corps to Chehery and 

Wurttemberg Division, met, coming from 

alry at Boutaucourt and infantry at Flize, 

the direction of Mezieres. Outposts were 

Chalandry, F’lize was occupied by the adv

Eoutaueourt by the Division. 

These small encounters were without 

they showed that the enemy was at Mezie

couId attack the left flank of the Germans, 

at any rate and weaken the Third Army for 

tle. This army might have been stronger 

Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division been 

They might, as stated in the General Staff A

the movements of the enemy in rear of the 

point, and bar the way to Rheims and Pari

troops stationed at Mezieres. The corps d

the least, for either of the problems. It d

French XIII Corps ‘in time, which threate
gg y, 

Corps found the bridge at Remilly destroyed and sa

columns marching to Bazeilles on the opposite b

.artillery duel opened across the river. The Bavar

lery line extended gradually to le Pant Maugy, a

units arrived. French skirmishers, which had ad

the Meuse and across the railway bridge, molested 

ners. One company of Jagers drove the French 

left bank, another company of Jagers drove away 

men who were about to demolish the bridge suppor

stormed across the bridge, in spite of the hot fire, 

powder into the Meuse and occupied the railway 

ment. Upon the arrival of one more company th

sharpshooters were driven south of Bazeilles, the 

occupied and the advance continued to the northe

The French had in the meanwhile, broken off the 

duel and retired north. They faced partly about 

quer the lost village. For two hours did the five c

of Jagers under Major Rasehreiter repulse the attac

superior French. Since, however, General von 

wanted to avoid isolated combats, and forbade se

reinforeements to the other bank of the Meuse, t

was forced to an orderly retreat. The pontoon 

arrived, in the meanwhile, and built a bridge at A

It was protected, as well as the railway bridge, by 

and artillery positions, on the left bank of the Meus

of which the troops bivouacked. 

By the provisions of an order, sent out in the e

the 3&t, the XI and V Corps were to advance e

September via Donehery to Vrigne-aux-Bois, the W

berg Division was to cross the Meuse over a bridge 

constructed at Dom le Mesnil and take a position s

able to face Mezieres or to serve as reserve to bo

The Bavarian II Corps was to occupy with one div

heights opposite Donehery, with the other those o
y 

qy 

thought it had already accomplished this du

the Guard to Pouru-aux-Bois and Pouru St. 

Corps to Douzy and the IV to Mouzon. A d

1 September had thus been planned, althou

had been ordered to be ready at 7:OO AM. 

Neadquarters of the Third Army share

held by Royal Keadquarters that the enemy 

his retreat to Mezieres in the night. The Third 

thus, in crossing the Meuse at Donchery and 

with two and one half corps, meet considerable 

road : St, Menges-Mezieres, the attack of wh

be rendered easier by the terrain. It would b

ble that the part of the enemy, left at Sedan

and prevent.ed from reinforcing the troops 

march. The Ravarian I Corps was, consequ

to “‘hold that part of the enemy which opposed 

tion was sent to the commander of the neigh

concerning all the measures taken and the su

might be considerably heightened by the ass

Army of the Meuse. The Crown Prince of 

nixed that an attack would correspond better 

ing of the enemy than a passive occupation 

and decided not only to hold the enemy, sup

rear of the Givonne, but to prevent him from 

Belgium. This required an attack against 

the envelopment of the left wing. 

It was known from the reports of the cava

Cernay was occupied by a strong rearguard 

Map 99. of the 31st. The hostile left wing was, conseq

at the village of Givonne if not further north. 

it and cut off its principal road to Belgium, the 

wing was to march to La Chapelle and further 

the Bavarian I Corps was to attack the south 

Ies and the front of the position at Givonne 
from Pouru St, Remy via Francheval to Villers C

.thenee, by various roads, without crossing the X

via La ChapelIe to Illy. The IV Corps was to 

Bavarian I Corps with one division, with the other 

Corps. The enemy would t,hus, inasmuch as he 

of Sedan, if not driven back, at least be held fast 

from Belgium. A battle line of 11 km. must have 

in the time of mass formations, too extensive, 

half was found sufficient. Four corps were th

on a width of front of 5 km. and of these three an

corps were compressed into a front of 3 km. In sp

small extent of the battlefield, the conduct of batt

no means united. This was caused by the Bavaria

starting at 3 ~00 AM, to Bazeilles, situated there in 

vicinity, and by the distant corps of the Army of 

starting at 5:OO AM, in the direction of Givanne

General von der Tann hoped to be able to take 

which was in his hands the day before, easily in 

and fog. The French: had, in the meanwhile oc

point with a brigade of Vassoigne’s Division and p

for obstinate resistance. Great massive buildin

walls, several tributaries of the Givonne facilitated 

ing of a nucleus of houses and gardens, reaching in 

westerly direction with Villa Beaurmann close to B

toward the east from the railway depot via Chatea

and Chateau Monvillers as far as La Nanvelle w

almost without a break. The entire energy of t

was directed against Bazeilles, which was com

harmless and farthest from the decisive point of S

which remained unheeded. 

Four battalions of the Bavarian 2d Brigade c

railway bridge. The Jager battalion in the lead p

at 4 :OO AM, through dense fog from the south into 

but was received with fire in front, from a barricad

flanks’ from the two story houses lining the two s
with all kind of alternating success and faiIure

tacks, and losses. Reinforcements arrived af

period of time for the Bavarians over the ponto

deployed gradually against Dorival and Monvi

brigades were thus utilized; the fourth was ke

as reserve south of Bazeilles. On the side of th

advanced the 2d Brigade of Vassoigne’s Division

of the I Corps and parts of Goze’s Division of 

to Bazeilles, while Lacretelle’s Division of th

Lartigue’s and Wolff’s Divisions of the I Corp

the first line, 1’Heriller’s one half Division and 

sion in the second line on the heights of the 

the Givonne and occupied with advance detach

villages in the valleys of the river from La 

Laminoir. 

The Army of the Meuse did not consider 

have been already gathered from the reports o

that the attack would have for objective a front 

that Bazeilles and La Moncelle formed only it

It kept fast to the words : the enemy retreats to 

has left a rearguard at Bazeilles and La Monc

a great success against these, the XII Corps an

vision were sent via Douzy and Lamecourt to 

the 8th Division via Remilly to Bazeilles. It w

to crush with 3 divisions at each point the n

rearguard. The Guard Corps which could fin

the valley of the Meuse was sent to Francheva

Cernay. Its right was not even opposite the 

the enemy and far from being able to outflank it

could hardly be reached here. 

When the advance guard of the 24th Div

talions, 1 battery) reached about 6:OO AM, La 

tillery and infantry could be recognized on the 

in spite of the fog. One of the Saxon batterie

and maintained it throughout the great Frenc

I 
them. Ten companies occupied La Monceile and 

into communication with Bavarian troops which had 

ed as far as the southernmost houses of the village. 

further reinforcements could arrive, it was reporte

the enemy was advancing from Daigny, General 

(I Corps) was holding the bridge at Daigny believin

be the only bridge over the Givonne which the hostile 

Iery could use and thought it necessary to cover it by 

tion on the eastern bank, charging Lartigue’s Divis

occupy the Bois Chevalier. 

The 105th Regiment of the Saxon advance guar

sent against it. The main body of the 24th Divisio

not yet arrived, but the division and corps artillery 

brought up in a hurry. At 8:30 AM, south of the 

court-La Moneelle road to the Rubecourt road 10 b

opened fire against Daigny. 

On the French side, command had been changed 

MaeMahon had been wounded on the heights east 

Moncelle by a shell splinter and had transferred th

mand to General Ducrot. The latter erroneously b

that the Army of the Meuse would surround Givonn

the north and render it untenable and thought just a

neously that sufficient measures had been taken for 

curity of the Meuse strip af Sedan-Mezieres and de

take a position on the Piateau of Illy resting his right 

Sedan and his left against the inaccessible Foret des 

nes. Under cover of this very impregnable positio

army was to start on its retreat via Mezieres. Th

would have been excellent, had not the columns of the 

Army already crossed the Meuse at Donchery. 

This circumstance was known to General Wimpffe

as a help in distress, had arrived on 30 August from 

by way of Paris and carried two ministerial army or

his pocket. The one named him commander of the V 
with the command. Seeing, however, tha

the basis of false suppositions, was on the 

the army to destruction, he made use of his 

the post of commander-in-chief, which was 

him willingly, and decided not to go back to 

advance to Carignan and seek in that direct

tion, avoided in the former. The divisions 

had already started on the march, received 

The situation which had just been altered, wa

Vassoigne’s Division and Laeretelle’s Divisi

eelle were to execute the mighty stroke v

powerful break through the enemy was to b

rific artillery fire started the decisive battle f

east of Balan at 9 :00 AM. Infantry advanc

Givonne, drove back the 10 Saxon companie

rapid fire on the Saxon Corps artillery whic

to 300 paces from the trench. It had to ret

a position farther to the rear if it were not 

by the fire of the advancing sharpshooters. 

the latter came into the open they were rece

and artillery fire and forced to retreat. 

houses, and gardens of Bazeilles there was 

of success, The fight in the streets, lulled fo

more fiercely than ever. The attempt to br

enemy had miscarried. In order to be p

a repetit,ion of the danger just avoided, th

trcops, which had remained behind, was a

23d Division following the 24th not via La

the road to Eazeilles, took part with one brig

bat of the Bavarians at Monvillers and ke

reserve at le Tulle. The Bavarian 4th Eriga

La Moncelle, The Bavarian I Corps and the 

assembled on the lower Givonne, the IV ad

7th Division to the right, with the 8th to the 
gy p p

talion in a small wood, with the two others on the 

left of this point, in order to await the arrival of 

advancing on a narrow front. Several attacks 

pulsed, but were always repeated by fresh troops. 

wing offered protection for some time to the art

But when it was forced by hostile skirmishers 

somewhat to the south, the three battalions were 

and found themselves in a very critical situation

munition threatened to give out. Distress was g

a Jager battalion came to the rescue. But as it ha

all its force8 against the superior enemy, it soon 

munition also. Only when another Jager batt

finally an infantry regiment of the 24th Division 

up, a counterattack was launched against the en

rior in numbers but in deeper formation who, 

both sides could not reach quickly enough Daigny, 

and the heights opposite, left 6 guns in the ha

Saxons. Further combat at this point was limite

tinuous firing, in which the French had the adv

account of the height of the right bank and of be

In the meanwhile the Guard Corps had arriv

from Pouru-aux-Bois, partly from Pouru-St.-R

Franeheval at Villers Cernay. The 2d Guard Div

sent to the northern point of the Bois Chevalier 

sistance of the Saxons, the 4th Brigade still farth

direction of Daigny. The 1st Guard Division oc

vonne and Haybes and advanced to the wood east o

The Guard Cavalry Division covered the right f

of the wood, the regiment of Guard Hussais cove

direction of La Chapelle. The corps in this po

outflanked by the left flank of the enemy. Ther

no thought of surrounding him. It was possib

other hand, that the French, by throwing in their 

might surround the German right wing via the 
g 

tiative of subaltern leaders then brought a q

affairs. 

In the two isolated houses on the road to B

La Moncelle two Saxon companies had main

position for hours, through the changes brough

vance and retreat of the French. In order to fre

their distress an advance was made from La 

south of it, first by Bavarian and later by S

The garrison of the two houses was relieved. 

troops, fighting in the valley, followed this mov

heights were attaeked also from the park of 

All stormed forward to the defile leading from 

Daigny via Hill 635. The French evacuated 

not witbout resistance, and left three guns an

prisoners in the hands of the Germans. 

The occupation of the ridge south of the La 

Balan road alarmed the defenders of Bazeille

their retreat threatened. Threatened, moreove

south and east by the 1st Brigade, from the we

Brigade of the Bavarian II Corps sent from t

of the Neuse, they started to retreat in the 

Balan. After 7 hours of fierce fighting, the B

mained masters of burning Bazeilles. 

A general onrush of the Germans must 

During the long hours of fighting in the streets 

Map 101. had become mixed up. The entire Bavarian 

taken baek to be reformed. Only isolated com

lowed by the 5th Brigade, pursued the enemy th

and to the heights north of the village. The 

tented themselves, in general, with the occup

conquered position, on the left wing of which, 

flooded meadowland, the 6th Brigade was adva

The commander of the Army of the Me

served, since early morning the course of the c
to help the lat.ter as soon as possible. Orders had b

hours before that, immediately after the taking 

vonne entrenchments, the Guard Corps should march 

neux, and the XII Corps to the ridge east of S

via Illy for junction with the Third Army. The 

I Corps was charged to cover in the direction of 

march of the Army of the Meuse. General von 

declared that, according to existing circumstances, 

not execute this command and asked the 8th D

undertake the task. The division, which had c

close and some of whose companies had taken p

latest combats, was ready to undertake, jointly 

Bavarian 3d Division (5th and 6th Brigades) the 

set before the corps. Security against Sedan se

to be established. The retreat of the Guard and X

was more difficult. For not the entire entrenchme

vonne, but only its southernmost part had been tak

main body of the enemy might be expected abov

and then Balan. The XII Corps would meet it g

La Moncelle via Illy to the heights southwest o

and the Guard Corps would encounter it in march

Givonne to Fleigneux. The latter wouldt conseque

drive the enemy from the heights west of Givo

march further to Fleigneux and prepare the attack 

artillery, sending only the Guard Cavalry Divisio

valley of the Givonne along the hostile front on th

Fleigneux. The XII Corps could have driven off t

standing south of the Fond de Givonne-Haybes 

then advanced to Illy. By an attack of this corps 

south, the Guard Corps from the east, the Third A

the north and west, the enemy would have been 

driven together. The XII Corps, however, wanted 

Illy by a mar& along the Givonne and took its troo

the position west of La Noncelle. The 8th Division 

position in a bend on both sides of the La Moneel
gp

could reach the glacis of Sedan. On the right, 

south of Fond De Givonne stood isofat,ed com

fire and that of the Prussian artillery forced t

teries which were covering the withdrawal, to 

in rear of Hill 656. 

While in the corner between Balan and Fo

the French XII Corps was retreating, the righ

I Corps stood on the road from Bazeilles run

635 northward, fighting against the seven ba

24th Division which had occupied Daigny. In 

by side, separated only by Hill 765, stood 

fronting west, and the French, fronting east, 

Aict. This situation of utter harmlessness m

up, when the 23d German Division started 

PM, with the 45th Brigade (9 battalions, 4 ba

west,ern valley road, with the 46th Brigade (

first behind the 45th then on the eastern va

Monvillers past La Moncelle. The advance 

45th Brigade met with unexpected enemies in t

of Daigny, Six companies were sent to the 

march was continued under their cover. The 

ing violence of the rifle fire decided the Division 

Genera1 Montbe, to halt the head of the left c

bes, and to send 6 more companies to the hi11 

to deploy with 6 battalions and 4 batteries 

edge of the valley. The 7 battalions of the 24th 

to hold Daigny. Thirteen battahons, and four 

kept in reserve, while 3 battalions only were 

the attack, Fortunately the latter were j

Grenadier battalions of the Kaiser Franz 

They pursued the enemy when he was driv

woods, and ascended by companies and battal

(3B”Theywere at the head of the 2d Guard 

Daigny. 
py 

Meuse and thus to open a road to Car&an. 

Division driven back and likewise exhausted, re

a few regiments of infantry and battalions of Z

to march through Bazeilles. Goze’s Division was 

for a secondary attack in the direction of Daigny 

&’s Division was sent in rear of the latte

echelon. Emperor NapoIeon was invited to take 

undertaking for the purpose of being the first to 

dom at the head of his faithful troops. While 

was waiting on the site of the old camp at Vi

principal person, Goze moved to Daigny and met, 

goal, the five Saxon-Prussian battalions which h

the edge of the valley between Daigny and Hay

protection of Montbe’s left flank. At a run, rifles 

firing continually, the deep columns stormed for

shells of the rapidly firing German artillery tore 

masses or hurled them down, Swarms only re

stormed on still firing, but were so broken up by 

firing skirmishers that only a few brave men 

German line, where they were either killed or ca

companies of t,he IOlst Regiment, one battalion 

Regiment and the two battalions of the Kaiser 

ment pursued the remnants in the direction 

Givonne. As soon as the ridge on either side 

de Givonne-Haybes road had fallen into the h

Saxons, the corps artillery units of the 45th B

the divisional artillery were dispatched via G

46th Brigade was directed into that village, a

Division was assembled and placed in reserve eas

Thus the Army of the Meuse and the thre

divisions succeeded after 3 :OQ PM, in gaining a 

on the ridge on the right bank of the Givonne betw

fes and Haybes. One Bavarian Division had b

ward Sedan via Balan. The 1st Guard Divisio

cupied Givonne on the right, while 10 batteries h
bridges below the bridge of Donchery and ha

ments across the Meuse for the protection 

Map 100. crossings. After crossing the river early in 

the XI Corps marched in three coIumns, in e

battle, against the enemy, who had been obse

between St. Menges and Mezieres, via Mon

court, and Ma’rancourt to Vrigne-aux-Bois, t

column to Vivier-au-Court (Map 99). The 

Division threw a bridge across at Dom-le-M

companied the two corps as a left echelon. 

patrol of the enemy was seen during the marc

quarters ordered a turn to the right toward St. 

execution of the order seemed to raise appreh

to be expected that the defile of the Falizette 

be found hermetically closed and that Viney 

from Mezieres against the rear of the colum

the right. This general, however, limited him

dary undertakings against the erossings of th

could be easily repulsed by the Wurttemberg 

the defi!e at Fatizette was found unoccupied. 

elements encountered the enemy only at St. 

viilage was taken and occupied and one co

Hill 812 south of the same and two to Floing. 

ceeded in occupying the northern part of the 

superior hostile forces which held the souther

hill in rear of it, whiIe the former occupied a s

rounded by walls. Reinforced by several 

formed the cover for the 14 batteries of the X

trotted past the marching column, graduahy 

going into position on the hi11 between St

Floing and opened fire on the French artillery 

a much more favorable position on the sout

tween Calvaire d’Illy and Floing. 
Brigade was to turn from St. Albert to Floing, the 

vision to take up position between St. Menges and Fle

the 9th on the Champ de la Grange. The enemy wa

on the north. Not only vehicles, but even cavalry 

tillery, attempting to flee at the last moment via 

Fleigneux, were driven back or captured. The probl

was to drive the enemy from the north back to Se

toward the Army of the Meuse. 

General Wimpffen had thought, in the beginnin

the fights at St. Menges were only demonstrations 

were to prevent him from supporting the troops on th

Givonaa The increasing cannonade in the northwes

ed him to inquire personally into the condition of th

of the VII Corps. 

Since the commanding general, Douay, recom

the reinforcement of the garrisons of Cnlvaire d’

Bois de la Carenne, General Wimpffen ordered the t

sions of the I Corps, I’Herriller’s and Pelle’s standing 

serve, to be called and himself hastened back to the XII 

He found that corps in full retreat and sent word to 

to support him with all the troops he could spare. 

ter sent Mousson’s Brigade, attached to his comma

on repeated request, one division of his corps was a

in the direction of Bazeilles. The troops of the 

which were to support the VII, and troops of the VI

which were to support the XII, were still occupied in 

de la Gnrenne, in marching to the north and south res

ly, when the 26 batteries, on the heights of St. Men

Fleigneux, directed their full fire against t,he hostile 

and the Cafvaire d’Illy. They found a very strong 

in the Guard batteries east of Givonne. Many 

guns were shattered under the crossfire of these tw

lery lines or silenced through the loss of their gun

great number of caissons were exploded and the as
Map 100. . 

Under their fire and that of the two artil

fenders of the advanced bulwark melted 

The Guard Cavalry Division, arriving on 

Givonne at La Foulerie, sent two platoons 

of the Guard, followed by one squadron, 

penetrated to the batteries, and took one 

return, driven off by the fire from Bois de 

retreat of the defenders was, nevertheless

bold deed and a company from Illy was ab

without losses, the Galvaire, take position 

fire on the well defended northern edge of 

General Douay quickly assembled a fe

charged the lost hill repeatedly. Every ti

was forced to abandon it, by the infantry 

artillery fire from front, flank, and rear. T

80th Regiments occupied finally the Calva

strip from Hill 920 as far as the Givonne 

Opposite them the enemy held the edge of 

Greater trouble than the Calvaire d’Ill

attacker by the other wing of the French n

two companies, occupying the northern pa

out for two hours without support. Grad

the fierce artillery fire, one company after 

to their reinforcement from the main positio

sufficient forces had been assembled, a su

was made against the southern part of the v

driven back after a bloody battle and the 

neighboring hi11 in front of the southeaster

lage occupied. The companies of the 83d

Regiments weakened by obstinate fighting, 

to take the steep hill on the southeast and 

did not believe that the long disputed villa

from the victors. Being in a supposedly 

tion, it awaited the attack. 
Cazal, the Ieft wing straight up the slope. As 

Brigade had started its movement, the garrison 

joined in the attack of the line: la Maladrie-the 

It was not an easy thing to climb the steep ascent 

to point, from thicket to thicket, under the fire a

attacks of the enemy. The attack was repeate

back to FIoing. Lieutenant von Bardeleben s

bringing eight guns into position on Hill 812 c

slope. The artillery fire from north and west s

down the defenders of the narrow plateau. T

of Gaulier helped to shake their steadfastness. 

mans succeeded in winning the hill. As soon as th

lines climbed the steep ascents and reached the 

plateau, they were charged by cavalry. Margue

vision had come up from the Bois de la Garerme to 

aspect to the day. The mass of troopers had a

thrown into confusion on the road to Floing by th

of the Prussian batteries and the obstacles in t

Still the charge was executed with impetus and 

sacrifice. The thin lines of skirmishers were ov

the first impact. Even the battery position was e

few detachments charged into Floing and eve

Albert causing confusion among trains and ve

many points hand to hand fights ensued. Wit

saber, and rammers did the Germans defend 

against the furious attacks of the French. Bu

fire of the steadfast rifles finaIIy broke the stren

powerful rush. Repeated attacks only met wit

resistance since the advancing infantry had 

large numbers the edge of the plateau and nes

abandoned entrenchments. 

The 43d Brigade pursued the retreating 

penetrated to the eastern edge of Cazal. Pursu

here, 300 paces from the fortress. The 17th B

sent as support. The former garrison of FYoing 
Kurchbach directed the 19th Brigade, from Flei

Fleigneux Creek. The brigade was joined by 

panies of the XI Corps, which had been employe

time as artihery supports, garrisons of villages, 

crossed the valley of Illy under severe losses, a

northern ridge between Calvaire d’IlIy and Floin

the troops at that point, and, with the help of th

advancing from Floing, and the support of a fe

which accompanied them, stormed the southern 

enemy was driven back into the Bois de la Gare

the Meuse along the eastern edge of Cazal and 

edge of the woods as far as Calvaire d’Illy, and 

Foulerie, the Germans cut the enemy off from t

north. 

The greater portions of the I and VII Cor

with the reinforcements which had been sent 

south, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, all in co

sembled and sought refuge in the Bois de la Gar

rose from the battlefield between the Meuse, G

Menges, and Fleigneux, and commanded all the 

heights. Upon these masses, artillery fire w

from the north, northwest, and east. The Guar

which had advanced closer to the Givonne, fired 

by battery and by piece on the woods east of the 

road. When the guns seemed to have obtained 

fect, the advance guard and the 1st Guard Briga

the woods from the northeast in the direction of 

while the 45th Brigade penetrated into the southe

The completely disorganized French troops retrea

not without resistance, in the direction of Sedan. 

met on the road by companies of the XI and V 

the west, by the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Regime

east, and by two battalions of the Kaiser Franz 

which had advanced to the quarries north of 

‘vonne. 
, gy g 

Brigade and the reinforcements which had been bro

it from the 6th. 

This attack, however, went to pieces against th

arriving from Bazeilles and La Moncelle and under 

of the Prussian batteries on Hill 635. Repeated o

the Emperor to enter into negotiations with the en

celerated the decision to withdraw. It was high 

bring the battle to a close. The batteries of the B

II Corps, which had remained on the Ieft bank of the 

and of the Wurttemberg Division had opened fire 

Sedan itself and the Crown Prince of Saxony had 

ordered the XII and the Guard Corps to move their 

into effective range of the fortress. 

The negotiations, begun late in the evening, res

11 :OQ AM the next day in the surrender of 113,000 

cluding 14,000 wounded, and 549 guns. 

A battle of Cannae had at last been fought, a 

surrounding of the enemy achieved, None of th

generals of the last century had known the course 

battle on the Aufidus. Only its final results floate

their eyes as a goal to be striven for. King Frederic

almost sufficient forces were at his disposition at th

ning of the Seven Years’ War, invested the Saxons a

the Austrians at Prague. But with this his means 

an end. His remaining forces were not strong en

attack on all sides a second Austrian army, which w

ing to the rescue. He therefore limited himself at 

containing the front and striking the annihilating 

the right flank. The Prussian left wing, designated 

this attack, struck o&y the extended front of the Au

The weak Prussian army, moreover was not strong 

for a frontal attack against the strong position; it 
faced toward the threatened side in a deep 

could now be enveloped on their new front 

left. They were defeated and compelled th

change of front, to retreat by the Rank un

At Zorndorf the surrounding movement wa

the Prussian army stood in rear of the Rus

hurriedly faced right about. The Russi

against the Cider by enveloping attacks, 

right, then against the left Bank. They 

rounded. One more attack and they wouId 

hilated. Rut such a last attack could neve

ried through by the exhausted Pruss’ians

against the power of resistance of the 

would have been decimated and rendered un

uation of the war. Tbe Russians had a doo

by which they could escape. They were 

but eliminated for that campaign. When t

following year, Frederick wanted to attack 

sides at Kunersdorf and, in spite of their s

annihil’ate them. The attack broke again

strong position of the enemy and was tran

annihilating defeat. One thing had, howev

this Cannae : the Russians continued to ruin

der the Prussian territory, but under no circ

they allow themselves to be enticed into a ba

ick. The mere report “the King is coming” 

them f?ee. 

Frederick abandoned perforce the at

sides and at Torgau tried an attack against 

The aftaek was repulsed, but the fire from 

proved insupportable. The Austrians retre

by the only flank left open to them. Only 

been concluded with Russia and this peace 

an alliance, did Frederick return to the norm

front, flank, and rear. The Austrians, how
g , , 

those of Frederick, with a minority in the vicinit

battlefield, but carrying him after days and weeks 

are with vastly superior numbers, into the rear of th

Ke then attacked enveloping both his wings, or be

allowed the weaker enemy to attack him, in order 

the annihilating blow after the exhaustion of his 

From the very beginnizg be made Hasdrubal’s de

tack on the enemy’s rear, his principal stroke, jus

been done at Zorndorf and Torgau, enveloped his 

in rear and on both flanks, and left open to the Austr

Prussians only the front in the direction of France. 

they might go, followed by superior forees. This 

at Marengo and Urn, the immediate annihilation o

my. At Jena it had to be attained by a leng

suit. The battIe which had begun at Vierzehnheilig

brought to a tragic conclusion at Prenzlau and 

Likewise the Beresina, in the campaign of MOSCO

the seal of a terrible Cannae, as t.he piercing a

brought about the conclusion of the gigantic c

1313. 

In the campaign of Prussian-Eylau the 

movement did not lead against the rear, but ag

flank of the enemy, who knew how to escape th

small turning movement likewise. Napoleon sto

site the weaker enemy. A mass attack against t

a weak attaek against one Bank, strong reserves h

were to bring the solution of the simple problem. 

brought about in a contrary sense by the oppon

outflanked the weak flanking attack. Frederick t

failed in many a battle of annihilation, because h

were too smal1 and he had nevertheless dared the 

Napoleon faiIed at Prussian-Eylau, because he h

too much on a frontal attack, left too much in res

used too littIe on the decisive flank attack. 
Austerlitz, because the enemy on his part 

of the turning columns with superior streng

Once more did NapoIeon fight an almo

battle. The enemy placed himself at Frie

sition exceedingIy favorable for his annihila

his rear against the Alle, the front agains

almost double his strength and, moreover, b

which alone could help. him to escape. T

did not entirely succeed because Napoleon 

one flank and the front, leaving the othe

order to keep strong reserves in case of even

strong reserves could not decide his battie b

lessen his victories. 

According to the principle of Cannae 

line goes forth against a narrower, but g

one. The overlapping wings turn against 

cavalry preceding them, against the rear. S

be separated from the center, for some rea

is not necessary to assemble them against t

der to continue jointly the march for a 

tack, as they can immediately advance, by t

against flank or rear, This was what Mo

junction of separated units on the field of 

clares it the highest achievement of a gen

the most effective and, of course, the most r

erals and almost all abIe commanders appreh

of the units being defeated before their jun

ously endeavor to execute the junction of 

and on the battlefield itself, but as long as 

the battle. In this manner they relinquish 

sult and must be satisfied with a lesser or 

whatever. The former was experienced 

Regensburg, the Iatter at Gross-Gorsehen, 

humanity, and MoItke wouId have experien

the other had he listened to the advice of his 
den, and the Prussian First Army might have 

Koniggratz had Benedek started early in the 

the 3d of July to fall upon Prince Frederick C

his entire force. The consequences would have 

the victor would soon have had to leave the van

order to turn against one of the enemies who w

ening his flanks, that the defeated opponent w

advance, and so through apparent victory the fina

ing and annihilation would be materially furth

were not thus made entirely possible. This is 

the campaign of 1813 and the wars of 1815 and 

order to defeat one of the separated enemies a

him with combined forces, the remainder must

away that no interference can be expected from 

Prague in 1757. Should they come closer, the 

forces must be divided for parry. Units fight 

weaker enemy, standing in the center has no pre

anywhere and is lost as soon as it is possible t

the forces of the stronger opponent on the battle

Leipzig, Waterloo, or Koniggratz. The weake

Frederick, would have been lost at Bunzelwitz, 

sians and Austrians, intimidated by previous 

had not renounced the difficuh attack. 

‘It is desirable to have, for any kind of C

numerieal superiority in one’s favor. Moltke ha

it in 1870. A large crushing coalition threatened 

Moltke held to the principle for which he had 

1866: no observation corps, no armies, where 

enemy. All the 16 corps were destined for Fra

French Army assembled in Lorraine and Alsac

the Rhine above Karlsruhe and invade South G

was easy for the Germans to stem the stream 

vasion. As Napoleon in 1806 turned the front o

sian army assembled north of the Thuringian 

rapid marches from the right, MoItke turned 
wanted, after they had been completely t

the turning columns as at Rossbach. T

tention, executed lamely, had a sorry end 

1806, and would have in 1870 led to the at

of the French Army had it advanced in 

Mayence--Manheim, which would hardly 

mitted to recross the Saar. A premonition 

happen held Napoleon back. Thus the 

were able to advance to the Saar and Lauter

corresponded to the Napoleonic strategy 

Germans in 1870 had crossed the Meuse 

wing and had forced the French, did the 

refuse battle, in a southerly direction to the 

Swiss frontier. The incomplete railway 

ago did not allow such an operation. The 

detriment of the right, had to be made v

was to bring the decision. The Third Arm

started two days earlier to throw back the e

assembling in Alsace, and to attack by turnin

the French main army in flank and rear, 

and Second Armies attacked its front. 

because the First and Second Armies had s

and the Third too late. The French Army 

Alsace, but in Lorraine it could retreat to M

ly damaged. With the great numerical su

Germans it would have been most simple t

emy and to turn wit,h the two overlapping 

his flanks after a strong cavalry had stop

The equipment and armament of the caval

not appear to allow such operations at the 

the 5th Cavalry Division stopped parts of th

on 15 and 16 August, at Vionville, fro

vance and even forced them to retreat. Th

have solved the problem given by General v

to the III Corps on 16 August, i.e., the haltin
three armies, accompany him, if necessary in paral

suit, on his retreat to Metz, turn to the right at a fa

moment and drive him to the Luxemburg and 

frontiers, thus completing the surrounding moveme

plan was furthered by the halt which the fortress 

and the battle of Colombey forced upon the French 

but was spoiled by the slowness and irresolution of th

ments of the German armies, by the small number of 

‘over the MoseIle, the unfavorable network of roads 

left bank and not a little by the cautious hesita

Bazaine, to give up connection with the protecting f

The Marshal was not without reason persuaded 

Metz were abandoned and the open reached, he w

attacked on all sides and annihilated. Nevertheless 

intention would probably have been fulf?lled if Gen

Barnekow had been allowed on 16 August to 

through the Bois des Ognons with the 25th Divisi

through the Bois de Vaux against the road : Rezo

Point du Jour. It would have been difficult for Ba

find a road which was not either barred by the e

swept by his fire. He wouId have gone in the n

direction that Moltke wished him to take. But since 

kow had been used, as customary, for fruitless fron

tacks and the 25th Division could only come up v

in his stead, the principa1 road of retreat was left 

the French. The Germans had to give up the anni

of the enemy for the time and be satisfied with his 

ment in Mefz, i.e., with hopes for the future. 

MacHahon. aho had to be driven by frontal atta

attacks against his right flank toward the Belgian f

Since, however, the position of the camp near Cha

kheims did not offer sufficient advantages for defens

Mahon wanted to retire to Paris, before being s

threatened. The difficult situation of the Germans w

pletely changed in their favor by MacMahon’s forced 
could be easily brought up, the roads leadi

could be blocked. Only the retreat west h

for the present. MacMahon wanted to u

upon hearing of the advance of the Germ

mediately driven by Paris to inevitable 

the ten and one half German corps advanc

wing via Longuyon along the Belgian f

left, via Rethel, over all the existing road

four French corps would have been grad

driven to the Belgian frontier, whether 

or right, forward or back. Should they 

resistance on one or the other road, the Ge

these same roads in an opposite direction 

battle. The remaining corps, however, 

ther in the initial direction, first to see i

mies in front of them, and further be

have but one march to make to strike 

and give effective support to the neighbori

The Army of the Meuse did not wish 

the problem, laid before it on 30 Augus

enemies before it-on the Sommauthe-La 

Beaumont, on the Mouton-Stenay road a

at Carignan. ShouJd the two Bavarian co

road and the Army of the Meuse send 

Beaumont, and th.e Guard and XII Corps 

of the Meuse, it would have driven the thr

it and, what was still more important, w

their way to east and south. Army headq

did not wish to divide its forces, but wa

the five corps, three in the first line and 

in front of Beaumont. This freed at least 

without evil intent, forced by the measu

Germans and also by their omissions, wer

the flanks of the latter and at least show 

have happened had there been., in their p
to get at the enemy, had not lengthened the front

him to retire by outflanking him and thus somew

tened the planned retreat of the French. The resuh

by severe losses, amounted to just this acceleration. 

whole, the enemy, who must be pitiIessly encirc

freed from ail molestation and could retire calmly a

out danger in either of two directions. He fort

failed to use the advantage offered him by the 

enemy, and, after a short march, halted again 

nation to his fate before the annihilating blow, an

nately, Moltke was there to unravel the gigantic m

which the two German armies had assembled and 

possible an attack from three sides, and later fro

The numerical superiority of the Germans was 

that they might have executed the investment co

and yet could have given free scope to their inclin

mass troops on the narrowest space on the easte

It would not have been expedient to have been so 

gant, had the enemy extended his troops a little mo

strip along the Meuse between Sedan and Mezi

lengthening of the German wing beyond Meziere

then have been necessary. The forces on hand w

have sufficed to send one corps by each road, so 

average length which Moltke wanted to give the m

columns, after the experienee of 18’70, might h

reached in order to render a timely deployment 

Whether or not he would have retained this form 

length of a corps column, without trains, had 

from 15 to 29 km. remains unanswered. 

A eompIete battle of Cannae is rarely met in 

For its achievement, a Hannibal is needed on the 

and a Terentius Varro, on t.he other, both cooper

the attainment of the great goal. 

A Hannibal must possess, if not a superiority 

bers, the knowledge how to create one. It is desi
the Great or a Napoleon, to direct the 

against the flank or rear, of a Frederick 

MoItke to replace t.he absent Hasdrub& 

stacle or the frontier of a neutral state. 

needed subordinate commanders, well train

fession, and able to comprehend the intention

A Terentius Varro has a great army, 

his best to increase and train it. He d

his forces against the principal enemy. H

to vanquish by fire superiority from seve

the weight of masses in narrow and deep fo

ing for attack the hostile front as being 

pable of resistance. 

All these desirable conditions will no

bined on either side. A few of Hanniba

some of the means at, his disposal were po

generals. Terentius Varro, on the other 

the produet of the school. Thus it happe

no real Cannae, with the exception of Sedan

there has been a whole series of nearly ann

and these have always been found at the 

history. 

ii- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF