2014 WI 68

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2011AP2902 

COMPLETE TITLE: Board of Regents - UW System,

 Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,

 v.

Jeffrey S. Decker,

 Respondent-Appellant.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 279, 827 N.W.2d 929

(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)

OPINION FILED: July 16, 2014

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: October 15, 2013

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit 

COUNTY: Dane

JUDGE: John Markson

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED: ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs. (Opinion filed.)

PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 

DISSENTED: 

NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 

ATTORNEYS:

For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 

argued by R. Duane Harlow, assistant attorney general, with whom 

on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 

For the respondent-appellant, there was brief by Gary 

Grass, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Gary Grass.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 

Dustin B. Brown, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 

the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, 

Inc., and oral argument by Dustin B. Brown.

 
2014 WI 68

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2011AP2902

(L.C. No. 2011CV4619)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Board of Regents - UW System,

 Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,

 v.

Jeffrey S. Decker,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

JUL 16, 2014

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and 

cause remanded. 

¶1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of an 

unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a 

decision and order of the Dane County Circuit Court2 issuing a 

harassment injunction against defendant Jeffrey S. Decker 

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.125 (2009-10).3

 

1 Board of Regents v. Decker, No. 2011AP2902, unpublished

slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2013).

2 The Honorable John W. Markson presiding.

3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.
No. 2011AP2902 

2

¶2 The question before us is whether the circuit court 

properly granted a harassment injunction under Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125, Wisconsin's harassment injunction statute. Decker 

argues that (1) Wis. Stat. § 813.125 does not extend protection 

to institutions; (2) his behavior did not constitute harassment 

under the statute; and (3) the harassment injunction granted by 

the circuit court was overbroad and vague. The Board of Regents 

concedes4 that the injunction was overbroad but asserts that Wis. 

Stat. § 813.125 protects institutions as well as people, and 

further argues that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and

lacked a legitimate purpose.

¶3 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 can extend 

injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural 

persons. We further hold that the circuit court's decision to 

grant a harassment injunction was a proper exercise of its 

discretion, and sufficient evidence existed for the court to 

find that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and lacked a 

legitimate purpose. However, because the parties agree the 

injunction was overbroad, we remand to the circuit court to 

refine the injunction and clarify its terms. For these reasons, 

the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause 

is remanded to the circuit court. 

 

4 This court is "not bound by the parties' interpretation of 

the law or obligated to accept a party's concession of law." 

State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶50, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516.
No. 2011AP2902 

3

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 Jeffrey S. Decker ("Decker") is a former student of 

the University of Wisconsin—Stevens Point ("UWSP"). On August 

13, 2010, Decker met with the UWSP Chancellor, Dr. Bernie 

Patterson, in the Chancellor's office to discuss Decker's 

concerns regarding segregated fees charged to students.5 During 

the meeting, Decker became agitated and began to talk about 

university employees in a derogatory manner. Decker also swore 

at the Chancellor and threatened to interfere with the 

Chancellor's upcoming State of the University address and donor 

function if his demands were not met.6 As tensions escalated 

during the meeting, Decker reached for a stack of papers on the 

Chancellor's conference table. The Chancellor informed Decker 

the papers did not belong to him and tried to pull the documents 

away, but Decker yanked the papers back and forcibly stabbed 

 

5 Segregated fees are "charges in addition to instructional 

fees assessed to all students for services, programs and 

facilities that support the primary mission of the university." 

Segregated Fees Information, Office of the Registrar,

http://registrar.wisc.edu/segregated_fees_information.htm (last 

visited Dec. 24, 2013). Decker believes that university 

officials must consult student government prior to assessing 

segregated fees.

6 Decker sent several emails to the Chancellor prior to 

their meeting. For instance, on August 4, 2010, Decker emailed 

the Chancellor regarding segregated fees and stated, "There is 

only one answer to the question I pose, and unless you answer it 

by 9 am tomorrow I will embarrass you before your peers for 

being in charge of an utterly corrupt and despicable scheme." On 

August 5, 2010, Decker wrote, "It'll be a few hours before you 

discover how I've chosen to embarrass you personally for your 

new role in this scam. Just because I believe in fairness and 

opportunity, here's this second notice."
No. 2011AP2902 

4

them with a pen. The Chancellor then called the police to remove 

Decker from his office.7 The Chancellor returned to his office 

approximately thirty minutes later and found the following note:

Threat: Due to rampant violations of of [sic] state 

law, ethical and professional standards and multiple 

commitments for communication, I shall soon demand the 

resignation of Kevin Reily [sic] and Bernie Patterson, 

or a dragon shall do it for all students. Jef Decker 

¶5 As a result of Decker's behavior during his meeting 

with the Chancellor, Decker was brought before a Nonacademic 

Disciplinary Committee ("the Committee"), which found that 

Decker had engaged in Disorderly Conduct in violation of Wis. 

Admin. Code § 18.11(2).8 The Committee suspended Decker from UWSP 

 

7 Decker provided a slightly different version of events in 

a written statement he made to UWSP Police. Decker claims he 

informed the Chancellor that he would demand the resignation of 

UW System President Kevin Reilly "from within a giant dragon 

costume." Decker maintains that the Chancellor reacted by 

"visibly shaking with rage" and vowing to document Decker's 

threats. Decker alleges he then offered to write down his 

statements for the Chancellor on a packet of papers in front of 

Decker. As Decker began to write, Vice Chancellor Bob Tomlinson, 

who was also present at the meeting, attempted to remove 

Decker's pen from the papers. Decker resisted and applied more 

pressure to the pen as the Chancellor seized the papers, 

resulting in the papers becoming crumpled.

8 Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 18.11(2) states:

No person may engage in violent, abusive, indecent, 

profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise 

disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the 

conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance, in 

university buildings or on university lands.

Wisconsin Admin. Code § UWS 17.09(14) provides university 

officials with disciplinary authority over students in 

violation of Chapter 18.
No. 2011AP2902 

5

for the period of November 19, 2010, through January 1, 2012. At 

the end of the disciplinary meeting, Decker informed the 

Committee that he had no intention of complying with the 

suspension. 

¶6 Decker was true to his word. University of Wisconsin 

("UW") regulations provide that a suspended student is 

prohibited from being "present on any campus without the written 

consent of the chief administrative officer of that campus." 

Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 17.17(4).9 Nevertheless, Decker continued 

to enter university property on at least four separate occasions 

after he was suspended, which are described in detail below.10 

¶7 On January 22, 2011, Decker requested permission from 

Chancellor Richard Wells of UW-Oshkosh to enter the campus, 

 

9 Decker later testified before the circuit court that 

approximately one week after his suspension, he "became aware 

that the university's position was that Administrative Code 

17.17 prohibited me from being on campus." Decker also stated, 

"it's clear based on my actions after [the suspension], that I 

do not regard the Administrative Code to be lawful in a free 

country where public property can be accessed by citizens of 

this great land."

10 Although the Board of Regents chronicles only four 

incidents in which Decker entered UW property after his 

suspension, Decker was charged with two additional violations of 

Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 18.11(7)(a), which prohibits suspended 

students from entering university lands. The first charge 

stemmed from conduct occurring on February 15, 2011, in 

Winnebago County, and was dismissed on May 9, 2011. The second

charge related to conduct occurring on October 12, 2011, in 

Winnebago County, and Decker was convicted after a bench trial 

on January 26, 2012. In addition, although only one of the 

incidents described by the Board of Regents occurred on the UWOshkosh campus, Decker testified before the circuit court that 

he had been at UW-Oshkosh "several times" since his suspension.
No. 2011AP2902 

6

which was denied. In spite of Wells' denial, Decker went to an 

intercollegiate basketball game at UW-Oshkosh and distributed 

literature to attendees. 

¶8 On September 1, 2011, Decker entered UW-Fox Valley 

property to attend a meeting between members of the UW student 

government and Ray Cross, the UW Colleges and UW-Extension 

Chancellor.11 Decker interrupted the meeting while the Chancellor 

was posing a question to student government members. The 

Chancellor asked Decker to leave, but Decker continued to 

disrupt the meeting. The Chancellor then asked a colleague to 

call the police and apologetically explained to Decker: "I 

really hate to do this. If you had remained quiet, Jeff, I 

wouldn’t have done that." Decker responded by admonishing the 

Chancellor for not returning his phone calls, at which point the 

Chancellor started to leave the meeting. A student then asked 

Decker to remain silent: "Mr. Decker, this is our time to visit 

with the Chancellor. . . . I think it would be respectful if we 

could spend our time with him. We don’t get a whole lot of 

time." 

¶9 Decker promised to be quiet, then after a brief pause, 

he hijacked the meeting entirely, spending several minutes 

talking about his suspension from UW. The Chancellor dismissed 

the meeting and left, followed by the students. The meeting was 

 

11 An unofficial transcript of the meeting was published by 

The Forum, the student newspaper for UW-Marathon County. See

John Kronenwetter, Transcript: UW Colleges Convocation, Student 

Governance Council Meeting, Sept. 1, 2011 at UW-Fox Valley, The 

Forum at UW-Marathon County, Nov. 1, 2011.
No. 2011AP2902 

7

later reconvened in another room without Decker, who had moved 

on to a different meeting with the UW Colleges Assistant Deans 

for Administrative Services, where he was removed by police. 

¶10 Decker's next recorded trespass onto UW property 

occurred on September 8, 2011, when Decker entered a meeting of 

the Board of Regents held at Van Hise Hall, located on the UW 

campus at Madison. Decker began to videotape and photograph the 

proceedings and was asked to leave by university police.12 Decker 

declined and continued to film the meeting. University police 

informed Decker that he was in violation of his suspension and 

repeated their request that Decker leave the meeting. Decker 

again refused, and campus police arrested him, at which point 

Decker went limp and was dragged out of the meeting. Decker was 

charged with criminal Trespass to Land under Wis. Stat. 

§ 943.13(1m)(a),13 but charges were ultimately dismissed on April 

23, 2012.

 

12 Decker later posted his footage of the September 8, 2011, 

meeting on the internet. See UW Corruption, (Feb. 14, 2012), 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6VfXogJSEQ&feature=c4overview&li

st=UUI5M8zovksT35zw07ScBdsw. The video also shows Decker 

approaching UW-Oshkosh Chancellor Richard Wells with his 

videocamera as Wells was getting into his car. Decker asked 

Wells to speak with him and Wells declined. Decker exclaimed, 

"If you happen to know exactly why you say I'm not stable enough 

for a university environment, please do tell me." Decker 

continued to videotape Wells as he drove away.

13 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.13(1m)(a) prohibits entry onto "any 

enclosed, cultivated or undeveloped land of another . . . 

without the express or implied consent of the owner or 

occupant."
No. 2011AP2902 

8

¶11 Decker's fourth documented trespass onto UW property 

occurred on September 19, 2011, when he entered a meeting of the 

UW-Fox Valley Board of Trustees held on the UW-Fox Valley

campus. Decker began to speak at the meeting, but Interim Dean 

Keogh reminded Decker he was prohibited from entering UW 

property during his suspension and asked Decker to leave. Decker 

refused and began handing out literature to meeting attendees as 

he remarked: 

I, myself, was personally assaulted by the chancellor 

of the UW-Stevens Point and [the] UW system saw fit to 

railroad and suspend me, all to protect hundreds of 

millions of dollars of corruption and the end of rule 

of law at the University of Wisconsin. . . . I'm not 

going to leave this meeting. You know, I'll just sit 

here until the cops haul me out. 

By this time, the police had indeed been called. Decker again 

went limp and continued to denounce university fees as he was 

dragged from the room.14 Decker was charged with Disorderly 

Conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01,15 and he pled no contest on 

January 9, 2012.

 

14 According to The Fox Journal, the UW-Fox Valley student 

newspaper, Decker returned to campus later that afternoon and 

distributed literature in the office of Senior Student Affairs 

Coordinator Jeff Kuepper. See Kari Toland, Police arrest former 

UW-Stevens Point student at Fox, The Fox Journal, Oct. 17, 2011. 

The article also explained that Decker had been protesting 

student fees at UW for five years at the time of his September 

19 arrest. Id.

15 Wisconsin Stat. § 947.01(1) provides:

Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in 

violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, 

unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 

under circumstances in which the conduct tends to 
No. 2011AP2902 

9

¶12 The UW Board of Regents petitioned the Dane County 

Circuit Court, Judge John Markson presiding, for a temporary 

restraining order against Decker on October 17, 2011. The 

petition named the University of Wisconsin System as the 

protected party. It requested Decker be required to (1) cease or 

avoid harassing the protected party; (2) avoid the protected 

party's residence and/or any premises it temporarily occupies; 

(3) avoid contact that harasses or intimidates the protected 

party; and (4) refrain from entering upon any real property 

owned by, leased by, or otherwise subject to the control of the 

Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. The 

temporary restraining order was granted and an injunction 

hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2011. 

¶13 UW-Oshkosh Police Chief Joseph LeMire attempted to 

serve the temporary restraining order papers on Decker on 

October 18, 2011. Decker was on his porch when the Chief arrived 

at his house, but when the Chief got out of his car, Decker went 

inside, closed the door, and refused to answer the doorbell. The 

Chief left and drove around the block, but when he returned, 

Decker's car was gone. A handgun hotline report later informed 

the Chief that, after Decker had left his house, he had 

immediately attempted to purchase a handgun. 

 

cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B 

misdemeanor.
No. 2011AP2902 

10

¶14 On October 24, 2011, Judge Markson held an injunction 

hearing to discuss the Board of Regents' petition. The circuit 

court found that Decker attended meetings at UW,

knowing that he would be asked to leave, knowing that 

he was not intending to leave, and then necessarily 

what that would entail, which would be calling the 

officers and causing the sort of disturbance that was 

present on each of the occasions that were the subject 

of testimony.

The circuit court concluded that Decker's repeated entry onto UW 

property in willful violation of his suspension "constitutes 

conduct of a sort that is harassing and intimidating" and was 

"not done for any lawful or legitimate purpose." The circuit 

court also found "clear and convincing evidence that there is a 

real concern that Mr. Decker may use a firearm to cause physical 

harm to another or endanger the public safety." The circuit 

court reasoned that the persistence of Decker's harassing 

behavior, his resistance to law enforcement, and his purchase of 

a handgun immediately after Chief LeMire attempted to serve him 

with the restraining order were sufficient to order a firearm 

restriction for the pendency of the harassment injunction. The 

circuit court noted Decker already possessed four other guns and 

remarked, "It has not been satisfactorily explained to me the 

reason for his needing to buy yet another handgun and doing so 

immediately after being aware that process is being served on 

him in this case."

¶15 The circuit court granted a harassment injunction 

against Decker based on the Board of Regents' petition and 

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.125, effective through October 24, 
No. 2011AP2902 

11

2015. The harassment injunction named the "Board of Regents UW 

System," as the protected party, although the Board of Regents' 

petition requested protection for the "University of Wisconsin 

System." Decker was ordered to cease or avoid harassment of 

the "Board of Regents UW System," avoid the residence and any 

premises temporarily occupied by the Board of Regents, and 

refrain from contacting the Board of Regents. Decker was also 

prohibited from possessing a firearm until the harassment 

injunction expired. 

¶16 In an unpublished, per curiam decision, the court of 

appeals reversed the circuit court's order for a harassment 

injunction. Board of Regents v. Decker, No. 2011AP2902, 

unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2013). The court of 

appeals reasoned that the harassment injunction statute, Wis. 

Stat. § 813.125, requires a party seeking an injunction to prove 

"(1) that the defendant intentionally engaged in a course of 

conduct which harassed the victim; and (2) that the defendant's 

conduct served no legitimate purpose." Id., ¶7. The court of 

appeals assumed, without deciding, that Decker's conduct 

constituted harassment, but it determined Decker had a 

legitimate purpose for his actions. Id., ¶10. The court found 

that Decker's purpose in attending the UW meetings was to 

protest university student fees, which was conduct he had been 

engaging in since at least 2010. Id., ¶12. The court of appeals 

noted that Decker's right "to publicly demonstrate, protest and 

persuade others" is constitutionally protected. Id., ¶13. Since 

"legitimate protest of government policies is protected by law," 
No. 2011AP2902 

12

the court of appeals concluded Decker had a legitimate purpose, 

and the harassment injunction was therefore improperly granted 

by the circuit court. Id.

¶17 The Board of Regents petitioned this court for review, 

which we granted on June 14, 2013. We now reverse and remand to 

the circuit court for the reasons discussed below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18 This case requires us to examine the harassment 

injunction statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.125, to determine if the 

statute applies to conduct against institutions in addition to 

natural persons. Statutory interpretation is a question of law 

that this court reviews de novo. State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, 

¶18, 349 Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126; Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. 

Orion Constr. Grp., LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶12, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 

N.W.2d 332.

¶19 We review a circuit court's decision to grant a 

harassment injunction for an erroneous exercise of discretion. 

Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶23, 312 Wis. 2d 435, 752 

N.W.2d 359. We look for reasons to sustain a discretionary 

ruling. Id., ¶24. In addition, "[t]he scope of an injunction is 

within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id.

¶20 Though the decision to issue an injunction is within 

the discretion of the circuit court, in order to grant an 

injunction under Wis. Stat. § 813.125, the circuit court must 

find "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has 

engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the 

petitioner." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(4)(a)3. Such a finding 
No. 2011AP2902 

13

presents a mixed question of fact and law. Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 

435, ¶23. This court will uphold the factual findings of the 

circuit court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. However, 

whether reasonable grounds exist to grant the injunction is a 

question of law that we review de novo. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

¶21 The question before us is whether the harassment 

injunction against Decker was properly granted by the circuit 

court under Wis. Stat. § 813.125, the harassment injunction 

statute. The Board of Regents argues Wis. Stat. § 813.125 

protects institutions as well as people. The Board of Regents 

further claims Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 

lacked a legitimate purpose because his intent was to harass the 

board and his actions were illegal as a matter of law. Decker 

responds that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 does not provide authority to 

issue a harassment injunction to protect an institution. Decker 

also maintains he had a legitimate purpose to protest the 

Board's activities, and therefore his conduct did not constitute 

harassment as defined by Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b). Decker's 

final argument is that the circuit court's harassment injunction 

is overbroad and vague in its scope.

¶22 We begin in Part A by addressing whether Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125 applies to institutions as well as people. In Part B, 

we discuss whether Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 

lacked a legitimate purpose pursuant to Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125(1)(b). Finally, in Part C, we discuss the scope of the 

harassment injunction. For the reasons discussed below, we find 
No. 2011AP2902 

14

that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 applies to institutions, and Decker's 

conduct constituted harassment that was properly enjoined. 

However, because the parties agree the injunction was overbroad, 

we remand to the circuit court to refine the harassment 

injunction and clarify its terms.

A. Wisconsin Stat. § 813.125 Protects Institutions

¶23 Wisconsin's harassment injunction statute, Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125, provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Definition. In this section, "harassment" means 

any of the following:

(a) Striking, shoving, kicking or otherwise subjecting 

another person to physical contact; engaging in an act 

that would constitute abuse under s. 48.02(1), sexual 

assault under s. 940.225, or stalking under s. 940.32; 

or attempting or threatening to do the same.

(b) Engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly 

committing acts which harass or intimidate another 

person and which serve no legitimate purpose.

¶24 The Board of Regents contends Wis. Stat. § 813.125 

protects institutions as well as individuals. For support, the 

Board of Regents relies on Wis. Stat. § 990.01, which contains 

the general definitions and rules of construction for Wisconsin 

laws. Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01 provides:

In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and 

phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated 

unless such construction would produce a result 

inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 

legislature.

Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(26) goes on to define "person" as 

including "all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or 

corporate." The Board of Regents argues that it is a political 
No. 2011AP2902 

15

body, and under Wis. Stat. § 36.07(1), it is also a corporate 

body: "The board and their successors in office shall constitute 

a body corporate by the name of 'Board of Regents of the 

University of Wisconsin System.'" The Board of Regents also 

notes that in Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 211 

Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of 

appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 can protect a municipal 

corporation. 

¶25 Decker argues Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(a) clearly 

contemplates harassment directed towards an individual and not 

institutions. An institution such as the Board of Regents cannot 

be the target of "[s]triking, shoving, kicking or . . . physical 

contact," nor can it be subjected to physical or sexual abuse, 

sexual assault, or stalking. Although Decker's harassment 

injunction was issued under Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b), Decker 

maintains the language of this subsection also suggests a human 

subject. Relying on dictionary definitions of "harass," Decker 

argues an institution cannot be "subjected to mental agitation, 

worry, grief, anxiety, distress, or fear."

¶26 We agree with the Board of Regents' argument that Wis. 

Stat. § 813.125 protects institutions as well as people. 

Although Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b) describes harassment as 

"committing acts which harass or intimidate another person," 

Wisconsin's general definitions statute defines a "person" as 

including "all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or 

corporate." Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) (emphasis added). This 

definition is presumed applicable to the harassment injunction 
No. 2011AP2902 

16

statute "unless such construction would produce a result 

inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature." Wis. 

Stat. § 990.01. In Tigerton, the court of appeals noted, "the 

legislature's definition of 'person' predates the harassment 

statute." Tigerton, 211 Wis. 2d at 784. The court of appeals in 

Tigerton relied on the "maxim that assumes the lawmakers acted 

with full knowledge of existing laws, including statutes" and 

concluded the legislature intended the general statutory 

definition of "person" to govern the harassment injunction 

statute. Id. Likewise, we assume the legislature was aware of 

the statutory definition of "person" when it enacted Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125 and intended that definition to apply. Nothing in 

Wis. Stat. § 813.125 indicates such a reading would be contrary 

to the "manifest intent" of the legislature. Moreover, our 

conclusion is supported by the court of appeals' decision in 

Tigerton, which held that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 applies to 

municipal corporations. Id. at 783.

¶27 Having determined that the statutory definition of 

"person" in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) applies to the harassment 

injunction statute, we must next consider whether the Board of 

Regents qualifies as a "person" under this definition. Wisconsin 

Stat. § 990.01(26) defines a "person" as including "all 

partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate." 

There is ample reason to think the Board of Regents constitutes 

a body politic. The Board of Regents is empowered to enact 

policies and promulgate rules; employ police officers to enforce 

its rules; appoint officers and delegate authority to those 
No. 2011AP2902 

17

officers; allocate funds and set institutional budgets; 

establish a mission statement; and purchase, lease, and manage 

property. Wis. Stat. § 36.11; see also Rouse v. Theda Clark Med. 

Ctr., Inc., 2007 WI 87, ¶31, 302 Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30 

(holding that the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics 

Authority is a political corporation because of "the power 

granted [to it] by the legislature"). In addition, members of 

the Board of Regents are primarily appointed by the Governor. 

Wis. Stat. § 15.91; see also University of Wisconsin System 

Board of Regents, University of Wisconsin System, 

http://www.wisconsin.edu/bor/ (last visited July 8, 2014). In 

Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Commission, we held 

that the Milwaukee County Civil Service Commission is a "body 

politic" because the Commission "consist[s] of appointed members 

who perform statutorily defined, important governmental 

functions entirely independent of the governmental entity which 

appoints members." Watkins v. Milwaukee Cnty. Civil Serv. 

Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 417-418, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979). 

¶28 Moreover, regardless of whether the Board of Regents 

is a body politic, it is plainly structured as a body corporate 

under Wis. Stat. § 36.07(1): "The board and their successors in 

office shall constitute a body corporate by the name of 'Board 

of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.'" Accordingly, 

we conclude that the Board of Regents is a "person" as defined 

in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) and is therefore eligible for 

injunctive protection under Wis. Stat. § 813.125.
No. 2011AP2902 

18

¶29 We agree with Decker that Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(a), 

when read in isolation, does appear to contemplate harassment 

directed towards a natural person. However, a party seeking a 

harassment injunction must establish the requirements of either 

Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(a) or (1)(b). The harassment injunction 

against Decker was issued under Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b), and 

nothing in the language of that provision invites the same 

conclusion. It is an established canon of statutory 

interpretation that "statutory language is interpreted in the 

context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 

whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closelyrelated statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 

unreasonable results." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 

Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 

¶30 Decker claims an institution cannot be "harassed" or 

"intimidated," as described in Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b), but 

the very fact that the Board of Regents sought a harassment 

injunction against Decker indicates otherwise. After all, an 

institution is nothing more than a collection of individuals 

engaged in a common purpose. An institution, as well as an 

individual, can be the subject of threats and intimidation, 

which is why protests and picket rallies are often organized 

outside of an institution's headquarters. Protestors frequently 

target institutions in an attempt to elicit a response and draw 

attention to themselves and their cause. Likewise, Decker 

obviously sought to influence the Board of Regents through a 

calculated, long-term scheme of protesting, handing out 
No. 2011AP2902 

19

literature, filming university board members and officials, and 

disrupting university events. Decker might as easily be arguing 

that an institution cannot be "influenced" or "persuaded," but 

this is clearly not what he believes. Decker's actions are a 

manifestation of his belief that an institution can be harassed 

or intimidated in the same way that it can be influenced or 

persuaded. 

¶31 Our conclusion that institutions are eligible for 

injunctive protection under Wis. Stat. § 813.125 is also 

supported by public policy concerns. An injunction has several 

features that make it an especially desirable remedy for 

harassment victims. First, an injunction can be quickly obtained 

when circumstances demand an immediate remedy. Second, a victim 

can proactively seek protection by taking the initiative to seek 

an injunction. Third, injunctive relief does not depend on the 

criminal justice system, which can take months or even years to 

render a final judgment. Other hindrances such as understaffed 

prosecutor's offices, limited judicial resources, and the higher 

burden of proof required by the criminal justice system may, 

separately or in the aggregate, serve to deny a harassment 

victim any protection. 

¶32 Decker argues the Board of Regents does not need 

access to injunctive relief because it already possesses a 

sufficient remedy under Wis. Stat. § 947.01, Wisconsin's 

criminal disorderly conduct statute. The American Civil 

Liberties Union ("ACLU") took a similar position in its amicus 

brief. The ACLU also asserted during oral arguments that a 
No. 2011AP2902 

20

harassment victim's first recourse should always be to pursue 

criminal charges. We conclude that such a requirement would lead 

to absurd results. As discussed above, many features of a 

harassment injunction make it a superior remedy for victims. 

Harassment injunctions protect a variety of individuals, 

including those faced with serious and imminent threats to their 

safety, such as domestic violence victims. In 2012, circuit 

courts in Wisconsin handled 6,824 petitions for harassment 

injunctions and temporary restraining orders.16 Thousands of 

individuals would be adversely affected if this court agreed 

with the ACLU's position that criminal charges must be pursued 

before a harassment injunction can be issued. 

¶33 Moreover, both Decker and the ACLU fail to note that 

the Board of Regents did pursue criminal relief prior to 

obtaining the harassment injunction. In fact, Decker's history 

with the Board of Regents demonstrates precisely why a criminal 

remedy is sometimes inadequate. Decker was arrested multiple 

times by university police, and as Decker explained to the 

circuit judge, the university was unable to successfully 

prosecute him prior to issuance of the harassment injunction. 

Although Decker was arrested on September 8, 2011, and charged 

with Trespass to Land under Wis. Stat. § 943.13(1m)(a), the 

prosecutor ultimately dropped the charges. Decker was also 

 

16 Civil Disposition Summary—Statewide Report, Wisconsin 

Court System, 

https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/statistics/circuit/docs/ci

vildispostate12.pdf.
No. 2011AP2902 

21

arrested again on September 19, 2011, but he was not convicted 

of Disorderly Conduct under Wis. Stat. § 947.01 until some two 

and a half months after the circuit court had already granted 

the harassment injunction.

¶34 In addition, university officials have a 

responsibility to ensure the health and safety of students. See, 

e.g., Wis. Stat. § 36.11(1)(a), (2)(b) (providing authority for 

the Board of Regents to enact laws "to protect the lives, health 

and safety of persons on property under its jurisdiction" and to 

employ police officers to "preserve the peace" and enforce 

university rules). It cannot be disputed that threats to student 

safety are on the rise. No institution, including a university, 

should be forced to rely on the criminal justice system when a 

more immediate remedy is available. A harassment injunction may 

not prevent a tragedy such as the atrocious shooting at Virginia 

Tech or Sandy Hook,17 but it is nevertheless an important and 

effective tool for university officials to maintain order and 

ensure student health and safety. 

B. Decker's Conduct Constituted Harassment and Lacked a 

Legitimate Purpose

¶35 We next address whether Decker's conduct constituted 

harassment that could be properly enjoined under Wis. Stat. 

 

17 For background information on the shootings at Virginia 

Tech, see Christine Hauser & Anahad O'Connor, Virginia Tech 

Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2007. For more 

information about the shooting at Sandy Hook elementary school, 

see Steve Vogel et al., Sandy Hook Elementary shooting leaves 28 

dead, law enforcement sources say, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 2012.
No. 2011AP2902 

22

§ 813.125. A circuit court may grant a harassment injunction if 

there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has 

engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the 

petitioner." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(4)(a)3. Harassment is defined 

as "[e]ngaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing 

acts which harass or intimidate another person and which serve 

no legitimate purpose." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b). 

¶36 The Board of Regents argues that Decker's persistent 

disruptions at university meetings demonstrate an intent to 

harass. The Board of Regents also contends that because Decker 

was prohibited from entering UW property during his suspension, 

Decker's conduct was illegal as a matter of law and could not 

serve a legitimate purpose. The Board of Regents acknowledges 

that Decker was protesting student fees but asserts that 

otherwise harassing behavior cannot be transformed into nonharassing, legitimate conduct simply by labeling it "protest."

¶37 Decker argues his conduct did not constitute 

harassment because he had the legitimate purpose of protesting 

student fees. Decker points out that harassment under Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125(1)(b) is conduct that serves "no legitimate purpose." 

Therefore, Decker contends, his conduct could not constitute 

harassment if he was motivated by any legitimate purpose. Decker 

maintains his history of protesting UW's segregated student fees 

demonstrates he was not motivated by a desire to harass. 

¶38 We agree with the circuit court that Decker's conduct 

constituted harassment and lacked a legitimate purpose, and that 

Decker possessed the requisite intent to harass. In Bachowski v. 
No. 2011AP2902 

23

Salamone, we explained, "conduct or repetitive acts that are 

intended to harass or intimidate do not serve a legitimate 

purpose." Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 408, 407 

N.W.2d 533 (1987). Decker argues conduct can never constitute 

harassment if it is done for any legitimate purpose, such as 

protesting. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument 

suggests that if an individual has both a legitimate and an 

illegitimate purpose, the legitimate purpose automatically 

protects the individual's conduct from being enjoined. Put 

another way, according to Decker's logic, conduct done with both 

the purpose of protesting and the purpose of harassing cannot 

constitute harassment. This is a senseless argument that flatly 

contradicts our holding in Bachowski that intentionally 

harassing conduct can never serve a legitimate purpose. Decker 

cannot shield his harassing conduct from regulation by labeling 

it "protest." If Decker's purpose was even in part to harass the 

Board of Regents, his conduct may be enjoined under Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125.

¶39 The circuit court described the evidence presented at 

the injunction hearing regarding Decker's repeated entry onto UW 

property as follows: 

. . . We did have corroborating evidence that people 

have complained about that and found Decker's presence 

at meetings, knowing he would be asked to leave, 

knowing that he was not intending to leave, and then 

necessarily what that would entail, which would be 

calling the officers and causing the sort of 

disturbance that was present on each of the occasions 

that were the subject of testimony here . . . .
No. 2011AP2902 

24

I credit the testimony of the witnesses that were 

offered by the university here. I think it was 

credible, and I think it establishes a pattern, and a 

pattern that if not enjoined, I am confident that 

based on Mr. Decker's testimony today, he will intend 

to repeat. And it constitutes harassment. It's not 

done for any lawful or legitimate purpose.

The circuit court found that Decker had repeatedly trespassed on 

UW property with the intent to disrupt university proceedings. 

We uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous. Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶23. Based on the 

evidence presented at the injunction hearing, the circuit court 

concluded that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and 

lacked a legitimate purpose. The circuit court, in its 

discretion, decided to grant the harassment injunction against 

Decker. We give deference to a circuit court's decision to issue 

a harassment injunction, upholding it absent an erroneous 

exercise of discretion. Id. Based on the record, we conclude 

that there was ample evidence to support the circuit court's 

factual findings and its decision to grant the harassment 

injunction against Decker. 

¶40 The evidence presented before the circuit court 

demonstrated the following: first, Decker swore at and 

threatened the UWSP Chancellor in a meeting and stabbed the 

Chancellor's documents with a pen during a heated argument. 

Second, Decker told the suspension committee that he had no 

intention of complying with his suspension, and Decker was aware 

his suspension prohibited him from entering UW property. Third, 

Decker trespassed on UW property on numerous occasions after his 

suspension and disrupted several university meetings. Fourth, 
No. 2011AP2902 

25

Decker attempted to purchase a handgun immediately after police 

endeavored to serve him with a restraining order.

¶41 Specifically, the evidence at the injunction hearing 

established that on September 1, 2011, Decker interrupted a 

meeting between student government members and the UW Colleges 

and UW-Extension Chancellor. University police arrested Decker, 

but prior to their arrival Decker was so disruptive that the 

Chancellor was forced to end the meeting. On September 8, 2011, 

Decker returned to UW property and disrupted another meeting. 

When Decker was again arrested, he went limp and police had to 

drag Decker from the meeting. Not to be dissuaded from causing 

further disruption, Decker again trespassed on UW property on 

September 19, 2011, and upset yet another meeting. University 

officials repeatedly asked Decker to be quiet, but he refused. 

Once again, Decker was arrested and forcibly dragged from the 

meeting as he continued his diatribe against student fees. All 

of these events were delineated at Decker's injunction hearing, 

providing the circuit court with overwhelming evidence to 

conclude that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and lacked 

a legitimate purpose. Based on Decker's pattern of knowingly 

trespassing on university property to interrupt university 

meetings, and his blatant disregard for the rights of university 

officials and students, the circuit court could also reasonably 

find that Decker engaged in harassment with the intent to 

harass. 

¶42 The circuit court also concluded that Decker may 

present a threat to public safety. Decker's attempted purchase 
No. 2011AP2902 

26

of a handgun immediately after police visited his home led the 

circuit court to find there was "clear and convincing evidence 

that there is a real concern that Mr. Decker may use a firearm 

to cause physical harm to another or endanger the public 

safety."18 The circuit court's public safety concern is bolstered 

by Decker's prior exchanges with the UWSP Chancellor. For 

instance, Decker left a note in the Chancellor's office that he 

specifically designated a "threat." Decker also sent several 

intimidating emails to the Chancellor. The circuit court could 

reasonably conclude that Decker's conduct was unpredictable at 

best and dangerous at worst. The risk to public safety, combined 

with Decker's pattern of trespassing and his deliberate 

disruption of university meetings, provides abundant support for 

the circuit court's decision to issue the harassment injunction. 

¶43 We recognize that Decker's protests implicate First 

Amendment concerns.19 "With respect to persons entitled to be 

 

18 Decker also argues in his brief that the harassment 

injunction's firearm restriction was not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence and violated his Second Amendment right to 

bear arms. We disagree and conclude that the circuit court 

correctly determined that Decker's outburst during his meeting 

with Chancellor Patterson, his history of volatile behavior, and 

his attempted purchase of a handgun after police tried to serve 

him with a temporary restraining order supplied a sufficient 

basis to find clear and convincing evidence existed to support 

the firearm restriction. We defer to the circuit court's 

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Welytok, 312 

Wis. 2d 435, ¶23.

19 Sections 3 and 4, art. I, of the Wisconsin Constitution 

"guarantee the same freedom of speech and right of assembly and 

petition as do the First and Fourteenth amendments of the United 

States constitution." Lawson v. Hous. Auth. of City of 

Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 274, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955).
No. 2011AP2902 

27

there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights 

of speech and association extend to the campuses of state 

universities." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981). 

The United States Supreme Court applies a forum-based approach 

to government restrictions on speech. The applicable level of 

judicial scrutiny is determined based on whether the forum 

involved is a traditional public forum, a designated public 

forum, or a non-public forum.20 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 

Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); see also Kevin 

Francis O'Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 

Loy. L. Rev. 411, 422-23 (1999). Public meetings at state 

universities are designated public forums and, consequently, are 

afforded the same constitutional protections as traditional 

public forums. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68, 270. 

¶44 Under this standard, a time, place, and manner 

restriction is constitutional if it is reasonable and contentneutral. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. 

 

20 Traditional public forums are places such as parks, 

streets, and sidewalks, "which by long tradition or by 

government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Perry 

Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 

(1983). A designated public forum is "created by government 

designation of a place or channel of communication for use by 

the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain 

speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects." Cornelius 

v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802

(1985). Non-public forums are places "which, by tradition or 

design, are not appropriate platforms for unrestrained 

communication" such as "military installations and federal 

workplaces." Paulsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d 

Cir. 1991).
No. 2011AP2902 

28

Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. An 

individual's ability to protest is therefore not unlimited.21

Rather, it is subject to reasonable regulation. 

¶45 We have recognized that an individual's First 

Amendment speech rights are "not absolute." State v. Givens, 28 

Wis. 2d 109, 118, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965). "The right to 

demonstrate (even peaceably) in pursuance of our constitutional 

rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom to 

petition for redress of grievances might be appropriate in one 

place and not in another." Id. at 121. The United States Supreme 

Court has explained that a student may express his opinions,

If he does so . . . without colliding with the rights 

of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class 

or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially 

disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 

invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not 

immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom 

of speech.

 

21 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 

Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (statute restricting distribution 

of literature in an airport terminal is constitutional); Frisby 

v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (upholding an ordinance 

prohibiting picketing before or about the residence or dwelling 

of any individual); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800 ("Nothing in 

the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access 

to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every 

type of Government property without regard to the . . . 

disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities."); 

Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 213 (3d Cir. 2011) (ejection of a 

resident from a county legislative meeting who objected during a 

period not open to public comment was constitutional); M.A.L. ex 

rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841, 847 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(upholding a policy restricting middle school student from 

distributing literature in school hallways).
No. 2011AP2902 

29

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 

(1969). Decker's right to protest on UW property can be 

restricted when he engages in harassment with the intent to 

harass or intimidate. The circuit court's conclusion that Decker 

engaged in harassment with the intent to harass or intimidate 

the Board of Regents was supported by an abundance of evidence, 

and we give deference to the circuit court's decision to issue 

the harassment injunction. We conclude that the circuit court's 

decision to grant a harassment injunction was a proper exercise 

of its discretion. 

C. The Scope of the Harassment Injunction

¶46 Decker's final argument is that the harassment 

injunction is vague and overbroad in its scope. Decker maintains 

that because the harassment injunction prohibits him from 

contacting any university representatives, the injunction 

proscribes contact with all 40,000 university employees and, 

arguably, all 181,000 university students. By its terms, Decker 

asserts that the injunction "forbid[s] benign association with 

one 25th of the state population." Decker claims the 

injunction's reach extends to members of Decker's religious 

congregation and his professional contacts. Decker also contends 

the injunction infringes on his First Amendment rights by 

enjoining contact with thousands of people who were unaffected 

by the complained-of conduct. 

¶47 The Board of Regents did not address the scope of the 

harassment injunction in its brief, but it conceded at oral 

argument that the harassment injunction was overbroad. 
No. 2011AP2902 

30

¶48 Because the parties both concede that the injunction 

is overbroad, we need not address this issue. Rather, we remand 

to the circuit court to refine the injunction.22 In Bachowski, 

we explained that, because the violation of a harassment 

injunction is a criminal offense, the injunction "must be 

specific as to the acts and conduct which are enjoined." 

Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 414. Clarity in a harassment 

injunction is essential, not just for the parties involved, but 

also in order for law enforcement to effectively enforce it. 

See, e.g., State v. Sveum, 2002 WI App 105, ¶24, 254 Wis. 2d 

868, 648 N.W.2d 496 ("Before the violation of a harassment 

injunction may be found, the State must prove at least that: (1) 

an injunction was issued against the defendant under Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125; and (2) the defendant committed an act that violated 

the terms of the injunction.)". 

¶49 The protected party named in the harassment injunction 

is the "Board of Regents UW System." However, the petition for 

the injunction requested protection for the "University of 

Wisconsin System" as a whole, and the petitioner for the 

harassment injunction was the "Board of Regents – Univ. of 

 

22 For instance, the circuit court ordered Decker to 

"avoid[] the residence and any premises temporarily occupied by 

the petitioner/protected person." We note that the University 

of Wisconsin System may include entities such as the University 

of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics, UW-affiliated bookstores and 

theaters, and the University of Wisconsin Foundation, an 

independent charitable institution. By refining the harassment 

injunction, the circuit court can clarify whether it intended 

such an expansive reach.
No. 2011AP2902 

31

Wisconsin System." In addition, the circuit court explained at 

the injunction hearing that Decker was restrained from 

contacting "the UW or any of its representatives." Consequently, 

it may be unclear to both Decker and law enforcement who the 

protected party is.23

¶50 We are not equipped with sufficient facts to undertake 

the task of refining the harassment injunction. In this case, 

the circuit court found that Decker's conduct constituted 

harassment24 and made a discretionary decision to grant the 

injunction. The circuit court is therefore better situated to 

assess the facts and apply its discretion to craft an injunction 

tailored to the particularized facts of each case.

 

23 We do not suggest that a harassment injunction that 

protects an institution can never proscribe contact with 

specific individuals. An institution can be defined in many 

different ways, from its organizational structure or real estate 

holdings to its list of members, employees, or representatives. 

The larger the institution, the greater the difficulty in 

defining the scope of the protection afforded by the injunction. 

These issues do not arise in the context of a typical harassment 

injunction protecting an individual, such as a domestic violence 

victim. Therefore, the scope of an injunction protecting an 

institution may need to be structured with greater care than an 

ordinary injunction protecting an individual. Obviously, nothing 

in this opinion limits the authority of a circuit court to craft 

an appropriate injunction to protect an individual. 

24 We acknowledge that Decker's suspension was set to expire 

on January 1, 2012. There is nothing in the record to indicate 

whether Decker's suspension actually expired, whether it was 

extended, or whether Decker has since been suspended again for 

other reasons. In the time this case has taken to come before 

us, the terms of Decker's suspension might very well have 

changed, and we decline to speculate on its current status. The 

parties are free to request an amendment to the injunction from 

the circuit court if they have additional particularized needs 

or concerns that pertain to facts not before us.
No. 2011AP2902 

32

¶51 We conclude the circuit court properly determined that 

a harassment injunction can be granted to protect the Board of 

Regents from Decker's harassing behavior, and it provided ample 

support for its reasoning on a difficult issue that implicated 

both First Amendment and public safety concerns. However, we 

remand to the circuit court to refine the injunction and clarify 

its terms. 

IV. CONCLUSION

¶52 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 813.125 can extend 

injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural 

persons. We further hold that the circuit court's decision to 

grant a harassment injunction was a proper exercise of its 

discretion, and sufficient evidence existed for the court to 

find that Decker's conduct constituted harassment and lacked a 

legitimate purpose. However, because the parties agree the 

injunction was overbroad, we remand to the circuit court to 

further clarify the scope of the injunction. For these reasons, 

the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause 

is remanded to the circuit court. 

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
2011AP2902.ssa

1

¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (concurring). Everyone 

involved in the instant case——including the Board of Regents,1

Decker, and this court2——agrees that the circuit court's 

harassment injunction does not pass muster: the scope of the 

injunction is impermissibly broad. The majority opinion 

correctly asserts that the circuit court's harassment injunction 

fails to identify the protected party and fails to specify the 

conduct to be enjoined.3 

¶55 Because the injunction is overbroad, the injunction is 

invalid.4 On remand, the circuit court must refine the 

injunction and clarify its terms. Majority op., ¶3. In effect, 

the circuit court must craft a new injunction.

¶56 The harassment statute, Wis. Stat. § 813.125, is 

obviously designed to address harassment of individuals, 

especially instances of domestic child and family harassment or 

 

1 See majority op., ¶¶48-49.

2 "[I]t may be unclear to both Decker and law enforcement 

who the protected party is." Majority op., ¶49.

3 Majority op., ¶48 & n.22 (noting that both parties 

"concede that the injunction is overbroad," that it is unclear 

who the protected party is, and that the "expansive reach" of 

the circuit court injunction extends to broad property).

There are even discrepancies between the circuit court's 

oral ruling on the injunction and the written form injunction 

that it issued.

4 Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 414, 407 

N.W.2d 533 (1987) ("[T]he injunction is drafted too broadly and 

is therefore invalid.").
2011AP2902.ssa

2

violence. Such cases are very different from the instant case.5 

The instant case does not fit easily into the statute.6 The 

statute is somewhat difficult to adapt to the present case 

because the statute was intended to safeguard one individual 

from another individual's harassment. Although I agree with the 

majority opinion that our case law has interpreted the statute 

to permit harassment injunctions to protect "persons" (defined 

more broadly than "individuals" in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26)),7 the 

 

5 See 2005 Wis. Act 272 (defining "harassment" to include 

sexual assault, abuse under Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1), and stalking 

under Wis. Stat. § 940.32).

6 The majority opinion agrees that "Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125(1)(a) . . . does appear to contemplate harassment 

directed towards a natural person." Majority op., ¶29.

The forms used in the circuit court are designed for 

individuals (not for harassment of a body politic or a corporate 

body). The forms, like many forms, have to be supplemented to 

fit the facts presented. The Board of Regents did supplement 

its petition, but the circuit court did not supplement the form 

injunction in the instant case. The circuit court's injunction 

is attached as an appendix. 

7 Majority op., ¶¶26-27; see also Village of Tigerton v. 

Minniecheske, 211 Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997).

The majority opinion acknowledges the difficulty of 

determining how to characterize a non-individual person for the 

purposes of a harassment injunction. The majority opinion 

refers to the Board of Regents variously as: 

(1) A non-individual "body politic." Majority op., 

¶¶26-27; 

(2) A non-individual "body corporate." Majority op., 

¶¶24, 26; and 

(3) An "institution," defined by the majority opinion 

as "a collection of individuals engaged in a common 

purpose." Majority op., ¶¶24, 30.
2011AP2902.ssa

3

statutory language and the one-size-fits-all required forms 

designed to protect individuals are difficult to apply to nonindividuals and to the present case.8 Therefore, circuit courts 

should exercise caution in crafting harassment injunctions to 

protect non-individual persons.

¶57 I write to point out matters that the circuit court 

must consider in crafting a new injunction. I begin by 

concisely summarizing in chart form the circuit court's 

injunction and what remains of the injunction under the majority 

opinion.

INJUNCTION 

CIRCUIT COURT MAJORITY OPINION

PROTECTED PARTY The Board of Regents; 

"the UW or any of its 

representatives"9

"[I]t may be unclear 

to both Decker and law 

enforcement who the 

protected party is."10

HARASSING CONDUCT Trespassing onto UW 

land in violation of 

terms of suspension

Trespassing onto UW 

land in violation of 

terms of suspension 

ENJOINED BEHAVIOR Harassment; avoid the 

residence; contacting 

The majority opinion 

notes the expansive 

 

8 The circuit court used form CV-407, 11/13 Injunction 

(Order of Protection – Harassment), which is mandated for use in 

civil actions under Wis. Stat. §§ 807.001 and 758.18(1). 

9 The harassment injunction could conceivably extend to 

thousands of people, including UW faculty, staff, and students. 

The University has about 40,000 employees and 181,000 students.

10 Majority op., ¶49.
2011AP2902.ssa

4

the UW or any of its 

representatives 

unless they consent 

in writing. Avoid 

premises occupied by 

University of 

Wisconsin System, all 

of its campuses, any 

premises under the 

control of the Board 

of Regents.11

reach of the 

injunction but 

mentions no enjoined 

conduct.12

¶58 In effect, the majority opinion vacates the circuit 

court's injunction, because as the majority opinion explains, 

the injunction is unclear in its description of the party 

protected or the enjoined conduct. 

¶59 The mandate of the majority opinion is somewhat 

misleading when it "reverse[s]" the court of appeals and 

"remand[s]" the issue to the circuit court.13 Both the majority 

 

11 The written circuit court injunction required Decker to 

"avoid the residence and any premises temporarily occupied by 

the protected party." 

At the hearing, the circuit court orally ordered Decker "to 

avoid any premises occupied by the petitioner or protected 

person, namely the University of Wisconsin system, all of its 

campuses, any premises under the control of the Board of 

Regents." 

12 Majority op., ¶47 & n.21.

13 Majority op., ¶52.
2011AP2902.ssa

5

opinion and the court of appeals agree that the circuit court 

must craft a new injunction.

¶60 In crafting a new injunction, the circuit court must 

adhere to the legal standards for a harassment injunction as

stated in Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 414-15, 407 

N.W.2d 533 (1987), the lead case interpreting Wis. Stat.

§ 813.125, the harassment statute. If an injunction fails to 

meet the criteria in Bachowski, the injunction is "invalid."14 

¶61 According to the Bachowski case, 139 Wis. 2d at 414-

15, upon which the majority openly relies, the proceedings and 

harassment injunction must meet the following requirements:

I. The petitioner being protected by the injunction must 

be specific and named;15

II. The harassing conduct that is the basis for the 

injunction must be set forth;16 

 

14 Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 414.

15 Wis. Stat. § 813.125(5)(a)1.-2. (requiring the name of 

the person who is the alleged victim and the name of the 

respondent in the petition); see Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 412-

13.

16 See Wis. Stat. § 813.125(5)(a)3. (requiring that the 

complaining party show "[t]hat the respondent has engaged in 

harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner"). 

The Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and/or 

Petition and Motion for Injunction Hearing form (form CV-405) 

asks the complaining party to "[s]tate when, where, what 

happened, and who did what to whom." This is largely similar to 

language that the court found to be sufficient notice in 

Bachowski. The Bachowski court stated: "Thus, it would be 

insufficient, for example, pursuant to sec. 813.125(5)(a) for a 

petitioner to simply allege that he or she has been 'harassed or 

intimidated' by the [defendant]." Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 

412-13. 
2011AP2902.ssa

6

III. The specific harassing acts or conduct to be enjoined 

must be either identical to or substantially similar 

to the conduct found to be harassing by the circuit 

court;17 and

IV. An injunction must be "specific as to the acts and 

conduct which are enjoined" such that the defendant 

has notice of what he or she is prohibited from 

doing.18

I

¶62 To assist the circuit court, I begin with the first 

Bachowski criterion: the petitioner and the party protected 

must be specific and named. 

¶63 In the instant case, a real issue exists about who the 

petitioner is and who the protected party is. They need not be 

the same person. 

 

17 "Only the acts or conduct which are proven at trial and 

form the basis of the judge's finding of harassment or 

substantially similar conduct should be enjoined." Bachowski, 

139 Wis. 2d at 414.

See also III Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook, Family Actions, 

Miscellaneous Actions, Harassment FA 18-54 (4th ed. 2011) 

(similarly stating the injunction "must be tailored to 

necessities of particular case"). (The Benchbook states that it 

is not intended that the Benchbooks be cited as independent 

authority.)

18 Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 414. See also III Wisconsin 

Judicial Benchbook, supra note 17, at 18-54 (adhering to 

Bachowski: "The injunction must be specific as to prohibited 

acts and conduct so one enjoined may know what actions to 

avoid.").

Specificity is required because violation of an injunction 

is a criminal offense.
2011AP2902.ssa

7

¶64 The written order names "Board of Regents UW System" 

as the petitioner. In its oral ruling, the circuit court stated 

that Decker was "specifically prohibited from contacting or 

causing any person to contact the UW or its representatives

unless they consent in writing" (emphasis added). I agree with 

the majority opinion that it is "unclear to both Decker and law 

enforcement who the protected party is."19

¶65 The circuit court's injunction appears to include as 

protected parties between 18 individuals (the individual members 

of the Board of Regents) and 200,000 or more individuals (the 

students, staff, and faculty of the university). 

¶66 The lack of clarity of the protected party's identity 

in the circuit court's injunction renders it invalid under the 

first Bachowski criterion: the protected party is undefined and 

unknown. The identity of the protected party must be clear from 

the injunction.

II

¶67 The second Bachowski criterion is that the harassing 

conduct that is the basis for the injunction must be set forth.

 

19 See majority op., ¶49 (listing various potential 

formulations of the protected party from the record in the 

instant case).

The majority opinion lists other parties that may be 

"protected parties" under the circuit court's injunction. 

Majority op., ¶48 n.22.
2011AP2902.ssa

8

¶68 Trespass is the gravamen of the harassing conduct used 

to justify the injunction. Trespass in turn is based on 

Decker's status as a suspended student.

20 

¶69 The circuit court described the trespasses as the 

harassing conduct, as follows:

[T]here are several incidents described as a matter of 

the record here that Mr. Decker, contrary to the clear 

terms of the lawful existing order that is 

established . . . . It specifically says he may not 

enroll in any UW system institution and may not be 

present on any campus without the written consent of 

the chief administrator of that campus. He has done 

so on several occasions without the written consent of 

the administration on the particular campus. . . .

And in my view, that constitutes conduct of a sort 

that is harassing and intimidating.

¶70 According to the circuit court, the harassment was the 

disruption of a meeting at the Stevens Point campus before

Decker's suspension and at least four documented trespasses on 

university land after Decker was suspended as a student, 

including additional disruption of meetings. One of the 

trespasses, leafleting, is not described as being disruptive. 

See majority op. ¶¶4-5, 39-41.

 

20 A suspended student, according to the Wisconsin 

Administrative Code §§ UWS 17.02(16) and UWS 18.11(7)(a), may 

not be present on any campus "without the written consent of the 

chief administrative officer" of that campus and "may [not] 

enter the university lands of any institution without the 

written consent of the chief administrative officer." According 

to § UWS 17.02(17), "university land" is defined as "all real 

property owned by, leased by, or otherwise subject to the 

control of the board of regents . . . ." 
2011AP2902.ssa

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¶71 The majority opinion specifically identifies the 

harassing conduct (which forms the basis for the injunction) as 

trespassing conduct violating the terms and conditions of 

Decker's suspension and the Wisconsin Administrative Code as 

follows:

• Contrary to the terms and conditions of his suspension 

and the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Decker 

trespassed on the UW-Oshkosh campus and distributed 

leaflets at a UW-Oshkosh basketball game. No 

disruption or adverse consequences are described. 

Majority op., ¶7.

• Contrary to the terms and conditions of his suspension 

and the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Decker twice 

trespassed on the campus of UW-Fox Valley by attending 

meetings, during which he was disruptive and was 

forcibly removed by police officers. Majority op., 

¶¶8, 11.

• Contrary to the terms and conditions of his suspension 

and the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Decker 

trespassed by attending a meeting of the Board of 

Regents in Madison and was disruptive. Majority op., 

¶10.

21

 

21 To obtain an order relating to Decker's guns, the circuit 

court and majority opinion rely on Decker's pre-suspension 

conduct at Stevens Point of striking the Chancellor's papers and 

the timing of Decker's purchase of guns. Majority op., ¶42.
2011AP2902.ssa

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¶72 According to the record before us, Decker's suspension 

ended January 1, 2012. 

¶73 I do not speculate as to the present status of 

Decker's suspension. Yet if the suspension no longer exists, 

any harassing conduct created by "trespass" may also no longer 

exist. 

¶74 When the circuit court crafts its new injunction, it 

may need to consider whether trespass in violation of Decker's 

suspension can continue to serve as the basis of harassing 

conduct. 

III

¶75 The third Bachowski criterion is that "[o]nly the acts 

or conduct which are proven at trial and form the basis of the 

[circuit court] judge's finding of harassment or substantially 

similar conduct should be enjoined." Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 

414. 

¶76 As noted above, the harassing conduct the circuit 

court found as the basis for the injunction was Decker's 

trespass as a suspended student and disruption of meetings. As 

the majority opinion notes, the circuit court's injunction was 

not limited to the conduct that forms the basis of the circuit 

court's finding of harassing conduct or similar conduct.22 

¶77 In crafting a new injunction, the circuit court must 

limit the enjoined conduct to the acts or conduct that form the 

basis of the harassment finding or substantially similar 

 

22 Majority op., ¶48 n.22.
2011AP2902.ssa

11

conduct: the trespass as a suspended student and the disruption 

of meetings. 

IV

¶78 The fourth Bachowski criterion is that the injunction 

must be "specific as to the acts and conduct which are 

enjoined," such that the defendant has notice of what he is 

prohibited from doing.23 Law enforcement also needs clarity in 

the terms of an injunction in order to enforce the injunction.24

¶79 The majority opinion notes the “expansive reach" of 

the injunction. Majority op., ¶48 n.22.

¶80 In crafting a new injunction, the circuit court must 

remedy the defects in the original injunction that the majority 

opinion details, namely that the injunction fails to be specific 

about what person or persons Decker may be enjoined from 

contacting and fails to be specific about what property Decker 

is enjoined from entering.25 

 

23 Injunctions must be specific as to the prohibited acts 

and conduct in order for the person being enjoined to know what 

conduct must be avoided. Disobeying an injunction is a criminal 

offense. Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶24, 312 

Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359. 

24 Laws must provide "reasonably clear guidelines for law 

enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." City of Madison v. 

Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 674, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the statute requires 

that the injunction must be sent to "the sheriff or to any local 

law enforcement agency which is the central repository for 

orders and injunctions and which has jurisdiction over the 

petitioner's premises." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(5g).

25 Majority op., ¶48 n.22.
2011AP2902.ssa

12

¶81 As stated previously, the injunction is unclear 

because it can be read to enjoin Decker from contacting 18 

individuals or 200,000.26 

¶82 The injunction is also unclear regarding what property 

Decker is enjoined from entering. Decker was prohibited from 

entering "the University of Wisconsin system, all of its 

campuses, any premises under the control of the Board of 

Regents." 

¶83 The Board of Regents controls 18,000 acres of 

property, with campuses across 25 counties. The UW has 

approximately 1,814 buildings covering 60 million square feet of 

space.27 UW property extends from UW medical facilities across 

the state, including doctor's offices and emergency rooms, to 

conservation tracts and nature preserves, to apartments, to golf 

courses, and so on. 

¶84 How should Decker or law enforcement identify which 

properties are "controlled by" the Board of Regents? 

• The University of Wisconsin Hospital and its medical 

facilities are run by a separate authority that 

includes members of the Board of Regents. May Decker 

 

26 The circuit court in its oral ruling stated that Decker 

is "specifically prohibited from contacting or causing any 

person to contact the UW or its representatives unless they 

consent in writing."

27 Capital Planning & Budget, University of Wisconsin System 

Capital Assets, 

http://www.uwsa.edu/capbud/documents/capbud_description.htm

(last visited June 30, 2014). 
2011AP2902.ssa

13

visit his physician who has an office in one of the 

many university medical facilities across the state?

• May Decker visit a graduate student friend at a UWmanaged dormitory or apartment complex? 

• May Decker attend a theater production at a UW 

theater?

• May Decker patronize one of the multiple retail 

locations of the University of Wisconsin Bookstore?

• May Decker enter property controlled by the University 

of Wisconsin Foundation? 

• May Decker distribute material on or near streets in 

or near a University campus? 

¶85 Thus, neither Decker nor law enforcement can 

understand what conduct is enjoined, both with regard to persons 

Decker cannot contact and to real property Decker cannot enter. 

Without knowing what conduct is enjoined, the circuit court 

cannot determine whether the enjoined behavior is identical to 

or substantially similar to the conduct found harassing, namely 

the third criterion in Bachowski. 

¶86 Thus, the injunction is invalid under the fourth 

Bachowski criterion.

* * * *

¶87 I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit 

court's injunction fails to meet the criteria set forth in 

Bachowski. Under Bachowski, an injunction that fails to meet 

the criteria is invalid. Thus, the majority opinion in effect 

vacates the injunction and advises the circuit court to start 
2011AP2902.ssa

14

over. Circumstances may have changed significantly since 

October 24, 2011, when the injunction was issued. 

¶88 Before I conclude, let me quickly note the issues that 

I do not address.

¶89 I do not address whether the conduct at issue meets 

the statutory definition of harassment under Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125(1)(b).28 "Harassment" is defined as repeated conduct 

that harasses or intimidates another person "and which serves no 

legitimate purpose." Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(b) (emphasis 

added). I do not address the statutory language "serves no 

legitimate purpose."29

 

28 The statutory definition of "harassment" is problematic; 

"harassment" is defined as "acts which harass," a form of the 

very word being defined.

To grant an injunction, the circuit court must find 

reasonable grounds to believe that the person has engaged in 

harassment with the intent to harass or intimidate a named party

and which serves no legitimate purpose. Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125(4)(a)3. 

29 The parties expend considerable effort addressing the 

"legitimate purpose" statutory language. The majority opinion 

takes language out of context from Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 

408, treating the case as saying that "intentionally harassing 

conduct can never serve a legitimate purpose." Majority op., 

¶38.

The majority opinion treats the statutory phrase "which 

serves no legitimate purpose" as surplusage, contravening our 

rules of statutory interpretation. See Crown Castle USA, Inc. 

v. Orion Const. Grp., LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶13, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 

N.W.2d 332.

Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 408, treats the inquiry into 

legitimate purpose as a separate element of harassment, 

declaring:
2011AP2902.ssa

15

¶90 I do not address First Amendment issues, although I 

agree with the court of appeals that there are freedom of speech 

implications presented by the instant case.30 Injunctions carry 

great risks of freedom of speech violations and deserve 

additional scrutiny from courts.31 

 

The definition of harassment further requires that the 

harassing and intimidating acts "serve no legitimate 

purpose." This is a recognition by the legislature 

that conduct or repetitive acts that are intended to 

harass or intimidate do not serve a legitimate 

purpose. Whether acts or conduct are done for the 

purpose of harassing or intimidating, rather than for 

a purpose that is protected or permitted by law, is a 

determination that must of necessity be left to the 

fact finder, taking into account all the facts and 

circumstances. 

The court of appeals opinion reads Bachowski as stating 

that conduct can be harassment only if "done for the purpose of 

harassing or intimidating, rather than for a purpose that is 

protected or permitted by law." Bd. of Regents-UW Sys. v. 

Decker, No. 2011AP2902, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. 

Jan. 24, 2013).

In Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶¶30-31, the court of appeals 

viewed the "no legitimate purpose" language as establishing a 

separate element and concluded that the circuit court found that 

the defendant was "motivated by one thing and one thing only and 

that was to harass," that the circuit court "saw through" the 

defendant's "attempts to manufacture a legitimate purpose," and 

that the circuit court's finding that no legitimate purpose was 

intended was supported by the evidence. 

30 A case should be decided on non-constitutional grounds 

whenever possible. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of 

Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803.

31 See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 

765-66 (1994). For an overview of the potential impact of civil 

harassment injunctions on freedom of speech, see Aaron H. 

Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 Hastings 

L.J. 781 (2013).
2011AP2902.ssa

16

¶91 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

 

The majority opinion intimates that its injunction is akin 

to a "time, place, and manner" restriction that does not offend 

the First Amendment. Majority op., ¶44. The circuit court's 

overbroad injunction bans every manner of "conduct" (which 

includes speech) by Decker at all times and in all places 

controlled by the university.
No. 2011AP2902.ssa

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APPENDIX
No. 2011AP2902.ssa

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No. 2011AP2902.dtp

1

¶92 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring). The majority 

opinion makes a powerful case for the issuance of a harassment 

injunction against Jeffrey Decker (Decker). Decker's campaign 

regarding the use of student segregated fees in the University 

of Wisconsin System has been self-defeating because his tactics 

alienate people who might otherwise share his concerns. 

Whatever Decker's message is, it is completely overshadowed by 

his tactics, which have crossed the line and become 

unreasonable. I concur in the majority opinion because I agree 

that something had to be done.

¶93 I also agree with the majority (and with the 

concurrence of the Chief Justice) that the circuit court's 

injunction is too broad and must be redone. If a remand for 

revision were not part of the majority opinion, I would feel 

obligated to dissent. 

¶94 Having explained my reasons for concurrence, I must 

register my reservations about the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 

§ 813.125. 

¶95 In my view, this statute was never intended to cover 

institutions as well as natural persons. It was intended to 

address a wide variety of harassment problems when people have 

to deal with the irrational conduct of other people. Thus, the 

remedies that must be afforded to an abused spouse, and may be 

afforded to a corporate officer or a member of the University of 

Wisconsin Board of Regents as an individual, are not the same as 

the remedies that may be afforded to everyone who is part of a 

corporation or an educational institution.
No. 2011AP2902.dtp

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¶96 Once the court determines that the broad definition of 

"person"1 applies to an institution as a victim, then necessarily 

it also applies to an institution as a perpetrator. I am 

confident that many people believe some institution, 

association, or body politic or corporate is engaging in a 

course of conduct to harass or intimidate them in a manner that 

serves no legitimate purpose.

¶97 The statute has been interpreted more broadly than I 

would read it in Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 211 

Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997), and now in this 

case. But the legislature has failed to give much guidance on 

how judges should apply the statute in these cases. This lack 

of guidance is bound to spawn future controversy. 

¶98 I respectfully suggest that the legislature review the 

language and effectiveness of all the specialized statutes on 

injunctions and restraining orders in Wis. Stat. ch. 813 and 

consider adopting a new statute for "persons" who are not 

people.

¶99 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

 

1 Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) ("'Person' includes all 

partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate.").
No. 2011AP2902.dtp

1