Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A

Strategic Approach

September 1994

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Foreword

0

ver the next two decades, Earth observations from space promise to become increasingly important for predicting the weather,

studying global change, and managing global resources. How

the U.S. government responds to the political, economic, and

technical challenges posed by the growing interest in satellite remote

sensing could have a major impact on the use and management of global

resources.

The United States and other countries now collect Earth data by

means of several civilian remote sensing systems. These data assist federal and state agencies in carrying out their legislatively mandated programs and offer numerous additional benefits to commerce, science, and

the public welfare. Existing U.S. and foreign satellite remote sensing

programs often have overlapping requirements and redundant instruments and spacecraft. This report, the final one of the Office of Technology Assessment analysis of Earth Observations Systems, analyzes the

case for developing a long-term, comprehensive strategic plan for civilian satellite remote sensing, and explores the elements of such a plan, if it

were adopted. The report also enumerates many of the congressional decisions needed to ensure that future data needs will be satisfied.

In undertaking this effort, OTA sought the contributions of a wide

spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided

information; others reviewed drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their

contributions of time and intellectual effort. OTA also appreciates the

help and cooperation of officials with the Department of Defense, the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

(7+AzQ. .

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director
Advisory Panel

Rodney Nichols, Chairman David Goodenough

Chief Executive Officer Chief Research Scientist

New York Academy of Sciences Pacific Forestry Center

Forestry Canada

James G. Anderson

Professor Donald C. Latham

Department of Chemistry Vice President

Harvard University Loral Corp.

William Brown

President

ERIM

Ronald Brunner

Professor of Political Science

Center for Public Policy Research

University of Colorado

Joanne Gabrynowicz

Associate Professor

Department of Space Studies

University of North Dakota

Alexander F. Goetz

Director

Center for Aerospace Sciences

University of Colorado

Cecil E. Leith

Livermore, CA

John H. McElroy

Dean of Engineering

The University of Texas at

Arlington

Molly Macauley

Fellow

Resources for the Future

Earl Merritt

President

Space Systems Markets

Alan Miller

Director

The Center for Global Change

University of Maryland

Raymond E. Miller

Professor

Department of Computer Science

University of Maryland

Kenneth Pederson

Research Professor of

International Affairs

Georgetown University

Washington, DC

David T. Sandwell

Geological Research Division

Scripps Institute of Oceanography

Dorm Walklet

President

TerrNOVA Int.

Albert Wheelon

Montecito. CA

iv
Peter Blair

Assistant Director, OTA

Industry, Commerce, and

International Security Division

Alan Shaw

Director

International Security and

Space Program

Ray Williamson

Project Director

Arthur Charo

Project Staff

CONTRIBUTOR

Mark Suskin

CONTRACTORS

Mark Goodman

Cynthia Allen

Paul Bowersox

Leonard David

Madeline Gross

Russell Koffler

Paula Kern

Pamela L. Whitney

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Jacqueline Robinson Boykin

N. Ellis Lewis
workshop Participants

A National Strategy for Civilian Space-Based Remote Sensing

Scott Pace, Chairman

Policy Analyst

The RAND Corporation

Ghassem Asrar

EOS Program Scientist

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Col. Bill Campbell

Office of the Undersecretary of

Defense for Acquisition and

Technology

Department of Defense

Gary Chesney

Director of Business Development

LORAL Corporation

Frank Eden

EOS Project Scientist

Martin Marietta Astrospace

John Hussey

Director

Office of Systems Development

National Environmental Satellite,

Data, and Information Service

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

Ronald G. Isaacs

Vice-President for Applied

Research

Atmospheric and Environmental

Research, Inc.

David Johnson

Study Director

Committee on National Weather

Service Modernization

National Academy of Sciences

Russell Koffler

Consultant

Washington, DC

Berrien Moore

Director

Institute for the Study of Earth,

Oceans, and Space

The University of New Hampshire

Carl Schueler

Manager

Advanced Development Programs

Hughes Santa Barbara Research

Center

Chris Scolese

Office of Science and Technology

Policy

Executive Office of the President

Philip Schwartz

Head

Remote Sensing Division

Naval Research Laboratory

Brent Smith

Chief

International and Interagency

Affairs

National Environmental Satellite,

Data, and Information Service,

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

William Townsend

Deputy Assistant Administrator

for Mission to Planet Earth

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Robert Watson

Associate Director, Office of

Science and Technology Policy

Executive Office of the President

Milt Whitten

Manager, DMSP/NOAA Programs

Lockheed Missiles and Space

Company

vi
Acknowledgments

This report has benefited from the advice of many individuals. In addition to members of the advisory

panel and the workshops, the Office of Technology Assessment especially would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance and support. The views expressed in this paper, however, are the

sole responsibility of OTA.

Richard Beck

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Donald Blersch

Anser Corp.

Dixon Butler

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Barbara Cherry

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Lt. Col. Laura Kennedy

U.S. Air Force

Linda Moodie

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

John Morgan

Eumetsat

Jeffrey Rebel

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

Eric Rodenberg

World Resources Institute

Lisa Shaffer

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Jack Sherman

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

Ashbindu Singh

GRID

Milton C. Trichel

ERIM

Hassan Virji

START Secretariat

Greg Withey

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

vii
contents

Executive Summary 1

Elements of a Strategic Plan 1

Data Collection 3

1 Findings and Policy Options 5

Need for a Strategic Plan 10

Structural Elements of a Strategic Plan 13

Limitations of a Strategic Plan 21

Monitoring Weather and Climate 22

Land Remote Sensing 28

Ocean Remote Sensing 32

2 National Remote Sensing Needs

and Capabilities 37 -

National Uses of Remote Sensing 38

U.S. Remote Sensing Capabilities 44

Matching Capabilities to Needs 52

3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing

Systems 57

A National Strategic Plan for Environmental Satellite

Remote Sensing Systems 58

Monitoring Weather and Climate 63

Land Remote Sensing and Landsat 86

Ocean Remote Sensing 95

4 International Cooperation and

Competition 101

International Remote Sensing Needs 103

The Benefits and Risks of International

Cooperation 104

International Competition in Remote Sensing 110

National Security Issues 112

Options for International Cooperation 116

ix
A

B

c

D

E

F

G

NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth 129

Survey of National and International

Programs 131

Convergence of U.S. POES

Systems 142

A Brief Policy History of Landsat 145

Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy 148

Clinton Administration Policy

on Remote Sensing Licensing

and Exports 152

Abbreviations 155
Executive

Summary

o

ver the past two decades, data from Earth sensing satellites have become important in helping to predict the

weather, improve public safety, map Earth’s features and

infrastructure, manage natural resources, and study environmental change. In the future, the United States and other countries are likely to increase their reliance on these systems to gather

useful data about Earth.

U.S. and foreign satellite remote sensing systems often have

overlapping requirements and redundant capabilities. To improve the nation’s return on its investment in remote sensing

technologies, to meet the needs of data users more effectively,

and to take full advantage of other nations’ capabilities, Congress may wish to initiate a long-term, comprehensive plan

for Earth observations. A national strategy for the development

and operation of future remote sensing systems could help guide

near-term decisions to ensure that future data needs will be satisfied. By harmonizing individual agency priorities in a framework

of overall national priorities, a strategic plan would help ensure

that agencies meet broad-based national data needs with improved efficiency and reduced cost.

ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGIC PLAN

A comprehensive strategic plan would endeavor to:

■ incorporate the data needs of both government and nongovernment data users,

■ improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of space and datahandling systems,

■

n

involve private operators of remote sensing systems,

incorporate international civilian operational and experimental

remote sensing programs, and 1
2 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

■ guide the development of new sensor and

spacecraft technologies.

I Meeting Data Requirements

To provide the foundation for a strategic plan, the

federal government should aggregate and consider specific data needs from all major data users.

Options for strengthening the process for setting

data requirements include:

m

■

■

developing methods to increase the interactions among users, designers, and operators of

remote sensing systems,

involving a broader range of users in discussions of requirements, and

developing a formal process for revising

agency satellite programs in response to

emerging capabilities and needs from a broadened user base.

Federal government civilian operators and

data users

Scientists

Operational users (e.g., resource

managers, planners, geographers)

Military and intelligence users

Private industry

Value-added companies

Data suppliers

Commercial data users

State and local governments

Nonprofit sector

Universities

Environmental organizations

9 Private Sector

A strategic plan for Earth observations should

capitalize on the expertise resident in private

industry. The collection of private firms that supply data-processing and -interpretation services is

small but growing rapidly. In setting requirements

for future remote sensing systems, the federal

government may wish to take into account the

needs of private-sector data users, who provide an

important source of innovative applications of remotely sensed data.

U.S. firms are now developing land and ocean

sensing systems with new capabilities. If private

systems succeed commercially, they are likely

to change the nature and scope of the data market dramatically. Congress could assist the remote sensing industry and enhance its international competitiveness by:

directing federal agencies to purchase data

rather than systems from private industry.

providing oversight to ensure that federal agencies do not compete with industry in developing software, providing analytic services, and

developing remote sensing systems, and

supporting the development of advanced

technologies to assist government remote

sensing programs and private-sector needs.

International Cooperation

To reduce costs and improve the effectiveness

of remote sensing programs, a strategic plan

should include mechanisms for exploiting international capabilities. The open exchange of

data is essential to international cooperation in remote sensing, especially for weather forecasting,

global change research, ocean monitoring, and

other applications that require data on a global

scale. To enhance the benefits of international

cooperation in remote sensing, the United States

could consider pursuing one or more of the following:

●

m

●

increase U.S. efforts to promote sharing of data

gathered from national systems,

participate in a formal international division of

labor, which would allow countries to specialize in the types of data they collect, and

support development of an international remote sensing agency, to which each participating nation would contribute funding to develop an international satellite system.
Executive Summary 13

Canada

European Space Agency (ESA)

European Organisation for the Exploration of

L. Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat) (ESA)

France

Germany

Japan

Russia

United States

DATA COLLECTION

As part of its strategic plan, the United St

needs to improve its programs for:

■

■

■

■

■

B

ates

collecting atmospheric data to support weather

forecasting and severe-weather warning,

monitoring the land surface,

monitoring the oceans and ice caps,

collecting data to support research on global

environmental change, and

monitoring key indicators of global change and

environmental quality over decades.

Converging the Polar-Orbiting

Meteorological Satellite Systems

The Clinton Administration’s plan to consolidate

the two polar-orbiting systems operated by the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Defense

(DOD) is one important component of a broader

strategic plan. DOD, NOAA, and NASA will contribute personnel and funding to an Integrated

Program Office within NOAA, which will operate

the converged polar-orbiting system.

This proposal arose from the desire to reduce

program redundancy and costs. Yet, convergence

of the agencies’ satellite programs into a single

program could have several benefits even if it

achieved no cost savings. These include the institutionalization of mechanisms for moving research instruments into operational use, the development of long-term environmental monitoring

programs, and the strengthening of international

partnerships.

The convergence plan would continue U.S.

cooperative relationships with Europe through

Eumetsat, which plans to operate the METOP-1

polar-orbiting meteorological satellite system beginning in 2000. The plan also increases U.S. dependence on Europe for meteorological data.

DOD’s desire to control the flow of data from U.S.

sensors aboard the Eumetsat METOP during

times of crisis may impede the completion of a

U.S.-Eumetsat agreement. In the future, the

United States and Eumetsat may wish to expand

their cooperative satellite program by including

Japan and/or Russia as partners.

The U.S. government has few examples of successful long-term, multiagency programs. Ensuring stable funding and stable management in programs that now involve multiple agencies and

multiple congressional authorization and appropriations committees will challenge Congress

and the Administration. Nevertheless, convergence of the polar-orbiting programs could serve

as an important experiment in determining the

feasibility of developing and executing a longterm strategic plan for Earth observations.

I Land Remote Sensing

Despite significant advances in remote sensing

technology and the steady growth of a market

for data, the United States continues to approach the Landsat program more as a research effort than a fully operational one. As

currently structured, the Landsat program is vulnerable to a launch-vehicle or spacecraft failure. It

has also suffered from instability in management

and funding. The current management arrangement, in which responsibility for satellite procurement, operation, and data distribution is split

among NASA, NOAA, and the U.S. Geological

Survey, risks failure should differences of opinion

about the value of Landsat arise among these

agencies or the appropriations committees of the

House and Senate.

High system costs have prevented the U.S.

government from committing to a fully operational land remote sensing system. To reduce taxpayer

costs, the government could:
4 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

= return to an EOSAT-like arrangement, in which

the government supplies a system subsidy but

allows the firm to sell the data at market prices,

■ contract with industry suppliers to provide data

of specified character and quality,

= create a public-private joint venture in which

the government and one or more private firms

cooperate in developing a land remote sensing

system, and/or

■ lead the development of an international land

remote sensing system with one or more foreign partners.

1 Ocean and Ice Remote Sensing

The United States may eventually wish to provide

ocean and ice data on an operational basis. Not

only do NASA, NOAA, and DOD have applications for scientific and operational data, but so

also do ocean fishing companies, private shipping

firms, and operators of ocean platforms. Europe,

Japan, and Canada are emerging as primary

sources of ocean and ice data for research and operational purposes. If Congress wishes to support

a U.S. commitment to civilian operational ocean

and ice monitoring, it could direct NASA, NOAA,

and DOD to:

■

■

■

●

■

broaden their scope for monitoring ocean and

ice on existing systems,

develop a comprehensive national ocean observation system,

take part in developing an international ocean

monitoring system,

purchase data from commercial satellite operators, or

rely primarily on data exchanges with other

countries.
and

Policv

Options 1

s

atellite systems supply information about Earth that assists federal, state, and local agencies with their legislatively mandated programs and that offers numerous additional benefits to commerce, science, and the public

welfare. To provide these benefits, the U.S. government current] y

operates or plans to develop five major civilian Earth sensing systems (table 1-1 ).

Three agencies—the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Defense

(DOD)-currently operate remote sensing systems that collect

unclassified data1 about Earth.2 These and other U.S. agencies

make extensive use of the remotely sensed data that these systems

generate. In addition, foreign countries and regional agencies

have satellite programs that generate remotely sensed Earth data

for national and global use (appendix B).3

Existing remote sensing satellite programs are characterized

by having overlapping requirements and redundant instruments

and spacecraft. This is the natural outgrowth of the way the

United States divides responsibilities within the federal government and an authorization and appropriations process that has encouraged agencies to develop and acquire space-based remote

1 l%i~ report is not concerned with any satellite system built exclusively for national

security purposes, except for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP),

whose data are available to civilians.

2 Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories also develop sensors that are incorporated

into operational and research satellites,

3 Canada expects to join this group in 1995 with the launch of Radarsat, now under 15

development.
6 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Existing systems Operator Primary objective status

Weather monitoring, severestorm warning, and environmental data relay.Two operational (one borrowed from Eumetsat);

GOES-8 (GOES-Next)

launched in April 1994; operational in October 1994.

Geostationary Operational

Environmental Satellite System

NOAA

,

(GOES)

Polar-orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite

System (POES)

NOAA Two partially operational; two

fully operational, launch as

needed.

Weather, climate observations; land, ocean observations; emergency rescue,

Defense Meteorological

Satellite Program (DMSP)

Air Force, for

DOD

Weather, climate observations.

One partially operational; two

fully operational; launch as

needed,

Landsat EOSAT, NASA,

NOAA, USGSb

Mapping, charting, geodesy; global change, environmental monitoring,

Landsat 4 and 5 operational;

Landsat 7 under development—-planned launch date

1998.

Mission to Planet Earth NASA

Upper Atmosphere NASA

Research Satellite (UARS)

Launched September 15,

1991; still operating.

Research on upper-atmosphere chemical and dynamical processes,

TOPEX/Poseidon NASA/CNESC

NASA

Research on ocean topography and circulation.Launched in August 1992; still

operating,

Earth Observing System

(EOS)

Global change research, EOS AM platform in advanced

planning; launch in 1998; EOS

PM in early planning; launch

in 2000, CHEM in early planning, launch in 2002.

Earth Probes (focused

process studies)

NASA Global change research, TOMS planned for launch in

1994; TRMM planned for

launch in 1997; others being

planned.

a The five major Earth sensing systems are GOES, POES, DMSP, Landsat, and EOS The United States also collects and archives Earth data for

non-U S satellites

b EOSAT, a private corporation, operates Landsats 4 and 5 for the government Landsat 6, launched in September 1993, failed to achieve orbit

when launched NASA, NOAA, and the U S Geological Survey will develop and operate a future Landsat 7.

c TOPEX/Poseidon IS a joint project between NASA and the French Space Agency, Centre National of dÉEtudes Spatiales (CNES)

SOURCE U S Congress, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994.

sensing systems uniquely suited to their particular

needs. NOAA’s two environmental satellite systems serve the needs of the National Weather Service and the general public. NOAA’s data are also

distributed free of charge to the larger international community. DOD’s Defense Meteorological

Satellite Program (DMSP) is designed to provide

similar weather data to support the surveillance,

war-fighting, and peacekeeping operations of

U.S. military forces. As part of its Mission to

Planet Earth program, NASA plans to build a series of satellites, including its Earth Observing

System (EOS), to gather data in support of research to understand and predict the effects of human activities on the global environment. The

Landsat system, developed by NASA and now

operated by the private corporation EOSAT under

contract to NOAA, provides multispectral data

about Earth’s surface for a wide variety of research

and applied uses. Other countries and organizations have developed similar satellites with distinct, but often overlapping, capabilities.

The United States now spends about $1.5 billion per year to collect and archive remotely
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options 17

■

■

■

■

reflected from the surface

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

sensed data. To maximize the nation return on its

investment in remote sensing technologies (box

l-l; figure l-l), to meet the needs of data users

more effectively, and to take full advantage of the

capabilities of other nations, Congress may wish

to initiate the development of a long-term, comprehensive strategic plan for civilian satellite remote sensing.4 A national strategy for the development and operation of future remote sensing

systems could help guide near-term decisions

to ensure that future data needs will be satisfied. By harmonizing agency priorities with

overall national priorities, a strategic plan

would help ensure that agencies carry out programs that serve national data needs, not just

the narrower interests of individual agencies.

As envisioned in this report, a strategic plan for

remote sensing would provide a general framework for meeting U.S. data needs for a diverse set

of data users in the public and private sectors. A

comprehensive strategic plan should remain flexible enough to respond effectively to changes in

remote sensing technologies and institutional

structures, and to improvements in scientific

knowledge. However, developing such a plan carries certain risks. Without careful attention to the

hazards that have jeopardized previous efforts to

coordinate programs that affect many participants,

4 u S Congress, ()~ce ofTechnolo~y Assessment, The Future ofRemote Sensingjiom Space: ci~tilian Satellife syStem.S and Applications, . .

OTA-ISC-558 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global

Change Research and NASA’.S Ear[h Ob.\er\[ng Sysfem, OTA-BP-ISC- 122 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November

1 993).
8 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Geosynchronous weather satellites

GOES-W

(USA)

1 12%V

/LA

(USA)

\

JERS-1 (JAPAN) MOS-2 (JAPAN)

I

-NOAA (usA)

b

GMS

(JAPAN)

14CPE

\

*OT(FRANcE) \

METEOR (RUSSIA) I

~~ METEOSAT

(EUMETSAT)

0’

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

a comprehensive plan could result in a cumbersome

management structure that is overly bureaucratic,

rigid, and vulnerable to failure. It could also undermine existing operational programs that have

met the needs of individual agencies.

This report, the last in a series of Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) reports and

background papers about civilian Earth remote sensing systems (box 1-2), examines elements of a comprehensive long-term plan for

U.S. satellite-based remote sensing. The assessment was requested by the House Committee on

Science, Space, and Technology; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Veterans Affairs, Housing and

Urban Development, and Independent Agencies;

and the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence.

This chapter outlines the elements that any strategic plan for satellite remote sensing must address and considers how the United States can best

position itself to achieve its short-term and longterm goals for space-based remote sensing. It

summarizes the assessment and analyzes policy

options for congressional consideration.

Remotely sensed data provide the basis for

unique kinds of information (box 1-3). Such ap-
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 9

Reports

■

■

■

1,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
10 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

placations of remotely sensed data are mirrored

around the world. Chapter 2: National Remote

Sensing Needs and Capabilities introduces applications of remotely sensed data and summarizes the primary characteristics of the satellite

systems that provide them. It also discusses the

process for determining what data are needed by

the federal government and other data users, and

considers the potential role of the private sector in

meeting data needs.

Chapter 3: Planning for Future Remote

Sensing Systems provides an overview of institutional and organizational issues surrounding the

development of operational environmental satellite remote sensing programs. In addition, the

chapter discusses the potential for creating a stronger partnership than now exists between NASA as

the developer of satellite research instruments and

NOAA as the operational user. The chapter further

explores the present and future status of the Landsat program, the involvement of the private sector

in remote sensing, and the potential for operational ocean sensing.

Because Earth remote sensing already has a

strong international component, a strategic plan

must consider the role of international partners

and competitors. Chapter 4: International

Cooperation and Competition examines the

part played by non-U.S. agencies and companies

in gathering and applying remotely sensed data. It

identifies the most important benefits and drawbacks of increased cooperation, including their

impact on national security and the competitive

position of the U.S. remote sensing industry. Finally, it analyzes a range of options for strengthening international cooperation in remote sensing,

including a possible international agency or consortium for remote sensing.

NEED FOR A STRATEGIC

Several factors underscore the importance of improving the U.S. approach to its remote sensing

efforts:

1. The expanding need for more and better data

about Earth. The experimental remote sensing

work of NASA, NOAA, and DOD in the 1960s

and 1970s demonstrated that gathering environmental and other Earth data from space was

both feasible and desirable (figure 1-2).

NOAA’s and DOD’s experience with collecting

data on an operational basis has led to ever

more capable remote sensing systems and the

development of a broad base of data users who

need reliable and accurate data for a varied set

of applications. Future long-term operational

data needs include:

■ Monitoring of weather and climate for accurate weather forecasting, which will continue to be important to the U.S. economy and

national security. In addition, the United

States has a developing interest in monitoring the global climate.

8 Monitoring of the land surface to assist in

global change research: management of natural resources; exploration for oil, gas, and

minerals; mapping; detection of changes;

urban planning; and national security activities.

D Monitoring of the oceans to determine such

properties as ocean productivity, extent of

ice cover, sea-surface winds and waves,

ocean currents and circulation, and oceansurface temperatures. Ocean data have particular value to the fishing and shipping industries, as well as to the U.S. Coast Guard

and Navy.

5 Operational programs have an established community of data users who depend on a steady or continuous flow of data products, longtenn stability in funding and management, a conservative philosophy toward the introduction of new technology, and stable data-reduction

algorithms.
2. The increasing concern over regional and

global environmental changes. The U.S.

Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)

and related international efforts grew out of a

growing interest among scientists and the public over the potentially harmful effects of human-induced regional and global environmental change. Satellite data, combined with data

gathered in situ, could provide the basis for a

deeper understanding of the underlying processes of regional and global change, leading to

useful predictions for the policy debate.

Today, scientists understand too little about

Earth’s physical and chemical systems to make

confident predictions about the effects of global change, particularly the effects on regional

environments. Data from NOAA’s and DOD’s

satellites systems will continue to be very useful

to global change scientists, yet these data are

not of sufficient breadth or quality to discern

subtle changes in climate or other components

of Earth’s environment. As its contribution to

the USGCRP, NASA has developed the EOS

satellite program, which will provide more detailed, calibrated data about Earth over a

15-year period (appendix A). NASA designed

the EOS program to improve scientists’ understanding of the processes of global change by

complementary airborne and ground-based

measurements.

3. A growing consensus within the scientific

community on the need for long-term, calibrated monitoring of the global environment.

Although EOS is not structured to collect environmental data over the decadal time scales scientists believe are needed to monitor the health

of the global environment, it would provide the

basis for designing an observational satellite

program capable of long-term, calibrated environmental observations. A long-term global

monitoring program will also require a coordinated program of measurements taken by air4.

craft and ground-based facilities, 6 and the

cooperation and involvement of other nations,

both to collect critical environmental data and

to share program costs.

The increasing pressures, in the United States

and abroad, to improve the cost-effectiveness

of space systems. Congress and the Clinton

Administration have reached consensus that to

control so-called discretionary spending in the

federal budget, funding for space systems must

remain steady or decrease. As noted in an earlier OTA report, a declining NASA budget is

likely to force the Administration and Congress

to make difficult decisions about NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth program, which competes

for funding with other NASA programs such as

the Space Station or the Shuttle.7 NASA’s

6 U.S. Congre\s, Offke of Technology Assessment, Global Chunge Research and NASA’s Earrh Ob.~er\’ing Sjstem, op. cit., pp. 4, 13

7 U.S. Congre\\, Office of Technology Assessment, The Future of Remote Sensin,gjiom Space, op. cit., pp. 18-23.
12 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

FY 1995 proposed budget for Mission to Planet

Earth is $1,238 million, compared with its

FY 1994 budget of $1,024 million, an increase

of 20 percent.

NOAA’s funding for satellite programs is

projected to remain between $410 million and

$460 million (in current dollars) until the end

of the decade. NOAA’s budget is constrained

by potential conflict with other agency programs, such as NEXRAD,8 and by planned

budget increases in other Department of Commerce programs, such as the National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST). These

pressures and declining defense budgets have

led Congress and the Clinton Administration

to propose consolidating the Polar-orbiting

Operational Environmental Satellite System

(POES) and the DMSP system as a way to reduce the costs of the nation’s meteorological

programs. The data gathered by DOD’s DMSP

and NOAA’s POES are similar, and the United

States faces the challenge of making these

programs more efficient without losing important capabilities that now exist or that

are being developed.

5. The increasing internationalization of civilian operational and experimental remote

sensing programs. Budget pressures within

most countries and the desire to improve the

scope of national remote sensing programs

have led to increased international interest in

sharing satellite systems and data. This interest

has increased U.S. opportunities to exploit foreign sources of satellite data and to develop

new institutional arrangements. Non-U.S.

instruments now fly on U.S. satellites, while

European and Japanese satellites fly U.S.

instruments. This pattern will continue in the

future. In particular. NASA’s Mission to Planet

Earth, including its EOS program, has a major

international component.9 Participating countries share the data to support scientific research. NOAA has long pursued cooperative

activities as a way to increase its capabilities of

supplying environmental data. It is currently

negotiating an agreement with Eumetsat to

supply an operational polar-orbiter (METOP- 1 ) in the year 2000 that would allow

NOAA to operate one satellite, rather than

two. 10 Opportunities for further expansion of

cooperative activities could increase as other

countries gain experience in remote sensing

and confidence in international cooperation.

6. The introduction of privately operated remote

sensing systems to collect remotely sensed

data on a commercial basis. Private firms have

played a major role in the development of the

remote sensing industry. They serve both as

contractors for government-developeds systems

and as service providers that process raw satellite data, turning them into useful information

(i.e., the so-called value-added industry). First

EOSAT and then SPOT Image have operated

remote sensing systems developed by governments and have marketed the data worldwide.

Recently, U.S. firms have received government approval to operate privately financed

satellite systemsl1 and to market geospatial

8 me Next (jenera[i~n wea~er Radar, ~ ~e[w~rk of advanced Doppler radar s[~[ions for rneaiuring w intis re~ponsiblc for severe weather, It

is a joint program funded by NOAA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and DOD.

9For example, tie first major EosSatelll[e, [he so-called AM platfoml, will carry the Japanese Advan~~d Spaceborne Thermal Emi~~i~n and

Reflection Radiometer (ASTER). Instruments built by NASA and the French \pace agency, Centre Natiomil d’Etudes Spatiale\ (CNES), w ill fly

on the Japanese Advanced Earth Observing System (ADEOS ) satellite, developed b}( Japtin’s Nalional Space D(velopnmnt AgcIIcy (~’A:jDA )

and its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI ).

10 Eume(sat’s Me(eoro]~gi~al C)wrational S:l[e]]i[e (~~TOP) w OLJ]~ fl~ in a w-c~]}c~ morning orbit, crossing the equator at about ~:~() ~.nl.

NOAA’s POES satellite would fly in the afternoon orbit. The Clinton AdnliniwWion’\ con~ ergcnce plan a~sunle~ completion of this ttgreement.

11 u s Congress, Office of Technolog) A\se\\ment, Renlott’1)” SCtI.\Cd J9UIU.’ T(J(}III01OS], ~ i4an(Jqenlcn/, and,WurLcrs, OTA-ISS-6(M (Wa\h- .

ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994j, ch. 4.
7.

data12 to government and industry customers

around the world. If successful, they will

change profoundly the international marketplace for remotely sensed data. Even now, international commerce in remotely sensed data

shows signs of rapid change as foreign companies also begin to explore the potential for developing commercial remote sensing systems. 13

The end of the Cold War era, which has forced

reexamination of the role of space technologies in promoting national security and U.S.

technological prowess. Much of the existing

structure of U.S. space efforts grew out of the

Cold War tensions between the United States

and the former Soviet Union. The breakup of

the Soviet Union has resulted in new opportunities for cooperation instead of competition

with the former Soviet republics. The United

States has now brought Russia into its partnership with Canada, Europe, and Japan in building an international space station. Other cooperative projects, including Earth observations,

are likely to follow as well. 14

NASA was developed as an independent, civilian agency to separate civilian and military

interests in the development of science and

technology. Among other things, this separation allowed the military and intelligence agencies to pursue their space agendas largely out of

the public view. As a result, NASA and DOD

often developed similar technologies independent y. With the end of the Cold War and other

changes in the political makeup of the world,

the United States has eased many of its earlier

Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options

restrictions on the civilian development

I 13

and

use of remote sensing technologies. As noted

above, the United States has also undertaken

the consolidation of DOD’s DMSP system

with NOAA’s POES; similar efforts fell short

in the past, in part as a result of national security considerations during the Cold War. 15

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS

OF A STRATEGIC PLAN

The existing collection of satellite remote sensing

systems, both nationally and internationally, has

evolved in response to a variety of independent

needs for data about Earth. Consequently, system

capabilities may overlap, as they do in the polarorbiting environmental satellites operated by

DOD and NOAA. Some capabilities are also complementary. For example, both Europe and Japan

operate synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites,

but the United States has no civilian SAR system

in operation.

16 Hence, for its SAR data, the United

States now largely relies on Europe’s and Japan’s

satellites.

A strategic plan would consider the short-term

and long-term needs of all major data users. As

noted earlier, future data needs are likely to involve:

■

■

■

■

collecting atmospheric data to support weather observations and forecasting,

monitoring the land surface,

monitoring the oceans,

collecting data to support research on global

environmental change, and

12 Geospatia] da(a are data (hat are organized according tO their location on Earth.

13 p, Seitz, “New Ventures Tempt European SPace Firms! “ Space Ne\+s, May 23-29, 1994, p. 3.

I -1 ~c United States ~d Russia are ~unent]y ~orklng together on a modest scale in Em remote sensing. Russia flew a Total ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) aboard one of its Meteor polar-orbiting satellites in 199 I and has agreed to do so again.

IS DOD and NOAA have ~o]]a~rated in eight previous convergence studies, most of which contributed 10 operational improvements and

closer cooperation between DOD and NOAA. However, attempts to meld the systems always failed on grounds that such a move would w eahen

U.S. national security without appreciably lowering overall system costs.

16 me United Sta(e$ has recently flown advanced SAR in~tmments, the Shuttle Inlaging Radar (SIR-A, B. C), on the Space Shuttle, but tht?\c

instruments do not provide continuous data collection. In 1978, NASA also orbited the experimental ocean rcmote sensing satellite. Seasat.

which operated for only 3 months in 1978. See chapter 3.
14 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

H long-term monitoring of key indicators of

global change and environmental quality.

Programs for gathering needed data are discussed in later sections of this chapter. This section discusses structural and institutional issues

that would affect the development of a strategic

approach to remote sensing. For example, How

can the United States most effectively identify and

aggregate its data requirements? What role, if any,

should private firms have in supplying data? How

can the United States make the most effective use

of the capabilities of other countries in meeting

important data needs?

Plans for meeting national data needs will be

developed within the context of other national priorities such as reducing the federal budget deficit

by working more efficiently in space, defining the

U.S. role in international cooperative activities,

increasing U.S. competitiveness, improving

scientific understanding of the global environment, improving the U.S. technology base, and

maintaining U.S. national security.

~ Interagency Coordination

and Collaboration

A strategic plan for Earth observations would

weigh the potential contributions of every federal

agency. NASA, NOAA, and DOD each fund the

development and operation of satellite remote

sensing systems in response to agency mission requirements for specific types of data. Yet, the data

these systems provide have applications far beyond the needs of the agency generating them.

Agencies also have overlapping interests in the

collection and application of data. Further, each

agency has developed certain areas of expertise.

For example, NOAA and DOD have considerable

expertise in providing operational satellite data.

NASA has particular strength in developing new

instrumentation and satellite platforms. To share

their respective strengths, agencies develop

mechanisms for coordinating and cooperating

with each other on subjects of mutual interest. The

collaborative USGCRP demonstrates such an interagency mechanism. Through it, agencies can

tackle much larger problems than could any

agency acting alone. However, such collaboration

requires a certain accommodation to the needs of

other agencies so that facilities and information

can be shared efficiently .17

One of the benefits of developing a strategic

plan for Earth observations is the opportunity to

identify mutual interests and to strengthen cooperative relationships by sharing systems and data

more effectively. The Clinton Administration’s

efforts to consolidate NOAA’s and DOD’s polarorbiting satellite programs provide an important

example of how one aspect of a strategic plan

might function. By including NASA in the Integrated Program Office that will operate the combined polar-orbiting system, the Administration

has the opportunity to use NASA’s expertise in developing new sensors and spacecraft to enhance

the collection of useful satellite data. The section

“Monitoring Weather and Climate,” later in this

chapter, examines issues related to convergence of

the polar-orbiting systems in more detail.

The convergence of polar-orbiting satellite

systems is one important aspect of a strategic

plan for U.S. remote sensing. Congress must

also decide the future of U.S. efforts in land and

ocean remote sensing and determine the U.S.

role in long-term climate monitoring. The sections on land and ocean remote sensing in this

chapter examine such issues. Congress will also

be interested in NASA’s and NOAA’s plans for

cooperating with international organizations and

non-U.S. agencies in sharing costs and capabilities in remote sensing. Finally, Congress will also

wish to understand what options it might have for

assisting U.S. industry’s efforts to supply remotely sensed data to a global marketplace in the face

of national security concerns over the wide distribution of high-resolution geospatial data.

17 For the USCjCRp, the Su&ommj[tee on Global Change Research of the Committee on Environment and Natural Resources Research of

the National Science and Technology Council in the executive branch has provided oversight to assist collaboration.
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options 115

I Data Users and the

Requirements Process

As noted earlier, the use of remotely sensed Earth

data extends well beyond the federal government,

to include state and local agencies as well as a variety of nongovernment users (box 1-4). Each data

user has a range of requirements for satellite

instruments and operations. To develop the

foundation for a strategic plan, specific data needs

will have to be aggregated and considered as part

of a broad-based process.

Mechanisms for improving the process for developing data requirements process should be a

central element of a national strategy for remote

sensing. The federal government now has no established institutional means for considering

overall needs for Earth observations. The current

process for establishing requirements for these

observations occurs mainly within individual

agencies and involves specific groups of users

who are responsible for those agencies’ missions.

This process can lead to inefficient decisions, as

seen in a broad, national context, by limiting the

ability to make tradeoffs between costs and requirements and excluding users outside the agencies. Chapter 2 discusses several options for

strengthening the requirements process:

■

■

■

Increasing the interaction among users, designers, and operators to improve the ability

to make tradeoffs between requirements and

costs. This can occur over time with successive

generations of operational programs, but it is

difficult to achieve with new programs.

Including a broader range of users in discussions of requirements. This could involve establishing formal channels for seeking outside

input into agency processes or formal interagency reviews of requirements.

Developing a formal process for revising

agency missions in response to emerging capabilities and needs. This could involve establishing an independent panel of experts to reexamine periodically agency capabilities and

needs in the context of changing national priorities.

1 The Private Sector

The activities and plans of private industry need to

be considered in developing a strategic plan for

Earth observations. The value-added sector of the

remote sensing marketplace, which provides data

processing and interpretation services, is relatively small ($300 million to $400 million per year)

but growing rapidly as federal, state, and local

government agencies and private firms discover

the value of satellite data in a variety of applications. 18 U.S. companies developed most of the

geographic information system (GIS) and other

software used for processing geospatial data.

They have been a major force in increasing the capability and reducing the costs of such software.

U.S. industry, therefore, has a strong foothold in

the development of the value-added industry; it

supplies both software and information to a wide

range of government and private customers. In

setting requirements for future remote sensing

1~ U.S. Congrc\f, Office of Technology Assessment, Rernotelv Sensed Data: Technology>, Management and Markets, op. cit.. p. 107.
16 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

systems, the federal government may wish to take

into account the needs of private data users because they are an important source of innovative

applications of remotely sensed data.

Private firms could also play a substantial role

in expanding overall U.S. remote sensing capabilities and in supplying data for government needs.

As noted above, private U.S. firms are now developing land remote sensing systems with new capabilities. At least three private firms expect to be

able to offer higher-resolution, more timely

stereoscopic data19 and to charge much less for

such data than existing systems do. These firms

have targeted international markets now served

primarily by aircraft-imaging firms, especially in

applications that require digital data for mapping,

urban planning, military planning, and other uses.

If private systems succeed commercially, they

are likely to change the nature and scope of the

data market dramatically.

The United States faces significant opportunities, challenges, and risks in assisting with the development of these systems. The federal government has the opportunity to facilitate the

development of a robust U.S. remote sensing industry, one that provides high-quality, spatial data

and information to customers throughout the

world. If it decides to do so, it faces the challenge

of devising the appropriate technological, financial, and institutional means to help this fledgling

industry to compete with foreign governments

and companies. Because the data from commercial systems would have significant military utility, however, the United States faces the risk that

unfriendly nations might use the data to the detriment of the United States or its allies.

Current Administration policy (appendix F) allows for the licensing of U.S. companies to sell

imagery with resolution as fine as 1 meter (m) and

permits the companies to sell data worldwide,

with several restrictions, including the possible

limitation of data collection and/or distribution

during times of crisis.

The policy also allows for the sale of “turnkey”

systems to the governments of other countries,

which would be able to gather whichever images

they wish. However, Administration policy on

such systems is much more restrictive than it is on

U.S.-owned and -operated systems. The Administration will consider export of turnkey systems to

other governments only on a case-by-case basis

and under the terms of a government-to-govemment agreement.

NASA has recently contracted with TRW. Inc.,

and CTA, Inc., to build and operate two remote

sensing systems under its Smallsat Program.20

These represent two very different approaches to

satellite remote sensing. The TRW system will

carry a sensor capable of gathering data of 30-m

resolution in 384 narrow spectral bands from the

visible into the near-infrared. NASA will pay

TRW $59 million for the satellite system, which

will test a variety of new remote sensing technologies, including new materials, sensors, and spacecraft components. The data from this system will

be of considerable interest to scientists working

on global change research and to many current users of Landsat data, including farmers, foresters,

and land managers.21

The CTA spacecraft, which will cost $49 million, will carry a sensor identical to the WorldView Imaging Corporation sensor now in production for a 1995 launch. The CTA system will be

capable of collecting land data of 3-m resolution

(panchromatic). In contracting for these satellite

systems, NASA is attempting to demonstrate its

capacity to encourage the development of innovative, lightweight satellite technology, and to do it

19 Stereoscopic data make it possible for data analysts to generate topographic maps of a region directly from satellite data.

z~ L. Tucci, “NASA Awwds Smallsat Work,” Space News, June 1319, 1994, pp. 3,29.

2 I If ~uccessfu], me system should, among other things, generate data capable of distinguishing types of plants and trees from space by

comparing responses from different spectral bands.
quickly and efficiently.zz NASA officials emphasize their intent to stimulate the market for remotely sensed data.

Several private firms have argued that with regard to the CTA system, the market does not need

such stimulation: private firms have already embarked on similar, competing systems. Further,

these firms argue that NASA’s entry into an endeavor so closely connected to ongoing commercial pursuits is already making it difficult for them

to raise needed capital in the financial markets.

The y complain that NASA is, in effect, competing

with them.23 NASA counters that the two satellites will test a range of new technologies that

could contribute to the usefulness of remotely

sensed data.

Although the two NASA satellites may improve the utility of remotely sensed data over the

long term, in the short term, the CTA system, especially, could also inhibit the ability of firms to

develop their own systems. Whether these systems help or harm markct development will depend in large part on the perceptions the venture

capital market has regarding NASA’s intentions

and on NASA’s plans for making the data available to customers. For example, if NASA makes

these data available only for experimental purposes for a limited period of a few months, it could

stimulate market interest. If, on the other hand,

NASA makes the data available for longer periods. it would effectively compete with private efforts. Yet, if NASA limited the distribution of data

from the CTA satellite to a few NASA users, Congress might well consider the $49 million COSt of

the satellite too high. For example, DOD would be

a likely major user of data of 3-m resolution.24 It is

hard to see how NASA could limit DOD’s use of

data paid for by taxpayers. Congress may wish to

monitor NASA’s Small sat Program closely to enChapter 1 Findings and Policy Options

sure that both taxpayers and private satellite

I 17

remote sensing firms are well served by its actions.

In the Office of Mission to Planet Earth, NASA

has entered into a different contracting arrangement with Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) in

which NASA has agreed to provide funding of

$43.5 million up front in return for 5 years of data

from OSC’S SeaStar satellite. SeaStar will carry

the Sea-Viewing Wide Field Sensor (SeaWiFS)

ocean-color sensor for gathering multispectral

data about the surface of the ocean. NASA will use

SeaStar data in its studies of global change. OSC

will market data from SeaStar to fisheries and other ocean users, who will use them to locate the

most productive ocean areas and assist in ship

routing. The NASA-OSC “anchor tenant” agreement has allowed OSC to obtain additional funding from the financial markets to complete its

project and will, if the satellite proves successful,

deliver data of considerable interest to NASA scientists. Congress may wish to consider encouraging NASA and other agencies to use the

mechanism of data purchase to stimulate the

market for data. Such a mechanism has the advantage of providing the government with

needed data while assisting private firms in developing new Earth observation systems.

I international Cooperation

and Competition

An effective strategic plan will also include consideration of how the United States cooperates

and competes with other nations. Over the past

decade, satellite remote sensing has become increasingly international: the European Space

Agency (ES A), the European Organisation for the

Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat), France, India, Japan, and Russia now operate

‘2 K. S;iw>ur. “l;or NASI\ “Snutlluit\,’ a Commercial Role,” The \4h\hIn,qIon Po\/, June 9, 1994. p. A7.

~~ L. TuccI. ‘“NASA Rctuw\ To Sell Clark. Industry LJp@ with Agenc) Smallwt Inqcry Advantage. ” Si)ace ,Velt f, June 27- JUIJ 3,

I 994, pp. 3.2 I

‘~ Indeed. 1X)11 ii I ihcl> to bc a nui]or customer of data from Wrorld\’icw, Space Imaging. Inc., and Eyeglass International. See chapter 3.
18 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

satellite systems; others, such as Australia, Brazil,

Canada, China, Germany, Italy, South Africa,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have developed considerable expertise in remote sensing

instrumentation and the application of remotely

sensed data but do not currently operate remote

sensing systems.

25 Countries have become active

in remote sensing to improve control over their information sources and applications, to obtain data

not otherwise available, to develop capabilities in

advanced information technologies, and to assist

their national security forces.

International remote sensing activities have

also become increasingly interactive: countries

cooperate to expand their own access to remote

sensing capabilities; they also compete for commercial advantage or technological prestige. In

this new international environment, the United

States, which once was the only supplier of remotely sensed data, no longer dominates the

technology or the data markets. These circumstances require greater give-and-take in managing

international cooperation and increased attention

to the opportunities for maintaining and improving the U.S. competitive stance.

International Cooperation

Because remote sensing satellites pass over large

portions of the Earth without regard to political

boundaries, remote sensing is inherently international in scope. Cooperation among countries

offers the opportunity to reduce costs and improve the effectiveness of remote sensing programs. International cooperation can reduce costs

by eliminating unnecessary duplication among

national programs. Cooperation can also improve

the effectiveness of remote sensing by uniting the

complementary strengths of national programs

and eliminating data gaps that might otherwise occur. However, international cooperation carries

certain risks because it entails some loss of control

over the types and quality of available data. It also

risks the loss of some data by relying on the contributions of other countries and poses additional

burdens of meeting the requirements of other

countries.

Data exchange is essential to international

cooperation in remote sensing. The open exchange of data is particularly important for weather forecasting, global change research, ocean

monitoring, and other applications that require

data on a global scale. For this reason, the United

States has had a long history of sharing remotely

sensed data with other nations. Because some

governments view data as a valuable commodity

whereas the U.S. government and others treat

them as public goods, the international remote

sensing community faces a challenge in coordinating data access and pricing policies. Failure to

coordinate and reach substantial commonality in

policies on data access and exchange could greatly

complicate access to data and undermine the effectiveness of remote sensing programs.26 This is

especially true for global change research, which

requires large quantities of different kinds of

data to develop and verify global environmental

models.

Stronger institutional arrangements could enhance the benefits of international cooperation in

remote sensing. Two questions will be critical.

First, can countries share control over cooperative

satellite programs in a way that meets their overlapping but distinct requirements? Second, can

countries share the costs of these programs in a

way that is fair and alleviates the pressures for cost

recovery that can lead to restrictive data policies?

Options for strengthening the institutions of international cooperation in remote sensing include

the following:

■ An international information cooperative,

which is a set of institutional arrangements for

the open sharing of data and information and

ZS Bra~i], however, has ~ agreement wl~ China tO &VelOp a polar .orbiting remote sensing satellite, and Canada will launch its Radarsat

spacecraft in early I 995.

26 us congress, Office of Technology Ass~ssnlent, R~~o(~/y sensed Data: Tech~/ogy, ~a~gemenl, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 5.
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options 119

the voluntary sharing of responsibility for data

management. The prime example is the World

Meteorological Organization (WMO), which

has developed agreements for the open distribution of basic meteorological data, whether

they come from satellites, ground stations, or

other sources. The Committee on Earth Observations Satellites (CEOS) is a more informal

organization, 27 which has pursued agreements

on common principles for data exchange for

global change research and environmental

monitoring. Building on those agreements,

CEOS could provide the basis for a broad information cooperative for sharing satellite data

on the atmosphere, land, and oceans.

● A formal international division of labor.

Countries already specialize to some degree in

their remote sensing programs. Japan has devoted particular attention to ocean observations, whereas Europe focused initially on observations of atmosphere and land surface. In

scaling back its initial plans for the Mission to

Planet Earth, NASA has developed a program

that complements these foreign efforts. A formal division of labor could allow countries to

specialize further in the types of data they

choose to collect without risking a loss of access to other types of data that are collected by

other countries.

In the future, such arrangements could be

extended to make efficient use of the specialties developed within each country. For example, the United States has considerable expertise in weather and climate observations;

Europe and Japan are developing strengths in

ocean sensing and synthetic aperture radar

(SAR) technology; Canada, which will soon

launch its Radarsat, is focusing attention on

■

SAR sensing of land and polar ice cover. Dividing up the tasks and labor among many countries would encourage those countries to make

formal arrangements for sharing data from a

wide variety of instruments in support of international monitoring efforts.

An international remote sensing agency. Several experts have suggested that the United

States should take the lead in establishing an international remote sensing agency to provide

some global remote sensing needs.28 An international remote sensing agency might focus

on a narrow set of objectives, such as land remote sensing,29 or it could deal with broad

needs for data about the land, ocean, and atmosphere. Such an agency would allow countries to

pool resources for a satellite system that meets

their overlapping needs without the unnecessary duplication that characterizes current efforts. However, establishing such an agency

would require great ingenuity in devising an efficient organizational structure that gives each

member country a fair share of control. For the

next several years, experience in working with

CEOS and other international arrangements

should provide insight into the ultimate workability of an international remote sensing

agency.

Russia has a long and wide-ranging tradition of remote sensing and could be a strong international partner. The United States has a twodecade history of cooperation with the former

Soviet Union, but Cold War tensions limited the

scope of this cooperation. Current U.S.-Russian

space activities involve cooperation in the use of

data for Earth science and planned flights of U.S.

instruments on Russian spacecraft. These activi-

~7 No formal intergo~ emmental agreements are involved. Government agencies and nongovemment organizations send representatives to

][s meetings.

28 J.H. McElroy, “IN TELSAT, INMARSAT, and CEOS: Is ENVIROSAT Next?” In Space Re<qInWSfOr ~hp Furure, G. MacDoald and S. Ride

(eds. ) (San Diego, CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1993); J. McLucasand P.M. Maughan, “The Case

for En\ iroiat,” SpuCe Pol/c)I 4(3):229-239, 1988.

29 N. Helms and B. Edelson, “An International Organization for Remote Sensing,” unpublished paper presented at the 42nd Annual ,Meering

oj (he In(ernurional A.\/r(mau/ical Fe(/era/ion, Montreal, October 1991 (IAF-9 1-112. )
20 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

ties could provide the basis for the future integration of Russia into international remote sensing

programs. Because of the potential benefits to

the United States of cooperating with Russia on

remote sensing programs, Congress may wish

to urge NASA and NOAA to explore the potential for closer cooperation in operational programs. In particular, the United States might explore the potential for including Russia in its

cooperative program with Eumetsat in polar-orbiting satellites (see below, “Monitoring Weather

and Climate’ ’).30 Ongoing cooperative activities

on the international space station and other areas

of space technology have given U.S. officials considerable insight into Russian capabilities and

provide optimism that cooperative efforts would

be highly beneficial for both countries. However,

uncertainties in Russia’s political relationships

and the capacity to sustain its space programs argue for particular caution in undertaking cooperative programs with Russia. Projects should be

well-defined, the benefits to both sides should be

clearly articulated, and plans to handle contingencies should be developed.

International Competition

Despite the advantages of international cooperation noted above, commercial competition

and national security considerations may limit

the scope of intergovernmental cooperation in

remote sensing. For example, commercial activity in land remote sensing will likely limit the development of intergovernmental cooperation. Yet,

commercial firms and government agencies from

various countries will likely cooperate on a variety of activities, including marketing data and developing technology and processing algorithms.

The recent marketing agreement between EOSAT

and the National Remote Sensing Agency of India

provides an example of such cooperation.31 Such

strategic commercial alliances are likely to expand the global market for remotely sensed data.

The U.S. private sector has been a world leader in

the development of sensors and spacecraft and is

likely to maintain its dominant, competitive position for some time. However, the development and

operation by other nations of rnultispectral and

SAR satellite systems will give the private sectors

of those countries considerable incentive to build

their own systems and market data from them.

Experience with research and practical applications of data creates a strong synergy between the creation of a data market and the demand for the development of satellite systems.

Such experience also extends to systems developed for national security needs. For example,

several countries in Europe are cooperating in developing and operating the French-led HELIOS-1

surveillance satellite, which reportedly will be capable of l-m panchromatic ground resolution.32

This experience will enhance the capabilities of

non-U. S. government laboratories and private

firms to field highly capable remote sensing systems and to use the data in a wide variety of civilian applications. If foreign private firms enter the

marketplace with data from privately operated

systems, they are likely to do so with the strong financial backing of their governments. If Congress wishes to assist in maintaining U.S. competitiveness in remote sensing systems and

data-management software, it has several options. It could:

= direct U.S. agencies to purchase from private

industry the multispectral data needed for operational purposes in monitoring the land and

oceans,

● provide oversight to ensure that federal agencies do not compete with private firms in devel30 U.S. congress, office of Technology Assessment, The Future of Remofe Sen.$ingfiorn SPace, oP. cit i P. 31.

3] “EOSAT To Market Indian Data,” EOSATNotes, falh’winter 1993, pp. 4-5.

32 Fr~ce exwcts [0 launch HELIOS. ] in ] 995. Ge~~y has just announced its willingness 10 cooperate in the de~ e]opmem of a fOlhJW-On

system, HEL1OS-2. See “Germany Ready To Take Role in Helios Pro gram,” Space News, May 23-29, 1994, p. 2.
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options 121

■

■

oping software and in providing data processing and other value-added services,

provide oversight to ensure that federal agencies do not compete with private firms in developing remote sensing systems, and

fund the development of advanced sensors that

would assist government remote sensing programs and private-sector needs.

LIMITATIONS OF A STRATEGIC PLAN

By linking different government environmental

remote sensing programs, as well as private-sector

developments, a national strategic plan for environmental satellite remote sensing might assist in

the creation of an integrated remote sensing system that is less susceptible than current systems to

single-point failure or changing priorities—a

more “robust and resilent” system for Earth observations. If, on the other hand, it resulted in a

large, single system, a comprehensive strategic

plan might make Earth observation plans more

susceptible to failure. NASA’s initial, large EOS

program, for example, was restructured twice to

make it more resilient to technical failure and to

lower funding expectations. The Space Station

program has been cited as an example of the difficulties of funding and managing a large, single

project incorporating several interest groups.33 In

addition, by forcing operating agencies to coordinate among themselves and with data users even

more intensively than they now do, the process of

developing and executing a national strategic plan

for remote sensing has the potential to result in an

overly bureaucratic approach to Earth observations. Furthermore, as noted in chapter 3, the Clinton Administration faces technical and programmatic risks in merging operational programs such

as NOAA’s POES and DOD’s DMSP with research programs such as NASA’s EOS.34

Integration of smaller programs into larger,

comprehensive ones to accommodate research

and development or operations goals tends to inhibit adaptation to external challenges because

more groups have to be persuaded of a particular

course of action. Further, although integration

into larger systems tends to deter budget cuts,

when cuts come they can undermine the entire

program. By contrast, cuts in an isolated program

may have few adverse effects beyond the program

cut. Developing and executing a comprehensive

strategic plan would be a major challenge because

the existing institutional structure tends to resist

change and integration into a larger whole. Each

agency has developed a set of priorities for its programs, which then becomes incorporated into the

work of the authorization and appropriations committees of the House and Senate. These committees thus have a stake in the development of new

priorities and, therefore, may resist efforts to make

changes that would reduce their influence over the

agencies for which they are responsible.

Finally, as the experience with the USGCRP

has demonstrated, the development of a wellcoordinated plan within the executive branch does

not necessarily mean that the program will be considered as a whole when the federal budget reaches Congress. Each committee has its own priorities and may either enhance or cut the budget of a

given program, independent of the funding balance agreed upon by the Clinton Administration.35 In other words, the very structure of the

U.S. government may make the development

and execution of a strategic plan difficult. The

s~ R.D. Bmnner and R, Byerly, Jr., ‘The Space Station PrOgrarnme,” Space Policy 6(2): 131-145, 1990.

34 ~[he other hand \clen[ists have noted that data from the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) ~ensor a~flrd INOAA’\

POES are extremely ufeful for certain aspects of global change research and that better calibration of the instrument would enhance [heir research. Hence, a mechanism for including research interests in operational systems would be beneficial.

35 1n tie Ca$e of the USGCRP, the programs of some agencies have been sharply cut and others enhanced as the rcwlt of congrcifional

action. Appropriations subcommittees do not nece~sarily consider the effects of cuts or increases on the overall USGCRP program. See (-1, S.

Congre\\, Office of Technology Asse\$ment, Global Change Research and NASA’s Ear~h Obser\/ng 5\,\renl, op. cit., p. 9.
22 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

USGCRP has succeeded in increasing overall

funding for global change research. It remains to

be seen whether a coordinated plan devoted in part

to increasing efficiency in Earth observations will

function as well.

MONITORING WEATHER AND CLIMATE

NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) System and DOD’s Defense

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) have

distinct but similar capabilities for gathering data

on weather and climate. Since the 1970s, successive administrations have attempted, with only

partial success, to merge these two systems.

1 Convergence

To reduce federal spending, Congress36 and the

Clinton Administration’s National Performance

Review recommended the consolidation of the

“various current and proposed remote sensing

programs.” 37 The National Performance Review

also recommended that NASA “assist in ongoing

efforts to converge U.S. operational weather satellites, given the benefits of streamlining the collection of weather data across the government.”38

The Administration released its plan in May 1994

(appendix C). Administration officials will attempt to achieve total savings of up to $300 million by the year 2000 and $1 billion over a decade

by consolidating POES and DMSP (figure 1-3).39

The proposals to consolidate the polar-orbiting

programs arose from the desire to achieve cost

savings and greater program efficiencies. Nevertheless, the consolidation of NOAA’s, DOD’s,

and NASA’s satellite programs could have several benefits even if it achieved no cost savings.

These include the institutionalization of mechanisms to develop research instruments and move

them into operational use, the potential for development of long-term (decadal-time-scale) environmental monitoring programs, and a potential

strengthening of international partnerships that

could facilitate new cooperative remote sensing

programs.

Consolidation of DOD and NOAA meteorological programs involves more than merging

programs, spacecraft, and sensors. The Clinton

Administration’s convergence plan calls for

DOD, NOAA, and NASA to cooperate in setting

up an Integrated Program Office (IPO) within

NOAA to operate a converged polar-orbiting system. Each agency has different priorities, data requirements, user communities, perspectives, and

protocols with respect to technology development, acquisition, and operations-differences

they have developed during more than two decades of cooperative, but independent, operation.

Therefore, consolidating space activities from

DOD, NOAA, and NASA is as much a “cultural”

and institutional challenge as a technical one.

36 In 1993, two congressional committees requested a review of the NOAA and DOD polar-orbiting satellite programs to explore possible

cost savings. See G.E. Brown, Chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, letter to D.J. Baker, Administrator of

NOAA, Feb. 22, 1993; J.J. Exon, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, letter

to R. Brown, Secretary of Commerce, June 2, 1993; OTA also suggested consolidation of the two programs as an option for reducing federal

spending. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Future of Remore Sensing ji-om Spact’, op. cit., p. 16.

37 A, Gore, From Red Tape to Resu/(s: Creating a Government 7’hut Works Better and Costs Lt’ss, report of tie National perform~ce

Review (Washington, DC: OffIce of the Vice President, September 1993), Department of Commerce Recommendation 12: Establish a Single

Civilian Operational Environmental Polar Satellite Program.

38 of fIce of tie Vice Resident, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, accompanying report of the National performance Review

(Washington, DC: OffIce of the Viced President, September 1993): “By considering MTPE research activities in context with operational

weather satellite programs, cost savings are possible through convergence of the current operational satellite fleets. Convergence of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Polar Metsat and NASA’s EOS-PM (Earth Observing SystemAfternoon Crossing [Descending] Mission) will eliminate redundancy of measurements, enhance the capability of NOAA’s data set and potentially result in cost savings. ”

39 A. Gore, From Red Tape t. Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less, op. cit.: “TO reduce duplication and save

taxpayers a billion dollars over the next decade, various current and proposed polar satellite programs should be consolidated under NOAA.”
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 23

~‘V7RR Thermal control

IMU

=Q%$K/

pinwheel louvers

SAR

IMP

HIRS -

,

antennas

LEll&

(scanner) ‘“~D~ ‘-” v / ‘~ jERBE

(non scanner)

REA(4)

VRA

\~

SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1993.

The principal challenge in converging the

polar-orbiting satellite systems is likely to be

the development of organizational and institutional mechanisms to ensure stable funding

and stable management in programs that now

involve multiple agencies and multiple congressional authorization and appropriation

committees. The government has few examples

of successful long-term, multiagency programs .40

The recent failure of the joint NASA-DOD management of the Landsat system suggests that proposals to consolidate NOAA, NASA, or DOD

programs should, at the very least, be viewed with

great caution.

Under the IPO set out in the Clinton Administration’s plan (figure 1-4), each agency would take

the lead on one aspect of the operational system—technology development, procurement,

and operations—but each functional office would

include representatives of all agencies. The converged system would be funded by the three SOURCE: Department of Defense, 1993

M NEXRAD, ~ program funded joint]k b} NOAA, the Federal A\iation Administration (FAA), and DOD, ha~ functioned relati~’el~f ~’ell.

. .

Howe\er, unlike the converged polar-orbiting sy~tem, the components of NEXRAD are relatively smerable. If one agenc} pro~es unable to

fund its portion. the program can \till proceed at a reduced le~ e].
24 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

I-E4

Principal deputy director

System program

director ‘T

I

Program Program system

control engineering and

integration

Associate director

for acquisition

1

I

c1Ground & C3

segment

Ezl

c1Space

segment

Ezzl

Associate director for Associate director

technology transition for operations

➤ ✍ I ✌

agencies. Such an arrangement ensures that each

agency has a role and a stake in ensuring system

success. On the other hand, it suffers from the

weakness of depending on three different sources

of funding to support the system. Within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the

budgets of each agency are handled by different

examiners, who must perform a budget crosscut to

ensure that the total funding for the IPO is appropriate. Within Congress, the programs and

budgets of each agency receive oversight by two

committees in each chamber; three subcommittees of the House and Senate appropriations committees appropriate funds.

Although the planning for convergence has already begun, a converged system will not be fully

operational until 2005 or later. Near-term savings

are, therefore, likely to be modest. The Administration estimates savings of up to $300 million

from a total projected outlay of about $2.2 billion

between FY 1996 and FY 2000. If implemented

successfully, convergence could eventually lead

to greater savings. It might also lead to more effective programs as talent and resources are pooled.

Perhaps as important as cost savings, however,

would be the opportunity to strengthen the

relationship between NASA and NOAA in de-
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options 125

veloping the technology that will be needed for

future operational spacecraft. Before the

mid- 1980s, NASA funded the Operational Satellite Improvement Program (OSIP), which developed technology and flight-worthy instruments

for NOAA’s operational systems.41 During the

Reagan Administration, NASA sharply reduced

its support for OSIP.42 Currently, NOAA has the

lead role in managing operational programs, but it

lacks the funds and in-house expertise to develop

the instruments it will need to carry out potential

new Earth observation programs, such as ocean

monitoring and long-term monitoring of Earth’s

climate.

Once the Integrated Program Office is organized and staffed in October 1994, it will need to

address many technical and programmatic issues,

including program synchronization and the development of new sensors and spacecraft.

● Synchronizing programs. To maintain the operational status of their systems, both NOAA

and DOD have satellites in storage and in various stages of construction. Before the Clinton

Administration’s convergence proposal was

announced, both systems had been scheduled

for so-called block changes, or major redesigns

of new sensors and satellites, by about 2006.

The Administration now plans to prepare a

single spacecraft design by 2005 or 2006 that

will satisfy the requirements of both NOAA

and DOD. This approach could require the development of new sensors and a new spacecraft. The timing of the spacecraft might enable

the converged system to use sensors and/or the

spacecraft adapted from the NASA EOS-PM

satellite, which NASA is developing to support

its two-decade study of global change (appendix A).43 The first satellite in this series, PM-1,

is too far into development for modification to

be cost-effective. The second, PM-2, is scheduled for launch in approximately 2005; therefore, it and PM-3, which might be launched in

2010, are the most likely candidates for inclusion in a combined research-operational satellite program.

8 Sensor and spacecraft convergence. A converged meteorological satellite would have to

satisfy DOD needs for advanced imagery sensors and NOAA’s requirements for highly calibrated sounders. For example, NOAA and

DOD may find designing an optical imager

suitable for the needs of both agencies particularly difficult technically. Existing NOAA and

DOD optical scanners generate images differently and differ in their capabilities to operate

at low light levels.44 Accommodating NASA’s

science research agenda in an operational program would add further technical and financial

challenges.

■ The transition from research to operational

systems. The possibility of implementing a

combined DOD and NOAA operational program with NASA’s EOS-PM science research

program adds both opportunities and complications to instrument and spacecraft design. A tri -

agency research-operational satellite program

‘$1 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Fumre of Remote Sensingfiom Space, op. cit.. PP. 38-39.

Q Throughout the 1970s, NASA helped develop NOAA’s operational satellites through the NASA OSIP. For example, NASA built and paid

for the launch of the first two geostationary operational satellites, which NOAA operated. OSIP ended in the early 1980s as NASA placed its

emphases elsewhere and may have contributed to the subsequent difficulties NOAA expienced in the development of “GOES-N ext,” an advanced geostationary satellite that suffered schedule delays and cost overruns. The first GOES-Next was launched in April 1994 and w ill go into

operation in October 1994. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Future ofRemote Sensingfiom Space, op. cit., pp. 38-39,

for a discussion of the GOES-Next program.

43 EOS-pM Camles instmments &Signed to collect data on weather and climate. See chapter 3.

44 me DOD operational LinesCan system, for examp]e, generates images with approximately constant resolution acro~~ the field of ~’ ie~.

Images from NOAA’s AVHRR degrade in resolution toward the edges of the field of view. Both characteristics are the re~ult of tradeoffs between achieving data of particular interest to the missions of each agency and added cost and complexity.
26 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

would present challenges that include the need

to:

■ satisfy operational needs with relatively unproven instruments,

D accommodate the different production standards and data and communication protocols that, so far, have distinguished operational and research instruments,

■ develop advanced instruments that meet

NASA’s research needs but are affordable to

NOAA and DOD,

■ develop instruments that meet the more limited space and volume requirements of the

smaller, cheaper launch vehicles used in operational programs, and

■ accommodate demonstrations of new technology and prototyping of spacecraft that

are being used for operational programs.

Operational systems require a predictable,

steady supply of data. Historically, the transition from research instrumentation to operational instrumentation has been successful

when it has been managed with a disciplined,

conservative approach toward the introduction of new technology. In addition to minimizing technical risk, minimizing cost has been an

important factor in the success of operational programs, especially for NOAA.

Convergence provides an opportunity to restore a successful partnership between NASA and

NOAA in the development of operational environmental satellites, expanding that partnership to

include DOD operational requirements. However,

even with convergence, tensions could arise, as

both NOAA and NASA face difficulties in reconciling the inevitable differences in risk and cost

between instruments designed for research and

instruments designed for routine, long-term measurements. For example, the Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS), a key

EOS instrument, could eventually replace

NOAA’s AVHRR. Yet, as currently designed,

MODIS is unlikely to fit within NOAA’s budget

and would produce data that would tax the processing capabilities of operational users. NASA

and NOAA would likely have to redesign MODIS

to make its characteristics more compatible with

NOAA’s needs. NASA designed its EOS program

to provide data for the research and policymaking

communities rather than to serve as a test bed for

advanced technology. With or without convergence, NASA, NOAA, and DOD would find

many challenges in adapting EOS instruments to

serve both research and operational needs.

The Clinton Administration’s convergence

plan maintains and could even strengthen U.S.

cooperative relationships with Eumetsat,

which plans to operate the METOP-1 polar-orbiting meteorological satellite system beginning in 2000. At the same time, the plan increases U.S. dependence on Europe for

meteorological data. As the IPO develops its detailed plans for convergence, it will have to address certain questions, including the following:

■ What arrangements can the United States and

Eumetsat make to prevent its adversaries

from using these meteorological data during

times of crisis? Who determines when such

times exist and how? Previous efforts at convergence failed in part because DOD wished to

control its source and distribution of weather

data, especially in times of crisis. Current plans

call for Eumetsat to include three U.S. sensors

on METOP.45 DOD has argued that it needs the

capability to deny useful weather data to adversaries in times of crisis. During such times,

DOD proposes to encrypt data from U.S. sensors. It would release the data a few hours later,

when they could no longer be used to assist adversaries’ war-fighting capabilities.

Even if control over data is achieved, the

growing capabilities of other countries to acquire sophisticated weather data and information may reduce the advantage DOD would

45 AVHRR, the High-Resolution Infitied Sounder (HIRS), and the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU).
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 27

have in controlling weather data.46 Eumetsat is

dubious of such data control because it would

sharply reduce the capability of the METOP

system to supply data to Eumetsat’s contributing partners, the weather bureaus of each country. Eumetsat has linked this issue to “the open

issues between NOAA and Eumetsat regarding

data policy for both geostationary and polar

satellites.” 47 Before disclosing the plans for

convergence on May 6, 1994, the United States

opposed the encryption of data on either the

geostationary or the polar-orbiting satellites on

grounds that such data should be available to

all users.

■ How will the United States reconcile European desires for self-sufficiency in sensors

and spacecraft with U.S. needs for consistency of data among spacecraft? Although three

U.S. sensors will fly on METOP-1 and METOP-2, Europe plans to develop its own sensors for future METOP spacecraft. Data users

require consistency in format and calibration.

To maintain consistent data, IPO officials will

have to coordinate closely with Eumetsat and

European Space Agency officials concerning

the technical characteristics of new sensors.

● What contingency plans are necessary should

delays occur in the launch of METOP or

should it fail at launch or on orbit? As the

U.S. and European experience has demonstrated, space operations risk occasional delays

and failures. Hence, the United States and Eumetsat will have to work out a detailed contingency plan to ensure full operational status.

Previous NOAA-Eumetsat experience in providing backup satellites and services for each

other in times of need will provide important

guides for future plans.

In the future, the United States may wish to

consider expanding its international cooperation

on weather satellites. It already cooperates closely

with Japan and with Eumetsat on supplying data

from the geostationary weather satellites. Recently, officials from both Japan and Russia have inquired informally about the possibility of broadening the arrangement for the polar-orbiting

systems.

48 Japan has a very active remote sensing

program in support of operational applications

and scientific research, cooperating closely with

the United States on global change research.49 Japan does not currently operate polar-orbiting

weather satellites, but it is interested in the longterm operation of ocean monitoring satellites. Japan currently depends on data from the U.S. polar

orbiters. Russia operates the Meteor series of polar-orbiting weather satellites that provide data

similar to the U.S. POES. One of the Meteor satellites now carries a Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) instrument, provided by NASA. to

assist in monitoring atmospheric concentrations

of ozone. In the next few years, Congress may

wish to explore the opportunities for expanded

international cooperation in the polar-orbiting

program in an effort to improve the gathering

and distribution of Earth observation data.

Other countries could supply sensors, spacecraft, or both.

~ National security re~trlctions on technica] capabilities of land remote sensing systems ha~e relaxed considerably since the 197[)~. in ]ar&

part because other countries have gained capabilities once controlled only by the United States and the former Soviet Union. France, for c\anl -

ple, currently operates the SPOT Image satellite system, w hich collects data of much higher ground resolution than the comparable L’.S. Landsat

system. As noted earlier in this chapter, the French HELIOS surveillance satellite reportedly will achieve 1 -m ground resolution. Other countries are steadily improving their weather monitoring systems as well.

~T J, Morgan Director of Eunletsa[, letter to E.F. Hollings, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. ~1.s.

Senate, Washington, DC, June 10, 1994.

~ D,J, Baker, Under SecretaV of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, h’a[ional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. lc~tlnlonj

presented at hearing son convergence before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Washington. DC, June 14,

1994.

@ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Future of Remofe sensing from Space, Op. cit.. PP. 177-178.
28 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

I Long-Term Options

If the federal government were structuring an

institution to develop and operate environmental

satellites de novo, it would probably not create as

complicated an administrative arrangement as the

Integrated Program Office. However, the Administration is attempting to bring two satellite systems, each with its own requirements, objectives,

and procedures, under a single institutional structure. By including NASA in the structure, it is also

attempting to increase the success of incorporating instruments from EOS satellites in future polar-orbiting spacecraft. This arrangement could

also benefit NASA’s EOS program by tying it

more closely to an operational program.

Experience with the Administration’s plan,

which provides near-term direction for convergence, will guide future long-term plans. For example, experience with the IPO arrangement may

demonstrate that DOD’s needs for timely meteorological data can be met with a civilian-operated

system. In addition, the international proliferation

of environmental satellite systems may increase

the sources of high-quality weather data, thereby

reducing the need for a strong DOD presence in

the operational system. Thus, over the long term,

Congress may wish to consider eventually

placing the development, acquisition, and operation of the nation’s polar-orbiting environmental satellite system entirely within a single

civilian agency. Long-term options for this shift

of responsibility include (see box 1-5):

●

■

■

●

incorporate the Integrated Program Office

into a NOAA office,

integrate NOAA'S operational satellite services into NASA,

develop an independent agency focused on

Earth observations, or

incorporate Earth remote sensing efforts into

a Department of the Environment.

Each of these options would streamline the

congressional authorization and appropriations

process. The last three might lead to greater funding stability for a global environmental monitoring system. None would undercut efforts to increase international participation in such a

system. As the United States gains experience

with the near-term arrangement as outlined in the

Administration plan, arrangements more suitable

for the long term can be considered. Experience

may also show that none of these options is able to

give sufficient attention to DOD’s needs for data

that support its missions. The Administration’s

near-term plan gives heavy emphasis to DOD’s

data requirements and adopts many elements of

DOD’s process for determining data requirements. Decisions about a long-term plan do not

need to be made for several years; in the meantime, Congress will have ample opportunity to assess the progress made in bringing these programs

together.

LAND REMOTE SENSING

U.S. government efforts to develop operational,

civilian, space-based land remote sensing systems

have proved technically successful but chaotic in

terms of policy. Since 1972, first NASA, then

NOAA, and now EOSAT have operated the Landsat system—the U.S. satellite system for collecting multispectral data (figure 1 -5) about the surface of Earth (appendix D). NASA, NOAA, and

the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) are now collaborating on procuring and operating the newest

Landsat system, Landsat 7. Because Landsat data

constitute the longest continuous record of the

state of the world’s land and coastal areas, they are

extremely important in monitoring regional and

global change. Many federal and state agencies

now depend on Landsat data to carry out their legislatively mandated programs. Hence, maintaining the continuity of data from Landsat should

continue to be a priority for the United
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 29

●

■

■

■
30 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

SOURCE O 1993 by EOSAT

States. 50 If the United States is to maintain the future continuity of data delivery from Landsat, it

will have to develop an operational system. However, despite significant advances in remote

sensing technology and the steady growth of a

market for data, the United States lacks a coherent, long-term plan for a fully operational

land remote sensing system.

I The Future of the Landsat Program

As currently structured, the Landsat program

is vulnerable to a launch-vehicle or spacecraft

failure. The Landsat program has also suffered

from instability in management and funding.

Indeed, the Landsat program still bears more resemblance to an experimental program than an operational one. As a result of the loss of Landsat 6

and the lack of a backup satellite, the United States

now faces the prospect of losing data continuity

before Landsat 7 can be built and launched in late

1998. In addition, as demonstrated by its policy

history, the Landsat program is highly vulnerable

to the breakdown of institutional relationships.

Responsibility for satellite procurement, operation, and data distribution is currently split among

three agencies—NASA, NOAA, and USGS.

Thus, the Landsat program could be in jeopardy

should differences of opinion about its value arise

within NASA, the Department of Commerce, or

the Department of the Interior, or within the appropriations subcommittees of the House and

Senate. 51 Indeed, the report of the Senate Appropriations Committee for NASA’s FY 1995 appropriations expresses concern over whether

NOAA will have sufficient funding to support the

operations of Landsat 7.52 Ensuring the future of

the Landsat program will require close cooperation among NASA, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Interior, and the six

appropriations subcommittees of the House of

Representatives and the Senate.

The United States has a few short-term options for improving Landsat program resiliency. As one option, the United States could also

some Land Remote Sensing po]icy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163-41 80; 15 USC 5601, sec. 2. Findings) strongly suppo~ tie

“continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data from space” in the belief that such data are of “major benefit in studying and

understanding human impacts on the global environment, in managing the Earth natural resources, in carrying out national security functions,

and in planning and conducting many other activities of scientific, economic, and social importance.”

51 NASA’S appropriations Origina(e in tie Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies; NOAA’s originate in the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary; and USGS’s originate

in the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies.

52 me Committee recommended removing 4’$ I () million from program reserves for Landsat. In the operating plan, NASA should indicate

whether sufficient support exists in NOAA’s committees of jurisdiction in the Congress to support NOAA funds for Landsat 7. Without such

assurances, the viability of Landsat 7 as a joint project is questionable.” Report 103-31 I of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for the

Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies for FY 1995, p. 126.
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 31

rely on non-U. S. sources of data. Land remote

sensing became broadly international in the 1980s

with the development of the French SPOT, the

Russian Resurs-F, and the Indian Remote Sensing

Satellite (IRS) systems. Some data users would be

able to substitute digital data from the French

SPOT system or from the Indian IRS system,

which EOSAT now distributes worldwide. SPOT

data are already in wide use in the remote sensing

community. However, SPOT data do not have the

spectral or spatial range of Landsat. Few users

have experience with IRS data, which nearly duplicate the resolution and spectral response of the

first four spectral bands of Landsat TM data. To

determine whether IRS data could serve as backup

to the Landsat system, data users will have to experiment with the data in their specific application. NASA, USGS, and other U.S. agencies

could assist such users by carrying out a series of

experiments with the IRS data to determine how

well they would function as backups to Landsat

data.

Alternatively, if the Thematic Mapper (TM)

sensors or the X-band data transmitters aboard

Landsats 4 and 5 fail, before the launch of Landsat

7 in 1998, it will still be possible to collect data

from the low-resolution Multispectral Scanner

(MSS) sensor, which could likely be reactivated. 53 Such data would still be useful for certain

global change studies and other applications

where fineness of resolution is not a major concern.

In the long term, the United States may wish

to develop a fully operational system that provides for continuous operation and a backup

satellite in the event of system failure. In the

past, high system costs have prevented the U.S.

government from making such a commitment. If

system costs can be sharply reduced by inserting

new, more cost-effective technology or by sharing

costs with other entities, the government might be

able to maintain the continuity of delivery of

Landsat-type data.

As noted earlier, several firms plan to build and

operate commercial remote sensing systems.54

Because these firms focus on providing data of

comparatively high resolution, only a few or no

spectral bands, and limited spatial coverage,

these systems cannot substitute for the Landsat

system, which collects calibrated multispectral

data over a large field of view. However, these

systems are likely to provide data that would complement data from Landsat and similar systems.

Ultimately, the United States may wish to develop

a new system concept for Landsat, one that incorporates both wide-field multispectral observations and narrow-field, stereo panchromatic observations.

D Options for Reducing the Costs of

Federal Land Remote Sensing

One way to cut costs in land remote sensing would

be to enter into partnership with a U.S. private

firm or firms. Four broad options are possible:

1.

2.

-.3

Contract with a private firm to operate a system, paid for by the federal government, that

distributes the data at the cost of fulfilling user

requests .55

Return to an EOSAT-like arrangement in

which government supplies a subsidy and specifies the sensor and spacecraft but allows the

firm to market the data, setting its own prices

according to market forces.

Make a data-purchase arrangement in which

the government purchases data of specified

character and quality from a private-sector supplier.

53 EOSAT ha~ deactivated the ,MSS sensor, MSS data could be collected agalIl if the MSS sensor and the S-band transmitter that transrllit~

MSS data continue to operate properly. EOSAT stopped collecting data from these wnwlr~ in December 1992 because demand for these relatively low-resolution data was low.

5J see .~~e pri~ ate Sector” section.

ss In other ~ordj, accor~jng to the guidance of OMB Circular A- 13~.
32 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

4. Create a public-private joint venture in which

the government and one or more private firms

cooperate in developing a land remote sensing

system.

The U.S. government could also enter into partnership with one or more foreign governments.56

Interest in enhancing national prestige and the

prospect of being able to make remote sensing a

commercially viable service have heretofore prevented the United States and other countries from

developing cooperative land remote sensing systems. Yet, systems such as Landsat that produce

calibrated multispectral data of moderate resolution may never be commercially viable,57 

even

though the data are of great interest to global

change scientists and other users who require coverage of relatively large areas. Hence, cooperation

on systems that primarily serve the public good

may eventually be in the best interests of several

countries. Possible candidates include Canada,

which is developing Radarsat; France, which is

operating the SPOT system; Germany, which has

developed several sensors but has no satellite system; India, which now operates IRS-1; Japan,

which operates Japan Earth Resources Satellite- 1

(JERS-1) and Marine Observation Satellite-2

(MOS-2); and Russia, which has a long history of

using photographic remote sensing systems but

whose multispectral digital systems have yet to

prove themselves. Alternatively, a system might

be provided by a consortium of several countries.

In addition to paying greater attention to improving organizational efficiencies and reducing

costs, the United States may wish to institute a focused program to develop remote sensing technologies. If the United States wishes to maintain

and improve its capabilities in remote sensing

technology as called for in the Land RemoteSensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555, Title

III), it should continue to develop new technology for the Landsat program as well as for EOS

and other programs.

OCEAN REMOTE SENSING

The oceans cover about 70 percent of Earth’s surface and, therefore, make a significant contribution to Earth’s weather and climate. The oceans interact with the atmosphere, land, and ice packs,

constantly exchanging heat and moisture with

them. Yet Earth’s oceans remain much more of a

mystery than its atmosphere. Scientists know very

little about the details of the oceans’ effects on

weather and climate, in part because the oceans

are monitored only coarsely by satellites, ships,

and buoys. Sea ice covers about 13 percent of the

world oceans and has a marked effect on weather

and climate. Measurements of the thickness, extent, and composition of sea ice help scientists understand and predict global trends in weather and

climate. More detailed geographic coverage and

more timely delivery of ocean and ice data would

significantly enrich scientists’ understanding of

both realms.

Improving the safety of people at sea and managing the seas’ vast natural resources also depend

on receiving better and more timely data on ocean

and sea-ice phenomena. For example, until satellite measurements became available, the difficulties of monitoring characteristics of the ice packs

from ground- or aircraft-based observations were

major impediments to understanding the behavior

of sea ice, especially its seasonal and yearly variations. Table 1-2 summarizes some of the data that

ocean-ice satellite sensors can provide.

S6 N. Helms and B. Edelson, Op. cit.

57 M c. .Tfiche] ERIM, has Sugges[ed th~( al~ough Lan&l as currently conceived may not be a candidate for commercialization because

of its 16-day revisit period and its 1970s technology, a Landsat replacement using lightweight advanced technology might be commercially

successful (personal communication, 1994). NASA’s experience with the data from a hyperspectral smallsat built by TRW may help determine

whether the market would support such a system.
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 33

Sensor —. Data Science question Application

Ocean-color sensor Ocean color.

Scatterometer Wind speed,

wind direction

Altimeter Altitude of ocean

surface, wave height,

wind speed.

Microwave Imager Surface wind speed,

ice edge,

precipitation

Microwave radiometer Sea-surface

temperature. —. — -

SOURCE U S Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1994

I Operational Monitoring

of the Oceans and Ice

Phytoplankton concentration,

ocean currents,

ocean surface temperature;

pollution and sedimentation

Wave structure,

currents, wind patterns.

El Niño onset and structure

Thickness, extent of ice cover;

internal stress of ice; ice growth

and ablation rates

The development and operation of NASA’s Seasat

system, the first satellite devoted solely to measurements of ocean-ice phenomena, demonstrated

the utility of continuous ocean observations, not

only for scientific use, but also for navigating the

world’s oceans and exploiting ocean resources.

Seasat failed after only 3 months. Nevertheless, its

operation convinced many that an operational

ocean remote sensing satellite would provide significant benefits.58 Although the capabilities of

land and ocean sensing systems are not entirely

separable, 59 agencies have developed satellite

systems with specialized applications in order to

optimize the sensors and spacecraft.

In the long term, the United States may wish to

provide ocean-ice data on an operational basis.

Not only do NOAA and DOD have applications

for data in an operational mode (i.e., where contiOcean-air interactions.

nuity of data over

mats change only

Fishing productivity,

ship routing, monitoring

coastal pollution.

Ocean waves;

ship routing,

currents,

ship, platform safety

Wave and current forecasting.

Navigation information,

ship routing, wave and

surf forecasting

Weather forecasting

time is ensured and the data forslowly), but so also do private

shipping firms and operators of ocean platforms.

Knowledge of currents, wind speeds, wave

heights, and general wave conditions at a variety

of ocean locations is crucial for enhancing the

safety of ocean platforms and ships at sea. Such

data could also decrease costs by allowing ship

owners to predict the shortest, safest sea routes.

Information about ocean biological productivity

would help guide commercial fishing to promising fishing grounds and assist in maintaining fisheries yields.

Despite repeated proposals for operational

ocean satellites, the United States has not yet

made the commitment to ocean monitoring outside of meteorological applications.60 In the

meantime, other entities, such as ESA, Japan, and

Canada, are emerging as primary sources of ocean

data for research and operational purposes (figure

‘x D, Montgomery}. “Commercial Applications of Satellite Oceanography,” oceunus 24(3), 198 I: Joint Oceanographic Institutions,

“Oceanography) from Space: A Research Strategy for the Decade 1985- 1995”’ (Washington, DC: Joint Oceanographic Institutions, 1984).

S9 ~lo,t ~en(or~ prc)~,ide \ome data about both land and tie oceans.

60 me Nationa] oceanographic Sate]]ite System (NOSS), deve]o~d in the late 1970s by NASA, NOAA, and the Navy, was canceled in

1981 in part becau~e of it~ co~t. A similar fate befell the Navy Remote Ocean Sensing Satellite (N-ROSS) in 1988.
34 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

SOURCE: © 1992 by ESA.

1-6). Growing experience with these data for operational uses and for global change research

could increase U.S. interest in ocean monitoring

and could build confidence in relying on these

(and other) foreign services. In addition, growing

experience with land remote sensing has demonstrated to a wider set of users the utility of remote

sensing for operational purposes.

1 Options for Operational

Ocean Monitoring

If Congress wishes to support a U.S. commitment

to civilian operational ocean monitoring, it could:

■ Expand the mandate of the IPO to include an

ocean and ice monitoring capability. Although the POES and DMSP satellites collect

data about the surface of the ice and oceans,

these capabilities could be expanded to include

additional useful data about ocean-surface

wind speeds and currents, and more precise

characterization of the boundaries and thickness of sea ice. The IPO could increase its capabilities for collecting such data incrementally

by improving existing instruments and by adding additional ones as needs arise.

Develop a comprehensive national ocean observation system, which would be the most

costly option because it would require the U.S.

government to develop instruments and a

spacecraft that it does not now possess. However, a national system would allow the greatest

independence in developing programs to meet

U.S. national needs. The United States has

started out on this course twice in the past,61

only to step back as the costs mounted.

Take part in an international ocean monitoring system, which would be much less expensive than creating a national system because the

U.S. government would share the burden of

satellite systems with other countries. For example, the United States could deploy satellites

for ocean color, scatterometry, and wave altimetry while relying on other countries for SAR

data on sea ice. This type of approach would

build on existing mechanisms for international

data exchange to provide data from various

types of sensors to all participants, but it would

require expanding the capacity for data processing and transmission, both domestically and

internationally.

Purchase data from commercial satellite operators, which might reduce costs and

strengthen the U.S. private sector. However, to

reduce the risk to potential contractors, this option would require a long-term commitment

from the government to acquire specified types

and quantities of data. The novel arrangement

between NASA and Orbital Sciences Corpora-

~1 For ~xamp]e, with [he proposed joint civilian-military NOSS ~d with the Navy’s N-ROSS.
Chapter 1 Findings and Policy Options I 35

(ion for the development of the SeaStar system

will provide a test of this approach.

■ Rely primarily on data exchanges with other

countries, which means that the United States

could also continue to forego any major commitment of resources to satellite ocean monitoring beyond existing meteorological programs. This approach offers the lowest up-front

cost, but it also provides the United States with

the least influence over the future of ocean

monitoring programs and related data-exchange policies unless it is tied to other activities with these same countries. The eventual

cost in limited data access or high data prices

might surpass the initially low costs.

Whichever path Congress chooses for the future of U.S. ocean monitoring activities, the

most important question is whether the

United States will make a long-term commitment to ocean monitoring. Cost has been a critical factor in the inability to maintain past proposed programs, which may have been overly

ambitious. The emergence of satellite ocean observation programs in other countries presents

the opportunity to develop a less expensive strategy for ocean monitoring. Experience with data

from the European Remote-Sensing Satellite-1

(ERS-1 ), JERS-1, MOS, and Radarsat, as well as

from the U.S. SIR-C synthetic aperture radar

flown on the Space Shuttle,62 will provide additional information regarding the desirability of

an operational system. That information, when

considered in light of overall U.S. goals for Earth

observations, could provide the basis for deciding whether or not to pursue an operational

ocean-ice monitoring program.

62 S[R.C flew for fie firit time on me SpXC Shuttle in April 1994. 1(s second flight is scheduled for December 1994.
National Remote

I

Sensing

Needs and

Capabilities 2

A

comprehensive strategy for satellite remote sensing

must take into account the specific features of remote

sensing technologies and applications. Remote sensing

satellite systems have historically been expensive to develop and operate, involving long time lines for planning, procurement, and integration into operations. 1 The process of developing, operating, and using the data from remote sensing

satellites involves complicated and indirect linkages among

many actors at many levels, including system contractors, commercial and government satellite operators, data managers, and

the ultimate users of the derived information.

Remote sensing satellite systems serve a variety of purposes,

depending on their specific design characteristics (box 2-1 ). Systems designed for one purpose often differ markedly from those

designed for other purposes. Thus, for example, land remote sensing systems are quite different from systems designed to gather

meteorological data.

The requirements of different applications often overlap in

complicated ways, so systems designed for one purpose can serve

a range of other purposes, perhaps with some modifications. For

example, the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer

(AVHRR) on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Sat-

‘ Pro\pectl\ c pri~ ate-sector \upplier\of remotely sensed data are attempting to \horten the time taken to dellvcr a satellite to orbit. On June 8. 1994, the National Aeronautics

tmd Space /\dmin istra[ion (NASA ) announced contract awards for two new Smallwit

Earth obserl :i(ion satelli[e~. NASA expects them to demonstrate ad~anced ~ensor

technologic~. cojt Iesf than $60 million each, and be defeloped, launched, and deli~ ered I 37

on orbit in 24 months or le~$ on a Pegasus launch vehicle
38 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

■

●

●

●

■

■

■

■

ellite (POES), designed primarily to measure sensing capabilities to data needs and discusses

cloud cover and surface temperatures, can also

monitor land vegetation on a global scale. The distinct but often synergistic requirements of remote

sensing applications lead to complicated policy

decisions, where choices made regarding a particular application of data have important effects on

other potential applications.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the

uses of remote sensing, including its use in existing operational and research programs. It then reviews the satellite programs of the agencies that

develop and operate remote sensing systems. Finally, it describes the process for matching remote

possible improvements in that process.

NATIONAL USES OF REMOTE SENSING

As described in chapter 1, remote sensing programs serve a variety of national needs, including

national security, technology development, and

economic growth. This section concentrates on

the direct application of civilian remote sensing

systems to meet national needs for weather forecasting, scientific research, and other purposes. It

describes the uses of satellites for these purposes

and the federal agencies and other institutions responsible for them.
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 39

I Monitoring Weather and Climate

Weather Forecasting

Satellites are used to observe and measure a wide

range of atmospheric properties and processes to

support increasingly sophisticated weather warning and forecasting activities. Imaging instruments provide detailed pictures of clouds and

cloud motions, as well as measurements of seasurface temperature. Sounders collect data in several infrared or microwave spectral bands that are

processed to provide profiles of temperature and

moisture as a function of altitude.2 Radar altimeters, scatterometers, and imagers (synthetic aperture radar, or SAR) can measure ocean currents,

sea-surface winds, and the structure of snow and

ice cover.

Several federal agencies have distinct but overlapping mandates for monitoring and forecasting

weather. The National Weather Service of NOAA

has the primary responsibility for providing severe storm and flood warnings as well as shortand medium-range weather forecasts. The Federal

Aviation Administration provides specialized

forecasts and warnings for aircraft. The Defense

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) at the

Department of Defense (DOD) supports the specialized needs of the military and intelligence services, which emphasize global capabilities to

monitor clouds and visibility in support of combat

and reconnaissance activities and to monitor seasurface conditions in support of naval operations.

Several private companies also provide both general and specialized weather forecast services

commercially. NOAA, the Air Force, and the

Navy share responsibility for processing the data

from NOAA and DMSP satellites: NOAA for

soundings, the Air Force for cloud imagery, and

the Navy for ocean-surface data.

Global Change Research

Global change research aims to monitor and understand the processes of natural and anthropogenic changes3 in Earth’s physical, biological, and

human environments. Satellites support this research by providing measurements of stratospheric ozone and ozone-depleting chemicals: by providing long-term scientific records of Earth’s

climate; by monitoring Earth’s radiation balance

and the concentrations of greenhouse gases and

aerosols; by monitoring ocean temperatures, currents, and biological productivity; by monitoring

the volume of ice sheets and glaciers; and by monitoring land use and vegetation. These variables

provide critical information on the complex processes and interactions of global environmental

change, including climate change.

The U.S. Global Change Research Program

(USGCRP) was established as a Presidential Initiative and by congressional mandate in 1990 to

encourage the development of a more complete

scientific understanding of global environmental

changes and to provide better information for

policymakers in crafting responses to those changes

(box 2-2). The USGCRP coordinates the activities

of 11 federal agencies and organizations, although

NASA, NOAA, the National Science Foundation,

and the Department of Energy will contribute 91

percent of the funding in FY 1995. NASA alone is

expected to contribute 68 percent of the total.

Long-Term Monitoring of Climate

and Other Earth Systems

Scientists recognize the need for continuous,

global, well-calibrated measurements of a broad

range of critical environmental indicators over periods of several decades.

The Earth undergoes major processes of

change that are reckoned in scales of decades to

millennia. Decades of continuous calibrated

o Generally, the larger the number of chtinnels, the better the vertical resolution of the sounder. Hence, the proposed Advanced Infrared

Sounder (AIRS) has 2,3(K) channel~ compared with 20 channels in the High-Resolution Infrared Sounder (HIRS) it would replace.
40 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

cally located sites on the Earth’s land and oceans this long-term operational task. No federal agency

will be required to document climate and eco- has the combination of mission focus and resystem changes and for differentiating natural sources needed to support long-term monitoring. variability from human-induced changes.4

An operational satellite program is ideally suited 1 Land Remote Sensing

to these purposes. Yet, NASA’s Earth Observing

System (EOS), the principal space-based compo- Mapping and Planning

nent of the USGCRP, is scheduled to operate for The development of highly capable computer

only 15 years. EOS will gather data on climate and workstations and mapping software known as

other environmental processes, which will help geographic information systems (GIS) has spurred

4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program aniiNASA’s Earth Obser\ing S>’stem, OTA-BPISC- 122 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1993), p. 3.
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 41

much of the current interest in satellite remote

sensing. 5 Within the federal government, the U.S.

Geological Survey (USGS) of the Department of

the Interior (DOI) has the primary responsibility

for civilian mapping whereas other agencies use

GIS for more specialized purposes, including military and intelligence applications. USGS also

leads an interagency coordination effort through

the Federal Geographic Data Committee to develop a National Spatial Data Infrastructure,6 which

would provide a consistent nationwide basis for

geographic data and information.

The U.S. Department of Transportation and

state and local transportation departments make

use of remote] y sensed data from a aircraft and from

SPOT (Système pour I ’Observation de la Terre)

and Landsat to assist in planning major highways

and other transportation routes. Pipeline companies use similar data sets to help plan pipeline

routes and monitor development near pipelines.7

State and local governments make extensive use

of remotely sensed data for land-use planning and

for general infrastructure development.

The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) has the

primary responsibility for creating maps used in

military assessment and planning and for fighting

wars. During the Persian Gulf Conflict, DMA

generated maps of the Persian Gulf region based

on SPOT and Landsat data. Because these maps

were created using unclassified data, the U.S. military was able to share them with U.S. allies without fear of compromising classified data or the

means of generating these data.

The Army Corps of Engineers makes extensive

use of remotely sensed data and GIS to map project sites and assess the condition of dams, river

channels, and levies in major watersheds. The

Corps has projects throughout the world that make

use of remotely sensed data.

Terrestrial Monitoring and

Natural Resource Management

Remotely sensed land data support an extremely

diverse set of natural resource monitoring and

management applications. 8 This diversity reflects

the diversity in natural, agricultural, residential,

and other land-use types. It also leads to a diverse

set of data requirements and data-processing techniques, making it difficult to develop a common

set of requirements for a single land remote sensing sysem. As small, relatively inexpensive satellites increase in capability, they will be designed

to target “niche” markets for satellite data.

Crop monitoring

Using data from two channels of NOAA’s

AVHRR sensor or from the Landsat sensors yields

a vegetation index—roughly, “greenness’ ’—which

provides information on the condition of vegetation. More detailed information can distinguish

among various crop types. The Foreign Agricultural Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) combines the vegetation index with

meteorological information to forecast crop production around the world. USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service relies on aerial photography to provide higher-resolution information on

domestic crops and to monitor compliance with

agricultural land-use restrictions.9

5 U.S. Congrc\\, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotel> Sensed Dutu: TK}~nolog>, Murrugement, and Markets, OTA-l SS-604 (N’ashingtcm. DC- [J. S. Got emment Printing Office. September 1994), ch. 2.

() ~econlrllcn(iiiti on” DO].q in the ~ationa] performmce Review (,4. Gore, From Red Tupe to Re.\ulr~: creating u Gol’ernntenl T}IUI ~~~r~~

Better [Jnd C()\/\ l.~ \ j, report of the National Performance Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Vice president, Sept. 7, 1993 )) and Executi\ e

order 12906, Apr. I 1, I 994.

7 For a d[wu\\ion of the u\e of remotel) sen~ed data for pipeline planning and management, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Asw\wnent, Rcmotcl] Sen$e(i Dutu: Te(hnoiog>, M(inugernent, and Murke(~, op. cit., app. B.

X lbId., appi. B and C.

‘) The European Umon u~ei data from France’s SPOT satellite system for this purpose.
42 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Managing federal lands

USDA and DOI use satellite data in managing federal lands. The Forest Service and the National

Park Service each incorporate data from various

land remote sensing systems and other sources

into GIS to monitor forest harvests, natural habitats, and conditions that pose the risk of wildfires. ’” The Bureau of Land Management performs similar functions on other federal lands,

including forests and range land. The Army Corps

of Engineers uses satellite imagery to monitor inland and coastal waterways for flood control, flow

management, and coastal erosion management.

Environmental regulation

Satellite monitoring can also support programs

for regulating the use of private activities on public and private lands. The United States has programs for protecting wetlands, endangered species, and erodible farmlands administered by the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DOI,

NOAA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and

USDA. These programs rely on onsite monitoring

as well as aerial and satellite remote sensing.

Geology and Mining

Satellite observations support a variety of geological observations. Moderate-resolution, multispectral land remote sensing systems can distinguish among mineral types based on their infrared

reflectivity y and can observe large-scale geological

features such as fault regions. These measurements are useful both scientifically and for mineral prospecting. The Laser Geodynamics Satellite

(LAGEOS) and the Global Positioning System

(GPS) satellites also provide precision measurements of position that can be used to monitor tectonic activity and earthquake risks.

Private Sector

Small private firms have provided processing and

analytic data services since the beginning of satellite remote sensing. These so-called value-added

companies take raw remotely sensed data and add

other goespatial data to them to generate information of value to a wide selection of governmental

and private customers. State and local governments have made significant use of the information provided by these firms, generally in the form

of maps used for monitoring and planning. This

small but rapidly growing sector of the U.S. economy has helped fuel the development and use of

GIS and imaging-processing software. ’l The

United States leads the world in the development

of the remote sensing value-added industry.

I Ocean Remote Sensing

In addition to providing greater understanding of

ocean processes for global change research, the

use of satellite data for ocean monitoring can support a variety of operational activities. Ocean-color sensors can observe coastal pollution and provide a measure of biological activity for fishing

and for the management of fisheries. Measurements of sea-surface winds, waves, currents, and

ice can be critical both for shipping and for weather forecasting. Monitoring the processes that underlie the El Niño-Southern Oscillation phenomenon could lead to greatly improved seasonal and

interannual weather forecasts. NOAA and the

U.S. Navy have the principal responsibility for the

United States’ operational ocean monitoring and

rely primarily on in situ measurements from

ground stations and radiosonde balloons and on

sea-surface wind and temperature data from the

NOAA and DMSP meteorological satellites.

10 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data: Technology, Management, and Markets, Op. cit., app. c.

I I sales Of remote sensing value-added firms totaled an estimated $300 million in 1992. They are growing at rates between 15 and 20 percent

per year. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely Jensed Data: Technology, Management, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 4.
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 43

~ Other Needs

Public Safety

Severe storms, floods, fires, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions can seriously disrupt the orderly

flow of commerce and can cause displacement

and great hardships in people’s lives. In the United

States. the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) has the responsibility for managing the federal responses to public emergencies.

FEMA is beginning to use remotely sensed data

from aircraft and from satellites to assess damage

from natural disasters and to plan appropriate responses. GIS technologies have proved especially

useful in creating geographic overlays that show

the extent of damage, the locations of potential

emergency centers, and the best routes for moving

people and emergency supplies through affected

areas. State and local governments feed into the

development of the GIS by supplying data about

the locations of state and local facilities. 2 For example, the Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, and

state agencies collaborated on assessing damage

from the 1992 floods along the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. Such assessments helped in determining which areas were most severely affected

and how to allocate disaster-relief funding.

International Development Assistance

Information provided by satellites can be extremely useful in planning and administering international relief and development-assistance

programs. The U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) uses low-resolution vegetative-index data from satellites in its Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) program to monitor

possible famine conditions in several regions of

Africa. Information from FEWS helps in planning

African food-assistance programs. Similarly, the

African Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance Program uses vegetative-index data to forecast the risk of insect infestations. USAID also

provides technical assistance to developing countries in the use of remotely sensed data, particularly in GIS, and uses information from these systems to monitor the effectiveness of its

programs. 

14

Research and Education

Universities have played a major part in conducting research on the use of remotely sensed data.

Not only have university teams experimented

with the characteristics of the data and determined

their advantages and limitations, they have developed applications in a variety of disciplines such

as archaeology, agriculture, forestry, geological

exploration, mapping, and soil conservation. Universities have been the principal force behind providing a trained workforce for processing and

analyzing remotely sensed data.

Public interest groups such as Ducks Unlimited, the World Wildlife Fund, World Resources

Institute, and Conservation International have

used remotely sensed data from aircraft, Landsat,

and SPOT in their conservation efforts, both in the

United States and abroad. The availability of relatively inexpensive software and hardware has

made remote sensing data and techniques much

more accessible in the 1990s than before, and it

has helped public interest groups use the data.

However, the work of universities and public interest groups has been inhibited by the relatively

high cost of Landsat and SPOT data compared

with what they can budget for the data. Such

groups and universities look forward to much

cheaper, more accessible data in the future. 5

1: See 1;.S, Congres\, Office of Technology Assessment, Rernotel> Sensed DUIU: 7i’chn[)loq), Muna,qernenr, and Markets, op. cit., app. B.

1 ] Ibid., ch. 5.

] 4 Ibid.. app. B.

15 L“, s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, In[emational Securitj and Space Program, Renwel)’ sensed Data from space: ~i.$-

rrIhII/I{)n, Pr/(/n,q, und Applicaflcms, background paper (Washington, DC: Office of Technology Awcwment, July 1992), p. 17.
44 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

U.S. REMOTE SENSING CAPABILITIES

Several federal agencies and private firms are involved in developing and operating the satellites

and managing the data systems necessary to meet

the needs of users. In some cases, the operational

agency is the same as the agency responsible for

using the data, but for many applications, there is

little or no overlap between the user and supplier

agencies.

~ National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data,

and Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible

for managing the environmental satellite systems

used to fulfill NOAA’s missions in environmental

forecasting and stewardship. l6 These systems

consist of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) System and the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite

(POES) System,17 both of which were developed

by NASA, along with their associated data and information systems.

GOES consists of two operational satellites in

geostationary orbits. One, called GOES-West, is

stationed over the eastern Pacific Ocean and the

other, GOES-East, is stationed over the Atlantic

Ocean. 18 These two satellites provide continuous

images of clouds over North and South America

and the nearby oceans (box 2-3). GOES-8,

launched in April 1994 and the first satellite in the

upgraded GOES-Next series (figure 2-1 ), was designed to produce higher-resolution images, temperature measurements, and soundings. GOES-8

will replace the current GOES-East in early 1995

after extensive in-orbit testing and calibration.

POES consists of two polar-orbiting satellites

(figure 2-2), each of which carries an imager for

clouds and surface-temperature measurements

and a pair of sounders for measuring the atmospheric temperature and moisture content, as well

as other instruments (box 2-4). These satellites

provide critical inputs to the National Weather

Service’s global weather forecast models.

NOAA also operates ground systems for processing, disseminating, and archiving meteorological data. It processes sounding data from both the

NOAA and DMSP systems as part of the NOAADOD Shared Processing Network and makes the

processed data available worldwide. NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center, National Geophysical Data Center, and National Oceanographic

Data Center serve as archives for environmental

data from these and other satellite systems and

make those data available worldwide.

~ Department of Defense

The Air Force developed and operates two DMSP

satellites in polar orbits (figure 2-3), which provide DOD, the individual armed services, and the

intelligence community with global information

on clouds, visibility, and ocean conditions, in addition to weather forecast information (box 2-5).

On the ground, the Air Force processes the visible,

infrared, and cloud imagery; the Navy processes

the sea-surface data; and NOAA archives the data.

The Navy developed and operated the Geodetic

Satellite (Geosat) from 1985 to 1989 to provide

detailed ocean altimetry and to map Earth’s gravitational field for military purposes. Geosat data

were initially classified, but some have since been

made available to oceanographers for studies of

16 NOAA>S strategic pl~ lls~ seven Prlnclpal missions in IWO broad categories. For the env ironrnental prediction, monitoring, and as:,essment category, NOAA has defined its missions as short-term environmental forecasting and warning, seasonal to interannual climate forecasting, and global change monitoring over periods of decades to centuries. Ile environmental protection category includes the environmental

management of fisheries, endangered species, and coastal ecosystems, as well as navigation and positioning missions.

IT The poES sate] ]ites were known initially as Television Infrared Observing Satellites (TIROS) and are often referred to by that name.

18 Afier GOES-6 failed in 1989, Europe made Meteosat 3 available to NOAA in place of GOES-East.

19 For a description of he ho]dings of these archives, which also serve as World Data Centers of the International Council of Scientific

Unions, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely .Wnse(i Data: Tec}mology’, Management, and Markets, op. cit.
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 45

ocean topography and dynamics. The Navy is de- mospheric, terrestrial, and oceanic remote sensveloping a Geosat Follow-On (GFO) satellite for

launch in 1996.

1 National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

NASA’s mission in remote sensing has traditionally focused on research and development. In the

1960s and 1970s, NASA developed NOAA’s principal operational systems, TIROS (now POES) and

GOES, as well as the NIMBUS, Landsat, and Seasat systems to demonstrate new capabilities in ating. However, NASA has no formal charter to

operate these systems on a continuing basis.20

The Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) forms the

focus of NASA’s current remote sensing activities. It includes the major EOS platforms (appendix A), scheduled for launch beginning in 1998,

and several earlier observational projects. These

include two ongoing projects: the Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite (UARS ) for measuring

stratospheric chemistry and ozone depletion and

the U.S.-French TOPEX/Poseidon for measuring

20 mere is one ~xceptlon t. [his ~]e. NASA has the mi$~ion of pro~iding con[inuou~ g]~b~l ozone ~a[a from [he Total O/011~ Mapping

Spectrometer (TOMS ).
46 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Telemetry and

control antenna

Trim

tab

L-P’=.. /kbvv2-

Solar

array

Iar

I

NOTE: GOES-Next IS the new generation of geostationary meteorological satellites developed for NOAA and built by Ford Aerospace

SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1994.

ocean topography and currents. A series of smaller Earth Probes will begin with the Total Ozone

Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) Earth Probe in

late 1994.2]

Recognizing the challenge of using the massive

quantities of data to be produced by EOS, NASA

has devoted a large fraction of the EOS budget to

the EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS). 22 EOSDIS is designed to provide ready

data-access and data-processing capabilities to

global change research scientists supported by

NASA. It will also provide access for other users

of remotely sensed data, including foreign researchers.

NASA also has a traditional role as the developer of new technologies for civil remote sensing,

from the first TIROS weather satellite in 1960 and

the first Landsat satellite in 1972 to the new systems being developed as part of MTPE. NOAA’s

environmental satellite systems reflect the legacy

of NASA’s technology-development efforts.

NASA has two programs that support the development of commercial remote sensing applications. The Centers for the Commercial Development of Space include the Space Remote Sensing

Center located at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, which is developing commercial applications for agriculture and environmental monitor2 I me ]aunch of tie TOMS Eti proIx has ken delayed pending review of a recent failure of its Pegasus launch vehicle.

22 U.S. Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Dutu: Technology, Management, und Markets, op. cit., ch. 3; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Mission to Planet Earth, EOSDIS: EOS Data and Information System (Washington, DC:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1992); National Research Council, Space Studies Board, Panel to Review EOSD/SPlans, Final Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994).
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 47

AVHRR

Z Advanced Very High

/

Ssu

Stratospheric

Sounding Unit

\

\ SBUV

UHF Data Solar Backscatter

Collection Ultraviolet Radiometer

System AMSU

Antenna Advanced Microwave

Sounding Units

USE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT

1 ( I I L!!ii!L. ~

Land albedo and

temperature

Sea surface

Ocean temperature

circulation AVRR

Snow and

Hydrology and ice cover

ice warning

[ 1

Cloud extent

H

I I I I

Atmospheric HIRS

humidity

I I 1 )

r I i 1 1 I

Search and

H

Beacon position

kd

SAR

rescue I I I I I I

1 1 1

Solar storm

k--i

Solar output

{

SEM

warning

I I I 1 1 )

SOURCE Martin Marietta Astrospace 1993
48 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

1

2

3

4

5

■

■

■

■
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 49

SSIES

Monitor

SSM/1

o

Ion and Electron

Microwave Imaqer Scintillation ~

 -

OLS

Or3erational - ‘“’“E

Llnescan

‘Ystem,%!llve’par

Humidity

Sounder

\

\

SSM

SSMIT-1 Magnetometer

Microwave ‘

Temperature SSBX-2

Sounder Gamma and X-ray Spectrometer

USE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT

I

‘1 Cloud extent , I OLS

1 -

,—— —— —— —.

Atmospheric

temperature 1

,-- ~ ::~_—

I

1

tmospheric

humidity ~

1

Ice and

snow extent“---1

,.

~- forecastin

Weather and

sea state

g

1

I

E

I

l–-—

1—-–~

at sea surface

Wind speed

 ------ -

I

I

I

mI 1

Precipitation

rate P

[

Global

magnetospheric

model

[- ~

Characterize

aurora

1- Earth’s

magnetic field

, 1

r

SSM

Flux and energlesl

of electrons I

and ions

SSJ

IZ!”!J!!J ~—

Space plasma

- .—

above lono-

~ spheric F region 1

.

-—

Monitor

I

nuclear events

I 1

SSBX-2

1

‘

— 

communlcatlons;

Long-haul ”-– ~

OTH radars

i SSIES 1

L---——J

—

SOURCE Martin Marietta Astrospace 1993
50 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 51

ing, and the Center for Mapping at Ohio State

University. 23 The Earth Observation Commercial

Applications Program (EOCAP) provides matching federal funds for privately proposed projects

designed to demonstrate the commercial application of remotely sensed data.24 Through its Small

Satellite Technology Initiative (SSTI) in the Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology,

NASA has awarded two contracts to develop

small remote sensing satellites. These satellites

are to demonstrate technologies that could be used

in future commercial projects.25

1 Landsat

Since the launch of Landsat 1 in 1972, the Landsat

system has provided a continuous record of multispectral, moderate-resolution land-surface data.

Throughout its history, the continuation of the

Landsat system has been uncertain, as NASA,

NOAA, DOD, USGS, and the private company

EOSAT have at various times had responsibility

for system development, operations, and data

management and distribution (appendix D). Under current plans, NASA is responsible for the development of Land sat 7, NOAA for ground operations, and USGS for data-archive management

(see chapter 3).

1 The Advanced Research Projects

Agency and the Defense Laboratories

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)

is charged with assisting the development of new

defense-related technologies that might not be undertaken by the private sector without government

assistance. For example, ARPA helped develop

Orbital Sciences Corporation’s Pegasus launch

vehicle by agreeing to purchase a specified number of launches on the new vehicle. ARPA has

been attempting to develop a new, common small

spacecraft that could be used in a variety of applications, including for remote sensing.26

Several DOD and Department of Energy laboratories have a long history of developing sensors

and spacecraft for defense purposes. For example,

Los Alamos National Laboratory developed the

Alexis satellite system for detecting charged particles and for observing other characteristics of the

near-Earth space environment. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has created sensors for

detecting the launch of missiles. Derivatives of

these sensors, developed for the Strategic Defense

Initiative, found their way into the highly successful Clementine satellite that recently mapped the

moon in 11 spectral bands.27 The sensor developed for the WorldView commercial remote sensing satellite now under development grew out of

sensor research carried out at Livermore.

D Private Sector

Private firms have long served as contractors to

the federal government, designing and building

sensors, communications packages, and spacecraft for both civilian and national security government remote sensing programs. Hence, they

have developed considerable expertise in spacecraft and instrument design.

In recent years, private firms have begun to explore the market potential for building and operating their own remote sensing systems (see box

3-7). Orbital Sciences Corporation, WorldView

Imaging Corporation, Space Imaging, Inc., and

23 “Commercial Development: NASA Centers for the Commercial Development of Space.” Space Technolog) Innmation, May-June,

1994, p. 14.

24 For example, NASA is sponsoring the Cropix program to demonstrate the use of satellite data to manage individual farms. See U.S. Congreis, Office of Technology Assessment, Remorel> Sensed Data: Technology, Managemen~, and Markets, op. cit., app. B; and ‘bRemote Sensing

program Offer\ Partnership Advantages,” Space Technology lnno~’ation, May-June 1994, pp. 8-9.

25 K. Sawyer, “’For NASA ‘Smallsats,’ a Commercial Role,” The Washing/on Pos(, June 9, 1994, p. A7.

26 U.S. Congres\,Office of Technology Assessment, The Future ofRemore Sensing from Space: Ci\iliun Salellite Systems andApplicut[on.~,

OTA-lSC-558 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993), app. B.

27 me Naval Research Laboratory built the Clementine satellite.
52 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Eyeglass International, Inc., have all received licenses from the Department of Commerce to operate remote sensing systems. These new business

ventures, formed largely from companies with

previous experience building systems for the government, expect to orbit highly capable spacecraft

in the next few years and to sell data from these

systems in the global data market. If they succeed

commercially, these companies are likely to revolutionize the delivery and use of remotely sensed

data from space (see chapter 3).

MATCHING CAPABILITIES TO NEEDS

The array of uses of satellite remote sensing systems matches only imperfectly the missions of the

agencies that develop and operate those systems.

Matching the requirements of data users with the

capabilities of satellite systems presents an extremely important challenge. OTA finds that

mechanisms for improving the requirements

process should be a central element of a national strategy for remote sensing.

I The Requirements Process

The United States currently has no national process for developing remote sensing satellite requirements. Instead, each agency has developed

its own mechanism for matching its individual

missions with programmatic resources to determine data requirements and satellite-design specifications. The development of systems to collect

needed data depends in turn on the legislative and

administrative processes for developing and refining agency missions and on the budgetary process

for allocating resources. The Office of Management and Budget has initiated occasional budget

reviews for specific policy issues concerning land

remote sensing, the convergence of polar-orbiting

meteorological satellites, and global change research. Congress has also weighed in on these issues, but there have been few formal, comprehensive reviews of Earth observations needs.

The current system has important strengths.

For critical national needs, it is simpler and more

efficient to assign each mission to a single agency

with the resources and authority to carry it out.

This arrangement also meshes well with the congressional authorization and appropriations process, by allowing a single authorizing committee or

appropriations subcommittee in each house to

deal with the missions assigned to a given agency.

Through their experience in continuous satellite operations and repeated system upgrades, the

agencies with operational remote sensing missions have developed disciplined processes for

developing and refining requirements. These

processes rely on the accumulated knowledge of

data users as well as the availability of proven satellite technologies.

The requirements processes for NOAA and the

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program are

now being merged. Before the current convergence effort began, NOAA’s requirements process

would begin with requests for each NOAA line

and program office to define its needs for data.

NOAA would then analyze these requirements for

technical feasibility and cost before a review that

established mission priorities. Weather forecasting has the highest priority because of its importance for public safety. NOAA’s offices are also

expected to represent the interests of the many

outside users who rely on data from the agency’s

environmental satellite systems, but NOAA has

no formal mechanism for gathering information

on outside needs.

The requirements process for DMSP has been

more formalized than NOAA’s: the Air Fore’e initiates the process of generating an Operational Requirements Document (ORD), which then passes

it to the Army and Navy for comment before final

review by the Air Force Space Command and the

Air Staff. This process went through three stages

at increasing levels of detail (ORD- 1. -2, and

-3)-corresponding to major development milestones—for assessing cost, feasibility, and priority. At each stage, requirements had to be formally

validated as essential to support established military missions. This interservice process could provide a model for interagency coordination, although its hierarchical structure has had the effect

of separating users from designers.

The requirements processes for NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth derive not from operational
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 53

experience but from mission priorities established

through the U.S. Global Change Research Program. NASA uses a variety of mechanisms, including scientific conferences, technical workshops, and internal and external review panels, to

refine these into scientific priorities and requirements. The agency then solicits proposals for

instruments that will meet these requirements and

selects proposals according to feasibility, cost,

and mission priority. NASA also makes effective

use of science teams that combine observational

users with engineering designers during the design and development process.

Despite its strengths, the current agency-centered approach to requirements has several weaknesses that affect the processes of reaching agreement on high-level requirements28 and of linking

those requirements to design specifications.

■ Insufficient weight given to the requirements

of outside users. An instrument designed for

one purpose often produces data that can serve

other purposes, though doing so may require

some modifications in its design or in its

associated data systems. As noted above,

AVHRR data from NOAA’s POES platforms

can provide a measure of vegetative condition

through a vegetative index.29 Although the index was not a primary goal of AVHRR development, several programs, including the Foreign Agricultural Service and the USGCRP,

now use it for global vegetation monitoring.

NOAA has accommodated this application by

making minor modifications of the spectral

bands for the next-generation AVHRR/3,

though not with the improved radiometric calibration some users need. In general, however,

the requirements process is geared to a specific

group of users and will give a higher priority to

the needs of those users. NOAA uses sounding

data primarily as input to weather forecast

models and is reluctant to undertake the longterm commitment of meeting the more refined

requirements of climate monitoring without

additional funding.

Inefficiencies from overlapping capabilities.

For example, the POES and DMSP satellites

serve primarily the purposes of operational

weather forecasting, and the EOS-PM platforms will collect more refined atmospheric

data for research purposes. A coordinated program to meet the combined mission requirements should be cheaper over the long run than

three separate systems. This is the impetus for the

convergence proposal, discussed in chapter 3.

Inability to aggregate diffuse requirements.

This happens when several agencies or other

users have requirements for similar data, but

none of those agencies can afford the satellite

system needed to acquire those data. The difficulties in funding the Landsat system provide

a clear example. Although many agencies use

Landsat data, historically, no single agency has

found its data needs compelling enough to fund

a satellite system of its own. Because of this, responsibility for the Landsat program has

shifted from agency to agency and still lacks

the robustness that operational users need

(chapter 3).

Inefficiency in making tradeoffs between

costs and requirements. The current requirements process often separates the phase of

drawing up user requirements from the phase of

engineering design. This separation makes it

difficult for users and designers to discuss

tradeoffs between requirements and costs. For

example, a slight adjustment in requirements

2R High-level requirements are intermediate between broad mission statements and the detailed requirements used in in~trument de~ign. For

the broad mis~ion of cl i mate monitoring, for example, the high-level requirements would be to improve the accuracy of temper-ature w)unding

data to a few tenths of a degree, whereas the engineering requirements would be to describe the radiometric calibration and \pecIra! band~ of W

sounding instrument.

29 me N~rma]ized Difference Vegetative Index was originally derived from two spectral bands of Landsat ‘S Multi \pectrtils~alln~r ( h~ss ).

but it applie~ to other sen~ors with similar bands, \uch as AVHRR. The difference in intensities in the green and red bands. normali~ed by the

total intensity, providej a rough index of plant “greenness.”
54 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

could result in a major reduction in cost, or a

substantial improvement in capabilities could

be accomplished at modest additional cost. Private industry has used this process of concurrent engineering to meet market demands more

efficiently. 30 These tradeoffs can occur in operational programs through many iterations of

the process of developing and refining requirements for successive generations of satellites

but are harder to accomplish for new satellite

systems. Several systems under development

were later canceled because stated requirements led to unaffordable costs.31

m Difficulty in establishing national priorities.

The current institutional arrangement for meeting national priorities allows each agency to

make tradeoffs among its own missions and

budget constraints but provides no mechanism

for establishing priorities and making tradeoffs

among the programs of several agencies. The

problem is especially acute when an agency is

attempting to establish new missions and the

budgets to carry them out. For example, NOAA

may be the appropriate agency to pursue longterm monitoring of global change, but it currently lacks the budget to carry out that mission. Conversely, NASA has a substantial

budget for research and development but no

charter for long-term operational missions.

● Lack of agency expertise. The agency responsible for operating a satellite system may lack experience and expertise in the design of satellite

systems. This has been true for NOAA, which

relies on NASA for the development of new

instruments. Partly for this reason, the ambitious requirements for GOES-Next led to significant delays and cost overruns that threatened the continuity of the GOES program.32

1 Coordination Mechanisms

There are several options for improving the requirements process and limiting the drawbacks of

the current agency-led approach, without altering

the organizational structure of the agencies. Some

of these mechanisms are already in place for global change research through the USGCRP and

could be expanded; others could be implemented

at the agency level. For example, the Committee

on the Environment and Natural Resources

(CENR) 33 could expand its purview to include

oversight and coordination of agency-based remote sensing programs.

~ Improve mechanisms for communicating requirements of outside users. The agency responsible for operating a satellite could solicit

data requirements from users or from art advisory committee on data requirements. Either

process would give the agency information on

the data needs of other agencies and of users

outside the federal government. The agency

could undertake this process on its own initiative, or CENR or Congress could mandate that

it do so. Even with information on the requirements of outside users, however, operating

agencies generally give a higher priority to

their own data needs than to the needs of outside users.

■ Improve interactions between the setting and

implementation of requirements. A more direct channel of communication between data

30 me Bwing Compmy recently made effec[lve u5e of Concumen[ engineering and computer-aided design in designing and building its

Boeing 777 aircraft. See P. Proctor, “Boeing Rolls Out 777 to Tentative Market,” A\iafion Week, Apr. 11, 1994, pp. 36-37.

~ ] me High Resolution Multiswctral 1mager (HRMSI) originally planned for LandSat 7 was one of these, as were tWO paSt pI’OgrWIIS fOr

developing operational ocean observing satellites, the National Ocean Satellite System (NOSS) and the Naval Remote Ocean Satellite System

(N-ROSS).

32 For a summv of tie hlstog of ~ES-Next, see us, congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The F-U/Ure of Remo(e ~ensing from

Space: Ci\’ilian Satellite Systems and Applications, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

33 CENR, pm of tie National Science ~d Technology council (NSTC), is tie descendant of the Committee on Earth and Environmental

Sciences (CEES), established under the Federal Coordinating Committee for Science, Education, and Technology (FCCSET), the predecessor

to NSTC. CENR already oversees the USGCRP.
Chapter 2 National Remote Sensing Needs and Capabilities I 55

users and satellite engineers could improve

cost-effectiveness by permitting tradeoffs between system costs and capabilities to occur

early in the design process. For example, satellite engineers could play a formal role in the

process of defining requirements, and data

users could be involved in the major engineering-design milestone reviews. This concurrent

engineering process provides away for the data

users and the satellite designers to understand

and respond to each other’s perspective on satellite design and operations. When pursued

early in the development process, such interactions can lead to more effective satellite design.

■ Institute a formal interagency process for setting and implementing requirements. The

coordination processes of CENR or the

USGCRP would function most effectively for

setting high-level requirements. However, the

detailed implementation of high-level requirements depends on the cooperation of the

agency or agencies involved. The history of efforts to converge civil and military meteorological satellites demonstrates how difficult it can

be to achieve this cooperation (see chapter 3).

■ Improve mechanisms for assigning and updating agency missions. USGCRP and CENR

can address these issues on an interagency basis, but where agencies fail to reach consensus,

they may require decisionmaking at” a higher

level. Congress could assist this process

through authorizing legislation that specifies

agency roles in meeting new national missions

for environmental data collection.

Each of these options has the advantage of

making the requirements process more responsive

to a broader set of needs, but the options also risk

undermining established operational programs by

diluting the role of agency missions in the iterative

process of establishing and refining system capabilities. Defining a baseline set of requirements

that are essential to each operational mission

could protect operational programs from the

risk of having their missions diluted or

eroded. 34 These baseline requirements will generally arise from each agency’s operational missions but may require high-level policy input if interagency negotiations do not lead to agreements

to protect those requirements.

Beyond revising the requirements process, a

national strategy for remote sensing could include

new agencies or interagency programs. The longterm stability of interagency programs depends on

continuing political commitments from the participating agencies, which in turn rest on the agencies’ abilities to meet their essential requirements.

The Integrated Program Office proposed for a

converged meteorological satellite program provides an example of how this might work (see

chapter 3).

1 Market-Oriented Options

As mentioned above, budgetary processes underlie many of the inefficiencies of the agency-oriented requirements process. Unless they receive

funding to do so, agencies are unwilling to meet

requirements that go beyond their established

missions. Market-oriented financing mechanisms

would allow users to pay a part of satellite system

costs, either directly or through data purchases.

This could give users some leverage over the design and operation of satellite systems, provided

the users clearly indicate their requirements and

their willingness to pay for meeting them.

● Facilitate interagency payments by data

users. This would provide a way to aggregate

resources and to give the agencies using the

data some financial leverage for influencing the

development of system requirements and capabilities. So far, using interagency payments has

not been a common practice in the federal

budget process. In the late 1980s, the Office of

Management and Budget attempted to convince agencies that use significant quantities of

34 me C]lnton Administration’s convergence proposal assigns each requirement one of three levels of priority. Baseline requirements essential to each agency mission are called “key” requirements, whereas lower-priority requirements are labeled “threshold” and “objective.”
56 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

■

■

Landsat data to help pay for a next-generation

Landsat satellite, but even agencies that routinely purchase Landsat data commercially

were unwilling to make a such a financial commitment in advance.35

Allow commercial data sales by federal agencies. Other countries, particularly in Europe,

have developed commercial data-access policies that allow government agencies to recover

some of the costs of satellite systems through

data sales (see chapter 4 for a discussion of international data policies). These data-access

policies give those agencies an incentive to

meet commercial data requirements. This option would be difficult to institute in the United

States because of long-standing policies36 and

traditions that forbid commercial data sales by

federal agencies; U.S. agencies can charge data

users, but only for their marginal costs of fulfilling user requests for data. Data collected by

government agencies are considered to be in

the public domain (that is, they may be freely

reproduced and transmitted to third parties) and

are made available as a public good.

Encourage federal agencies to purchase data

from commercial suppliers. This may be much

easier for federal agencies than attempting to

sell data commercially.37 Furthermore, it may

be easier for the private sector than for government agencies to respond to market forces as it

designs systems to meet user needs. Users of

land data already do this on a small scale, but

NASA’s arrangement to purchase SeaWiFS

data from the Orbital Sciences Corporation

would be the largest data purchase yet and the

first to cover the capital costs of satellite development and launch.

Government data-purchase arrangements raise

the question of data access for third parties, which

affects whether the supplier can also sell data commercially. In the case of SeaWiFS, Orbital

Sciences expects to make a profit by selling timely

operational data to commercial fishing operations

while NASA uses the same data on a longer time

scale for global change research. For terrestrial

data, timeliness of data access does not distinguish as clearly between commercial and governmental data needs, so the question of whether third

parties may have access to data purchased by the

government becomes an important subject for negotiation between the government and the commercial data suppliers.

Market mechanisms also pose several problems. Increased data costs for commercial users in

the short run could hold down the demand for data

and impede the development of the information

market. Furthermore, government agencies will

continue to be the largest users of remotely sensed

data. Budget and policy constraints may prevent

agencies from paying more for the data they use,

even if the national need for their use of the data

continues or grows. Finally, data-purchase arrangements pose anew set of risks to agencies and

contractors: for agencies, the loss of control over

data supply, and for contractors, uncertainties in

the long-term continuity of data demand. Chapter

3 addresses these issues in greater detail.

35 In FY ] 989, sel,eral user ~gencies did contribute funds 10 pay for continued operation of Landsats 4 and 5. For a more detailed account of

the history of Landsat, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Fu[ure oJLund Remote Sen.s/ng Sutellite Sy.Sfem (Lund.wr),

9 I -685 SPR (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Sept. 16, 1991 ~,.

36 This ~licy is outlined in OMB Circular A- 130 and reaffirmed in TAe Global Change Data Exchange principles.

J1 u s congress office of Technology Assessment, T}le Future ofRemote Sensingfrom Space: Ci\’i/ian .$alellite S?’.ilem.$ an(lAp[)lrcation.s,

. . .!

op. cit., ch. 6.
Planning for

Future

Remote Sensing

Systems 3

T

his chapter provides an overview of institutional and

organizational issues surrounding the development of operational environmental satellite remote sensing programs. In particular, the chapter examines issues related

to the development of a multiagency weather and environmental

monitoring satellite system and its place in a national strategic

plan for environmental satellite remote sensing programs.

Three themes emerge from the discussion in this chapter. First,

the United States does not have an institutional mechanism

for identifying national environmental remote sensing interests, ordering them by priority, and fashioning a coordinated

approach to managing them. In May 1994, the Clinton Administration announced its proposal to coordinate several existing environmental satellite remote sensing programs by consolidating

(“converging”) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) and the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) polar-orbiting operational meteorological programs and capitalizing on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s

(NASA’s) experimental remote sensing programs.2 However,

with its focus on just three federal agencies and only weather and

] Operu(ionul programs are distinguished from experimental programs by having

long-term stability in funding and management, a conservative philosophy toward the

introduction of new technology, stable data-reduction algorithms, and, most importantly,

an established community of data uwm who are dependent on a steady flow of data products

2 The operational programs are NOAA’\ Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite Program (POES) and DOD’S Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).

The NASA program mo~t relefant to the convergence effort is the Earth Observing Sys- 157

tern (EOS).
58 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

climate monitoring, this proposal is not intended

to serve as a comprehensive approach to satellitebased environmental remote sensing.

Second, the proposed consolidation of

NOAA’s and DOD’s polar-orbiting meteorological programs raises both “cultural” and

technical issues. The technical issues center on

developing an affordable and reliable spacecraft

and sensor suite that will meet the different requirements of the two agencies. This challenge is

exacerbated—perhaps even dominated—by problems inherent in combining programs that originate in agencies that serve different user communities. NOAA’s and DOD’s meteorological

programs have different priorities, different perspectives, and different protocols for acquisition

and operations. These differences developed in

over two decades of independent operation and

have manifested themselves in numerous ways—

most visibly in the different instruments that currently make up satellite sensor suites.

Third, the principal challenge to NOAA,

DOD, and NASA in implementing a jointagency satellite system to monitor Earth’s

weather and climate will be to develop organizational mechanisms that ensure stable, multiyear funding and stable management. Historically, executive branch agencies and their

congressional authorization and appropriation committees have provided long-term stability in the

management and funding of operational programs.

Joint-agency operational programs would require

similar continuity in management and funding.

However, the involvement of multiple budget examiners within the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) and the involvement of multiple

authorization and appropriation committees within Congress (all operating on an annual budget

cycle) create new risks of program disruption.

The Clinton Administration’s proposal to consolidate the nation’s current and planned weather

and climate satellite remote sensing programs had

its origins in a desire to reduce costs. However, the

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) found

that converging programs could have several

benefits even if there were no cost savings. These

include the institutionalization of efficient mechanisms to develop research instruments and manage their transition to operational use, the institutionalization of long-term (decadal-time-scale)

environmental monitoring programs, and a

strengthening of international partnerships that

would facilitate new cooperative remote sensing

programs.

A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE REMOTE

SENSING SYSTEMS

In an era of fiscal austerity, designing programs to

perform space activities more efficiently and with

greater return on investment has emerged as a key

element of national space policy. Greater program

integration, both domestically and internationally, has the potential to reduce costs and redundancy. However, it can also add such risks as program

delays, increased costs, and the possibility that

program goals will be compromised. In the past,

the development of new or improved sensors and

spacecraft has proceeded according to the specific

needs of the funding agency. The nation is now engaged in a reexamination of this model as it considers the risks and benefits of multiagency programs and the emerging possibilities of engaging

the private sector in providing satellite services.

In an earlier report, 3 OTA observed that the

need to maximize the return on investments in remote sensing was spurring calls for the creation of

a single, flexible, national strategic plan for remote sensing. The elements of such a plan, OTA

suggested, should include mechanisms to:

= guarantee the routine collection of high-quality

measurements of weather, climate, and Earth’s

surface over decades;

■ develop a balanced, integrated, long-term program to gather data on global change that in3 U,S, congre~~, Offlce of Technology Assess~nt, The Future ofRemole Sensingflom Space: Civilian Sateliile SYstems an~APplications*

OTA-ISC-558 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993).
Chapter 3

eludes scientifically critical observations from

ground-, aircraft-, and space-based platforms;

■ develop appropriate mechanisms for archiving,

integrating, and distributing data from many

different sources for research and other purposes; and

■ ensure cost savings by incorporating new

technologies in system design developed in either the private or the public sector.

A coherent plan for future environmental

remote sensing systems can help guide the

near-term decisions that are necessary to ensure that the data needs of users in the early

part of the 21st century will be satisfied. A particular challenge in the development of a national

strategic plan would be to address the needs of an

expanding and diverse “user community.” Several

attendees of an OTA workshop5 stressed the importance of the early involvement of frequent users of remotely sensed data for research, operations, and applications to inform the process that

would set national policy and establish a strategy

for developing national remote sensing capabilities (see chapter 2).

Users of environmental remotely sensed data

are not just agencies of the federal government;

they also include academic researchers, businesses, and state and local governments. Increasingly, the user community for remotely sensed

data also includes foreign governments. The diversity of users reflects the varied applications of

environmental remotely sensed data, which range

from investigations of the physical and chemical

processes responsible for ozone depletion and

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 59

other “global change” phenomena to resource

management and urban planning.

Meeting the data needs of the next century is

likely to require new remote sensing spacecraft

and sensors in addition to upgraded versions of

current systems. The first priority of future environmental satellite remote sensing missions will

be to continue the present collection of operational meteorological data for weather prediction and

monitoring. However, to support state-of-the-art

numerical weather prediction models, as well as

other applications, these systems will need expanded capabilities, including sensors with higher

spatial, spectral, and radiometric resolution.6 In

addition, the environmental remote sensing systems of the 21st century are likely to have to meet

new observational needs for data over the oceans

and land surface. These include:

■ Monitoring of the oceans—for example,

ocean productivity, ice cover and motion, seasurface winds and waves, ocean currents and

circulation, and ocean-surface temperature.

NOAA’s and DOD’s monitoring systems currently gather data related to several of these

variables; however, the data are not sufficient

to support such high-priority scientific concerns as understanding the phenomena responsible for the onset of ENSO (El Niño and the

Southern Oscillation) events.7 Improved ocean

monitoring data would also have commercial

value, especially to the fishing and shipping industries. More generally, an expanded set of

observations over the oceans is necessary to

4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global Change Research and NASA’s Earth Obxer\’ing S.vstem, OTA-BP-l SC- 122

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1993).

5 A ,Vatl{)nul Srrafeg\,jor Cib,lllan ,$pace-Ba.~ed Remote Sensing, OTA workshop, Office of Technology Assessment. Washington, DC, Feb.

I 0, 1994.

6 De\lgners of remote sensing systems are forced to make compromises and tradeoffs among several p~ameters tia[ characterize \~\tem

performance. These parameters include spatial resolution, spectral resolution (the capability of a sensor to categorize e!ec(romagnctic \igntils

by their wavelength), radiometric resolution (the accuracy with which intensities of signals can be recorded), and the number of \pectral bands

(a spectral band is a narrow wavelength interval). (See box 2- 1.)

7 For example, by monitoring sea-surface levels in the Pacific Ocean, a satellite altimeter can detect the equatorial waves that tend to precede

the onset of El Niilo. See D.J. Baker, Planet Earrh: The View’jiwn Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 70-71.
60 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

improve understanding of the role of oceans in

the global carbon, biogeochemical, and hydrologic cycles, and in regulating and modulating

Earth’s climate.

■ Monitoring of the land surface with new operational sensors such as a synthetic aperture

radar (SAR)8 and with follow-ons and additions to the Landsat series. Future visible and

infrared imaging systems are likely to feature

higher spatial resolution, improved radiometric sensitivity, stereo imaging, and a larger

number of spectral bands than does the current

Landsat. Such systems would support operational needs to manage nonrenewable and renewable resources. The systems would also

support applications such as mapping and landuse planning.

■ Monitoring of key indices of global change,

especially changes in climate, through programs designed to measure ozone concentration and distribution, Earth’s “radiation

budget," and the atmosphere’s aerosol content and characteristics. Meeting these needs

will require the development of affordable

spacecraft and finely calibrated instrumentation that can be flown in a continuous series for

periods measured in decades. Future systems

will also have to support detailed “process

studies” to improve scientific understanding of

the complex physical and chemical ocean-landatmosphere processes responsible for global

change. This will require a mix of both satellite

and in situ measurement systems.9

By linking different government environmental remote sensing programs, as well as

private-sector developments, a national strategic plan for environmental satellite remote

sensing might assist in the creation of an integrated remote sensing system that is less susceptible than current systems to single-point

failure or changing priorities—a more “robust

and resilient” system for Earth observations.

For example, NASA has designed the Earth Observing System (EOS) program with the assumption that it will be complemented by Landsat.

However, the failure of Landsat 6 and recent budgetary problems have demonstrated that Landsat

has not acquired the characteristics of an operational program, which include relatively stable

budgets, spacecraft and launcher backups, and a

“launch-on-failure” capability to ensure continuity of operation. Similarly, programs such as the

Navy Geosat follow-on are vulnerable to budget

cuts in a time of rapidly changing security requirements.

A national strategic plan might also assist in the

development of new sensors and advanced

technologies. In some cases, government and private-sector partnerships are needed to develop

specific systems. 10 In others, such as the development of an affordable multifrequency SAR, these

partnerships may have to be extended internationally. More generally, there is an urgent need to

coordinate efforts among researchers in government laboratories, academia, and the private sector to reduce the size, weight, and resultant cost of

satellite remote sensing systems. To lower costs,

future systems should accommodate demonstrations of advanced technologies. However, the tension between continuing past observations and in8 A SAR would Provide a unique all-wea~er, day-and-night capability to make high-spatial-resolution global measurements of Earth’s

surface. As discussed below, it would complement visible and infrared sensors.

9 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global Change Research and NASA’s Earth Obsert’ing System, op. cit., pp. 3, 13.

lo For example, Unpi]o[ed air vehicles. Govemmen( and private-sector partnerships might also assist in the development Of new technologies for Earth observation, which are described in appendix B of U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Fuwre ofRemote Sensingfiom Space: Ci\i/ian Satellite Sysrerns and Applications, op. cit. NASA is pursuing technology demonstration as part of its Landsat 3 program and through its Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology. On June 8, 1994, NASA announced contract awards for two new Smallsat

Earth observation satellites that will demonstrate advanced sensor technologies. NASA expects them to cost less than 950 million each and be

developed, launched, and delivered on orbit in 24 months or less on a Pegasus launch vehicle.
Chapter 3

fusing new technology continues to be among the

most challenging aspects of planning future remote sensing programs.

A national strategic plan would recognize explicitly that Earth observations cross agency

boundaries. For example, NOAA’s operational

environmental satellites currently focus primarily

on measurements of atmospheric variables. However, the study of Earth as a system will require

complete coverage of both Earth’s surface and the

atmosphere, with instruments tailored in measurement frequency and duration to the particular

local, regional, or global phenomena under study.

For example. meeting the objectives of the U.S.

Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)l1

will require integrating satellite data and in situ

data with validated models to derive global data

products that may be compared over periods ranging from seasons to centuries.

A comprehensive plan for environmental

satellite remote sensing would help ensure that

program and instrument choices were driven

by truly national needs instead of the sometimes parochial interests of individual federal

agencies. Currently, the United States does not

have an adequate system for allocating funds to

programs that serve data users who are outside the

normal program bounds of the operating agency,

nor does it have a reliable system for allocating

funds to programs that cut across agency boundaries. Under the existing system for appropriating

federal program funds, the agency responsible for

a program must defend that program to the office

of Management and Budget and to congressional

committees. Programs compete for funding and

attention both within and outside agency boundPlanning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 61

aries. As a result, programs that cut across agency

boundaries or are perceived as peripheral to the

agency's central mission are vulnerable regardless

of how important they may be to the federal government as a whole (see discussion of Landsat below).

A national strategic plan should also strive to

achieve an appropriate balance between “hardware” and “software” development. Sensors collect data, but models and algorithms are necessary

to translate these data into useful information.

Several participants at an OTA workshop 12 noted

the tendency to meet new requirements for environmental remote sensing systems by “pushing

the technology” and neglecting (by comparison)

less costly software solutions. Meeting new requirements for environmental remote sensing

systems in the most cost-effective manner will

require an examination of the “end-to-end”

process that turns data into information.

NOAA has historically been the lead agency in

managing civil operational satellite programs.

However, NOAA has lacked the budget authority

and the in-house capability to develop and flighttest instruments for new operational programs.

The majority of NOAA’s funding is currently directed at meeting its principal mission, which is to

provide reliable short-term weather forecasting

and weather warning. Without new budget authority, NOAA might have difficulty funding expenditures for new climate and ocean monitoring

instruments and spacecraft, or even for such improvements as upgrading the calibration and number of spectral channels of the Advanced Very

High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) sensor to

make it better suited for land remote sensing

I 1 For ~ ~e~crlptlon of the U’jG~’Rp, \ec us Congress. office of Techn~l~g} Asse\\ment, G/~b~l/ C/lufl,qe Re.\earch and ,VASA’.S Eur/}z

Ob\cr\ in~ .$)s(cm, op. cit., and references therein.
62 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

(box 3-1) or for being better able to determine frequently the factor that limits the extent of these

cloud type. 13 applications. For example, better calibration

Higher stability and better calibration of satel- might allow climate trends to be discerned from

lite sensors will also be required by global change an analysis of sea-surface temperatures, which are

researchers attempting to distinguish real changes derived from weather satellite data.14 A national

from instrument-induced effects. In addition, ex- strategic plan for environmental remote sensing

perience has shown that satellite data can be ap- may be useful in reaching a consensus on how best

plied to a host of applications for which they were to fund and develop improvements such as better

not originally intended; instrument calibration is calibration of satellite sensors.

13 Cloud ty~ is determ~ed from analysis of mul[ispectra]-image data from instruments on OWratiOna] meteorological satellites. CUITently,

the number of spectral channels available and the calibration is insufficient for unambiguous determination of some clouds (for example, polar

clouds). Several proposed EOS instruments may help in cloud classification. See Committee on Earth Obser~’ution Satellites (CEOS) 1993 Dossier—Volume C: The Relevance of Satellite Missions to Global En\’ironmental Programs (September 1993), p. C-34.

1A R*H. ~omas, Po/ar Researchflom Sate//ites (Washington, DC: Joint Oceanographic Institute, February 1 ~ 1).
MONITORING

Chapter 3

WEATHER AND CLIMATE

B NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite Program15

In 1960, the United States launched the world’s

first weather satellite, TIROS-1 .16 TIROS provided systematic cloud-cover photography and

observations of Earth with broad-band visible and

infrared imagery. Images obtained in visible

wavelengths gave researchers global views of the

structure of weather systems and weather movement. Infrared sensors allowed these views to be

extended into hours of darkness. Combining both

types of imagery allowed a determination of cloud

type and the relative altitudes of the uppermost

cloud layers. Although considered experimental,

the success of TIROS- 1 led to operational uses of

the data, which the U.S. Weather Bureau pursued

simultaneously with NASA’s research and development satellite-improvement program.

As noted in chapter 2, NOAA operates its current satellite programs primarily to support the

data needs of the National Weather Service for

weather warning (the geostationary satellites) and

global forecasting (the polar satellite program). To

support its Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Program (POES), NOAA operates two Advanced TIROS-N (ATN) 1 7 spacecraft

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 63

in complementary, circular, sun-synchronous polar orbits, with morning and afternoon equator

crossings that designate the spacecraft as AM and

PM (box 3-2). Since its inception, NOAA has operated its meteorological satellites to serve the

public good. This has resulted in continuity of

weather observations and public availability of

weather warnings (figure 3-1 ).

The POES system primarily provides daily

global observations of weather patterns and environmental conditions in the form of quantitative

data that can be used for numerical weather analysis and prediction. As a result, NOAA’s principal

requirements for POES are high-quality imaging,

primarily at optical wavelengths, and high-resolution temperature and humidity “soundings.”18

U.S. weather models are initialized with satellite

temperature and humidity measurements immediately to the west of the United States in the eastern

Pacific Ocean at times corresponding to the release of weather monitoring balloons (00 Greenwich mean time (GMT) and 12 GMT). Therefore,

NOAA has a particular need for afternoon (PM)

temperature and humidity measurements over the

eastern Pacific. For similar reasons, European

weather organizations need morning data acquired over the Atlantic Ocean.

The key instruments and services available

from the two operational POES satellites have

IS For ~ Ovewiew of NC)AA and DOD pro~rarns, see D.J. Baker, Planer Earlh: The Vie~from Space, op. cit. A detailed description of

sensors and spacecraft design appears in National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ENVIROSAT-2000 Repor[: Comparison of Defense Meteorological Sarellite Program (DMSP) and the NOAA Polar-orbltin.g Opera ~ional Environmental Salellite (POES) Program (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1985).

lb T/ROS is tie acronym for Television and Jnfrared Observing Satellite. In this chapter, the term T/ROS salellite is used interchangeably

with the term (NOAA ) POE-S sarellire, T] ROS was the culmination of a project begun under the Department of the Army, which was then transferred to a newly created NASA and completed by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center.

17 TIROS-N, ]aunched in 1978, was tie prototype for the modem NOAA polar-orbiting environmental satellite. The ATN, which dates to

1984, is an enhanced version of TIROS-N. lts increased capacity allowed the addition of the Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SBUV ) instrument,

the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE) instrument~, and the search and rescue system, SARSAT.

18 Data on tie tem~rature and humidi(y \tmcture of the atmosphere are necessary to understand the stability of the weather patterns and to

forecast short- and long-term changes. Satellite instruments used to remotel y probe the temperature and moisture structure of the atmosphere

are generally refereed to as sounding instruments. To determine the temperature of the surface of Earth, infrared or microwave observations are

made at wavelengths at which the atmosphere is transparent. To determine the temperature structure of the atmosphere, observations are made

at wavelengths where there is absorption and emission by a uniformly mixed gas. Atmospheric moisture distributions may be monitored by

sensors that detect emissions from water \apor. See National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space-Based Rcmo/e Sensing of Ihe Ear/h: A Report to /he Con,<res.s (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1987).
64 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

changed only slightly since the launch of TI- ers (HIRS—High-Resolution Infrared Sounder,

ROS-N in October 1978. The principal instru- SSU—Stratospheric Sounding Unit, and MSUments on recent POES satellites are an optical sur- Microwave Sounding Unit (box 2-4)). 19

face and cloud imager (i.e., AVHRR) and infrared NOAA’s current POES satellites are built with

and microwave temperature and humidity sound- a design life of 2 years, which has usually been ex19 HIRS measures scene radiance in 20 spectral bands, permitting the ciildatbn of the vertical temperature profile from Earth’s surface [o

about 40 km altitude. SSU is used to measure the temperature distribution in the upper stratosphere between 25 and 50 km. MSU gives NOAA an

all-weather (i.e., cloudy or clear condition) capability for temperature and moisture measurements. NOAA is developing a completely new

Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU) for POES to improve the quality of temperature and humidity sounding. Ibid., pp. 60-68.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 65

ceeded.20 To ensure continuous availability of

weather data, NOAA attempts to procure these

satellites at intervals that would allow launch

within 120 days of “call-up.” The NOAA-J spacecraft and the enhanced NOAA-K, -L, and -M are

in production or test. The launch vehicle for future

POES satellites (and for DOD’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)) is the Titan

11,2 The cost of the K, L, M series is approximately $100 million per satellite.

Before the Clinton Administration’s convergence proposal was announced, agreement in

principle had been reached between Europe, represented by the European Space Agency (ESA)

and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat), and

the United States, represented by NOAA, to transfer responsibility for the morning (AM) segment

of NOAA’s polar-orbiting constellation in approximately the year 2000.22 The United States entered this arrangement to reduce costs and to gain

the benefits of shared data, mutual backup, and

some simplification in operations. The Administration’s convergence proposal has not altered the

U.S. desire to enter into an arrangement with Europe to provide the morning meteorological satellite; however, it has prompted the parties involved

to start renegotiating the terms of the agreement.

At the time this report was written, several issues

relating to implementation of the agreement had

not been resolved. In particular, issues regarding

U.S. control of real-time data from U.S. instruments on board the European METOP23 satellite

had not been fully settled (see below).

The proposed convergence of NOAA and DOD

weather satellites has also not altered either

agency’s plans to implement major upgrades

(block changes) in next-generation systems. For

example, NOAA had planned to use the extra capacity of satellites O, P, and Q to fly an upgraded

complement of its current instruments while testing new instruments that would be candidates for

future operational use. At one time, the O, P, Q series had been scheduled for launch starting in

~o For example, NOAA’S primaV PM and AM mission spacecraft, NOAA-1 1 and NOAA- 12, are still operational after launch in September

1988 and May 1991, respectively. However, the next satellite in this series, NOAA- 13, which was launched into a PM orbit cm Augu\t 9.1993,

failed on August 21, 1993, because of a power system failure.

21 Titan II rep]aces the Atlas-E.

22 The first launch of an operational European spacecraft, METOP- 1, is scheduled for December 2000. plms cdl for ,METOP ~o Caq ~ U.S.

operational instrument package in addition to European-supplied instruments. Europe has also agreed to \upply a high-latitude ground station.

Thi\ arrangement will eliminate blind orbits—that is, orbits where data transmission is not possible because the satellite is not in the line of sight

of a ground \tation.

23 A term derived from metrological @rational Mission.
66 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

2000. However, when the series was delayed until

2005, NOAA developed plans to launch “gap-fillers,” designated as NOAA-N and -N’, to ensure

continuity between K, L, M and the block upgrade. It now appears that satellites N and N’ will

serve as gap-fillers between J-M and a converged

system (table 3-1).

NOAA satellite Projected launch date/status

J (PM) September 1994/under contract

K (AM) September 1995/under contract

L (PM) September 1997/under contract

M (AM) September 1998/under contract

N (PM) September 2000/under contract

anticipated

N’ (PM) September 2003/under contract

anticipated

O (PM) September 2005/old baselinea

P (PM) September 2008/old baseline

Q (PM) September 201 l/old baseline

.—a Schedule before the Clinton Administration’s convergence

proposal was completed, If the convergence plan I S

executed, NOAA will terminate the planned launch of satellites O, P, and Q and instead incorporate features of this

block change into the proposed NOAA-DOD-NASA national

polar-orbiting environmental satellites

Source National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

1994

DOD’s Operational

ProgramMeteorological

Like NOAA, DOD has an operational requirement for meteorological data. As executive agent

for a joint-service program to provide global

weather data, the U.S. Air Force operates a series

of meteorological satellites under its DMSP. The

first satellite in the DMSP series was launched in

1976. The current system includes satellites and

sensors; ground command and control (distinct

from NOAA’s); Air Force, Army, Marine Corps,

and Navy fixed and mobile tactical ground terminals; and Navy shipboard terminals .24 Operational users of DMSP products obtain data via a

centralized system (AFGWC, for Air Force Global Weather Central); direct links to DMSP are also

possible.

DMSP satellites support the needs of classified

surveillance programs and the tactical needs of the

fighting forces for information about the weather.

Data from DMSP are used by the military to:

■

■

●

■

●

✘

●

detect and forecast the absence or presence of

clouds,

determine wind speed over the open ocean,

provide precipitation data to determine crosscountry mobility of armor forces,

optimize performance of electro-optical sensors,

provide data for artillery and missile targeting,

provide input data for weather forecasts over

data-denied or enemy territory, and

provide space environmental data to support

space systems operations.25

The DMSP space segment normally consists of

two satellites in 833-km, circular, sun-synchronous polar orbits that are similar to the POES satellites, but with different equator crossing

times.26 Unlike NOAA, DOD has designed its

satellites to be flexible in orbit crossing times to

support changing mission requirements.27 DMSP

carries payloads that are specific to DOD requirements for data encryption, survivability, launch

responsiveness, flexibility in orbit selection,

24 Most DMSP terminals can also receive NOAA satellite data directly.

25 G.R. Schneiter, Director, Strategic and Space Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), U.S. Department of Defense, testimony before the Subcommittee on Space of the Committee on Sc ience. Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, Nov. 9, 1993.

26 The most recent DMSP launches had local equator crossing times of 0530 ~d 0730.

27 NOAA’s principal requirement for gathering data for its numerical weather forecasts does not require flexible orbit crossing times (in fact,

NOAA weather models are designed to be initialized at the same time of day).
Chapter 3

low-light imagery, and constant-resolution cloud

imagery for automated data processing (box

2-5). 28

The primary sensor carried on every DMSP satellite is a visible and infrared imager known as the

Operational Linescan System (OLS), which was

first flown in 1976 on Block 5D spacecraft. OLS

imagery is used to depict cloud types and cloud

distribution and to locate cloud-free areas. OLS

data are also used to identify the location, extent,

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 67

and development of significant weather systems;

the location of jet streams, troughs, and ridges;

and areas of potential turbulence and icing. DMSP

satellites also carry an advanced passive millimeter-wavelength microwave imager, the Special

Sensor Microwave/Imager (SSM/I), that provides

information concerning sea states and ocean

winds, polar ice development, precipitation, and

soil moisture estimates, data that are of great interest to a wide variety of users (box 3-3). SSM/I is

1~ See ~pa~ment of Defense comments in U.S. General Accounting OffIce, Wearher Sarel/ires: Economies A~’uilable b}’ Con\’ ergin.~ Go~-

ermnenf ,t~elec~rcjl~~,ql(tll Sa/ei/I/c\, GAO NSIAD-87- 107 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 51.
68 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

also used for hurricane and typhoon characterization. 29 DMSP carries two passive microwave

sounding instruments—SSM/T-l and SSM/

T-2—that provide data that allow derivation of

vertical temperature and tropospheric water vapor

profiles of the atmosphere, respectively.

Historically, to support tactical operations and

other missions, one of the two operational DMSP

spacecraft has had an equator crossing at dawn and

the other has been operated at varying crossing

times later in the morning (for example, 0830).

These satellites meet DOD’s particular needs for

imagery at a time when clouds are less likely to

obscure the ground. DOD also uses data from the

DMSP satellites and from NOAA’s PM satellites

as inputs to numerical forecast models. Together,

DMSP and POES weather satellites meet DOD’s

requirements for 4-hour refresh rates for cloudimagery data and DOD-NOAA requirements for

6-hour refresh rates for sounding data.

Four DMSP satellites are in storage and five are

under construction: S 11, S 13, S14, and S15-S20.

S11, S13, and S14 are Block 5D-2 design;

S 15-S20 are Block 5D-3.30 The recurring cost of

each 5D-3 satellite is approximately $134 million. 31 DOD expects the DMSP spacecraft to

achieve 4 years of operation on-orbit for the spacecraft in storage and 5 years for the spacecraft being

constructed .32 Assuming that the historic reliability of DMSP spacecraft continues, the last DMSP

under construction could be launched in 2006 or

later.

I Comparing NOAA’s and DOD’s

Polar-Orbiting Operational

Meteorological Programs

Differences between NOAA’s and DOD’s meteorological programs in part reflect the comparatively greater importance DOD attaches to cloud

imagery (to support tactical operations) than to

sounding measurements of atmospheric temperature and moisture. Although NOAA shares

DOD’s requirement for cloud imagery, it has a

particular need for high-accuracy temperature and

moisture profiles of the atmosphere. These data

initialize NOAA’s twice-daily global numerical

weather forecasts.

The differences between NOAA’s and DOD’s

requirements are reflected in the instrument suite

on board DMSP and POES satellites. For exam--

ple, POES satellites use high-resolution infrared

soundings complemented by microwave soundings for their weather models, whereas DMSP satellites use only the lower-resolution microwave

soundings. 33 NOAA plans to introduce an ad29 SSWI is p~icular]y Usefi] in monitoring the pacific ocean, where it has replaced more costly aerial reconnaissance as a way to track

typhoons. Although sometimes characterized as a “Navy” sensor, SSM/I is used by many federal agencies and serves a diverse user community.

Workshop participants at a joint DOD-NOAA conference on DMSP retrieval products were, in fact, primarily civilian and international users.

See R.G. Isaacs, E. Kalnay, G. Ohring, and R. McClatchney, “Summary of the NMC/NESDIS/DOD Conference on DMSP Retrieval Products,”

Bulletin of the American Meteorology Society 74(1):87-91, 1993.

los. 12 is already in orbit. S-15 is designated as a 5D-3 design because It uses the 5D-3 spacecraft bus. However, its instrument package is

identical to that found on 5D-2 satellites.

3 I 1992 dollws. 5D-2 satellites cost approxima[e\y $120 million in 1992 dollars. T’hese figures refer only to recurring costs of the spacecraft

and sensors. They do not include one-time initial startup costs such as RDT&E (for research, development, test, and evaluation), nor do they

include costs associated with the ground segment, such as the costs of ground terminals and of the satellite command, control, and commun ications network.

~z me ~ES satelll[es have an on-orbit design life of 2 years, but they generally last longer.

~~ Microwave sounders complement infrared sounders because they can penetrate clouds. For example, recent POES satellites have COmbined data from infrared sounders HIRS/2 and SSU, with MSU, a four-channel radiometer (sounder) that makes passive microwave measurements in the 5.5-mm oxygen band. DOD, having less need forhigh-resolution soundings and being most interested in an “all-weather” capability, has pioneered the development of microwave sounders (for example, the SSM/1). T’he infrared and microwave instruments on POES satellites are capable of resolving temperature differences in the vertical structure of the atmosphere of approximately 1.5 to 2 degrees kelvin {K),

even in the presence of clouds. DMSP instruments can resolve approximately 3 K. Note that the all-weather capability of DMSP does not refer to

seeing through precipitation. The millimeter wave instruments carried by DMSP will operate through clouds, but not rain. In fact, this property

can be used to estimate rainfall.
Chapter 3

vanced microwave sounder, AMSU, which will

have a higher resolution than DOD microwave

instruments. DMSP and POES satellites are also

built differently for at least three other reasons:

1.

2.

-.3

The DMSP system must meet DOD’s specification that it provide global visible and infrared

cloud data through all levels of conflict. Therefore, components in DMSP must meet requirements for hardening and survivability that are

not present in POES.

DMSP satellites are built to military specifications (“mil-spec’’).34

DMSP satellites contain specialized electronics, such as those needed to implement encryption schemes that support DOD’s requirement

to control real-time access to data.

This last difference affects NOAA’s and DOD’s attitudes toward international data exchanges. In

contrast to DOD’s approach, the Department of

Commerce’s weather forecasting (through

NOAA) relies on international partnerships to

fulfill its data needs and those of other U.S.

agencies, including DOD. Indeed, these partnerships, which have their historical basis in U.S. decisions to treat meteorological data as a public

good, have been part of U.S. foreign policy since

the Kennedy Administration.

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 69

As noted above, the primary sensor carried on

every DMSP satellite is the Operational Linescan

System (OLS). OLS provides day and night cloud

imagery from two sensors, which operate in the

visible and longwave-infrared regions .35 OLS has

several features that distinguish it from the

AVHRR on NOAA’s POES satellites. First, OLS

has a photomultiplier that allows DOD to generate

visible imagery from scenes illuminated at low

light levels (as 1ittle as the light from a one-quarter

moon). 36 Second, OLS is the only operational

imager capable of nearly constant spatial resolution across its data swath width (box 3-4).37

Constant resolution and other unique features of

OLS result in expedited delivery of images directly to the field and reduced time for weather forecasts. 38 Third, the sensor cooler on OLS is designed to operate at a range of sun angles,

allowing operation at different equator crossing

times and, therefore, at different sun angles with

respect to the spacecraft as needed. Thus, OLS is

somewhat more flexible than AVHRR with respect to the orbits it can support.

The current series of DMSP and the POES TIROS-N satellites are built with a similar spacecraft “bus”39 and several subsystems (an exception is the command and data-handling subsystem).

34 DMSp,, ~I~o built [() Iast longer than pOES, but this added cost ma) be balanced by the need for fewer satellites during the cour~e of the

progrum. For a dctalled comparison of POES and DMSP, see National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, E,VV/ROSAT-2000° Reporr:

Compur[ i(m t~[~ql~n.~e Ve[corologi(’ul Sutellite Progrum (DMSP) und the NOAA Polar-orbiting Operurionul .En\ironmentul Sutellite (POES)

Pro,qrumt op. cit.

75 OL\ is used L(l pr[)~lde cloud i[nagcrl,, cloud-top temwrature, sea-surface temperature, and auroral image~f. OLS ‘f visible-near-infrared

\en\or operate\ in the 0.4-1. I -pm band; the infrared sensor operates in the 10 13-Lnl band. Three spectral band~ are chosen to enhance the

ability to distinguish among clouds, ground, and water. The extension of the vijible band to near-infrared wavelengths is chosen to enhance the

ability to distingui~h tropical \ cgeta(ion from water.

~@lJS ]Ow.light capabi] it} is n. ]Onger considered advanced technology. In fact, it is a feature of the recently launched NOAA GOES-8.

HOW e~ er, design ~tudics w ]11 be-needed to determine whether this feature can eaiily be incorporated into an instrument that replaces AVHRR

and 01.S on a conk erged NOAA and DOD satellite.

?7 ~1 s ij ~Wrated 1. Pr{)duce a near]} ‘.onjtant ().6-km \patia] rejo]u[ion acro~s it~ approximate) 3,000-km data SW ah. Direct readout data

.

at fine (0.6-knl ) and “wnoothcd ” (2.8-km) resolution can be received at tactical terminal~; data can also be recorded on board the spacecrtift at

both fine and Smoothed resolution for transmission to central receiving stations. I.OW -light-level nighttime v isible data are at 2.8-km resolution.

78 ~:or ~xanlp]e constant resolution \inlp] ifiej the ground processing that would otherwise be needed, es~ciall~ if a user recei~ Cd imWW’

data al the edge of the field of VICW of the OLS (see di$cu$sion and figure in bm 3-4).

3Y The ~pacecraft bu~ carri~~ the pavload and inc]udej s} ~tenl~ ~nd subs~itenls that provide \e\eral “housekeeping” functions. ‘ncludill~

.

propul~ion: electrical power generation, conditioning, and distribution; communications (tracking, telemetry, and command): attitude determintition and control: thermul control; and command and data handling. See E. Reeves, “Spacecraft Design and Sizing.” Space Al[.sslon An(Jl>I-

\I.\ und I)es[,qn. V’.J, Larwm and JR. Wertz (eds. ) (Torrance, CA: Microco\nl, Inc., 1992).
70 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

.-

NADIR

%’
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems

Before the Clinton Administration’s convergence

proposal was announced, the Air Force had been

planning a block change for DOD’s meteorological satellites. Like NOAA, DOD planned to initiate this upgrade after the satellites in storage and

under construction had been exhausted. Although

recent DMSP and POES satellites have increased

their use of common systems and subsystems, the

follow-ons that DOD and NOAA had planned

would have resulted in systems with less in common than the current series. For example, Block 6

DMSP and NOAA-O, -P, -Q satellites would likely have been built with different buses and would

have had a greater number of different components and subsystems. These differences are noteworthy because they suggest that before the Administration’s convergence proposal was made,

the two agencies had been on a course that would

have resulted in distinctive meteorological satellites and perhaps fewer opportunities for program

savings through economies of scale.

1 NASA’s Weather- and Climate-Related

Programs

The Administration has involved NASA in proposals to converge operational meteorology programs for three reasons. First, NASA is funding

and developing the Earth Observing System of

satellites, which carry instruments that may later

be modified for use on operational weather satellites. Second, NASA currently develops the

POES satellites for NOAA. Third, NASA has

historically been the agency that funds, develops,

and demonstrates prototype advanced remote

sensing technologies for civil applications. Once

proven, these technologies are candidates

NOAA’s operational missions.

I 71

for

The principal spacecraft in the EOS program

are comparatively large, multi-instrument platforms designated AM, PM, and CHEM. Plans call

for the 5-year lifetime AM, PM, and CHEM

spacecraft to be flown successively three times.

Under the current schedule, the first flight of AM

would occur in 1998 (figure 3-2), the first flight of

PM would occur in 2000, and the first flight of

CHEM spacecraft would be in approximately

2002.40 Instruments on AM are intended primarily for Earth surface observation (characterization

of the terrestrial and oceanic surfaces; clouds,

radiation, and aerosols; and radiative balance);

instruments on PM are intended primarily for

study of global climate (clouds, precipitation, and

radiative balance; terrestrial snow and sea ice; seasurface temperature; terrestrial and oceanic productivity; and atmospheric temperature); and

instruments on CHEM are intended primarily for

study of atmospheric dynamics and chemistry

(ocean-surface stress and atmospheric chemical

species and their transformations) .41

EOS program officials have stated that they expect some research instruments to evolve into the

next generation of instruments for routine and

long-term data collection. In particular, the EOS

PM series, scheduled for launch beginning in

2000, 42 will fly instruments that have potential

application for operational weather and climate

data collection.43 (However, as discussed below,

NOAA officials express concern about the high

cost of flying EOS instruments as part of a system

for long-term, routine data collection.) Consideration of converging EOS PM satellites with

40 Re\coplng the EOS Program has pa~lcular]y affected the CHEM mission. See G. Asrar and D.J. Dokken (eds. ), EO.$Reference Handb~~~~~

(Washington, DC: NASA Earth Science Support Office, i993).

~IFor ~ description of EOS \pacecraft and ins[mmen[s, see G. Asrar and D.J. Dokken (eds.), EOS Reference Hand~oo~. ibi~.

42 However, [igh[ EOS budgetj may force NASA to delay PM-1 by at least 9 montis.

43 pM c] i mate monitoring in~tmments include ~ atmospheric infrared sounder to measure Earth ‘S outgoing radiation (AIRS); an advanced

microwave radiometer to provide atmospheric temperature measurements from the surface to some 40 km (AMSU); and a microwa} e radiometer to provide a(moipheric water \ apor profiles (MHS). AMSU, which is actually three modules, will replace the Microwave Sounding Unit

(MSU ) and the Stratospheric Sounding Unit (SSU ) on POES satellites, starting with NOAA-K. MHS is a European instrument that will be flown

on the European morning polar weather \atellite, METOP.
72 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

MOPITT

Measurements of

pollution in the troposphere

CERES

Clouds’

radiant

MISR

Multi-angle imaging

spectro-radiometer

USE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT

m

m--

I dynamics I

Volcanic

eruptions and v

SOURCE Martin Marietta Astrospace, 1993
Chapter 3

NOAA and DOD operational satellites might occur starting with PM-2 or PM-3, which are scheduled for launch in approximately 2005 and 2010,

respectively. This plan would allow PM- 1 to serve

as a demonstrate ion platform for subsequent operational instruments. The year 2005 also lies within

the approximate period when DOD and NOAA

had been considering block changes in their current programs. In principle, PM-1 could be designed to meet both the needs of the research community and the needs of NOAA and DOD for

operational weather data: however, NASA,

NOAA, and DOD have concluded that employing

unproven research instruments in operational uses

is too risky.

NASA is also sponsoring competitive “Phase

B“ studies aimed at developing a common spacecraft for EOS PM-1, CHEM- 1, and AM-2,3.

These studies are examining the possibility of

launching EOS payloads on either an intermediate-class expendable launch vehicle (IELV), such

as the Atlas IIAS planned for AM-1, or a smaller

medium-class expendable launch vehicle

(MELV), such as the Delta II. Although these

studies are independent of convergence studies,

they are driven by a similar necessity to accommodate constrained budgets. As discussed below, an

EOS PM series adapted for launch on an MELV

might allow for a common spacecraft bus to be developed for EOS PM and a converged NOAADOD meteorological satellite.

9 Efforts To Converge NOAA’s and DOD’s

Polar Weather Satellite Programs44

The United States has conducted Earth environmental remote sensing satellite programs for over

30 years: for most of this period, the programs

have been under the auspices of NOAA, DOD,

JJ Thl~ \cc[lon draw J on material prepared for OTA by R. Koffler.

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems 173

and NASA. These agencies have generally

succeeded in providing a workable mix of capabilities to meet their own needs: DOD has managed

the operational and research and development

(R&D) programs dedicated to national security

purposes; NASA has undertaken the sometimes

risky development of the enabling technologies

for new remote sensing programs; and NOAA has

used the technical services of both NASA and

DOD to develop and operate the civil operational

environmental satellite system. On occasion,

NOAA and DOD have provided backup capabilities in support of each other’s programs.

Management and operation of the nation’s civil

operational weather satellite system has historically been vested in NOAA.45 In general, the

technologies that NOAA needs to conduct its satellite operations are the products of the R&D work

already completed by NASA and DOD. NOAA

also depends on the resources of NASA and DOD

to procure and launch its spacecraft. For example,

NASA administers the contracts for NOAA’s satellites, and Air Force crews launch NOAA’s polarorbiting satellites from Vandenberg Air Force

Base.

NOAA reimburses NASA and DOD for the

personnel and other costs they incur when helping

NOAA meet its space mission. Overall and specific agreements between NOAA and NASA and between NASA and DOD (launch agreements are

between NASA and DOD) govern the responsibilities and costs of the support provided to NOAA.

NOAA is responsible for determining the requirements of users of its satellite services, specifying

the performance of the systems needed to satisfy

requirements, and obtaining the necessary funds

to build and operate both the space and ground

segment of its systems. These arrangements are an

4.5 me ,$ ~rjd,~ fir~t ~) Pratlona] ~,ea(her satellite, E7J,SA. 1 ( for Environmental Sciences Semices Administration- I ; ESSA was the predeceswr to Nt3~\A ), was launched on Februa~ 3, 1966. The system was brought to full operational capability with the launch of ESSA-2 on Februarj

ZX, 1 ~~~, The owra[lonal” }ttu[h[,r satel]ite prOgram has ken in continuous existence since these Iaunche\: however, as its capabilities v’cre

upgraded, II wa~ referred to as the operational enlrronmenful satellite program. NOAA’S policy to allow unrestricted collection of weather information by any grtmnd station in the line of sight of its satellites dates to policies enunciated by President John F. Kennedy.
74 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

outgrowth of agreements first reached by the three

agencies in the 1960s.

The distinction between NOAA operational

satellites and NASA research satellites dates to

1963, when NOAA rejected NASA’s NIMBUS

satellite as the basis for an operational program

because of delays in its development and because

it was judged too complex and expensive.

Throughout the 1960s, DOD was developing

weather satellites specific to its needs. By 1972,

the DMSP weather satellite system, which for the

first time included atmospheric sounders in addition to cloud imagers, was supporting centralized

and field ground stations. At the same time,

NOAA was launching the first of a series of second-generation operational satellites (denoted as

the Improved TIROS Operational Satellite

(ITOS)). 46 Development of a third-generation series of operational satellites was also under way—

an atmospheric-sounder instrument array, in part

provided by the United Kingdom, was under development; an upgraded visible-infrared imager

was being designed; and plans called for the use of

a data-collection system that would be provided

by France.

In 1973, a national space policy study led by the

Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council examined the fiscal and

policy implications of conducting separate DOD

and NOAA operational weather satellite programs. Before the study, some officials had anticipated that a merged system could meet both agencies’ requirements (because each had a similar

requirement to acquire imagery of clouds) while

providing an overall savings to the government.

As noted above, however, NOAA and DOD

weather systems acquire different kinds of data at

different times of day to support different users.

The 1973 study based assessments of the technical feasibility and costs of a converged system

on NOAA, NASA, and DOD analyses. The study

concluded that no option could maintain current

performance levels while providing significant

cost reductions. In addition, policy concerns argued for the two programs to remain separate.47

The 1973 review did, however, result in the Nixon

Administration directing NOAA to use the DMSP

Block SD spacecraft bus, then under development

by the Air Force, as the basis for the next-generation series of polar-orbiting satellites. In addition,

NOAA and DOD were instructed to coordinate

the management of the separate programs more

closely.

On eight occasions since 1972, the Departments of Commerce and Defense have studied

convergence and implemented recommendations

designed to increase coordination and avoid unnecessary duplication in their respective polar-orbiting environmental programs. The 1973 study

and subsequent studies have resulted in programs

that have similar spacecraft with numerous common subsystems and components. In addition,

both programs now use a common launch vehicle

and share responsibility for creating products

derived from the data. The two programs also

work together closely on R&D efforts and provide

complement environmental information. However, until now, foreign policy and national security concerns have precluded full convergence.48

The latest proposal to consolidate NOAA’s and

DOD’s meteorological programs is more likely to

46 In 1972, ITOS/NOAA.2 became the first operational polar-orbiting satellite to convert from the use of a television camera to a scanning

radiometer, permitting day and night imaging and quantitative sea-surface and cloud-top temperature measurements.

47 DMSpdata were not shared wi~ o~er nations. However, the United States had pledged to maintain an open CIVll weather Satellite system.

Additionally, the NOAA system was a visible demonstration of the U.S. “cysen skies” policy, and it satisfied long-standing U.S. obligations to

exchange Earth data with the meteorological agencies and scientific organizations of other nations.

~ D.J. Baker, Under Secretaw for oceans and Atmosphere, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, testimony before the Subcommittee on Space of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, U.S.

Congress, Nov. 9, 1993.
Chapter 3

succeed than past attempts because of the confluence of several factors, including:

m

■

■

■

Extremely tight agency budgets in an era of

fiscal austerity. Officials from NOAA, NASA,

and DOD agree that this is the most important

factor spurring convergence.

Calls from members of Congress and the

President to streamline government and effect cost savings. Satellite environmental remote sensing programs were among the programs targeted for cost savings in the

President’s National Performance Review.49

Plans to make substantial upgrades (“block

changes”) in both the DMSP and POES programs during approximately the same period

after the turn of the century.

A changed international security environment. The importance of this factor is uncertain. DOD requirements for meteorological

data have not changed in the post-Cold War era.

Nevertheless, some analysts believe the

changed security environment has encouraged

DOD to moderate its historical objection to

shared military-civil systems.

Two other factors influencing the current convergence effort are: 1) the involvement of NASA, especially through the potential use of its EOS PM

instruments, and 2) the involvement of foreign

governments. especially through the planned u s e

of Europe’s METOP satellite.

1 Issues and Options for Convergence50

Satellite environmental remote sensing systems

consist of both a ground and a space segment;

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 75

therefore, consolidation of separate programs

(convergence) could involve a range of options.

For example, convergence could occur at the level

of data processing and dissemination if common

data requirements, standards, and distribution

systems were established. Convergence might

also occur at the instrument level if common requirements and designs for the acquisition of

instruments were mandated. At a still higher level,

convergence could involve the merging of operational programs under the direction of a single

agency or a single new organizational entity. Finally, a fully converged system would do all of the

above and use common spacecraft and instruments to satisfy what are now separate operational

and research needs.

There are two principal scenarios for consolidating meteorological programs. The first would,

in effect, involve combining plans for DOD

DMSP Block 6 with NOAA-O, -P, and -Q meteorological satellites. The principal technical challenge in this convergence scenario would be meeting DOD’s requirement for constant-resolution

imaging and NOAA’s requirement for calibrated

imaging and atmospheric sounding. For example,

DOD and NOAA have both studied concepts that

would improve their respective imagers; convergence would require a new study to determine

whether a single imager could be developed to

meet both agencies’ needs at an acceptable cost, or

whether to fly two separate imagers would be

more practical.

The second scenario would involve developing

a common satellite and spacecraft bus and modified EOS sensors that would satisfy NOAA’s and

“) A. (;or-e, “From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less,” report of the National Performance

Rc\ ICW ( W’mhington, DC: Office of the Vice president, Sept. 7, 1993). See also National Performance Review, OffIce of the Vice President,

.\’atIonal Aer<)nuufIc.\ und Space Administration: Accompunylrrg Reporl of the National Performance Re\ie\*v (Washington, DC: Office of the

\“Icc Pre\ldent, September 1993).

$( )Thl\ \ccti[)n draw, on intern iew~ and briefings from NOAA, NASA, DOD, and industry officials. It also draWS on briefing papers pro-

~ lded by attendeei of an OTA Workshop, A National Sfralegy for Cit’ilian Space-Bared Remote Sensing, held Feb. 10, 1994. For a review of

technlca] und policy iisues specifically related to the Clinton Adminiswation’s convergence plan, see D. Blersch, DMSP/POES: A Posr Cold

khr ,45 icj ttnent (A Re-Examination of Tradi!lonal Concerns In a Changing En~’ironment) (Washington, DC: ANSER Corp., June 1993); and

H. Kottler. J.R. Llfslt~, J.J. Egan, and N.D. Hulkower, Perspective.\ on Convergence, Project Report NOAA- 10 (Lexington, MA: Massachusetts

In\tltutc of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, Feb. 8, 1994). See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General, Nu/iona/

.5’tru/c,q\ /f~r RemoIe Serning 1.s Needed, AIS-0003-O-0006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Februa~ 1991 ).
76 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

DOD’s operational requirements and NASA’s science research missions. Attention has focused on

NASA’s planned PM series of satellites because

these satellites will carry instruments that have

previously been identified as candidates for future

NOAA weather and climate monitoring needs.

NASA is studying the practicality of reconfiguring EOS payloads into smaller MELV Delta IIclass expendable launch vehicles. This “threeway” convergence scenario would offer greater

savings to the government than NOAA-DOD convergence because it would use a common bus and

might use EOS instruments to satisfy both operational and research objectives. Several economies

of scale would also result if a converged Delta IIclass spacecraft and bus were suitable for all three

agencies.

The Clinton Administration’s convergence

proposal combines the two scenarios outlined

above. It seeks to consolidate NOAA’s and DOD’s

meteorological programs while capitalizing on

NASA’s EOS technologies. Any convergence

plan—whether the Administration’s or one of its

many permutations-has several generic elements that raise a common set of issues. The following section provides an overview of these issues, giving particular attention to questions

about program synchronization, program implementation, and the effect of combining U.S. civil

and military programs with European civil programs. The future of Landsat, options for converging future land remote sensing programs with the

EOS AM series, and potential ocean monitoring

systems are not part of the Administration’s proposal. They are discussed in this report because, as

noted earlier, land and ocean monitoring systems

would be an essential part of any comprehensive

long-term plan for U.S. satellite-based environmental remote sensing.

National Security Considerations and the

Role of International Partners

Historically, meteorological programs at NOAA

and DOD have differed in their reliance on cooperative international ventures and in their policies

toward sharing data. NOAA has a long record of

international cooperation in its environmental remote sensing programs. Indeed, international

cooperation has proved essential to NOAA in its

geostationary operational environmental satellite

system (GOES). By an agreement signed in July

1993, ESA and Eumetsat are making METEOSAT-3 available to replace the failed NOAA geostationary satellite, GOES-6.51 Similarly, by international agreement, meteorological data from

NOAA’s POES satellites are provided to the U.S.

National Weather Service and to foreign weather

services. As noted ealier, convergence has not altered the U.S. intent to use European METOP satellites to satisfy a requirement for an AM polar orbiter. Plans call for METOP to carry

U.S.-supplied sounders and imagers as well as European payloads.52

In addition to the foreign policy benefits usually associated with successful international ventures, foreign cooperation in meteorological and

climate monitoring programs may benefit the

United States by reducing expenditures for operational programs (e.g., METOP replaces NOAA

AM satellites) and by increasing opportunities to

flight-test advanced technologies (on METOP-1

51 Cument]y, five geostationaw Satellites orbi( Earth; two are operated by Europe, and the United States, Japan, and India each operate OIW. If

GOES-6 had not failed, the United States would be operating two satellites to monitor regions of Earth of interest to NOAA weather forecasters.

52 Europe Originally p]anned to launch a polar-orbiting Earth observation satellite, denoted as POEM. METOP, whose primary mission is

operational meteorology, and ENVISAT, which is primarily an atmospheric chemistry mission, resulted when the POEM platform was di~ ided

into two smaller platforms. Before the Administration’s convergence proposal was announced, the United States had planned to fly the following instruments on METOP- 1: AVHRR/3 (Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer); AMSU-A (Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A, a

U.S. instrument that will be flown on NOAA POES satellites beginning with NOAA-K in 1996 andon EOS PM- 1 in 2000);” and HIRSf3 (HighResolution Infrared Sounder). VIRSR (Visible and Infrared Scanning Radiometer), an upgraded version of AVHRR/3, had been scheduled for

inclusion on METOP-2. It could be replaced by anew sensor to match the needs of both NOAA and its pwtner in convergence, DOD. However,

partly to achieve economies of scale, ESA may wish to make METOP-2, in effect, a clone of METOP-I.
Chapter 3

and its successors). European, Japanese, and Canadian cooperation is also essential if the longterm objectives of NASA’s Mission to Planet

Earth and the U.S. Global Change Research Program are to be fulfilled (chapter 4).53

Plans to use European satellites for NOAA’s

AM mission—in effect, an international “convergence’’—were in place well before the Administration initiated its convergence studies. It is not

known yet whether a convergence plan that combines NOAA’s and DOD’s meteorological programs with European programs will require

changes in the U.S.-supplied portion of METOP’s

payload. In particular, the question of whether

successors in the METOP series would carry an

instrument combining the functions now performed by NOAA’s AVHRR and DOD’s OLS remains unresolved. This issue is independent of the

more general question of whether Eumetsat will

agree to U.S. conditions regarding control of data

from U.S. instruments on board METOP.54

Maintaining international cooperative relationships in environmental remote sensing is

an important consideration in any convergence proposal. Therefore, any convergence proposal must address the following questions:

■ What contingency plans are needed if delays

arise from the U.S. development of a combined

payload-spacecraft for NOAA, DOD, and, perhaps, EOS PM?

■ Does the plan reconcile European desires for

self-sufficiency in sensors and spacecraft with

U.S. needs for data consistent among spacecraft? Although the United States and Eumetsat

plan to fly three U.S. sensors on METOP-1 and

METOP-2, Europe plans to develop its own

sensors for future METOP spacecraft. To maintain consistent data, U.S. officials will have to

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 77

53 scc G, A\r~r ~n~ D.J. Dokken (eds. ), EOS Reference Handbook, op. cit.

coordinate closely with Eumetsat and ESA officials concerning the technical characteristics

of new sensors. Issues related to technology

transfer may also arise, especially if the United

States concludes that meeting NOAA’s and

DOD’s requirements in a converged program

will require that METOP carry a new advanced

visible and infrared imager.

Does the plan address European concerns about

data access while satisfying DOD needs for

data protection during times when U.S. national security interests would be threatened by

open access? Who decides when such times exist? What happens if an agreement cannot be

reached?

What contingency plans are needed should delays occur in the launch of METOP- 1, and what

contingency plans are needed to maintain service should a launch or on-orbit failure occur?

In particular, when should METOP-2 be available to ensure continuity with METOP- 1, and

what are the European plans beyond METOP-2?

The Administration’s convergence proposal

answers many of these questions. However, one

issue in particular remains unresolved: DOD’s approval of European involvement in the converged

program is subject to Europe’s acceptance of several conditions relating to data access and control.

Program Synchronization

The last satellite in the current NOAA POES series is scheduled for launch near the end of 2005.

Similarly, the last of the current series of DOD

DMSP satellites under development or contract

(S11-S20) may be launched around this time or

later. This schedule focuses attention on the possibility of redesigning NOAA-N and -N as merged

54 Mo\[ ]ike]y, 1( is ~]ready too ]a[e [0 develop new ins(mmen(s for inclu~ion on METOP- 1, ~hl~h is Under d~\ c] OpnlClll, ~ Itll a ~~ll~~ulcd

launch in 2(XK). Whether Eumetsat would agree to a new instrument in METOP-2 was unknown at the time thii report waj completed (July

1994). METOP-2 is also under development; its scheduled launch is 2005, How ever, if DOD and NOAA merge thclr weather progranl\. the

United State\ may ask that METOP-2 be available sooner to ensure continuity of \cn ice }$ ith MET OF- 1. This M ould rcducc the IInlr ay al Iahle to

make change~ in METOP. In addition, for reasons noted above, European space offlcia] \ ma) bc reluctunt to charrgc N1 ETO1>- 2.
78 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

NOAA and DOD meteorological satellites.55 It

also raises such issues as whether it would be costeffective to redesign DMSP satellites for joint

missions,56 whether a new spacecraft should be

developed, and whether instruments on NASA’s

PM satellites could be adapted to satisfy NOAA’s

and DOD’s operational requirements. PM-2 is

scheduled for launch in approximately 2005;

therefore, it and PM-3 would be the most likely

candidates for inclusion in a combined researchoperational satellite program. An added complication in these issues is the possibility that

NOAA’s and DOD’s satellites will exceed their

expected lifetimes.

To meet NOAA’s and DOD’s requirements, the

Administration’s convergence plan calls for three

polar-orbiting satellites, with local equator crossing times of 0530, 0930, and 1330, to replace the

current constellation of four satellites. Europe’s

METOP satellite is scheduled to assume the

morning NOAA mission beginning in 2000 (assuming the successful resolution of ongoing negotiations). National security and other considerations unique to DOD missions (see above)

effectively foreclose the possibility y of a combined

DMSP-METOP AM mission. Therefore, it is

most likely that convergence would result in a system architecture consisting of both U.S. and European AM satellites, with the U.S. satellite designed to satisfy DOD’s imagery needs and the

European AM satellite (carrying U.S. instruments) designed to satisfy NOAA’s and DOD’s

sounding needs. Depending on the results of ongoing studies, the PM satellite could either be a

NOAA-DOD meteorological satellite or a combined NOAA-DOD-NASA satellite that would

satisfy current and anticipated needs for operational meteorological and climatological data.

Land remote sensing is not part of the current

convergence effort, but it could be part of a future

effort to coordinate polar Earth observation programs. NASA hopes to launch Landsat 7 by the

end of 1998. Assuming a 5-year satellite lifetime,

a Landsat 8 might follow in approximately 2004.

Given the advanced state of preparations for EOS

AM-1, scheduled for launch in 1998, AM-2,

scheduled for launch in approximately 2003,

would be the first opportunity to converge land remote sensing programs. The many issues

associated with developing follow-ons in the

Landsat series are discussed below.

Impact of NASA’s Redesign of EOS

Originally, NASA planned to launch the largest

EOS satellites—AM-l,2,3; PM-1,2,3; and

CHEM-1,2,3-on intermediate-class expendable

launch vehicles such as the Atlas IIAS. As noted

above, NASA is now determining whether these

missions (except AM- 1, which is too far into development) can be launched on a smaller MELV

such as a Delta II. However, the more restrictive

volume and weight constraints of the Delta II

might force NASA to reduce the size, weight, and

capability of instruments such as MODIS and

AIRS.57 Such “descoping” might also prove necessary even if NASA retains IELVS because the

S5 NOAA.N and -N were ‘bgap-fil]ers” [ha( were intended to maintam continuity between NOAA’s last scheduled PM spacecraft In the

current ATN series and the block change. They are now supposed to serve as gap-fillers before the first launch of a converged satellite. Currently,

NOAA and DOD do not plan to attempt to redesign N or N’ as a converged satellite.

M For example, according t. a DMSP Offlclal, tie SD-3 bus was not designed to carry the heavier NOAA ins[~ment~.

57 AIRS an inshment designed for determining global atmospheric temperature and humidity profiles, would effectively be a much more

capable version of NOAA’s HIRS (box 2-4). Its improved capabilities include an increase by a factor of 2 in ground resolution (13 km looking

nadir). These and other improvements would support NOAA’s desire to extend its weather predictions to 7 to 8 days. MODIS is considered a

“keystone” instrument for the EOS program. It is a multispectral instrument for measuring, on a global basis every 1 to 2 days, biological and

physictil processes on the surface of Earth, in the oceans, and in the lower atmosphere. MODIS may be thought of as a highly advanced, or

next-generation, AVHRR. It is being designed with 36 visible and infrared bands (from 0.41 to 14.4 pm) compared with AVHRR’S five bands

and will incorporate extensive on-board “end-to-end” calibration features. These calibration features, which are not present on AVHRR, are

designed to give MODIS unprecedented spatial and radiometric accuracy across its spectral bands. As a result, MODIS should be able to distingui~h instrument effects from subtle changes in the various processes researchers hope to study. Modifications to the MODIS focal plane and

wunning mode might also allow it to serve as a replacement for DOD’s OLS.
Chapter 3

AIRS and MODIS original y planned for flight by

NASA had capabilities that exceeded NOAA’s

“core” requirements and would have strained

NOAA’s budget. Operational programs typically

require the launch of a series of spacecraft that acquire data over periods measured in decades.58 In

their original configuration, AIRS and MODIS

would likely have been unaffordable. In addition,

they would have strained NOAA’s data-processing capabilities. These “descoping” options affect convergence proposals because AIRS and

MODIS have long been identified as candidates

for future operational instruments.

Several options would satisfy NASA’s desire to

accommodate its EOS payloads on a smaller, less

expensive launch vehicle and the Administration’s

goal to consolidate polar-orbiting satellite programs. For example, PM-1 could be developed and

Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 79

launched on an IELV as currently planned in 2000,

but that experience could be used to determine the

practicality of modifying EOS research instruments to make them smaller, less expensive, but

highly reliable operational instruments suitable

for converged spacecraft launched on an MELV.

The end result of such an exercise would be to develop versions of PM-2,3 that satisfy the needs of

both research and operational users of environmental data. A critical, as yet unresolved, question

is whether such a payload suite is practical.

Instrument Convergence

A converged meteorological satellite will have to

satisfy DOD’s needs for advanced imagery sensors and NOAA’s requirements for highly calibrated operational and affordable sounders (table

3-2).59 Accommodating some of the EOS techAgency and mission Sensor a

—

NOAA

MuItispectral Imagery (cloud, vegetation) AVHRR

Temperature and humidity (initialize numerical TOV S

weather prediction models)

DOD

Visible and infrared cloud imagery (cloud- OLS

detection forecast, tactical imagery dissemination)

Microwave imagery (ocean winds, precipta- SSM/I

tion)

Attributes

Calibrated, multispectral imagery

High spatial resolution, cross-track scanning (PM

equator crossing)

Constant field of view, Iow-light (early AM equator

crossing)

Conical scan

Temperature and humidity (electro-optical SSM/T- 1 Low spatial resolution, cross-track scanning

propagation, initialize numerical weather pre- SSMT-2

diction models

a AVHRR = Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer, TOVS = TIROS Operational Vertical Sounder, OLS = Operational Linescan System SSM/ I =

Special Sensor Microwave/lmager Special Sensor Microwave/T-1 = SSM/Temperature Sounder Special Sensor Microwave T-2 = SSM Water Vapor Sounder

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1994

58 version of AIRS now planned for flight on EOS satellites will be supplied by LORAL Infrared and Imaging Systems. AIRS was

“descoped” in 1992 to reduce its cost; the current design will better match NOAA’s requirements than the original EOS design (the changes

involved a reduction in the spectral coverage, but not the sensitivity}. of the instrument). NASA’s EOS MODIS instrument will be supplied by

Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center. MODIS has not been redesigned; NASA scientists envision flying MODIS to determine how best to

design a version suitable for operational missions.

59 A combined en~ ironmental Satel]i[e would ]ikc]~ also carry instrument~ for search and rescue and space environment nlOnitOrlng. but

these instruments are \mall and do not appear to pre$ent significant technical challenges.
80 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

nology demonstration and science research programs in an operational satellite program would

add to this challenge. Issues related to the development of an appropriate suite of instruments

for converged environmental satellites cannot

be fully resolved until the technical requirements for a joint program are finalized. If convergence efforts were to be integrated into a broader effort to coordinate operational, scientific, and

commercial remote sensing efforts (that is, if convergence was subsumed into a larger national strategic plan), then the NOAA and DOD search for a

common set of requirements would also require

consultation with the broader scientific community and with other users of remotely sensed data

(see chapter 2). However, several reviewers of a

draft of this report expressed concern that broadening the focus of convergence would complicate

the already difficult process of determining jointagency operational requirements.

The principal technical challenge in designing

a suite of instruments to meet the current NOAA

and DOD requirements is the imager for supplying data now provided by AVHRR and OLS (box

3-4). Another issue is how to meet DOD’s and

NOAA’s needs for high-resolution wide-area microwave imaging and high-resolution sounding,

respectively. DOD now uses the SSM/I to meet its

microwave-imaging needs. An upgraded version

of SSM/I, whose features include a wider ground

coverage, is also under development by DOD.60

However, the scanning method used by these

instruments differs from the type of scanning

NOAA sounders use. Because NOAA requirements dictate the use of their particular scanning

method, instrument designers would face a problem designing a common DOD-NOAA microwave imager-sounder.61 Separating NOAA and

DOD instruments on a converged satellite maybe

possible, but not without weight and volume penalties. This scan-method mismatch has its roots in

the instrument heritage and acquisition strategy

peculiar to NOAA and DOD. It maybe viewed as

a manifestation of the cultural differences that

have developed between the two agencies.

Another issue relates to the possible U.S. use of

MIMR (Multi-frequency Imaging Microwave

Radiometer), a more capable version of SSM/I being developed in Europe for use in both METOP

and, under a Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and ESA, for use on EOS PM-1.

MIMR uses advanced millimeter-wave technology. Millimeter-wave environmental sensing is a

DOD technology that is highly developed in

DMSP spacecraft. Some experts in this technology expressed concern about ceding its continuing

development to a foreign partner.

Implementing a combined NOAA-DOD operational program with NASA’s EOS PM science

research program would add both opportunities

and complications to instrument and spacecraft

bus design. A tri-agency converged satellite program would present challenges that include the

need to:

8

m

m

■

satisfy operational requirements for data continuity with comparatively unproved instruments;

accommodate the different production standards and the different data and communication

protocols that heretofore have distinguished

operational and research instruments;

develop instruments that meet NASA’s research needs but are affordable to NOAA and

DOD;

develop instruments that meet the more limited

space and volume requirements of a mediumclass expendable launch vehicle; and

bf~ SSMIIS ~il] replace SSM/1, SSMIT. 1, and SSM/T-2 on DMSP 5D-3 spacecraft. It will have improved equatorial coverage, which is particularly important to the Navy because storms originate in the equatorial legions.

~1 NOAA weather forecast models require near-simultaneous infrared and microwave sounding measurements through a particular dumn

of air. Because the NOAA infrared sounder on recent POES satellites, HI RS, uses a “cross-track” scan, the NOAA microwave sounder, MSU

(and the AMSU to be flown on NOAA’s K-N series), is also a cross-track scanner. However, DOD’s microwave imager, SSM/1, and its planned

upgrade, SSM, IS, execute a conical scan to generate images.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 81

■ accommodate technology demonstration and

prototyping on operational spacecraft.

Program Funding and Management

The overriding consideration in the current round

of convergence proposals is reducing program

costs. If implemented successfully, convergence

might also lead to more effective programs as talent and resources are pooled. Perhaps as important

as cost savings, however, would be the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between NASA

and NOAA to enable them to develop the technology that will be needed for future operational

spacecraft. Historically, NASA funded, developed, and demonstrated space technology and

flight-worthy instruments and spacecraft that

were then used for operational missions. Currently, NOAA has the lead role in managing operational programs, but it lacks the funds and inhouse expertise to develop the instruments and

spacecraft it will need to carry out new missions,

such as ocean monitoring and long-term monitoring of Earth’s climate.

Convergence also poses risks, especially the

disruption in operational programs that, by definition, are designed to provide stable data products

on a routine basis. The principal challenges in

implementing converged operational satellite

remote sensing programs are not technical

(that is, developing an instrument suite and

spacecraft suitable for joint programs). Instead,

the challenges are likely to be centered in program management and program funding.

Developing joint program management structures that will mesh with existing congressional

and executive branch budgeting procedures may

prove particularly challenging. Currently,

NOAA’s, NASA’s, and DOD’s environmental remote sensing programs originate within separate

parts of the Office of Management and Budget and

are submitted yearly for authorization to several

different congressional authorization committees

in the Senate and the House of Representatives.62

Budgets are then authorized by three different appropriations subcommittees in the House of Representatives and three different appropriations

subcommittees in the Senate. OMB, NOAA,

NASA, and DOD can develop mechanisms for integrating budget submissions; however, the congressional authorization and appropriations process would still involve multiple subcommittees.

The current authorization and appropriations

process is not designed to formulate a national

weather and environmental satellite system.

There is no congressional organizational structure parallel to that of the executive branch,

where the Office of Science and Technology

Policy and the Office of Management and

Budget seek to coordinate policy across the different departments and agencies. 63 Currently,

congressional committees long familiar with

NOAA, NASA, and DOD oversee each agency’s

particular needs and problems. Thus, joint management of satellite programs will add new elements of uncertainty in the authorization and appropriations process. Disputes between different

committees that result in a shortfall in one

agency’s budget would affect all participating

agencies.

Under the current congressional authorization

and appropriations process, a joint program

would, in effect, be considered in pieces, with

each agency contribution analyzed in the context

of the agency’s overall budget, rather than in the

~J 1n the }+ou~e ()[ Rcpre\cnta[i\ c~, ~Ycr\ight for R&D activitic~ related to Landsat and NOAA operational satellite programs (pOES ~d

GOES ) Ilcs In the Houw Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (HSST). NASA R&D activities are also overseen in the House by

HSST. Howe\ cr. HSST (loc\ not hai c jurisdiction o}’er basic research conducted by DOD, which is overseen by the House Armed Services

Committee, A slmil~r ~ltuation ex iit~ on the Senate ~ide, with the Cormmittce on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (SCST) playing a role

an:ilogt)u~ to HSST’\ tind the Senate Armed Ser\ice\ Committee playing a role analogous to the House Armed Sen ices Committee’s, See Carneg 1~ ~“omm i~ilon on SC j~n~c, T~chno]og)” . and Government, .Sc[cnctj, Ttchnolo,q>. and Congres r.. Orgun[:arion and Procedural Reforms

( Ncw Yorh: Ctirncgic Commi\\ion on Scicncc, Tcchnologj, and Government, February 1994),

“3 Ibid.
82 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

context of its contribution to the joint program.

Historically, federal agencies have been reluctant

to fund systems 1) that do not fit completely into

the framework of their missions, 2) that carry a

price tag disproportionately high for the good they

do for the agency, or 3) that commit large sums

over many years to another agency’s control. The

government has few examples of successful

multiagency programs-recent problems with

joint NASA-DOD management of the Landsat

system suggest that proposals to consolidate

operational programs should, at the very least,

be scrutinized with great care.

Before the announcement of the Clinton Administration’s convergence proposal, NOAA,

NASA, and DOD officials had stated that a single

agency should lead a joint-agency environmental

satellite program. NOAA’s assignment as the lead

agency was made, in part, to ensure the continuation of successful international partnerships in

operational meteorology programs. The Administration’s plan assigns NASA the lead role in

technology transition efforts and DOD the lead

role in system acquisition. This division of responsibilities represents a significant change from

current practices only with respect to acquisition-currently, NASA manages satellite acquisition for NOAA.

The Administration’s plan is organized with

mutual interdependence and shared interests as

key objectives. Such arrangements are designed to

minimize the chances for a repeat of the breakdown in joint program management that occurred

between NASA and DOD in the development of

Landsat 7 (see box 3-5). Nevertheless, they still

leave open the possibility that in a constrained fiscal environment, agencies or appropriations committees will fully fund only those programs perceived to be of highest priority (“burden shifting”).

In a previous report, OTA described how the

Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences

(CEES) coordinated the U.S. Global Change Re-
Chapter 3

search Program (USGCRP).64 The CEES mechanism for reducing redundancy and coordinating

disparate efforts among some dozen federal agencies engaged in global change research is generally considered to have “worked,” at least on the

executive branch side. However, agencies participating in the USGCRP may have supported the

CEES process, despite some loss of control over

the global change portion of their budget, because

CEES delivered increased funding through its

multiagency “cross-cut” budget. In contrast, convergence is an effort to reduce overall government

expenditures. Whether this will affect the success

of the tri-agency management plan remains to be

seen. Administration officials note the success of

aground-based interagency remote sensing effort,

NEXRAD (Next-Generation Weather Radar), as a

model for how convergence might work. In NEXRAD, the Departments of Commerce, Transportation, and Defense cooperate on the purchase and

operation of powerful radar systems. However, a

joint-agency environmental satellite program

would differ from NEXRAD in at least one important way: the nation is less dependent on NEXRAD radars than it is on its weather satellites. Furthermore, the failure of a single radar or a delay in

the introduction of radar upgrades would affect

the ground radar system to a far less degree than

would a similar problem with the weather satellites.

Establishing Common Requirements

To implement a convergence plan, NOAA and

DOD will have to establish a common set of requirements for converged operational environPlanning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 83

mental satellites. However, requirements for satellite data depend not only on the sensors, but also

on how sensor data are analyzed (the “retrieval”

algorithms used to translate measurements into

useful information) and how data are assimilated

65 Thus, establishing a into the models by users.

common set of requirements for NOAA’s and

DOD’s meteorological systems will require an examination of the hardware and software involved—from data acquisition to data analysis—

in both the space and ground segments of the

POES and DMSP systems.

The differences between NOAA and DOD

practices noted earlier-different priorities, different user communities, different perspectives,

and different protocols with respect to acquisition

and operations—will complicate the effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory set of requirements.

For example, NOAA had planned for its next-generation POES satellites (O, P, and Q) to provide

improved global atmospheric temperature and humidity profiles to support state-of-the-art numerical weather prediction models.66 However, DOD

requirements for infrared sounding had been set

only to meet those of the current 5D-3 satellites.67

The resolution of this and similar differences will

directly affect sensor selection and cost. As discussed below, another complication in setting requirements is determining the role of NASA in a

tri-agency satellite program.

Cost Savings

The Administration expects convergence to

achieve economies by developing and procuring

common space hardware from a single contractor,

6J US, Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global Change Research and NASA Earth Ohsert’irrg System, op. cit. @November

23, 1993, pre~l~cn[ C]hrton announced the establishment of the National Science and Technolog} Council. With this announcement, coordination of the USGCRP transferred from CEES to the newly formed Committee on Environmental and Natural Resources Research (CENR).

M ~c federal .Ovemment o~rate~ ~ree oWrationa] numerica] weather prediction centers: NOAA’S National Meteorological Center

(NMC), the Navy Fleet Numerical Oceanographic and Meteorological Center (FNMOC), and the Air Force Global Weather Center

(A FGW’C ). The way that satellite data is used by these centers is somewhat different; however, there is a Memorandum of Understanding coordinating a Shared Processing Network among the centers.

66 For ~Aample, tie ~equlrement~ of tie Atmospheric Infrared Sounder, which ha~,e ~en set to meet NOAA’S requirements, call for vertical

resolution of I km, temperature accuracy of I K, and ground resolution of 13 km—al] approximately a factor of 2 better than what is now available. ThI\ w III ~upport NOAA’s desire to extend its weather prediction models to 7 to 8 days.

~T DOD’S DMSp B]ock 6 Upgrade emphasized Cost savings and enhanced microwave-imaging capabilities over enhanced sounding capabilities.
84 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

reducing the number of spacecraft (the current total of four DOD and NOAA operational meteorological satellites in orbit simultaneously would be

reduced to two), and reducing the cost of launch

services. The Administration also expects savings

to accrue from reductions in the cost of program

and procurement staff, consolidation of ground

control centers, and economies of scale related to

data-receiving and -processing hardware and software. Common instruments and data formats

would allow increased production volumes for

data-capture terminals and related equipment that

would service a broader community. However, in

the next several years, convergence would offer

only limited opportunities for savings—for example, from the termination of parallel design efforts

for block changes and new spacecraft bus designs

in both the POES and DMSP satellites. A triagency convergence plan would also consolidate

some of NASA’s planning for its PM satellites.

Implementing convergence would also require

funding several new activities. Requirements

studies, instrument-tradeoff studies, the development of new instruments, a new spacecraft bus (or

the adaptation of an existing bus), and the possible

adaptation of MELVS

68 to launch converged

spacecraft would be “upfront” costs that would be

incurred before the longer-term savings from convergence could accrue. Moreover, because the architecture and instrument complement of converged spacecraft programs are not finalized,69

estimates of the savings expected from reduced

numbers of launches and spacecraft are more uncertain than are estimates of the additional costs of

implementing convergence. Therefore, Congress may wish to examine estimates for the net

savings of convergence with particular attention to the question of how these estimates

would change if unexpected problems or delays occurred in the design or adaptation of

sensors, spacecraft buses, and launch vehicles.

Transition from Research to

Operational Satellites

A principal requirement for operational satellite

systems is the unbroken supply of data. Therefore,

operational systems require backup capability in

space and on the ground and a guaranteed supply

of functioning hardware. In turn, these requirements translate into maintaining a proven production capability when new versions of operational

satellites are introduced. They also require a parallel effort to improve system capability continuously without jeopardizing ongoing operations.

Finally, new technology must be introduced without placing an undue financial burden on the operational system. Historically, the transition from

research instrumentation to operational instrumentation has been successful when managed

with a disciplined, conservative approach toward

the introduction of new technology. In addition to

minimizing technical risk, minimizing cost has

been an important factor in the success of operational programs, especially for NOAA (box 3-6).

During the 1960s and 1970s, the development

of NOAA’s operational weather satellites was assisted by both a vigorous R&D program within

the agency and by strong ties to several NASA

programs, especially OSIP (Operational Satellite

Improvement Program) and NIMBUS. The NIMBUS program began in the early 1960s. Initially,

NASA conceived of NIMBUS as an Earth observation program that would provide global data

about atmospheric structure. In addition, NASA

intended NIMBUS to replace its TIROS satellite

and to develop into an operational series of weather satellites for NOAA. However, NOAA chose to

68 For example, launchlng a converged EOS-PWmEs/DMspsatellite on a Delta II MELV might require redesigning and testing an en

-

larged fairing.

~y Even when program details are announced, there will still be uncertainty surrounding the introduction of technology to be demonstrated

by EOS-PM. Technical studies to resolve issues such as how to meet DOD’s and NOAA’s imaging and sounding requirements can be completed

in less than 1 year; however, the on-orbit record of EOS PM instruments will not be available until 200 I or later.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 85

■

■

●

develop TIROS as its operational system, in part

to minimize technical risk. Both programs then

went forward, with NASA developing NIMBUS

as a research test bed for observational payloads.

Eventually, NASA launched a total of seven NIMBUS satellites with payloads that have matured

into advanced research and operational instruments for current and planned spacecraft including POES, DMSP, UARS (Upper Atmosphere

Research Satellite), and EOS.70

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, NASA

also assisted with the development of NOAA operational satellites through its funding for OSIP.

For example, NASA built and paid for the launch

of the first two geostationary operational satellites

(called SMS, for synchronous meteorological satellite) that NOAA operated. TIROS-N, the prototype for the modern NOAA POES satellite, also

started out at NASA and was transferred to

NOAA. OSIP ended in 1981 as NASA, faced with

a tightly constrained budget (in part, the result of

Shuttle cost overruns), withdrew from its interagency agreement with NOAA. NASA’s support

for NOAA operational programs continued but

was carried out with NOAA reimbursing NASA.

The end of the NASA-NOAA partnership may

To For example, NIMBUS 7, ]aunched in &tober] 978 and partially operational 15 years later, carried the Scanning Multi frequency Microwave Radiometer (SMMR) that became the SSM/I on DMSP. It also earned the Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet and Total Ozone Mapping

Spectrometer (S BUV/TOMS) and the Coastal Zone Color Scanner (CZCS). SBUV is now carried on TIROS, and CZCS is the predecessor for

the planned SeaWiFS ocean-color-monitoring instrument. Other NIMBUS 7 instruments were predecessors to instruments now fl} ing on

UARS or planned for EOS. See H.F. Eden, B.P. Elero, and J.N. Perkins, “Nimbus Satellites: Setting the Stage for Mission to Planet Earth,” Eos,

Trurr.~ucr/on.~, American Geoph?s{cal Union 74(26):281 -285, 1993.
86 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

have contributed to the subsequent difficulties

NOAA experienced in the development of

“GOES-Next” (GOES I through M).71 It also

marked a lessening of support within NASA for

the development of operational meteorological

instruments. Instead, as illustrated by the precursor and planned instruments for the EOS series,

NASA became more focused on experimental research instruments designed to support basic

scientific investigations.

Convergence provides an opportunity to restore what had been a successful partnership

between NASA and NOAA in the development

of civil operational environmental satellites.

However, even with convergence, tensions will

likely arise in the new relationship. NOAA and

NASA will face difficulties in reconciling the inevitable differences in risk and cost between

instruments designed for research and instruments designed for routine, long-term measurements. For example, NASA considers MODIS, a

key EOS instrument, a potential successor to

NOAA’s AVHRR. However, MODIS is unlikely

to fit within NOAA’s budget.

NASA’S NIMBUS program was successful

in facilitating the transition between research

and operational instruments because the

instruments that flew on Nimbus did not require extensive modification after they were

turned over to NOAA. In contrast, EOS instruments such as MODIS would likely have to be restructured to be affordable to NOAA or other operational users. This raises the obvious question of

whether it is more cost-effective to develop a new

instrument designed for NOAA than it is to demonstrate a research instrument and then “descope” its capabilities.72 Unlike NIMBUS,

NASA’s EOS program was not conceived as a

test bed for advanced technology. EOS is primarily a system designed with the research and the

policymaking communities in mind. With or

without convergence, NASA, NOAA, and DOD

will face challenges in adapting EOS programs to

serve both research and operational needs.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, future operational missions are likely to include

monitoring the land surface and monitoring the

oceans. The last two sections of this chapter discuss several issues related to the development of

these programs, with particular attention to the

Landsat program—a quasi-operational system

that illustrates both the promise and the challenges

of implementing new operational programs.

LAND REMOTE SENSING AND LANDSAT

Land remote sensing from satellites began in the

late 1960s with the development of the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS). NASA

launched ERTS-1, later renamed Landsat 1, in

1972. Throughout the 1970s, NASA and other

U.S. agencies demonstrated the usefulness of satellite-based multispectral remote sensing for civil

purposes, using expensive mainframe computers

and complex software to analyze data from Landsat multispectral scanner (MS S). NASA also encouraged the development of Landsat receiving

stations around the world (figure 3-3), both to col71 ~oblems with the ~ES program beg~ with the addition of a sounding capability to the visible and infrared spin scan radiometer

(WSSR), which became the VISSR Atmospheric Sounder (VAS). See U.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology Assessment, The Future of Remore

Sensingfiom Space, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

72 Reviewers of ~ eti]y daft of this Chapter raised two other issues. One stated, “If one accepts the earlier arguments about adding ocemic,

terrestrial, and cloud imaging requirements to the operational satellites, there are two options to fulfill these requirements. First, building three

independent instruments to meet specific requirements of each discipline (i.e., AVHRR, CSC2YSeaWiFS and Landsat). Second, build a single

instrument to meet all these requirements (i.e., MODIS). A cost, technology, and requirements analysis should reveal which option is optimum.”

A second reviewer noted, “Until MODIS, or some instrument with similar capabilities, is flown, it will not be possible to define the instrument

that NOAA really needs. Only by using MODIS, with its high spectral resolution, high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and excellent calibration to

acquire an extensive data set, can we establish what spectral bands, what SNRS, and what calibration accuracies are required for what i~pplications. . . . Atmospheric remote sensing instruments can be designed almost from first principles . . . but the utility of land remote sensing instruments for many applications really cannot be assessed without acquiring the large-scale data sets that only satellites can provide.”
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 87

r------ -------------

~=. KIRUNA I

SOURCE: EOSAT, 1994

lect data for U.S. needs and to encourage widespread use of the data.73 For example, NASA and

the U.S. Agency for International Development

collaborated on Landsat demonstration projects

and training in developing countries.74 These efforts made the advantages of satellite data for

mapping, resource exploration, and managing

natural resources well known around the world.

Landsats 1, 2. and 3 carried the MSS. In the

1970s, NASA also developed the Thematic Mapper (TM), a sensor with more spectral bands and

higher ground resolution (table 3-3).75 Landsats 4

and 5, which were launched in 1982 and 1984, respectively, carried both the MSS and TM sensors.

Until the first French Système pour l’Observation

de la Terre (SPOT-1) satellite was launched in

1987, Landsat satellites provided the only widely

available civil land remote sensing data in the

world. The SPOT satellites introduced an element

of market and technological competition by pro73 NASA*~ Lan~sat ~[icpr ~aj ~ (’o]~ W’ar ~(r:iteg; (0 ~emonstrate the Superiority of U.S. technology ~d to promote the open sharing of

.

remotely sen~ed data.

7J For a discussion of ~everti] Land\a[ projec[i in dei eloping countrief, see U.S. Congress, Office Of Technology Asse~~ment, R~)nI~jfe

Sensing and rhe Pritu[e Sectc)r: Ijjucijiw DI\f14t\ic~n, OTA-TM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1984),

app. A.

75 users of MSS data had argued that nlore \Fc[ra] bands and higher ground re~olution ~ou]d ]ead (CI wider use of remoteiy sensed data.
88 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Sensor Satellite Spectral bands, resolution

Multispectral Scanner (MSS) Landsat 1-5 2 visible, 80 m

1 shortwave Infrared, 80 m

1 Infrared, 80 m

Thematic Mapper (TM) Landsat 4, 5 3 visible, 30 m

1 shortwave Infrared, 30 m

2 Infrared, 30 m

1 thermal, 120 m

Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM) Landsat 6 (failed to reach orbit) 3 visible, 30 m

1 shortwave Infrared, 30 m

2 Infrared, 30 m

1 thermal, 120 m

1 panchromatic, 15 m

3 visible, 30 m

1 shortwave Infrared, 30 m

2 Infrared, 30 m

1 thermal 60 m

1 panchromatic, 15 m

Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus Landsat 7

(ETM+)

High Resolution Multispectral Landsat 7 2 visible, 10 m (stereo)

Stereo Imager (HRMSI) 1 near Infrared, 10 m (stereo)

(proposed but since 1 Infrared, 10 m (stereo)

dropped from the satellite) 1 panchromatic, 5 m (stereo)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

vialing data users with data of higher resolution

and quasi-stereo capability.76

In the 1980s, the development of powerful

desktop computers and geographic information

systems (GIS) sharply reduced the costs of processing data and increased the demand by potential

users in government, universities, and private industry. In the late 1980s, India entered into land remote sensing with its launch of the Indian Remote

Sensing Satellite (IRS)77 and the Soviet Union began to market data from its photographic remote

sensing systems.78

During the 1990s, continuing improvements in

information technology and the proliferation of

on-line data-distribution systems have increased

dramatically the accessibility of remotely sensed

data and other geospatial data.79 As a result of the

maturation of the market for remotely sensed data

and the development of lower-cost sensors and

spacecraft technology, several U.S. private firms

are now poised to construct and operate their own

remote sensing systems. These firms expect to

market remotely sensed data on a global basis. De76 me S~T satel]ltes are capable of collecting data of 10-m resolution (panchromatic) and 20-m resolution in four visible and near-infrared

multispectral bands.

77 Howey.er Untl] 1994, India had not made data from its system readily available beyond its borders. In fa]l 1993, Eosat signed ~ agreement with the National Remote Sensing Agency of India to market IRS data worldwide.

T~ Through tie Russian firm Soyuzkarta.

79 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Rernotcl> Sen.redDa[a: Techrrologj, Management, andMarket.\, OTA-1SS-604(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, September 1994), ch. 2.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 89

spite these technical advances and the steady

growth of the market for data, the United

States still lacks a coherent, long-term plan for

providing land remote sensing data on an operational basis. This section explores the elements of a long-term plan for U.S. land remote

sensing.

I Future of the Landsat System

After more than two decades of experimentation

with the operation of the Landsat system, during

which the government attempted but failed to

commercialize land remote sensing80 (appendix

E), the Clinton Administration has now decided to

return the development and procurement of Landsat to NASA and has assigned NOAA the responsibility of operating the Landsat system. The U.S.

Geological Survey’s Earth Resources Observation System (EROS) Data Center will distribute

and archive data.81 NASA plans to launch Landsat

7 (figure 3-4) in late 1998.82

Since 1972, Landsat satellites have imaged

most of Earth’s surface in different seasons at resolutions of 80 or 30 meters (m).83 Because a

spacecraft in the Landsat series has been in orbit

continuously, the Landsat system now serves an

established user community that has become dependent on the routine, continuous delivery of

data. However, the Landsat system is only quasi-operational and has been developed without

the redundancy and backup satellites that

characterize NOAA’s and DOD’s operational

meteorological programs. As currently structured, the Landsat program is vulnerable to a

launch system or spacecraft failure and to instability in management and funding. Despite

the Administration’s resolve to continue the Landsat program, the earlier difficulties in maintaining

the delivery of data from the Landsat system (appendix E) provide ample warning that the path to a

fully operational land remote sensing system is

full of obstacles.

■ Technical vulnerabilities. As illustrated by the

loss of Landsat 6, the existing Landsat system

is vulnerable to total loss of a spacecraft in the

critical phase of launch and spacecraft deployment. If historical patterns hold, even the most

successful of expendable launch vehicles will

occasional y suffer catastrophic failure and loss

of payload.84 Furthermore, the failure of

NOAA-1 3 after a successful launch85 demonstrates the additional risk of spacecraft hardware failure. The failed part was designed in the

1970s and had flown repeatedly without incident on earlier spacecraft. Despite attempts to

design and build launch vehicles and spacecraft

with a high degree of reliability, operations in

space are inherently risky.

In contrast to the Landsat system, in which

designers planned to fly only a single satellite

at any time86 and did not plan for a backup satellite, the NOAA POES satellites have sufficient backup that NOAA can replace a failed

satellite within a few months of the failure. The

decision not to provide a backup Landsat satellite was driven by the relatively high costs of

X[) see U.S. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, The Furure of Remore Sen.$[ng from Space, op. cit., PP. 48-52.

~ I ~csldentla] Decision Directive NSTC-3, May 5, 1994.

xl ~and~at 7 had ken ~cheduled for launch in ]a[e 1997. The slip in schedule is the reSUlt both Of the recent policy turmoil and ‘he ‘eed ‘it

Landsat into NASA’S budget for Mission to Planet Earth.

X3 me Ad, ~ced \7ev H,gh Resolution Radiometer sensors that have been orbi(ed on NOAA’S POES Sate]litef ha~ c a]so prot ided multlspectral imaging (two \ isible channels; three infrared channels) but at much lower resolution ( I km and 4 km).

X4 At a rate of approximately, z ~rcent of (o[a] launches. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ac~r.~.\ 10 .$PUCC: Ttl~l Fulure

of L’. S, Space Tran.\porra[/on ~~}.i[em$, OTA-ISC-41 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1990), p. 22.

X5 NOAA-l j ~ as ]aunche(f on ALIgu\[ 9, 1993. It suffered a failure on August 21, 1993.

w Land\at 5 ~aj launched ~n]) ~ ~ear~ after Land\a[ 4 reached orbit because Land\at 4 had experienced a ~ub~} ~tem failure and NOAA ~~ as

unwre how long it would continue to function.
90 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

ETM+ /

Enhanced thematic

mapper

USE MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT

1 Laf’lduse l–

monitoring

r

Mineralioil

exploration }

I

Hydrology

F

Environmental

monitoring }

I

Cartography \

I I

Land

albedo and

temperature at

high spatial

and spectral

resolution

SOURCE: Martin Marietta Astrospace, 1993

the Landsat spacecraft compared with the doc- Comparing the experiences of foreign govumented need for the data. Lack of agreement ernments in developing systems similar t o

within the U.S. government over the need for Landsat is also instructive. Noting U.S. diffithe Landsat system also influenced this deci- culties with Landsat, Centre National d’Études

sion. The mid- 1980s effort to commercialize Spatiales (CNES), the French space agency, deLandsat also played a role in the decision to signed a cheaper, simpler system and Com -

forego a Landsat backup. mitted initially to building three satellites.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 91

SPOT was a technical success, providing better

resolution than Landsat’s and the ability to

gather quasi-stereo data.87 In part because the

system was designed from the start as a commercial venture, CNES officials also placed a

premium on designing SPOT as an operational

entity, capable of delivering data on a routine

basis. Three SPOT satellites are now in orbit.

SPOT-2 and SPOT-3 are operational. SPOT-1,

which has been in orbit since 1989, can be reactivated to provide data during times of heavy

use of the system, such as the spring growing

season.

■ Institutional vulnerabilities. The TM sensor

aboard Landsats 4 and 5 was designed to gather

data that would be appropriate for many uses.

When combined with other remotely sensed

data, such as the 10-m panchromatic data from

SPOT, higher-resolution aircraft data, or other

geospatial data,88 TM multispectral data

constitute a powerful analytic tool. Indeed, the

data already serve most federal agencies in applications such as land-use planning; monitoring of changes in forests, range, croplands, and

hydrologic patterns; and mineral resource exploration (chapter 2), However, the very diffuseness of the customer base for Landsat data

has made the process of developing an operational system extremely difficult.

DOD has historically been a large Landsat

data user, but DOD officials do not want to be

responsible for funding the entire system. Although NASA developed the Landsat system,

it has not routinely generated and distributed

operational data products to an established

community of data users. Rather, as demonstrated by its long history of successfully operating the GOES and POES satellite systems

(developed by NASA), NOAA has the requisite operational experience. However, NOAA

has no established constituency of users either

within or beyond the agency to defend its Landsat budget in competition with other agency

priorities.

The proposed arrangement for Landsat 7

was arrived at through consultations among

NOAA, NASA, DOD, and the Department of

the Interior, overseen by the Office of Science

and Technology Policy. Although a Presidential Directive such as the one that President

Clinton signed regarding the development and

operation of Landsat 789 can be a powerful

method for creating new interagency cooperative institutions, such institutions remain vulnerable to a change of Administration. As the

experience with providing long-term funding

for the USGCRP demonstrates, interagency

cooperative programs are also vulnerable to

changes in program balance as budgets are altered in congressional committees.90 Therefore, ensuring the future of the Landsat program will require close and continuing

cooperation among NASA, the Department of

Commerce, and the Department of the Interior

and among the three appropriations subcommitties.91 procuring and launching Landsat 7

87 me spfJT Sa[e]]jte is capable of ~in(ing off nadir, which enables SPOT ]mage, the operating entity, tO generate stereo imagc~ on different

passes. However, the SPOT system has the limitation (compared with Landsat) of having only four spectral bands. It also covers an area of onl)

60-by-60 km per scene, compared with Landsat’s 185-by-170-km coverage.

88 ~ese mlgh[ include data a~u[ soils, terrain elevation, zoning, highway networks, and other geospatial elements.

89 presidential Decision Directive NSTC-3, May 5. 1994.

90 u s congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The I’J.S. Global Change Research program and NASA ‘.7 Earth Obser\in~ S)’.YtCm, Op.

. .

cit., p. 9.

91 NASA’Sappropfiatlons Ofiginate in the House Appropriations committee subcornrni[[ee on veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies; NOAA’s appropriations originate in the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee

on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary; USGS appropriations originate in the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on

Interior.
92 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

will cost NASA an estimated $423 million,

spread over 5 years.

92 NOAA estimates that

constructing the ground system and operating

the satellite through 2000 will cost about $75

million.

The need to improve Landsat program resiliency. Because the United States has never

committed to a fully operational land remote

sensing system, its land remote sensing effort

faces the significant risk of losing continuity of

data supply. In the long term, the United States

may wish to develop a fully operational system

that provides for continuous operation and a

backup satellite in the event of system failure.

In the past, high system costs have prevented

the United States from making such a commitment. If system costs can be sharply reduced by

inserting new, more cost-effective technology

or by sharing costs with other entities, it might

be possible to maintain the continuity of Landsat-type data delivery.

Options for sharing costs include a partnership with a U.S. private firm, or firms (discussed below), and/or a partnership with another government. The high costs of a truly

operational land remote sensing system have,

from time to time, led observers to suggest the

option of sharing system costs with another

country. 93 However, national prestige and the

prospect of being able to make such a service

commercially viable94 have generally prevented the United States and other countries

from cooperating.

The need to insert new technology into the

Landsat program. The Land Remote-Sensing

Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555) calls for a

program to develop new technology for the

Landsat series. According to the earlier Landsat Program Management Plan, Landsat 8 was

anticipated in approximately 2003. Although

still in the early stages, planners are considering advanced capabilities, such as greater numbers of spectral bands, stereo data, and much

better calibration than the existing Landsat has.

It is not too early to begin planning for the characteristics needed for a follow-on Landsat satellite.

One option for demonstrating new technology will be available on Landsat 7. Landsat 7

was not redesigned after the DOD decision to

withdraw from the program and the subsequent

cancellation of the HRMSI (High-Resolution

Multispectral Stereo Imager) sensor. As a result, the spacecraft will have the room and the

electrical power needed to incorporate an additional sensor. NASA is offering to fly an experimental sensor paid for by other federal agencies or by private firms. This represents an

opportunity for testing new technology at relatively low cost. The Department of Energy

(DOE) laboratories have been exploring the development of different sensors that might be

candidates. In addition, NASA is exploring the

potential of using small satellites for Earth observation through its Small Satellite Technology Initiative. Recently, NASA awarded two

contracts to teams led by TRW and CTA, both

of whom will demonstrate advanced technology and rapid development in low-cost, Smallsat-based satellite remote sensing. A variety of

technical developments, including increasing

capabilities for on-board processing and the potential to fly small satellites in formation, may,

92 R. Roberts, NASA Landsat Office, personal communication, August 1994.

93 N, Helms and B. Edelson, “’An International Organization for Remote Sensing,” pre$ented at the 42ndAn)~u<J/ ,llccfln~ of the lnterna//onU1 A.\ fronuu//cul I“ederunon, Montreal 1991 (IAF-9 I -1 I 2).

‘)4 However, systems that produce calibrated multi spectral data of moderate resolution-of greatest interest to global change scientists and

other users who require coverage of large areas—may never be commercially viable. Should this be the case, the United States might find ~e} era] partners to develop a system that would explicitly be designed to serve the public good. These include France, which is operating the SPOT

system; Germuny, which has developed several sensors but has no satellite system; Japan, which operates JERS - I; and Russia, wh]ch has a long

history of using photographic remote sensing systems but whose multispectra] digital systems have ) et to pro\e themselves.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 93

in the longer term, allow small satellites to perform some of the missions now accomplished

with comparatively largr and expensive Earth

observation satellites.

9 5

Other future land sensors that the United States

may wish to develop and operate include an operational synthetic aperture radar. The proposed EOS

SAR, based on technology demonstrated in airborne and Space Shuttle experiments, was canceled in large part because of its high cost. The

EOS SAR would have been capable of making

multiangle, multifrequency, multi polarization

measurements.96 These capabilities allow more

information to be extracted from an analysis of radar backscatter and have more general application

than do currently operational Japanese and European single-frequency, single-polarization satellite-based SARS. The Canadian Radarsat, planned

for launch in 1995, will also carry a single-frequency, single-polarization SAR. In contrast to

the broad-based capabilities of an EOS SAR,

which would be particularly suited to global

change research. these SARS are designed for specific applications, such as mapping sea ice and

snow cover.

1 Role of the Private Sector

By launching Landsat. NASA created the potential for a new market in remotely sensed data.

However, as the policy history of the Landsat program demonstrates, commercial markets cannot

be developed solely by government policy.

Among other elements, growth in commercial

data markets requires technological innovation

and the ability to tailor production to user needs.

Government policy can either impel or impede the

development of markets that will support new

technologies. 97

Private firms have had an important part to play

throughout the development of land remote sensing technologies. The information industry has

developed powerful computers and software, capable of handling large remotely sensed data files

quickly and efficiently. Through firms that convert raw data to information (so-called value-added firms), the information industry has also expanded the utility of remotely sensed data

acquired from spacecraft. Aerospace firms have

also served as contractors for government civil

and classified remote sensing systems. Hence,

they have contributed to the technology base that

now enables private firms to develop their own remote sensing systems. Government laboratories

pursuing related technologies have also assisted in

the creation of this technology base.

Three privately financed land remote sensing

systems are now under development (box S-7).

These systems focus on providing data of comparatively high resolution with only one ‘-panchromatic” visible band, or a few multi spectral bands

over relatively narrow fields of view. As a result.

they cannot substitute for the Landsat system,

which collects calibrated multi spectral data over a

large field of view. The privately financed systems

are not intended or designed to supply the repeat.

multi spectral, global coverage that is the mainstay

of Landsat. However, if these systems operate as

planned, they will provide data for many applications, including those now served primarily by

aircraft imaging firms. These systems especially

target international markets that require digital

data for mapping, urban planning, military planning, and other uses.98

For one or more of these systems to be successful. they will have to overcome hurdles of market

acceptance. competition with systems from firms
94 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

that supply similar data acquired from aircraft,

and competition among themselves. If they can

deliver data in a timely manner and at low prices,

one or more are likely to be highly successful. Ultimately, the U.S. government may wish to move

to a new partnership with the private sector in providing land remote sensing and other data that

have commercial value. Four broad options are

possible:

Contract with a private firm to operate a government-supplied system. Under this arrangement, the government would procure the satellite system and submit a request for proposal

(RFP) for a private firm to operate the system

and distribute data. Data would be made available at the cost of reproduction, according to

the direction of OMB Circular A-130. This arrangement is very similar to current plans for

Landsat 7 in which NOAA will operate the satellite and the EROS Data Center will archive

and distribute the data.99 Proponents of private-sector operation contend that such an arrangement would make the operation and distribution of Landsat data more efficient.

However, when NOAA operated Landsat 4 and

5, much of the actual operation and the distribution of Landsat data was carried out by private

firms under contract to NOAA and the EROS

Data Center. Hence, some of the potential efficiency of private-sector involvement had already been realized.

Return to an EOSAT-like arrangement in

which government supplies a subsidy and

specifies the sensor and spacecraft. This arrangement would capture most details of the

existing EOSAT contract in which EOSAT operates Landsats 4 and 5 under contract with the

Department of Commerce and markets data

worldwide. Income from data sales and from

the licensing of foreign Landsat ground stations pays for satellite operations and provides

EOSAT’S profit. EOSAT is free to charge market rates for the data as long as it makes data

available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all

customers, according to U.S. remote sensing

policy. l00

Create data-purchase arrangements. Under

this arrangement, the government would specify data characteristics and would contract with

industry to provide a stream of data for a specified period for an agreed-upon price. NASA

has chosen this path in a contract with Orbital

Sciences Corporation to provide data about the

ocean surfaces. OTA has explored this option

in two earlier reports. 101

DOD had expected to use the data from the

HRMSI sensor aboard the earlier version of

Landsat 7 to support its needs for mapping and

other applications. If WorldView is successful

in providing data from its 3-m/l 5-m system,

these data may fit DOD’s needs and be available 2 years before the HRMSI sensor would

have flown under the previous interagency arrangement. In like manner, DOD may wish to

purchase data with even higher resolution from

either the Lockheed or the Eyeglass system,

should either or both prove successful (box 3-7).

Create government-private partnerships. In

this arrangement, the government and one or

more private firms would enter into a partnership to build, operate, and distribute data from

a land remote sensing satellite. This partnership would have the advantage of enlisting private-sector innovation and ability to target applications markets while supplying the

government’s data needs. It would also have

the advantage of reducing the financial risk of

the private firm. The experience of the French

w ~e~ldentia] ~cision Directive NSTC-3, MaY 5, 1994.

100 See U.S. Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data from Space: Distribution, Pricing, and Applications

(Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment, International Securi[y and Space Program, July 1992).

10I u s Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Furure ofh’emofe Sen.\ingfiom Space, Op. cit., p. 5; U.S. cOngItSS,Oflce of . .

Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data: Techrrolog>’, Management, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 4.
Chapter Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 95

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1994

space agency, CNES, and SPOT Image (figure

3-5) provides one possible model of such an arrangement. However, U.S. firms that are already building a remote sensing system would

likely charge that such an arrangement would

be unfair competition (unless the system’s

characteristics guaranteed them a niche in the

data market). For example, NASA’s contract

with TRW to build a small satellite capable of

gathering data of 30-m resolution in many

spectral bands would serve the needs of the

government and probably enhance the private

market for such data. However, as noted in

chapter 1, NASA’s similar arrangement with

CTA could actually impede commercial development unless the distribution of data from the

satellite was severely restricted.

OCEAN REMOTE SENSING

The impetus for ocean monitoring comes from users of remotely sensed data in both the civil and

military communities. As D. James Baker wrote: 102

The large-scale movement of water in the

oceans, also called “general circulation,” i n -

fluences many other processes that affect human

life. It affects climate by transporting heat from

the equatorial regions to the poles. The ocean

also absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, thus delaying potential warming, but how

fast this occurs and how the ocean and atmos102 D.J, Baker, Plunet Eurth: The Vieit’ from SpfJCe, Op. cit.. p. 66
96 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

phere interact in this process depend on surface

currents, upwelling, and the deep circulation of

the ocean. Fisheries rely on the nutrients that are

carried by ocean movement. Large ships, such

as oil tankers, either use or avoid ocean currents

to make efficient passage. The management of

pollution of all kinds, ranging from radioactive

waste to garbage disposal, depends on a knowledge of ocean currents. And the ocean is both a

hiding place and a hunting ground for submarines.

Scientific, commercial, and government users

of remotely sensed data have long argued for an

operational ocean monitoring system. An ocean

monitoring system would facilitate the routine

measurement of variables related to ocean productivity, 103 currents, circulation, winds, wave

heights, and temperature. In turn, these measurements would allow scientists to study and characterize a range of phenomena (figure 3-6), including those described above by Baker. The

development of an operational system that would

assist in the prediction of the onset of El Niño and

the Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events (box 3-8)

is of particular interest.

The distinction that is sometimes made between satellite-based “atmosphere,” “ocean,” and

“land” remote sensing instruments is somewhat

arbitrary. 104 U.S. ocean monitoring is currently

carried out on a routine basis by sensors on POES

and DMSP. In addition, ocean data are being provided by satellite-borne altimeters on board the

TOPEX/Poseidon satellite, SARS that are part of

the instrument suite on the European ERS-1 and

the Japanese JERS-1, and Shuttle-based observat ions using the multi frequency, polarimetric SAR,

SIR-C.105 NOAA is especially interested in seasurface temperature imagery, which is acquired by

analyzing AVHRR data. Because its ships travel

through and on the surface of the ocean, the Navy

has a particular interest in DMSP (especially

SSM/I) and altimetry data, which allow mapping

of the ocean’s topography and assist in detecting

los In a process simi]w IO photosyn~esis on ]and, phytopkmkton in the ocean convert nutrients into plant material through an lnteraCtlOn

between sunlight and chlorophyll. Measurements of ocean color provide estimates of chlorophyll in surface waters and, therefore, of ocean

productivity. Ocean-color measurements are also used to help detect ocean-surface features. Satellite ocean-color data have not been available

since the failure of the Coastal Zone Color Scanner (CZCS) in 1986. NASA has contracted with Orbital Science Corporation (OSC) for the

purchase of data resulting from OSC’S launch of SeaWiFS (Sea-viewing, Wide-Field-of-view Sensor), a follow-on to CZCS.

104 Al~ough in some cases, orbit requirements differentiate one type from another. For example, an EOS rev iew committee recently concluded that “the science objectives of EOS land-ice altimetry and ocean altimetry dictate that these sensors be on separate spacecraft. Polar

orbits with non-repeating or long-period repetition ground tracks are requiled for complete ice sheet surface topography, while lower inclination orbits with reasonable values for mid-latitude and equatorial ground track crossover angles are required to achieve optimal recovery of

ocean surface topography.” B. Moore 111 and J. Dozier, “A Joint Report: The Payload Advisory Panel and the Data and information Sy\tem

Advisory Panel of the Investigators Working Group of the Earth ObservinS System,” Dec. 17, 1993. This report is available through NASA’s

Office of Mission to Planet Earth.

105 u,s. congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The F“ulure of Renw/e Sensingfrom SpuCC. op. cit., app. B.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 97

H@, N2, 02,

COZ, O, etc.,

aerosol

\

Terrestrial

radiation

SPACE

Atmosphere

~‘recipi’””n

Broken arrows lndlcate those lnfitiences external to the Earth or altered by human actlwtles

NOTE Adapted from Joint Oceanographic Commission, Global Atmospheric Research Programme A Physical Baslsfor Cllmate and Cllmate Mod

e w GAW Pub/ Ser 76 [1975)
98 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

large-scale ocean fronts and eddies, surface ocean for a similar National Oceanic Satellite System

currents, surface wind speed, wave height, and the

edge of sea ice. 106 Radar altimetry data have also

been used to estimate ice-surface elevations in polar regions.

U.S. efforts to develop satellites suitable for

ocean monitoring have lagged behind those for

land-surface monitoring. Seasat,107 a notable success during its 3 months of operation, was

followed by a NOAA, DOD, and NASA proposal

(NOSS). NOSS instruments included a SAR, a

scatterometer, an altimeter, a microwave imager,

and a microwave sounder. This effort was canceled in 1982, as was a subsequent proposal for a

less costly Navy Remote Ocean Sensing Satellite

(NROSS). 108

As noted above, the only U.S. systems that routinely monitor the oceans are the weather satellites. Of particular interest for this report is the de1(~ DJ, Baker, P/ane( Earrh: The View’from Space, Op. cit., pp. TO-T 1.

I(J7 SeaSat,whichwas designed in pafl to demonstrate the feasibility of using radar techniques for global monitoring of oceanographic phenomena, carried an altimeter, a scatterometer, a seaming multichannel microwave radiometer, a SAR, and a visible and infrared radiometer. An

electrical failure caused the satellite to fail prematurely. See D.J. Baker, Plane/ Earth: The View fiorn Space, op. cit., pp. 66-71.

1~~ NROSS was canceled in ] 986, reinstated in 1987, and terminated in 1988. NROSS Would have been less costly than NOSS. primarily

because of the elimination of the SAR.
Chapter 3 Planning for Future Remote Sensing Systems I 99

velopment of new operational satellite-borne

instruments for ocean monitoring. These include

an altimeter, to continue the TOPEX/Poseidon

mission; a scatterometer, to measure sea-surface

wind vectors; a lidar (laser radar), to measure tropospheric winds; a SAR, for a variety of high-spatial-resolution measurements (meters to tens of

meters) in ice-covered waters; and an ocean-color

sensor, to monitor ocean productivity. Box 3-9

gives an overview of applications of radar altimeters and scatterometers for ocean monitoring. Applications of SAR and lidar are discussed in a previous OTA report. l09

NOAA currently lacks the budget authority to

undertake major expansion of its operational satellite program. Early in NASA’s planning for
100 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

EOS, when it was still a broad-based earth science

program, the program appeared to be a vehicle for

developing instruments that would become an operational ocean monitoring program. However,

cutbacks to the EOS program and its subsequent

“rescoping” to emphasize climate change l10 have

resulted in the cancellation, deferral, or dependence on foreign partners of several instruments

with oceanographic application. Rescoping actions include the cancellation of EOS SAR (less

capable European and Japanese SARS are available and Canada plans to launch a SAR in 1995);

transfer of the U.S. scatterometer to a Japanese

satellite; and deferral of development of next-generation microwave-imaging radiometers (the

United States will use European and Japanese

instruments). In addition to scientific losses, several reviewers of this and previous OTA reports on

Earth Observing Systems were concerned that allowing the U.S. lead to slip in these technologies

would harm the nation technology base for environmental remote sensing.

Observing this situation, the Ocean Studies

Board of the National Research Council wrote:111

A major obstacle for marine science lies in the

difficulty of development and managing spaceborne instruments over the next decades. Historically, NASA developed meteorological spacecraft that evolved into operational systems

managed by NOAA. However, for marine observations, apart from the long-standing efforts

in the visible and infrared sea-surface temperature observations and microwave sea ice measurements (both of interest to short-term forecasting), there is no effective mechanism for the

systematic development or transfer of technology from research to operations. Some mechanism must be found to routinely collect such observations that are important to the NOAA

mission. NOAA will need additional funding to

carry out these observations, and a partnership

arrangement will be necessary to identify the essential variables to be observed.

In summary, with respect to ocean monitoring

systems, OTA finds that the development of a national strategic plan for Earth environmental remote sensing offers an opportunity to:

■

■

■

■

provide coherence, direction, and continuity to

disparate programs that have previously suffered from fits and starts;

assist in the selection and enhance the utilization of EOS sensors;

assist in the development of advanced technologies; and

restore a beneficial relationship between

NASA and NOAA to manage the transition between research and operational instruments

more effectively (the same benefit noted above

for other environmental remote sensing instruments).

110 U.S. Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Global Change Research and NASA’S Earth Obseri’ing system, op. cit.

I I I Ocem Resemch Counci] of tie National Rese~ch Council, Oceanography in the Next Decade: Building New Partnerships (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992).
International

Cooperation

and

Competition 4

A

U.S. national strategy for satellite remote sensing must

take into account the increasing importance of international remote sensing activities. The growing number of

countries that are active in remote sensing and the increasing number and depth of international interactions among

remote sensing programs have created expanding opportunities

for the United States to benefit from international cooperation in

remote sensing. The changing international scene also poses new

challenges to U.S. competitiveness in commercial remote sensing and force a reconsideration of national security interests in remote sensing technologies.

Several factors have led to the increasing international interactions in remote sensing, which include both cooperation among

governmental programs and competition in commercial activities. First, the market for satellite data is naturally a global one, in

terms of both supply and demand. The supply is global because

satellites are capable of viewing the entire globe as they orbit

Earth. 1 The demand is global because users around the world are

making increasing use of satellite data and because many of the

] Not all $atcllites ha~ e global scope, but all are capable of viewing very large regions

of Earth. Stitelllte\ m polar orbit can observe the entire globe as Earth rotates under their

orbits: tho~e in IOW er-inclination orbits misf regions that are too far north or south; those in

geosynchronous orbit view continuously the same region—roughly a third+f Earth”s

surface. ArtIclc 11 of the Outer Space Treaty (United Nations, Treuf} on Principles G<J\ -

erntng [he A ctI\’It{e $ of .5”Iute,\ [n the L’.zploru{[on urrd Use of .Chtcr Spuce, ln<ludtng the

Moc~n und O/}wr Cele.\t/al Bed/e\, Jan. 27, 1967) recognizes the right of \atellitcs to pasj

o~’er international boundaric~ w ith impunity, and The United Nafion.$ Princi/~le.~ Relufinq

to h’emtjlt .%Jn\I’nK ~jflhe h’urlhjr(ml @ce reaffirm the legitimate role of remote sensing

sate]] ites. See U, S. Congre\\, Office of Technolog~’ Asseswnen(, Renm~el] S’en.$ et/ f>uftJ..

72chn(~l{~,q.v, Munaxemenf, fJrd Murkels, OTA-ISS-604 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Augu\t 1994), box 5-3.

I 101
102 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

applications of satellite data, such as weather forecasting and global change research, depend on the

availability of global data sets.

The national pursuit of technological self-sufficiency has helped produce a second factor behind

the internationalization of remote sensing: the increasing international diffusion of technical capabilities. Although commercial firms are playing

an increasingly large role in satellite remote sensing, national governments continue to predominate. Canada, Europe, India, Japan, and Russia all

have substantial and overlapping capabilities in

remote sensing. This creates new opportunities

for international cooperation in remote sensing,

but it poses challenges to U.S. leadership. U.S.

policies and practices no longer determine international standards by default. Instead, the

United States faces the more difficult task of providing leadership through consensus building and

accommodating the interests of other countries.

The third critical factor affecting international

remote sensing activities is the worldwide interest

in reducing costs. This leads to two competing impulses:

the growing interest in international cooperation in order to increase the cost-effectiveness

of remote sensing programs, particularly to

eliminate unnecessary duplication among various national programs; and

the tendency toward commercialization, provided by government agencies to recover some

of the costs of developing and operating remote

sensing systems.

These two impulses are in conflict because international cooperation relies on the relatively

open exchange of data, while commercialization

depends on the ability to limit data access only to

paying customers. Because of this conflict, efforts

to promote international cooperation in an era of

multiple suppliers have focused first on the coordination of data policies. 2 The development of

successful data-exchange policies will be critical to future international cooperation in remote sensing.

These three factors have led to programs of international cooperation and plans for continuing

the expansion of international cooperation in re -

mote sensing. The ultimate scope and direction of

this cooperation will depend on several factors:

II

II

■

●

the ability to preserve effective data-exchange

mechanisms;

the ability to share equitably both the costs of

developing and operating remote sensing systems and control over those systems, without

creating cumbersome financial and administrative arrangements;

the confidence of all international partners in

their ability to rely on one another (thus, the

United States needs to judge the reliability of

its partners and to strive to be a reliable partner

itself); and

the uncertain political and economic stability of

Russia.

International cooperation will evolve slowly

through successive generations of satellite systems as experience determines whether the

United States can work effectively with other

countries on remote sensing programs.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of

international interests and activities in satellite remote sensing. The following sections discuss the

risks and benefits of expanded international cooperation in remote sensing, with particular attention to the implications for commercial markets

and for national security interests. The concluding

sections apply these considerations to an analysis

of a range of options for future organizational

structures to support enhanced international cooperation in remote sensing.

2 U.S. Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Remo/ely Sensed Data: Technology, Marwgement, and Marke[s+ oP. cit., ch. 5.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 103

INTERNATIONAL REMOTE SENSING

NEEDS

For the most part, international uses of remote

sensing are similar to those in the United States

(see chapter 2). Some of these applications have

data requirements that are truly international in

character. In other cases, the data requirements are

essentially local, although the needs of some foreign users, particularly in developing countries,

are qualitatively different from those of U.S. data

users.

Weather forecasting is the most established international application of satellite remote sensing.3 The related endeavors of scientific studies

and operational monitoring of oceans and climate,

as proposed under the planned Global Climate

Observing System (GCOS) and Global Ocean

Observing System (GOOS),4 also require data

that are international in scope, as would a proposed Environmental Disaster Observation System (EDOS).5 These global applications require

operational mechanisms for the international exchange of raw and processed data, including the in

situ data6 that remain critical to the quantitative

interpretation of satellite data.

Many applications of remote sensing—particularly land remote sensing—require only local or

regional data. Yet these uses of remote sensing,

applied in widely dispersed locations, often require nearly identical types of data. With their

global coverage, satellites offer an economy of

scope in meeting data needs in different parts of

the world. Despite this, the desire for technological development and autonomy has led many

countries to develop independent capabilities in

land remote sensing. These countries have taken a

range of approaches to the public and private-sector roles.

Other international differences arise from contrasting data needs in different parts of the world,

particularly in the developing world. Poorer, developing countries often lack fundamental information about land cover, land use, and natural

resources and have limited administrative and financial resources for collecting that information

on their own.7 Providing this basic information

through remote sensing could improve substantially the ability of developing countries to manage their natural resources and develop their economies in ways that respect the natural

environment,8 although it could also be used to

strengthen the control of authoritarian regimes.

Accomplishing development and resource management goals involves much more than simply

providing satellite data; it often requires foreign

assistance in developing national capabilities to

~ For more information on the data-exchange requirements and mechanisms used in weather forecasting, see U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology A~\essment, Rernotel) Sen~ed Data: Technology, Management, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 5.

~ p]ans for GCOS ~d GoOS, Which are cumen[]y under development, will probably reIy on a mixture of new sate]] ite and In situ instruments

and in~truments planned for other purposes. For information on GCOS, see Joint Scientific and Technical Committee for GCOS, GCOS: Responding to the Needfcjr Cl/inure Obser}arions, WMO No. 777 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1992); f’or information on GCOS,

see D.J. Baker, “Toward a Global Ocean Observing System,” Oceans 34(1 ):76-83, spring 1991; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ftr,sl Steps Tb\~ard a U.S. COOS: Report of a Workshop on U.S. Contributions to a Global Ocean Obser\’ing S>’.stem, October 1992

(available from Joint Oceanographic Institutions Inc., Washington, DC).

5 For a history of this idea, see J. Johnson-Freese, “Development of a Global EDOS: Political Support and Constraints,” Space Policv

IO( 1 ) 1 :45-55, 1994. EDOS would not necessarily require a new, dedicated system of satellites, but could rely on timely access to data from

satellites de~igned primarily for other purposes.

~ In contrast t[~ remotely \en\ed data, in situ data are measured at the location of the phenomenon that is being observed.

.

T India is tie nlain exception (. this ~le, ~lth a \ub\tantia] commitment to developing its own remote sensing capabilities. China and Brazil

also have significant remote \en\ing program~.

* Committee on Earth Ob\en ations Satellites, ‘The Relevance of Satellite Missions to the Study of the Global Environment,” paper presented at the United Nations Conference on En\ ironment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992.
104 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

make effective use of data from satellites and of in festiveness of their national programs. This

situ data.9

THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

These common interests in remote sensing, combined with the equally common desire for technological independence, have led an increasing

number of countries to undertake civilian spacebased remote sensing programs (appendix B). The

programs have often begun as independent efforts, but many countries have pursued international cooperation as a way to increase the cost-efcooperation has taken a variety of forms (box 4-1).

Each cooperative arrangement has dealt with

the problem of facilitating data exchanges and

harmonizing data-access policies among the participating agencies (box 4-2). These efforts to

coordinate satellite remote sensing programs and

their associated data policies form the foundation

for a steady expansion of international cooperation.

International cooperation in remote sensing

presents the United States with an array of benefits

and risks. Many of these benefits and risks apply

9 See the section on international development in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remofely Sensed Daru: Technology,

Munugemenf, und Murke[s, op. cit., ch. 5.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 105

equally (o interagency coordination within the

U.S. government. but some issues are unique or

more pronounced in an international context. An

expansion of international cooperation should

aim to enhance the benefits of cooperation without adding unnecessary risks.

I Benefits of Cooperation

= Reducing cost. Many of the agencies involved

in remote sensing share common goals and

have developed overlapping satellite programs. Facing budget constraints, these agencies are looking for ways to coordinate their

programs to eliminate unnecessary duplication

and, thereby, to reduce their overall cost.

Reducing technological and program risk.

Some degree of redundancy is necessary, particularly for meteorological and other operational satellite programs. The exchange of

backup satellites between the National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and

its European counterparts is a case in point:

NOAA provided a backup geostationary satellite, the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES), when Europe had

problems with its Meteosat program, and Eu-
106 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 107

—
108 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

●

●

■

rope returned the favor when NOAA faced

problems with its GOES program, lending Meteosat 3 to NOAA in place of GOES-East (see

appendix B). Because the United States and

Europe could rely on each other for backups,

they avoided more serious disruptions in their

operational programs while maintaining the

deliberate pace of their satellite-development

programs.

Increasing effectiveness. The elimination of

unnecessary duplication can also free up resources and allow individual agencies to match

those resources more effectively with their missions. This reallocation of resources can eliminate gaps that would occur if agency programs

were not coordinated. International discussions

can be valuable even if they merely help to

identify such gaps, but they can be particularly

useful if they lead to a division of labor that reduces those gaps. Cooperation on data collection and exchange, especially for data collected

in situ, can also provide important benefits.

Sharing burdens. International cooperation

can lead to a more equitable sharing of costs for

existing remote sensing programs. One organization, the International Polar Operational

Meteorological Satellite organization (IPOMS),

was founded largely for this purpose. IPOMS

was disbanded in 1993, having accomplished

its mission with Europe’s commitment to polar

meteorological satellite programs, particularly

the Meteorological Operational Satellite (METOP). 10 The growing interest and activity by

other countries in remote sensing has also

helped to equalize this burden. In 1993, U.S.

programs accounted for roughly 40 percent of

worldwide spending for civilian remote sensing (table 4-1 ).

Aggregating resources. International cooperation can also provide the means to pay for new

programs and projects that individual agencies

cannot afford on their own. This has been the

case in Europe, where the formation of the EuAgency or countrya

NASA

NOAA

DOD (Landsat and DMSP)

Total United States

ESA

Eumetsat

France

Germany

Italy

United Kingdom

Total Europe

Japan

b

Canada

Russiac

China

India

Others d

Total

Budget

($ million)

938

320

150

1,408

354

143

415

88

66

127

1,193

396

95

228

128

90

39

3,577

a NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NOAA = National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration DOD =Department

of Defense, DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program ESA =

European Space Agency

b Including $150 million estimated for the Japan Meteoroloical

Agency

c From Anser - $100 million estimated for Meteor

d From Anser

SOURCES National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/Natiiona Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, 1994, Anser

Corporation, 1994, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

ropean Space Agency (ESA) and the European

Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat) has allowed European countries to pursue much more ambitious

and coherent programs than any of them could

have accomplished alone. The need to aggregate resources is particularly great for remote

sensing programs, such as the Earth Observing

System (EOS), that are organized into large,

multi-instrument platforms. In addition to aggregating financial resources, cooperation can

also allow countries to combine complementary technical capabilities.

10 The Coordlnatlon Group for Meteorologica] Satc]lites (CGMS ) assumed the remaining coordination functions of IPOMS
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 109

■ Promoting foreign policy objectives. Cooperation in space also serves important foreign

policy objectives, as exemplified by the international space station program. 11 Important

cooperative remote sensing activities grew out

of the space station programl2 and from the

agreements on space cooperation signed in

1993 by Vice President Albert Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chemomyrdin.13

Cooperation on data exchange helped the

United States promote the ideal of openness

during the Cold War.

1 Risks of Cooperation

■ Decreased flexibility. The planning, development, and operation of a major remote sensing

project require a substantial long-term commitment of resources and do not allow a great deal

of flexibility. International coordination could

further reduce that flexibility y by making the decisionmaking process more complicated, leading to inefficient choices that limit the potential

reductions in cost and risk.

■ Increased management complexity. International cooperation can introduce an extra layer

of complexity to the management of a remote

sensing program. Not only does the decisionmaking process become more complicated, but

the political and budgetary processes of cooperating agencies in different countries may be

difficult to reconcile.

■ Decreased autonomy. The commitment of a

substantial portion of an agency’s budget to international activities reduces its ability to

modify its programs in response to changing

needs or budgets. An agency may be forced to

compromise on meeting its own requirements

in order to meet the requirements of an international program, or it may have to defer desired

programs of its own.

H Potential unreliability of foreign partners.

Complementing the loss of autonomy is the

concern over the reliability of foreign partners

and their commitments. An attempt by one

partner to reduce or withdraw its commitment

to a joint program could jeopardize the entire

program, including portions that had been proceeding steadily as separate national programs.

This could pose particular difficulties when

cooperation rests on political arrangements of

uncertain stability, as is now the case with Russia. The reliability of U.S. commitments is also

a concern to potential foreign partners. given

recent uncertainties over U.S. commitments to

the space station and other major international

science and technology programs. 14

n Decreased scope for private markets. As discussed in chapter 3. one way to meet the government’s remote sensing data needs is to purchase data from the private sector. This has

particular advantages when the aggregate demand for a certain type of data is large but no

single agency can afford the satellite system.

International agreements to fund remote sensing systems jointly could eliminate an important opportunity for the private sector. On the

other hand, agreements to discuss common requirements and meet those requirements

through coordinated data purchases could stim -

ulate private-sector activities.

8 Increased technology transfer. Although

many countries now possess the technical abilit y to build remote sensing systems oft heir own,

the United States maintains a substantial lead

I I Lr s congress, Office Of Technology Assessment, Remote/}? Sensed Duta: TtJchnolog>, Mtitzugcmctit, LJtJd tf(lrkef$, OP. cit.. box ~- 1. .

‘ 2 In particular, the Earth Observation International Coordination Working Group (EO-ICWG) grc~ out ofthc international polar platforms

of the international \pacc \ta[ion program.

1‘I white House, Plan for Ru.yTlan.Anlerjcun C(x)p(,rutjje pro,qrarns in E(Jrt}l .y(’ien(’e UII(/ ~<n~ lrotl!?l(’tll(l/ ~fonlf(~rln,~ ,fTOnl $/)~J(’~’

(Washington, DC: White House, Oct. 27, 1993).

I ~ me Cancc]]a[lon of the SuFrconduc[ing Supercol}ider may ~lnstructl~ e in :it lc~~t t~~o \\r:i}$. Fir\[, I])C \J II ]III:IIC\\ of ~ongrci~ to ~’iill~~l

a large ongoing project casts some doubt on the U.S. abi I ity to make the needed commitment to Iwge coupcrati~ c prt~gran~i. Second, unccrtmnt)

over the U.S. commitment to thif project deterred other countriei, particularly Japan, from taking part.
110 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

in several critical technologies. Cooperative

programs require some sharing of technological information, and simply working together

inevitably promotes the exchange of technological knowledge. This transfer could, in turn,

undermine U.S. national security interests as

well as the technological advantages of U.S.

companies in the international market.

International cooperation offers many of the

same benefits and risks as cooperation among

U.S. agencies, with one important difference: International agreements have no central authority like the U.S. federal government to set

the agenda and adjudicate disputes. Central authority in the U.S. government is relatively weak,

and interagency discussions often resemble international negotiations, but national political decisions can intervene to resolve disputes. For example, the planned convergence of polar

meteorological satellites was dictated by a Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (appendix

C), and NOAA and the Department of Defense

(DOD) must answer to presidential and congressional authority in carrying out that decision.

Two areas that deserve special attention as potential constraints on international cooperation in

remote sensing are the potential effects on emerging commercial markets and on national security.

The next two sections deal with these issues in

more detail.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

IN REMOTE SENSING

Countries compete in remote sensing for many

reasons, including military power, technological

prowess, and political symbolism. This section

focuses on the more concrete issue of international

competition in the commercial aspects of satellite

remote sensing.

The United States dominated the development

of scientific, operational, and commercial applications of remote sensing as part of the Landsat

program in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Land

Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984

(P.L. 98-365) and the emergence of the French

Systéme pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT)

system in 1987 helped launch an international

market in remote sensing. More recently, enterprises in Europe, Russia, and Japan have attempted to break into the commercial market, and

several U.S. firms have announced plans to sell

high-resolution land imagery (box 3-7).

Current markets for remotely sensed data are

becoming more specialized, with the development of a variety of niche markets, each with its

own requirements.

15 The growth in commercial

data markets has been stimulated by the most rapidly growing sector: the value-added firms that

convert raw data into usable information. European value-added firms are playing a growing

role,16 although U.S. firms continue to dominate

the market for Geographic Information Systems

(GIS). 17

National governments continue to dominate

both the supply and the demand for remotely

sensed data. Because of this, national remote sensing policies play a major role in international data

markets. To compete in international markets,

U.S. firms must confront markets that are shaped

in part by foreign governments. European counIS For Cxanlple, agricultural] users require moderate-resolution multispectral images with short revisit times. The mapping and p]anning

market often requires high-resolution stereoscopic images, but timeliness is less important. For an outline of the differing requirements for ‘some

commercial markets, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote!}’ Sensed Dula: Technology, Manu,gemenr, and Markers,

op. cit., ch. 4.

I h me Countfies of Eastern Europe have demonstrated their interest and capabilities in software development, particularly in analyzing data

for operational purposes. See R. Armani, Managing Director of Vitro-SAAS Kft., testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

Not ember 1993.

11 GIS are flexible, computer-based mapping software systems that allow users to manipulate and combine information of different types

that comes from a variety of sources, including satellite images. For a more detailed discussion of GIS, see U.S Congress. Office of Techncllogy

A\\mwnent, Remotel) Sensed Data: Technology>, Management, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 4.
Chapter 4 international Cooperation and Competition I 111

tries in particular have strikingly different policies

from the United States on pricing and access to

data from government-funded systems, as well as

on the role of governments in commercial markets. 18

Furthermore, government standards for data

format and quality can have major effects—beneficial or detrimental----a data markets. They are

beneficial when they reduce market risks by encouraging users to coalesce around a predictable

set of data requirements, and they can be detrimental if they discourage the emergence of new

markets that require different types of data. 19

Recent events pose several dangers for U.S.

firms in the international market. First, the failure

of Land sat 6 has created great uncertain y over the

continuing supply of Landsat-type data and has

encouraged many users to seek other sources of

supply, including SPOT data. Any interruption in

the data supply could undermine established value-added firms and make it difficult for U.S. data

suppliers to break back into a reshaped market.

Chapter 3 identified several options for mitigating these risks, including strengthening government support for continuation of the Landsat

system, developing public-private partnerships

for a possible Landsat successor or gap-filler, and

using long-term data-purchase contracts. Alternatively, the United States could attempt to prevent

any data gap by exploring the use of data from foreign satellite systems.20

The lack of a U.S. source for operational

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite data21

also poses a danger for U.S. firms, particularly in

the value-added market. Although heavy datatelecommunication and data-processing demands

currently make SAR data too expensive for most

commercial purposes. SAR systems could open

up a range of new commercial applications.22 Europe, Canada, and Japan all have experience operating SAR systems, and Europe has promoted the

development of new SAR applications through

public-private partnerships. Each of these countries has designated a specific firm23 to market the

data for commercial purposes, and these firms

could have a particular advantage in the value-

-added market.

As described in chapter 3, the United States has

several options in order to avoid being left out of

the SAR data and value-added market, including

deploying its own SAR and funding the purchase

of SAR data for the development of commercial

applications. In addition, the United States could

push for international agreements on equal access

to SAR data from foreign sources. Ideally, such

agreements would prevent foreign countries from

charging higher rates to U.S. commercial users or

giving preferential access to designated companies.

Finally, U.S. firms could face obstacles in international markets because of the data policies

and commercial subsidies that other governments

provide to their national firms. These issues arise

frequently in international trade negotiations. and

a range of trade policy tools is available to address

them.

‘x Ibid.. ch. 5.

‘g L.S. Conge\s, Office of Technolog}f As\e\\ment, International Security and Space Progrwn, lktu }“ormuf .Sfundard.j /i)r Ci\I/Ian R(-

mo~c .%n}~rt~ Sufcll/Ic.\, background paper (Washington, DC: OffIce of Technology Assewment, April 1993).

‘(i T%e lndian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) systcm may be one of the closest to LandwH in its technical chara~teri~tic~, b~lt the Ru~\i:m

Re\ur\-O or the Jtipancw Advanced Earth Observing Satellite (A DEOS) s> stem could provide a uwble substitute.

2

 ] The only U.S. ipace-baseci SAR system is the Shuttle Imaging Radar-C (SIR-C), which has flown on the Space Shuttle. SIR-C is a much

more w}phlstlcatcd radar thun anj of [he foreign $y~tenl$. but fire\ onlj in freqwntl).

22 The ability of SAR systems to “see” through cloudi pro~ ide~ a particular ad~ untage o~ cr optical ~> stems in pro} iding prompt and rel]abk

imagery when timcline$$ ri critrcal.

23 Eurimagc in Europe, Radar\at ]ntemational rn Canada. and the Remote Sensing Tecbnolog> Center (RESTEC ) in Japan,
112 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

National security concerns also pose constraints

on the extent of international cooperation in remote sensing and on U.S. participation in global

markets for satellite data and technologies. Remote sensing serves a variety of military and other

national security purposes, including many that

are similar to civilian applications, such as mapping and weather forecasting, and many that have

no obvious civilian counterpart, such as arms control verification, reconnaissance, targeting, and

damage assessment. Because the technologies

and many of the applications are similar, a national strategy for civilian remote sensing must also

consider national security concerns.

U.S. military strategy has long relied on technological superiority, including the superior information that comes from advanced remote sensing systems. The ability to obtain superior

information and to deny it to an adversary can be

decisive on the battlefield. For this reason, military approaches to remote sensing emphasize control over both technology and data. As discussed

below, however, U.S. military requirements may

change with the evolving international security

environment and the increasing diffusion of technological capabilities.

1 International Issues in Convergence

The likely European role in a converged weather

satellite system designed to meet both military

and civilian requirements raises two related issues: control over the data stream, and U.S. reliance on foreign sources of data. DOD has an explicit requirement that it be able to deny the

meteorological data stream to an enemy in a crisis

or in wartime (chapter 3). Encryption of the broadcast data stream would accomplish this, while preserving the availability to broadcast cloud imagery to properly equipped troops in the field.

On-board data storage would allow uninterrupted

records for climate and land-use monitoring to be

maintained.

The United States would like to be able to control the data stream from the European METOP

platform as well, and has insisted on control over

data from U.S.-supplied instruments. For METOP- 1, these include the most critical proven meteorological imaging and sounding instruments:

the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer

(AVHRR), the High-Resolution Infrared Sounder

(HIRS), and the Advanced Microwave Sounding

Unit (AMSU). Initially, Eumetsat has balked at

this proposal, noting that data from these instruments is currently freely available by satellite

broadcast. 24

The Clinton Administration’s convergence

proposal calls for U.S. imagers and sounders to

continue to fly on future generations of METOP

satellites, but Europe will probably develop some

of its own instruments. France and Italy are collaborating to develop the Interferometric Atmospheric Sounding Instrument (IASI), which could

become a candidate to replace HIRS.25 Similarly,

ESA is developing a Multifrequency Imaging Microwave Radiometer (MIMR), which could replace the Special Sensor Microwave/Imager

(SSM/I), although budget and satellite size

constraints have led Europe to review both of

these instruments.26

Operational users would prefer that compatible

data come from the same instruments on METOP

as are on the U.S. converged weather satellites. If

Europe wanted to fly its own operational instruments, this compatibility could come into question. Alternatively, European instruments could

fly on all three satellites, but this would raise con2J A. LawIer, “Data COntro] complicates Weather Merger,” Space New’s, June 20-26, 1994, p. 3.

25 The Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS) instrument currently under development by NASA for EOS PM-1 is another candidate to

replace HIRS, as is the Interferometric Tcmperitture Sounder (ITS) proposed by the Hughes Santa Barbara Research Corporation. Chapter 3

discusses the development of future meteorological instruments.

26 Europe currentl) has no plans to develop an imager to replace AVHRR.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 113

cerns over U.S. self-sufficiency in basic meteorological systems.

The use of European imaging and sounding

instruments on METOP would reduce U.S. leverage over access to and management of the METOP data. Even with a formal agreement on the

conditions for restricting access to METOP data,

DOD would lose direct control and would have

less confidence in its ability to cut off the data flow

during times of crisis. In part for this reason, the

convergence proposal calls for the United States

to operate two of the three operational satellites.

Restricting the data flow from these two satellites-either by outright denial or, more likely, by

delayed access—would reduce the value of the

data from METOP alone. Controlling two of three

satellites also limits DOD’s reliance on foreign

sources of data. The convergence plan calls for the

United States to maintain the ability to launch a

spare satellite on short notice, which further reduces U.S. reliance on European data sources.

Control over the data flow from a converged

satellite system would not necessarily limit all access to comparable data sources. DOD has resisted attempts to make its meteorological imagery available operationally, especially the

sea-surface wind data derived from SSM/I, although Europe has developed similar capabilities.zT Russia also operates polar satellites in the

Meteor series, which broadcast some data in the

low-quality Automatic Picture Transmission

(APT) format. and China has deployed experimental polar weather satellites as well. If these

sources continue and improve, the United States

could lose all ability to restrict access to highquality meteorological data. However. maintaining open access (except in a crisis) to data from the

converged satellite system could forestall this development by limiting the motivation of other

countries to develop advanced meteorological

instruments of their own.

1 Control of Data and Reliance

on Foreign Sources

Military concerns over control of access to and

management of U.S. data and reliance on foreign

sources of data apply to issues beyond convergence. Data from government-run civilian land remote sensing systems have primarily civilian applications, although some types of data have

significant military utility.28 The U.S.-led coalition used data from Landsat and France’s SPOT

during the Persian Gulf War, and the United States

and France restricted the flow of those data to other countries. DOD’s Defense Mapping Agency

now relies heavily on SPOT data, but may switch

to U.S. commercial suppliers once their systems

become operational.

The United States will remain a leader in providing satellite weather data and will have strong

influence over the shape of cooperative agreements in that endeavor, but the situation could be

quite different in other areas. For example, it may

be difficult to establish a working partnership on

ocean remote sensing that involves two of the

leading players—Japan and the U.S. Navy—because of the Japanese policy to support remote

sensing only for peaceful purposes. A lack of operational experience with civilian SAR systems

could hamper DOD ability to make effective use

of data from foreign SAR systems.

Although U.S. security policies have traditionally relied on superior intelligence and information, some people have argued that open access to

satellite intelligence would provide greater security benefits than keeping access restricted. French

and Canadian proposals in the 1980s, which were

27 The .ActI\c Nlicrowave ln~trument (AhlI ) on bowl ERS- I can function af a watterometer, measuring \ea-surface wind speeds.

2X LJ.S. Congrc\\, Office of Twhnologj Asw\\ment, The Futl/rc ofl?emotc Scnfln<zfronl Sp~Jce: Ci\ilian Sutelllfe S?.stems undAppllcafion.r,

OT&lSC-55X (Wra\hington, DC: U.S. Go}cmment Printing Office. Jul] 1993), ch. 6 and app. C.
114 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

never realized, called for an international satellite

monitoring agency to help verify arms control

agreements and promote openness in military deployments in order to defuse military tensions and

deter surprise attacks.29

I Licensing Commercial Data Sales

The differences in technical capability between

military and civilian remote sensing systems are

narrowing, particularly in the light of proposed

high-resolution civilian systems. The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555)

reiterated the authority of the Department of Commerce to license commercial sales of remotely

sensed data. This act presumes that a license

should be granted, with possible restrictions on

data access. As noted in chapter 3, several firms

have since applied for and received licenses to sell

data with resolutions as high as 1 to 3 meters (m).

In March 1994, the Clinton Administration announced its policy on licensing the sale of remotely sensed data (appendix F). This policy requires

the satellite operator to keep records so that the

U.S. government can know who has purchased

what data, and it authorizes the government to restrict the flow of data to protect national security

interests during a crisis or war.

The principal considerations in permitting such

data-sale licenses are: 1) the military sensitivity of

the data in question and 2) the availability of comparable data through other channels.30 Data with

1 -m resolution could certainly be used to identify

targets for military attack, although restrictions on

data access during a crisis or war could limit their

use against mobile military targets. Data of similar resolution will soon be available internationally, from SPOT 4, with 5-m resolution,31 from

Russian satellites, with 2-m resolution or less,32

and from the French HELIOS satellite.

U Diffusion of Technological Capabilities

U.S. export-control policies have been designed

to prevent the spread of technologies with critical

military applications, including remote sensing.

The United States leads the world in many specific sensor technologies, in the development of

lightweight sensors and satellite systems, and in

the hardware and software of signal process ing.33

These advantages are important for the commercial competitiveness of U.S. industry as well as for

national security. However, the spread of these

technological capabilities as other countries pursue remote sensing programs has reduced these

U.S. advantages substantially.

The United States no longer leads in all aspects

of remote sensing technology, and increasing foreign investments in remote sensing technology

are likely to narrow the gaps. For example, the

United Kingdom is the world leader in active

cooling of infrared sensors. For the type of

technology involved in international remote sensing partnerships, technology transfer has become

a more equal two-way process in which commercial control of proprietary technologies is more

important than military control of sensitive

technologies.

International partnerships often involve contractual restrictions that forbid those who receive

technical information to support joint projects

from using that information for other purposes.

Another way to limit the transfer of sensitive

technologies is to restrict cooperative programs to

less sensitive activities. The imagers and sounders

NOAA is providing for METOP-1 fall into this

29 This technlca] capability a]one is not enough [0 prevent such attacks. U.S. intelligence satellites d~te~tcd the Iraqi buildup on Kuwait’s

border in July 1990 but did not conclude that Iraq was planning to attack Kuwait until a few hours before the attack.

3~ These we [he no~al considerations for all expotl COIltl’OIS.

3 I spOT 4 is scheduled for launch in 1996. See appendix B.

32 Russia has indicated (hat it might a]so sell images With resolution of less ‘han 1 ‘“

33 see ~hapter q for a discussion of the r~]e of technology development in the future Of remote sensing.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 115

category. Finally, the use of “black box” arrangements can minimize the likelihood of inadvertent

technology transfers. This entails providing as

little detail as possible about the internal functioning of specific instruments while providing such

essential information as their weight, power requirements, data quantity and format, and physical tolerances. Such arrangements are generally

consistent with the standard engineering practice

of modular design, making the components of an

overall system as independent as possible.

With any cooperative project, some technology

transfer is inevitable, even necessary. Having scientists and engineers work together is probably

the most efficient way to transfer technological

knowledge, particularly for system-level technologies such as bus design and spacecraft integration and for signal transmission and processing.

The various instruments on a satellite generally

share common data-communication channels,

and the exchange of raw and processed data is essential to any cooperative arrangement.

National security concerns about technology

transfer will continue to pose constraints on international cooperation in remote sensing. Given

the increasing diffusion of technological capabilities, however, the desire to protect competitive advantages in international commercial markets

may take on greater relative importance, and the

ability to maintain these advantages through

technology controls is likely to erode in any case.

I Licensing Satellite Sales

Some countries have expressed an interest in purchasing high-resolution remote sensing satellite

systems from U.S. companies, and some U.S.

companies have responded with proposals to sell

“turnkey” systems for other countries to operate. 34 This type of transfer raises issues that go

beyond concerns over the sale of data. Specifically, it would offer the recipient country the opportunity to gain experience in satellite operations

and in data processing and management, while

limiting the ability of the U.S. government to restrict the flow of data. U.S. policy continues to restrict the sale of these sensitive technologies (see

appendix F).

1 Export Controls and

Cooperative Projects

Cooperative remote sensing projects often involve foreign agencies providing instruments to

fly on U.S. satellites or U.S. agencies providing

instruments to fly on foreign satellites. The transfer of instruments for joint projects differs from

more sensitive exports in several important ways.

First, instruments can be transferred under a

“black box” arrangement that minimizes the opportunities for technology transfer. Second, the

sensors involved in joint projects generally have

little or no specific military application. Finally,

the United States usually undertakes joint projects

with allies who often have comparable technical

capabilities, so technology transfer is less of a

concern (the placement of the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) instrument on a (then)

Soviet satellite was a significant exception).

Currently, most satellite instruments are treated

as munitions under export-control regulations.35

For most joint projects, these controls are not applied at the time of transfer but at the time when

the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing a project is being negotiated. Such an MOU

gives NASA the authority to license the necessary

transfer of instruments.

36 Complete export control reviews are still required for certain countries,

including Russia (although this may change in response to growing U.S.-Russian space cooperation). Another option being considered is to treat

remote sensing instruments—at least those that do

~~ J H FrcJ ~esidcn[ of ][ek optical s) s[enl~, testimony before the Senate Se]cct committee on Intel ligcn~c, NO V. 17, 1993, ,

~s They are lifted on the U.S. Munitions List, which is administered by the Department of State.

36 L Shaffer Ac[lng A\sis(an[ As\ociate Adminis~ator for Extema] Coordination, Office of Mission to planet Eaflh, NASA, Wrsonal cOn~-

munication, July 22, 1994.
116 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

not contain sensitive technologies—as dual-use

technology items

37 rather than as munitions.

OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

The preceding sections considered the risks and

benefits of international cooperation in remote

sensing. This section applies those considerations

to a range of options for increasing cooperation in

the future.

Current plans for international projects and the

agendas of international organizations call for a

steady expansion of international cooperation in

remote sensing over the next decade and raise the

prospect of further long-term growth in international cooperation. This section analyzes three

principal alternative approaches to the long-term

future of international cooperation in remote sensing. Each of these approaches uses existing international organizations as models or building

blocks,

■

■

●

Develop an international information cooperative for environmental data, modeled on

the World Weather Watch (WWW). The free

and open exchange of data has been traditional

both in operational meteorology and in the

earth and environmental sciences but has come

under increasing pressure from promoters of

restrictive data-access policies.

Develop formal specialization and division of

labor, based on the Earth Observation International Coordination Working Group (EOICWG). The logical extension of current coordination efforts, this approach would develop

formal commitments outlining specific roles

for each agency.

Create an international remote sensing

agency, modeled on ESA or Eumetsat. The

long-term need for efficient and reliable international arrangements could lead to a formal

international organization for satellite remote

sensing.

These options are not mutually exclusive, nor

do they provide an exhaustive list of possible future arrangements. They do provide a framework

for thinking about the long-term future of international cooperation in remote sensing. The variations on each of these approaches also illustrate

possible paths for evolution toward greater cooperation.

1 International Information Cooperative

Modeled on WWW, an international information

cooperative could develop broad institutional

mechanisms for data exchange and for sharing responsibilities for data and information management. WWW (box 4-3) has three main functional

elements: 1 ) a Global Observing System, consisting of the observational equipment whose data

stream WWW member countries make available

for broader use; 2) a Global Data Processing System of forecast centers operated by WWW members; and 3) a Global Telecommunications System

for transmitting raw and processed data and forecast information among WWW members. The

World Meteorological Council meets regularly to

coordinate plans for these systems and for other

purposes.

The most important feature of WWW may be

its underlying assumption that the mutual benefit

of open data exchange is greater than the costs of

providing access to data. WWW members provide

basic meteorological data and forecast information for the general use of all other members in real

time and at no charge. In addition, all programs of

the WWW are carried out through the voluntary

cooperation of WWW members.

Information cooperatives have significant advantages over more-restrictive data-access mechanisms. Cooperatives are well-suited to modern

information technologies that make it easy to provide access to data and information but difficult to

control that access. They also allow for an informal sharing of the burden of data collection that

does not require a strict accounting of costs and

37 ControIs on dual-use [echno]ogy i(ems are administered by the Department of Commerce under the Commerce control List.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 117
118 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

benefits to each party. Furthermore, information

cooperatives facilitate the development of information services in the private sector, such as

Accu-Weather, by reducing the cost of raw data.

Finally, the open data exchange that would occur

under an international information cooperative is

compatible with U.S. government data policies

and practices.38

Information cooperatives also carry substantial

disadvantages, however. Some agencies feel that

they are bearing a disproportionate share of the

costs of data collection and perceive relatively low

benefits from the data they receive in exchange.

Others will be tempted to act as free riders, using

freely available data without contributing proportionately to the cost of collecting those data. The

greatest potential disadvantage of an information cooperative is that it impedes the emergence of a commercial market for data and of

the financial mechanism of data sales that

could give data users leverage over the datacollection system.

Eumetsat has made the strongest objection to

the free exchange of data: if Eumetsat makes its

data freely available, nonmember countries will

have little incentive to join Eumetsat and pay its

operating costs. This is why Eumetsat plans to encrypt Meteosat data. 39 In addition, some developing countries have reduced their provision of in

situ data from weather stations. The countries argue that the benefit goes mainly to developed

countries, so developed countries should pay a

greater share of the cost. These circumstances

have raised fears for the future of the WWW system.

The possible erosion of the WWW system

might not have a great effect on the availability of

satellite data to NOAA. As the leading supplier of

such data, NOAA would almost certainly retain

access to other sources through bilateral exchange

agreements. However, the erosion of the WWW

system could undermine the exchange of in situ

data as well as efforts to improve the collection of

high-quality in situ data that are essential for understanding climate change and other aspects of

global change. Furthermore, bilateral data exchanges usually entail restrictions on access by

third parties, which could undermine the ability of

private information services to obtain the data

they need.

The International Council of Scientific Unions

(ICSU) established an information cooperative

that is similar to WWW, the World Data Centres

(WDCS) (box 4-4), to support international collaboration in earth and environmental sciences

and to archive data gathered during the International Geophysical Year in 1957. These centers,

which hold both satellite and nonsatellite data,

now constitute a valuable resource for global

change research. WDCS are generally national

data centers, but not all national data centers are

WDCS. The WDC system provides open access to

data on the basis of reciprocal data exchange

among centers. Because of their desire to recover

costs through data sales, however, some countries

have reduced their contributions of data to the

WDC system.40

The model of an information cooperative could

also be applied to other areas, such as oceanic and

terrestrial monitoring. Programs of the International Oceanography Commission (IOC) could

provide the basis for operational exchanges of

oceanic data, and programs of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) could

provide the basis for exchanging data about the

38 us ~]lcy ~lucldated in Office of Managemen[ and Budget Circular A-130, treats information owned by the federal government as

. .

being in the public domain and allows agencies to charge those requesting information only the marginal cost of fulfilling user requests.

39 L. Shaffer and ML. Blazek (“International and Interagency Coordination of NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and Information SYStem,” ERIM Symposium on Remote Sensing and Global Environmental Change, Graz, Austria, Apr. 4-8, 1993) argue that European countries

already have substantial reasons to join Eumetsat, including national prestige and the opportunity to have a say in Eumetsat decisions. This may

explain why 17 countries already belong to Eumetsat, although Austria’s decision to join is generally attributed to Eumetsat’s encryption policy.

4(I For example, Cmada has stopped providing gmrnagmtic data to the WDC for geomagnetism in Boulder* Colorado.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 119

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1994

terrestrial environment. However, interest in the

operational use of these types of data has been relatively weak and fragmented, so these exchange

mechanisms remain largely unexploited for operational purposes.

Alternatively, the Committee on Earth Observations Satellites (CEOS) could provide the

basis for a more comprehensive information

cooperative involving satellite data of all types. A

broad-based information cooperative may be difficult to achieve at a time when many agencies are

emphasizing cost recovery and potential commercial applications of satellite data. Congress may

wish to monitor international negotiations that

address the challenge of maintaining open access and exchange of data for operational me-
120 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

teorology programs and for global change research.

1 International Specialization and

Division of Labor

Rather than pursue comprehensive remote sensing programs that go far beyond their means, most

agencies have little choice but to specialize in one

way or another. In some cases, such as NOAA and

Eumetsat, this specialization reflects the scope of

an agency’s missions, but frequently, it reflects

deliberate decisions about where to focus limited

resources, particularly in relatively new programs. These decisions are based on a variety of

factors, including national and regional needs,

technological strengths and opportunities, and the

potential for commercialization.

For example, ESA’S nonmeteorological remote

sensing programs place special emphasis on atmospheric chemistry and the development of

SAR technology and applications. Japan has emphasized observations of ocean color and dynamics and of coastal zones. Canada has focused on

the application of SAR to monitor snow and ice

cover on land and at sea. Even EOS, which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) originally planned as a comprehensive

system, has been “rescoped” in response to budget

constraints in order to focus on observations related to climate change.

41 Although most agencies have activities outside these core areas, the

tendency toward specialization is real and significant.

This specialization arose in part through the

coordination activities of CEOS and the Earth Observation International Coordination Working

Group (EO-ICWG) and, more importantly, in part

from the independent choices of independent

agencies. Even this informal division of labor allows the participants to receive the benefits of a

comprehensive remote sensing system without

any one group bearing all the costs. For example,

NASA has been able to reduce its costs for EOS

based on the commitment of other agencies to perform some of its functions. Specifically, NASA

has eliminated or deferred instruments, such as a

SAR and HIRIS, based in part on the fact that Europe, Japan, and Canada are flying similar instruments, though these instruments are less capable

and less expensive than those NASA would have

flown .42 NASA could also benefit from the coordination of atmospheric chemistry missions between NASA’s EOS Chem and ESA’S Envisat.43

Even with some division of labor, however, the

United States may prefer not to rely too heavily on

foreign sources of data, especially in technologically promising areas such as SAR and hyperspec -

tral land sensing.44

Relying on the current division of labor

without formal commitments from foreign

agencies carries significant risks. These risks

are twofold. First, an agency could eliminate or

substantially modify its plans so that it no longer

meets U.S. needs. Second, even if the program

continues, the data it produces might not be readily available to users in the United States. Although formal agreements can also collapse, they

at least provide assurance of an agency intention

and make it more difficult politically for that

agency to change direction.

Under a formal division of labor, agencies

would agree to take on specialized functions not

only for their individual benefit but for the collective benefit of all cooperating agencies. This

~1 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Furure of fi’emole Sensing flom space, op. cit., aPP. B.

42 me JapaneseAdvmced Spaceborne Therlna]Emission andR-flecdcm Radiometer (ASTER) will fulfill some of the functions ‘of [he

canceled HIRIS (High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer), and the SAR instruments on Europe’s ERS- 1, ERS-2, and En\ isa[ and Canada’s

Radarsat will fulfill some of the functions of the canceled EOS SAR.

J~ Recornmenda[ion of the EOS payloadAdViSOVpanel Report, Office of Mission to Planet Earth, National Aeronautics and SpaCc Adnlinistration, Dec. 17, 1993, p. I I.

44 see the earlier section on international competition.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 121

would permit each agency to limit the scope of its EO-ICWG provides a framework that facilitates

programs with some confidence that it would not

at the same time narrow the range of data it might

receive or the applications it might pursue.

A formal division of labor would require a

structured mechanism for negotiating and reaching agreement on the roles of individual agencies.

EO-ICWG provides an example of how this might

work (box 4-5). In its ongoing efforts to coordinate selected agency programs (table 4-2) into an

International Earth Observing System (IEOS),

the implementation of instrument exchanges and

joint projects. The mandate of EO-ICWG is quite

broad and includes coordinating plans for future

remote sensing programs. This broad mandate

would allow the formation of a joint planning

group responsible for coordinating agency plans.

The option of a formalized division of labor

raises two principal issues. First, can one agency

rely on others to meet its data requirements? For

example, can NOAA rely on ESA, Eumetsat, and

Country or region Agenciesa

Satellites

United States NASA, NOAA EOS-AM, EOS-PM,

EOS-Chem, EOS-Alt,

EOS-Aero, POES

Europe ESA, Eumetsat Envisat-1

Japan NASDA, JEA, JMA, MITI ADEOS, ADEOS-2

Canada CSA Contributor to Envisat-1

Japan, United States NASA, NASDA TRMM

aNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration: NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ESA -

European Space Agency NASDA National Space Development Agency, CSA = Canadian Space Agency

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Adminitration, 1994
122 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Japan’s National Space Development Agency

(NASDA) for atmospheric and oceanic data? The

long history of convergence efforts for NOAA and

the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

(DMSP) polar systems shows the difficulties of

building confidence even among agencies of the

U.S. government.

45 To build that level Of Confidence, a formal division of labor requires a formal

process through which the agencies that develop

and operate remote sensing systems can address

the requirements of those who use the data.

The risks of relying on foreign agencies for remotely sensed data are greatest when the data requirements are the most demanding, particularly

in terms of operational timeliness and reliability.

Therefore, the challenge of international coordination grows with the transition from research

and demonstration to operational monitoring,

whether for global change research, weather forecasting, or environmental management.

To meet particularly critical needs, an agency

may provide in-kind contributions of instruments

or share responsibility for data management. For

example, NOAA is contributing imagers and

sounders to the European METOP platform.

NASA is providing a scatterometer to measure

sea-surface winds for the Japanese Advanced

Earth Observing Satellite (ADEOS) platform and

taking responsibility for processing the data from

this instrument. Cash contributions are also possible, but nations usually prefer to make in-kind

contributions in order to develop and maintain

their own technological capabilities.

The willingness of agencies to continue bearing the costs of maintaining and operating a system they have developed can also be an issue, especially if these costs stand in the way of pursuing

new programs. Eumetsat has moved toward a

more restrictive data policy in large part to spread

its costs more broadly. Under a formal division of

labor, it would be clearer what each country received in return for its contributions and there

would be a mechanism for addressing the division

of costs, but it would be difficult to avoid the tendency for each agency to value its own contributions more highly than what it receives in return.

Furthermore, some agencies have relatively narrow charters and would not benefit from the data

they receive from others. For example, Eumetsat

might not be willing to make data from METOP

freely available to Japan in return for ocean data

from ADEOS, which would have relatively little

value to Eumetsat’s meteorological mission.

Finally, a division of labor might spread the

burden too narrowly among the participating

agencies, and the pressure would remain to spread

the burden more broadly by restricting data access

and charging others for the use of data.

I International Remote Sensing Agency

Over the years, several authors have proposed establishing an international satellite remote sensing agency or consortium. 46 These proposals generally envision an organization that is broad-based

both in the international scope of its membership

and in the functional scope of its observations and

their application. It would collect contributions

from national governments and, in turn, make data

and information available to those governments.

This section considers the assumptions that underlie these proposals and summarizes some alternative approaches.

Many proposals cite the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) as a

model for an international satellite monitoring

consortium. Intel sat provides a mechanism for national telecommunications services to combine

resources to pay for satellites that provide international telecommunications links. National ser4S See chapter s for a discussion of convergence.

% J.H. McElro~, ‘. INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and CEOS: Is ENVIROSAT Next?” In Space Monim-ing ofG/obu/ Change, G. MacDonald and

S. Ride (eds.) (San Diego, CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1993); J. McLucas and P.M. Maughan,

“The Case for Envirosat,” Space Policy 4(3):229-239, 1988,
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 123

vices receive access to these links in proportion to

their investment in Intelsat. The International

Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) plays

a similar role for mobile and maritime communications.

The Intel sat model may not be directly applicable to remote sensing because of the nature of the

service Intelsat provides. It is much more difficult

for remote sensing than for telecommunications

services to distribute the benefits of a satellite system in proportion to contributions. Weather forecasting and global change research provide information as a public good. Furthermore, investors in Intelsat recoup their costs by charging users

for the telecommunications service they provide.

Other organizations created for international

cooperation in the noncommercial applications of

space technology, such as the European organizations ESA and Eumetsat (box 4-6), may provide

more appropriate models than Intelsat for an international remote sensing organization. Further

experience with interagency cooperation through

the Integrated Program Office, planned as part of

the convergence of the Polar-orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite (POES) and DMSP systems, may also provide important lessons for

structuring such an organization.

In general, an international remote sensing organization requires a closer, more formal cooperative structure that could increase both the benefits

and the risks of cooperation. Compared with an information cooperative or a formal division of labor, an international organization offers a greater

ability to share costs broadly and equitably47 and a

more formal method for meeting international requirements. It could also lead to the most cumbersome administrative arrangements. An international agency also requires the greatest degree of

trust among its participants.

The effectiveness of an international monitoring agency will depend on how it deals with several issues:

■

●

m

■

m

How much does each member contribute? For

example, members of Eumetsat contribute a

percentage of their gross domestic product

(GDP). Members of ESA contribute to socalled mandatory programs (mostly operations

and overhead) on a percentage-of-GDP basis

and to other programs on a voluntary basis.

What are the procedures for making decisions? ESA and Eumetsat generally require

consensus among member agencies. which

often impedes decisionmaking. In contrast, Intelsat makes decisions like a corporation, on the

basis of a majority of share ownership. The decisionmaking process is particularly important

in establishing system requirements and

matching those requirements to available resources.

What are the policies on data access, for member and nonmember governments as well as

for private organizations? To create incentives

for membership, ESA and Eumetsat give preferential access—providing data at reduced

cost, in a more timely manner, or in a more

complete form-to member governments.

What should the agency buy-satellite systems or data-and from whom? Under its

“juste retour” policy, ESA spends contract

money in a member country in proportion to

that country’s voluntary contribution to ESA.

This policy has been criticized as cumbersome

and inefficient, but it aims to provide technological and economic benefits in proportion to

national contributions. Intelsat and Eumetsat

have no such policies. For now, the absence of

rules on procurement sources would benefit

U.S. aerospace firms, which hold the technological lead in many areas. But in the long run,

this approach might not guarantee a continuing

role for U.S. companies in providing the systems they currently produce.

How comprehensive should the agency’s mission be? Eumetsat focuses on weather and c1i47 In p~ncip]e, such an organization could lead tO an unfair distribution of costs. However, it is unlikely to impose a greater relati~’e burden

than current arrangements do on the United States.
124 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

mate observations, for example, but most pro- (he synergies between different types of meaposals envision a comprehensive agency that surements and because measurements often

encompasses all aspects of operational remote serve multiple purposes, it makes sense to consensing. A comprehensive international sider the requirements of multiple applications

agency offers several advantages. Because of simultaneously. 48 Defining a program too nar-

~ Sce chapter 2 NASA Origlna]]y planned t. make Eos a mrnprehmslve system but has since narrowed the intended scow of EOS to focus

on climate. EOS is meant to be a research program rather than an operational one, although some of its elements may lead to long-term operations.
Chapter 4

rowly may make it more difficult to pursue applications that have been left out, and it may ultimately be simpler to administer a single

international program under a single set of procedures than to allow special-purpose organizations to proliferate.

But a comprehensive international agency also

carries significant drawbacks that limit its feasibility for the near term. By maximizing the scope

of the proposed agency, one also maximizes the

disadvantages that come with cooperation: administrative complexity and loss of autonomy.

Furthermore, some of the participating national

agencies have more restricted missions and would

not be willing to take part in an international

organization with a broader scope.

I Options for a More Specialized

International Remote Sensing Agency

A narrowly focused international remote sensing

agency could concentrate its cooperative efforts

on those areas where cooperation may offer greater benefits, with less risk of disrupting existing national programs. Over time, such an agency could

broaden its mandate if member governments saw

an advantage in doing so.

The main drawback of embarking on a more focused mission is that it could fail to take advantage

of the synergies between various remote sensing

missions and capabilities. For example, an ocean

monitoring agency might not give adequate

weight to monitoring ocean processes that affect

the climate system. However, in the context of

currently emerging mechanisms to address these

issues in other ways, this drawback may not be

critical. The following are several possible international agencies with more limited scope:

8 An international weather satellite agency.

Like NOAA’s satellite programs, this kind of

agency could include both polar and geostationary satellites. The polar satellite component might grow out of a future converged

International Cooperation and Competition I 125

U.S.-European system based on POES, DMSP,

and METOP. Because these satellites cover the

entire planet, however, the agency that supports

them might seek a broad global membership incorporating systems from Russia, Japan, and,

possibly, China, although this might make it

difficult or impossible to exercise control over

data for national security purposes. The funding formula and benefits of participation could

be designed to encourage the broadest possible

membership and to discourage free riders. and

the administrative procedures would have to be

relatively simple. For example, the international agency might simply contract with the

United States, Europe, or Russia to provide polar satellite services. much like the way Inmarsat, early in its operation, built on preexisting

capabilities, leasing communications channels

from satellite operators.

Geostationary satellites have a more limited

scope and, therefore, present slightly different

issues. Rather than contributing to a worldwide

agency, members might contribute to regional

agencies centered on the current U. S., European, and Japanese programs. The central

Asian region presents a problem because India

has not allowed access to its data, and Russia

and China have encountered problems in de49 An interregion- ploying satellites of their own.

al coordinating body could establish minimum

agreed standards for these satellites and simplify data exchange across regions.

An international climate monitoring agency.

Climate monitoring depends on much of the

same information as weather forecasting but requires more precise meteorological measurements as well as a broader range of in format ion.

For example, satellite measurements must be

validated by comparison with well-calibrated

in situ measurements from around the world.

Climate depends on a range of ocean and land

processes, so climate monitoring requires obw ~c Ru\slm Geo\[atlc)nam Owrationa] McteOro]Ogi~al Sate]li[e (GOMS) has reportedly been ready for launch sin~c 1992 ~nd ‘nay be

awaiting forclgn funding. The C“hlnese FY-2 satellite, \chedulcd for launch in April 1994, was destroyed during ground tefting.
126 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

servation of these processes as well. Climate

also depends on information about atmospheric

chemistry—the concentration of aerosols and

greenhouse gases—which is not essential for

most other applications of remote sensing.50

A climate monitoring agency, which might

evolve from the proposed Global Climate Observing System, could function in several

ways. It could operate satellites to collect only

those data unique to climate studies, such as atmospheric chemistry measurements, while

maintaining archives of high-quality meteorological data and related land and ocean data obtained from other sources. This would require

the cooperation of other agencies or programs,

which would collect those data. Alternatively,

climate monitoring could be carried out by a

weather forecasting agency; Eumetsat is considering expanding its mandate to include climate monitoring. Given the broad national

commitments to climate research and the scope

of international cooperation in global change

research, however, such an agency may not be

needed.

8 An international ocean satellite agency. This

differs from the weather satellite case in that no

operational systems now exist, except as adjuncts to meteorological systems. An international agency could facilitate the establishment

of an operational program by aggregating resources from the various interested agencies.

Because proposed requirements led to high

costs, the United States has been unable to

make a commitment to an ocean observing satellite system, but U.S. participation in an international system should be more affordable.51 Like an international weather satellite

agency, however, an international ocean satellite agency would make it more difficult to control data for national security purposes.

An ocean monitoring agency poses some

unique problems. One is how to determine national contributions. An island nation such as

Japan is naturally more interested in oceanic information than is a landlocked country such as

Austria, although both could be concerned

about the influence of oceans on climate. This

suggests that a division of labor based on varying degrees of’ interest may be more appropriate

than an international agency. However, the

formation of an international agency could

sidestep the potential problems of direct cooperation between Japan and the U.S. Navy, given

Japan’s policy to support only nonmilitary applications of remote sensing.

● An international land remote sensing agency.

Internationally as well as nationally, the problem of aggregating demand is particularly acute

for terrestrial monitoring, which involves a variety of national and local government agencies

having overlapping but often quite different requirements (see chapter 3). Harmonizing these

requirements into a mutually agreed to and affordable basic set presents a considerable challenge. Terrestrial monitoring also faces the

greatest overlap between public and privatesector interests,52 as well as civilian and military interests. An international agency could

also stifle the development of commercial ventures in land remote sensing.

■ An international data-purchase consortium.

Instead of organizing resources to develop and

operate satellite systems, any international remote sensing agency could accomplish its mission—whether narrow or comprehensive—

through the purchase of data from commercial

so other sa[e]lite instmmen[s Cm also provide important climate information. These include the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment

(ERBE), which measures the balance between incoming solar and outgoing thermal radiation from Earth, and the Active Cavity Radiometer

Irradiance Monitor (ACRIM), which measures the total energy flux from the sun.

51 For a discussion of U.S. options for ocean monitoring, see chapter 1.

52 me Pub]lc sector tends t. ~more in[eres(ed in LandSat-type imagery (high spectral resolution, moderate spatial resolution) while the

private sector may be more interested in high-spatial-resolution imagery prov ided by SPOT and other proposed commercial ventures, but there

is no clear line of demarcation between the two.
Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 127

suppliers. NASA is testing this relatively novel

arrangement with its purchase of data from the

Sea-Viewing Wide Field Sensor (SeaWiFS)

(chapter 3). A data-purchase consortium would

then operate a data-management, -processing,

and -distribution system to serve its members,

but its greatest challenge could be to aggregate

and coordinate its members’ data requirements

and to match the needs of its members with the

available resources. The principal advantage of

this type of agency is that it would stimulate international private-sector activity by demonstrating a guaranteed demand for the data in

question, rather than competing with and potentially crowding out private-sector activities.

A data-purchase consortium would raise the

question of data access by third parties, that is,

nonmember governments and private companies or individuals.

Any of these proposed organizations could

function independently, with varying degrees of

cooperation with other programs. They could also

provide manageable steps on the road toward a

more comprehensive international remote sensing

agency.

I International Convergence Processes

All of these cooperative arrangements-an information cooperative, a formal division of labor,

or an international agency—face several common

challenges. In each case, decisionmakers must

consider the tradeoff between the perceived advantages of cooperation—increased effectiveness

and reduced costs—and the drawbacks—reduced

autonomy and the risks of relying on others.

These approaches to international cooperation

also provide alternative methods of dealing with

the tradeoff between maintaining a manageable

organizational structure and ensuring a fair allocation of the burden of paying for it. An information

cooperative requires the least formal structure but

allows for the greatest inequity in sharing costs. A

formal international division of labor could reduce but not eliminate these perceived inequities

and could restore the attractiveness of open information sharing. An international agency would

formalize the distribution of costs but would require careful design to avoid becoming excessively bureaucratic.

Over the years, international cooperation in remote sensing has steadily expanded. Initially, the

open sharing of meteorological and other environmental data from U.S. satellites strengthened the

WWW information cooperative. The entry of other countries with more restrictive data policies

threatens to undermine this tradition, but it could

also lead to a more equal partnership based on an

international division of labor. Such a partnership

offers substantial improvements in cost-effectiveness, providing the participants can accept a relatively open exchange of data.

An international agency seems unlikely under

current international conditions, but the growth of

mutual trust that could emerge from intermediate

stages of cooperation might make it seem feasible

or even inevitable in the future. Because remote

sensing systems and programs take decades to develop and mature and because some setbacks and

disagreements are inevitable, cooperative relationships will probably evolve through gradual,

measured steps.

Intergovernmental cooperation stands in contrast to the alternative of relying on the private sector for data and allowing individual agencies to

fend for themselves in the private-data market. In

principle, these markets should provide an efficient system of sharing costs without a cumbersome organizational structure. As discussed previously, however, private markets for remote

sensing take time to develop and mature and have

not yet demonstrated that they are economically

viable. Furthermore, reliance on private markets

can discourage investments in remote sensing as a

public good.

9 Cooperation with Russia

The United States and Europe have sought to expand technological cooperation with Russia, for

both practical and political reasons. This cooperation is a symbol of Russia’s reintegration into the
128 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

53 and provides financial international community

support to maintain the Russian economy and

Russia’s skills in science and technology. But

Russia’s future, including the stability of its political relationships and its ability to maintain an ambitious space program, remains uncertain. This

situation increases the risk of relying on Russia for

important remote sensing needs and imposes limits on the scope of current cooperative efforts.

In 1993, Vice President Gore and Russian

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed several

agreements on U.S.-Russian cooperation in space

activities. Although these agreements emphasized Russian participation in an international

space station, they also included agreements to expand cooperation in earth science and remote

sensing. 54 Russia has a long history and important

capabilities in civilian remote sensing.

Building on past cooperative efforts, these

agreements include several possible projects:

■ Strengthening Russia’s data-management

capabilities.

~ Encouraging Russian participation in international projects of global change research.

■ Arranging future flights of U.S. TOMS and

Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment

(SAGE) instruments on future Russian

spacecraft. 55

Congress may wish to explore ways for Russia to contribute to improving the robustness of

existing operational satellite programs. For example, Russia’s Meteor satellites could provide

valuable backup capability for a converged U.S.

and European satellite system. Similarly, Russia’s

RESURS-O satellites could help fill in possible

gaps in the U.S. Landsat system.

These projects could provide the basis for Russia’s gradual integration into international cooperative programs in remote sensing. But this integration must overcome major obstacles and

withstand the test of time. Expanding cooperation with Russia on remote sensing depends on

steadily growing mutual confidence in Russia’s

political relationships and its ability to mainlain its programs through difficult economic

limes.

s~ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data: Technolog-y, Management, und MarketA, Op. cit., box 5-1.

.5J Whitc House plan f(jr Russ;an.American cooperati~,e Programs in Earth Science and En\’ironrnentul Monitoring from Spuce, op. cit.

55 me Uni[ed states and Russia have agreed in principle tiat a TOMS instrument will fly on a future Meteor satellite, and negOtlatlOnS fOr the

placement of a SAGE instrument are under way.
Appendix A:

NASA’s

Mission to

Planet Earth A

N

ASA established its Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) in

the late 1980s as part of its program in earth sciences.

MTPE includes the Earth Observing System (EOS),

which would consist of a series of satellites capable of

making comprehensive Earth observations from space; a series of

Earth Probe satellites for shorter, focused studies: and a complex

data-archiving and -distribution system called the Earth Observing System Data and Information system (EOSDIS). In the near

term, MTPE research scientists will rely on data gathered by other

earth sciences satellites, such as the Upper Atmosphere Research

Satellite (UARS), the U.S.-French TOPEX/Poseidon,l Landsat,

and NOAA’s environmental satellites. Data from the EOS sensors

may provide information that will reduce many of the scientific

uncertainties cited by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC)--climate and hydrologic systems, biogeochemical-dynamics, and ecological systems and dynamics.2 NASA

designed EOS to provide calibrated data sets, acquired over at

least 15 years,3 of environmental processes occurring in the

oceans, the atmosphere, and over land.

I Thl~ LJ,S,.French cooWra[ive satellite was successfully launched lntO orbit AUgUSt

10, 1992, aboard an Ariane 4 rocket.

2 me u ,s, G]obal ch~ge Research program, our Ch[inging pkm)r: The J-Y 199/ R~-

.\eurch Pl~Jn, a report by the Committee on Earth and En\ ironmenttil Sciences, October

I 990.

3 NA$A has ~rop$ed t. bui]d ~d ]aunch two sets of three wtellites. me fir~t set

.

(called the AM satellite because it will follow a polar orbit and cross the equator every

morning ) would be launched in 1998, 2003, and 2008. The second jet (called the PM satellite) would be launched in 2(X)0. 2005, and 2010.

1129
130 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

EOS is the centerpiece of NASA’s contribution

to the Global Change Research Program. Managed by NASA’s newly created Mission to Planet

Earth Office,4 EOS is to be a multiphase program

that would last about two decades. The original

EOS plan called for NASA to build a total of six

large polar-orbiting satellites, which would fly

two at a time in 5-year intervals over a 15-year period. In 1991, funding constraints and concerns

over technical and budgetary risks narrowed

EOS’S scope.

The core of the restructured EOS consists of

three copies each of two satellites (smaller than

those originally proposed and capable of being

launched by an Atlas II-AS booster), which would

observe and measure events and chemical concentrations associated with environmental and

climate change. NASA plans to place these satellites, known as the EOS-AM satellite (which

would cross the equator in the morning while on

its ascending, or northward, path) and the EOSPM satellite (an afternoon equatorial crossing), in

polar orbits. The three AM satellites would carry

an array of sensors designed to study clouds, aerosols, Earth’s energy balance, and surface processes. The PM satellites would take measurements of clouds, precipitation, energy balance,

snow, and sea ice.

NASA plans to launch several “Phase I“ satellites in the early and mid- 1990s that would provide observations of specific phenomena. Most of

these satellites pre-date the EOS program and are

funded separately. UARS, which has already provided measurements of high levels of ozone-destroying chlorine oxide above North America, is

an example of an EOS Phase I instrument.

NASA’s EOS plans also include three smaller satellites (Chemistry, Altimeter, and Aero) that

would observe specific aspects of atmospheric

chemistry, ocean topography, and tropospheric

winds. In addition, NASA plans to include data

from its Earth Probes and from additional copies

of sensors that monitor ozone and ocean productivity in EOSDIS.

NASA will develop EOSDIS6 so that the system can store and distribute data to many users simultaneously. This is a key feature of the EOS

program. According to NASA, data from the EOS

satellites would be available to a wide network of

users at minimal cost to researchers through EOS1>1S. NASA plans to make EOSDIS a user-friendly, high-capacity, flexible data system that will

provide multiple users with timely data and that

will facilitate the data-archiving process critical to

global change research. EOSDIS will require substantial amounts of memory and processing. as

well as extremely fast communications capabilities.

q cr~~t~d in March 1993 When tie o fflce of space science and Applications was split into the Office of Mission tO pkU’M Earth, tie OffIce of

Planetary Science and Astrophysics, and the Office of Life Sciences.

5 National Research Comci], “RepO~ of he Earth observing System (EOS) Engineering Review committee,” SePternber 1991.

6 Hughes Information Technology won the contract to develop the EOSDIS core sYStern in l~z.
Appendix B:

Survey of

National and

International

Programs B

T

he level of international activity in remote sensing has

grown steadily since the first TIROS weather satellite in

1960. The extent of cooperation among these agency programs has grown in tandem with the increasing number

of national and regional agenciesl that have undertaken remote

sensing programs. Nations pursue remote sensing programs for

both their direct utility and the technological development they

stimulate. Remote sensing. therefore, also involves an element of

international competition for technological advantage in national

security, national prestige, and commercial markets for remote

sensing systems and data.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PROGRAMS AND PLANS

This section focuses on the remote sensing programs of non-U.S.

agencies (tables B-1 and B-2)2; see chapter 3 for descriptions of

the main U.S. programs. Figure B-1 summarizes the existing and

proposed U.S. and non-U.S. remote sensing systems.

Europe. The French space agency, CNES (Centre National

d’Études Spatiales), has the largest national remote sensing program in Europe. CNES was the first European agency to develop

and deploy a remote sensing system, the commercially operated

I Here ~TA is ~jlng the terl~l ~i4qtJr1(} [O refer both to national agencies such as NASA

and N“OAA and to regional organ ization~ such as the European Space Agency and Eumet-

%lt,

2 For more de[aili, see U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, The Future

of Rem{jte .Sen ~ ing frcml .Ypd(c: ~“i~li[un Sutellite S>YfcmS c~nd Appllcutions, OTAISC-588 (W’a\hington, DC: LT.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993).

I 131
132 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Platform Country Year —

Landsat 4

Landsat 5

NOAA-1 1

NOAA-1 2

GOES-7

GOES-8

UARS

SPOT 1

SPOT 2

SPOT 3

Meteosat 3

Meteosat 4

Meteosat 5

Meteosat 6

ERS-1

TOPEX/Poseidon

GMS-4

MOS-1b

JERS-1

IRS la

IRS 1 b

INSAT IIa

INSAT Ilb

Meteor 2

Meteor 3

Okean-0

Resurs-0

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

France

France

France

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

United States/France

Japan

Japan

Japan

India

India

India

India

Russia

Russia

Russia

Russia

1982

1984

1988

1991

1987

1994

1991

1986

1990

1993

1988

1989

1991

1993

1991

1992

1989

1990

1992

1988

1991

1992

1993

1975 (series)

1984 (series)

1986 (series)

1985 (series)

Functiona

—

Land remote sensing

Land remote sensing

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

Atmospheric chemistry

Land remote sensing

Land remote sensing

Land remote sensing

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

SAR and ocean dynamics

Ocean dynamics

Meteorology (GEO)

Land and ocean color

SAR and land remote sensing

Land remote sensing

Land remote sensing

Meteorology (GEO) and telecommunications

Meteorology (GEO) and telecommunications

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (polar)

Ocean

Land

a GEO = geostationary Earth orbit, SAR = synthetic aperture radar

SOURCE: Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) 1993 Dossier--Volume A, 1993

SPOT (Systeme Pour l’Observation de la Terre) the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eusatellite system. 3 France is also developing the metsat; box 4-6). ESA currently operates ERS- 1

Helios reconnaissance satellite, which may have and is preparing ERS-2 for launch in early 1995.

civil as well as military applications. Germany, These are part of an ambitious long-term plan that

Italy, and the United Kingdom also have substan- includes Envisat-1, now under development for

tial remote sensing programs. launch in 1998, and as yet unspecified future sysA large portion of Europe’s remote sensing ac- tems. Eumetsat operates the geosynchronous Metivities take place through the European Space teosat weather satellite system and is developing

Agency (ESA) and the European Organisation for the polar platform METOP-1 for launch in 2000

3 Al~ough SpOT is ~Frated Commercially through SpOT Image, it con(inues to receive subsidies from CNES, which pays tie costs of

developing, procuring, and launching new satellites and owns a 40 percen[ share of SPOT Image.
Appendix B Survey of National and International Programs I 133

Platform

NOAA-J

NOAA-K

NOAA-L

NOAA-M

NOAA-N

GOES-J

GOES-K

GOES-L

TOMS Earth

Probe

EOS AM-1

EOS PM-1

EOS Aero-1

EOS CHEM

EOS Color

Landsat 7

SeaStar

WorldView

TRMM

Meteosat 7

Meteosat 8

METOP

SPOT 4

ERS-2

Envisat- 1

Radarsat

GMS-5

ADEOS

GOMS

Almaz-1B

Almaz-2

IRS-1 C

IRA-1 d

MECB SSR-1

MECB SSR-2

a GEO= geostationary Earth orbit SAR = synthetic aperture radar

SOURCE Committee on Earth Observayion Satellites (CEOS) 1993 Dossier—Vohxne A, 1993

Country

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States/

Commercial

United States/

Japan

Europe

Europe

Europe

France

Europe

Europe

Canada

Japan

Japan

Russia

Russia

Russia

India

India

Brazil

Brazil

Year

1-994 ’--

1996

1997

1999

2000

1995

1999

2000

1995

1998

2000

2000

2002

1998

1998

1995

1994

1997

1995

2000

2000

1996

1994-95

1998

1995

1994

1996

1994

1996

1999

1994

1996

1996

1997

Functiona

Meteorology (polar)

.

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (polar)

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

Atmospheric chemistry

Climate, atmospheric chemistry, ocean color, land remote sensing

Climate and meteorology

Atmospheric chemistry and aerosols

Atmospheric chemistry, solar ultraviolet, trace gases, ozone

Ocean color

Land remote sensing

Ocean color

High-resolution land remote sensing

Climate and tropical precipitation

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (GEO)

Meteorology (polar)

Land remote sensing

SAR, ocean dynamics, atmospheric chemistry

SAR, atmospheric chemistry, ocean dynamics and color

SAR

Meteorology (GEO)

Oceans, climate, and atmospheric chemistry

Meteorology (GEO)

SAR

SAR

Land remote sensing

Land remote sensing

Land remote sensing (vegetation)

Land remote sensing (vegetation)
134 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

METEOR-2 Series

LANDSAT 4, 5

METEOR-3 Series

RESURS-O Series

OKEAN-O Series

SPOT 1

GOES 7

IRS-la

METEOSAT 3, 4, 5

NOAA 11-12

GMS-4

SPOT 2

MOS1b

ERS-1

IRS-lb

UARS

JERS-1

INSAT Series

TOPEX/POSEIDON

STELLA

SPOT 3

METEOSAT 6, 7 (8)

GOMS Series

IRS-I C

IRS-P2

GMS-5

NOAA J

SeaStar

GOES I-M

PRIRODA

TOMS Earth Probe

ERS-2

IRS-P3

RADARSAT

ALMAZ-1 B

SPOT 4

ADEOS

NOAA K-N

CBERS-1

IRS 1-d

TRMM

TOMS Earth Probe

ENVISAT-1

CBERS-2

EOS-AM 1, 2, 3

EOS COLOR

LANDSAT 7

ALMAZ-2

ADEOS II

MSG Series

SPOT 5

EOS-AERO 1-5

BEST

HIROS

METOP Series

EOS-PM 1, 2, 3

SPOT RADAR

EOS-CHEM 1,2, 3

EOS-ALT 1,2,3

96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 135 06 c)7

+1

-

1’

—-

I,J— In serwce

Firm/approved, proposed

~~~~~~ Extension beyond planned Ilfetlme

4

1’

J

J

I

I I

I

I

I

1 L

I

SOURCE Committee on Earth Observations Satellites, 1993
iAppendix B Survey of National and International Programs 1135

Instrument Agency or governmenta

AATSR-Advanced A-long-Track Scanning Radiometer U. K., Australia

AMSU-A—Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit N O M

ASCAT—Advanced Scatterometer ESA

AVHRR/3—Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer N O M

GOMI—Global Ozone Monitoring Instrument ESA

HIRS/3—High Resolution Infrared Sounder N O M

IAS1—infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer CNES/ASl

MHS—Microwave Humidity Sounder Eumetsat

MIMR—Multifrequency Imaging Microwave Radiometer ESA

ScaRaB—Scanner for Earth’s Radiation Budget CNES/DARA

SEM—Space Environment Monitor N O M

a NOAA = National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ESA = European Space Agency, CNES/ASl = Centre National

d'Études Spatiales/Agenza Spaziale Italiana, CNES/DARA = CNES/Deutsche Agentur fur Raumfahrtsangelegenhelit.

SOURCE Committee on Earth Observation Satetellites (CEOS) 1993 Dossier—Vo/ume A, 1993

(table B-3). The European Union is also involved

in remote sensing applications and data management.

Japan. Japan launched its remote sensing programs with the Geosynchronous Meteorological

Satellite (GMS) series, which began in 1977.

Since then, Japan has concentrated on ocean remote sensing, with the infrared and ocean-color

sensors on the Marine Observation Satellites

(MOS-1) and the imaging radar on the Japan Earth

Resources Satellite (JERS-1).4 Japan’s remote

sensing plans include the Advanced Earth Observation Satellite (ADEOS), with an international suite of instruments for observing the oceans,

atmospheric chemistry, and land surface, and the

joint Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission

(TRMM) with NASA.

Canada. Canada has contributed search-andrescue instruments to NOAA polar satellites and

plans to deploy Radarsat, its first remote sensing

satellite, in 1995. Radarsat will provide synthetic

aperture radar (SAR) data for operational purposes—mainly for monitoring sea ice cover—and

for research. The Canadian Space Agency hopes

to recover some of its operational costs through

commercial data sales to foreign governments, although the United States will receive free access

to Radarsat data in exchange for providing launch

services.

Russia. Russia continues several series of satellites inherited from the Soviet Union for observing weather, oceans, and land. This includes the

Meteor-2 and Meteor-3 series of polar weather

satellites, the Okean-O series of low-resolution

ocean observing satellites, and the Resurs-F and

Resurs-O series of moderate-resolution land remote sensing satellites. These series have been

quite stable, although the satellites often have

short lives or use old technologies. Russia has also

deployed the Almaz-1 radar satellite and is preparing a follow-on Almaz-1b. Since 1992, Russia has

listed its first Geosynchronous Operational Meteorological Satellite (GOMS) as ready for launch,

but funds for this launch have not been forthcoming.

Russian enterprises have attempted to sell data

from the Resurs-F and Resurs-O series and from

Almaz-1 but have had difficulty meeting commercial demand for timeliness and reliability. Russia

has also begun offering 2-m resolution land imag4 JERS- ] encountered prob]em~ witi i[s antenna and power systems and produces low-quality data.
136 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

ery from intelligence satellites and is reportedly

considering offering still higher-resolution imagery.

5

India. India has the most active remote sensing

program among developing countries. Telecommunications satellites in the Insat series carry a

Very High Resolution Radiometer (VHRR) for

cloud cover and infrared images. The Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite series, similar to

Landsat but with lower resolution and fewer

bands, is part of India’s commitment to technological self-sufficiency. Except for wind data derived

from Insat, these data have not been available outside India, but the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) recently signed an agreement

with the U.S. firm EOSAT to market IRS imagery

outside India.6

China. China has deployed the FY-1 (Feng

Yun—’’Wind and Cloud”) series of experimental

polar weather satellites and has developed a geosynchronous weather satellite (FY-2) as well, but

neither has been very successful.7 In 1988, China

and Brazil signed an agreement to develop two

China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites

(CBERS-1 and 2) for observing land and vegetation, but no firm plans have yet emerged.

Brazil. In addition to working with China on

CBERS-1 and 2, Brazil has deployed a data-relay

satellite for collecting environmental data from

remote ground stations and is developing a follow-on satellite with a camera for vegetation monitoring.

South Africa. South Africa is developing the

lightweight Greensat for commercial sale, with

both civilian and military applications.

Ground Segment. Many countries are active

in the applications of remote sensing through the

operation of ground stations for collecting and

processing satellite data from Landsat, SPOT,

ERS-1, and JERS-1. Hundreds of ground stations

around the world receive data of various kinds

from polar and geostationary meteorological satellites.

JOINT SATELLITE PROJECTS

Joint satellite projects are a growing form of international cooperation in remote sensing. Typically, these projects involve one agency providing

instruments for a satellite being developed by

another agency. Joint satellite projects have paved

the way for many countries to enter the field of remote sensing through relatively modest initial

steps, which, over the years, has led to more equal

international partnerships. Other forms of partnership include providing launch services and cooperating on data management. The partnerships

also require coordination in such areas as export

controls, the operation of satellite ground stations,

and the exchange of data.

NOAA Polar Series. Canada, France, and

Britain have contributed instruments to NOAA

polar satellites for search and rescue, data relay,

and stratospheric temperature soundings.

TOMS. The Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer was developed by NASA and has flown on a

variety of platforms, including the Russian Meteor 3 series. It will also fly on the planned Japanese ADEOS satellite and a future Meteor 3. The

negotiations for placing the first TOMS on Meteor

were complicated by export restrictions on radiation-resistant electronics included in TOMS.

TOPEX/Poseidon. This joint mission between NASA and CNES provides accurate measurements of ocean topography and, indirectly,

ocean current. NASA and CNES provided instruments and NASA built, assembled, and operates

the spacecraft, which was launched by a French

Ariane rocket.

TRMM. Japan’s National Space Development

Agency (NASDA) is providing a Precipitation

Radar for NASA’s Tropical Rainfall Measurement

Mission.

.—

5 B. lonatta, “Russia Expected To Raise Ante in Satellite Image Market,” Space Netis, Apr. 18-24, 1994, p. 18.

~ EOSAT press release, Feb. 28, 1994.

7 chin~’~ P{)ltir \a(cl]ites ~]] failed within a few months of launch, and its first geosynchronous satellite was destroyed during ground test ing.
Appendix B Survey of National and International Programs I 137

ADEOS. In addition to NASA’s TOMS instrument. the Japanese ADEOS will carry a NASA

scatterometer and the POLDER instrument provided by CNES to measure greenhouse gases and

acrosols.

ASTER. The Japanese Advanced Spaceborne

Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer

(ASTER). a moderate-resolution land imager,

will fly on EOS AM-1.

METOP. Eumetsat plans for METOP grew out

of international discussions on sharing the cost

burden of polar weather satellites. Because of the

need to coordinate with NOAA and because of

Eumetsat’s relative inexperience in satellite development, METOP will be the most heavily international remote sensing satellite in history,

with instruments provided by eight separate national and European agencies (table B-3). Plans

for cooperation depend on future agreements between NOAA and Eumetsat about data-access

policy and encryption.8

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Several organizations have arisen to promote

cooperation between government agencies in remote sensing. Some of these organizations address remote sensing comprehensively, while others deal with specific applications of remote

sensing. Though they operate with varying degrees of formality, they all offer mechanisms for

voluntary cooperation among the national and regional member agencies. g

CEOS. The Committee on Earth Observation

Satellites (box B-1: figure B-2) grew out of a 1984

summit of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations. It was created to improve coordination

among those countries’ remote sensing programs.

Its membership has since expanded to include all

the major remote sensing agencies in the world

(table B-4). CEOS is a voluntary association, with

no legal authority over its members, and works to

achieve consensus on a range of issues that focus

on data policy. The committee also provides a forum for its members to discuss these and other issues with its affiliates, which are international organizations of users of remotely sensed data. In

recent meetings, CEOS has focused on data policies designed to promote global change research

and operational uses for remote sensing.

EO-ICWG. The Earth Observation International Coordination Working Group (box 4-5)

grew out of remote sensing programs originally

associated with the international space station

program but has since become independent of that

program. It aims to coordinate the details of selected major Earth observation platforms of its

member agencies (table 4-2) into an International

Earth Observation System (IEOS). EO-ICWG has

reached formal agreement on data policics for

these IEOS platforms, which would form the basis

for binding agreements applying to specific joint

projects. These policies do not apply to platforms

such as METOP that are not part of IEOS, although such platforms could be included at a later

date.

WMO/WWW. The World Weather Watch of

the World Meteorological Organization is a cooperative program for worldwide sharing of meteorological data and information. It operates

through the voluntary cooperation of its members

to collect, transmit, and process meteorological

data from satellites and a variety of in situ sources

and to disseminate meteorological forecast products. The WWW depends on a longstanding tradition of open and timely sharing of meteorological

data (box 4-3).

CGMS. The Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites was founded in 1972 to harmonize the operations of geosynchronous meteorological satellites in connection with the WMO’S

x SCC ch:iptcr -$,

9 SW [1.S. Congrc\\, Offlcc of Technology As\e\smcnt, Remotcl] SetI.\d D{Ira: Tccllnolocq), W~JrI~J,q[JI~ItIIr, ~~nd ,tfur/wr\, OTAISS-6(M

( W’;i\hington. 1)(’ L“. S. (iot emment Printing Office, August 1994), ch. 5, for more dctuiled kwriptions of mm) of these or:wl]/;ltion\,
138 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP). IOC. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic

The mandate of CGMS has since expanded to in- Commission is a U. N.-affiliated organization that

elude polar satellites as well. 10 CGMS provides a promotes international cooperation in oceanoforum in which international issues in the conver- graphic research. Several data centers around the

gence of weather satellites can be addressed. world serve as archives for oceanographic data,

10 me ~rigina] name of CGMS was tie Coordination of Geosynchronous Meteorological Satellites group. For more details, see Us. (Dongress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data: Technology, Management,andMarkets, OTA-ISS-604(Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, September 1994).
Appendix B Survey of National and International Programs I 139

n\ A-J L“- ) A I

I

u-( a nESA and Eumetsat members I

SOURCE Committee on Earth Observallors Satel’ltes, 1994

including remotely sensed data, and take part in

the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Data Exchange (IODE) program.

UNEP. The United Nations Environment Programme supports two related programs that use

remotely sensed data. The Global Environmental

Monitoring System (GEMS) collects information

to support international environmental protection

and management programs. The Global Resource

Information Database (GRID) serves as an archive with 10 centers on five continents that provide environmental data to natural resource managers around the world. Although they frequently

use satellite data, GEMS and GRID do not have

the resources to support operational satellite datagathering activities.

FAO. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization also supports programs that use remotely

sensed data in agriculture, forestry, and environmental monitoring. The Global Information Earl y

Warning Network uses satellite imagery and national crop reports to provide early warning of

possible famine conditions. The Forest Resource

Assessment program aims to provide an updated

inventory of tropical forests every 10 years.
140 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

Members

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA)

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Admmistration (NOAA)

Canadian Space Agency (CSA)

European Space Agency (ESA)

European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological SatelIites (Eumetsat)

Centre National D’Études Spatiales

(CNES) (France)

British National Space Centre

(BNSC)

Deutsche Agentur fur Raumfahrtangelegenheit (DARA) (Germany)

Agenzla Spaziale Italiano (ASI)

(Italy)

Swedish National Space Board

(SNSB)

Science and Technology Agency

(STA) (Japan)

Russian Space Agency (RSA)

Russian Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environment Monitoring (Rosgidromet)

National Space Agency of Ukraine

Chinese Academy of Space

Technology (CAST)

National Remote Sensing Centre of

China (NRSCC)

Indian Space Research Organisation (SRO)

Commonwealth Scienific and Industrial Research Organisation

(CSIRO) (Australia)

Instituto Nacional de Pesequias Espacials (INPE) (Brazil)

Observers Affiliates

Norwegian Space Centre (NSC)

Belgian Office of Science and Technology (BOST)

Commission of the European Community (C EC)

Canada Centre for Remote Sensing

(CCRS)

Crown Research Institute (CRl)/New

Zealand

International Council of Scientific

Unions (SCU)

International Geosphere-Biosphere

Programme (IGBP)

World Climate Research Programme

(WCRP)

Global Climate Observing System

(GCOS)

Global Ocean Observing System

(GOOS)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

Intergovernmental Oceanographic:

Commission (IOC)

World Meteorological Organisation

(WMO)

Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO)

SOURCE Committee on Earth Observations Satellites
Appendix B

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS

In addition to the intergovernmental and U. N.-affiliated organizations that use remotely sensed

data. international scientific organizations’ have

developed research programs involving the use of

remotely sensed data. Although these programs

often involve U. N.-affiliated organizations, they

rely for their effectiveness on personal contacts

and an international imprimatur to influence the

research agendas of national research agencies. 12

The World Climate Research Programme

(WCRP), founded in 1972, focuses on geophysical aspects of climate change. WCRP projects

such as the World Ocean Circulation Experiment

(WOCE), the Global Energy and Water Cycle Experiment (GEWEX), and the Tropical Oceans

Global Atmosphere (TOGA)13 form the core of

the U.S. Global Change Research Program. The

International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme

(IGBP) was founded in 1986 to address the gaps in

WCRP (specifically, the biogeochemical interactions that are critical to understanding the effects

of climate change, the feedbacks] 4 that could amSurvey of National and International programs I 141

plify or moderate climate change, and other important areas of global change). IGBP projects and

proposals are beginning to influence national research programs. The Human Dimensions of

Global Environmental Change Programme

(HDP), founded in 1991. studies the interactions

between environmental change and human conditions and activities.

In addition to these process-oriented programs,

scientists are pursuing several international programs to address the related need for long-term

monitoring to assess the state of the global envi15 These programs ronment and its rate of change.

would also address the needs of natural resource

managers around the world for operational satellite data. The evolving concepts for the Global

Climate Observing System (GCOS), the Global

Ocean Observing System (GOOS), and the Global Terrestrial Observing System (GTOS) will involve a mixture of improvements in existing operational systems and the development of

dedicated new systems.

11 These are the 1ntematlonal Councll of Sclentlfic Unions (] CSU), which includes nationtil science iicadenlles such as the U.S. National

Academy of Sciences as members, and the International Social Science Council (ISSC), which include, national wcial science organizations

such as the U.S. Social Science Research Council.

12 See us, Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Remotel> Sensed Data: Technolo8>, kfuna~emcnl. and )$’furkef.\, op. cit., box 5-9

for more information on these research programs.

I ~ TOGA aims tO monitor and model the El Niho phenomenon.

14 The ~tentlal magni[ude of Warning from the emission of greenhouse gases depends on a variet~’ of feedback effects, ~onle of which

ink ol~’e the reaction of natural ecosystems to changes in climate and atmospheric chemistry. See U.S. Congre\\, Office of Technolo: y Assessment, OTA-BP-ISC- 122, Global Change Research and NASA’S Eurrh Obser\ing S?.stem (Washington, DC U.S. Got cmment Printing Office.

November 1993).

15 ~oce~~-orien(ed research aims t. understand the basic phyfical, biological, and chemical procesws that underlie ~lobal environmental

change. Research monitoring aims to provide high-quality measurements to detect subtle change\ in the crl(ica] lndicator~ of global change.

Operational monitoring aims to use the data for day-to-day environmental and rewmrce mimagemcnt decisions.
Appendix C:

Convergence

of U.S.

POES

c Systems

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1994

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSTC-2

TO: The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Convergence of U.S.-Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems

1. Introduction

The United States operates civil and military polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems which

collect, process, and distribute remotely-sensed meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental data. The Department of Commerce is responsible for the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite (POES) program and the Department of Defense is responsible for the Defense Meteorological

Satellite Program (DMSP). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), through its

Earth Observing System (EOS-PM) development efforts, provides new remote sensing and spacecraft

technologies that could potentially improve the capabilities of the operational system. While the civil

and military missions of POES and DMSP remain unchanged, establishing a single, converged, operational system can reduce duplication of efforts in meeting common requirements while satisfying the

unique requirements of the civil and national security communities. A converged system can accommodate international cooperation, including the open distribution of environmental data.

142 I
Appendix C Convergence of U.S. POES Systems I 143

Il. Objectives and Principles

The United States will seek to reduce the cost of acquiring and operating polar-orbiting environmental

satellite systems, while continuing to satisfy U.S. operational requirements for data from these systems.

The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense will integrate their programs into a single,

converged, national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system. Additional savings may

be achieved by incorporating appropriate aspects of NASA’s Earth Observing System.

The converged program shall be conducted in accordance with the following principles:

Operational environmental data from polar-orbiting satellites are important to the achievement

of U.S. economic, national security, scientific, and foreign policy goals.

Assured access to operational environmental data will be provided to meet civil and nation

security requirements and international obligations.

It

1 1

The United States will ensure its ability to selectively deny critical environmental data to an adversary during crisis or war yet ensure the use of such data by U.S. and Allied military forces.

Such data will be made available to other users when it no longer has military utility.

The implementing actions will be accommodated within the overall resource and policy guidance of the President.

III. Implementing Actions

a. Interagency Coordination

1. Integrated Program Office (IPO)

The Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA will create an Integrated Program Office

(IPO) for the national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system no later than October 1, 1994. The IPO will be responsible for the management, planning. development, fabrication, and operations of the converged system. The IPO will be under the direction of a System

Program Director (SPD) who will report to a triagency Executive Committee via the Department

of Commerce’s Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere.

2. Executive Committee (EXCOM)

The Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA will forma convergence EXCOM at the

Under Secretary level. The members of the EXCOM will ensure that both civil and national security requirements are satisfied in the converged program, will coordinate program plans, budgets.

and policies, and will ensure that agency funding commitments are equitable and sustained. The

three member agencies of the EXOM will develop a process for identifying, validating, and documenting observational and system requirements for the national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system. Approved operational requirements will define the converged system

baseline which the IPO will use to develop agency budgets for research and development, system

acquisitions. and operations.

b. Agency Responsibilities

1. Department of Commerce

The Department of Commerce, through NOAA, will have lead agency responsibility to the EXCOM for the converged system. NOAA will have lead agency responsibility to support the IPO

for satellite operations. NOAA will nominate the System Program Director who will be approved

by the EXCOM. NOAA will also have the lead responsibility for interfacing with national and
144 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

international civil user communities, consistent with national security and foreign policy requirements.

2 . Department of Defense

The Department of Defense will have lead agency responsibility to support the IPO in major system acquisitions necessary to the national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system. DOD will nominate the Principal Deputy System Program Director who will be approved by

the System Program Director.

3. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA will have lead agency responsibility to support the IPO in facilitating the development and

insertion of new cost effective technologies that enhance the ability of the converged system to

meet its operational requirements.

c. International Cooperation

Plans for and implementation of a national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system will be based on U.S. civil and national security requirements. Consistent with this, the

United States will seek to implement the converged system in a manner that encourages cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations. This cooperation will be conducted in support of these requirements in coordination with the Department of State and other

interested agencies.

d. Budget Coordination

Budgetary planning estimates, developed by the IPO and approved by the EXCOM, will serve as

the basis for agency annual budget requests to the President. The IPO planning process will be

consistent with agencies’ internal budget formulation.

IV. Implementing Documents

a. The “Implementation Plan for a Converged Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellite System” provides greater definition to the guidelines contained within this policy directive for creating and

conducting the converged program.

b. By October 1, 1994, the Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA will conclude a triagency memorandum of agreement which will formalize the details of the agencies’ integrated

working relationship, as defined by this directive, specifying each agency’s responsibilities and

commitments to the converged system.

V. Reporting Requirements

a. By November 1, 1994, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and NASA will

submit an integrated report to the National Science and Technology Council on the implementation status of the national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system.

b. For the fiscal year 1996 budget process, the Departments of Commerce and Defense and NASA

will submit agency budget requests based on the converged system, in accordance with the milestones established in the Implementation Plan.

c. For fiscal year 1997 and beyond, the IPO will provide, prior to the submission of each fiscal year’s

budget, an annual report to the National Science and Technology Council on the status of the national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system.
Appendix D:

A Brief

Policy History

of Landsat D

A

fter winning a policy dispute with the Department of the

Interior (DOI) over which agency should operate a land

remote sensing satellite, 1 NASA developed the Landsa t

system during the 1970s, made the data widely available

at low cost, and funded a variety of demonstration projects. 2 A f -

ter determining that the system was ready for operational status,

Congress and the Carter Administration decided to transfer op -

erational control to NOAA, which had a successful history o f

managing the weather satellites. Eventually, experts believed, remote sensing technology and the user base would mature to the

point that private firms could fund, develop, and operate their

own remote sensing systems for government and private markets.

In their view, additional experience with the 30-m-resolution data

from Landsats 4 and 5 would help pave the way.

In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration attempted to

hasten the commercialization process by transferring to a private

firm operational control of the satellite and responsibility for collecting and marketing data. In 1983 and 1984, Congress held a

series of hearings on the issue, concluded that Landsat was ready

for a phased transfer to private-sector development and operation,

and passed the Landsat Commercialization Act in 1984 .

3 Afte r

holding a competition, NOAA selected the Earth Observation

Satellite Company (EOSAT) in 1985. NOAA retained overall responsibility for system operation. Administration officials

‘ P, Mack. L’[cM In<: the Ear?h: The Sociul Construction of the Landsal Satell\te S>stem

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Prcw, 199(1), ch. 5.

2 Data were either free or delivered at the co~t of reproduction. I 145

s P,L. 98.365 ( I 5 U.S. C, 4201, et seq.).
146 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

and Congess expected that EOSAT, assisted by

the value-added industry, would be able to generate sufficient market for data to assume full re -

sponsibility for funding future Landsat satellites.

According to the plan, government officials

would work with EOSAT to develop Landsat 6

and 7, which EOSAT would operate. EOSA T

would put some of its capital at risk by providing

partial funding for both satellites, each of which

would be designed to last 5 years. In 1985, officials expected that Landsat 6 would be ready for

launch in 1990 or 1991, followed 5 years later by

the launch of Landsat 7.

During the late 1980s, Congress, the Administration, and EOSAT made several abortive attempts to find a funding plan acceptable to all parties. Although the Landsat Commercializatio n

Act supported the concept of providing sufficient

subsidy to ensure commercial success of the program, the operation of Landsat was nearly terminated several times for lack of a few million dollars in operating funds. Ultimately, the thre e

parties resolved the confused commercialization

effort by agreeing to develop only Landsat 6, to be

launched in 1992. The federal government pro -

vided most of the funding for Landsat 6. Assuming that Landsat 6 successfully reached orbit and

operated as designed, this plan still left the United

States with the prospect of entering the late 1990s

with no capability to collect Landsat data. Three

circumstances helped convince government officials of the importance of continuing to provide

Landsat data. First, multispectral data from Landsat and France’s Systéme pour l’Observation de la

Terre (SPOT) proved extremely important in the

1992 Gulf War. These data provided the basis for

creating up-to-date maps of the Persian Gulf.

4

Second, global change researchers began to realize how important Landsat data are for following

environmental changes. Third, failing to develop

Landsat 7 would leave SPOT Image in control of

the international market for remotely sensed data

from spacecraft.

As a result of these and other pressures to continue collecting Landsat data, in 1992, the Administration, with the strong support of Congress,

moved to transfer operational control of the Landsat system from NOAA and EOSAT to DOD and

NASA. Under the Landsat management plan ne -

gotiated between DOD and NASA, DOD woul d

have funded development of the spacecraft and its

instruments and NASA was to fund construction

of the ground-data processing and operations systems, operate the satellite, and provide for distribution of Landsat data. The Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992,5 passed by Congress and

signed into law in October 1992, codified th e

management pla n

6 and provided for approximate -

ly equal funding for the operational life of Landsat

7. The act reaffirmed Congress’s interest in the

“continuous collection and utilization of land remote sensing data from space” in the belief that

such data are of ● ’major benefit in studying and understanding human impacts on the global environment, in managing the Earth’s natural resources,

in carrying out national security functions, and in

planning and conducting many other activities o f

scientific, economic, and social importance.”7

Initial NASA and DOD plans called for Landsat 7 to carry an Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus,

an improved version of the Enhanced Thematic

Mapper that was aboard the failed Landsat 6 (table

3-3). Later, the two agencies began to consider including a new multispectral sensor, the High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager (HRMSI).

Cost estimates for developing, launching, and operating Landsat 7 for 5 years equaled $880 mil1ion

(1992 dollars). Including the HRMSI sensor on

the spacecraft would have cost an additional $400

million for procurement of the instrument and the

4 Maps ~d ~~er data ~roduct5 made from these civi]ian sys[ems have the advantage that they can be shared amOng U.S. allies in a conflict.

5 P. L. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163-4180.

(1 ] 5 USC 56] 1.

7 15 U.S.C. 5601, Sec. 2. Findings.
Appendix D A Brief Policy History of Landsat I 147

ground operations equipment. Because of the high

data rates expected for the HRMSI, operating the

sensor would have added significant costs t o

NASA’s yearly ground operations budget.

The September 1993 loss of Landsat 6 left the

United States with a substantial risk that continuity of data from Landsat would be lost. Although

the TM sensors on Landsat 4 and Landsat 5 continue to operate, both have suffered data-transmission-subsystem failures and the spacecraft ar e

substantially beyond their projected operatin g

lifetimes. 8 They could fail completely at any

time.9 Hence, to maintain the potential for continuity of data delivery, DOD and NASA had to act

expeditiously to develop and launch Landsat 7.

However, in September 1993, NASA decided that

the costs of operating Landsat 7 with HRMSI

were too large compared with the benefit NASA

researchers would receive from HRMSI data.

HRMSI was of greater interest to DOD and other

U.S. national security agencies because it would

have provided 5-m-resolution stereo data of sufficient quality to create high-quality maps. Hence,

NASA decided that it could not support the

ground operations of HRMSI and did not include

sufficient funds in its FY 1995 budget request to

begin developing the data system. In December

1993, DOD decided that it could not fund the resulting Landsat 7 budget shortfall. As a result of

their disagreement over the Landsat 7 requirements and budget, NASA and DOD subsequently

decided that each agency should go its own way.

NASA would fund development of Landsat, carrying the planned 30-m-resolution ETM Plus. 10

DOD would decide later whether or not to develop

a 5-m-resolution sensor on its own. 1 1

Still undetermined in early 1994 was the question of whether NASA or some other agency

would operate Landsat 7. NASA needs Landsat

data to support its global change research program. However, Landsat data support many government operational programs and the data needs

of state and local governments, the U.S. private

sector, and foreign entities. Hence, Landsat data

have both national and international value that extends far beyond NASA’s requirements for global

change data.

In May 1994, the Administration decided to resolve the outstanding issue of procurement and

operational control of the Landsat system by assigning it to NASA, NOAA, and DOI. Under the

new plan, NASA will procure the satellite, NOAA

will manage and operate the spacecraft and

ground system, and DOI will archive and distribute the data at the marginal cost of reproduction. 12

x Both wtteilites were designed to operate for 3 years. Landsat 4 was launched in 1982; Landsat 5 was launched in 1984.

9 HOW ever. i! might still be possible to retrieve data from the MSS aboard both satellites because the MSS sensor is still capable of operating

and it uses an S-Band transmitter that is also still operational.

lo DOD [rmjfemed $90 nli]lion to NASA for the development of Landsat 7.

I I Letter from Undersecretary of Bfense John Deutsch to Congressman George Brown, December 1993.

12 ~esldentla] ~ci~ion Directive NSTC-3, May 5, 1994.
Appendix E:

Landsat

Remote

Sensing

E Strategy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1994

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSTC-3

TO: The Vice President

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Interior

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy

1. Introduction

This directive provides for continuance of the Landsat 7 program, assures continuity of Landsat-type

and quality of data, and reduces the risk of a data gap.

The Landsat program has provided over 20 years of calibrated data to a broad user community including the agricultural community, global change researchers, state and local governments, commercial users, and the military. The Landsat 6 satellite which failed to reach orbit in 1993 was intended to replace

the existing Landsat satellites 4 and 5, which were launched in 1982 and 1984. These satellites which are

operating well beyond their three year design lives, represent the only source of a global calibrated high

spatial resolution measurements of the Earth’s surface that can be compared to previous data records.

In the Fall of 1993 the joint Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration Landsat 7 program was being reevaluated due to severe budgetary constraints. This fact, coupled

with the advanced age of Land sat satellites 4 and 5, resulted in a re-assessment of the Landsat program by

representatives of the National Science and Technology Council. The objectives of the National Science

148 I
Appendix E Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy I 149

and Technology Council were to minimize the potential for a gap in the Landsat data record if Landsat

satellites 4 and 5 should cease to operate, to reduce cost, and to reduce development risk. The rcsults of

this re-assessment are identified below.

This document supersedes National Space Policy Directive #5, dated February 2, 1992, and directs

implementation of the Landsat Program consistent with the intent of P. L. 102-555. the Land Remote

Sensing Policy Act of 1992, and P. L. 103-221, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. The

Administration will seek all legislative changes necessary to implement this PDD.

Il. Policy Goals

A remote sensing capability, such as is currently being provided by Landsat satellites 4 and 5, benefits

the civil, commercial, and national security interests of the United States and makes contributions to the

private sector which are in the public interest. For these reasons, the United States Government will seek

to maintain the continuity of Landsat-type data. The U.S. Government will:

(a) Provide unenhanced data which are sufficiently consistent in terms of acquisition geometry.

coverage characteristics, and spectral characteristics with previous Landsat data to allow quantitative

comparisons for change detection and characterization;

(b) Make govemment-owned Landsat data available to meet the needs of all users at no more that the

cost of fulfilling user requests consistent with data policy goals of P.L. 102-555; and

(c) Promote and not preclude private sector commercial opportunities in Landsat-type remote sensing.

Ill. Landsat Strategy

a. The Landsat strategy is composed of the following elements:

(1) Ensuring that Landsat satellites 4 and 5 continue to provide data as long as they are

technically capable of doing so.

(2) Acquiring a Landsat 7 satellite that maintains the continuity of Landsat-type data. minimizes development risk, minimizes cost, and achieves the most favorable launch schedule to mitigate the loss of Landsat 6.

(3) Maintaining an archive within the United States for existing and future Landsat-type

data.

(4) Ensuring that unenhanced data from Landsat 7 are available to all users at no more than

the cost of fulfilling user requests.

(5) Providing data for use in global change research in a manner consistent with the Global

Change Research Policy Statements for Data Management.

(6) Considering alternatives for maintaining the continuity of data beyond Landsat 7.

(7) Fostering the development of advanced remote sensing technologies, with the goal of

reducing the cost and increasing the performance of future Landsat-type satellites to

meet U.S. Government needs, and potentially, enabling substantially greater opportunities for commercialization.

b. These strategy elements will be implemented within the overall resource and policy guidance provided by the President.
150 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

IV. Implementing Guidelines

Affected agencies will identify funds necessary to implement the National Strategy for Landsat Remote Sensing within the overall resource and policy guidance provided by the President. {In order to

effectuate the strategy enumerated herein, the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior are

hereby designated as members of the Landsat Program Management in accordance with section 10l(b)

of the Landsat Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. 5602(6) and 5611 (b).} Specific agency

responsibilities are provided below.

a. The Department of Commerce/NOAA will:

(1) In participation with other appropriate government agencies arrange for the continued

operation of Landsat satellites 4 and 5 and the routine operation of future Landsat satellites after their placement in orbit.

(2) Seek better access to data collected at foreign ground stations for U.S. Government and

private sector users of Landsat data.

(3) In cooperation with NASA, manage the development of and provide a share of the funding for the Landsat 7 ground system.

(4) Operate the Landsat 7 spacecraft and ground system in cooperation with the Department

of the Interior.

(5) Seek to offset operations costs through use of access fees from foreign ground stations

and/or the cost of fulfilling user requests.

(6) Aggregate future Federal requirements for civil operational land remote sensing data.

b. The National Aeronautics and Spac e Administration will:

(1) Ensure data continuity by the development and launch of a Landsat 7 satellite system

which is at a minimum functionally equivalent to the Landsat 6 satellite in accordance

with section 102, P. L. 102-555.

(2) In coordination with DOC and DOI, develop a Landsat 7 ground system compatible

with the Landsat 7 spacecraft.

(3) In coordination with DOC, DOI, and DOD, revise the current Management plan to reflect the changes implemented through this directive, including programmatic, technical,

schedule, and budget information.

(4) Implement the joint NASA/DOD transition plan to transfer the DOD Landsat 7 responsibilities to NASA.

(5) In coordination with other appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government develop a strategy for maintaining continuity of Landsat-type data beyond Landsat 7.

(6) Conduct a coordinated technology demonstration program with other appropriate agencies to improve the performance and reduce the cost for future unclassified earth remote

sensing systems.

c. The Department of Defense will implement the joint NASA/DOD transition plan to transfer the

DOD Landsat 7 responsibilities to NASA.

d. The Department of the Interior will continue to maintain a national archive of existing and future

Landsat-type remote sensing data within the United States and make such data available to U.S.

Government and other users.
Appendix E Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy I 151

e. Affected agencies will identify the funding, and funding transfers for FY 1994, required to implement this strategy that are within their approved fiscal year 1994 budgets and subsequent budget

requests.

V. Reporting Requirements

U.S. Government agencies affected by the strategy guidelines are directed to report no later that 30

days following the issuance of this directive, to the National Science and Technology Council on their

implementation. The agencies will address management and funding responsibilities, government and

contractor operations, data management, archiving, and dissemination, necessary changes to P. L.

102-555 and commercial considerations associated with the Landsat program.
Clinton Administration

Policy on Remote Sensing

F Licensing and Exports

On March 10, 1994, the White House released a statement of policy on two issues: the licensing of

commercial remote sensing systems and the export of remote sensing technologies. This statement follows verbatim:

1 U.S. Policy on Licensing and Operation of Private Remote Sensing Systems

License requests by US firms to operate private remote sensing space systems will be reviewed on a

case-by-case basis in accordance with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (the Act). There is a

presumption that remote sensing space systems whose performance capabilities and imagery quality

characteristics are available or are planned for availability in the world marketplace (e.g., SPOT, Landsat, etc.) will be favorably considered, and that the following conditions will apply to any US entity that

receives an operating license under the Act.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The licensee will be required to maintain a record of all satellite tasking for the previous year and

to allow the USC access to this record.

The licensee will not change the operational characteristics of the satellite system from the application as submitted without formal notification and approval of the Department of Commerce,

which would coordinate with other interested agencies.

The license being granted does not relieve the licensee of the obligation to obtain export license(s)

pursuant to applicable statutes.

The license is valid only for a finite period, and is neither transferable nor subject to foreign ownership, above a specified threshold, without the explicit permission of the Secretary of Commerce.

All encryption devices must be approved by the US Government for the purpose of denying unauthorized access to others during periods when national security, international obligations and/or

foreign policies may be compromised as provided for in the Act.

A licensee must use a data downlink format that allows the US Government access and use of

the data during periods when national security, international obligations and/or foreign policies

may be compromised as provided for in the Act.

152 I
Appendix F Clinton Administration Policy on Remote Sensing Licensing and Exports 1153

7. During periods when national security or international obligations and/or foreign policies may

be compromised, as defined by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State, respectively,

the Secretary of Commerce may, after consultation with the appropriate agency (ies), require the

licensee to limit data collection and/or distribution by the system to the extent necessitated by the

given situation. Decisions to impose such limits only will be made by the Secretary of Commerce

in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State, as appropriate. Disagreements between Cabinet Secretaries may be appealed to the President. The Secretaries of State,

Defense and Commerce shall develop their own internal mechanisms to enable them to carry out

their statutory responsibilities.

8. Pursuant to the Act, the US Government requires US companies that have been issued operating

licenses under the Act to notify the US Government of its intent to enter into significant or substantial agreements with new foreign customers. Interested agencies shall be given advance notice of such agreements to allow them the opportunity to review the proposed agreement in light

of the national security, international obligations and foreign policy concerns of the US Government. The definition of a significant or substantial agreement, as well as the time frames and other

details of this process, will be defined in later Commerce regulations in consultation with appropriate agencies.

I U.S. Policy on the Transfer of Advanced Remote Sensing Capabilities

Advanced Remote Sensing System Exports

The United States will consider requests to export advanced remote sensing systems whose performance capabilities and imagery quality characteristics are available or are planned for availability in the

world marketplace on a case-by-case basis.

The details of these potential sales should take into account the following:

■ the proposed foreign recipient’s willingness and ability to accept commitments to the US Government concerning sharing, protection, and denial of products and data; and

■ constraints on resolution, geographic coverage. timeliness, spectral coverage, data processing and

exploitation techniques. tasking capabilities, and ground architectures.

Approval of requests for exports of systems would also require certain diplomatic steps be taken, such

as informing other close friends in the region of the request, and the conditions we would likely attach to

any sale; and informing the recipient of our decision and the conditions we would require as part of the

sale.

Any system made available to a foreign government or other foreign entity may be subject to a formal

government-to-government agreement.

Transfer of Sensitive Technology

The United States will consider applications to export remote sensing space capabilities on a restricted

basis. Sensitive technology in this situation consists of items of technology on the US Munitions List

necessary to develop or to support advanced remote sensing space capabilities and which are uniquely

available in the United States. Such sensitivc technology shall be made available to foreign entities only

on the basis of a government-to-government agreement. This agreement may be in the form of end-use

and retransfer assurances which can be tailored to ensure the protection of US technology.
154 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

I Government-to-Government Intelligence and Defense Partnerships

Proposals for intelligence or defense partnerships with foreign countries regarding remote sensing

that would raise questions about US Government competition with the private sector or would change the

US Government use of funds generated pursuant to a US-foreign government partnership arrangement

shall be submitted for interagency review.

SOURCE: White House Press Office, March 10, 1994.
AATSR

ACR

ACRIM

ADEOS

AES

AID

AIRS

ALEXIS

ALT

AMS

AMSR

AMSU

AMTS

APT

ARA

ARGOS

ARM

ARPA

ASAR

ASCAT

ASF

Advanced Along-Track Scanning

Radiometer

Active Cavity Radiometer

Active Cavity Radiometer

Irradiance Monitor

Advanced Earth Observing Satellite

Atmospheric Environment Service

Agency for International

Development

Atmospheric Infrared Sounder

Array of Low Energy X-Ray

Imaging Sensors

Altimeter

American Meteorological Society

Advanced Microwave Scanning

Radiometer

Advanced Microwave Sounding

Unit

Advanced Moisture and

Temperature Sounder

Automatic Picture Transmission

Atmospheric Radiation Analysis

Argos Data Collection and Position

Location System

Atmospheric Radiation Monitor

Advanced Research Projects

Agency

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar

Advanced Scatterometer

Alaska SAR Facility

Abbreviation

ASTER

ATLAS

ATN

ATMOS

AVHRR

AVIRIS

AVNIR

CCD

CCDS

CCRS

CEES

CENR

CEOS

CERES

CES

CFC

CGC

s G

Advanced Spaceborne Thermal

Emission and Reflection

Radiometer

Atmospheric Laboratory for

Applications and Science

Advanced TIROS-N

Atmospheric Trace Molecules

Observed by Spectroscopy

Advanced Very High Resolution

Radiometer

Airborne Visible Infrared Imaging

Spectrometer

Advanced Visible and Near-Infrared

Radiometer

Charged Coupled Device

Centers for Commercial

Development of Space

Canada Centre for Remote Sensing

Committee on Earth and

Environmental Science

Committee on Environment and

Natural Resource Research

Committee on Earth Observations

Satellites

Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy

System

Committee on Earth Studies

Chlorofluorocarbon

Committee on Global Change

I 155
156 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

CGMS

CIESIN

CLAES

CNES

CNRS

COSPAR

CPP

CSA

CZCS

DAAC

DARA

DB

DCS

DDL

DMA

DMSP

DOC

DOD

DOE

DOI

DORIS

DOS

DPT

DRSS

EC

EDC

EDOS

EDRTS

ELGA

ENSO

EOC

EO-IC-WG

EOS

EOS-AERO

EOS-ALT

EOS-AM

Coordination of Geostationary

Meteorological Satellites

Consortium for International Earth

Science Information Network

Cryogenic Limb Array Etalon

Spectrometer

Centre National d’Études Spatiales

Centre National de la Recherche

Scientifique

Congress for Space Research

Cloud Photopolarimeter

Canadian Space Agency

Coastal Zone Color Scanner

Distributed Active Archive Center

Deutsche Agentur fur

Raumfahrt-Angelegenheiten

Direct Broadcast

Data Collection System

Direct Downlink

Defense Mapping Agency

Defense Meteorological Satellite

Program

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of the Interior

Doppler Orbitography and

Radiopositioning Integrated by

Satellite

Department of State

Direct Playback Transmission

Data Relay Satellite System

European Community

EROS Data Center

EOS Data and Operations System

Experimental Data Relay and

Tracking Satellite

Emergency Locust Grasshopper

Assistance

El Niño/Southern Oscillation

EOS Operations Center

Earth Observation International

Coordination Working Group

Earth Observing System

EOSAerosal Mission

EOS Altimetry Mission

EOS Morning Crossing (Ascending)

Mission

EOSAT

EOS-CHEM

EOSDIS

EOSP

EOS-PM

EPA

ERBE

ERBS

EROS

ERS

ERTS-1

ESA

ESDIS

ESOC

ESRIN

ETS-VI

Eumestat

FAA

FAO

FCCSET

FEMA

FEWS

FOV

FST

FY

GCDIS

GCOS

GDP

GDPS

Geosat

GEWEX

GFO

GGI

GIS

Earth Observation Satellite

company

EOS Chemistry Mission

EOS Data and Information System

Earth Observing Scanning

Polarimeter

EOS Afternoon Crossing

(Descending) Mission

Environmental Protection Agency

Earth Radiation Budget Experiment

Earth Radiation Budget Satellite

Earth Resources Observation

System

European Remote-Sensing Satellite

Earth Resources Technology

Satellite- 1

European Space Agency

Earth Science Data and Information

System

European Space Operations Center

European Scientific Research

Institute

Engineering Test Satellite-VI

European Organisation for the

Exploitation of Meteorological

Satellites

Federal Aviation Administration

Food and Agriculture Organization

Federal Coordinating Council for

Science, Engineering, and

Technology

Federal Emergency Management

Agency

Famine Early Warning System

Field-of-View

Field Support Terminal

Feng Yun

Global Change Data and

Information System

Global Climate Observing System

gross domestic product

Global Data-Processing System

Navy Geodetic Satellite

Global Energy and Water Cycle

Experiment

Geosat Follow-On

GPS Geoscience Instrument

geographic information system(s)
Appendix G Abbreviations 1157

GLAS

GLI

GLRS

GMS

GOES

GOMI

GOMOS

GOMR

GOMS

GOOS

GOS

GPS

GTS

HIRDLS

HIRIS

HIRS

HIS

HRMSI

HRPT

HSST

HRV

HYDICE

IAF

IASI

IEOS

IELV

ICSU

IGBP

Geoscience Laser Altimeter System

Global Imager

Geoscience Laser Ranging System

Geostationary Meteorological

Satellite

Geostationary Operational

Environmental Satellite

Global Ozone Monitoring

Instrument

Global Ozone Monitoring by

Occultation of Stars

Global Ozone Monitoring

Radiometer

Geostationary Operational

Meteorological Satellite

Global Ocean Observing System

Global Observing System

Global Positioning System

Global Telecommunications System

High-Resolution Dynamics Limb

Sounder

High-Resolution Imaging

Spectrometer

High-Resolution Infrared Sounder

High-Resolution Interferometer

Sounder

High-Resolution Multispectral

Stereo Imager

High-Resolution Picture

Transmission

House Committee on Science,

Space, and Technology

High-Resolution Visible

Hyperspectral Digital Imagery

Collection Experiment

International Astronautical

Federation

Interferometric Atmospheric

Sounding Instrument

International Earth Observing

System

intermediate-class expendable

launch vehicle

International Council of Scientific

Unions

International Geosphere-Biosphere

Program

ILAS

INSAT

IMG

IOC

IPCC

IPO

IPOMS

IRS

IRTS

ISAMS

ISY

ITS

JOES

JERS

JPL

JPOP

LAGEOS

Landsat

Lidar

LIMS

LIS

LISS

LITE

LR

MELV

MERIS

MESSR

METOP

MHS

MIMR

Improved Limb Atmospheric

Spectrometer

Indian Satellite

Interferometric Monitor for

Greenhouse Gases

Intergovernmental Oceanographic

Commission

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change

Integrated Program Office

International Polar Operational

Meteorological Satellite

organization

Indian Remote Sensing Satellite

Infrared Temperature Sounder

Improved Stratospheric and

Mesospheric Sounder

International Space Year

Interferometric Temperature

Sounder

Japanese Earth Observing System

Japan’s Earth Resources Satellite

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Japanese Polar Orbiting Platform

Laser Geodynamics Satellite

Land Remote-Sensing Satellite

Light Detection and Ranging

Limb Infrared Monitor of the

Stratosphere

Lightning Imaging Sensor

Linear Imaging Self-scanning

Sensors

Lidar In-Space Technology

Experiment

Laser Retroreflector

medium-class expendable launch

vehicle

Medium-Resolution Imaging

Spectrometer

Multispectrum Electronic

Self-Scanning Radiometer

Meteorological Operational Satellite

Microwave Humidity Sounder

Multifrequency Imaging Microwave

Radiometer
158 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

MI PAS

MISR

MITI

MLS

MODIS

MOP

MOPITT

MOS

MSR

MSS

MSU

MTPE

MTS

NASA

NASDA

NESDIS

NEXRAD

NIST

NOAA

NOSS

NREN

NROSS

NRSA

NSCAT

NSPD

NSTC

OCTS

OLS

OMB

OPS

OSB

OSC

OSIP

Michelson Interferometer for

Passive Atmospheric Sounding

Multi-Angle Imaging

SpectroRadiometer

Ministry of International Trade and

Industry

Microwave Limb Sounder

Moderate-Resolution Imaging

Spectroradiometer

Meteosat Operational Programme

Measurements of Pollution in the

Troposphere

Marine Observation Satellite

Microwave Scanning Radiometer

Multispectral Scanner

Microwave Sounding Unit

Mission to Planet Earth

Microwave Temperature Sounder

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

National Space Development

Agency (Japan)

National Environmental Satellite,

Data and Information Service

Next-Generation Weather Radar

National Institute for Standards and

Technology

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

National Oceanic Satellite System

National Research and Education

Network

Navy Remote Ocean Sensing

Satellite

National Remote Sensing Agency

NASA Scatterometer

National Space Policy Directive

National Science and Technology

Council

Ocean Color and Temperature

Scanner

Operational Linescan System

Office of Management and Budget

Optical Sensors

Ocean Studies Board

Orbital Sciences Corporation

Operational Satellite Improvement

Program

POEM

POES

POLDER

RA

Radarsat

RESTEC

RF

RIS

SAFIRE

SAFISY

SAGE

SAMS

SAR

SARSAT

or S&R

SBUV

SCARAB

SCST

SeaWiFS

SEDAC

SEM

S-GCOS

SIR

SLR

SMMR

SMSIGOES

SNR

SOLSTICE

SPOT

SSM/I

SSTI

SSU

Polar-Orbit Earth Observation

Mission

Polar-orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite

Polarization and Directionality of

Earth’s Reflectance

Radar Altimeter

Radar Satellite

Remote Sensing Technology Center

Radio Frequency

Retroreflector in Space

Spectroscopy of the Atmosphere

using Far Infrared Emission

Space Agency Forum on ISY

Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas

Experiment

Stratospheric and Mesospheric

Sounder

synthetic aperture radar

Search and Rescue Satellite Aided

Tracking System

Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet

Radiometer

Scanner for the Radiation Budget

Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation

Sea-Viewing Wide Field Sensor

Socio Economic Data Archive

Center

Space Environment Monitor

Space-based Global Change

Observation System

Shuttle Imaging Radar

Satellite Laser Ranging

Scanning Multispectral Microwave

Radiometer

GOES synchronous meteorological

satellite

signal-to-noise ratio

Solar Stellar Irradiance Comparison

Experiment

Système pour I ’Observation de la

Terre

Special Sensor Microwave/Imager

Small Satellite Technology

Initiative

Stratospheric Sounding Unit
Appendix G Abbreviations I 159

STIKSCT

SWIR

TDRSS

TUSK

TIROS

TM

TOGA

TOMS

TOPEX

TOVS

TRMM

UARS

UAVS

UNEP

UNESCO

Stick Scatterometer

Short Wave Infrared

Tracing and Data Relay Satellite

System

Tethered Upper Stage Knob

Television Infrared Observing

Satellites

Thematic Mapper

Tropical Ocean Global Atmosphere

Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer

Ocean Topography Experiment

TIROS Operational Vertical

Sounder

Tropical Rainfall Measuring

Mission

Upper Atmosphere Research

Satellite

Unpiloted aerospace vehicles

United Nations Environment

Programme

United Nations Educational,

Scientific, and Cultural

Organization

USDA

USGCRP

USGS

VAS

VHRR

VISSR

VTIR

WCRP

WDC

WEU

WMO

WOCE

WWW

X-SAR

U.S. Department of Agriculture

U.S. Global Change Research

Program

U.S. Geological Survey

VISSR Atmospheric Sounder

Very High Resolution Radiometer

Visible and Infrared Spin Scan

Radiometer

Visible and Thermal infrared

Radiomete r

World Climate Research Program

World Data Center

Western European Union

The U.N. World Meteorological

Organization

World Ocean Circulation

Experimen t

World Weather Watch

X-band synthetic aperture radar
I ndex

A

ADEOS. See Advanced Earth Observing Satellite

Advanced Earth Observing Satellite, 122

The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 51

Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer, 26,

37-38,48,61,62,70

AVHRR. See Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer

B

Baker, D. James, 95

Bromley, D. Allan, 40

Bureau of Land Management, 42

c

CENR, See Committee on the Environment and

Natural Resources

CEOS. See Committee on Earth Observations Satellites

Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing Systems, 6

Climate monitoring. See also Weather forecasting

agency responsibilities, 39-40

Clinton Administration

convergence proposal, 22-26, 57-58, 65, 74-86,

122, 142-144

policy on remote sensing licensing and exports,

114, 115, 152-154

Commercial remote sensing. See Private sector

Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences

program. See U.S. Global Change Research Program

Committee on Earth Observations Satellites, 19,

119, 138, 140

Committee on the Environment and Natural Resources, 40, 54, 55

Crop monitoring, 41

CTA, Inc., 16-17

D

Data exchange

control of data, 1 I 3-114

existing agreements, 104

importance of, 106-107

options, 18, 35

policy issues, 102

reliance on foreign sources, 113-114

Data purchase -

by federal agencies, 56

international consortium, 126

options, 17, 34

Data sales by federal agencies, 56

Data users

major elements, 15

requirements process, 15-16

Data uses by federal agencies, 41-43

Defense Laboratories capabilities, 51

Defense Mapping Agency, 41

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

agency responsibilities, 39

convergence proposal, 13, 21-26, 57-58, 65,

74-86, 122, 142-144

description, 66-68

launch vehicle, 65

objectives and status, 6, 23, 34

ocean data, 42

requirements issues, 52, 83

satellites, 44, 49

summary, 49, 50

Department of Agriculture

data uses, 41-42

Foreign Agriculture Service, 41

National Agricultural Statistics Service, 41

Department of Commerce, 12

Department of Defense

convergence proposal, 13, 21-26, 57-58, 65,

74-86, 122, 142-144

1161
162 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

data requirements, 5,28,29

experimental work in the 1960s and 1970s, 10

global change data, 11

interagency collaboration, 14, 16

laboratories, 51

operational meteorological program, 66-68

satellites, 44-45, 49

satellites in storage, 25

Shared Processing Network, 44

Department of Energy

funding for U.S. Global Change Research Program, 39

Department of the Environment option, 29

Department of the Interior. See also Forest Service;

National Park Service; U.S. Geological Survey

data uses, 42

Department of Transportation, 41

Design characteristics of remote sensing satellite

systems, 37, 38

DMA. See Defense Mapping Agency

DMSP. See Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DOD. See Department of Defense

DOI. See Department of the Interior

E

Earth Observation International Coordination Working Group, 121

Earth Observing System

data and information system, 46

instruments and measurements, 72

international component, 12, 121

launch schedule, 6,45, 133

program design, 11,60,73,78-79

restructuring of program, 21, 28

Earth’s systems, 97-98

Education uses for remote sensing data, 43

Environmental satellite systems

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 5, 6

Environmental changes monitoring, 11, 28. See also

Global change research

Environmental Protection Agency, 42

Env ironrnental regulation

agency responsibilities, 42

EO-ICWG. See Earth Observation International

Coordination Working Group

EOS. See Earth Observing System

EOSAT, 6, 12,20,28,31

EPA, See Environmental Protection Agency

ERS- 1. See European Remote-Sensing Satellite-1

ESA. See European Space Agency

Eumetsat. See European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites

European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, 12, 17, 20, 26, 27, 65, 123,

124

European Remote-Sensing Satellite- 1

data experience, 35

image of Bay of Naples, 34

European Space Agency, 17,27,33-35,65, 123

Eyeglass International, Inc., 52,95

F

Famine Early Warning System, 43

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 43

Federal Geographic Data Committee, 41

Federal lands management

agency responsibilities, 42

FEMA. See Federal Emergency Management

Agency

FEWS. See Famine Early Warning System

Foreign programs. See International programs;

Internationalization of remote sensing programs

Forest Service, 42

G

Geodetic Satellite, 44,60

Geographic information systems, 15,40-41, 110

Geological observations

agency responsibilities, 42

Geosat. See Geodetic Satellite

Geosat Follow-On satellite, 45

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite

System, 11,44,45,46

GFO. See Geosat Follow-On satellite

GM. See Geographic information systems

CTlobal change research. See also Environmental

changes monitoring; U.S. Global Change Research Program

data, 11,60

funding, 28

international interest, 27

Global Positioning System, 42

GOES. See Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite System

GPS. See Global Positioning System

Ground systems for meteorological data, 44

H

HELIOS-1 surveillance satellite, 20

House Committee on Science, Space, and

Technology, 8
Index I 163

I

ICSU. See International Council of Scientific

Unions

Integrated Program Office

con~’ergence proposal and, 14, 22-25, 27

coordination responsibilities, 55

long-term options, 28,34

Intel sat. See International Telecommunications Satell ite Corporation

International competition

issues, 17, 20-21

risks, 110-111

Intemtitional cooperation

benefits, IO4-109

international issues, 17-20, 27, 32, 112-116

national security issues, 112-116

options. 116-128

risks, 109-1 I O

International coordinating organizations

options, 104-105, 125-127

International Council of Scientific Unions, 119

International development assistance, 43

International Oceanography Commission, 118

International programs

budget for 1993, 108

summary, 5, 12, 101-105, 131-141

International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation, 122-123

Internationalization of remote sensing programs,

12-14, 17-19

IOC. See International Oceanography Commission

IPO. See Integrated Program Office

J

Japan Earth Resources Satellite-1, 32,35

Japanese Advanced Earth Observing Satellite, 122

JERS. See Japan Earth Resources Satellite-1

L

LAGEOS. See Laser Geodynamics Satellite

Land remote sensing. See also Landsat system

crop monitoring, 41

data needs, 10,28

environmental regulation, 42

federal lands management, 42

~eo]og)” and mining, 42

histcmy, 86-89

international agency option, 126

Landsat future and, 89-93

mapping and planning, 40-41

natur[il resource management, 41

pri~[ite sector role, 93-95

private sector services, 42

sensor technologies. See Landsat system; Synthetic aperture radar

terrestrial monitoring, 41

Land surface monitoring. See Land remote sensing

Landsat system

agency responsibilities, 51

data uses, 41,56

future, 30-31,89-93

history, 6, 16,28,30,86-89

image of Miami, 30

Landsat 6,89

Landsat 7,90

options for reducing costs, 31-32

policy, 145-147

receiving stations, 87

remote sensing strategy, 148-151

sensors, 88

technologies, 60

vulnerabilities, 30

Laser Geodynamics Satellite, 42

Licensing issues, 114-115

M

Mapping

agency responsibilities, 40-41

Center for Mapping, 51

systems, 27, 31, 46

Marine Observation Satellite-2, 32,35

Meteor series satellites, 27

METOP platform, 12,26,27,65,76-77, 122, 135

Microwave sensor applications, 67

Mining

agency responsibilities, 42

Mission to Planet Earth

description, 45-46, 129-130

funding issues, 11-12, 17, 19

objective and status, 6

requirements issues, 52

Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer,

26

MODIS. See Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer

MOS-2. See Marine Observation Satellite-2

MPTE. See Mission to Planet Earth

Multispectral systems, 20,31-32

NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration

N

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

budgetary considerations, 11

collaboration, 10, 14, 19, 29, 34

data purchase agreement, 17

development as an independent agency, 13
164 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

EOS program, 6, 11-12,21,25,28,57

experimental work in the 1960s and 1970s, 10

Mission to Planet Earth program, 5,6, 11-12, 17,

45-46,52, 129-130

OSIP program, 25

research and development mission, 45-46

Smallsat Program, 16-17

National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service

responsibilities, 44

systems. See Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite System; Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

National Institute of Standards and Technology, 12

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

convergence proposal for POES, 57-58, 65,

74-86, 122, 142-144

environment satellite systems, 5,6

experimental work in the 1960s and 1970s, 10

funding for satellite programs, 12

funding issues, 61,81-83

global change data, 11

GOES-1 image of Earth, 11

ground systems, 44

Integrated Program Office, 22,29

interagency collaboration, 14

international programs, 12

National Climatic Data Center, 44

National Geophysical Data Center, 44

National Oceanographic Data Center, 44

NESDIS, 44

operational programs, 25, 85

partnership with NASA, 10

remote sensing responsibilities, 42, 44

requirements issues, 52, 83

satellites. See Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

satellites in storage, 25

Shared Processing Network, 44

systems. See Advanced Very High Resolution

Radiometer

National Park Service

data uses, 42

National Performance Review

recommendations, 22

National Science and Technology Council, 40

National Science Foundation, 39

National security issues in international cooperation

convergence, 112-113

data control, 113-114

diffusion of technological capabilities, 114-115

export controls, 115-116

licensing commercial data sales, 114

licensing satellite sales, 115

reexamination, 13, 20, 26

role of partners, 76-77

National Spatial Data Infrastructure, 41

National uses of remote sensing

current national and international programs,

131-141

geology and mining, 41-42

global change research, 39

summary, 38

terrestrial monitoring, 41-42

weather and climate, 39-40

National Weather Service, 6

Natural resource management

agency responsibilities, 41-42

international needs, 103-104

NESDIS. See National Environmental Satellite,

Data, and Information Service

NEXRAD, 12

NIMBUS system, 45,74

NIST. See National Institute of Standards and

Technology

NOAA. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

0

Ocean remote sensing

cost considerations, 35

international agency issues, 126

Japanese interest, 19,27

long-term needs, 10,35,59-60

national data needs, 32, 42

ocean and ice data, 33

operational monitoring, 33-35, 42, 95-100

summary, 32

office of Management and Budget, 24,52,58,61

office of Science and Technology

program. See U.S. Global Change Research Program

office of Technology Assessment, 58

OMB. See Office of Management and Budget

operational Satellite Improvement Program, 25

operational satellite systems, 25-26,84,85

optical imagers, 25-27

orbital Sciences Corporation, 17,34-35,51,56,95

OSC. See Orbital Sciences Corporation

OSIP. See Operational Satellite Improvement Program

OTA publications on satellite remote sensing, 9

Ozone monitoring systems. See Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometers
Index I 165

P

POES. See Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite

System. See also Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer

agency responsibilities, 44

convergence proposal, 12, 14, 21, 23, 57-58,65,

74-86, 122, 142-144

description, 40,44,47,48,63-66

image of Hurricane Hugo, 65

launch schedule, 66

program comparison, 68-71

requirements issues, 37-38, 83

sensors, 79

technology improvements plan, 62

Polar-orbiting systems

cooperative agreements, 12, 26

international interest, 27

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, 110,

142-144

Private sector

capabilities, 41, 51-52

collaborative options, 31-32

competitiveness, 20-21

firms, 95

licensing commercial data sales, 114

licensing satellite sales, 115

potential of SAR data, 111

role, 93-95

value-added industry, 15-16, 42

Public interest groups

data uses, 43

Public safety, 43

R

Radarsat, 19,32, 35

Requirements issues, 52-54,83

Research and education uses of remote sensing, 43

Research systems

transfer to operational systems, 25-26

Resurs land remote sensing program, 31, 132

Russia

CEOS member, 140

cooperation with, 13, 19-20, 127-128

programs, 17, 19-20,27,31,32, 132

SPOT image of nuclear testing facility, 96

s

SAR. See Synthetic aperture radar

Satellite remote sensing

definition, 7

Scatterometers, 33,99

Seasat system, 45

SeaStar satellite, 17,34-35

Sea-Viewing Wide Field Sensor, 17,56

SeaWiFS. See Sea-Viewing Wide Field Sensor

Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Veterans

Affairs, 8

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, 8

Sensor and spacecraft convergence, 25

Sensors

ocean and ice data, 33

standardization issue, 25, 26, 27

The Shuttle program, 11

SIR-C synthetic aperture radar, 35

Smallsat Program, 16-17

Software suppliers, 15

Space Imaging, Inc., 95

The Space Station, 11

Space systems

cost-effectiveness pressures, 11-12

SPOT land remote sensing program, 12,31,32,41,

96

Stennis Space Center, 46

Strategic plan

contingency plan requirements, 27

development of new technologies, 60-62

elements, 58-59

funding issues, 61,81-83

goals, 7

limitations, 21-22

long-term operational data needs, 10

long-term options for a converged satellite system, 28, 29

national data needs, 14, 59-60

need for, 10-13

purpose of report, 8

standardization issue, 27

structural elements, 13-21

summary of elements, 8, 10

Sun-synchronous orbits, 64

Synchronizing programs, 25

Synthetic aperture radar, 13, 19,20,35

potential, 111

uses, 39,96-100

SystLme pour l’Observation de la Terre, 41

T

Thematic Mapper, 31

TIROS system, 45,63

TM. See Thematic Mapper

TOMS. See Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometers

TOPEX/Poseidon satellite, 99

Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometers, 27,46

TRW, Inc.

Smallsat Program, 16
166 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

u

U.S. Agency for International Development, 43

U.S. Air Force

satellite systems, 44. See also Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 41,42,43

U.S. Geological Survey, 28,41

U.S. Global Change Research Program

coordination, 14, 21-22, 54, 55, 61

establishment, 39

funding, 39

history, 11

mission, 39, 53

summary, 40

US. Navy

remote sensing responsibilities, 42

satellite systems, 44. See also Geodetic Satellite;

Geosat Follow-On satellite

U.S. Weather Bureau, 63

USAID. See U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA. See Department of Agriculture

USGCRP. See U.S. Global Change Research Program

USGS. See U.S. Geological Survey

Utility of satellite remote sensing, 9

v

Value-added companies. See Private sector

Value-added sector, 15

Vegetation monitoring, 41,43,62

w

Weather forecasting

agency responsibilities, 39-40, 73-75

data needs, 10, 19

DMSP program, 66-69

international applications, 103

international cooperation on weather satellites,

27,28

issues and options for convergence, 75-76, 77-86

NASA program, 71-73

national security considerations, 76-77

POES program, 63-66

Weather monitoring systems. See Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

WMO. See World Meteorological Organization

World Data Centres, 118-119

World Meteorological Organization, 19, 117

World Weather Watch, 116-118, 127

WorldView Imaging Corporation, 16,95

WWW. See World Weather Watch

x

X-band data transmitters