NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 18-3559 & 18-3668

Ralph Briggs, Sr. 

Appellant in No. 18-3559

v. 

Potter County; Glenn Drake, II; Susan Kefover; Paul Heimel; 

Douglas Morley; Angela Milford; Kenneth Sauley

Ralph Briggs, Sr.

Appellant in No. 18-3668

Nos. 18-3560 & 18-3669

Roy Hunt,

Appellant in No. 18-3560 

v.

Porter County; Glenn Drake, II; Susan Kefover; Paul Heimel; 

Douglas Morley; Angela Milford; Kenneth Sauley

Appellant in No. 18-3669

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(District Court Nos.: 4-17-cv-00419 and 4-16-cv-01729) 

District Court Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
2

Argued on July 9, 2019

(Opinion filed: September 12, 2019)

Before: McKEE, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

Michael J. Zicolello [ARGUED]

Schemery Zicolello

333 Market Street

Williamsport, PA 17701

Counsel for Ralph Briggs

Joshua J. Cochran [ARGUED]

Schemery Zicolello

333 Market Street

Williamsport, PA 17701

Counsel for Roy Hunt

Robin A. Reed [ARGUED]

McNerney Page Vanderlin & Hall

433 Market Street

P.O. Box 7

Williamsport, PA 17701

Counsel for Potter County; Glenn C. Drake, II;

Susan Kefover; Paul Heimel; Douglas Morley;

Angela Milford and Kenneth Sauley

_______________

OPINION*

_______________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Ralph Briggs and Roy Hunt were corrections officers at the Potter 

County Jail (“PCJ”). They both ran for Potter County Sheriff, losing in the Republican 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute

binding precedent.
3

primary to the eventual winner, Glenn Drake II. Once Drake took office, they were both 

fired. Defendant-appellees, including Potter County, Drake, and other individual 

defendants, assert that Briggs and Hunt were fired for violating various jail policies. But 

Briggs and Hunt urge that they were fired in retaliation for engaging in protected First 

Amendment activity, namely, freedom of speech, political association, and union activity. 

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We conclude 

that there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Briggs’s and Hunt’s 

terminations were retaliatory, but there are other aspects of the District Court’s ruling with 

which we agree. Therefore, we will reverse the District Court’s summary judgment order

in part and affirm in part.

1

I

2

In the Republican primary for Potter County Sheriff, Hunt and Briggs ran against 

Drake, who at the time was the Chief Deputy Sheriff. Drake, who had retired from the 

Pennsylvania State Police Department, was brought into the Chief Deputy job by the 

previous Sheriff, Ken Sauley, with the understanding that he would run for Sheriff at the 

 

1 Because we have consolidated multiple cases for disposition on appeal, there are two 

sets of briefs and two sets of appendices that we will cite. Hunt’s and Briggs’s briefs will 

be cited using their names. Citations to Appellees’ brief will be preceded by an H if it is 

the brief in response to Hunt’s opening brief, and a B if it is in response to Briggs’s 

opening brief. Similarly, the appendix associated with Hunt’s case will be cited as HA, 

and the appendix associated with Briggs’s case will be cited as BA. 

2 Because we review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellees, we 

review the facts in the light most favorable to Briggs and Hunt. See Bradley v. W. 

Chester Univ., 880 F.3d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 2018). Where there are significant disputes 

regarding the facts, we have noted them in the footnotes.
4

next election. According to Briggs, the last three Sheriffs had attained the office via this 

route—retiring from the Pennsylvania State Police, followed by appointment to the Chief 

Deputy position, and then election to Sheriff. Briggs and Hunt questioned the wisdom of 

this practice during the campaign.

Hunt and Briggs were critical of Drake during the campaign. Hunt believed that 

Drake was conducting campaign activities “on County property, in his official uniform, 

and during time that he was to have been at work for the County.”3 Hunt Br. 5. He believed 

that these actions violated federal, state, and county law, and reported Drake to the District 

Attorney, the Pennsylvania Attorney General, and the Potter County Commissioners at a 

public Commissioners’ meeting. Briggs also attended the meeting and raised similar 

concerns. Hunt asserts that officials were dismissive of their claims: Susan Kefover, one 

of three Commissioners of Potter County, stated “that’s how things were done in Potter 

County;” and Drake “angrily confronted” him about the allegations. Hunt Br. 6.

Drake was endorsed by the Deputy Warden of PCJ, Angela Milford, the thenSheriff, Ken Sauley, and a Potter County Commissioner, Douglas Morley, among others. 

During the campaign, Briggs advocated eliminating the position of Deputy Warden. 

Hunt’s campaign was also critical of the current leadership, and he stressed the need to 

 

3 Appellees assert that “Drake self-reported to Sauley and Kefover that he had 

inadvertently wore his Deputy Sheriff’s uniform to a campaign event and apologized.” H 

Appellee Br. 14.
5

boost morale, cut costs, and more diligently follow state law. Drake was ultimately 

victorious in the primary and went on to win the general election.

After the primary, but before Drake took office, Briggs asserts that he was subjected 

to a series of retaliatory employment actions. First, he received an Employee Warning 

with four separate allegations: (1) failure to strip search an inmate; (2) failure to support a 

fellow Corrections Officer, Kevin Hannan, when he was booking a new inmate; (3) being 

rude to an inmate when passing out commissary items; and (4) taking excessive smoke 

breaks. Second, Briggs was issued another Employee Warning for accepting three 

photographs from an individual who was attempting to deliver them to an inmate. Third, 

Officer Hannan emailed the Deputy Warden of PCJ, Angela Milford, a photograph of 

Briggs allegedly sleeping on a bench. Sauley immediately fired Briggs, but his termination 

was rescinded the next day. Sauley instead imposed a two-day suspension with 90 days of 

probation. Fourth, Briggs was accused of disclosing confidential information to a woman 

who called to ask if a certain inmate was taking his medication. And, finally, Briggs was 

seen flicking the lights in a holding cell on January 13, 2016.4 On that same day (nine days 

after Drake assumed the office of Sheriff), Briggs was fired for flicking the lights and 

disclosing confidential information. After Briggs’s termination, Officer Hannan was 

promoted to his position.

 

4 Appellees assert that the inmate in the cell was on suicide watch, that Briggs laughed 

while flicking the lights, and that he did so to intentionally agitate the inmate. H 

Appellee Br. 8.
6

In addition to serving as a Corrections Officer, Hunt was also a shop steward for 

PCJ’s labor union, the Teamsters Local Union No. 110. Four days after Briggs was fired, 

Hunt, acting in capacity as Union Steward, “grieved the termination of Briggs under the 

CBA and notified the Defendants of his role in investigating and prosecuting the grievance 

for the Union.” Hunt Br. 6. Hunt claims that approximately a week later (February 2, 

2016) “Drake and Milford initiated unfounded disciplinary writeups against Roy under the 

Jail cell phone policy.”5 Id.

While investigating Briggs’s termination, Hunt discovered that Briggs had been 

accused of sleeping on the job. On February 14, Hunt observed two officers, Whitman and 

Wilson, sleeping on the job. He reported the incident up the chain of command, but no 

action came of it. On February 18, 2016, Hunt met with Kefover, and requested relevant 

surveillance footage of Whitman and Wilson,6intending to use it to show that sleeping on 

the job was commonplace and never punished. Hunt states that Kefover “registered her 

displeasure” with his request, telling him that “if you live by the sword, you die by the 

sword.” Hunt Br. 8. Kefover told Drake about Hunt’s request, and also put her recollection 

 

5 Appellees assert that, shortly after he assumed office, Drake held a meeting with all 

prison personnel in which he stated that enforcing the cell phone policy would become a 

priority. Hunt Br. 9.

6 Appellees assert that Hunt did not follow jail policy, in that he should have reported the 

sleeping incident to Milford and Drake. Instead, he waited four days, did not report the 

incident to Milford and Drake, and asked Kefover for the tapes. H Appellee Br. 10. 

Hunt asserts that he had reported the incident to the Officer in Charge, and that Drake had 

directed that all complaints be reported in this manner. Further, Hunt asserts that he had 

reported sleeping incidents to Milford in the past and that no action had ever been taken. 

Hunt Br. 7.
7

in a memo, see HA 621. Drake described this incident as “the straw that broke the camel’s 

back” in the decision to fire Hunt. Hunt was never given the tapes, which he states were 

destroyed. Id. Then, on February 23, Drake and Milford fired Hunt. See HA 5. Hunt

states that the firing was “expressly for approaching Kefover in his Union Steward status 

to obtain a copy of the videotape.” Id. (emphasis in original).7

Hunt and Briggs filed this suit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania, alleging that they were fired in retaliation for exercising their First 

Amendment rights to speech, political association, and (in Hunt’s case only) union 

association. See HA 6; BA 5. Hunt also brought a claim under the Pennsylvania 

Whistleblower Law. See 43 P.S. § 1423. The District Court granted summary judgment 

for the defendants. See HA 3-9; BA 3-9. The Court held that neither Briggs nor Hunt 

could establish a causal connection between their protected activity and their terminations, 

as approximately eight months elapsed between the primary campaign and their 

terminations. The Court also held that Hunt’s union activity was not protected, as it was

not related to matters of public concern. See id.

 

7 Appellees assert that “Hunt had a history of disrespect for and insubordination against 

Milford.” Hunt Br. 6. Appellees cite a 2013 incident in which Hunt was giving a written 

warning by Milford for “holding a memorandum written by her up to the Control Room 

security camera and pretending to wipe his behind with it.” Id. It also cites a 2014 

incident in which Hunt “badger[ed]” Milford over a time-card issue. Id. Hunt allegedly 

disregarded instructions that he was not allowed to go to the Fiscal Office to investigate 

pay issues, and was issued a written reprimand. Id. at 7. He was also issued a written 

reprimand for “abandon[ing] his post in an act of disrespect to Milford in response to 

Milford instructing him to remove an urinal with his urine in it from the 

lunchroom/breakroom.” Id. 
8

Hunt and Briggs filed these timely appeals, which we have consolidated for 

argument and disposition.

II

The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo” and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” 

Bradley v. W. Chester Univ., 880 F.3d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is 

appropriate where the record shows “there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat. 

Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

III

Briggs and Hunt bring First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 

Briggs urges that he was retaliated against on the basis of his speech and political 

association.9 Hunt also makes political association and speech claims, as well as a union 

association claim and a claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Act.10 We first 

 

8

“To establish any claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the conduct 

at issue was committed by a person acting under the color of state law, and (2) the 

complained-of conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution or 

federal law.” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 n.6 (3d Cir. 2019). 

Only the second question is at issue here.

9 Briggs has claims remaining against Drake, Milford and Sauley (claims against the 

County, Kefover, Heimel and Morley were dismissed before summary judgment).

10 Hunt has claims remaining against Potter County, Drake, Milford, Kefover, Heimel,

and Morley.
9

address the First Amendment claims, followed by Hunt’s state law claim and Appellees’

claims that Appellants’ claims are barred by waiver or preemption.

A

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he 

engaged in ‘constitutionally protected conduct,’ (2) the defendant engaged in ‘retaliatory 

action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional 

rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link [existed] between the constitutionally protected conduct and 

the retaliatory action.’” Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 80–81 (3d Cir. 2018)

(quoting Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006)). The first question is 

a legal determination, while the latter two are questions of fact. There is no dispute that 

being fired is a “retaliatory action” that satisfies part two of the test. Therefore, we begin 

by addressing the threshold legal question: whether Briggs and Hunt engaged in 

constitutionally protected activities. Then, we address the factual question embodied in 

part three of the test: whether there is a causal link between Briggs’s and Hunt’s protected 

activities and their firings.

1

There are three main activities that Briggs and Hunt allege were protected: 

(1) speech, specifically, criticizing Drake during the campaign and at the public 

Commissioners’ meeting; (2) association, specifically, membership in a political faction 

opposed to Drake and campaigning against Drake; and (3) for Hunt only, union activity, 
10

specifically, his position as a union steward and the actions he took pursuing Briggs’s 

grievance. We address these issues in turn.

Beginning with Briggs’s and Hunt’s speech claims, we find that their activity is 

constitutionally protected. A public employee’s speech is considered to be a protected 

activity if: “(1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement involved a 

matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not have ‘an adequate 

justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general 

public’ as a result of the statement he made.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 

241–42 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006)). 

Briggs’s and Hunt’s speech satisfies all three elements.

First, these statements were made in the context of a political campaign, which is 

necessarily a function of one’s actions as a citizen. Second, the issues that they raised, 

including possible corruption in the Sheriff’s Office and policy views as to how the office 

should function, are matters of public concern. See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 

241 (2014) (“The content of Lane’s testimony—corruption in a public program and misuse 

of state funds—obviously involves a matter of significant public concern.”). And third, 

balancing “the public employee’s interest in speaking about a matter of public concern and 

the value to the community of [his] being free to speak on such matters” against “the 

government’s interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the services it 

performs through its employees,” there is no reason for prison officials to have treated Hunt 
11

and Briggs differently because of their comments. Azzaro v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 

968, 980 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Hunt’s and Briggs’s campaigns against Drake are also protected associational 

activities. The quintessential political association case involves the termination of an 

employee based on membership in a different political party. But such claims can also be 

made on the basis of membership in different factions within the same party. See Galli v. 

New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] plaintiff can 

meet the second prong of a prima facie political discrimination claim if she suffers because

of active support for a losing candidate within the same political party.”). In Curinga v. 

City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2004), we held that a City employee’s campaign 

against the “establishment” members of his own party “involved a matter of public 

concern.” See Curinga, 357 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Primary election fights can be 

famously brutal, sometimes more so than contests in the general election, and animosity 

between candidates is likely to result.”). Because Hunt and Briggs were clearly in a 

different faction of the party than Drake, their campaign against him in the Republican 

primary was protected associational activity under the First Amendment.11

 

11 We note that there is obvious overlap between Briggs’s and Hunt’s speech claims and 

their association claims. See Curinga, 357 F.3d at 309 (“Both [speech and association] 

are implicated when a high-level government employee speaks out against his public 

employer during an election campaign.”). In Curinga, we held that “in most cases, where 

a confidential or policy making employee engages in speech or conduct against his public 

employer, the better analytical approach is found under the freedom of speech doctrine.” 

Id. Although Curinga dealt with policymaking employees, its teaching on this point is 

apposite to the instant case. Therefore, we leave it to the District Court’s discretion to 
12

Union membership is also a protected activity. In Palardy, we held that “mere 

membership in a public union is always a matter of public concern,” thus, “union 

membership is worthy of constitutional protection.” 906 F.3d 76, 83–84 (3d Cir. 2018). 

More recently, in Baloga v. Pittston Area School District, 927 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 2019), we 

held that “retaliation against a union leader for the union’s decision to file a grievance—as 

distinct from retaliation based on the substance of the grievance—constitutes retaliation 

based on association rather than on speech per se.” Baloga, 927 F.3d at 755. This covers 

precisely the conduct in which Hunt alleges he engaged. Moreover, contrary to the District 

Court’s assertion, “there is no need to make a separate showing of public concern for a 

pure union association claim because membership in a public union is ‘always a matter of 

public concern.’” Id. at 749 (quoting Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80–81). Accordingly, we hold 

that Hunt’s actions as Union Steward constitute protected activity.

2

Having established that Briggs and Hunt engaged in protected activities, we move 

on to the question of causation. We find that genuine disputes of material fact remain 

regarding this question. The District Court found that the temporal proximity between 

Briggs’s and Hunt’s protected activities during the campaign and their terminations 

(approximately 8 months) was not “unusually suggestive.” BA 8. But this interpretation 

ignores the fact that Briggs was fired a mere eight days after Drake took office and gained 

 

decide whether to consolidate Briggs’s and Hunt’s association and speech claims under 

one doctrine or the other for further proceedings. 
13

the power to fire him. Moreover, Hunt was fired approximately a month after Briggs, while 

he was pursuing a grievance on behalf of Briggs. A reasonable jury could certainly find 

this brief temporal proximity to be suggestive of a retaliatory firing. 

The District Court’s opinion also glosses over serious disputes that the parties have 

regarding the facts of the case. It concluded that Briggs “failed to sufficiently discredit 

Defendants’ explanation of their decision to discipline and eventually terminate [him],” 

BA 9, and that “[a]t most, the record evidence supports finding a causal connection 

between Mr. Hunt’s request for surveillance tapes and his termination,” but that such 

activity was not protected, HA 10. As to the association and speech claims, Appellees

allege that Briggs and Hunt violated various jail policies: flicking the lights in a jail cell

(Briggs), disclosing confidential inmate information (Briggs), and bypassing PCJ’s chain 

of command (Hunt). Briggs, however, disputes that he was fired because of these alleged 

violations. He asserts that the evidence that he violated jail policies in disclosing 

confidential information is weak: he argues that it was “known that the caller was 

associated with the inmate,” and he asserts that no one was able to identify what aspect of 

the information he conveyed was confidential. Briggs Br. 21. He also asserts that flicking 

the lights in holding cells is common practice, and one that almost all officers have 

participated in without being reprimanded. See Briggs Br. 22. Furthermore, Briggs claims 

that all complaints against him came from supporters of Drake (Officers Hannan, Goode, 

and LeBar) and that he was replaced by another Drake supporter (Officer Hannan). Id. 
14

Both positions have support in the record. The District Court made conclusions that a jury 

should address. These are disputes that should not be resolved on summary judgment. 

This holds also true with Hunt’s union association claim. Appellees allege that Hunt 

did not follow proper protocol when pursuing Briggs’s grievance. But Hunt urges that he 

was fired for doing his job: zealously advocating on behalf of his union members. As 

evidence, he points to the following facts: just a week after he filed a grievance as union 

steward on behalf of Briggs, “Drake and Milford initiated unfounded disciplinary warnings 

against him;” at his meeting with Kefover regarding his request for surveillance footage, 

Kefover threatened him; and just days later, Drake reprimanded and terminated Hunt for 

approaching Kefover. Hunt Br. 16-17. Moreover, Hunt asserts that he was negotiating a 

new CBA at the time, and that Drake had registered his displeasure by calling him a “pink 

elephant.” Hunt Br. 17. And Commissioner Kefover testified that the grievances filed by 

Hunt were “overbearing.” Id. Hunt also asserts that, since his firing, “Drake boasted that 

. . . he had received no Union grievances.” Id. (citing HA 994). As with the speech and 

association claims, both sides find support for their arguments in the record. Therefore, 

we cannot resolve this dispute as a matter of law on summary judgment.

Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred in holding, as a matter of law, 

that there was no causal link between Hunt’s and Briggs’s protected activities and their 

terminations as it relates to the individual defendant-appellees. We will affirm the District 

Court’s summary judgment order, however, as it relates to Briggs’s and Hunt’s claims 

against Potter County. To prevail against Potter County, Appellants must show that the 
15

County had a policy or custom that caused “the specific deprivation of constitutional rights 

at issue.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)). While Briggs and Hunt have provided 

evidence that particular individuals may have deprived them of their constitutional rights, 

they have not provided any evidence that Potter County had a specific policy that deprived 

them of their constitutional rights. Accordingly, their claims against Potter County fail, 

and we will affirm that aspect of the District Court’s ruling.

B

Hunt also brings a claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. See 43 P.S. 

§ 1423. This law prohibits retaliating against an employee who “makes a good faith 

report . . . of wrongdoing or waste by a public body or an instance of waste by any other

employer . . . .” Id. Wrongdoing is defined as: “A violation which is not of a merely 

technical or minimal nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation, of a political 

subdivision ordinance or regulation or of a code of conduct or ethics designed to protect 

the interest of the public or the employer.” Id. § 1422. If a plaintiff establishes 

wrongdoing, he must also establish a causal connection between his reporting of the 

wrongdoing and his firing. See Golaschevsky v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 554 Pa. 157, 163 

(1998). The District Court disposed of this claim in a footnote, finding that there was “no 

evidence of such a connection.” HA 10.

Hunt argues that he reported wrongdoing when he raised concerns, both publicly 

and privately, about Drake campaigning in his Sheriff’s uniform and on County property 
16

and time. We hold that this satisfies the requirement of reporting wrongdoing. The second 

issue—that of causation—involves the same factual issues as Appellants’ First 

Amendment retaliation claims. As with those claims, we hold that there are genuine 

disputes of material fact. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s summary 

judgment order on this claim.

C

Lastly, Appellees argue that Appellants claims are barred for three reasons: (1) they 

failed to exhaust their remedies under the CBA; (2) their claims are preempted by the Labor 

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185; and (3) their claims are 

preempted by the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act (“PERA”), 43 P.S. 

§ 1101.903. The District Court rejected all three of these arguments, and we agree with its 

reasoning. The Court held that the CBA provided a grievance process for “[a]ll disputes 

and any grievance . . . relating to the application or interpretation of th[at] Agreement or 

any dispute concerning the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered 

by this Agreement.” BA 6. But Appellants’ claims arise under state law and the 

Constitution, so they are not barred for failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA. 

Similarly, the LMRA and PERA apply to “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an 

employer and a labor organization,” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and “disputes or grievances arising 

out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement,” 43 P.S. 

§ 1101.903, respectively. Once again, Appellants’ claims arise under state law and the 

Constitution, so they are not preempted by the LMRA or PERA.
17

IV

For the aforementioned reasons, we vacate the District Court’s order granting 

summary judgment for the individual defendants on Briggs’s and Hunt’s First Amendment 

retaliation claims and on Hunt’s claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law and 

remand for further proceedings on these claims. We will also affirm the District Court’s 

order granting summary judgment for Potter County and its order to the extent that it held 

that Briggs’s and Hunt’s claims are not barred by the CBA, the LMRA, and PERA.