COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Retired Judge Brown∗

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DOUGLAS MADISON WEEKS, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗∗ BY 

v. Record No. 1939-02-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 JUNE 24, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

James R. Swanson, Judge 

 Anthony F. Anderson (Melissa W. Friedman; 

Stephanie Gacek Cook, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 A jury convicted Douglas Madison Weeks, Jr., of throwing a 

missile at an occupied vehicle and felony assault and battery. 

He contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

strike a juror for cause. Concluding the trial court did not 

err, we affirm the convictions. 

 During voir dire, defense counsel asked whether any juror 

or their relative had been the victim of a crime. Jessica 

 ∗

 Retired Judge J. Howe Brown, Jr., took part in the 

consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code 

§ 17.1-400. 

∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Henley stated that approximately "twelve years" earlier, her 

"best friend's mother was murdered and two years before that her 

father was murdered."1 Defense counsel then asked if that 

experience made Henley feel "uncomfortable in sitting in 

judgement of others." She responded, "Kind of, yes." Defense 

counsel asked, "Do you find that that experience would cause you 

to feel any different if you sit as a juror in this case, you 

might find yourself leaning in favor of one side than the 

other?" Henley responded, "I think it probably would, I'm not 

sure but I think it may." Defense counsel concluded his 

questioning of Henley by asking whether she could put those 

feelings aside after being instructed on the law. She 

responded, "I think I'd feel uneasy." 

 The Commonwealth's attorney asked Henley2 if she was leaning 

for or against any party and she responded: 

No, not right now but I don't mind about 

making, finding guilty or not guilty, and 

then have to worry about it later. Like we 

just consider . . . over and then not think 

I did the wrong thing or, I don't know, I'm 

just kind of nervous about the whole thing. 

(Emphasis added.) The Commonwealth's attorney then asked, 

 1

 Because Henley stated this happened "twelve years ago," we 

conclude she misspoke when she gave the date as "1999" in answer 

to an earlier question. 

2

 The parties stipulated that the references to Ms. Hunter 

on pages 39 and 40 of the trial transcript properly refer to Ms. 

Henley. 
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"putting nerves aside, do you think you'd be able to make a 

decision without letting anyone push you one way or another?" 

Henley responded, "Yes." 

 The defendant moved to strike Henley for cause. He argued 

she was uneasy due to her past experiences and would not be able 

to lay aside that history. The Commonwealth argued that Henley 

was uneasy because she was nervous about making the correct 

decision. The defendant argued her responses showed that she 

would be biased, while the Commonwealth argued her responses 

showed that she was just nervous about making a correct 

decision. 

 The trial court determined that any apparent equivocation 

in Henley's answers resulted from the fact that she was 

conscientious and "nervous and . . . didn't want to make the 

wrong decision." It did not result from her being influenced by 

her past history. The trial court concluded it had no 

reasonable doubt that the juror would be impartial in that case. 

 In reviewing a denial of a motion to strike a juror for 

cause, we consider the entire voir dire, give great deference to 

the trial judge's decision, and do not reverse unless the 

decision constitutes manifest error. Clagett v. Commonwealth, 

252 Va. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1996). The responses of 

juror Henley were susceptible to two interpretations. Counsel 

presented those opposing interpretations of the facts to the 

trial court. 
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 The judge resolved the issue of which of the competing 

interpretations correctly interpreted the meaning of Henley's 

responses. The record supports that finding of fact. George v. 

Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 276, 411 S.E.2d 12, 19 (1991) (no 

error in refusing to exclude juror whose son was pallbearer at 

victim's funeral). After observing Henley's demeanor and 

evaluating her answers to the questions posed, the trial court 

concluded it had no reasonable doubt that she would stand 

impartial to the cause. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 

200, 402 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1991) (trial judge observes and 

evaluates first hand prospective jurors' "'sincerity, 

conscientiousness, intelligence and demeanor'"). 

 The trial judge "is in a superior position to determine 

whether a prospective juror's responses during voir dire 

indicate that the juror would be prevented from or impaired in 

performing the duties of a juror as required by the court's 

instructions and the juror's oath." Green v. Commonwealth, 262 

Va. 105, 115, 546 S.E.2d 446, 451 (2001). The trial court 

concluded it had no reasonable doubt that the juror was "free 

from partiality or prejudice." It applied the proper legal 

standard to its factual finding. Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 

Va. 297, 298, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976). The trial court 
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properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion to 

strike the juror for cause. 

 Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed.