Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 1 of 4 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
A PPELLANT P RO SE Allenn Peterson New Castle, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana Karl M. Scharnberg Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Allenn Peterson, A

ppellan t -Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana, A

ppelle e -Plaintiff March 18, 2015 Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1408-CR-304 Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Salvador Vazquez, Judge The Honorable Natalie Bokota, Judge Cause No. 45G01-8103-CR-034


### Friedlander, Judge.

[1] Allenn Peterson appeals the denial of hi s pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence, claiming that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 2 of 4 [2] We affirm.

[3] On March 11, 1981, Peterson murdered Robert Watkins and then raped and robbed Watkins’s mother wh en she arrived home later that evening. Peterson was subsequently convicted of murder, cl ass A felony rape, and class B felony robbery. He was sentenced to forty-five years for murder, thirty-five years for rape, and thirty years for robbery. Th e sentences for murder and rape were ordered to be served consecutively. His convictions were upheld on direct appeal and post-conviction relief. See Peterson v. State , 453 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 1983); Peterson v. State , 650 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

[4] On August 4, 2014, Peterson filed a moti on to correct erroneous sentence. The trial court promptly deni ed the motion, noting that the sentence was not erroneous on its face. Peterson now appeals.

[5] A motion to correct erroneous sentence derives from Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1- 15 (West, Westlaw current with all legisl ation of the 2015 First Regular Session of the 119 th General Assembly effective through February 23, 2015): If the convicted person is errone ously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted pe rson. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointi ng out the defect in the original sentence. “The purpose of the statute is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correctin g the occasional er roneous or illegal sentence.” Davis v. State , 937 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied

.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 3 of 4 [6] “[A] motion to correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgme nt imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson v. State , 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004). In other words, use of this statutory motion should be reserved for the correction of “obvious sentencing errors”. Id . at 787 n.3. Claims that require consideration of matters outs ide the face of the sentencing judgment may not be addressed via this type of motion. See, e.g ., Neff v. State , 888 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. 2008); Robinson v. State , 805 N.E.2d 783.

[7] In his motion, Peterson argu ed that the trial court lack ed statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences “because [h is] offenses all derived from a single episode of criminal conduct”. Appellant’s Appendix at 11. He cited Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session of the 119 th General Assembly effect ive through February 23, 2015) in support of his argument, which imposes an aggregate sentencing cap for felony convictions (except convictions for crimes of violen ce) arising out of an episode of criminal conduct.

[8] Peterson’s motion lacks merit for severa l reasons. Most notably, because a determination of whether the crimes ar ose out of an episode of criminal conduct cannot be made without look ing beyond the sentencing judgment 1 to the facts underlying each conviction, ther e is no facially apparent error in

1 In fact, Peterson has not ev en included the sentencing judgment in th e record. In light of the prior appeals, however, we were able to de termine the sentence imposed.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 4 of 4 Peterson’s eighty-year senten ce. The argument, therefor e, may not be raised in a motion to correct sentence.

[9] Furthermore, the statutory provision upon which Peterson relies did not exist until 1994. See Slone v. State , 652 N.E.2d 552, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (the episode of criminal conduct limitation is “part of a legislat ive amendment to the statute which was added in 1994 and whic h represents a prev iously nonexistent restraint upon a trial court’s discretion when imposing consecutive sentences”), trans. denied . Even if it had existed in 1981, the statutory limitation has always been inapplicable to murder.

[10] Judgment affirmed. Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.