THE ARMY AND MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS:

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

William J. Doll

Steven Metz

Report of a Roundtable Sponsored by

Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College

and the

U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

November 29, 1993
*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717)

245-4078 or DSN 242-4078.
FOREWORD

Effectiveness in multinational peace operations has become

an important issue for the Army. In addition to traditional

peacekeeping to monitor cease-fires and truces, the Army is now

involved in activities such as peace enforcement and the

reconstruction of failed states. While the Army has wellestablished procedures for traditional peacekeeping, it clearly

has much to analyze and learn about these new types of

multinational peace operations.

As part of this process, the Strategic Studies Institute and

the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute sponsored two roundtables at

the Army War College in 1993. Both brought together diverse

experts from within and outside the government, and sought to

clarify key questions and problems rather than provide definitive

answers. To encourage frank and open discussion, the roundtables

operated on a nonattribution basis.

The first roundtable examined grand strategy and foreign

policy. It dealt with issues such as the future of the United

Nations and U.S. objectives in Third World conflict. The second

was at the level of military strategy and operations, focusing on

the concerns of regional combatant commands and U.S. components

in multinational forces. This is the report of the second

roundtable.

This report is not a verbatim transcript of discussion at

the roundtable, but an attempt to capture the essence of the

debate and identify core issues which emerged. The Strategic

Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a

contribution to the ongoing analysis of the Army role in

multinational peace operations.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM J. DOLL is Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic

Studies Institute. He holds a B.A. in political science from

Michigan State University and a J.D. from Mercer University. He

is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

and the Army War College. LTC Doll is a Georgia National

Guardsman. A Judge Advocate General's Corps officer in the

Active Guard/Reserve program, he has had active duty assignments

as an air cavalry officer with the 101st Airborne Division in

Vietnam and as a staff officer at First U.S. Army Headquarters.

He as also served with the State Area Command, Georgia Army

National Guard, and as National Guard Advisor to the Judge

Advocate General's School. His most recent assignment was as a

National Security Fellow at Harvard University. LTC Doll is coauthor of A Blue Helmet Combat Force.

STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. Prior to this, he

held appointments as Associate Professor of Low Intensity

Conflict and Third World Studies at the Air War College, and

Professor of International Relations and National Security

Affairs at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He

has also taught at several universities and been a consultant to

political organizations and campaigns. Dr. Metz holds a B.A. and

M.A. in international studies from the University of South

Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins

University. He is the author of many monographs and articles on

world politics, military strategy, and national security policy.
SUMMARY

Since current U.S. policy stresses multilateral peace

operations, the military services are attempting to better

understand this type of activity. To contribute to this process,

the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army College and the U.S.

Army Peacekeeping Institute sponsored two roundtables in late

1993 which brought together experts from the strategic community.

The first examined grand strategic issues; the second, problems

of a regional combatant commander and the commander of the U.S.

contingent of a multinational force. This is the report of the

second roundtable.

Recent peace operations suggest a number of persistent

problems:

• Dual loyalties, ulterior motives, hidden agendas, dual

chains of command, and constrained terms of reference among the

contingents in a multinational force;

• Weak understanding of Third World conflicts and wavering

commitment on the part of the United States;

• The tendency of the United States to dominate a coalition

once it is committed.

The roundtable participants considered changes in attitudes

the most pressing task for the Army. Leaders must understand and

value peace operations. Most of the roundtable's recommendations

for U.S. commanders in peace operations concern intellectual

challenges:

• Seek clarity concerning endstates, capabilities,

parameters, rules of engagement, procedures, and objectives.

• Coordinate and synchronize with other national military

contingents, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations,

and U.N. headquarters before and during a crisis. Encourage the

development of combined doctrine, procedures, and training.

• Understand the conflict using new methods of conflict

assessment and planning.

• Understand national contingent capabilities and leaders'

personalities.

• Institutionalize staff experience with peace operations.

Roundtable participants encouraged further analysis of key

issues:

• Profile of successful multinational force commanders;

• The process of force structuring used by the United
Nations;

• The notion of "stand off" peace operations;

• Techniques to assess the resolvability of a conflict or

its ripeness for resolution;

• Adequacy of the Joint Strategic Planning Process for

multinational peace operations.

The roundtable focused on the concerns of a U.S. military

commander anticipating near-term involvement in a peace

operation. Full effectiveness, however, also depends on long-term

changes. The ideas discussed at the roundtable suggest a program

to improve Army support to multilateral peace operations. This

would have four objectives:

• A healthy intellectual environment for improvements in

understanding and capability;

• Assignment of top-quality personnel;

• Mature doctrine, planning procedures, and training;

• A holistic perspective.
THE ARMY AND MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS:

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Introduction.

International cooperation to resolve crises can lessen the

burden on the United States and disperse responsibility for

global stability, thus leading to a more frugal national security

strategy. Multinational peace operations, most under the aegis of

the United Nations, have become one important form of such

security cooperation. Current U.S. policy stresses multinational

peace operations1

. As a result, the military services are

attempting to improve doctrine, training, and procedures. This

first requires a deeper understanding of the problems associated

with this type of activity.

Traditionally, peace operations are not a strong suit of the

U.S. Army. With great deliberation, the modern Army was designed

for warfighting. Unit for unit and individual for individual, it

is probably the most effective land combat force in history, a

finely honed tool for the use or threat of violence. Given the

inherent difficulties of preserving this proficiency in a time of

declining resources, it is easy to see multinational peace

operations as a distraction. They demand time and money needed to

retain warfighting skill and post uncomfortable and difficult

intellectual challenges. For some critics, it is simply

unrealistic to expect a solider to be both effective warfighter

and talented peacemaker.2

Faced with these problems, many Army leaders might prefer to

avoid multinational peace operations all together. Most, however,

recognize their potential importance and are committed to

increasing the Army's contribution. The key is preserving

warfighting skill while augmenting effectiveness at peace

operations. Warfighting and peace operations must not become

alternatives but compatible and symbiotic techniques aimed at a

common goal. To complete this union, Army leaders must fully

understand peace operations, their potential and problems. This

is not easy. Multinational peace operations themselves are

changing rapidly, making old wisdom obsolete. Like any moving

target, peace operations can be mastered, but only by

deliberately developed skill.

During the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping did help

resolve conflicts, but only under special conditions.3

 If the

antagonists in a conflict were superpower clients or did not want

outside intervention, the U.N. was helpless. For most Third World

conflicts, stalemate in the Security Council prevented U.N.

action and limited peacekeeping to the periphery of the

international system. Only the dogged determination of U.N.

officials and nations such as Canada, Austria, Australia and the

Scandinavian countries gave peacekeeping any utility at all.
When the cold war ended, it seemed peacekeeping's utility

would expand dramatically. As the United Nations successfully

intervened in a spate of festering Third World conflicts,

peacekeeping became a true growth industry. For every U.N.

peacekeeping force deployed, there were two, three, or four other

nations clamoring for multinational involvement. This change was

also qualitative as traditional peacekeeping evolved into "second

generation peace operations."4 While traditional peacekeeping was

usually monitoring of a negotiated cease-fire or truce by a

neutral multinational force, second generation operations--

championed by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali--

included more intrusive actions such as coalition peace

enforcement in violent environments and the attempted

reconstruction of "failed states" facing what Andrew S. Natsios

calls "complex humanitarian emergencies."5 Reflecting changes in

the notion of national sovereignty, coercive international

intervention will likely remain an important element of the

future security environment.6

This expansion and evolution of peacekeeping initially

spawned great expectations. Optimists, both within and outside

governments, considered multinational peace operations a panacea

for Third World conflict, a model for mature cooperative

security, and the fruition of dreams spun by U.N. founders. But

as rapidly as these dizzy expectations emerged, they were

shattered by failure in the Balkans and Somalia. Suddenly, the

world community questioned the effectiveness of multinational

peace operations and the Clinton administration--initially an

ardent advocate of a more active U.N.--took a second, more

critical, look.7 With the demise of Secretary of Defense Les

Aspin and the withdrawal of the nomination of Clinton confidant

Morton Halperin to the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Peacekeeping and Democracy, peace operations lost

two of their strongest proponents.8 While calls for U.N.

involvement persisted among the conflict-ridden nations of the

Third World, support from the rest of the world faded and 1993

became, according to Madeleine K. Albright, the U.N.'s "summer of

discontent."9

Deflation of unrealistic expectations is often rapid and

severe. This seems to hold for multinational peace operations.

Driven by the horrors of Somalia and Bosnia, heady optimism

disintegrated into debilitating pessimism.10 But, as is

frequently the case, extremism is misguided; the truth lies

somewhere between euphoria and disillusionment. We now need a

sober, realistic, and balanced examination of multinational peace

operations. The world must understand that they cannot solve all

conflict, but can be a useful adjunct to diplomacy and

humanitarian relief. The key is to both understand the

limitations of multinational peace operations and improve their

effectiveness. The U.S. Army must play a role in this. The

question is: How?

A full answer will take extensive study, debate and
analysis. To contribute to this process, the Strategic Studies

Institute and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute brought

together experts from the strategic community in two roundtables

in late 1993. The first dealt with grand strategy, covering

issues such as the future architecture of the international

system and trends within the United Nations.11 The second

discussed the concerns of a commander of a regional combatant

command (CINC) supporting a multinational peace operation and the

commander of the U.S. contingent of a multinational force. This

is the report of the second roundtable.

Participants came from within the government and outside it

(a participant list is an appendix to this report). To facilitate

the free flow of ideas, discussion was non-attribution. This

report is not a verbatim transcript of the proceedings, but an

attempt to capture the issues raised and suggest some

conclusions.

Morning Session: Case Studies.

The recurring theme of the roundtable was the importance

(and difficulty) of cooperation in multinational peace

operations. Somalia, according to one participant, proves Ben

Franklin's observation, "We must indeed all hang together or,

most assuredly, we shall all hang separately." Cooperation--

between the military services, between the military and

nonmilitary agencies, between government and nongovernment

organizations, and among nations--may not guarantee success in an

operation, but its absence nearly always assures failure.

This theme pervaded the morning session which discussed

"lessons learned" from recent peace operations. The first topic

was the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).12

UNTAC's primary role was conducting the May 1993 elections. Since

these occurred and led to a government with wide legitimacy,

UNTAC is usually considered a success. Many humanitarian relief

organizations, however, felt that UNTAC did little to repair

Cambodia's infrastructure and prepare for sustained economic

reconstruction. A participant suggested this overlooked the

logical sequence of conflict resolution during peace operations.

The United Nations had to first help create a legitimate

government able to seek international reconstruction assistance.

To ask a multinational peace force to monitor an election and

cease-fire in a war-torn nation and simultaneously rebuild

economic infrastructure is simply too much. Besides, UNTAC's

mandate from the U.N. Security Council emphasized the elections,

not infrastructure.

Like all multinational peace operations, UNTAC suffered from

"dual loyalties." National contingents in multinational peace

operations represent both the United Nations and their own

country. They thus have two chains of command, one running to the

multinational force commander and the other to their national
authorities. Problems arise when these two loyalties conflict.

Cambodia showed that military leaders must recognize the motives

and interests of participating states since these affect the

capabilities and autonomy of national military contingents. Some

contingents in Cambodia could not undertake risky actions without

direct approval from their national authorities, thus affecting

the missions they could be assigned. The terms of reference used

by each national contingent may not be explicit or public. This

forces headquarters planners to discover operational parameters

through trial and error. As a result, terms of reference are as

important as inherent military capabilities in determining how

national contingents can be used by the force commander.

Similarly, national contingents may have hidden agendas or

ulterior motives that only become clear over time. This is

especially true of contingents from nations with direct political

or economic interests in a conflict. The resulting problems

cannot always be rectified before an operation. Additionally, the

participation of a nation may be so politically important that

the United Nations and the U.N. force commander accept highly

constrained terms of reference.

Hidden agendas, ulterior motives, dual chains of command,

and constrained terms of reference are more pervasive in a

traditional peacekeeping operation such as Cambodia than in peace

enforcement.13 The closer a conflict is to outright war, the more

hidden agendas, ulterior motives, and the like are sublimated to

the good of the coalition. Thus partners in a warfighting

coalition will accept U.S. dominance more readily than in a

peacekeeping operation. The longer a conflict drags on, the less

clear the ultimate goals, or the more complex the political

motives of the participants in a multinational force, the more

these problems will erode the effectiveness of the force.

Drawing multinational forces from states without vested

interests in a conflict or region would minimize these problems,

but, with the exception of a handful of traditional peacekeeping

countries, disinterested states willing to undertake the human

and economic burdens of peace operations are scarce. Force

developers must often choose between knowledgeable soldiers from

nations with a definite political agenda and politically

disinterested but less knowledgeable ones. States familiar with a

region, its habits, terrain, and politics, usually have a bias or

vested national interest. Examples include the Slavic contingents

involved in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia and the

Italians in Somalia. Familiarizing uninterested national

continents with the peculiarities of a region is possible in

traditional, slowly-developing peacekeeping, but difficult in

faster-developing peace enforcement actions.

One reason nations contributing to a peacekeeping force

often insist on U.S. involvement is that we generally lack

geopolitical ambitions where such operations take place. This

follows the old logic that a rich man should make an honest
politician because his wealth places him beyond corruption. An

absence of geopolitical ambitions, however, does not always imply

an absence of political bias. Equally, a lack of identifiable

interests may also result in a weak level of American commitment

and little staying power. Clearly, then, U.S. involvement is a

mixed blessing. This even holds at the tactical level. While the

United States may have no territorial aspirations in a Third

World conflict, U.S. forces quickly become the center of

attention, both positive and negative. Americans are thus

vulnerable to hostage taking. If this occurs, the United States

tends to turn the operation into a bilateral confrontation as in

Somalia. To avoid such problems, multinational force commanders

often attempt to multilateralize a hostage situation by

immediately involving elements and individuals from nations other

than that of the hostage. A force commander in a relatively

slow-developing crisis can do this; it is more difficult in

rapidly developing crises.

Among the reasons UNTAC succeeded was its focus on elections

and avoidance of "mission creep"--the expansion of tasks and

objectives beyond the original terms of reference. Mission creep

could easily have occurred when the Khmer Rouge began obstructing

the electoral process. Some members of UNTAC supported using

force to enter Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. UNTAC decided,

though, that the election could succeed anyway so there was no

justification for asking the Security Council to expand the

original mandate. Given such complex decisions and delicate

balances, the UNTAC force commander General Sanderson was vital,

especially in preserving the mission's focus following the Khmer

Rouge's withdrawal from the electoral process. While Sanderson

was the "right man at the right time," it is difficult to

extrapolate any sort of general profile of a multinational force

commander from one case. A comparative study of multinational

force commanders would be useful.

Because of dual loyalties and vested interests, the Security

Council and Secretary-General must be brutally frank in composing

a multinational force. An assessment of the potential

contribution of a nation must examine not only military

capabilities, but also historic and political baggage. To ask

Germany, for example, to participate in peace operations in the

former Yugoslavia would be a political error. Although the

Secretariat can assess political inclinations, an effective

multinational military staff is needed to judge military

aptitudes. Furthermore, combining political disinterest with

specific regional knowledge suggests the need for a formal U.N.

training program. This has often been discussed as a means to

close the "capability/acceptability gap," but received little

serious support from key organizations and states. A feasible

first step would be construction of a basic data base of military

capabilities to help the U.N. staff compose forces.

The conflict in Bosnia illustrates the U.S.' difficulty in

understanding Third World conflict. The logic driving events
there might be twisted and complex, but is nonetheless clear. Our

inability to frame a coherent Bosnia policy grows from a failure

to understand the historic, political, and ethnic origin of the

conflict.14 The Bosnian war, after all, can be traced back 600

years. Similarly, negotiations between clans and factions in

Somalia often swirl around events from half a century or more

ago.

Luckily, most European leaders understand the complexities

of the Balkan conflict, and serve as brakes on outside

intervention. In this case, knowledge breeds caution. In fact,

detailed understanding of a region may help identify truly

unresolvable conflicts or, at least, ones not ripe for

resolution.15 Such knowledge must be provided to the Security

Council so that it can assess when and where to intervene. It

would be helpful if the Army could preserve and develop the

analytical skills to provide sophisticated analysis of regional

conflicts including frank assessments of the potential for

conflict resolution. Foreign Area Officers would form the core of

such effort. The result would be better advice to national

security decisionmakers.

The opportunity to do this will arise again. Around the

world, groups with distinct ethnic identities and traditional

territories but without a history of statehood are seeking

independence or autonomy. The former Soviet Union, in particular,

is rife with such movements. Their pleas are emotionally

powerful, but politically unresolvable. Any fragile states they

create in conjunction with outside intervention will have

difficulty surviving the withdrawal of peacekeeping or peace

enforcement forces. There is a persistent danger, then, of

overextending the U.N.'s peacekeeping capability despite urging

of restraint from the United States and other member nations.

 The real danger, however, may be less overextension by the

United States than disillusionment. Americans simply do not care

what happened decades or centuries ago in the Balkans or Somalia

and certainly believe American soldiers should not be placed at

risk because of ancient and incomprehensible grudges. The

perception that many Third World antagonists lack a just or

logical cause can generate frustration and fuel isolationism. The

only buffer is solid leadership based on U.S. concern with the

symbolism of violence. We seek an international system based on

the peaceful resolution of conflict. Ethnic violence, if allowed

to become normal and accepted behavior, challenges this. Even so,

the world response to regional conflict based on primal identity

should not be direct military intervention, but sanctions,

blockades, and quarantines--"stand-off peacekeeping."

It is not clear that the United States can participate in a

multinational peace operation without dominating it. One

participant noted that in the Somalia operation, other members of

the coalition were ambivalent about the appropriate American

role.16 Many wanted us only to provide logistics, communications,
and intelligence. Most Americans, though, feel the United States

is obliged to lead peace operations even if they are not sure

why. This is a direct reflection of a larger debate over the

American purpose which pits those who see a special U.S. mission

to construct a new world order against those who support a more

limited foreign policy based on tangible national interests

rather than systemic ideals.17

Given the fragility of American public support for peace

operations, we must test potential crises for resolvability and

political marketability. At the same time, the United States

should, according to one roundtable participant, outgrow or

transcend its obsession with casualties and admit that the ideals

undergirding peace operations are worth certain costs. Small

nations such as Ireland, Denmark, and Canada have long suffered

casualties in peace operations without faltering support.

American leaders must thus actively build support for peace

operations. Still, there is a problem of balance. While few

nations would be willing to provide peacekeepers if the United

States refused, other nations tend to abdicate leadership when

the United States becomes involved. This limits our ability to

play a constrained role; the only options seem to be leadership

or noninvolvement.

Afternoon Session: Working Groups.

During the afternoon session, working groups analyzed

specific issues encountered in multinational peace operations.

Each working group identified key problems, suggested solutions,

and then reported back to the plenary session of the roundtable.

The issues were: (1) planning procedures; (2) command and

control; (3) interface among organizations and agencies; and, (4)

conflict resolution and indicators of success.

Planning Procedures.

The first working group stressed that planning for peace

operations must be interagency and multinational with

contributions from the military, government political organs, and

humanitarian organizations (both governmental and

non-governmental). Clear strategic objectives are the foundation

of sound planning, but in peace operations, objectives are always

a composite blending those of the U.N. Security Council, nations

participating in the operation, and other organizations. The U.N.

Secretary-General can play a powerful role in shaping objectives

and building consensus, but usually does not have goals separate

from those of member states. This heterogeneity of political

goals affects operations. Military planners must understand this

as they complete an "estimate of the situation."

The working group then focused on five questions:

Are existing planning procedures such as OPLANS and campaign
planning adequate for peace operations? For purely military

planning, existing procedures are adequate. Their utility

declines during interagency planning where informal, even ad hoc

procedures often prove most valuable. To link strategic and

operational planning, the multinational force commander must be

involved in the strategic-level planning that defines ultimate

political objectives and structures the force--a role similar to

that of a U.N. CINC. Strategic planning procedures are less

useful. To be more effective in multinational peace operations,

the United States should reevaluate the Joint Strategic Planning

System (JSPS), especially the apportionment of forces through the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).18 This may still be

adequate, but its suitability in the post-cold war strategic

setting should at least be analyzed.

Should primary responsibility for U.S. planning rest with

unified commands? The unified commands--in conjunction with the

Joint Staff--should be preeminent in military planning for peace

operations. But, the CINC's planning staff must coordinate with

humanitarian organizations. Diplomatic concerns enter the

planning of unified commands through the CINC's political advisor

(POLAD). Cooperation with humanitarian organizations is vital,

but necessarily less formal and institutionalized. The goal

should not simply be unity of purpose, but unity of effort. The

unified command should have primary responsibility for all U.S.

planning if the military is the leader of the operation.

Currently, the unified commands vary widely in experience with

peace operations. The Central Command (CENTCOM) has extensive

expertise and skill at the interagency process derived from its

involvement in Somalia and location in the continental United

States. This is not always matched by the other unified commands.

A better way to manage expertise across the Department of Defense

is needed.

What type of planning procedures do non-DOD agencies use?

Other government agencies do both strategic and

situation-dependent planning but this is not closely coordinated

between agencies. These organizations usually send out assessment

teams to acquire basic information. The planning that results is

resource-based. Organizations such as the Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance of the Agency for International Development

support other humanitarian organizations which, in turn, provide

on-the-ground relief. There is an extensive audit trail to assure

funds are used effectively, efficiently, and legally.

What are the most common types of planning problems? The

core problems are not in the mechanics of planning, but in

confusing lines of authority and inadequate coordination. These

include:

• Lack of clearly defined objectives leading to an absence

of clearly defined military missions.

• Lack of clearly defined political end-states or
definitions of success.

• Shortage of doctrine and expertise for deliberate

planning.

• Confusion on lines of authority, and command and control,

including the international law of peace operations.

• Absence of clear, widely understood U.S. national security

strategy or policy on multinational peace operations; absence of

a standing interagency planning group for peace operations.19

• Weak methods for coordination at all levels.

What questions warrant further analysis?

• Should we create a formal planning process for peace

operations separate from the joint strategic planning process?

• Should the military be the lead agency in such a process?

• How effective is the National Security Council at

integrating U.S. Government activity in peace operations? Can its

effectiveness be improved?

• How can Department of Defense planning be harmonized with

U.N. headquarters and various multinational forces?

• What is the appropriate role of regional organizations?

• How can the planning process be flexible yet prevent

"mission creep" or "mission shrink"?

• What is the proper role for public opinion and the media?

Command and Control.

This working group dealt with several key questions.

What is the doctrinal chain of command for U.S. forces in a

multinational peace operation? The members of the working group

found little guidance in existing doctrine, so they proposed a

solution (Figure 1). This is similar to the command and control

system used by all nations in multinational peace operations. The

key characteristic is the dual chain of command running to the

United Nations and to national authorities.

Recent reform proposals in the U.N. would place political

representatives of the Secretary General at all levels of

command. They would serve as "political commissars" detailed to a

commander but responsible to the U.N. Secretariat. Resistance to

this idea among member nations is an indication of ambivalence

about strengthening the Secretary-General's ability to control
peace operations.

The roundtable participants disagreed on the importance of

the direct command link between military contingents and their

national authorities. A participant with extensive experience in

peace operations felt that this should be minimal and used for

reporting rather than for actual command and control. When a

contingent is deployed with a U.N. force, national authorities

may withdraw it, but should not exercise daily command. Other

participants felt that this was unrealistic. To ask a contingent

commander to give greater weight to the U.N. than his national

authorities is to expect him to disregard a lifetime of ingrained

loyalties and obligations. The notion of a multinational force

transcending national considerations is, at best, an ideal

attainable only by the creation of a supra-national U.N. force.

Support for such a force is limited among member states. For most

member states, better a weak, dependent, and pliable U.N. than a

stronger, autonomous one which might act against national

interests. This tension between supra-national and nation

concerns is a persistent one which will always flavor the

decisions of a U.S. commander in peace operations.

The extent of command intervention by national authorities

is determined by the clarity of the initial terms of reference.
If clear and coherent strategic objectives exist, national

authorities will be willing to defer to the multinational force

commander. If the terms of reference or strategic objectives are

ambiguous or subject to disagreement, national authorities will

retain closer control over their deployed forces. In addition,

the operational environment affects the authority given a

multinational force commander. When violence is limited,

constraints on a force commander are minimal. As hostility

escalates, the authority of the force commander declines. In

peace enforcement operations which emulate war, the authority of

the commander again rises. (See Figure 2.)

During recent peace operations contingents often waited for

approval from national authorities before executing orders from

the multinational force commander. This appears to be a new

development arising from improved communications and changes in

the political environment.

What sort of C3 problems occur between a U.S. contingent

commander and multinational force commander? Most problems stem

from failure to craft an overall strategic concept for the

operation. Other problems include:

• Difficulties caused when national contingents have greater

C3

I capability than higher headquarters. An American unit, for

example, will nearly always have greater intelligence
capabilities than the rest of the multinational force combined.

This gives the U.S. contingent more potential for autonomous

activities and can generate strains between the contingent

commander and the multinational force commander.

• National contingents may add conditions to the rules of

engagement developed by the force commander.

• Language differences can generate misunderstandings,

especially in the politically charged atmosphere of peace

operations where nuances often take on great importance. This can

be minimized by confirmatory memos and briefings as well as

"repeat back communications" through which subordinate units

repeat back directives and guidance to insure comprehension.

What types of problems arise during the collection,

analysis, and dissemination of intelligence during peace

operations? The United Nations avoids the word "intelligence"

since it connotes spying and other intrusive activities. Instead,

it prefers "information." What most militaries mean by

"intelligence," however, is not "information." A major problem

for the United States is sanitization of intelligence for

dissemination to other coalition partners. This must consider

protection of sources and assets as well as political

sensitivities. A force commander must also use information

provided by nongovernment organizations (including the media)

without compromising them or jeopardizing their security. To be

more effective, the U.N. must overcome its discomfort with

intelligence, especially in the type of enforcement operations

described in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. According to Richard

Connaughton, these may not require developing an organic

intelligence-gathering capability for the U.N., but rather

greater intelligence sharing among the permanent members of the

Security Council.20 In any case, it will remain politically

infeasible to collect strategic intelligence at U.N.

headquarters. This means the U.N. must continue to rely on

national suppliers for intelligence.

Interface.

This working group considered the following questions:

What are the procedures for improving coordination among

U.S. Government agencies in a peace operation? The first step is

a clear sense of purpose, balancing objectives, strategies, and

resources. The existing interagency process provides a

foundation. Manuals and doctrine should be shared among agencies

and each should have a dedicated group to concentrate expertise

and experience. Interface should be permanent and continuing

rather than periodic. At the level of grand strategy and national

policy, the National Security Council should provide

coordination.
What are the procedures for encouraging coordination among

the national contingents in a U.N. peacekeeping force? The United

States should send the best possible liaison personnel to work

with other national contingents in a multinational force. The

U.S. contingent commander must assure this. The United States

should encourage the development of common doctrine and training

among contingents likely to participate in a multinational force.

Training is especially important. The Army has long recognized

the warfighting value of combined arms training and, more

recently, joint training. This should be applied to peace

operations. Finally, the United States should demand mission

clarification and explanation of the limitations on various

national contingents at the outset of an operation. This will

probably have to take place at U.N. headquarters rather than at

the multinational force level.

What are the procedures for encouraging coordination between

a U.S. military contingent and nongovernment organizations during

humanitarian relief operations? This problem reflects the large

number of relief organizations involved in a major operation. In

Somalia, for example, there were 78. The military must better

understand the needs and philosophies of nongovernment

organizations and the functions of organizations such as the

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance which links government and

nongovernment organizations. Whenever possible, military

operations should be subordinate to and complement diplomatic,

political, and humanitarian efforts. Put in military terminology,

humanitarian affairs are the primary effort and military activity

the supporting effort in most peace operations. This requires a

fundamental change in attitude since trained warfighters must

understand that the ultimate objective of peace operations is not

to seize, defend, or deter, but to save, sustain, and comfort.

In any peace operation, there will probably be

nongovernmental humanitarian groups which reject cooperation with

the military lest they be "tainted" or appear to lose neutrality.

This cannot be avoided, but can be accommodated. Development of a

permanent corps of peace operations experts within the military

would ease cooperation with nongovernment agencies and

organizations. While it is not clear how these experts should be

identified, organized, and trained, we must, according to a

roundtable participant, "not only develop experience, but

institutionalize it."

Some roundtable participants were uncomfortable with the

notion of subordinating the military to humanitarian relief

organizations. While the two share interests, their objectives

are not identical. The military is an element of U.S. national

security policy, while nongovernment organizations, by

definition, are not even when U.S.-Government financed. This

means that subordinating military concerns to those of relief

organizations might be a useful goal, but should not be an

ironclad principle (and may entail legal complications). In some

cases, lack of cooperation between military and humanitarian
organizations grows less from misunderstanding than a real

divergence of purpose. This can be controlled, but not

transcended. In fact, the most crucial distinction between the

military and nongovernment humanitarian organizations is scope.

Military involvement in peace operations should be limited and

close-ended. That of humanitarian organizations should be

long-term, aimed at permanent national reconstruction rather than

short-term amelioration of conflict.

Conflict Resolution and Indicators of Success.

This working group considered resumption of services such as

electricity, mail, and a functioning legal and law enforcement

system--important indicators of success. But, it might be

countered, these services may not be "normal" in the type of

states which require multinational peace operations. For much of

the Third World, the normal level of corruption and inefficiency

is higher than in developed nations. Thus normality as it exists

in the developed world is not a useful indicator of success for a

peace operation. In any case, the strategic endstate should be

clarified before planners can develop indicators of success. This

endstate should be a condition, not a date. In general, the

indicator of success will vary from operation to operation, and

is usually defined by the body or organization authorizing the

mission.

Findings.

The most pressing tasks for the Army are not changes in

procedures, doctrine, force structure, organization, or training,

but in attitudes. Army leaders at all echelons must understand

peace operations. When peace operations are a valued part of the

Army's function, then changes in procedures, doctrine, force

structure, organization, and training will flow naturally and

smoothly.

Following this, most of the roundtable's recommendations

involve intellectual challenges. Specifically, U.S. commanders

involved in peace operations should:

Seek clarity concerning endstates, capabilities, parameters,

rules of engagement, procedures, and objectives.

Coordinate and synchronize with other national military

contingents, government agencies, nongovernment organizations,

and U.N. headquarters. The Department of Defense and military

services should develop and practice methods of coordination

before crises emerge. These can then be adapted to specific

conditions and specific coalition partners. Pre-crisis combined

training is vital. The roundtable participants did not discuss

coordination with the intelligence community or with local

authorities in a crisis area.
Understand the conflict. Any conflict involves a wide number

of parties, each with distinct capabilities, objectives, and

perspectives. Most conflicts represent the culmination of a long

chain of events. The history of a conflict is thus germane to its

present and future. Normal military procedures for the

intelligence preparation of the battlefield do not provide

guidelines for this type of assessment. This indicates a need for

innovative methods of conflict assessment and planning.

Understand contingent capabilities and leaders'

personalities when building a force for peace operations. The

process of force structuring must consider the capabilities and

limitations of each national contingent and its commander.

Admittedly, building a force is more the task of the U.N.

secretariat than an American CINC, but the regional understanding

which exists in the staff of a unified command must be

incorporated into the U.S. input to the force structuring

process.

Institutionalize peace operations experience at the staff

level. CINCs and the Joint Staff should consider forming

permanent cells for planning peace operations. Since these would

perform pre-crisis coordination as well as crisis planning, they

should include representatives from all major staff directorates

(J-1 through J-8) as well as political advisers.

The roundtable participants did not make recommendations for

the training or composition of a U.S. force involved in peace

operations. Nor did they consider the formation of dedicated

units for peace operations.

A number of concepts and issues warrant further analysis:

• Profile of successful multinational force commanders.

• The process of force structuring used by the United

Nations.

• The notion of "stand off" peace operations.

• Techniques to assess the resolvability of a conflict or

its ripeness for resolution.

• Adequacy of the Joint Strategic Planning Process for

multinational peace operations.

• Alternative formal planning systems

Conclusion: A Program For Action.

As our post-cold war national security strategy coalesces,
the United States may conclude that multinational peace

operations are not as useful as they seemed in the heady days of

the early 1990s. That is a decision for our top policymakers.

Unless such a decision is made, the U.S. military should

implement programs to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in

multinational peace operations. As the service with the greatest

traditional concern for peace operations, the Army should lead

this process.21

The roundtable focused on issues and actions of interest to

a U.S. commander preparing for a peace operation next month or

next year. We must also consider the future. Ultimate

effectiveness and efficiency depends on a long-term program for

action. As part of this, the U.S. military should dedicate itself

to four objectives, all attainable within a 5-year period:

A healthy intellectual environment. Senior leaders must take

peace operations seriously. Skill and expertise--even if not the

same as those required for warfighting--must be nurtured. Success

in peace operations should be valued by promotion and command

selection boards as much as success with large troop units. Peace

operations must be debated throughout the military services,

particularly within the Army. Healthy criticism of Army

shortcomings should be encouraged. Creativity should be stressed

rather than adherence to precedent. Peace operations should be

exercised at the Army's combat training centers and form a vital

part of the curricula of the military schools, from basic courses

to the war colleges. Finally, the Army should actively and

enthusiastically learn from other countries with experience in

multinational peace operations.22

Assignment of high quality personnel. Assignments involving

peace operations should receive a high priority. Those who serve

successfully in these positions should be rewarded. Care should

be taken that only top quality officers and soldiers work on

peace operations, whether in staff positions or in the field. A

highly skilled senior officer should be responsible for

development and implementation of this program for action.

Various staffs including the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and the

staffs of the unified and specified commands should develop

permanent peace operations planning cells.

Mature doctrine, planning procedures, and training. Current

doctrine--both Army specific and joint--is backward looking in

that it focuses on traditional peacekeeping rather than second

generation peace operations. It should be rebuilt from the ground

up. The Army's FM 100-23 and Joint Pub 3-07.3 are good starts,

but must be further developed. Planning procedures should imbue

peace operations with the high degree of coordination required

for success. These should be interagency as well as joint.23

Training for peace operations should occur at all levels,

including senior staff. There should be a regular program ranging

from tactical field training to high-level staff exercises or,

for lack of a better word, wargames. The growing simulation and
computer capability of the Army should be adapted to this. All

training should be done in cooperation with other governmental

agencies, nongovernment organizations, and other nations.

Coordination should be a persistent characteristic of training,

not a program. Since such training would create a new demand for

scarce resources, a macro-level analysis should proceed any

requirement to increase peace operations training.

A holistic perspective. The military should take the lead in

developing common perspectives and procedures with other

government agencies and nongovernment groups. Even though not the

lead organization in peace operations, the military does, through

joint and combined efforts, have considerable institutional

experience at complex cooperation. This is translatable to peace

operations. A system of military liaisons or seconded officers

should be developed to work with nonmilitary organizations and

nongovernment groups. To cultivate these ties, there should be a

coherently designed series of studies, publications, conferences,

and symposia co-organized and coauthored by representatives of

the military and nonmilitary organizations.

*******

Peace operations and warfighting may seem diametric. In

fact, they are inextricably linked. The U.S. Army has long

accepted the value of deterrence for avoiding full-scale war and

preserving national security. It must now recognize that

multinational peace operations fill the same role, and thus give

them appropriate care and attention.
ENDNOTES

1. R. Jeffrey Smith and Julia Preston, "U.S. Plans Wider

Role In U.N. Peace Keeping," Washington Post, June 18, 1993, p.

A1.

2. For an explanation of this concern, see James H. Baker,

"Peace Missions Dull the Army's Combat Edge," Army Times,

December 6, 1993, p. 37.

3. Traditional peacekeeping operations were usually

established by the Security Council; directed by the

Secretary-General; established with the consent of the

antagonists in a conflict; impartial; staffed by military

personnel provided by a number of member states on a voluntary

basis; lightly armed; and, authorized to use force only in self

defense (Geoff Forrester, "Peacekeeping at the Crossroads," in

Hugh Smith, ed., Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence

Force Academy, 1993. p. 3). For descriptions and analysis, see

William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping, New

York: St. Martin's, 1992; Alan James, Peacekeeping and

International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1990; Paul Diehl,

International Peacekeeping, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1993; and Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss,

UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers With a Difference, Headline Series No.

292, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990.

4. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali established

the policy framework for second generation peace operations. See

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy.

Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General

pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the

Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York: United Nations,

1992; idem, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93, pp 89-102; idem, "An Agenda for

Peace: One Year Later," Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp.

323-332; and, idem, "Don't Make the U.N.'s Hard Job Harder," New

York Times, August 20, 1993, p. A29. For analysis, see William J.

Durch, The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st

Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute, 1993; Ronald J. Fisher, "The Potential for

Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to

Peacemaking," Peace and Change, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1993, pp.

247-266; Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations

Peacekeeping," International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993,

pp. 451-464; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation

Multinational Operations," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3,

Summer 1992, pp. 113-134; Michael Renner, Critical Juncture: The

Future of Peacekeeping, Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute,

1993; Thomas G. Weiss, ed. Collective Security in a Changing

World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993; idem, "New Challenges

for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace,"

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 51-66; and
Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement:

The U.S. Role in the New International Order, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

5. Andrew S. Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian

Intervention and U.S. Policy," Washigton Quarterly, Vol. 17, No.

1, p. 130. On the distinction between second generation peace

operations and peace enforcement, see Cathy Downes, "Challenges

for Smaller Nations in the New Era of UN and Multinational

Operations," in Smith, ed., Peacekeeping: Challenges for the

Future, pp. 20-27.

6. Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United

Nations?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp.

109-128.

7. David Rogers, "House Strips Pentagon Budget of Funds For

Future Peacekeeping Operations," Wall Street Journal, October 1,

1993, p. 4; and Dick Kirschten, "Missions Impossible," National

Journal, October 30, 1993, pp. 2576-2579.

8. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Peace-Keeping: The Doctor Is

Indisposed," Washington Post, January 14, 1994, p. A23.

9. Madeleine K. Albright, "Measured Success at the United

Nations," Washington Post, January 6, 1994, p. A27. For details

on wavering global support for peace operations, see Geraldine

Brooks, "Peacekeeping Missions of U.N. Are Pursued On a Wing and

a Prayer," Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1993, p. A1.

10. Paul Lewis, "Reluctant Warriors: U.N. Member States

Retreat From Peacekeeping Roles," New York Times, December 12,

1993, p. 22; Brian Hall, "Blue Helmets," New York Times Magazine, January 2, 1994, pp. 19-29; and Richard Bernstein, "Sniping Is

Growing at U.N.'s Weakness as a Peacekeeper," New York Times, June 21, 1993, p. A1. For detailed analysis of the potential

shortcomings of multinational peace operations, see Laurence

Martin, "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry," The National

Interest, Vol. 32, Summer 1993, pp. 3-11.

11. See Steven Metz, The Future of the United Nations:

Implications For Peace Operations, Report of a Roundtable

Sponsored by Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

October 5, 1993, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

12. UNTAC was fielded in 1992. By 1993 it included 21,100

personnel. The component, which was the largest, was commanded by

Lieutenant General John Sanderson of Australia. Its mandate was

to disarm warring factions, conduct elections, provide civil

administration, and serve as humanitarian observers. 1993.)

13. Peacekeeping includes: "Non-combat military operations

(exclusive of self-defense), that are undertaken by outside
forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties,

designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing

truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a

political settlement to the dispute." Peace enforcement is: "A

form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed

intervention, that is pursuant to international license

authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel

compliance with international sanctions or resolutions--the

primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of

peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international

community." (Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, Proposed Final, June

1993, p. GL-11).

14. For an assessment of the current Balkan conflict

grounded in an analysis of its history, see William T. Johnsen,

Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1993.

15. On assessing the ripeness of conflicts for resolution,

see Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and

Regional Disputes, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.

16. There were actually several Somalia operations beginning

with Operation Restore Hope. By mid-1993, the U.N. Operational in

Somalia II (UNOSOM II) included more than 16,000 personnel under

the command of Lt. Gen Cevik Bir of Turkey. Its mission was to

provide a buffer and humanitarian relief to limit hostilities

during an indeterminate period. (CIA Directorate of Intelligence,

Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993, report EUR 93-10008, May

1993.) All U.S. forces are scheduled to be withdrawn by March 31,

1994.

17. George Bush was, of course, the most important advocate

of a special U.S. mission. Other supporters include Charles

Krauthammer and Ben J. Wattenberg. Advocates of a more limited

U.S. global role include Patrick J. Buchanan, Ted Galen

Carpenter, and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. On this debate, seen the

essays in Owen Harries, ed., America's Purpose: New Visions of

U.S. Foreign Policy, San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991.

18. The Joint Strategic Planning System is the formal means

by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the combatant commanders, discharges his responsibility to

give strategic plans and directions to the Armed Forces of the

United States and to interact with other DOD systems. The JSCP

furnishes guidance to the commanders of the unified and specified

commands (CINCs) and the Chiefs of Services to accomplish tasks

and missions based on current military capabilities. It

apportions resources to CINCs, based on military capabilities

resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP

offers a coherent framework for capabilities-based military
advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA). See AFSC (Armed

Forces Staff College) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide

1993, pp. 5-4 though 5-10.

19. New national security strategies and national military

strategies are being prepared to replace the 1993 version of the

national security strategy and 1992 national military strategy.

These will largely codify the series of key foreign policy

speeches given by Clinton administration officials in September

1993. The administration is also developing official policy on

peacekeeping. The policy statement, known as Presidential

Decision Directive 13, has undergone several revisions and, by

the end of 1993, was not yet approved. See Paul Lewis, "U.S.

Plans Policy on Peacekeeping," New York Times, November 18, 1993,

p. A7. Clinton policy on peacekeeping, including stipulations for

U.S. involvement, was explained in a speech at the National War

College by Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright. See John

Mackinlay, "Problems for U.S. Forces in Operations Beyond

Peacekeeping," in William H. Lewis, ed., Peacekeeping: The Way

Ahead?, Report of a Special Conference, Washington, DC: National

Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

1993, pp. 30-33.

20. Quoted in William H. Lewis, ed., Military Implications

of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, DC:

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense

University, June 1993, p. 41.

21. On the potential contributions of the other services,

see Steven Metz, "The Air Force Role in United Nations

Peacekeeping," Airpower Journal, Vol. VII, No. 4, Winter 1993,

pp. 68-81; and George Allison, "The United States Navy and United

Nations Peace-Keeping," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVI, No

.3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-35.

22. Many of these nations are currently capturing and

analyzing their experience. For example, see Smith, ed.,

Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future which is an Australian

collection with chapters by peacekeepers from Fiji, Singapore,

and Thailand, and John Gardam, The Canadian Peacekeeper, Burnstown, Ontario: General Store Publishing House, 1993. The

Department of Defense is also taking steps to better understand

the approach of other nations. See the contract study

Preparations for Peacekeeping: A Survey of Nine Nations, McLean,

VA: Science Applications International Corporation, August 1993.

23. The military is developing coordinated planning

procedures. See United States Atlantic Command Air Land Sea

Application Center, Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Worldwide Coordination

Version 3, October 1993.@Chapternumber = APPENDIX
ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

Moderator: COL John Mountcastle (U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute)

Participants:

• Gen (Ret.) Hannes Philipp (Austria)

• Ambassador Daniel Simpson (U.S. Army War College)

• Brig Gen Christain Clausen (Austria)

• Dr. Earl Tilford (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute)

• Col Charles T. Rogers (United Kingdom)

• Col Timothy Sparling (Canada)

• Ms. Elizabeth Lukasavich (Agency for International

Development)

• Ms. Laurie Fisher (American Red Cross)

• Mr. Douglas Kinney (Department of State)

• COL Karl Farris (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)

• COL James Dorton (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)

• COL William Flavin (U.S. Army War College)

• LTC Steven Danner (Joint Staff, J-5)

• LTC Robert E. Johnson (Army Staff)

• LTC Dennis Hardy (Joint Staff, J-7)

• LTC William Doyne (U.S. Army War College)

• LTC Michael Burton (Mershon Center, Ohio State University)

• LTC William MacDonald (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)*

• LTC William Doll (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute)*

• Mr. Joe Comé (Office of the DOD Inspector General)

• Ms. Lynda Chamowitz (Office of the DOD Inspector General)

• Mr. Richard Rinaldo (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command)

• Professor Walter S. Clarke (U.S. Army War College)

• Mr. Mark Walsh (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)

• Ms. Grace Parker (U.S. Army War College)

• CPT Phil Parker (Center for Army Lessons Learned)

Administrator: MAJ Carl Griffin (U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute)

_________________

*Roundtable co-organizers.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Doll

Dr. Steven Metz

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett