United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 1996 AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT

Consolidating Fighter

Squadrons Could

Reduce Costs

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-82

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271047 

May 6, 1996

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

In 1992, the Air Force decided to reconfigure its fighter force into smaller

squadrons. This decision occurred at a time when the Secretary of Defense

was attempting to reduce defense operating and infrastructure costs. We

evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the Air Force operating its fighter

forces in smaller squadron sizes and the implications this might have on

the Secretary of Defense’s efforts to reduce defense infrastructure costs.

We focused on the C and D models of the Air Force’s active component

F-15s and F-16s. Because of your interest in this subject, we are addressing

this report to you.

Background To achieve directed force structure reductions, the Air Force has been

reducing the number of F-15 and F-16 aircraft in its inventory. Between

fiscal years 1991 and 1997, the Air Force plans to reduce its F-15 aircraft

from 342 to 252. Over this same period, the Air Force plans to reduce its

F-16 aircraft from 570 to 444. In 1991, F-15 and F-16 aircraft were

configured in 42 squadrons. By fiscal year 1997, these aircraft will be

configured in 37 squadrons.

Until 1992, the Air Force predominantly organized its active fighter aircraft

in wings of three squadrons, with 24 combat aircraft in each squadron.

However, in 1992, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the squadrons

be reduced to 18 aircraft. By 1997, most fighter squadrons will have been

reduced to this smaller size, leaving only 54 aircraft in most wings.

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The Secretary of Defense has encouraged the services to consolidate

forces wherever possible to reduce infrastructure and operating costs.1

However, the Air Force acknowledged in 1995 that while the force

structure has been reduced by 30 percent, the supporting infrastructure

has been reduced by only about 15 percent.

Results in Brief The organizational structure of the Air Force’s fighter force is not

cost-effective. By operating F-15s and F-16s in smaller squadrons, the Air

Force increases the number of squadrons above the number that would

have been used in the traditional 24-aircraft configuration. The result is

increased operating costs and slowed progress in reducing infrastructure

costs. Although the Air Force considers smaller fighter squadrons

beneficial, it has not undertaken any studies to justify its decision. The Air

Force’s arguments for using smaller squadrons do not justify the additional

costs.

We evaluated a range of options for consolidating squadrons that could

reduce operating costs by as much as $115 million annually or by more

than $745 million over the Defense planning period of fiscal years

1997-2002. In addition, consolidating squadrons could result in base

closures, reducing infrastructure costs by about $50 million yearly per

base closing.

Benefits of Smaller

Fighter Squadrons Not

Compelling

The Air Force cited increased deployment flexibility and reduced span of

control as the primary benefits for having smaller fighter squadrons.

However, the Air Force has not demonstrated that these benefits are

compelling. Moreover, the Air Force has neither documented instances of

problems with deployment flexibility and span of control nor conducted

studies that support its decision to use smaller squadrons.

Deployment Flexibility

Exists Without Reducing

the Size of Squadrons

Air Force officials said that the primary benefit of using smaller-sized

squadrons is increased operational deployment flexibility. With fewer

fighters in the Air Force inventory, reducing squadrons to 18 aircraft

increases the number of squadrons above the number there would have

been had the aircraft been organized in traditional squadrons of 24

aircraft. Air Force officials stated that these additional squadrons are

1

“Operating costs” refer to elements contained in the operation and maintenance, military personnel,

and other procurement categories of Defense appropriations for example, wing and squadron

personnel costs. “Infrastructure costs” are for Defense activities such as, intelligence, strategic

defense, and applied research and development for example, base police and hospital costs.

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needed to respond to conflicts that reflect the new security environment.

This new security environment is characterized by multiple contingency

operations and the possibility of two nearly simultaneous military regional

conflicts.

On the basis of our analysis of Air Force fighter assistance in recent

contingency operations, it appears that the Air Force would have

considerable deployment flexibility even if the aircraft remained in the

former 24-aircraft configuration. We examined the three contingency

operations that were ongoing during June 1995 that required Air Force

F-15 and F-16 assistance. For two operations, the Commander in Chief

(CINC) for each theater operation required less than one squadron’s aircraft

for each operation. For these operations, the Air Force rotated 18

squadrons of F-15s and F-16s (7 active and 11 reserve) to provide year-long

coverage to support these contingency operations. We were told that for

the third operation, the CINC’s requirement, which equated to one

18-aircraft squadron each of F-15s and F-16s, was met by rotating 6 F-15

and 6 F-16 continental United States (CONUS) based 18-aircraft fighter

squadrons. We were advised that this number of squadrons was used

because Air Combat Command (ACC) desired, for quality-of-life reasons, to

maintain an 18-month interval between rotations for each squadron’s 3- to

4-month deployment overseas. However, using ACC’s stated goal of 

8 to 9 months between overseas deployments, the CINC’s requirements for

this latter operation could have been met with only three to four fighter

squadrons. If the Air Force deployed squadrons in accordance with ACC’s

stated goal, a larger number of squadrons would not be needed,

particularly since reserve squadrons are available to augment the active

force.2

We also question whether DOD’s current military strategy requires the

larger number of squadrons afforded by the 18-aircraft squadron design.

The Bottom-Up Review specified that 10 fighter wing equivalents

(72 aircraft each) would be needed for each of two anticipated major

regional conflicts. The term “fighter wing equivalent,” however,

underscores that fighter requirements are not stated in terms of squadrons

but rather in terms of the number of aircraft.

The Secretary of Defense’s fiscal year 1996-2001 Defense Planning

Guidance states Air Force requirements in terms of total aircraft, not

squadrons. Further, Air Force officials at ACC and the 9th Air Force

2

According to Air Force officials, because reserve component squadrons rotate for shorter durations,

about three reserve squadrons are used for a 3-to-4 month deployment while only one active squadron

is needed for the same period.

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headquarters (the U.S. Central Command’s air staff) said that requirements

for CINC missions are computed by the number of aircraft needed to

successfully execute the mission, not by the number of squadrons.

Moreover, officials at the 9th Air Force headquarters stated that the

primary use of squadron organizations in a regional conflict operation is to

manage the daily flight shifts and that squadron structures become almost

invisible because all aircraft are controlled by the theater’s air component

commander. Thus, from the CINC’s perspective, the number of squadrons in

which aircraft are organized is largely immaterial.

Span of Control Has Not

Been an Issue

Air Force officials told us that another benefit of smaller squadrons was

“span of control”—the ability to manage personnel and the collective tasks

for which they are responsible. Until recently, flight line maintenance and

associated personnel were controlled by the wing. When this function was

shifted to the squadron in 1991-92, a typical 24-aircraft squadron would

have increased from about 85 to over 300 people.3

 This fourfold growth,

according to Air Force officials, would have weakened the commander’s

ability to effectively manage people and missions. These officials believed

that the reduced number of squadron aircraft helps to offset this effect

because a smaller squadron reduces the number of squadron personnel.

However, we found that reducing the squadron to 18 aircraft only reduced

personnel by about 10 percent (about 30 people).

The Air Force’s standard for span of control for maintenance squadrons

commanders is 700 people, about twice the number of personnel being

supervised by flight squadron commanders. Although span of control may

have been a perceived problem early in the Air Force’s wing

reorganization, ACC officials are not aware of any instance where it has

been raised as an issue. Discussions with a number of wing and squadron

officials also indicated that the squadron commander’s span of control had

not increased enough to be a problem.

Decision to Reduce

Squadrons Was Not Based

on Analysis

The Air Force’s reduction in squadron size was neither evaluated in a

systematic manner, nor supported by documented studies. For example,

no assessment of benefits versus drawbacks of the appropriate squadron

size was conducted, and there were no studies to support scenarios where

more squadrons would be needed. Some Air Force officials said that the

basic rationale for moving to smaller squadrons was to minimize the

3

The decentralization of flight line aircraft maintenance from the wing to the squadron was part of an

Air Force reorganization called “Objective Wing.” This change gave the squadron commander

responsibility for managing some maintenance assets for the first time.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
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reduction in wing and squadron commands as the number of aircraft in the

force declined. We were told that the Air Force considered it inappropriate

to identify command reductions during a period when the base

realignment and closure (BRAC) process was ongoing because it would

constitute an action that would prevent the BRAC process from proceeding

as designed. According to Air Force officials, identifying changes that

significantly reduce base facilities was against Air Force policy and the

laws governing the BRAC proceedings. Although it is true that Department

of Defense (DOD) entities were constrained from reducing force structure

and closing bases beyond specified limits outside the BRAC process, the Air

Force was not precluded from making recommendations on these matters

during the BRAC process. In our view, such identifications would have

facilitated the development of recommendations for base closures.

Consolidating Fighter

Squadrons Could

Reduce Costs

Organizing the fighter force into 24-aircraft squadrons reduces the total

number of squadrons and results in more economical operations than

squadrons of 18 aircraft. For example, annual operating costs for 72 F-15s

are about $12 million less if they are organized into squadrons of

24 aircraft instead of squadrons of 18.

We calculated the savings from staffing standards and cost estimates

provided by Air Force officials, using an Air Force’s cost estimation model

(a more detailed description of our methodology is in app. III). The annual

savings are primarily due to reduced military personnel requirements, in

such areas as command, staff, administrative, and maintenance. The salary

costs associated with reduced military personnel requirements account for

about 70 percent of the total savings, of which over 90 percent is enlisted

pay. Also, larger squadrons allow maintenance specialty shops to be used

more efficiently, requiring little or no change in staffing. Other savings

occur due to reduced training, medical services, supplies, and base

operating support.

Feasible Alternatives

Exist for Increasing

Squadron Size

The Air Force could modify its current configuration of fighter aircraft in a

more cost-effective manner to increase the number of squadrons with 

24 aircraft. This modification would entail consolidating some existing

F-15 and F-16 squadrons with other squadrons to better maximize base

utilization. Our four illustrative options (which are presented in detail in

app. I) would have annual savings ranging from $25 million to $115 million

annually.

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Squadron Size Could Be

Expanded Without Major

Investments

ACC officials we contacted stated that bases that previously had 24 aircraft

per squadron and 72 aircraft per wing should be able to return to that

level. Our review of Air Force base closure capacity analysis data

indicated that most fighter wings on CONUS bases could increase squadron

size to previous levels with little or no additional cost. For example, a

capacity analysis prepared by Moody Air Force Base (AFB) officials stated

that Moody will retain the capacity to support 2 additional fighter

squadrons and increase 2 of its 18 sized F-16 fighter squadrons to 24

aircraft.

Similarly, wing personnel at Shaw AFB and Langley AFB indicated that their

installations could absorb 6 more aircraft per squadron or 18 per wing

with no additional costs. These officials stated that because their bases

previously had 24 aircraft per squadron and facilities were sized for 

24 aircraft, returning to 24 would be little to no problem. Moreover,

maintenance personnel stated that much of the support equipment could

handle six additional aircraft with little additional investment. Deployment

personnel at the 20th fighter wing at Shaw AFB stated that the supporting

equipment for 24 aircraft would take the same number of transport planes

to move as a squadron of 18 aircraft.

Factors to Be Considered

When Consolidating

Air Force officials at different levels of command cited several factors that

should be considered when consolidating aircraft into fewer squadrons

and wings. These factors include keeping aircraft with the same state of

modernization and mission characteristics together. In addition, they

stated that aircraft engines should be compatible at least in the squadron

and preferably throughout the wing. Other factors officials said should be

considered include the availability of training areas, impact on the

CONUS/overseas mix, and the capacity of the receiving base to accept the

additional aircraft and related personnel and equipment.

Air Force officials noted that different modernization upgrades and

specialized mission equipment can make the F-16 aircraft very different.

For instance, newer F-16s have improved avionics that require different

logistical support than earlier versions of the F-16. In addition, some

aircraft have specialized equipment, such as the equipment needed to

perform the night ground attack mission. Air Force officials stated that

specialized training is required for pilots to perform this mission and

believe mixing aircraft that have this capability with aircraft that do not

will reduce unit readiness.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
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Air Force officials also stated that having either F-15 and F-16 aircraft with

different engines in the same wing complicates maintenance. For instance,

different engines either from the same or different manufacturer can

generate unique maintenance requirements. Because different support

equipment and maintenance skills may be needed for various engines,

maintaining different types of engines at the same wing can strain

maintenance resources and ultimately reduce the availability of

deployable aircraft.

Additionally, Air Force officials said that any restructuring that affects

aircraft outside the United States must consider agreements with foreign

governments that govern the number of aircraft based in these countries.

In general, the number of aircraft should not change materially.

Alternatives Exist for

Reorganizing Fighter Force

Considering the factors that Air Force officials believe are most important

when consolidating forces we developed four alternatives for reorganizing

the F-15 and F-16 fighter force. Our alternatives generally did not

commingle aircraft with different type engines and modernization and

mission characteristics. We also kept relatively constant the U.S./overseas

basing mix and the number of aircraft in each theater, and we varied the

number of aircraft in the Air Force’s composite wings. These options

ranged from restructuring only fighter aircraft in the United States to

restructuring all F-15s and F-16s worldwide.

The “CONUS Only” alternative we developed is projected to save the Air

Force about $25 million annually in operating costs. This would be

achieved by increasing 6 existing fighter squadrons to 24 aircraft and

eliminating 2 squadrons. The alternative of consolidating fighter squadrons

worldwide would consolidate the F-15 and F-16 aircraft into 7 fewer

squadrons than the Air Force currently plans and increase 17 squadrons to

24 aircraft and 2 squadrons to 30 aircraft. This alternative could save the

Air Force a projected $115 million annually. Our other two alternatives

would fall between these savings.

Consolidating aircraft at fewer bases would also help the Air Force

identify excess base infrastructure and candidate bases for closure. For

example, three of the four alternatives would eliminate all fighter aircraft

from at least one base, suggesting the potential of a base closure. If a base

closure could be executed with savings similar to what DOD estimated for

similar bases during the 1995 BRAC process, annual savings would average

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about $15 million for the first 6 years and about $50 million in each

ensuing year.4

Air Force officials at headquarters and ACC expressed concerns about the

implementation of our alternatives without the support of DOD and

Congress. They stated that efforts in the past to move aircraft from a base

without an equal substitution for the losing base have not been achievable.

In their opinion, if the Air Force leadership decided to implement options

to increase squadron and wing size back to 24 and 72, respectively, the Air

Force would need the support of both DOD and Congress.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in his efforts to reduce the

DOD’s infrastructure costs, require the Secretary of the Air Force to

develop an implementation plan to operate the Air Force’s fighter force in

larger, more cost-effective squadrons. If the Secretary of Defense believes

that the plan could reduce costs, he should seek congressional support for

it.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation. DOD’s comments

are reproduced in appendix II. A detailed explanation of our scope and

methodology appears in appendix III.

We conducted this review from February 1995 to February 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and Air

Force and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies

available to others upon request.

4

Savings represent DOD’s estimate for fighter bases screened for closure but not recommended by

DOD during the 1995 BRAC process. See Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Process and

Recommendations for Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr.14, 1995).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
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Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

about this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix

IV.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security Analysis

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Consolidation

Alternatives

12

Alternative One 12

Alternative Two 13

Alternative Three 14

Alternative Four 15

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

17

Appendix III 

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

19

Estimating Cost Implications 19

Developing Alternatives 20

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

22

Tables Table I.1: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With

Alternative One

13

Table I.2: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With Basing

Alternative Two

14

Table I.3: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With

Alternative Three

15

Table I.4: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With

Alternative Four

16

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Contents

Abbreviations

ACC Air Combat Command

AFB Air Force Base

BRAC base realignment and closure

CINC Commander in Chief

CONUS continental United States

DOD Department of Defense

LCOM Logistics Composite Model

SABLE Systematic Approach to Better Long Range Estimating

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Consolidation Alternatives

We developed and refined four alternatives that demonstrate that the Air

Force could organize its fighter aircraft more cost-effectively.

Underpinning our analysis were principles that the Air Force cited as

important. These factors included keeping the continental United States

(CONUS)/overseas basing mix relatively constant; avoiding mixing aircraft

with different modernization upgrades (blocks), mission characteristics,

and engines; balancing capability throughout theaters; and assessing

receiving base capacity. While these principles are plausible, our options

vary the extent that these principles were used to gain greater economies.

Moreover, the Air Force has not rigidly adhered to these principles. For

example, different engines are contained in the F-15 wing at Eglin Air

Force Base. The Air Force also plans to mix F-16s with different blocks.

The following tables compare the Air Forces’s planned fiscal year 1997

mix of 18- and 24-aircraft squadrons at each base with the mix of

squadrons that would be achieved with each of our four alternatives.1

Preceding each table, we described the specific factors we considered in

developing each alternative.

Alternative One This alternative consolidates squadrons that are located in CONUS only.

Under this alternative, fighter aircraft would remain at the same number of

bases as the Air Force currently plans. The number of aircraft of one

composite wing would be changed. Bases would be restricted to having

the same aircraft that were in the Air Force’s plan. This alternative would

result in annual operating costs savings of $25 million. Table I.1 compares

the Air Force’s planned basing with alternative one.

1

Our analysis was based on the Air Force’s fiscal year 1997 planned structure as of September 1995.

Subsequent to completion of our analysis, the Air Force revised its 1997 basing plan. This change

would not affect the feasibility of our alternatives or the magnitude of our cost savings.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Consolidation Alternatives

Table I.1: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With Alternative One

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

Air Force plan for fiscal year 1997 Alternative one

Change in number

of squadrons

Comparison of total

F-15s and F-16s at

each base

Base F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16

Air

Force

plan

Alternative

one

1 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 –1 54 36

2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 60 72

3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 –1 36 24

4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 36 36

5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 18

6 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 60 78

7 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 54 72

8 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 –1 0 54 36

Total 7 11 0 2 3 7 3 5 –1 –1 372 372

Alternative Two This alternative consolidates squadrons and uses one fewer base than

currently planned by the Air Force. In order to execute this alternative,

fewer than one squadron from CONUS would have to be shifted outside of

CONUS. Two different aircraft blocks would be mixed, which is comparable

to the Air Force’s plan. The number of aircraft at two composite wings

would be changed. Also, aircraft other than F-15s and F-16s would have to

be relocated to fully execute this alternative. This alternative would result

in annual operating costs savings of $59 million. Table I.2 compares the Air

Force’s planned basing with alternative two.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Consolidation Alternatives

Table I.2: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With Basing Alternative Two

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

Air Force plan for fiscal year 1997 Alternative two

Change in number

of squadrons

Comparison of total

F-15s and F-16s at

each base

Base F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16

Air

Force

plan

Alternative

two

1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –3 54 0

2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 60 72

3 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 36 42

4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 36 36

5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –1 18 0

6 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 +2 60 108

7 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 54 72

8 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 –1 0 54 36

Subtotal 7 11 0 2 3 4 3 7 –1 –2 372 366

9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 18

10 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 36 36

11 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 36 42

12 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 –1 0 54 48

13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 24 24

14 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 48 48

15 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 24

16 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 54 54

17 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 36 36

Subtotal 7 7 0 3 3 6 3 4 –1 0 324 330

Total 14 18 0 5 6 10 6 11 –2 –2 696 696

Note: U.S. bases are 1-8; non-U.S. bases are 9-17.

Alternative Three This alternative consolidates fighters at one fewer base than currently

planned by the Air Force. The number of aircraft in three composite wings

would be changed. One squadron at base 4 would have 30 aircraft. One

squadron substitution between the Air Force’s active and reserve

components would be necessary. Some aircraft would be exchanged

between theaters. Two different aircraft blocks were mixed at one wing,

which is comparable to the Air Force’s plan. This alternative would result

in annual operating costs savings of $101 million. Table I.3 compares the

Air Force’s planned basing with alternative three.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Consolidation Alternatives

Table I.3: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With Alternative Three

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

Air Force plan for fiscal year 1997 Alternative three

Change in number

of squadrons

Comparison of total

F-15s and F-16s at

each base

Base F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16

Air

Force

plan

Alternative

three

1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –3 54 0

2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 60 72

3 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 36 42

4 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 36 54

5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 24

6 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 60 66

7 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 54 72

8 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 –1 0 54 48

Subtotal 7 11 0 2 0 2 6 8 –1 –3 372 378

9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 18

10 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 36 36

11 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 36 48

12 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 –1 0 54 48

13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 24 24

14 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 48 48

15 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 24

16 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 –1 0 54 36

17 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 36 36

Subtotal 7 7 0 3 2 5 3 5 –2 0 324 318

Total 14 18 0 5 2 7 9 13 –3 –3 696 696

Note: U.S. bases are 1-8; non-U.S. bases are 9-17.

Alternative Four This alternative consolidates fighters at one fewer base than currently

planned by the Air Force. The number of aircraft at two composite wings

would be changed. One squadron at base 4 and one squadron at base 6

would have 30 aircraft each. One squadron substitution would be required

between the Air Force’s active and reserve components. Also aircraft

would be exchanged between theaters. Two different aircraft blocks were

mixed at one wing, which is comparable to the Air Force’s plan. This

alternative would result in annual costs savings of $115 million. Table I.4

compares the Air Force’s planned basing with alternative four.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Consolidation Alternatives

Table I.4: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned Basing With Alternative Four

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

18-aircraft

squadrons

24-aircraft

squadrons

Air Force plan for fiscal year 1997 Alternative four

Change in number

of squadrons

Comparison of total

F-15s and F-16s at

each base

Base F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16 F-15 F-16

Air

Force

plan

Alternative

four

1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –3 54 0

2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 60 72

3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 –1 36 24

4 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 36 54

5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 18

6 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 60 78

7 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 54 72

8 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 –1 0 54 48

Subtotal 7 11 0 2 0 1 6 8 –1 –4 372 366

9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 18

10 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 36 42

11 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 36 48

12 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 –1 0 54 48

13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 24 24

14 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 48 48

15 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 18 18

16 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 –1 0 54 48

17 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 36 36

Subtotal 7 7 0 3 2 3 3 7 –2 0 324 330

Total 14 18 0 5 2 4 9 15 –3 –4 696 696

Note: U.S. bases are 1-8; non-U.S. bases are 9-17.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 8.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix III 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of this review was to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of

operating the fighter forces in smaller squadron sizes and the implications

this might have on the Secretary of Defense’s efforts to reduce defense

infrastructure. Our review focused on the Air Force’s active component

fighter aircraft with a primary focus on the C and D model of F-15s and

F-16s.

To evaluate the benefits resulting from reduced squadron sizes, we

interviewed officials in various Air Force Headquarters offices such as the

Force Programming Division; the Combat Forces Division of the

Directorate of Forces; the Combat Forces of the Directorate of Programs

and Evaluation; and the Air Operations Group. We also interviewed Air

Combat Command (ACC) officials, including officials from various staff

functions, the 33rd Fighter Wing, 1st Fighter Wing, and the 20th Fighter

Wing. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Central

Command Air Forces Headquarters. We examined a variety of Air Force

documents, including peace-keeping and Gulf War deployment records,

staffing requirements and historical levels, and various studies and

analyses. We also reviewed the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Planning

Guidance and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Air Force’s War

Implementation and Mobilization Plan.

Estimating Cost

Implications

To calculate the cost implications of operating smaller squadrons, we

obtained estimated annual operating costs for F-15 and F-16 fighters from

Air Force headquarters cost-modeling officials. Separate estimates were

provided for squadrons of 18 and 24 aircraft in the U.S., Pacific, and

European theaters. These are based on staffing estimates that we

developed using planning factors provided by the Air Force. The planning

factors included the number of officer and enlisted personnel in squadron

overhead, flight crew, and maintenance positions for independent and

dependent squadrons.1

To provide this data, the Air Force used its Systematic Approach to Better

Long Range Estimating (SABLE) model, an automated model that uses

various cost and planning factors to estimate the peacetime operating and

support costs of flying units. Operating costs include cost elements in the

operation and maintenance, military personnel, and other procurement

appropriations. Within these appropriations, the major cost categories

1

Independent squadrons have the personnel and equipment needed to perform maintenance at the

organizational and intermediate levels, whereas dependent squadrons have only organizational level

maintenance capability. “Intermediate” and “organizational” are the two levels of maintenance below

the depot level.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix III 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

include military and civilian pay, aviation fuel, depot level repairables, and

consumable supplies. These costs are estimated for each type and model

of aircraft within each major command.

The SABLE model only addresses variable costs but not any fixed costs.

Similarly, it captures direct costs but few indirect costs such as the costs

of maintaining the base and runway. The SABLE produces general cost

estimates to evaluate force structure options. The estimated savings do

not include any military construction, base closure, or other costs that

may be associated with transferring aircraft from one specific location to

another.

Since 70 percent of the estimated cost savings resulted from reduced

military personnel, our reliability assessment consisted of an analysis of

the reasonableness of the military personnel planning factors provided by

the Air Force. In conducting this assessment, we interviewed ACC

manpower officials who developed the personnel factors that were used

for the squadron located at U.S. bases. Since maintenance positions

accounted for over 80 percent of the military personnel savings, we also

reviewed the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) that ACC officials used in

developing their maintenance personnel factors. We also interviewed

fighter wing and squadron command and maintenance officials at Langley,

Eglin, and Shaw Air Force Bases and toured wing and squadron

maintenance and flight line areas. We also reviewed historical staffing data

that covered the period when the wings at these two bases previously had

squadrons of 24 aircraft.

Developing

Alternatives

To develop and evaluate alternatives for consolidating active F-15 and F-16

squadrons, we analyzed force structure organization at all bases that had

combat F-15 and F-16 squadrons from 1991 to present, as well as the Air

Force’s plans through 2001. We also reviewed and analyzed the base

capacity assessment completed by each fighter base as part of the 1995

base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. Additionally, we met with

various officials from Air Force Headquarters and ACC to identify and

understand factors that would constrain the consolidation of these fighter

aircraft. We also discussed squadron consolidation and constraining

factors with fighter wing officials such as the wing commander, squadron

commanders, maintenance officers, and facility and air space managers.

The baseline for our alternatives was the Air Force’s planned fighter force

structure for fiscal year 1997. Our alternatives ranged from restructuring

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix III 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

only fighter aircraft in the United States to including all F-15 and F-16s

worldwide. These options were discussed in open critiques with Air Force

officials from both Air Force Headquarters and ACC. Our alternatives did

not attempt to address political or international policies impacting basing

decisions.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Fred Dziadek, Assistant Director

Rodell B. Anderson, Senior Evaluator

Craig A. Hall, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Fred Harrison, Evaluator-in-Charge

Dan Omahen, Senior Evaluator

(701046) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-82 Air Force Aircraft
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