DA 15-0723

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2017 MT 198N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

CYLE KEITH KOKOT,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC 14-257C

Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant

Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant

Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 31, 2017

 Decided: August 15, 2017

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

08/15/2017

Case Number: DA 15-0723
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Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Cyle Keith Kokot appeals an order of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, 

Gallatin County, sentencing him to the Montana State Prison for twenty-five years with 

ten years suspended for one count of sexual assault in violation of § 45-5-502, MCA. We 

address whether the District Court premised its sentencing decision on materially false 

information, and whether the District Court abused its discretion by imposing 

alcohol-related conditions to Kokot’s sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

¶3 In August 2014, Kokot was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual 

intercourse without consent, in violation of § 45-5-503, MCA, for allegedly having sex 

with two minor-age high school students—FS1 and FS2—while Kokot was employed as 

the girls’ high school basketball coach. On September 17, 2014, at his first court 

appearance, the District Court told Kokot to not contact any of the alleged victims or 

witnesses in the case. Despite that order, Kokot contacted FS2 over fifty times, and 

contacted a witness in the case and accused her of lying to law enforcement. On May 1, 

2015, Kokot pleaded guilty to a single charge of sexual assault of FS2 in violation of 

§ 45-5-502, MCA. As part of the presentence investigation, Kokot was required to 
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undergo a psychosexual evaluation in which he described the web of relationships, deceit, 

and improper conduct involving the girls on the basketball team. 

¶4 On September 22, 2015, at the sentencing hearing, the District Court listed a 

number of reasons for its sentence, including: the sexual relationship Kokot admitted to 

with FS1; Kokot’s violation of the trust placed in him by the school district he worked for 

and the parents of his players; Kokot’s abuse of his authority as a basketball coach; and 

his contact with FS2 and a witness in violation of the District Court’s order. Ultimately, 

Kokot was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Montana State Prison with ten years 

suspended, which included a condition requiring Kokot to “not use or possess alcohol . . . 

[or] enter or seek employment at any establishment where alcohol is the chief item of 

sale,” and that Kokot submit to alcohol testing. Kokot timely appealed the sentencing 

order.

¶5 We review whether a sentencing order violates a defendant’s constitutional right 

de novo. State v. Simmons, 2011 MT 264, ¶ 9, 362 Mont. 306, 264 P.3d 706. We review 

probation conditions for abuse of discretion. State v. Leyva, 2012 MT 124, ¶ 15, 365 

Mont. 204, 280 P.3d 252. Abuse of discretion occurs when a sentencing court acts 

arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason. State v. 

Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 7, 353 Mont. 111, 220 P.3d 25.

¶6 Kokot argues on appeal that the District Court violated his due process rights by 

basing its sentencing decision on a misunderstanding of the facts. Kokot maintains he 

never admitted to having a sexual relationship with FS1, and therefore is entitled to a new 

sentencing hearing. In the alternative, Kokot argues the alcohol condition on his sentence 
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lacks any nexus to himself or the crime he committed, and should be struck from the 

sentencing order. The State argues the District Court accurately interpreted the evidence 

presented at the sentencing hearing. The State concedes that the alcohol condition should 

be struck from Kokot’s sentence.

¶7 A defendant’s due process rights include protection against a sentence “predicated 

on misinformation.” State v. Sherman, 2017 MT 39, ¶ 13, 386 Mont. 363, 390 P.3d 158. 

In making the argument that misinformation exists, the defendant has an affirmative duty 

to show that the sentence was premised upon “materially inaccurate or prejudicial” 

information. Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 22, 295 Mont. 306, 983 P.2d 955. Where 

no erroneous information is involved in imposing a sentence, there is no need for a 

reversal. Bauer, ¶ 24. Kokot claims that his references to sexual activity with FS1 were 

recounted in his psychosexual evaluation as a description of the lies he told in order to 

prevent anyone from alerting the authorities about his sexual activity with FS2. After 

reviewing all the evidence, however, the District Court reasonably concluded Kokot had 

indeed engaged in sexual activity with FS1, despite Kokot’s attempt to characterize his 

alleged sexual relationship with FS1 as actually an attempt to cover up his sexual 

relationship with FS2. The record is replete with evidence that supports the District 

Court’s conclusion. Moreover, the District Court’s recitation of the reasons for its 

sentence involved far more than just Kokot’s relationship with FS1. Kokot has failed to 

demonstrate that his sentence was premised on materially inaccurate or prejudicial 

information in violation of his due process rights. Bauer, ¶ 24.
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¶8 The State concedes the sentencing order should be remanded in order to strike the 

conditions prohibiting Kokot from using or possessing alcohol, entering or seeking 

employment at any establishment where alcohol is the chief item of sale, and requiring 

him to submit to alcohol testing. Notwithstanding the State’s concession, however, we 

have previously held: 

[A] standard condition of probation which the Department of Corrections 

adopts by rule, may not conflict with conditions imposed by a sentencing 

court. Thus, a standard condition adopted by the Department of Corrections 

will be included as a condition of a probationary sentence unless the 

District Court determines, in the exercise of its discretion, that a standard 

condition is inappropriate under the sentence it is imposing. We will review 

the sentencing judge’s conclusion that a standard condition should or 

should not be imposed for an abuse of discretion.

Hernandez, ¶ 7. The conditions prohibiting an offender from using or possessing 

alcoholic beverages and illegal drugs, and requiring him to submit to bodily fluid testing 

for drugs or alcohol, are standard conditions of probation which the Department of 

Corrections has adopted by rule. ARM 20.7.1101(9). The District Court here obviously 

did not find these conditions inappropriate since it affirmatively imposed them as 

conditions of Kokot’s sentence. Kokot presents no argument for striking these conditions 

other than contending they fail the nexus test we established in State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 

83, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164.1 However, we held in Hernandez that 

“the Ashby requirement of a nexus to the offender or to the offense does not apply” under 

these circumstances. Hernandez, ¶ 6. We conclude the District Court did not abuse its 

 

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“In imposing conditions of sentence, a sentencing judge may impose a particular condition of

probation so long as the condition has a nexus to either the offense for which the offender is 

being sentenced, or to the offender himself or herself.” Ashby, ¶ 15.
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discretion in imposing the conditions prohibiting Kokot from using or possessing 

alcoholic beverages and illegal drugs, and requiring him to submit to alcohol testing. 

¶9 The District Court’s condition prohibiting Kokot from entering or seeking 

employment at any establishment where alcohol is the chief item of sale has not been 

adopted by the Department of Corrections, is not otherwise authorized by statute, and is 

thus subject to the Ashby nexus test. The District Court made no finding of a nexus

between Kokot or the offense of which he was convicted and this condition, and the State 

has conceded that it should be struck. Therefore, we reverse the District Court with 

respect to the condition prohibiting Kokot from entering or seeking employment at any 

establishment where alcohol is the chief item of sale. 

¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of 

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion 

of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear 

application of applicable standards of review. Having reviewed the briefs and the record 

on appeal, we conclude Kokot has not met his burden of persuasion regarding the length 

of his sentence, and that the District Court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion with 

respect to one of its probation conditions. The sentence imposed is affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to strike the condition prohibiting Kokot 

from entering or seeking employment at any establishment where alcohol is the chief 

item of sale.

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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We Concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ JIM RICE