Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1710-CR-2277 | April 18, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew M. Kubacki

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Manuel Garcia,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 18, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1710-CR-2277

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Amy M. Jones, 

Judge

The Honorable David Hooper, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G08-1611-CM-44430

Altice, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1710-CR-2277 | April 18, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Manual Garcia was convicted of operating a vehicle 

with an alcohol concentration equivalent (ACE) of at least .08 but less than .15, 

a Class C misdemeanor, and driving while suspended, a civil infraction. On 

appeal, Garcia argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support 

his operating conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] At approximately 3:11 a.m. on November 12, 2016, IMPD Officer Duran 

Brown was dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle accident in the 2200 block 

of south Meridian Street. When he arrived at the scene less than ten minutes 

later, Officer Brown observed a vehicle that had crashed into a light pole and 

had significant damage. He made contact with the driver, later identified as 

Garcia, to ascertain whether Garcia was injured. The fire department and 

medics arrived at the scene less than five minutes after Officer Brown. Garcia 

was extricated from the car and placed in an ambulance to be taken to the 

hospital for treatment of his injuries. When Officer Brown spoke with Garcia 

after he was placed in the ambulance, he noted an odor of alcoholic beverage

on Garcia’s breath and that Garcia had red, glassy eyes. 

[4] Another officer at the scene read Garcia his Miranda warnings, and Garcia 

stated that he understood. When questioned, Garcia stated that he had been at 
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a friend’s house and had consumed alcoholic beverages that evening and that 

he had consumed his last drink at approximately 2:00 a.m. A portable breath 

test was administered to Garcia, after which Officer Brown read to him 

Indiana’s implied consent law, which he followed up with a description of the 

implied consent law in layman’s terms. Garcia stated that he understood and 

consented to a blood draw, which was performed at Eskenazi Hospital by a 

registered nurse at approximately 4:17 a.m. The results of the chemical test 

were analyzed by the Marion County Crime Lab and indicated an ACE of .105 

grams per one hundred milliliters of blood tested. 

[5] On November 16, 2016, the State charged Garcia with Count I, operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; Count 

II, operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or greater, a Class C misdemeanor; 

and Count III, driving while suspended, a civil infraction. A bench trial was 

held on September 8, 2017. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 

granted Garcia’s motion for a directed verdict as to Count I and found Garcia 

guilty of Counts II and III. Garcia now appeals. Additional facts will be 

provided as necessary. 

Discussion & Decision

[6] To convict Garcia of operating with an unlawful blood-alcohol concentration, 

the State was required to prove that his ACE was .08 or higher at the time he 

operated a vehicle. See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(a)(1). Provided that the State 

presented evidence to establish that a certified chemical test was administered 
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within three hours after the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the 

person operated the vehicle while intoxicated, the trier of fact is entitled to 

presume that the defendant’s ACE equaled the result of the chemical test. In 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction under 

Count II, Garcia argues that the State was not entitled to rely on the statutory 

presumption because the State failed to establish that his blood test was 

administered within three hours of the accident. 

[7] When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Suggs v. State, 

51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Id. We will affirm the 

conviction if there is probative evidence from which a the trier of fact could 

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] Ind. Code § 9-30-6-15(b) provides:

If, in a prosecution for an offense under IC 9-30-5, evidence 

establishes that:

(1) a chemical test was performed on a test sample taken 

from the person charged with the offense within the period 

of time allowed for testing under section 2 of this chapter; 

and

(2) the person charged with the offense had an alcohol 

concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) 

gram of alcohol per:
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(A) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s 

blood at the time the test sample was taken; or

(B) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s 

breath;

the trier of fact shall presume that the person charged with the 

offense had an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eighthundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per one hundred (100) 

milliliters of the person’s blood . . . at the time the person 

operated the vehicle. However, this presumption is rebuttable.

The chemical test administered “must be administered within three (3) hours 

after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person 

committed an offense under IC 9-30-5.” I.C. § 9-30-6-2(c).

[9] Garcia’s argument that the State did not prove that the blood test was 

administered within three hours of the accident is simply a request to reweigh 

the evidence, a task this court will not undertake on appeal. Here, the State 

presented evidence that Garcia admitted to having been at a friend’s house and 

to having had his last alcoholic drink at about 2:00 a.m. Officer Brown was 

dispatched to the accident scene at 3:11 a.m., where he found Garcia trapped in 

his vehicle. The blood draw was performed at 4:17 a.m. From this evidence, a 

reasonable inference can be drawn that Garcia had been at one location and 

that he had to have driven his vehicle to then wreck it into a utility pole. 

Officer Brown found Garcia trapped in his vehicle about an hour after Garcia 

admitted to having had his last drink. About an hour after that, Garcia had his 

blood drawn. This is sufficient circumstantial evidence that Garcia operated his 
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vehicle within the statutory presumption’s three-hour limit. The trier of fact 

was therefore entitled to rely on the presumption that Garcia operated his 

vehicle with an ACE of .105 as indicated by the results of the blood test. 

[10] Judgment affirmed. 

[11] Najam, J. and Robb, J., concur.