IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONY BERNARD MOORER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06CV672-WKW

) [WO]

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION

On 27 July 2006, the plaintiff, ANTHONY MOORER, filed a complaint pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. He filed a Motion

to Amend his complaint on 2 August 2006 (Doc. # 3). Attached to the motion to amend

were the Notice of Right to Sue issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission [“EEOC”] and a copy of Moorer’s charge of discrimination. 

This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Title VII claims only

if he first exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1). Virgo v. Riviera Beach Associates, Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11 Cir. 1994). th

Exhaustion necessarily implies that the claims made in the federal complaint fall within

the scope of the claims asserted before the EEOC and that the scope of the EEOC’s

investigation included the employer’s allegedly wrongful acts. Thus, “[t]he starting point

for determining the permissible scope of a complaint of employment discrimination is the

EEOC charge and resulting investigation. Smith v. Sentry Ins., 674 F.Supp. 1459, 1467

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(D. Ga. 1987),quoting Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Company, 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th

Cir. 1983). 

Moorer’s charge of discrimination alleged that the City of Montgomery

discriminated against him because of his race by (1) suspending him on 4 October 2005

for unapproved absence while declining to suspend a while employee who violated the

same policy, and (2) requiring him “to do jobs that other similarly situated employees are

not required to do”. The charge of discrimination indicates that it was received in the

EEOC’s offices on 27 October 2005.

In contrast, Moorer’s complaint in this court clearly indicates that the “alleged

discrimination occurred on or about April 7, 2005" (Doc. # 1). Further, Moorer alleges

that he was discriminated against because of his race when his supervisor, Bernard

Harris, a black male, “would only let [him] do the high work” and he “was harassed by

Mr. Harris at all times” (Doc. # 1). He also alleged that two other employees were not

forced to do the “high work”. Finally, Moorer alleges that the acts complaint of in this

suit are “[t]ermination of my employment” and “[f]ailure to promote me”.

Although “the scope of the EEOC complaint should not be strictly interpreted," 

Turner v. Orr, 804 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11 Cir. 1986), two unmistakable differences

th

between the charge of discrimination and the federal complaint appear to doom this

court’s jurisdiction:

! a suspension, the focus of the charge before the EEOC, is qualitatively

different from a termination or a promotion; and

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! complaining about events occurring in October 2005 is different from

complaining about events occurring in April 2005 

Indeed, if Moorer intends to complain about events occurring in April 2005, as his

complaint indicates, his charge was not timely - regardless of its content - because 27

October 2005 (the date upon which the charge was received) is more than 180 days after

7 April 2005 (the date upon which the acts of discrimination occurred).

Timely filing a charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to

bringing suit under both Title VII and the ADA. See Section

706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5 (e) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (a); Love v. Pullman,

404 U.S. 522, 523, 30 L. Ed. 2d 679, 92 S. Ct. 616 (1972) ("A

person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... may not maintain a suit for

redress in federal district court until he has first

unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of potential

administrative relief."); . . . . See Jackson v. Seaboard Coast

Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1011 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The

timely filing of an EEOC complaint is a condition precedent

to a Title VII action"). 

Maynard v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 256 F.3d 1259 (11 Cir. 2001). th

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. Moorer’s motion to amend his complaint is GRANTED.

2. On or before 21 August 2006, Moorer shall show cause in writing why his

complaint should not be DISMISSED because this court lacks jurisdiction

to consider his claims.

DONE this 9 day of August, 2006. th

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/s/ Vanzetta Penn McPherson

VANZETTA PENN MCPHERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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