Performance Measures

for the

Criminal Justice System

Discussion Papers from the

BJS-Princeton Project by

John J. DiIulio, Jr.

Geoffrey P. Alpert

Mark H. Moore

George F. Cole

Joan Petersilia

Charles H. Logan

James Q. Wilson

October 1993, NCJ 143505 
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs 

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Lawrence A. Greenfeld 

Acting Director

Bureau of Justice Statistics - Princeton University 

Study Group on Criminal Justice 

Performance Measures

The goal of the BJS-Princeton Project is to engage the

criminal justice community in a rigorous debate regarding

appropriate measures and ways in which they can be 

effectively utilized by policymakers and practitioners.

Papers were prepared for Study Group review 

and dissemination by John J. DiIulio, Jr. (project director), 

James Q. Wilson (project advisor), Mark H. Moore, Joan 

Petersilia, Geoffrey P. Alpert, George F. Cole, and Charles 

H. Logan. The authors focus on selected components of 

the criminal justice system and the utility of performance 

measures for each. Other members of the study group 

are Norman A. Carlson, University of Minnesota; Wayne 

Estelle, former warden, California Men’s Colony; James 

Short, Washington State University; and Steven K. Smith 

(project monitor), BJS.

This project is supported by BJS grant number 92-BJCX-0002 to Princeton University. The contents of this 

document do not necessarily reflect the views or policies 

of the Bureau of Justice Statistics or the U.S. Department 

of Justice.

ii Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Contents

Lawrence A. Greenfeld Foreword v

John J. DiIulio, Jr. Rethinking the Criminal Justice

 System: Toward a New Paradigm 1

Charles H. Logan Criminal Justice Performance

Measures for Prisons 19

Joan Petersilia Measuring the Performance

of Community Corrections 61

George F. Cole Performance Measures for the Trial

Courts, Prosecution, and

Public Defense 87

Geoffrey Alpert Measuring Police Performance in 

Mark H. Moore the New Paradigm of Policing 109

John J. DiIulio, Jr. Measuring Performance

When There Is No Bottom Line 143

James Q. Wilson The Problem of Defining

Agency Success 157

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System iii
Acknowledgments

A number of individuals actively contributed to the 

working group meetings, reviewed papers, and provided 

comments, including Pamela Casey and Sally Hillsman 

of the National Center for State Courts; James P. Lynch, 

American University; Elizabeth McCaughey, Manhattan 

Institute; Anne Piehl, Harvard University; Allen J. Beck, 

Tom Hester, and John M. Dawson of BJS; and Steven 

D. Dillingham, former director of BJS and study group 

member. Production was administered by Marilyn 

Marbrook and Yvonne Boston of BJS. 

iv Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Foreword

Efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness are central goals for 

the administration of criminal justice in the United States.

Efficiency means economically applying available resources

to accomplish statutory goals as well as to improve public

safety. Effectiveness refers to carrying out justice system

activities with proper regard for equity, proportionality,

constitutional protections afforded defendants and convicted

offenders, and public safety. Assuring equal treatment and

handling of like offenders and giving equal weight to legally

relevant factors in sentencing represent the types of concerns

generally expressed about the fairness of the criminal justice

system. 

Unanimous agreement exists that the justice system ought to

be efficient, effective, and fair. Less accord, however, exists

about how best to secure these essential qualities or how to

measure whether they have been achieved. Apart from the

obvious problem of determining the measurement criteria for

a particular performance expectation, there is a more difficult

subsequent problem of determining what weight to give to the

findings and what changes need to be made to resolve the gap

between expectation and performance. Unlike marks on a

ruler, criminal justice measures are not neutral standards but

are factors that enter into the processes being analyzed

—identifying relative degrees of improvement in fairness in

sentencing, for example, would still indicate that the

sentencing process was giving weight to information not

legally relevant. 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System v
The essays in this volume take a new tack as their authors

address all three concerns. The participants in the Bureau of

Justice Statistics-Princeton Study Group focus attention on

the problem of measurement with respect to these

fundamental expectations for the administration of justice.

After years of observing the justice system that they are now

writing about, the authors provide some new ideas to consider

for improving the justice system.

In the first essay, the director of the study group, John

DiIulio, Jr., proposes a fresh way to understand or interpret

the familiar elements in American criminal justice: prisons,

community supervision, trial courts, and police. He

establishes the theme that there must be a full and realistic

accounting of the activities of criminal justice agencies. 

In calling for measures grounded in civic ideals, DiIulio also

initiates the refrain that underlines the involvement of 

citizens in the work of those agencies.

Before the discussion curves back to DiIulio’s and James

Wilson’s thoughts about the challenge of measuring

performance in public organizations, the individual essays

both widen the argument, taking in broader intellectual

concepts, and narrow it, listing specific performance

measures. In some cases, as in George Cole’s presentation of

measures for trial courts, the basic outlines of the activities

remain untouched, while in other cases, as in Mark Moore’s

and Geoffrey Alpert’s consideration of measures for police,

the authors urge a departure from the familiar. In probation

and parole, the rapid growth in the community supervision

population, according to Joan Petersilia, has forced control

out of the hands of corrections professionals. She believes

that one way administrators can regain the operational levers

is to define a mission and to measure clearly how well the

agencies are achieving their goals. 

 

vi Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
BJS data: Delineating and testing performance

measures

The participants in the BJS-Princeton Study Group reached

their conclusions with few direct references to the basic

numbers and statistics that BJS has reported over the past 20

years. Their task was to start hammering out an institutional

template of concepts. As more persons enter the discussions

about evaluating the administration of justice, however,

increased attention will have to be paid to existing data and

the need for new data.

A commonly held view, for example, is that the criminal

justice system is chaotic and rather poorly administers the

statutory expectations placed upon it. BJS data reveal that

there may be more coherence between law and practice than

is generally assumed: 

Example: Over the last decade, States have reformed many

of their criminal sentencing laws, largely aiming to increase

the likelihood of a prison sentence. BJS data reveal that what

the State and Federal lawmakers sought in these reforms has

been achieved — the odds of imprisonment given conviction

for most crimes has increased. The reforms effectively

brought about three record high rates in the prison population:

 per capita, per reported crime, and per arrest. 

Example: Over the last decade, as well, a “War on Drugs”

was waged, and BJS data show that drug offenses now

account for a larger share of convictions and imprisonment

than ever before. BJS data tell us, in other words, that the

public’s legislative agenda produced the results that were

being sought.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System vii
The criminal justice system is busy, with many millions of

transactions taking place annually. Spending for criminal

justice activities accounts for just over 3 cents of every dollar

in public spending (about $74 billion) — less than 1% of

Federal spending, more than 6% of spending by the States,

and nearly 7% of local spending. Overall spending at all

levels of government for justice activities is about equal to

spending on transportation and just below that spent by

government on hospitals and health. 

The annual total for State and local justice translates into

about $300 per capita of the nearly $9,000 annual per capita

spent by government. While municipal and county

governments accounted for 53% of all justice spending, the

States accounted for 34%, and the Federal government just

under 13%. 

From 1985 to 1990, corrections spending has grown faster

and spending on police has grown slower than any other

components of the justice system. The following compare the

increases in per capita spending (in constant dollars)

occurring between 1985 and 1990 to the increases in

workload:

• Spending on police protection grew 8%, the number of

Index crimes reported by law enforcement agencies increased

16%, and the number of arrests grew 19%

• Spending on corrections grew 48%, the overall corrections

population increased 45%.

Example: Besides delivering what the public and their

legislators demanded, criminal justice agencies have

maintained the quality of services provided. Between 1984

and 1990, BJS data on State prisons show —

viii Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
• about a 2% reduction in the average amount of housing

space per inmate (from 57 square feet to 56 square feet) 

• about a 4% improvement in staffing per inmate (from 2.8

inmates per staff member to 2.7 inmates per staff member) 

ú the same percentage of prisons under court order to improve

conditions of confinement or practices within the facility

(24% of all prisons in both years) 

• about twice the percentage of inmates involved in drug,

alcohol, and personal counseling programs (14% versus 30%)

and nearly 4 times the number of inmates in such programs on

a single day (53,000 versus 193,000). 

Example: BJS data can be used to evaluate the fairness with

which the system is operating. Surveys conducted among

representative samples of State prisoners in 1979, 1986, and

1991 reveal that while the offense composition has changed,

with drug offenses accounting for more than twice the

percentage of inmates in 1991 compared to earlier surveys,

little has changed in the criminal histories of those confined.

In all three surveys well over 9 out of 10 prisoners were either

violent offenders or recidivists with prior sentences to

confinement facilities or probation. 

Research using a variety of sources including the National

Crime Victimization Survey, the FBI data on arrests, and

national prisoner surveys, has revealed that for personal

contact crimes, the racial composition of offenders as

identified by victims closely parallels the racial distribution 

of those arrested and sentenced to prison for the same crimes.

Data from recent national polls indicate that our citizens hold

the criminal justice system in much lower esteem than they do

most other public institutions. To operate a justice system

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System ix
that is effective, efficient, and fair challenges us to think

anew, examine, debate, and continuously measure and

evaluate its practices. In the final analysis, how these

measures are used to reduce the disparity between 

expectation and practice is fundamental to the credibility

given to our collective ideal of justice. 

Lawrence A. Greenfeld 

Acting Director 

 

x Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
 

Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: 

Toward a New Paradigm

By John J. DiIulio, Jr.

Overview: Beyond crime rates and recidivism 

rates

Rates of crime and recidivism have long served as critical

measures for the performance of the Nation’s criminal 

justice system. These measures represent the basic goals 

of public safety to which all components of the criminal

justice system contribute. At the same time, however, rates

of crime and recidivism are not the only, or necessarily the

best, measures of what criminal justice institutions do.

Few police officers believe that their work solely determines crime rates in their jurisdiction. Few corrections

officials believe that what they do chiefly determines 

recidivism rates. Likewise, most criminal court judges,

prosecutors, public defenders, and other justice practitioners know from experience that the prevalence and 

severity of crime depend mainly on factors affecting 

individuals long before most are taken into custody. Most 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 1
justice practitioners understand that they can rarely do for

their clients what parents, teachers, friends, neighbors, clergy,

bio-genetic inheritances, or economic opportunities may have

failed to do.1 

Still, crime rates and recidivism rates are meaningful 

overall measures of the system's performance in protecting

public safety, and what justice practitioners do undoubtedly affects crime and recidivism rates. For example, a

National Academy of Sciences panel concluded that rising

imprisonment rates may have reduced crime rates in the

Nation by 10% to 20%.2

 Furthermore, numerous studies

refute the once-fashionable idea that “nothing works” in 

the rehabilitation of criminals, showing that, other things

being equal, offenders who participate in certain types of

institutional or community-based treatment programs are 

less likely to be repeat offenders than the nonparticipants.3

 

While no evidence indicates that mere increases in police 

on auto patrol cut crime rates, a growing body of evidence 

establishes that crime and disorder are less common in 

2 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 1As James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein have

observed, a keen knowledge of the constitutional and social

factors that have been found to be associated with criminal

behavior “rivet(s) our attention on the earliest stages of the life

cycle, and reveals that “after all is said and done, the most 

serious offenders are boys who begin their delinquent careers at a

very early age”; see Wilson and Herrnstein, Crime and Human

Nature (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985), pp. 508-509.

 2

Alfred Blumstein, et al., eds., Criminal Careers and “Career

Criminals” (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986),

p. 6.

 3

For an overview, see John J. DiIulio, Jr., No Escape: The

Future of American Corrections (New York: Basic Books, 1991),

chapter 3.
neighborhoods where police get out of their cars and into

regular contact with citizens.4

Unquestionably, the justice system affects crime and

recidivism rates. As James Q. Wilson has commented, 

given “the elasticity of crime or recidivism rates to feasible

changes in police or correctional practices, how much of a

change in these rates can be obtained at a given cost in

money, liberty, etc.? Surely the answer is some number

greater than zero. If it were zero, then we could abolish

arrests and prisons with no adverse effects on society.

Clearly, that is not something we would be inclined to 

try. It is true that the prevalence and severity of crime in

society do not depend mainly on what justice practitioners 

do. But the real question is: What feasible changes in 

what institutions and practices will make the largest marginal changes in crime rates? Judged that way, it may turn

out that arrest or imprisonment rates have bigger effects on

marginal rates than any feasible change in family or school

practices, because what one can feasibly change in family 

or school practices turns out to be pretty trivial.”5

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 3

 4For an overview, see Robert C. Trajanowicz and Bonnie

Bucqueroux, Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective

(Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company, 1990), and 

the monographs produced by Mark H. Moore of Harvard

University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program 

in Criminal Justice, Perspectives on Policing (Washington, 

D.C.: National Institute of Justice, June and November 1988),

especially nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9.

 5

James Q. Wilson, commentary on the draft of the first

BJS-Princeton Discussion paper.
Toward a new paradigm

To evaluate the performance of police departments,

correctional agencies, and other key components of the justice

system exclusively in terms of crime rates and recidivism

rates may cause observers to overlook other 

important contributions of the system’s day-to-day

performance and can obscure the role that average citizens

play in promoting secure communities. A wide gap often

exists between the general public’s expectations for the

justice system and what most justice practitioners recognize

as the system’s actual capacity to protect public well-being.

This paper sketches an outline of a new paradigm

encompassing the criminal justice system’s history, vision,

purposes, and measures. Four points of qualification,

however, are in order. 

First, this call for a new paradigm is not motivated by a 

desire to design performance measures that guarantee 

justice agency success. Rather, it represents an attempt

4 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 6 The preliminary ideas for these sections were presented by

several members of the Study Group at the BJS/Justice Research

Statistics Association (JRSA) 1992 National Conference held 

in New Orleans, Louisiana, September 23-25, 1992. The Study 

Group wishes to thank those BJS/JSRA conference participants

who identified the need for the points of clarification and

qualification that follow, especially Dr. Timothy Car of the

Georgia Department of Corrections, Professor George Cole 

of the University of Connecticut; Professor Robert Friedmann 

of Georgia State University; Professor Graeme Newman of the

State University of New York at Albany; Dr. Sally Hillsman 

of the National Center for State Courts; and Professor Charles 

W. Thomas of the University of Florida. The Study Group’s

formal advisor, Professor James Q. Wilson of the University of

California at Los Angeles, provided invaluable criticism of an

earlier draft of this paper.
to develop realistic intermediate and long-range measures.

Realistic measures account for the daily activities of justice

agencies and for the constraints under which they normally

operate. Realistic, however, does not mean easy to achieve.

Indeed, the alternate measures presented in 

subsequent papers in this volume are measures according to

which many justice institutions, programs, and practices now

fail.

Second, better performance measures do not act like magnets

for better ways of meeting goals. All performance measures

have their limitations and may invite perverse and unintended

administrative consequences. Still, justice practitioners

probably can learn something about how to fashion and

implement effective performance measures from the

experiences of other organizations, public and private.

Third, a paradigm is broader than a theory. A theory is a

statement about the relationship between two or more

variables that is supposed to hold under specified conditions.7

 

A new paradigm orients general understanding to historical,

empirical, or normative realities that a prevailing paradigm

has arguably deemphasized, devalued, or simply ignored. In

essence, to call for a new paradigm is to appeal for new

concepts and categories of thinking about a given subject.

Fourth, crime rates and recidivism rates are indeed important

measures of the system’s performance, which ought to be

continually used and refined. Even so, all citizens in a

democracy are responsible to some degree for the way in

which society addresses the problem of crime. In addition,

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 5

 7 For a brief discussion of theory, see DiIulio, No Escape, pp.

213-225.
justice agencies serve the public in myriad ways that are

indirectly related to crime control goals, and society should

devise and implement performance measures that respect 

this reality.

History: Multiple, vague, and contradictory

purposes

The history of the American criminal justice system is a

history of swings in public mood. Americans have long 

been ambivalent about the purposes of criminal justice.8

 

Among other things, they have wanted a criminal justice

system that apprehends and visits harm upon the guilty

(punishment); makes offenders more virtuous, or at least 

more law abiding (rehabilitation); dissuades would-be

offenders from criminal pursuits (deterrence); protects

innocent citizens from being victimized by convicted

criminals (incapacitation); and enables most criminals to

return as productive citizens to the bosom of the free

community (reintegration). They have wanted the system 

to achieve these contradictory public goals without violating

the public conscience (humane treatment), jeopardizing the

public law (constitutional rights), emptying the public 

purse (cost containment), or weakening the tradition of 

State and local public administration (federalism).

Because the competing public expectations cannot be 

easily met all at once, first one and then another dominate

public attention. Justice policymakers and practitioners have

6 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 8 Portions of this section are drawn from John J. DiIulio, Jr.,

“Crime,” in Henry J. Aaron and Charles Schultze, eds., Setting

Domestic Priorities: What Can Government Do? (Washington,

D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), chapter 4.
generally allowed the institutional and programmatic

pendulum to swing with the public mood between different

approaches to crime prevention and control.9

 

For example, between 1967 and 1992, the Federal Government fought two very different wars on crime. The first 

war (1967-80) was against poverty; the second (1980-92) 

was against criminals. In the first war the social and

economic “root causes” of crime were attacked; in the 

second war the likelihood that criminals would be detected,

arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated was

increased. The chief strategists in the first war were 

persons who believed that the Federal Government should

play a central role in crime control. They emphasized the

goals of offender rehabilitation, reintegration, humane

treatment, and constitutional rights. The chief strategists 

in the second war were persons who believed that law

enforcement was primarily a State and local responsibility.

They emphasized the goals of punishment, deterrence, cost

containment, and federalism. 

Some justice practitioners have coped fairly successfully 

with such shifts in public sentiment, but many have not.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 7

 9 As William G. Mayer has shown, between 1960 and 1965,

public opinion on crime and punishment became more liberal,

and between 1965 and 1988 it became increasingly conservative;

see Mayer, “Shifting Sands of Public Opinion: Is Liberalism

Back?,” The Public Interest, no. 107 (Spring 1992), pp. 3-17.

Mayer’s analysis concurs well with trends in criminal justice

program administration such as the rise, decline, and , in many

jurisdictions, official or de facto abolition of paroling 

authorities. On parole, see Edward E. Rhine, William R. Smith,

and Ronald W. Jackson, Paroling Authorities: Recent History

and Current Practice (Laurel, MD: American Correctional

Association, 1991). 
Despite the conflicting and changeful public demands on

them, some police commissioners have been able to “make

themselves accountable to the public by defining their

purposes in broad terms and then by trying to keep their 

own actions, and the actions of their organizations, 

consistent with these broad purposes.”10 Similarly, some

corrections commissioners have coped well by means of “a

creative capacity to translate broad societal expectations and

policy decrees into administrative action.”11 Yet, the fact

remains that these swings in public mood and policy have

fostered administrative instability, frustrated long-term

planning, and bred bureaucratic norms that insulate

practitioners from what they sometimes view as a fickle,

generally unappreciative, and often hostile public.

Democratic vision: Citizens 

as co-producers of justice

In the light of this history, a moderating, democratic vision 

of the justice system’s public purposes and limitations is 

both necessary and desirable. Such a vision emerges from 

the realization that all citizens have the right and the

responsibility to participate in the system. Citizens are

co-producers of justice.12 The ability of justice practitioners

8 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 10Mark H. Moore, “Police Leadership: The Impossible 

Dream,” in Erwin C. Hargrove and John C. Glidewell, eds.,

Impossible Jobs in Public Management (Lawrence, KS:

University Press of Kansas, 1990) p. 98.

 11John J. DiIulio, Jr., “Managing a Barbed-Wire Bureaucracy:

The Impossible Job of the Corrections Commissioner,” in

Hargrove and Glidewell, Impossible Jobs, p. 67.

 12The phrase was suggested by the Study Group’s Professor

Mark H. Moore of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University.
to do their daily work depends on the cooperation and 

support of citizens who are formally “outside” the system 

— a citizen willing to testify against a violent drug dealer; 

a community group that trusts and assists the police; 

relatives, friends, and employers who help to keep a

community-based offender on the straight-and-narrow.

Citizens, not judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, or

corrections officials, are primarily responsible for the quality

of life in their communities, including the prevalence and

severity of crime within them. 

As many honest friends of democracy have argued down

through the ages, democratic citizens are wont to hold

everyone but themselves accountable for public problems and

to become impatient when facile solutions do not produce

immediate results.13 Citizens in a democracy 

must begin by holding themselves and their neighbors

accountable for public affairs. A democratic vision of the

justice system, therefore, is anything but a sop to public

frustrations with crime and disorder. Citizens who expect

judges, police, and other justice officials to solve society’s

crime problems are unrealistic; citizens should not expect the

officials to succeed without the active cooperation and

support of the community.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 9

 13 For example, see Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in

America, ed. Phillips Bradley, vol. 2 (New York: Vintage Books,

1945), and Walter Lippmann, Essays on The Public Philosophy

(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955).
Criminal-justice purposes: Four civic ideals

This democratic vision supplies a rationale for identifying 

the major purposes of the system in terms of four civic 

ideals: 

(1) Doing justice, 

(2) Promoting secure communities, 

(3) Restoring crime victims, and

(4) Promoting noncriminal options.

Justice can be defined as the quality of treating individuals

according to their civic rights and in ways that they deserve 

to be treated by virtue of relevant conduct. Criminal 

justice is rights-respecting treatment that is deserved by 

virtue of criminal conduct as judged by the rule of law.14 

Thus, doing justice implies at least four things: hold

offenders fully accountable for their offenses, protect

offenders’ constitutional and legal rights, treat like offenses

alike, and take into account relevant differences among

offenders and offenses. 

Promoting secure communities means more than to achieve

low crime rates. Rather, it means providing the security to

life, liberty, and property that is necessary for communities 

to flourish. It means enabling citizens to pursue their

collective life as they see fit without undue fear of having 

that life disrupted or destroyed. It means securing

communities against criminals who assault, rape, rob,

defraud, deal drugs, burglarize, extort, and murder, but it also

means securing them against the community-sapping

disorders that are commonly associated with crime and the

10 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 14 This definition of criminal justice was suggested by the 

Study Group’s Professor Charles H. Logan of the University of

Connecticut.
fear of crime — disorders such as petty crime, public

drunkenness, aggressive panhandling, loitering, graffiti,

abandoned cars, broken windows, and abandoned 

buildings.15

Restoring victims means to honor the community’s 

obligation to make victims of crime and disorder whole 

again. The victims’ rights organizations, manifestos, and

laws that have proliferated over the last decade or so

generally reflect and embody this long-overlooked goal.16 

Victims of crime have a special claim upon the criminaljustice system’s human and financial resources. Whatever

else it may achieve, no system that dishonors that claim 

can be considered legitimate. 

Finally, promoting noncriminal options means that

punishment for criminal behavior should interfere as little 

as possible with the pursuit of noncriminal behavior. Even 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 11

 15 A fine treatment of the relationship between disorder, crime,

and the fear of crime can be found in Wesley G. Skogan, 

Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay 

in American Neighborhoods (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 1990). Also see the following: George 

L. Kelling, “Measuring What Matters,” The City Journal, Spring

1992:21-33; James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Police 

and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” Atlantic Monthly,

March 1982, pp. 29-38; and James Q. Wilson and John J. 

DiIulio, Jr., “Crackdown: Saving the Next Generation From 

the Drug-and-Crime Epidemic,” New Republic, July 10, 1989, 

pp. 21-25.

 16 Knowledge about the physical pains, psychological traumas,

and economic losses suffered by victims of crime, their families

and friends, and the public remains shallow but is increasing. 

For a serviceable overview, see Albert R. Roberts, ed., Helping

Crime Victims: Research, Policy, and Practice (Newbury Park,

Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990.) 
in prison, offenders should have at least some opportunity 

to engage in meaningful, constructive, and legitimate activities. Nor should government impose arbitrary restrictions 

on employment or other legitimate activities by convicted

offenders except where justified as a form of punishment 

or where public safety is at risk. This is not to say that

society has any greater obligation toward the betterment 

of offenders than it owes to nonoffenders. It is not even to

say that government has an obligation toward the betterment of offenders and nonoffenders alike. But one 

function of government is to promote (not necessarily 

to provide) legitimate opportunities and to facilitate (not

necessarily to require or directly to reward) their pursuit. 

Realistic performance measures

These four civic purposes point beyond crime rates and

recidivism rates and toward more realistic ways of measuring the performance of justice institutions, programs, and

practices. By no means is this the first call for such 

measures. During both of the Federal wars on crime 

from the 1960’s through the 1980’s, a number of wellintentioned efforts were made to rethink the measures

commonly used to evaluate the system’s performance. 

(See Selected sources of measurement topics, p. 17.) Few 

of these efforts moved much beyond a rehashing of such

concepts as crime rates and recidivism rates, and none had a

wide or lasting impact on the field. In conjunction with his

work on the Study Group, Logan has developed a set of

performance measures for secure correctional institutions.

12 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
The measures Logan proposes for prisons and jails have 

the virtue of not asking criminal justice institutions to do 

what other social institutions are more responsible for 

doing and in many cases what other social institutions have

failed to do. They do not, for example, ask our corrections

officials to somehow “correct the incorrigible, rehabilitate 

the wretched, deter the determined, restrain the dangerous,

and punish the wicked.”17 But they do demand that, with 

the human and financial resources that society has 

provided, and with the requisite support of other social

institutions, the officials must “keep prisoners — keep 

them in, keep them safe, keep them in line, keep them 

healthy, and keep them busy — and do it with fairness,

without undue suffering, and as efficiently as possible.”18 

That alone is asking a great deal, but it is not asking too

much.

By the same token, it makes little sense to measure police

performance in terms of crime or arrest rates. Geoffrey P.

Alpert and Mark H. Moore have developed an expanded

range of policing measures. In anticipation of their

contribution, it is worth highlighting George L. Kelling’s 

recent article, “Measuring What Matters: A New Way 

of Thinking About Crime and Public Order.” After

documenting that the New York City Police Department has

been doing quite well in relation to such conventional

measures as crime rates, arrest rates, emergency response

times, and incidence of corruption, Kelling keenly observes: 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 13

 17 Charles H. Logan, “Criminal Justice Performance Measures 

For Prisons,” Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice

System, BJS-Princeton Discussion Papers, p. 23.

 18 Logan, “Criminal Justice Performance Measures,” p. 25.
But New Yorkers are not the least bit reassured by 

these statistical and relative achievements.... These

formal measures of police work have little to do with

community needs.... [A] significant reason disorder 

has been ignored is that professional criminal justice

ideology narrowly defines the appropriate business 

of police and criminal justice agencies as dealing with

serious crime — that is, index crimes. Crime response,

and arrest statistics, form a pillar of that ideology.

Disorder does not appear in any FBI index; therefore, it

has not been a priority.19

Conclusion: Toward a new paradigm?

Is it possible for justice officials to develop, implement, 

and organize themselves around performance measures that

go beyond conventional measures such as rates of crime 

and recidivism? And can this be done for all components 

of the system — courts, prosecutors’ offices, police

departments, institutional corrections, community-based

corrections?

The papers that follow in this compendium will tackle 

these questions and offer specific, detailed proposals for 

new measures consistent with the historical understanding,

democratic vision, and civic purposes outlined above. 

In addition, they spell out the practical and policy implications of adopting the new paradigm and spotlight its

implications for how agencies allocate resources, conduct

program evaluations, and so on.

It is worth noting that many of the most successful major

corporations use multiple performance measures that give

14 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 19 Kelling, “Measuring What Matters, pp. 21-22.
tremendous weight to “soft” indicators along with sales

reports, inventory records, and other “hard” financial data.

For example, McDonald’s Corporation has measured

performance not simply by the conventional bottom line 

of profits, but by a dozen or so measures that roving teams 

of inspectors apply — Are the floors clean? Are the salt

shakers full? Are the cashiers greeting customers and 

wearing their uniforms correctly? and so on. McDonald’s

recognized that the profits made by their stores were

conditioned by economic and other factors over which 

their franchisees had little or no direct control. But the 

store owners, managers, and staff could be and are held

strictly accountable for other factors that might affect

business.20

Likewise, over the last decade, the United States military 

has made great strides in developing reasonable and 

realistic measures of combat readiness and combat

effectiveness. Prodded by government and private studies

that found a need for improvements in military planning, 

and in the areas of weapons acquisition, combat training, and

force deployment, each branch of the military 

responded by revamping certain of its strategic doctrines 

and practices, and by getting away from simple “beancounting” measures. While many improvements have yet 

to be made, the military has begun to think about new 

and better ways of linking its national security mission to

meaningful performance standards and objectives.21

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 15

 20 David C. Rickert, McDonald’s Corporation (condensed),

Harvard Business School, revised February 1982.

 21For interesting examples that related to defense acquisition

programs, see Glenn A. Kent, A Framework for Defense Planning (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, August 1989), and Glenn 

A. Kent and William E. Simons, A Framework for Enhancing

Operational Capabilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991).
The performance measurement lesson that much of 

corporate America and the American military have learned 

is one that the American justice system can also apply. 

Crime rates, recidivism rates, and other conventional 

bottom-line measures must have better grounding in 

community needs and must be joined to a realistic set of

performance standards. The Study Group hopes to provide 

a gentle, democratic shove in that direction, and to get

policymakers, practitioners, analysts, activists, and 

interested citizens thinking and debating toward a new

paradigm of the American justice system.

About the author

John J. DiIulio, Jr., is Professor of Politics and Public 

Affairs at Princeton University and nonresident Senior 

Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He served as founding

director of Princeton’s Center of Domestic and Comparative Policy Studies. He is a member of the National

Commission on State and Local Public Service and served 

as an advisor to the National Performance Review. His 

most recent book is Improving Government Performance: 

An Owner’s Manual (Brookings, 1993). 

16 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Selected sources of measurement 

topics

Gordon P. Whitaker, Stephen Mastrofski, Elinor Ostrom,

Roger B. Parks, and Stephen L. Percy, Basic Issues in 

Police Performance, National Institute of Justice, July 1982.

Joan E. Jacoby, Basic Issues in Prosecution and Public

Defender Performance, National Institute of Justice, 

July 1982.

Thomas J. Cook and Ronald W. Johnson, with Ellen Fried,

John Gross, Mary Wagner, and James Eisenstein, Basic

Issues in Courts Performance, National Institute of Justice,

July 1982.

Gloria Grizzle, Jeffrey S. Bass, J. Thomas McEwen, 

Deborah M. Galvin, Ann G. Jones, Harriet D. Mowitt, and

Ann D. Witte, Basic Issues in Corrections Performance,

National Institute of Justice, July 1982.

Martha R. Burt, Measuring Prison Results: Ways to Monitor

and Evaluate Corrections Performance,

National Institute of Justice, June 1981.

Sorrel Wildhorn, Marvin Lavin, and Anthony Pascal,

Indicators of Justice: Measuring the Performance of

Prosecution, Defense, and Court Agencies Involved in Felony

Proceedings; A Guide to Practitioners, National 

Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of

Justice, May 1977.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 17
Sorrel Wildhorn, Marvin Lavin, Anthony Pascal, Sandra

Berry, and Stephen Klein, Indicators of Justice: Measuring

the Performance of Prosecution, Defense, and Court

Agencies Involved in Felony Proceedings; Analysis and

Demonstration, National Institute of Law Enforcement 

and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, May 1977.

Jack D. Reynolds, Performance Measurement in 

Probation and Parole, Washington, D.C.: University

Research Corporation, 1979.

Benjamin H. Renshaw, A Recommended Set of Indicators 

for Evaluating the Performance of the Philadelphia 

Criminal Justice System. Philadelphia: Government 

Studies & Systems, Inc., 1971. 

18 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Criminal Justice Performance 

Measures for Prisons

by Charles H. Logan

This is the second in a series of papers on how to measure 

and evaluate the performance of various agencies within 

the American criminal justice system. The first paper 

argued the need for new criminal justice performance

measures in addition to such conventional ones as crime 

rates, arrest rates, and recidivism rates. This paper extends

that argument and applies it to prisons. It starts with a very

brief and general definition of criminal justice from a

retributive (or “just deserts”) perspective. Such a 

perspective is rights-based rather than utilitarian, which

implies that evaluative indicators and measures of criminal

justice should focus more on the satisfaction of certain

standards, values, and constraints than on the production of

particular consequences. In Herbert Packer’s terms, they 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 19

 1John J. DiIulio, Jr., Rethinking the Criminal Justice System:

Toward a New Paradigm, BJS Discussion Paper, NCJ-139670

(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1993).
should focus more on the “Due-Process Model” than on 

the “Crime Control Model” of criminal justice.2

 The paper

will then outline the “confinement model” of imprisonment, which rests on a normative statement of mission 

for a prison or prison system. Finally, the paper will offer 

a set of empirical indicators that can be used as performance measures for prisons and that concentrate on the

competent, fair, and efficient administration of confinement as a form of deserved punishment. While based 

on the deserts theory of criminal justice, these measures 

will be seen to be at least somewhat sensitive also to such

goal-based concerns as rehabilitation of inmates and

protection of society, albeit for reasons independent of those

utilitarian justifications of imprisonment.

What is criminal justice?

Justice is the quality of treating individuals according to 

their rights and in ways that they deserve to be treated by

virtue of relevant conduct. Criminal justice is rightsrespecting treatment that is deserved by virtue of criminal

conduct. 

This definition of justice is rights-based, rather than 

utilitarian or consequentialist. A rights-based theory 

of justice gives a central role to punishment as a morally

necessary response to the violation of rights. To believe 

in rights is to believe in duties; those are alternative

statements of the same concept. To believe in duties is to

accept, implicitly but of logical necessity, the corollary 

of punishment. When we say that people have a duty

20 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 2 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction

(Stanford University Press, 1968).
to refrain from violating the rights of others, we are saying

that there must be some sanction if they fail to meet that 

duty. Duties are given meaning by the consequences that

attach to their nonfulfillment. Thus, the meaning of a duty,

like that of any other norm, must be socially constructed

through the attachment of sanctions to behavior. A norm 

(a rule, a law, a duty, a right) that had no sanction attached 

to its violation would be empty and without meaning.

Justice by this definition is backward-looking. It requires that

we treat people according to what they have done, not what

they (or others!) might do in the future as a result of how we

treat them now. Justice requires that all persons, including

offenders, be treated as autonomous and responsible actors

and as ends in themselves, not as means to social ends.

Finally, a rights-based theory sees justice as a process, an

ongoing property of criminal sanctioning as it occurs, not as

an expected outcome. Criminal justice is thus a value in itself

and not merely useful as a means to some other end.

Sanctioning that is evaluated as to its justice or injustice 

may, in addition, be evaluated in terms of its consequences

for other values, such as freedom, order, happiness, wealth, 

or welfare, but those are separate concerns. This means 

that questions about the effectiveness or efficiency of the

criminal justice system in achieving various “goals” or

“purposes” should be kept separate from, and secondary to, 

an evaluation of the performance of the justice system in 

its most basic mission: doing justice.3

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 21

 3 Again, however, the measures of justice to be derived here from

a normative and nonutilitarian model will be seen to 

overlap considerably with measures that might be derived

independently from a utilitarian model.
The nonutilitarian concept 

of prison performance

To date, most evaluation research on prisons has focused on

utilitarian questions. What are the goals of imprisonment?

To what extent and at what cost are 

they achieved? How does imprisonment compare to

alternatives in these respects? If we want evaluations 

of prison performance that are based on a normative 

rather than a utilitarian view of criminal justice, we need 

to reframe our question. We might ask, for example, “To

what values do prisons commit themselves in their mission

statements, and how well do they live up to those values?” 

Social scientists are not comfortable with the idea of applying

the tools of measurement directly to questions 

of value. That’s why criminologists are attracted to

utilitarianism, because it allows them to treat evaluative

research on prisons as if it were a purely objective, scientific

enterprise. In contrast, a court-appointed special master, who

is usually a lawyer rather than a social scientist, evaluates a

prison mostly from a formalistic rather than a utilitarian

perspective. That is, the prison and its activities are examined

not as means to an end (rehabilitation or crime control) but in

terms of standards and criteria of “proper” performance, or

conduct in fulfillment of duty. Consider this statement by a

prominent prison master:4

In summary, the ideal prison provides basic human

services in a decent and healthful physical environment.

Such a prison abjures idleness and its consequent human

22 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 4 Vincent M. Nathan, “Correctional Health Care: The

Perspective of a Special Master,” The Prison Journal, vol. 65,

No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1985), pp. 73-82, at p. 76.
 deterioration by offering constructive employment,

programming, and recreational activities to the greatest

extent possible; it addresses the human needs of

prisoners for self-expression, faith, and maintenance of

ties of importance to all human beings; it ensures safety

from random violence, rape, and exploitation of the

weak by the strong; it insulates decisions affecting the

lives of prisoners from arbitrary chaos by adhering to

due process of law; and it infuses the institutional

environment with constructive expectations through use

of positive incentives for hard work and good behavior.

That is not a bad statement of the mission of a prison, and 

it is probably one with which most correctional officials 

could agree. The most important point to note here is that 

it does not focus on ultimate goals, such as treatment or

punishment, but on a set of abstract values and normative

criteria against which to evaluate the day-to-day operation 

of a prison. 

A prison mission statement 

under the confinement model

We ask an awful lot of our prisons. We ask them to correct

the incorrigible, rehabilitate the wretched, deter the

determined, restrain the dangerous, and punish the wicked.

We ask them to take over where other institutions of 

society have failed and to reinforce norms that have been

violated and rejected. We ask them to pursue so many

different and often incompatible goals that they seem 

virtually doomed to fail. Moreover, when we lay upon

prisons the utilitarian goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, 

and incapacitation, we ask them to achieve results 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 23
primarily outside of prison, rather than inside.5

 By 

focusing on external measures, we set prisons up to be 

judged on matters well beyond their direct sphere of

influence.

If we do not want to set them up for failure, we must assign 

to prisons a function and a mission that we might 

reasonably expect them to fulfill. This mission ought to 

be fairly narrow and consistent in scope, and it ought to be

special to prisons, rather than conflated with the functions 

of other social institutions such as schools or welfare

agencies. It also ought to be achievable and measurable

mostly within the prison itself.6

 Finally, a prison’s mission

ought to have intrinsic, and not just instrumental, value. 

That is, it should identify activities that have value in

themselves, when they meet certain standards and criteria 

of performance, not activities that have value only if, 

when, and because they are effective in achieving some

further goal.

The prison mission statement proposed here is based on 

a “just deserts” theory of criminal justice, one that calls for 

a punitive and purely retributive (that is, a non-utilitarian)

response to criminal conduct. Punishment under such a

24 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 5For each of these three goals, the principal measure of its

achievement is the number of crimes avoided in the general

community. This is true even of incapacitation, because that refers

not to maintaining order within prisons but to avoiding the crimes

that current prisoners might have continued to commit if they were

not in custody. Incapacitation thus reflects much more the

performance of the police, prosecutors, and judges who catch,

select, and send offenders to prison than it does the performance of

those who simply hold them there.

 6

This last requirement pretty much rules out crime control and

rehabilitation, at least a criteria for evaluating the performance of

particular prisons, if not as goals of imprisonment generally. 
theory does not need to take the form of incarceration, 

but since this paper is about prison performance measures, 

I will narrow the theory down to what I call the “confinement model” of imprisonment.

Under the confinement model, the essential purpose of

imprisonment is to punish offenders — fairly and justly —

through lengths of confinement proportionate to the gravity 

of their crimes. Thus the term, “confinement model,” may 

be thought of as a shortened version of a clumsier but more

explicit label: the “doing justice through confinement as a

form of punishment model.” 

The mission of a prison under the confinement model can be

summarized quite succinctly:

The mission of a prison is to keep prisoners — to keep

them in, keep them safe, keep them in line, keep them

healthy, and keep them busy — and to do it with

fairness, without undue suffering, and as efficiently 

as possible.

The confinement mission of prisons is not as narrow as it 

may seem at first, nor is it necessarily harsh or insensitive 

to the welfare of prisoners. It should be noted that under 

the confinement model offenders are sent to prison as

punishment, not for punishment. It is not within the

legitimate mission of a prison to attempt to add to (any 

more than to avoid or to compensate for) the pain and

suffering inherent in being forcibly separated from civil

society. Stated more positively, coercive confinement 

carries with it an obligation to meet the basic needs of

prisoners at a reasonable standard of decency. Thus, 

measures of health care, safety, sanitation, nutrition, and 

other aspects of basic living conditions are relevant.

Furthermore, confinement must meet constitutional 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 25
standards of fairness and due process, so it is not just the

effectiveness and efficiency, but also the procedural justice

with which confinement is imposed that is important. 

In addition, programmatic activities like education, 

recreation, and work can be seen as part of the conditions 

of confinement, regardless of their alleged effects on

rehabilitation. In short, confinement is much more than 

just warehousing.

Under the confinement model, a prison does not have to

justify itself as a tool of rehabilitation or crime control or 

any other instrumental purpose at which an army of critics

will forever claim it to be a failure. It proclaims itself 

to be, first and foremost, an agent of justice, and not

necessarily an agent of either individual or social change. 

It asks to be judged only on its performance in carrying 

out the sanction of confinement-as-punishment; the

effectiveness of that sanction may be a valid and important

question, but it is not relevant to the measurement of prison

performance under the confinement model.

What, then, are the relevant criteria? 

Prison performance criteria 

under the confinement model

It might seem that measuring prison performance within 

a confinement model would be fairly simple — and indeed 

it is more straightforward than attempting to measure the

success of rehabilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation (let

alone the net effects of imprisonment on all three of these 

in combination) — but it is by no means easy. Still, the

confinement model does facilitate performance measurement, because it focuses less on the achievement of

ultimate and abstract goals and more on the fulfillment 

26 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
of delimited and immediate tasks. It shifts our attention away

from hard-to-determine outcomes and toward more directly

observable processes and adherence to measurable standards.

The confinement mission of a prison, as stated above,

identifies eight distinct dimensions for prison performance

measures: Security, Safety, Order, Care, Activity, Justice,

Conditions, and Management. Each of these dimensions will

be discussed briefly.

1. Security (“keep them in”). A secure facility is one that 

is impervious in either direction, outward or inward. 

Escapes are an obvious indicator of a lack of security, but

inward penetration, of drugs or other contraband, also

represents a breakdown of external security. Internal 

security would include control over movement of prisoners

within the prison and control over internal movement of

contraband, such as food or silverware from the dining 

hall, drugs from the infirmary, or tools from workshops.

2. Safety (“keep them safe”). Inmates and staff need to be

kept safe, not only from each other but from various

environmental hazards as well. Thus, measures of safety

would include assault statistics, safety inspection results, and

accidental injury reports.

 3. Order (“keep them in line”). Prisons run on rules, and

the ability of prison administrators to enforce compliance 

is central to prison performance. Allowing for variation in

the nature of their populations, it seems proper to evaluate

prisons according to their ability to prevent disturbances,

minimize inmate misconduct, and otherwise preserve order

inside their walls.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 27
4. Care (“keep them healthy”). I use the term “care” 

rather than “service” to cover the ministrations of such

personnel as doctors, dentists, psychiatrists, psychologists,

and dieticians. The distinction is primarily one of degree 

and entitlement. Convicts are entitled only to a very basic,

minimal level of personal care consistent with the principle

that it is not the purpose of imprisonment to inflict physical

suffering. At a minimum, prisons have an obligation to try 

to prevent suicide, malnutrition, exposure to the elements, 

and the spread of contagious diseases. Beyond the level 

of very basic care, however, the simple fact of confinement

does not entitle convicts to levels of service or to degrees 

of personal welfare that exceed what they are able to obtain

with their own resources. Therefore, when rating prisons 

on this dimension an evaluator might choose not to make

distinctions beyond a certain level.

5. Activity (“keep them busy”). When evaluating prisons

under a rehabilitation model, heavy emphasis is usually 

given to inmate programs; under a confinement model,

programs are still relevant, but on a different basis. 

Programs can be classified into five different types: work,

training, education, recreation, and therapy. All five types 

are relevant under a confinement model but in each case 

any rehabilitative effect a program might have is not 

directly relevant to its evaluation. Therapeutic programs 

are so closely associated with the rehabilitative ideal that 

they are difficult to recast in terms of the confinement 

model. They can, however, be offered as a form of “care,”

and evaluated according to the principles discussed under 

that dimension. Programs of the other three types should 

be judged according to how much opportunity they provide

inmates to engage in constructive activity or enterprise. 

“Constructive” activity is not defined here as “contributing 

to the betterment of inmates” but as activity that is, on its

28 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
face, consistent with the orderly, safe, secure, and humane

operation of a prison. Idleness and boredom can be seen as

wrong in themselves, from a work ethic standpoint, or as so

fundamentally related to mischief as to be undesirable for 

that reason. Either way, prison programs of work, training,

and education should be evaluated under the confinement

model as forms of constructive activity and as antidotes to

idleness, not as methods of rehabilitation.7

Under a rehabilitation model, work, education, and training

are seen as benefits that are offered to prisoners, or even

forced upon them, in the hope that this will make them better

and more law-abiding citizens. Under the confinement

model, work, education, and training are not benefits; they are

opportunities, available to prisoners who are willing to make

productive use of them. Ideally, prisons would have, or

would fit into, an economy in which inmates could earn

money by producing goods and performing services having

real value. Inmates might then seek education and training,

not to impress a parole board or a prison counselor, but to be

able to perform a more valuable and higher paying job.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 29

 7While a confinement model may sometimes be in conflict

with a rehabilitation model, it is not necessarily so. In the confinement model, it is desirable to keep inmates constructively

busy, quite apart from the question of whether that does them 

any rehabilitative good. That does not mean, however, that it 

does not matter from some other perspective whether the

programs have any rehabilitative effect. It would very nice if 

the prison programs had rehabilitative effects. However, when we

say that the primary purpose of prison is to punish through

confinement, we become more interested in the operation of 

hese programs inside the prison gates and less concerned about

their effects beyond.
The availability of opportunities for education and employment should offset some of the austerity of a prison 

organized around a strict confinement model. However,

amenities, privileges, and benefits that might be justified

under a rehabilitation model as a worthwhile investment of

taxpayers’ money should not be provided free to prisoners

under a confinement model. Any social benefits that are

guaranteed to all citizens should be provided to prisoners 

as well (within limits imposed by security needs), but 

beyond that prisoners would have to earn or purchase them 

at their own expense. Examples would include higher

education, entertainment, and medical, dental, or psychological services beyond the minimal levels entailed in the

confinement model.

Some people believe that constructive activity should be 

more than just an opportunity available to inmates; it 

should be a prisoner’s obligation as well. Offenders, in 

this view, should be held financially as well as morally

responsible for their crimes and their imprisonment. Thus,

prisoners should be required to work, to make restitution 

to their victims, to support their families, and to pay

something toward the cost of their incarceration. Financial

responsibility is not inconsistent with the confinement 

model, and could therefore be included under the 

dimension of activity. However, it is independent of, 

rather than integral to, a prison’s primary mission of

confinement-as-punishment.

 6. Justice (“do it with fairness”). In measuring the

performance of justice within prisons, the propriety of the

sentence may be taken for granted; what remains to be 

judged is the fairness with which the sentence is

administered. Stated more broadly, governing with justice

requires adherence to the rule of law inside prisons just as 

it does on the outside. Rules (“laws”) must be clear,

30 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
sanctions for their violation must be specified in advance 

and applied consistently, enforcement and adjudication 

must follow due process, and there should be provisions 

for independent review of decisions. Relevant to this

dimension would be procedures and practices in imposing

discipline and allocating good time, grievance procedures,

availability of and access to legal resources, and inmate

perceptions of the fairness and legitimacy of rules and their

enforcement.

7. Conditions (“without undue suffering”). A 

confinement model obviously requires some evaluation 

of the conditions of confinement. This broad term would

include such things as population density, food, clothing,

bedding, noise, light, air circulation and quality, temperature, sanitation, recreation, visitation, and communication

with the outside. As with the dimension of “care,” 

evaluation of living conditions and quality of life should 

not be completely linear (the more the better, without 

limits). In principle, this dimension is curved, so that

differences imply improvements at the lower end but have

declining or even negative merit (“too good for them”) 

above some higher point. Most prisons today, however,

probably lie along the middle range of this dimension, 

where comparison can be linear.

8. Management (“as efficiently as possible”). Quality 

of management is probably the single most important 

source of variation in the first 7 dimensions of quality 

of confinement. As such, there may be some redundancy 

in evaluating management as, itself, a separate component 

of prison performance. However, it is better to overmeasure than to under-measure, and many management

variables bear a strong enough presumptive relationship 

to overall quality of institutional operation that they can be

used as indicators of otherwise hard to measure concepts. 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 31
For example, such management-related variables as staff

morale, absenteeism, and turnover are visible reflections 

of institutional stress and tension. Training levels may 

be both a cause of quality (through increased staff

competence) and a result of quality (as a product of

institutional concern with proper procedure in treatment 

and discipline of inmates). Thus, various sorts of

management information can be used as a measure 

as well as an explanation of confinement quality. Good

management is also a legitimate end in itself. The public 

has an interest in seeing that the money it spends on

imprisonment is not wasted, through over-staffing, high

turnover, or other management-related problems.

These eight dimensions — security, safety, order, care,

activity, justice, conditions, and management — are

appropriate concerns of prison professionals under the

confinement model of imprisonment, and therefore 

constitute relevant focal points when measuring prison

performance. Moreover, they are relatively precise 

concepts susceptible to operationalization and empirical

measurement. First, however, each dimension must be

divided into its component parts, or subdimensions.

32 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Subdimensions and empirical indicators

The eight dimensions of prison performance described 

above are not directly measurable in themselves. As 

abstract concepts, they must eventually be linked to more

concrete and observable indicators before they can be

transformed into performance measures. A first step in 

that direction is to break each of the eight general concepts

down into an associated set of more specific subdimensions, as shown in Figure 1. These subdimensions can be

defined operationally by linking them to relevant empirical

indicators drawn from two types and sources of data:

institutional records and surveys of staff and inmates.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 33

 8Field observations would be a third type and source of data.

They are not discussed here because they are better suited to an

intensive case study than to the systematic, comparative style of

performance evaluation contemplated in this essay.
I

34 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

Security

Security procedures

Drug use

Significant incidents

Community exposure

Freedom of movement

Staffing adequacy 

Safety

Safety of inmates

Safety of staff

Dangerousness of inmates

Safety of environment

Staffing adequacy 

Order

Inmate misconduct

Staff use of force

Perceived control

Strictness of enforcement 

Care

Stress and illness

Health care delivered

Dental care

Counseling

Staffing for programs

and services 

Activity

Involvement in and 

evaluation of:

Work and industry

Education and training

Recreation

Religious services

Justice

Staff fairness

Limited use of force

Grievances, number and type

The grievance process

The discipline process

Legal resources and access

Justice delays

Conditions

Space in living areas

Social density and privacy

Internal freedom 

of movement

Facilities and maintenance

Sanitation

Noise

Food

Commissary

Visitation

Community access

Management

Job satisfaction

Stress and burn-out

Staff turnover

Staff and management 

relations

Staff experience

Education

Training

Salary and overtime

Staffing efficiency

Figure 1. Prison performance measures based on staff

and inmate surveys and institutional records
nstitutional records data can be drawn from such sources as

the following:

Significant incident logs

Disciplinary logs and files

Grievance logs and files

Inmate employment records 

Education records

Health clinic logs

Psychologist logs

Personnel records

Most prisons maintain records like these and should be 

able to retrieve and calculate summary information from 

them on a periodic basis. The Bureau of Justice Statistics

conducts a complete, nationwide census of all prisons and

jails every 5 years. The form used for this census requests

information on facility characteristics, court orders or 

consent decrees, inmate population size and characteristics,

housing confinement space, inmate education and work

assignments, counseling and other programs, furloughs, 

staff characteristics by function and payroll category, 

inmate medical facilities and HIV testing, inmate deaths, 

and major incidents during the last year. For the 1990 

prison census there was an additional set of questions 

on inmate drug use, interdiction methods such as drug

screening for inmates and staff, and treatment programs.

Ideally, the data collected through these censuses would 

allow researchers to construct performance measures for

comparing prisons both cross-sectionally and through time.

Unfortunately, respondent burden makes it difficult to 

expand the BJS census forms to address more of these 

issues in depth, at least as the forms are administered to all

facilities. It might be feasible, however, to extend the data

collection effort for a limited sample of prisons. Examples 

of performance measures based on institutional records are

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 35
offered in an appendix to this paper. Many of them could 

be derived directly from questions already included on the

BJS census form while others would require collecting

additional data.

Surveys of staff and inmates can be more costly than a 

census of facilities, but they have the advantage of being 

able to generate a far greater range of performance 

measures. Since the Bureau of Justice Statistics also does

national surveys of prison and jail inmates, in addition 

to the facility census, it might be feasible for those surveys 

to include questions aimed at constructing performance

measures. The Bureau of Prisons has developed what it 

calls the Prison Social Climate Survey (PSCS) to gather

information useful in the management of its facilities. 

This survey is administered to staff at half of the Bureau’s

prisons every 6 months and there is a parallel version of 

the survey for inmates, though it is rarely used. The PSCS

includes questions in four areas: 

1. Personal safety and security, which asks about the 

safety of staff and inmates; incidence of assaults, gang

activity, and use of weapons; dangerousness of inmates; 

use of force; security procedures; and degrees of control 

on different shifts.

2. Quality of life, which asks about sanitation, crowding,

turnover, privacy, noise, and grievance procedures.

3. Personal well-being, which asks about emotional and

physical health and symptoms of stress.

4. Work environment, which includes questions on

management effectiveness, job satisfaction, employee 

morale, adequacy of staff training, and relations with 

inmates.

36 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
The inmate version of the PSCS also covers the first three

areas, but in place of Work environment it has a Services 

and programs section asking about medical care, 

counseling, education, recreation, work, and religious

programs. Elsewhere, it has questions on staff competence,

attitudes, and interactions; on the discipline process; and 

on aspects of living conditions beyond those asked also 

of staff. 

Most questions in the PSCS ask the respondent to answer 

in terms of conditions prevailing during the last 6 months, 

so that repeated surveys can be used to map changes 

through time. The numerous questions cover all of the

dimensions of prison performance and quality identified in

this paper, albeit some dimensions more thoroughly than

others. Many of the survey-based indicators listed in the

appendix are taken from the staff and inmate versions of 

the PSCS.

Significantly, this paper’s eight conceptual dimensions of

prison performance, and the prison mission statement that

underlies them, were inspired in major part by analyzing 

the management concerns of the Bureau of Prisons as

revealed in its Prison Social Climate Survey. That the

dimensions and measures of prison performance

recommended here should come from observing the

self-imposed tasks, standards, and evaluation criteria of a

well-regarded prison system is consistent with the primary

theme of this essay: Prisons should be evaluated according 

to that which it is reasonable and realistic to regard as 

being within their sphere of influence, competence, and

accountability.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 37
Introducing an instrument for prison 

performance measurement

The final section of this paper is the Appendix, p. 42. It

presents an organized set of empirical indicators that could 

be used as performance measures for prisons. These

indicators are grouped into the eight dimensions that have

been identified as relevant to prison performance and quality

under a confinement model of imprisonment. Within each

dimension, the indicators are further organized according to

subdimensions, and the indicators based on official records

are distinguished visually (by the use of italics) from those

that are based on survey instruments. This set of performance

measures has not been tested for validity, reliability, internal

consistency, scalability, predictive weighting, discrimination,

or other statistical properties, and has been used, in its current

form, in only one study.9

 What the indicators have to

recommend them for further study is not so much their

current methodological quality as the fact that they are based

on a clear conceptual model.

In concluding this paper, a few caveats on the application 

of these measures may be in order. First, the indicators are

offered here without any instructions for coding, scoring,

combining into scales, or interpreting results. The intent 

of this paper is to offer some grounded and specific criteria

and empirical indicators for evaluating prison performance,

38 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 9Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing Quality of

Confinement in a Public and Private Prison (Washington, 

D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1991). The Prison Social

Climate Survey, on the other hand, has been tested for statistical

qualities, refined, and used in various research projects 

conducted by the Office of Research and Evaluation of the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons.
but not to prejudge the question of just what standards 

should differentiate good, fair, or poor performance. 

Indeed, such standards probably cannot be articulated 

in abstract or absolute terms. Rather, prison performance

should generally be viewed as a relative or comparative

matter, and preferably within contexts that hold constant 

or adjust for such factors as the population type, security

level, or other characteristics of the prisons being 

compared. In any case, the most important thing in

developing performance measures is not the choice 

of cutting points to use as standards (such as 60 versus 

58 square feet per cell), but the choice of the criteria

themselves (such as space per inmate in living areas). 

It is by choosing the criteria for evaluating performance 

that we structure incentives and thus shape the behavior 

we wish to evaluate and, ultimately, improve.

Second, as suggested by the large number of indicators 

in the Appendix, the concept of prison performance is

complex and multi-dimensional. No single indicator, nor

even any small subset of indicators, should be taken too

seriously by itself. Multiple indicators are required to 

capture the many tradeoffs that must be made between the

various and sometimes conflicting criteria of quality in the

operation of a prison. Since no organization can maximize 

all values at once, the more criteria and indicators we use, 

the more accurately we can reflect the total pattern of an

institution’s strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, some

indicators must be viewed in conjunction with others in 

order to be interpreted fully. For example, data on the

frequency of shakedowns must be combined with measures 

of inmate grievances, drug use, and amounts of contraband

found, in order to say whether those shakedowns amount to

harassing inmates, engaging in needless ritualism, or doing

what is necessary to interdict illicit traffic. Indicators taken

separately will always produce errors of measurement and

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 39
interpretation. Using large numbers of indicators helps 

to smooth out and counterbalance these errors, so that an

overall pattern of findings will be more reliable and

meaningful than the results of any of the individual indicators

alone.

Third, note that some indicators are used multiple times, 

to measure different concepts, sometimes with conflicting

results. For example, freedom of movement for inmates 

is a negative indicator on the dimension of Security, but 

a positive indicator on the dimension of Conditions. That 

sort of ambiguity is a fact of life, so it is valid to include

measures that are scored both positively and negatively, on

different dimensions. More troublesome are indicators that

can be interpreted either positively or negatively within the

same dimension. Many potential indicators were discarded

during the process of constructing the set of measures 

found in the Appendix because opposing interpretations

seemed equally plausible. Even after that culling process,

however, some of the remaining indicators can be 

interpreted, at least arguably, in either a positive or a 

negative direction. There is no way to avoid that problem

completely. To restrict oneself to indicators that are

absolutely clear and unambiguous would produce very 

limited and uninteresting reports. A better solution is to

report findings in detail, thus allowing others to make

differing interpretations, and to search for patterns rather 

than relying very much on single indicators.

Finally, it may be noted that some of the indicators are

“harder” and some “softer” than others. Most of the

indicators based on official records produce relatively

objective, factual, and verifiable data, while the indicators

based on inmate and staff surveys are more subjective and

perceptual. Researchers should be sensitive to the need to

look for conflicting results (for example, between staff and

40 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
inmate perceptions), should try to use the “harder” 

indicators to corroborate the “softer” indicators, and may

wish to consider weighting some indicators more heavily 

than others.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 41
Appendix

Criminal Justice Performance Measures 

for Prisons

Italicized items are based on official records. Others are

based on surveys of staff or inmates (or both, in which case

the staff and inmate means are counted as separate

indicators). “Rate per capita-6” means “divided by total

number of inmates resident at some time during a 6-month

reference period.” Scale values are omitted for all scale items

(“rating of ...,” “perception of ...,” etc.).

Survey and official record measures of prison performance

Dimension 1: Security (“keep them in”)

A. General

1. Rating of how the building design affects 

surveillance of inmates

B. Security procedures (6-month period)

1. Perceived frequency of shakedowns in the living

 area

2. Perceived frequency of body searches

3. Proportion of staff who have observed:

a. Any consequential problems within the 

institution 

b. Lax security 

c. Poor assignment of staff

d. Inmate security violations

e. Staff ignoring inmate misconduct

f. Staff ignoring disturbances 

g. Other problems 

42 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
4. Number of cell or bunk area shakedowns 

conducted in a 1-month period 

a. Rate per inmate

b. Proportion finding contraband

5. Number of urinalysis tests based on suspicion 

in a 1-month period

a. Rate per inmate

b. Proportion testing positive for opiates

C. Drug use (6-month period)

1. Drug-related incidents, number and rate per capita-6

2. Discipline reports related to drugs or contraband, 

number and rate per capita-6

D. Significant incidents (6-month period)

1. Significant incidents, total and rate per capita-6

a. Proportion of 6-month population involved

in any incidents

2. Escapes, number and rate per capita-6

E. Community exposure (6-month period)

1. Furloughs, number and rate per capita-6

F. Freedom of movement

1. Perceived freedom of movement for inmates: 

Day / Evening / Night

G. Staffing

1. Ratio of resident population to security staff

Dimension 2: Safety (“keep them safe”)

A. Inmate safety (6-month period)

1. Perceived likelihood of an inmate being

assaulted in his living area

2. Estimated rate (per 100 population) of armed

assaults involving inmates

3. Estimated rate (per 100 population) of assaults 

against inmates without a weapon

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 43
4. Estimated rate (per 100 population) of sexual

assaults upon inmates 

5. Estimated rate (per 100 population) of instances 

inmate has been pressured for sex

6. Inmates’ perceived danger of being: 

a. killed or injured

b. punched or assaulted

7. Proportion of inmates who say they have been 

physically assaulted by another inmate in a

6-month period

8. Proportion of inmates who say they have been 

physically assaulted by staff in a 6-month period

9. Discipline reports that involved fighting or

assault, number and rate per capita-6

10. Significant incidents involving inmate injury,

number and rate per capita-6

B. Staff safety (6-month period)

1. Rating of how the building design affects staff safety

2. Perceived danger to male staff

3. Perceived danger to female staff

4. Rating of how often inmates use physical force 

against staff

 5. Perceived likelihood that a staff member would be 

assaulted

6. Proportion of staff who say they have been assaulted 

by an inmate in a 6-month period

7. Significant incidents involving staff injury, number 

and rate per capita-6

C. Dangerousness of inmates

1. Proportion of inmates perceived to be extremely 

dangerous

2. Proportion of inmates perceived to be somewhat 

dangerous

3. Perceived frequency of inmate possession of 

weapons in living quarters

44 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
D. Safety of environment (6-month period)

1. Perceived frequency of accidents: 

Housing Units / Dining Hall / Work Environment

2. Perceived occurrence in housing units of clutter that 

could feed a fire

E. Staffing adequacy

1. Proportion of staff and inmates who feel there are 

enough staff to provide for safety of inmates: 

Day / Evening / Night

2. Proportion of staff who feel there are enough staff to 

provide for their own safety: 

Day / Evening / Night

Dimension 3: Order (“keep them in line”)

A. Inmate misconduct (6-month period)

1. Perceived frequency of physical force by inmates 

against staff

2. Perceived security of inmate personal property

3. Proportion of inmates who report being punished 

in the last 6 months:

a. with a major sanction

b. with a lesser sanction 

4. Number of inmates written up, as proportion 

of 6-month population

5. Discipline reports, total and rate per capita-6 

a. Reports per inmate among those written up

6. Significant incidents of disturbance or incitement 

to riot, number and rate per capita-6

B. Staff use of force (6-month period)

1. Perceived frequency that staff have used force 

against inmates over a 6-month period 

2. Significant incidents in which force was used, 

number and rate per capita-6

3. Significant incidents in which restraint was used, 

number and rate per capita-6

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 45
 C. Perceived control

1. Agreement that staff know what goes on among 

inmates

2. Agreement that staff have caught and punished the 

“real troublemakers” 

3. Perceptions of how much control inmates have over 

other inmates: Day / Evening / Night

4. Perceptions of how much control staff have over 

inmates: Day / Evening / Night

D. Strictness of enforcement (6-month period)

1. Proportion of discipline reports that were:

a. Dismissed

b. Guilty of a minor report

c. Guilty of a major report

2. Proportion of minor report convictions that received 

a sanction of:

a. Warning/reprimand

b. 5-10 extra hours of duty

c. 15-20 extra hours of duty

d. 25-30 extra hours of duty

3. Proportion of major report convictions that received 

a sanction of:

a. Segregation only

b. Loss of goodtime only

c. Segregation and loss of goodtime

4. Average number of goodtime days taken away

5. Average number of days to be spent in segregation

6. Proportion of major report sanctions

a. Suspended at committee level

b. Modified by warden

Dimension 4: Care (“keep them healthy”)

A. Stress and illness (6-month period)

1. Inmate stress scale: average of 9 items reporting 

feelings of mental, physical, and emotional strain

2. Average number of days an inmate was ill or injured

46 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
3. Average number of days an inmate was seriously ill 

enough that medical help was needed but did not go 

to sick call

4. Significant incidents involving suicide attempts or 

self-injury, number and rate per capita-6

5. Significant incidents requiring first aid or infirmary 

visit, number and rate per capita-6

B. Health care delivered (6-month period)

1. Proportion of inmates who used medical facilities 

other than for emergency problems 

a. Proportion of those who used the facilities who 

felt the problem was properly taken care of

2. Proportion of inmates who reported having had 

emergency medical treatment

a. Proportion of those who received emergency 

medical treatment who felt that it was adequately 

handled

3. Clinical contacts, total and rate per capita-6

4. Sick calls, number and rate per capita-6

5. Medical appointments, number and rate per capita-6

6. Physicals and TB tests, number and rate per capita-6

7. Lab appointments, number and rate per capita-6

8. Miscellaneous clinic visits, number and rate per 

capita-6

C. Dental care (6-month period)

1. Proportion of inmates who received dental treatment

a. Proportion of those receiving dental treatment 

who felt it was adequately handled

2. Dental visits, number and rate per capita-6

D. Counseling (6-month period)

1. The alcohol and drug counseling services have been 

satisfactory (agree/disagree)

2. Other counseling services have been satisfactory

(agree/disagree)

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 47
3. Proportion of inmates who report having 

participated in some kind of counseling:

a. Drug/alcohol counseling 

b. Therapy

4. Psychologist contact cases per capita for 1 month

5. Number of contact hours per contact case for 

1 month

6. Proportion of inmates who were involved in the 

following programs:

a. Psychology/psychiatric; includes substance 

abuse

b. Employment and pre-release counseling

7. Psychiatric visits (over a 6-month period), number 

and rate per capita-6

E. Staffing for programs and services

1. Number of program or services delivery staff (FTE):

a. Medical clinicians 

b. Education/work 

c. Psychology/counseling 

d. TOTAL

2. Number of inmates (average daily resident 

population) per FTE staff position in programs or 

services:

a. Per medical clinician 

b. Per education/work staff 

c. Per psychologist/counselor

d. Per total program/service staff

3. Program or services delivery staff as a proportion 

of total staff

Dimension 5: Activity (“keep them busy”)

A. General

1. Inmates usually have things to do to keep them busy

48 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
B. Work and industry involvement (6-month period)

1. Involvement in prison industry, work release, 

or institutional jobs:

a. Proportion of population eligible

b. Proportion working

2. Among eligible inmates, proportion involved in:

a. Prison industry 

b. Work release 

c. Institutional jobs

3. Average work hours per week among employed 

inmates

C. Work and industry evaluation (6-month period)

1. The work training program has been satisfactory 

(agree/disagree)

2. Have the vocational training courses provided skills 

that are useful?

a. Perceived importance of learning the 

information presented in class

b. Perceived understanding of the information 

presented in class

3. Grievances that involved problems with work, 

number and rate per capita-6

D. Education and training involvement (6-month period)

1. Proportion of inmates who report having participated 

in some educational program

a. Educational

b. Social education/pre-release skills

2. Enrollment in education or vocational training 

classes:

a. Proportion of population eligible

b. Proportion enrolled

 3. Among eligible inmates, proportion involved in the 

following programs:

a. Adult basic education 

b. Secondary education 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 49
c. College education courses 

d. Vocational training

4. Average class hours per week among those 

in education or vocational training programs

E. Education and training evaluation (6-month period)

1. The general education program has been satisfactory 

(agree/disagree)

2. Have the academic courses provided useful skills?

a. Perceived understanding of the information 

presented in class

 b. Perceived importance of the information 

presented in class

F. Recreation (6-month period)

1. Recreational activities are satisfactory 

(agree/disagree)

2. Rating of how often prison recreational facilities are 

used 

3. Rating of how often inmates are unable to use the 

recreational facilities 

G. Religious services (6-month period)

1. Religious services have been satisfactory 

(agree/disagree)

2. Rating of how often inmates attend religious services 

Dimension 6: Justice (“do it fairly”)

A. Staff fairness

1. Questions on aspects of staff fairness 

(agree/disagree)

a. Staff let inmates know what is expected of them

b. Staff are fair and honest

c. Inmates are written up without cause

2. Staff are too involved in their own interests to care 

about inmate needs (agree/disagree)

50 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
B. Limited use of force (6-month period)

1. Staff use force only when necessary (agree/disagree)

2. Perceived frequency with which staff have used 

force against inmates

3. Significant incidents in which force was used, 

number and rate per capita-6

4. Significant incidents in which restraints were used, 

number and rate per capita-6

C. Grievance volume (6-month period)

1. Proportion of staff reporting having a grievance filed 

against them in last 6 months

2. Proportion of inmates who reported filing 

a grievance against staff or management

3. Inmates filing grievances, number and proportion 

of 6-month population

4. Grievances filed, total and rate per capita-6

5. Number of grievances directed at individual staff

a. Proportion of all grievances

b. Rate per capita-6

D. The grievance process (6-month period)

1. Perceived effectiveness of the grievance procedure

2. Perceived benefits of the grievance procedure

3. Perceived effect of grievance procedure on the 

quality of life

4. Proportion of inmate grievants who report their 

grievance was taken care of:

a. Completely

b. Partially

c. Not at all

5. Proportion of inmates who did not file a grievance, 

who cite the following reasons:

a. They never had any major complaint

b. The problem was solved informally

c. They thought it would be useless

d. They were afraid of negative consequences

e. Other reasons

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 51
6. Proportion of all grievances that were appealed

E. The discipline process (6-month period)

1. Proportion of inmates receiving a major sanction 

who felt it was a fair punishment

2. Proportion of inmates receiving a lesser sanction 

who felt it was a fair punishment

3. Perception of how many maximum security inmates 

really belong there

4. Proportion of discipline guilty verdicts that were 

appealed

a. Minor reports

b. Major reports

5. Proportion of major report sanctions

a. Suspended at committee level

b. Modified by warden

F. Legal resources and legal access (6-month period)

1. Proportion of inmates who have used the law library 

2. Proportion of inmates who feel the law library has 

supplied adequate information

 3. Proportion of inmates who feel the law library has 

not supplied adequate information.

4. Grievances that involved legal resources or access, 

number and rate per capita-6

G. Justice delayed (6-month period)

1. Average number of days from the date of the 

discipline report until the hearing 

2. Proportion of minor reports with hearings beyond 

7-day limit

3. From date of grievance report until resolved 

by grievance officer:

a. Average number of days

b. Proportion beyond 20 days

4. From date of grievance report until resolution 

approved by warden:

a. Average number of days

b. Proportion beyond 27 days

52 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Dimension 7: Conditions (“without undue suffering”)

A. General

1. The administration is doing its best to provide good 

living conditions (agree/disagree)

B. Crowding (6-month period)

1. Average resident population as percentage 

of capacity

2. Proportion of 6-month period in which capacity 

was exceeded

3. Average number of sq. ft. per inmate in housing units

4. Perceived occurrence of crowding in the housing 

units

5. Perceived occurrence of crowding outside the 

housing units

C. Social density and privacy

1. Proportion of inmates who were confined in:

a. Single-occupancy units of 60 sq. ft. or more

b. Multiple-occupancy units with 60 sq. ft. or more 

per inmate 

c. Multiple-occupancy units with less than 

60 sq. ft. per inmate

2. Perceived amount of privacy within the sleeping area

3. Perceived amount of privacy in the shower and toilet 

area

D. Internal freedom of movement

1. Perceived freedom of movement for inmates: 

Day / Evening / Night

2. Proportion of inmates who were confined to housing 

units for over 10 hours per day

 E. Facilities and maintenance (6-month period)

1. Residents vs. conveniences in living areas

a. Inmates per shower

b. Inmates per sink

c. Inmates per toilet

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 53
d. Inmates per telephone

e. Inmates per television

2. Grievances about maintenance, number and rate 

per capita-6

F. Sanitation (6-month period)

1. Perceived occurence of insects, rodents, or dirt 

in the housing units

2. Perceived occurence of insects, rodents, or dirt 

in the dining hall

3. Perceived occurence of a bad odor or poor air 

circulation in the housing units

G. Noise (6-month period)

1. Perceived noise level in the evening hours 

2. Perceived noise level in the sleeping hours

H. Food (6-month period)

1. Quality of food at the institution 

2. Variety of the food at the institution 

3. Proportion of inmates who feel enough food 

is served for the main course

4. Proportion of inmates who feel the appearance 

of the food is appealing

5. Grievances involving food complaints, number 

and rate per capita-6

I. Commissary (6-month period)

1. There is an adequate commissary selection 

(agree/disagree)

2. Proportion of inmates who reported:

a. No errors in their commissary account 

b. Errors that were corrected

c. Errors that were not corrected

J. Visitation (6-month period)

1. Proportion of inmates who find it hard to arrange 

visits with family and friends

54 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
2. Proportion of inmates reporting family and friends 

who find it hard to arrange visits 

3. Average number of visitors reported by inmates 

4. Rating of the quality of visits 

 5. Perceived occurrence of too many people in the 

visiting area

6. Rating of how often it is hard to talk to a visitor 

because of noise in the visiting area 

7. Proportion of inmates who feel the visiting room 

has enough furniture

8. Proportion of inmates who feel the visiting room 

has enough vending machines

9. Grievances involving visitation and mail problems, 

number and rate per capita-6

K. Community access (6-month period)

1. Furloughs, number and rate per capita-6

Dimension 8: Management (“as efficiently as possible”)

A. Job satisfaction (6-month period)

1. Institution satisfaction index: average across 3 items 

expressing positive feelings toward the institution 

2. Proportion of staff who reported filing a grievance 

against management 

3. Proportion of staff who have not filed a grievance, 

who cite the following reason:

a. Never had a major complaint 

b. Problem was taken care of informally 

c. Thought it would be useless 

d. Afraid of negative consequences 

e. Other reason

B. Stress and burn-out

1. Job stress index: average across 5 items regarding 

how often staff experience stress on the job 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 55
2. Hardening-toward-inmates index: average across 

3 items regarding how often staff feel indifferent 

or harsh toward inmates

3. Relating-to-inmates index: average across 7 items 

regarding how often staff feel positive about the way 

they work with inmates 

C. Staff turnover

1. Staff on reference date divided into:

a. Vacancies on reference date

b. Terminations during previous 6 months

2. Termination rate divided by relevant BOP 

tenure-specific rate

D. Staff and management relations

1. Management and communication index: average 

across 10 items expressing positive appraisals 

of the organization and authority of management

2. Relationship-with-supervisor index: average across 

6 items regarding how positive staff feel toward their 

supervisor 

3. Rating of how the building design affects 

communication among line staff

4. Rating of how the building design affects 

communication between line staff and supervisors

E. Staff experience

1. Average number of years worked at this institution

2. Average number of other facilities worked in prior 

to this facility

3. Average years in corrections

a. Total staff, minus services staff

b. Custody staff

c. Top administrators

F. Education

1. Average years of education (excluding services staff)

56 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
G. Training

1. Training index: average across 5 items regarding the 

effectiveness and quality of the training program

H. Salary and overtime (6-month period)

1. Average salary (in $1,000’s)

a. Total, minus services staff

b. Custody staff

c. Top administrators

2. Average number of overtime hours worked in a week

3. Average proportion of overtime compensated by: 

a. Extra pay 

b. Compensatory time 

c. No compensation

I. Staffing efficiency

1. Number of resident inmates per FTE staff member

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 57
This paper is based on research conducted by the author 

with support from several agencies of the U. S. Department 

of Justice: the Bureau of Justice Statistics (grant no.

92-BJ-CX-0001), the National Institute of Justice 

(grant no. 86-IJ-CX-0062-S1), the National Institute 

of Corrections, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

The views are those of the author and do not necessarily

reflect Department of Justice policy.

58 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
About the author

Dr. Charles H. Logan is a Professor and Associate Head 

of Sociology at the University of Connecticut, where he 

has taught since 1970. He has published widely on many

criminal justice issues, including the deterrent effects of 

arrest and imprisonment, evaluation of correctional 

programs, the effects of parole, juvenile justice, jury

selection, prison performance measures, and the 

privatization of prisons. His major work in the latter area 

is Private Prisons: Cons and Pros (Oxford University 

Press, 1990). In 1987-88 he served as a professional staff

member for the President’s Commission on Privatization 

and has been a Visiting Fellow to several agencies of the 

U.S. Department of Justice — including the National 

Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Bureau 

of Justice Statistics. He is a member of the Corrections and

Sentencing Committee of the American Bar Association’s

Criminal Justice Section.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 59
Measuring the Performance 

of Community Corrections

by Joan Petersilia

Introduction

The 1980’s saw tremendous growth in community corrections’ populations — from about 1.4 million persons at the

start of the decade to 3.2 million by 1990 — a more than

130% increase. This increase was larger than that experienced by either prisons or jails over the same time period

(Hindelang et al., 1981; Jankowski, 1992). Today, 3 out 

of every 4 persons under correctional supervision in the

United States are on some form of community-based 

custody — mostly probation or parole — although 

community corrections also includes halfway houses, 

residential centers, work furlough, and all other programs for

managing the offender in the community.1

60 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 1Probation is often confused with parole. Probation is a 

sentence the offender serves in the community while under

supervision; parole is the conditional release of an inmate from

incarceration under supervision after a portion of the prison 

sentence has been served.
Despite its wide usage, community corrections is often the

subject of intense criticism. Probation and parole suffer 

from a “soft on crime” image and, as a result, maintain 

little public support. Their poor (and some believe, misunderstood) public image leaves them unable to compete 

effectively for scarce public funds. Nationally, community

corrections receives less than 10% of State and local government expenditures for correctional services, which 

includes jails and prisons (Flanagan and Maguire, 1992).

And their budgets are declining at a faster rate when compared to other criminal justice components. Over the last

decade in Los Angeles, for example, the county Superior

Court budget grew more than 200%, the sheriffs’ and district attorneys’ budgets grew about 50%, while that of

probation grew by a mere 10% — even though probation

populations more than doubled over this time period.

It is also true that those offenders being sentenced to probation and parole are more serious than in the past — in 

terms of their crimes, prior criminal records, and substance

abuse histories (Petersilia and Turner, 1990). In New 

York, for example, 77% of probationers are felons (not

misdemeanants), and fully a third of active cases are people

who have been found guilty of violent crimes — yet these

persons are supervised on caseloads of several hundred

persons (Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1993:A20). 

The Los Angeles situation is even more critical. The L.A.

County Probation Department, the largest in the world, 

supervises 90,000 adult offenders — 80% of all those convicted in the county. But three-quarters of those offenders 

are monitored only by computer, by probation officers with

caseloads of about 1,000 each. As a result, Chief Probation

Officer Barry Nidorf estimates that his deputies have, on

average, only 1 hour and 47 minutes per year to devote 

to each probationer (Los Angeles Times, February 8,

1993:A12). 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 61
Why does community corrections fare so poorly? It is 

not that its services are undervalued. Quite the contrary: 

every national study and commission beginning with the

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and

Administration of Justice (1967) up to the more recent

President’s National Drug Control Strategy (1990) has

recommended expanding community corrections. In fact, the

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards

and Goals (1973:311) referred to community corrections as

the justice system’s “brightest hope.” Public opinion polls

also show wide support for community-based sentencing for

nonviolent offenders (Doble, 1987; Jacoby and Dunn, 1987).

But while there is general support for the concept of

community sanctions, current programs are seen as

inadequate. Most of the commissions that endorse

community corrections go on to state that current programs

are unable to provide effective offender supervision or

rehabilitation. Furthermore, their minimal supervision is not

seen as adequate punishment for most serious crimes. As

DiIulio notes in No Escape: The Future of American

Corrections (1991:68),

Most Americans think that criminal sanctions that make

little or no use of incarceration fail to protect the public

adequately, to deter would-be criminals, and to prevent

convicted offenders from finding new victims. Furthermore, they simply do not feel that alternatives to incarceration are an adequate moral response to the pain and

suffering imposed upon innocent victims by often calculating and remorseless victimizers.

In their defense, “community corrections” remains an 

ambiguous concept. It is a legal status, an alternative to 

incarceration, a service-delivery mechanism, and an 

62 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
organizational entity. As an organizational entity, it has

objectives and performs a wide range of activities — some

totally unrelated to offender supervision and/or treatment.

One survey found that probation departments were responsible for more than 50 different activities, including courtrelated civil functions (for example, step-parent adoption

investigations, minority age marriage investigations)

(Fitzharris, 1979). The time-worn controversy over 

whether community corrections (particularly probation) is

punishment, treatment, or an amalgam of both further confuses discussions of its mission. As David Fogel (1984)

observed: “probation lacks a forceful imagery that other

occupations in criminal justice can claim: police catch

criminals, prosecutors try to get them locked up, judges put

them in prisons, wardens keep them there, but what do probation officers do?”

So while it is true that study panels continually endorse the

expansion of community corrections, none has specified

exactly what functions it should perform, or when and how 

it should be used. Having been founded more than 150 

years ago, community corrections still has an unclear 

primary mission, with confusion about what activities 

contribute to that mission and how best to assess their 

performance. Many observers have urged community 

corrections to quantify what they do, with whom, and to 

what benefit (Cochran et al., 1991; Petersilia et al., 1985;

Clear and O’Leary, 1983; McAnany et al., 1984; Blair 

et al., 1987).

Without a clear public mandate or an effective constituency, community corrections has been vulnerable to

political pressures. It has fallen prey to the weakness described by the adage: “If you don’t stand for something,

you’ll fall for anything.” In the 1970’s, when rehabilitation was in favor, it promised to rehabilitate. In the 1980’s,

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 63
when the public mood turned tough-on-crime, it promised

toughness. But with budget cuts, observers have noted that

community corrections ends up promising much but being

able to deliver very little (Clear and Byrne, 1992). 

As DiIulio (1992) points out, to some extent these problems are endemic to all public agencies. However, they 

seem particularly problematic in community corrections

agencies for two reasons. First, there is a serious lack of

consensus — and in fact, widespread disagreement —

among community corrections staff as to goals and mission. The leadership, as well as line staff, differ — both

within and among departments — as to the importance of 

the surveillance/control model versus the treatment/service

model. Of course, supervision usually combines elements 

of both, but studies have shown that supervision activities 

do differ significantly depending on which model the staff

endorses (Ellsworth, 1992). The controversy over whether

community corrections is punishment, treatment, or both 

has now been enlivened. A number of large community

corrections agencies (for example, Los Angeles) have now

openly embraced a surveillance model — quite different 

from the meshing of the two major goals in previous years. 

Thus, there is a major disagreement within the leadership

of community corrections about what the primary mission 

of their agencies is. 

The second major difficulty — closely related to the first —

is that community corrections has, by and large, never been

able to show that it “works.” Historically, recidivism 

rates — an offender’s return to crime after some intervention

— have been the gauge by which community corrections 

has been evaluated. And after hundreds of research studies

(most poorly done), the weight of evidence shows that

community corrections programs have not been able 

64 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
to reduce recidivism (Lipton et al., 1975; Gottfredson and

Gottfredson, 1980; Petersilia and Turner, 1993). A recent

report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics revealed that 43% 

of felons on State probation were rearrested for another

felony within 3 years (Langan and Cunniff, 1992).

After a long history of being unable to affect recidivism

significantly, probation and parole leaders have begun 

to question the outcome measure itself — not whether 

recidivism should be included at all, but whether it should 

be the sole or primary measure of their performance. They

note that crime is the result of a long line of social ills—

dysfunctional families, economic and educational deprivation, and so on — and these social problems are clearly 

beyond the direct influence of probation/parole agencies. 

As the BJS/Princeton Study Group concludes (1992):

to evaluate the system’s performance chiefly in terms 

of recidivism measures is to exaggerate the system’s 

ability to affect the prevalence and severity of crime in 

society, to miss other important measures of the

system’s day-to-day performance, and to obscure the

role that citizens can and should play in promoting 

secure communities (DiIulio, 1992).

Corrections officials also argue persuasively that recidivism rates measure just one function, while ignoring other

critical probation/parole tasks, such as preparing presentence investigations, collecting fines and fees, monitoring community service, and so on. Adequate performance 

indicators should reflect the multitude of an agency’s goals

and activities.

The American Probation and Parole Association (1992) has

recently called for including other intermediate outcomes in

program evaluations. These would measure the offend-

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 65
ers’ activities while on probation or parole supervision (for

example, rates of employment, drug use, participation in 

work and education). The association argues that programs

do affect offender behavior, and that the effects would be

shown if these mediating outcomes were measured. 

Corrections practitioners also question whether their performance should be judged by how the offender behaves 

once he is off formal probation/parole supervision. After 

all, other components of the justice system are not judged 

by their ability to affect the future criminal behavior of 

offenders, and corrections should not be either. Charles

Logan (1992) agrees and writes:

The police, prosecutor, and courts are judged by more

proximate outcomes (such as arrest and conviction

rates). It is only when the system switches to corrections, that changing the offenders’ crime behavior

becomes the primary measure of success.

An additional difficulty has recently emerged regarding the

recidivism measure. Specifically, even if one accepts that

recidivism is a useful measure of success, it is not clear which

direction indicates success. If one believes that the major

mission of community corrections is to protect the public —

emphasizing the surveillance function — then perhaps

increasing recidivism rates (for example, returns 

to prison) is a positive — not negative — performance 

indicator. If offenders are convicted of a crime and 

incarcerated, then public safety is being served. But if 

rehabilitation is the primary goal, as it has historically 

been, then decreasing recidivism indicates success. For

example, a recent evaluation of intensive probation/parole

supervision programs found that closer supervision 

increased technical violations and returns to jail and prison.

The Los Angeles Times called the probation program a

66 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
“dismal failure” since it failed to decrease recidivism. 

Barry Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer in Los Angeles 

County, used the higher recidivism figures to argue that 

the ISP program had succeeded. He wrote:

Reducing recidivism was not listed as the highest 

priority...holding offenders accountable was of primary

importance...given the stated project goal of protecting

the community, a significantly lower recidivism rate was

not expected.

For years, probation has been measured only by

recidivism rate....In today’s environment, with over 70%

of the probation caseload consisting of felony offenders,

is it still realistic to use only this one criterion? Why is

revocation and sentencing of a probation violator not

considered a “success”? I believe it should be...(Nidorf,

1991a).

Without consensus about whether the major criminal justice

outcome — recidivism — should be increasing or decreasing

as a result of interventions, the research field is likely to

become even more muddled.

It does appear that community corrections, more than other

public agencies, has had difficulty articulating its mission and

reaching agreement as to appropriate performance indicators.

But as budgets shrink, public stakeholders will be

increasingly asking what they are getting — in objective,

measurable terms — for their dollar. Within this context,

probation and parole will become increasingly vulnerable 

to budget cuts if they cannot clearly articulate what they 

do, with whom, and to what effect.

This paper is designed to address that need. Specifically, 

it attempts to — 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 67
1) articulate a mission statement for community 

corrections

2) identify the goals contained within the mission 

statement

3) specify methods or activities that address each goal 

4) identify measurable performance indicators for each 

goal.

This paper is clearly just a first step and is meant to stimulate discussion and further work. Other goals could be 

added to the mission statement (for example, educate 

the public, prevent crime), and additional (or different)

methods and performance indicators could be substituted 

for those indicated. Community corrections agencies 

should customize their mission statement, methods, and 

performance indicators so that they reflect local resources 

and priorities.

Step 1: Specify a mission statement for community 

corrections

A necessary first step toward developing performance

indicators is to articulate the organization’s goals and

mission. As Peters and Waterman, authors of In Search of

Excellence, put it: “Figure out what your value system is. 

Decide what your company stands for...” (1982: 227). The

same principle applies to social, nonprofit organizations.

Before community corrections agencies can evaluate their

performance, they must first define what they are attempting to accomplish. 

As noted above, probation and parole have historically 

had difficulty defining their mission (McAnany et al., 

1984; Petersilia et al., 1985). Different goals are often 

given by administrators and staff within the same depart68 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
ment. And sometimes the same person gives different 

messages to different audiences, depending on his or her

perception of their support for rehabilitation versus 

enforcement activities. In some instances, agencies adopt 

a mission or goal statement that they think will sell their

services to the external community, but that staff do not

sincerely support. And the goals of the staff might not 

be shared by their principal sponsors or customers (the 

judiciary, county funders, and the public, in the case 

of community corrections). The result is that the mission

statements of many agencies become public relations 

gimmicks as opposed to working statements that assist 

internal agency operations.

DiIulio (1991) advises criminal justice agencies to develop

mission statements that — 

1) include only activities that the agency can reasonably 

and realistically be expected to fulfill 

2) are fairly narrow and consistent in scope 

3) contain activities that are unique to the justice agency, 

rather than conflated with functions of other social 

institutions such as schools and welfare agencies. 

His major message is that the mission statement should not

ask the agency to “do the impossible” and it should contain

activities over which it has direct control, rather than seek the

achievement of more distant ends. 

Nidorf (1991b) adds an additional requirement: mission

statements must be responsive to expectations held by the

community and by other justice agencies. He argues

persuasively that community corrections operates within the

justice system, not independent from it, and that its goals

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 69
and activities — and eventual survival — depend heavily 

on how well it meets the expectations of the public and 

peer agencies (police, courts). 

Several attempts have been made to develop mission statements for community corrections, most recently by the

American Correctional Association (1986) and the California

Corrections Policy Project (1992). These statements, 

as well as those of earlier years (see Fitzharris, 1979;

McAnany, 1984; Clear and O’Leary, 1983), all embrace 

the notions of public protection and offender rehabilitation.

For instance, the California Corrections Policy Projects’

statement is:

The mission of community corrections is to protect 

the community; support the rights of victims; enforce

court-ordered sanctions; and assist offenders to change 

(CCPP, 1992).

The statement of the American Correctional Association

(ACA) is broader, simply stating that the community 

corrections mission as sanction is to “enhance social order

and public safety” (1986:58). 

The American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) 

(1992) says that the goals of community corrections are to: 

“protect the community; deter criminal and drug activity;

punish and rehabilitate offenders.”

In fact, all of the mission statements identified were quite

similar in their mention of public protection and offender

rehabilitation. Some also included assisting the court in

sentencing decisions, public education, and aiding victims

(Fitzharris, 1979).

70 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
For purposes of this paper, the author adopts the following

mission statement, which comes from reviewing the literature

as well as talking with the leadership of the APPA, National

Association of Probation Executives (NAPE), and the

California Probation/Parole and Correctional Association

(CPPCA).

The mission of community corrections is to assist the

court and/or parole board in assessing candidates’ 

suitability for community placement; and once 

offenders are placed in the community, to enforce 

the court-ordered sanctions, protect the community, 

assist offenders to change, and support the rights 

of their victims.

Step 2: Identify methods designed to accomplish 

each identified goal

The major objective in developing a clear mission or goal

statement is that it defines what the agency is about, what it

hopes to achieve. This makes the next step possible: 

specifying the agency activities that are designed to 

achieve (or move toward achieving) the various goals. 

The table on pp. 78-79 takes the mission statement adopted

for this paper, breaks it down into individual goals, and 

then identifies specific community corrections methods 

or activities that are designed to accomplish each goal. 

For example, the first goal pertains to advising the court 

about an offender’s suitability for community placement.

Community corrections staff do this in two principal ways: 

conducting presentence investigations, and conducting investigations of parole or probation violations. Methods are

linked to each of the five major goals contained in the 

study group's original mission statement. 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 71
Step 3: Specify performance indicators 

for each method or activity 

Once the agency has identified its goals and the methods it

 uses to address each goal, it can specify objective (measurable) performance criteria that determine the extent to 

which the activities are being performed and the goals 

are being achieved.

Identifying indicators of probation and parole success is 

not as easy as it sounds. As Clear and O’Leary (1983:67)

note, many probation and parole staff are like socialservice workers and tend to frame the substance of their 

work in terms of broad attitudinal or otherwise nonspecific

changes. Officers frequently identify the outcomes in

terms of changes in the client — but in often vague or 

ambiguous terms such as “ability to deal with authority,” 

or “improved self-image.” These broad changes are difficult to define operationally because they are subject to 

individual judgment —one officer’s definition of progress

might be quite different from another’s —and because 

there are few objective measures for determining whether 

the goal has been met. For purposes of performance 

measurement, we need objective, measurable outcome

statements that are tied to specific targeted activities that 

are believed to be related to the mission.

Column 3 of Table 1 (“Performance Indicators”) specifies

performance indicators for each of the major goals in the

mission statement. For example, one of the major goals 

of community corrections is to protect the public. This is

done by monitoring the offender’s behavior (through officer

contacts), drug and alcohol testing, and so forth. To

objectively measure whether these activities protect the

public, one would record the number and types of arrests that

occur during supervision and the number of offenders 

72 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
who abscond during supervision. Likewise, one goal is to

“assist the offender to change.” “Success” in achieving this

goal might be measured by the number of drug-free or

alcohol-free days, number of times attending treatment, and

objective tests of attitude change.

It is important to mention two things at this point: 

1) the performance indicators listed in Table 1 are quite 

different from those currently used and include much 

more than recidivism, and 

2) the measurements (including recidivism) reflect only 

activities that occur while the offender is formally 

on community corrections status, not beyond. 

It may be quite interesting to track offenders for some time

period after their supervision has ended and record their 

recidivism, but those rates should not be used, as they have

historically, as the primary measure of probation and 

parole effectiveness. Criminal behavior is motivated by 

social and other factors over which the justice system has

little, if any, direct control. Hawkins and Alpert (1989)

suggest that to ask the justice system to assume responsibility for post-program behavior is akin to asking high 

schools to assume responsibility for post-graduation employment. Success in high school is defined as completing

the course of study (not dropping out) and attaining some

level of knowledge and skills assessed by grades and 

standardized tests. Schools do not follow up their graduates 

to see if they slip back into ignorance or fail to hold a job

after leaving school. But corrections programs are judged 

not on their immediate impact but on their long-term 

effects: does the person refrain from crime after formal 

supervision has ended?

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 73
It is the belief of the BJS/Princeton Study Group that the

performance of community corrections agencies ought not

to be evaluated mainly or exclusively in terms of their

effects on recidivism rates, and that the success of

community corrections should not be based on some

postprogram assessment of behavior.

Why bother with performance indicators?

Community corrections agencies do not currently collect

information on most of the performance indicators listed 

in the table on pp. 78-79. To do so, agencies would first need

to define their mission, identify activities related to 

that mission, and collect relevant performance indicators.

Given their current budget woes, why would they want 

to take on this additional task? 

There are a number of reasons. Completing such an 

exercise would assist them in prioritizing activities and 

allocating resources. When the agency implemented a new

program or policy, data would be readily available to 

monitor (or even project) the program’s impact. Collecting

data on the performance indicators on pp. 78-79 should 

also increase staff morale, since these indicators measure

activities they do control and will likely show some success. Also, going through the exercise of defining mission, 

activities, and performance indicators helps the organization — top management and field staff — reach consensus 

on key issues. It also helps identify those priority areas 

that have few related program activities. The most important reason, however, for completing this exercise and 

collecting the necessary data is a practical one: without 

such information, community corrections remains vulnerable to continued budget cuts. It has been shown that those

74 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
who can quantify what they do, with whom, and to what

effect have a strong competitive advantage in budget

negotiations. 

Donald Cochran, Commissioner of Probation in Massachusetts (1991:38), articulates the practical advantages 

of engaging in such an exercise:

Probation managers need to use information to accurately determine what work needs to be done, the outcomes the agency will produce if resources are added, or

likely program outcomes and organizational practices if

resources continue to be reduced...information and

knowledge driven probation programs can and will be

funded (Cochran, 1991:36, underline in original).

Ronald Corbett (1991) expands by noting:

in a time when agencies are increasingly called to

define their existence, the absence of a clearly

articulated philosophy will leave agencies vulnerable,

unable to offer a compelling vision of their contribution to the common good in a manner that justifies

continued existence...an agency that cannot offer a

clear and convincing statement of its reason for being

will not survive the rough and tumble of competition

for shrinking tax dollars.

When public agencies fail to define their mission internally, political influences are more apt to define it for 

them. And when they fail to articulate how they should 

be evaluated, outcome measurements such as recidivism 

rates will likely be imposed upon them.

Over time, community corrections policy has become 

heavily influenced, not by those practitioners who are most 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 75
knowledgeable about it, but instead by public opinion, fear,

and political hype. One of the biggest challenges now facing

community corrections is to regain control of its profession.

One direct and effective way to do this is by defining a

mission and showing — in measurable terms — that the

agency is achieving it. With more solid information,

community corrections should again be able to inspire the

confidence of policymakers and the public, and ultimately

secure the dollars necessary to perform adequately the

activities that help accomplish their mission. 

76 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 77

Community corrections: Goals, methods, and performance indicators

Goals Methods/activities Performance indicators1. Assess offender’s suitability for Conduct presentence investigations (PSI) Accuracy and completeness of PSIplacement: Community corrections advises Conduct investigations of violation Timeliness of revocation and terminathe court and/or parole board on suitability reports tion hearingsof community placement. Validity of classification/prediction instrument 

 Percent of offenders receiving recom- mended sentence or violation act  Percent of offenders recommended for community who violate 

2. Enforce court-ordered sanctions: Monitor police arrest and investigation Number of arrests and technical The court permits the offender to remain in the reports violation during supervisioncommunity if he/she adheres to certain condi- Monitor victim restitution and court fees Percent of ordered payments collectedtions, which always include no new crime Monitor community service Number of hours/days performed and may include financial obligations and community serviceprohibitions on alcohol/drug use, peer Conduct personal contacts and other Number of favorable dischargesassociations, unemployment, etc. monitoring (such as electronic)  Verify employment, school performance Number of days employed, in voca- peer associations tional education or school Test for drug and alcohol use Drug-free and/or alcohol-free days

 during supervision 

The mission of community corrections is to assist the court and/or parole board

in assessing candidates’ suitability for community placement; and once offendersare placed in the community, to enforce the court-ordered sanctions, protect the community, assist offenders to change, and support the rights of their victims.
78 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System Goals Methods/activities Performance indicators 3. Protect the community: Offenders are Risk/needs instrument to assign Number and type of supervision contacts to be closely observed so that violations classification status of violation are noted, and if serious enough , result Conduct personal contact with offender in the offender’s being removed from Conduct telephone contacts and the community. collateral contacts Number and type of technical Limit offender freedom/mobility violations during supervision (e.g., curfews) Conduct drug and alcohol testing Coordinate with police on Number and type of arrest during investigations /warrants supervision Monitor arrest records Number of absconders during Restrict offender travel outside supervision designated community 4. Assist offenders to change: Refer to educational/vocational Number of times attending Offenders should be given the opportunity activities treatment/work programming to participate in activities designed to Employment during supervision reduce their long-term return to crime. Number of arrests and/or technical violations during supervision Refer to drug/alcohol treatment. Number drug-free and/or alcohol- free days during supervision Refer or conduct personal counseling Attitude change

5. Restore crime victims: Monitor restitution payments Payment of restitutionCrime victims have a right to be involved Inform victim of potential Extent of victim satisfaction within the justice system, provided necessary contact/danger services and departmentfinancial support and social services, and Inform victims of services for themprotected from harm and intimidation.
References

American Correctional Association (1986). Public Policy 

for Corrections. College Park, Md.: American Correctional Association.

American Probation and Parole Association (1992). 

Working Draft on Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole 

Training Manual.

Blair, Louis H., Harry P. Hatry, Karan Bunn et al. (1971).

Monitoring the Impacts of Prison and Parole Services: 

An Initial Examination. Washington, D.C.: The Urban 

Institute.

California Corrections Policy Project (1991). California

Corrections Policies for the Future: Mission and Policy

Statement. Sacramento: California Corrections Policy

Project.

Clear, Todd R., and James M. Byrne (1992). “The Future 

of Intermediate Sanctions: Questions to Consider,” in

James M. Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio, and Joan Petersilia 

(eds.), Smart Sentencing: The Emergence of Intermediate

Sanctions. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Clear, Todd R., and Vincent O’Leary (1981). Controlling 

the Offender in the Community. Lexington, Mass.: 

Lexington Books.

Cochran, Donald (1991). “Classification/Information 

Systems” in Donald Cochran et al., Managing Probation with

Scarce Resources: Obstacles and Opportunities.

Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 79
Cochran, Donald et al. (1991). Managing Probation 

with Scarce Resources: Obstacles and Opportunities.

Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections.

Corbett, Ronald P., Jr. (1991). “How Did We Get in this

Mess?” in Donald Cochran et al., Managing Probation 

with Scarce Resources: Obstacles and Opportunities.

Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections.

DiIulio, John J., Jr. (1991). No Escape: The Future of

American Corrections. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

— (1992). Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: 

Toward a New Paradigm. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Doble, John (1987). Crime and Punishment: The Public’s

View. New York: Public Agenda Foundation.

Ellsworth, Thomas (1992). “The Goal Orientation of Adult

Probation Professionals: A Study of Probation Systems,” in

Thomas Ellsworth (ed.), Contemporary Community 

Corrections. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, Inc.

Fitzharris, Timothy L. (1979). Probation in an Era of 

Diminishing Resources. The Foundation for Continuing

Education in Corrections. Sacramento, Calif.: The 

California Probation, Parole, and Correctional Association.

Flanagan, Timothy J., and Kathleen Maguire (eds.) (1992).

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991. U.S. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

80 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Fogel, David (1984). “The Emergence of Probation as 

a Profession in the Service of Public Safety: The Next 

Ten Years,” in Patrick D. McAnany, Doug Thomson, and

David Fogel (eds.), Probation and Justice: Reconsideration

of Mission. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn 

and Hain. 

Gottfredson, Michael R., and Don M. Gottfredson (1980).

Decisionmaking in Criminal Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: 

Ballinger.

Hawkins, Richard, and Geoffrey P. Alpert (1989). American

Prison Systems: Punishment and Justice. Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice Hall.

Hindelang, Michael J., Michael R. Gottfredson, and Timothy

J. Flanagan (eds.) (1981). Sourcebook of Criminal 

Justice Statistics, 1980. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Jacoby, Joseph E., and Christopher S. Dunn (1987).

“National Survey on Punishment for Criminal Offenses.”

Unpublished paper. Bowling Green State University,

Bowling Green, Ohio.

Jankowski, Louis W. (1992). Correctional Populations 

in the United States, 1990. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Langan, Patrick A., and Mark A. Cunniff (1992), 

Recidivism of Felons on Probation, 1986-89, Special Report.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 

Bureau of Justice Statistics.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 81
Lipton, D., R. Martinson, and J. Wilks (1975). The 

Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment and What Works: A

Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies. New York: Praeger

Publishers.

Logan, Charles H. (1992). “Criminal Justice Performance

Measures for Prisons,” Performance Measures for the

Criminal Justice System. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

McAnany, Patrick, Doug Thomson, and David Fogel (1984).

Probation and Justice: Reconsideration of Mission.

Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 

Standards and Goals (1973). Report on Corrections. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Nidorf, Barry (1991a). “‘Nothing Works’ Revisited,” 

Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 12-13.

— (1991b). “External Relations,” in Donald Cochran 

et al., Managing Probation with Scarce Resources: 

Obstacles and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: 

National Institute of Corrections.

Peters, Thomas, and Robert Waterman, Jr. (1982). 

In Search of Excellence. New York: Harper & Row.

Petersilia, Joan, and Susan Turner (1990). Intensive 

Supervision Probation for High-Risk Offenders: Findings

from Three California Experiments. R-3936-NIJ/BJA. 

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.

82 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
— (1993). “Intensive Probation and Parole Supervision: 

Research Findings and Policy Implications,” in Michael

Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice, Vol. 17. Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press.

Petersilia, Joan, Susan Turner, James Kahan, Joyce 

Peterson (1985). Granting Felons Probation: Public Risks

and Alternatives. R-3186-NIJ. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.

President of the United States (1990). National Drug 

Control Strategy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office.

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and

Administration of Justice (1967). The Challenge of Crime in

a Free Society. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 83
About the author

Joan Petersilia is director of RAND’s Criminal Justice

Program and Associate Professor in the Department of

Criminology, Law and Society, School of Social Ecology,

University of California, Irvine. She has directed major

studies in policing, sentencing, career criminals, correc-tions,

and racial discrimination. For the past several years, her work

has focused on the effectiveness of probation and parole. 

Dr. Petersilia has served as president of the American Society

of Criminology and of the Association for Criminal Justice

Research in California. She is a fellow of both the American

Society of Criminology and the Western Society of

Criminology and has received awards from the American

Probation and Parole Association and the California

Probation, Parole, and Corrections Association. 

She is coauthor of Smart Sentencing: The Emergence of

Intermediate Sanctions (1992). Her latest major publications include Intensive Probation and Parole (1993); Crime

and Punishment in California: Full Cells, Empty Pockets,

and Questionable Benefits (1992); Intensive Supervision for

High-Risk Probationers: Findings from Three California

Experiments (1990); Expanding Options for Criminal

Sentencing (1987); Police Performance and Case Attrition

(1987); and The Influence of Criminal Justice Research

(1987).

84 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 85
Performance Measures for the 

Trial Courts, Prosecution, 

and Public Defense

by George F. Cole

Introduction

Thurman Arnold has argued that the central ideals of every

Western government are symbolized in its judicial system: In

particular, that the criminal trial “overshadows all other

ceremonies as a dramatization of the values of our spiritual

government, representing the dignity of the State as an

enforcer of law, and at the same time the dignity of the

individual when he is an avowed opponent of the State, 

a dissenter, a radical, or even a criminal.”1

Although most Americans never visit the criminal courts,

those with firsthand experience — defendants, witnesses,

jurors — and those who learn about court processes and trials

through the media are greatly influenced by their 

86 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 1Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New York:

Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 128-130.
perceptions of the quality of justice. Their observations

would contribute to citizen education about the role of law 

in society, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, 

and ultimately to citizen willingness to abide by the law.

Adjudication — prosecution, defense, and courts — is the

subsystem of criminal justice that perhaps more than either

law enforcement or corrections is the component that the

public expects to allocate justice. Judges, prosecutors, and

defenders are all attorneys who have sworn to uphold the

ideals of justice and to act according to the canons of the 

legal profession. Judicial decisions are more visible than

actions in police stations, probation offices, or prisons; 

hence, the work of the courts is more open to public 

scrutiny. Not only do courts make decisions in individual

cases according to the concept of due process but judges 

are charged with ensuring that the other components of the

system operate according to the law. Thus, as Herbert 

Packer has emphasized, it is not enough that the law 

be fair; it must be seen to be fair.2

How should the performance of the agencies of 

adjudication be measured? What should be the standards

expected of trial courts, prosecution and defense offices, 

and the individuals who work in them? These are 

enduring questions and have been raised about American 

trial courts throughout this century.

Beginning in the 1970’s, a series of federally funded 

studies addressed the issue of performance indicators. To

varying degrees, the studies stressed measures emphasizing

process rather than results, efficiency rather than

effectiveness, and program outcomes rather than policy

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 87

 2Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968) p. 69.
outcomes.3 As a consequence, we know a lot about 

conviction rates, numbers of dismissals, percentages of 

guilty pleas, case processing times, and the use of various

sentencing options — yardsticks that say little about the

quality of justice. Few offices of prosecution, indigent

defense, or courts have developed and incorporated

performance assessments to evaluate the quality of the

behavior of officials as they interact with citizens — be 

they defendants, victims, jurors, or the general public. 

Since 1987 the National Center for State Courts has been

working on the development and implementation of

measurable performance standards to be used in general 

jurisdiction State trial courts. The center’s goal has been 

not measures of structure and process but of performance,

“what courts actually do with the means at their disposal.”4

 

This paper first traces the court reform movement so as 

to describe the assumptions that have guided trial court

88 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 3See Sorrel Wildhorn, Marvin Lavin, and Anthony Pascal,

Indicators of Justice (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 

1977); Joan E. Jacoby, Basic Issues in Prosecution and Public

Defender Performance (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of

Justice, 1982); Thomas J. Cook and Ronald W. Johnson, with

Ellen Fried, John Gross, Mary Wagner, and James Eisenstein,

Basic Issues in Courts Performance (Wahington, D.C.: 

National Institute of Justice, 1982). See also National District

Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards, 2nd ed.,

(Alexandria, Va.: National District Attorneys Association, 

1991); Robert Rovner-Pieczenik, Alan Rapoport, and Martha

Lane, Evaluation Design for Public Defender Offices

(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and

Criminal Justice, 1977).

 4

National Center for State Courts, Commission on Trial Court

Performance Standards, Trial Court Performance Standards

(Wiliamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, 1990), 

p. 1.
evaluation for the past half century and then fully explores 

the performance standards developed by the center. It is 

not the intention to ignore efforts to measure prosecutor 

and indigent defense performance but, rather, to use the

experience of the courts as a demonstration of the types 

of standards and measures that could be adopted by other

agencies in the adjudication subsystem of criminal justice.

Reforming the courts

The 1906 speech by Roscoe Pound to the American Bar

Association, entitled “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” has been referred 

to as “the spark that kindled the white flame of progress.”5

 

Pound pointed to organizational inadequacies of the 

judicial system and asserted that there were too many 

courts and, in consequence, duplication and inefficiency;

further, that there was a great waste of judicial power 

because of rigid jurisdictional boundaries, poor use of 

resources, and the frequent granting of new trials.6

Pound’s call to action fell on sympathetic ears among 

the reformers of the Progressive Era, who thought that

structural changes would lead to a more efficient and

equitable administration of justice. The American Bar

Association and the American Judicature Society set out 

to press the States to remove party politics from judicial

selection, increase funding for the courts, consolidate and

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 89

 5Roscoe Pound, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with

the Administration of Justice,” reprinted in Journal of the

American Judicature Society, 20 (1937):178-187; John H.

Wigmore, “Roscoe Pound’s St. Paul Address of 1906,” Journal 

of the American Judicature Society, 20 (1937):136.

 6

See also Roscoe Pound, “Organization of Courts,” Judicature,

11 (1927):69; Pound, “Principles and Outline of a Modern 

Unified Court Organization,” Judicature, 23 (1940):225.
simplify court structures, and create a force of professional

administrators. Proponents of the reforms emphasized that

their adoption would “serve the court’s basic task of

determining cases justly, promptly, and economically.”7

 

Referred to as the “conventional wisdom of State court

administration” by later scholars, the thrust of this 

orientation became “the accepted theory of State court

organization and administration for almost 70 years.”8

Among the problems affecting the judiciary, caseprocessing delay in the criminal trial courts has been a

continuing focus for concern and reform. The Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution mandates a speedy trial, 

yet throughout this century there is much evidence that the

processing of some cases can take months, even years. The

voluminous literature on delay underscores that caseprocessing time beyond that which is necessary for a fair

resolution of the issues greatly undercuts the quality of

justice. It is argued that “justice delayed is justice denied”

because witnesses may move or die, memories may fade, 

and the accused incurs costs because of pretrial restrictions 

on freedom, loss of income, and expenses run up in 

mounting a defense. The accumulation of case delay is 

seen as producing backlogs that “waste court resources, 

90 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 7American Bar Association, Commission on Standards of

Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Court Organization (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1974) p. 1.

 8

Geoff Gallas, “The Conventional Wisdom of State Court

Administration: A Critical Assessment and an Alternative Approach,” Justice System Journal 2 (Spring 1976):35-55. Gallas

cites as examples of the conventional wisdom such reports as

American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial

Administration, Standards Relating to Court Organization

(Chigcago: American Bar Association, 1974) and National

Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,

Courts (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).
needlessly increase lawyer fees, and create confusion and

conflict in allocating judges’ time.”9

Case-processing time has become one of the major criteria 

of trial court performance, akin to the use of arrest and

recidivism rates in evaluating the police and corrections. 

The speed with which cases are processed has been viewed 

as having a determinative impact on numbers of cases

handled, amount and types of resources required, and 

quality of justice allocated. Attacking trial court delay 

has thus been a focus of reformers and researchers. Goerdt

notes that since 1976 there have been at least eight national

research projects and a number of smaller studies that have

examined the pace of litigation.10 Attention to the problem 

has led to the adoption of disposition-time standards by 

the American Bar Association, the Conference of Chief

Justices, and the Conference of State Court Administrators.

In keeping with the conventional wisdom that the

inadequacies of courts are related to their structure, efforts

were advanced during the past quarter century to reduce 

delay through unification of court systems, centralization 

of management, and expansion of resources. However, by 

the late 1970’s research conducted by the National Center 

for State Courts began to challenge the assumptions that 

delay could be explained by such factors as court structure,

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 91

 9American Bar Association, National Conference of State

Trial Judges, Standards Relating to Court Delay Reduction

(Chicago: American Bar Association, 1984), p.5 (commentary 

to Sec. 2.50 of the Standards Relating to Trial Courts as 

amended in 1984). Cited in Barry Mahoney et al., Changing 

Times in Trial Courts (Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for

State Courts, 1988), p. 2.

 10John Goerdt, Examining Court Delay: The Pace of Litigation

in 26 Urban Trial Courts, 1987 (Williamsburg, Va.: National

Center for State Courts, 1989), p 4.
size, caseload per judge, and the type of case calendaring.11 

For example, as noted by one major study of the effect 

of structure on trial court operations, “Unification may

provide the framework in which the quality of justice can 

be enhanced, but it seems doubtful that unification has a

direct impact upon quality.”12 

The fact that “the link between a court’s effectiveness and 

its pace of litigation is taken as faith” was addressed by

Gallas, who argued that judicial leadership must be considered as a factor influencing performance.13 Other researchers argued that delay-reduction efforts should focus on 

such factors as “more effective court leadership, commitment to achievement of disposition time goals, early and

continuous court control over caseload, and increased 

judicial accountability for case processing.”14 Delay continued to be a primary measure of trial court performance, 

but explanations for its existence and methods for its

reduction shifted. 

Nonstructural influences on court performance

Recognition that court performance is related to factors 

other than structure has emerged through research 

completed during the past two decades. Even with the 

92 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 11Goerdt, Examining Court Delay, p. 4.

 12Thomas A. Henderson et al., The Significance of Judicial

Structure: The Effect of Unification on Court Operations

(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1984) p. 175.

 13Geoff Gallas, “Judicial Leadership Excellence: A Research

Perspective,” Justice System Journal, 12 (Spring 1987): 48. 

 14Henderson, The Significance of Judicial Structure, p. 175.

See Thomas W. Church, Jr., “The ‘Old and New’ Conventional

Wisdom of Court Delay,” Justice System Journal, 7 (1982): 395;

Barry Mahoney and Dale Anne Sipes, “Toward Better Management

of Criminal Litigation,” Judicature, 72 (1988): 29.
overall similarity of organizational structures and formal

processes of adjudication, differences among the trial 

courts are discernible to anyone who has visited American

courthouses. Some courts sentence offenders to longer 

terms than do others. Delay and tight pretrial release 

policies keep some accused in jail awaiting trial, whereas 

in other jurisdictions similar defendants are out on bail or

have their cases expeditiously resolved. Guilty pleas make 

up 90% of dispositions in some communities but only 60% 

in others. Researchers have found that there are 

differences in the processes and outputs of courts among

various cities and among courtrooms in the same city even

when the formal structures, laws, and procedures are 

the same. The concepts of “local legal culture” and

“courtroom workgroup” have been particularly useful 

in helping to understand these variations. 

The concept of local legal culture — norms shared by

members of a particular court community (judges, attorneys,

clerks, bailiffs, and others) as to case handling and

participants’ behavior in the judicial process — has been

shown to have a decided impact on court processes and

outcomes.15 Through the local legal culture informal 

rules and practices arise within particular settings, and the

“way things are done” differs from place to place. The

customs and traditions of each jurisdiction seem to vary

because local practices are affected by such factors as size,

politics, and population characteristics.16

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 93

 15Thomas W. Church, Jr. “Examining Local Legal Culture,”

American Bar Foundation Research Journal (Summer 1985), 

p. 49.

 16For a study that analyzes the role of local legal culture of 

nine communities, see: James Eisenstein, Roy B. Flemming, and 

Peter F. Nardulli, The Contours of Justice: Communities and 

Their Courts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988).
Adjudication is also influenced by the fact that courtroom

participants are organized as a workgroup.17 From this

perspective, the reciprocal relationships of the judge,

prosecutor, and defense attorney, along with those of the

supporting cast (clerk, reporter, and bailiff), are necessary 

to complete the group’s basic task: the disposition of cases

within the context of the laws and the concept of justice. 

As pointed out by Nardulli, the “courtroom elite” controls 

the operations of the court and, hence, most directly bears

upon court performance.18 Research has shown that the

outputs of courtroom workgroups differ, not because of the

formal structure and procedures but because of level of

cohesiveness, the influence of participants’ sponsoring

organizations (prosecution, judiciary, public defense), and 

the nature of the leadership of the group. In essence, the

workgroup operates in an environment in which the local

legal culture, recruitment and selection processes, cases, 

and the socioeconomic, political, and legal structures of 

the broader community are conceived as having an impact 

on decisionmaking.19 Court performance is thus greatly

influenced by these factors. 

How should trial courts be measured?

By the mid-1980’s it was apparent to judicial administrators, judges, and scholars that the longtime focus on the

structure of the courts and processing times and assump94 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 17James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob, Felony Justice (Boston:

Little, Brown, 1977).

 18Peter F. Nardulli, The Courtroom Elite: An Organizational

Perspective on Criminal Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger,

1978).

 19See Thomas J. Cook, Ronald W. Johnson et al., Basic Issues

in Courts Performance (Washington, D.C.: National Institute 

of Justice, 1982), p. 38.
tions about ways that performance should be looked at had

collided with research depictions of court operations as much

under the sway of the local legal culture, inter-organizational

links, and the interactions among members of the courtroom

workgroup. In addition, critics argued that a concern for

efficiency in case processing can lead to injustice and

undermine the judiciary’s institutional integrity.20

At a 1986 international conference on judicial administration,

calls were made for greater attention to performance

measures. Gallas declared that beyond the goal of reforming

organizational structure is the need for effective leadership.21 

He argued that evaluating trial courts requires examination of

the links between judicial leadership and court performance.

To differentiate successful from unsuccessful courts, he and

others argued, it is necessary to go beyond disposition times

to overall performance. Feeney emphasized that evaluating

performance incorporates a clear definition of goals, adequate

evaluative information, and meaningful standards for judging

performance. “About the only thing that is clear is that if the

courts are to improve during the next thirty years everyone

associated with the courts — managers, judges, researchers,

and others — must radically increase the attention to

evaluation of performance.”22

 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 95

 20Judith Resnik, “Managerial Judges and Court Delay: The

Unproven Assumptions, 23 Judges’ Journal, 8 (1984); H. Lee

Sarokin, “Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined,” 38 Rutgers Law

Review, 431 (1986). 

 21Geoff Gallas, “Judicial Leadership Excellence: A Research

Prospectus,” Justice System Journal, 12 (1987), p. 54.

 22Floyd Feeney, “Evaluating Trial Court Performance,” 

Justice System Journal, 12 (1987) p. 167.
Developing new measures of trial court 

performance

In their insightful book, Reinventing Government, Osborne

and Gaebler describe some of the problems of measuring 

the performance of public organizations.23 They note that

unlike private businesses, government agencies seldom 

focus on outcomes because assessment is so difficult.

Developing suitable measures may take years; they may be

appropriate to outputs but not outcomes; they may define

outcomes too narrowly, so that employees concentrate on

only a few goals; or they may be so numerous that 

employees do not know what to concentrate on. 

Citing the experience of the National Center for State 

Courts, Osborne and Gaebler say that public organizations

that have tried to measure performance have learned that

there is (l) a vast difference between measuring process and

measuring results; (2) a vast difference between measuring

efficiency and measuring effectiveness; and (3) an 

important difference between “program outcomes” and

broader “policy outcomes.” They also describe the

difficulties of developing acceptable performance 

standards and measurement tools and the resistance 

of public service providers to new approaches.

In 1987 the National Center for State Courts initiated the

Trial Court Performance Standards Project to develop 

96 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 23David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government

(New York: Praeger, 1992); see especially Appendix B. There is 

a large literature in public administration on the measurement of

public goods and services. See, for example, Vincent Ostrom,

Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, “The Organization of

Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,”

American Political Science Review, 55 (December 1991): pp.

831-842.
measurable performance standards for the State trial courts 

of general jurisdiction. The project was begun after

researchers at the center recognized the shortcomings 

of the focus on the structure and machinery of trial courts 

and moved on to questions relating to the goals of trial 

courts. What is it that courts are trying to do? What 

should courts be trying to accomplish with the resources 

at their disposal? What is the role of judicial leadership 

in improving the trial courts? How do we identify courts 

that are doing well? 

With funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, 

the center created the Commission on Trial Court

Performance Standards, which took on the arduous task 

of redirecting research attention to the outcome aspect —

what trial courts actually accomplish — and to developing

tools to assess outcomes according to acceptable criteria.

 The commission focused solely on institutional rather than

individual performance and promoted the approach as a

self-assessment tool for the trial courts.24

Over a 3-year period the commission and center staff

developed a set of 22 standards in 5 areas to measure 

trial court performance, developed a comprehensive

measurement system, field-tested the standards and the

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 97

 24The evaluation of the performance of individual judges 

has been ongoing in many States for nearly two decades. 

Much of this effort has been spearheaded by the American Bar

Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Judicial

Performance and the Judicial Performance Evaluation Project 

of the National Center for States Courts. See Susan Keilitz and

Judith White McBride, “Judicial Performance Evaluation Comes 

of Age,” State Court Journal (Winter 1992): 4-13.
system, and gained acceptance of the new criteria by key

judicial organizations and several States.25 

Let us examine the five performance areas as they relate 

to the key concepts suggested by the call in the first paper 

in this compendium for a new paradigm by which to

understand and measure the criminal justice system.26 The

paradigm emphasizes the important role played by citizens 

as co-producers of justice. It recognizes that police, courts,

and corrections require the cooperation and support of

citizens if they are going to be successful at their jobs. 

The paradigm also recognizes that like successful private

organizations, criminal justice agencies need to be measured according to “soft” performance indicators: how 

citizens are treated, how they evaluate performance, and 

the level of trust and confidence of citizens in their

institutions. 

The five performance areas for State trial courts decided 

upon are: 

• Access to justice 

• Expeditiousness and timeliness 

• Equality, fairness, and integrity 

• Independence and accountability

ú Public trust and confidence. 

98 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 25National Center for State Courts, Commission on Trial 

Court Performance Standards, Trial Court Performance Standards

(Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, 1990).
As noted by the commission, the groupings represent

alternative ways of viewing the fundamental purposes 

of trial courts as they allocate justice in individual cases,

resolve disputes, uphold and promote the rule of law, 

protect individuals from the arbitrary use of governmental

power, and encourage behavior that adheres to societal 

norms as expressed in statutes and regulations. Most 

people probably would agree that these are the things that

trial courts do and that the five areas summarize public

expectations of court performance. But as the commission

discovered, it is one thing to agree on designation of

performance areas in the abstract but it is another thing to

develop and define specific, measurable standards. Each 

of the five performance areas is summarized below and the

specific standards associated with them are listed.27 

Standard 1. Access to justice

In a democracy courts must be open and accessible. The

concept of accessibility refers not only to physical structure

but also to the procedures and the responsiveness of 

personnel to members of the public:

Standard l.l Public proceedings 

The trial court conducts its proceedings and other 

public business openly.

Standard 1.2 Safety, accessibility, and convenience 

The trial court facilities are safe, accessible, and

convenient to use.

Standard l.3 Effective participation 

All who appear before the trial court are given the

opportunity to participate effectively, without undue

hardship or inconvenience.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 99

 27See the appendix of the commission’s report for a listing 

of each performance measure, the data collection methods, and the

personnel to be included in the evaluation. 
Standard 1.4 Courtesy, responsiveness, and respect 

Judges and other trial court personnel are courteous and

responsive to the public and accord respect to all with

whom they come in contact. 

Standard 1.5 Affordable costs of access 

The costs of access to the trial court’s proceedings and

records — whether measured in terms of money, time,

or procedures that must be followed — are reasonable,

fair, and affordable.

Standard 2. Expeditiousness and timeliness

The trial court should meet its responsibilities to all 

persons and agencies affected by its actions and activities 

in an expeditious and timely manner. Unnecessary delay

causes injustice and hardship, and in turn diminished 

public trust and confidence in the court.

Standard 2.1 Case processing 

The trial court establishes and complies with recognized

guidelines for timely case processing while at the same

time keeping current with its incoming caseload.

Standard 2.2 Compliance with schedules 

The trial court disburses funds promptly, provides

reports and information according to schedules, and

responds to requests for information and other services

on an established schedule that assures their effective

use.

Standard 2.3 Prompt implementation of law 

and procedure 

The trial court promptly implements changes in law and

procedure.

100 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Standard 3. Equality, fairness, and integrity

The trial court should provide due process and equal

protection of the law to all who have business before it.

Equality and fairness demand equal justice under law.

Integrity should characterize the nature and substance 

of the trial court’s procedures and decisions and the

consequences of the decisions.

Standard 3.1 Fair and reliable judicial process

Trial court procedures faithfully adhere to relevant 

laws, procedural rules, and established policies.

Standard 3.2 Juries 

Jury lists are representative of the jurisdiction from

which they are drawn.

Standard 3.3 Court decisions and actions 

The trial court gives individual attention to cases,

deciding them without undue disparity among like 

cases and upon legally relevant factors.

Standard 3.4 Clarity 

Decisions of the trial court unambiguously address 

the issues presented to it and make clear how

compliance can be achieved.

Standard 3.5 Responsibility for enforcement 

The trial court takes appropriate responsibility 

for the enforcement of its orders.

Standard 3.6 Production and preservation 

of records 

Records of all relevant trial court decisions and 

actions are accurate and properly preserved.

 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 101
Standard 4. Independence and accountability

The judiciary must assert and maintain its distinctiveness 

as a separate branch of government. Within the organizational structure of the judicial branch, the trial court must

establish its legal and organizational boundaries, monitor 

and control its operations, and account publicly for its

performance.

Standard 4.1 Independence and comity 

The trial court maintains its institutional integrity and

observes the principle of comity in its governmental

relations.

Standard 4.2 Accountability for public resources 

The trial court responsibly seeks, uses, and accounts 

for its public resources.

Standard 4.3 Personnel practices and decisions 

The trial court uses fair employment practices.

Standard 4.4 Public education 

The trial court informs the community of its programs. 

Standard 4.5 Response to change

The trial court anticipates new conditions or emergent

events and adjusts its operations as necessary.

Standard 5. Public trust and confidence

The public’s compliance with the law is dependent to some

degree upon its respect for the courts. Ideally, public trust

and confidence in trial courts stem from the many contacts

citizens have with the courts.

Standard 5.1 Accessibility 

The trial court and the justice it delivers are perceived

by the public as accessible.

102 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Standard 5.2 Expeditious, fair, and reliable 

court functions 

The public has trust and confidence that the basic trial

court functions are conducted expeditiously and fairly

and that its decisions have integrity.

Standard 5.3 Judicial independence 

and accountability 

The trial court is perceived to be independent, 

not unduly influenced by other components 

of government, and accountable.

Implementing trial court performance 

evaluation

From its inception the commission recognized that trial 

court performance evaluation would require —

• a statement of goals or general principles according 

to which trial courts operate (or should operate) 

• standards by which to assess trial courts’ performance

against those principles 

• indicators or measures tied to the performance standards 

• procedures to link the indicators to the standards and goals 

• availability of data concerning performance.

Having promulgated the goals and standards, as outlined

above, the commission next addressed the tasks of 

developing measures of performance, outlining procedures 

for data collection, field testing the procedures, and

implementing the new approach in trial court demonstration sites.

The commission and its staff spent many hours wrestling 

with the operational definition of the standards so that

measurement criteria could be developed and data collec-

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 103
tion procedures generated. It was recognized that both

quantitative and qualitative measures would be used and 

that data collection efforts had to be feasible, given

consideration of costs and the availability of data needed 

for specific measures. Questions of implementing the 

process colored these discussions. The Appendix provides

examples of the measures, data collection methods, and the

persons to be used as evaluators. As can be seen, not only 

are members of the judicial staff involved in the evaluation 

of a court’s performance but qualitative data are gathered

from the consumers of justice — attorneys, jurors, litigants,

witnesses, and community leaders.

With distribution of copies of the Trial Court Performance

Standards in November 1990, the commission sought and

gained endorsement of the standards by judicial and court

management professional organizations, began training

programs for persons who would conduct the evaluations, 

and launched a series of demonstrations in New Jersey, 

Ohio, Virginia, and Washington. Not unexpectedly,

implementing the standards in the demonstration States

brought out the need to revise several of the measurement

methods. 

It is well recognized that instituting change in organizations can be difficult.28 Personnel are especially resistant

when new standards are instituted and when measurement

bears directly on their performance. One way to deal with 

the resistance of individual service providers is involve 

them in development of the measures and to couch

incorporation of the performance evaluation as part 

of an ongoing self-assessment. The experience of the

104 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 28Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, pp. 355-

359, summarize the “received wisdom” of experts in the

performance measurement filed with regard to implementations.
commission’s work in the demonstration States should assist

others with the implementation of performance measures.

Summary

The work of the Commission on Trial Court Performance

Standards of the National Center for State Courts serves as 

a useful illustration of the development of goals and evaluation methods more in keeping with a criminal justice

paradigm that emphasizes citizens as co-producers of 

justice. As we have seen, the commission’s standards —

• are customer oriented in that evaluations reflect the

concerns of those who use the courts rather than those 

who run the courts

• focus on performance and outcome rather than on 

structures, processes, and resources

• examine trial courts as organizations involved in tasks 

and processes that are linked together and that affect one

another

• are based on reliable data rather than on reputation.

It is hoped that incorporating these measures into the

management of State trial courts will not only provide 

an important management tool to make the judiciary more

responsive to the “democratic vision” but also guide leaders

in other sections of the criminal justice system — police,

prosecution, defense, and corrections — in the development

of their own standards and measurement tools.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 105
About the author

George F. Cole is Professor and Head of the Department 

of Political Science at The University of Connecticut. A

specialist on the administration of criminal justice, he has

published extensively on such topics as prosecution, the

courts, and corrections. He has been granted two awards

under the Fulbright-Hays Program to conduct research in

England and Yugoslavia, and has held a fellowship at the

National Institute of Justice. In addition to his scholarly

publications he is the author of the widely used introductory textbooks, The American System of Criminal 

Justice, 6th edition (Brooks/Cole, 1992) and with Todd 

Clear, American Corrections, 3rd edition (Wadsworth, 

1994).

106 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 107

Professional

group

Local bar; law Focus group

enforcement agencies;

local government; 

news media

5.(1-3).2 Community leaders’

perceptions

Court staff; 

consultant; 

graduate 

students

Telephone 

survey

5.(1-3).1 Public General public

perceptions

Court staff; 

consultant

Questionnaire 

survey; Delphi

technique; group 

review

4.5.2 Anticipation Potential issues

of change

3.2.2 Jury selection Juror selection Observation Court staff

procedures

Statistical Court staff

analysis

3.2.1 Jury source Juror source list

list

Questionnaire Court staff

survey

Attorneys; court

employees

3.1.2 Performance 

in applying 

the law

Data 

collection 

team

Structured 

observation; 

document and 

review; interviews; inventory

Court services;

court resources

1.5.1 Alternatives 

for the financially

disadvantaged

Structured Volunteers

observation;

questionnaire

1.4.3 Litigant Court proceedings

treatment

Court staff; 

graduate 

students

1.2.4 Knowledge Court employees Interviews

of emergency

procedures

Questionnaire Court staff

survey

Regular users 

of court

1.2.3 Perceptions 

of courthouse 

security

Structure Volunteers

observation

Court calendar and

proceedings

1.1.2 Understanding courtroom 

calendar

Structured Volunteers

observation

1.1.1 Open Court proceedings

hearings

Measure Object or subject Methods Evaluators

Appendix: Selected measures and data collection methods
Measuring Police Performance 

in the New Paradigm 

of Policing1

by Geoffrey P. Alpert and Mark H. Moore 

Introduction

During the 1980’s and 1990’s there has been a resurgence 

of interest in community policing. As an outgrowth of 

police-community relations, the concept of community

policing has become the goal, method, and guiding 

principle for police. Unfortunately, community policing

remains a concept and philosophy in search of a process,

without proper ways to document or evaluate its efforts. 

This essay in the BJS-Princeton series focuses on

community-oriented policing and takes a new approach 

to the measurement and evaluation of police performance.

Before outlining our paradigm of police performance

measures we will review the conventional measures and 

108 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 1Portions of this essay have been taken from Alpert and

Dunham, Policing Multi-Ethnic Neighborhoods (1988) and

Policing Urban America (1992).
why we believe a new way of thinking must direct our

attention to new performance measures. 

Citizens and their elected representatives have long sought 

a bottom line to measure police performance. The goals 

have been to reassure the public that hard-earned tax 

dollars were being spent to achieve important results and 

to hold police managers accountable for improving organizational performance. As police agencies matured, four

generally accepted accounting practices became enshrined 

as the key measures to evaluate police performance. These

include — 

1) reported crime rates

2) overall arrests

3) clearance rates

4) response times. 

As these measures became institutionalized over the years,

investments were made in developing information systems 

to record police performance consistent with these 

measures. Statistical reports using these measures were

routinely issued. Further, the media, overseers in city

councils, and auditors in city managers’ offices have all 

been primed to acknowledge and use these measures to

compare police performance from year to year and to

compare local accomplishments with those of other cities.

For most practical purposes, these are the statistics by 

which police departments throughout the United States are

now held accountable. 

These measures remain critical as part of an overall system

for measuring police performance. As currently used,

however, these measures reflect an increasingly outmoded

model of police tasks and fail to capture many important

contributions that police make to the quality of life. More

important, these measures may misguide police managers 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 109
and lead them and their organizations towards purposes 

and activities that are less valuable than others that can be

achieved with limited and diminishing resources. 

Police performance measures should focus on a new model 

of policing that emphasizes their charge to do justice, 

promote secure communities, restore crime victims, and

promote noncriminal options — the elements of an 

emerging paradigm of criminal justice (DiIulio, 1992: 10-

12). The purpose of this paper is to describe how policing 

fits in with this new paradigm, including implications for

restructuring the overall objectives and measuring the

accomplishments of policing through police agency

performance measures (Kelling, 1992). 

The evolving strategy of policing

Historically, policing in America has been inspired and

guided by a vision of professional law enforcement. This

vision is a coherent strategy of policing defining the 

principal ends, means, and legitimating principles of the

police enterprise (Wilson and McLaren, 1977).

Professional law enforcement: 

The dominant strategy of policing

In this vision, the primary, perhaps exclusive goals of the

police are to reduce crime and criminal victimization. 

Police seek to achieve this goal by arresting and 

threatening to arrest those who violate the criminal law. 

They organize themselves to produce this result by: 

1) patrolling city streets hoping to detect and deter crime

2) responding rapidly to calls for service

3) conducting investigations after crimes have been

committed to identify criminal offenders and develop

evidence to be used in prosecutions. 

110 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
In essence, in the vision of professional law enforcement, 

the police are seen as the all-important entry point to the

criminal justice system — the gatekeeper managing the

—first step in bringing the force of the criminal law to bear

on offenders.

To deal effectively with serious crime and dangerous 

criminal offenders, specialized skills are required. The 

police have had to learn how to use legitimate force with 

skill and confidence. They have had to improve their 

ability to investigate and solve crimes to reduce the chance

that serious offenders could escape accountability. Thus, 

in search of increased effectiveness in dealing with an

increasingly challenging and urgent problem, the police

consciously narrowed their focus and refined their skills 

in responding to serious crime and dangerous offenders. 

By relying on the techniques of patrol, rapid response, 

and retrospective investigation, the police have been kept 

at the forefront of community life and have been made

available to anyone who needed them when a crime 

occurred. 

Limitations of professional law enforcement

Recently, enthusiasm for this strategy of professional 

policing has waned. The professional policing model has

been ineffective in reducing crime, reducing citizens’ fears, 

and satisfying victims that justice is being done. Indeed,

recent research indicates that a majority of the population

believes that the crime problem has become progressively

worse during the past decade (Gallup, 1992, cited in 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992: 185). Similarly, citizens

have lost confidence in the criminal justice system to 

protect them (Cole, 1992: 23). 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 111
Such charges are, in many respects, unfair to the police. 

It is unreasonable to expect the police to reduce crime all 

by themselves. Crime rates are affected by vast social, economic, and political forces. No matter how professional,

police cannot solve the “root causes” of crime. They 

cannot be blamed for increasing unemployment, increasing

inequality, or eroding family structures (Bazelon, 1988). 

In addition, police are dependent on the rest of the criminal

justice system to give significance to arrests. 

Toward a new paradigm of policing

Many police executives are beginning to think about and

experiment with a strategy of policing that differs from the

professional model and emphasizes the development 

of a strong relationship with the community. The essence 

of this new paradigm is that police must engage in

community-based processes related to the production 

and maintenance of local human and social capital. 

The means by which these lofty goals are to be achieved

are through the development of strong relationships 

with institutions and individuals in the community. 

While the specific elements of this new strategy of policing

have not been agreed upon or clearly delineated, the broad

characteristics are reasonably clear.

The major theme of building a strong relationship with 

the community has two justifications. First, it is an

important way to make enforcement more effective. 

Second, it is a way to prevent crime and make the 

community co-producers of justice (Skogan and Antunes,

1979). 

One excellent example comes from the Metro-Dade Police

Department (MDPD) in Miami, Fla. In June 1992 the staff 

of the Northside Station of the MDPD conducted a survey 

112 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
of local residents (mostly African-American) to determine 

if any public personalities or activities could serve as

common ground between the police and young males

(Metro-Dade Police Department, 1992). What emerged 

was a fascinating finding. The young respondents 

identified local rap radio disc jockeys and rap music as

personalities and activities that interested them. 

In March 1993 the police turned these empirical findings 

into action. They created a series of “Jammin’ with the 

Man” concerts. Local disc jockeys were invited to hold

concerts in local parks sponsored by the police. While the

youths enjoyed the music and festivities, the police were

there, talking with the youths and encouraging them to 

talk and work with the police to understand each other.

Although more than 5,000 people attended the first event,

there were no negative incidents. The MDPD report

concluded by noting:

While Jammin’ with the Man was originally intended 

to be a single step in a process to improve policecommunity relations, a step aimed particularly at young 

men, [it] seems to have become part or all of the answer. 

It has also become an educational experience for the 

community as they see police as agents of peace rather 

than enforcers of law. More importantly, it has 

demonstrated that the mere act of the police engaged in 

active listening has the effect of empowering them and 

perhaps alleviating some of their sense of alienation 

(Metro-Dade Police Department, 1993: 6).

In other words, this project provided an excellent vehicle 

for the police to create and maintain positive contacts with

members of the community they serve and to be seen in a

positive light. Further, by initiating and participating in

activities the youths enjoyed, the police had an opportunity 

to see youth in a positive light.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 113
Dr. Trevor Bennett has classified the various ways 

to consider community policing and has reduced them to 

three categories. First, he notes that there are arguments

which refer to the intrinsic “goodness” of the general

relationship between police and the community. Second, 

he recognizes relationships in which the police and the 

public work together to achieve common and specified 

goals, including the shared responsibility for crime control.

Third, he acknowledges the need for police to take into

consideration the wishes and concerns of the community. 

In Bennett’s words:

... [A] workable definition of a community policing 

philosophy might include the following basic elements: 

a belief or intention that the police should work with the 

public whenever possible in solving local problems and 

a belief that they should take account of the wishes of 

the public in defining and evaluating operational police 

policy (Bennett, 1992: 7).

A second theme emphasizes attacking the communities’

problems on a broader front — in effect, rejecting the

exclusive focus on serious crime. The theme emerging 

from research is that much fear of crime is independent of

victimization and that there are things the police can do to

deal with fear (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1988, 1992).

Research findings and practice make clear that citizens use

the police for many purposes other than crime control and 

that things other than crime are principal concerns (Alpert 

and Dunham, 1992: 2-3). Certainly, goals other than the

reduction of serious crime should be emphasized when it is

realized that crime control is not the principal or only

objective of the police. In any case, the police cannot 

achieve the reduction of fear or crime by themselves. What

the police can achieve is the independent goal of public or

customer satisfaction.

114 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
A third theme emphasizes some important changes in the

way the police visualize their work and their methods. 

In the traditional strategy of policing, the key unit of work 

is the “incident.” That is, patrol officers respond to a 

specific incident, and it is the incident that becomes the 

focus of a criminal investigation. What we have recently

learned, however, is that a large proportion of incidents

emerge from a relatively small number of situations and

locations. Moreover, analysis of the problems underlying

many incidents reported to the police suggests that the 

police might be able to imagine and mount different kinds 

of intervention (Goldstein, 1990). 

The concept known as problem-oriented policing 

emphasizes involvement of the police in community life.

This strategy has police serve as community agents rather

than adversaries with the community. Study group 

member Professor James F. Short suggests that police 

should not maintain their gatekeeper function and solve

problems for the community but should be involved in 

solving problems with community support and assistance. 

In this way, police can help develop and promote a sense 

of community (Short, 1990: 225-226). Professor Short 

makes a critical link from the 1990’s problem-oriented

policing to the role of police in the Chicago Area Project

during the 1940’s. As he informs us, there are many

similarities in police functioning then and what we are

suggesting for the future. The vision was — 

... [T]he police as a resource for the community, aiding 

local residents and working with indigenous leaders to 

solve community problems, with special focus on the 

problems of young people. The goal in each of these 

programs is to promote the achievement of “functional

communities,” that is, communities in which family life, 

work, religion, education, law enforcement, and other 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 115
institutional areas reflect and reinforce common values 

(Short, 1990: 226).

Although arrests of offenders remains an important tactic, 

the police repertoire must be widened to include a variety 

of civil actions, mobilization of citizens and other 

government agencies to change the conditions that 

generate crime or that will likely escalate deteriorating

conditions. For example, the strategy of “Weed and Seed” 

is to eliminate drug-related crime and to restore economic

vitality to inner cities through multi-agency cooperation 

and the use of community empowerment and resident

involvement (Department of Justice, 1991). An important

aspect of this third theme is that the police should become

pro-active, interactive, and preventative in their orientation

rather than rely solely on reacting and control. 

A fourth theme focuses on changes in internal working

relationships. That is, police agencies need to examine 

the potential strengths and weaknesses of decentralization 

of authority by seeking ways to guide discretion and police

behavior generally through increasing reliance on values

rather than rules and strict methods of accountability 

(Alpert and Smith, 1993). These ideas are central to the

concepts of community policing, problem-solving policing

and smarter policing. Incorporating these ideas into 

strategies of policing, we believe, would truly professionalize police rather than treat them as blue-collar workers. 

In addition to making police work more effective, these —

four strategies may increase job satisfaction — and most

importantly — community satisfaction (Greene, Alpert and

Styles, 1992). 

These four themes combine to form the overarching principle

of changed police-community relationships. Currently, 

police work revolves around serious crimes. The commu116 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
nity participates by becoming the eyes and ears of the 

police; however, this strategy keeps the police outside and

above the community. Police are summoned by the

community through individual requests for service, and 

those requests are evaluated primarily in terms of whether 

an offense has been committed and a crime has been 

solved.

Creative, problem-oriented policing strategies place the

community in a much different position than they have 

been in the recent past. Under this new paradigm, police

work is oriented toward community satisfaction and the

increase in human and social capital in the community.

Satisfaction is determined not only by the police response 

to individual calls, but also by community members 

banding together to advise and consult with the police.

Further, community institutions play the most important 

roles in changing community conditions that generate 

crime and in shaping police activities related to crime 

and other community conditions. Placing police and the

citizens in communication with community leaders creates 

a dialogue and interaction. This removes the police from 

a hierarchical position and has the effect of increasing the

accountability of the police to the community. 

One of the crucial issues that must be faced by all 

concerned with community policing is the assumption that

there is a community to organize. Some cities and suburbs

have developed rapidly and have not formed what sociologists refer to as communities or neighborhoods. Similarly,

some precincts or reporting areas may not be contiguous 

with natural neighborhoods or communities. Finally, 

some areas that have deteriorated or are in the process of

deteriorating may be difficult to organize. Areas needing

organization the least will be the easiest to assist, while less

well-organized communities, particularly underclass areas 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 117
of the inner city, will be the hardest to organize (Alpert 

and Dunham, 1988). However, examples of difficult and

complicated organization are available.

One example of this community-building comes from 

Judge Thomas Petersen in Dade County, Fla. Judge 

Petersen was able to create a sense of community in several

areas known for their lack of community spirit or 

allegiance. Judge Petersen, with assistance from the 

housing authority, law enforcement officials, and private

industry, established three community stores that sold

essential items in housing projects. In each, the housing

authority found sufficient space and turned the space into

grocery stores with supplies donated by private industry. 

The shelves were stocked with no up-front costs. Further,

training for the people necessary to run the business was

procured from professionals in the grocery business. 

Those who were hired to run the store were in need of child

care, and the space and training for that service was 

provided by the housing authority. 

After a short period of time, a group of people were 

working in the store, others were working in the child care

center, and all were removed from public assistance. More

important, however, was the sense of community created 

by the stores and child care centers. The stores became a

focal point of the projects, and residents, police, and others

involved in their establishment gained a mutual respect and

trust for each other. Residents who had been scared to talk 

to other residents began to realize the importance of

community spirit and the benefits of mutual assistance. 

The workers and residents began to identify with the

operation of the store, and when anyone began to cause

trouble or tried to sell drugs, the police were called immediately, and residents would point out the offender and 

118 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
work with the police to do justice. After a short period, 

the stores earned the reputation as establishments that would

not only sell goods but also as the heart of the housing 

projects, serving as a rumor control center, a place to get

assistance from others, and a place with respect for the 

police function.

This new-found respect for police spread very quickly

through the projects and neighborhoods. Residents who 

once despised the police were now working with them 

to solve crimes and create an atmosphere where street

criminals would not be tolerated. In many respects, Judge

Petersen had created a community spirit that fit neatly into 

the community-oriented policing strategy (Petersen, 1993).

Implications for police performance 

measurement

As society and the police approach a new understanding 

of how each can contribute to the other, it is critical to

develop new measures to determine how well the police

perform. Measures of performance rely on the definition 

of what the police are expected to do and how they are

expected to do it. The measures must not only reflect but 

also help to shape community expectations of the police. 

For example, consider how neatly the current enshrined

measures of police performance fit the dominant current

strategy of policing.

Current performance measures as a reflection

of professional law enforcement 

Recall that the current strategy of policing emphasizes 

crime control through arrests and that arrests are produced 

by patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and 

retrospective investigation. Current police performance

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 119
measures are linked directly to these tasks. First, the 

overall objective of police has traditionally been perceived 

to reduce crime. It follows that the traditional measure of

police performance is the level of reported crime measured 

by the Uniform Crime Reports. Another police task is 

apprehending offenders. This task is measured by arrests.

Other traditional measures related to the crime rate include

the ability to solve crimes (clearance rates — a very

subjective measure) and the ability to get to crime scenes

quickly (response times). These existing measures fit the

traditional policing strategy perfectly, and they have 

become recognized as the important measures. 

What is missing from these measures 

Limitations of the traditional policing strategy are also

represented by the current performance measures. It is

important that crime is measured in terms of reported 

crime, rather than through victimization surveys. Indeed, 

the police long resisted the development of criminal

victimization surveys, concerned that they would reveal

differential reporting and would be too subjective. This

emphasis on reported crime left invisible many crimes such 

as domestic assault, child abuse, extortion by armed 

robbers and drug gangs, and other crimes in communities 

that did not trust or have confidence in the police (Bureau 

of Justice Statistics, 1992, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992).

It is also important that the measures that could have 

revealed the fairness and economy within which the 

authority of the police was deployed got less attention than

the question of police effectiveness. There was no routine

expectation that the police would publish data on patrol 

allocations, response times, or crime solution rates across

neighborhoods. 

120 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Similarly, no serious efforts were made to develop 

statistical evidence on the incidence of brutality, excessive

use of force, discourtesy, or corruption. In principle, one

could have collected information about these things by

soliciting civilian complaints and taking them as indicators 

of problems, if not probative of individual officer misconduct (U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1981). Again, the

argument, albeit flawed, was that unlike official crime

statistics, such information was suspect and too subjective.

Thus, in this area as elsewhere, the commitment to fairness

and discipline in the use of authority was less important than

the claim of crime control effectiveness.

Further, there was no real way to capture the quality of the

response that the police made to citizen calls other than 

those involving criminal offenses for which an arrest could 

be made. In fact, most of the operational indicators 

implicitly viewed responding to non-crime complaints as

something to be avoided and resisted rather than taken

seriously. Measures included a comparison between time 

out of service and time in-service. In-service meant being 

on patrol, while out-of-service included meal breaks but 

also included meeting citizens and responding to their calls

for service. Similarly, time spent on high-priority calls was

compared with time spent on “nuisance calls.” The 

purpose was to reduce time on nuisance calls, despite the 

fact that it was these calls that could be used to build the

relationship with the community that was necessary to 

make their current tactics effective in dealing with crime

(Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990).

Finally, there was no real way to account for or measure

pro-active operations. The only way to do this was 

through monitoring specialized squads or units. Units 

were created to deal with particular problems, often on 

a temporary basis, without the establishment of a method 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 121
to capture the nature or extent of the units’ activities.

Similarly, there was no attempt to determine how much of the

organization’s resources was being committed to such

pro-active operations (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992).

Reforming police performance measures

Orienting the agency to the community

Several options exist to reform police performance 

measures. First, existing measures could be improved to live

up to the challenge of professionalism. This would 

include audited clearance and arrest rates and the

development of statistical evidence on the use of force and 

the incidence of brutality, discourtesy, and corruption, 

among others. Second, performance measures could be

linked more closely to action in the community, including 

the level of centralization and community-level programs.

Under this structure, programs must be established that

encourage calls to the police and evaluate calls to the 

police for service as well as concerns regarding criminal

behavior. Measures should also include —

• police-related and inter-governmental activities that improve

the social fabric of the community

• projects with the assistance of private industry that improve

informal and formal social control in the community

• fear of crime

• victimization and police service programs that help promote

community spirit in those neighborhoods where none existed.

Further, measures of the form and level of self-defense 

efforts by citizens and measures of trust and confidence in 

the police should be routinely taken and evaluated. 

Measures of the quality of service delivery by the police

122 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
should be taken to improve departmental functioning and

reveal the quality of individual officers as reported by the

citizens with whom they come in contact (Furstenberg and

Wellford, 1973, and U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1981).

Encouraging pro-active problem solving

One of the biggest problems in accounting for the

performance of police departments is to capture what 

is accomplished during pro-active and problem-solving

activities. One way to measure this concept is to view each

problem-solving initiative as a particular program to be

evaluated for its immediate impact. A second way to 

measure the impact is to view each as equivalent to a 

criminal investigation or special operation. In this way, 

a file is created, activities are monitored, and results 

recorded and evaluated. 

The problem, of course, is that the problems come in different

sizes. Size can be measured in terms of — 

1) total resources committed to the problem

2) amount of time taken to solve

3) the number of specialized resources required

4) the extent to which higher-ranking officers must mobilize

and coordinate efforts within and outside 

the department to deal with the problem

5) its importance and scale within the community. 

One way to deal with these concerns is to develop a 

tailored program for individual areas. In other words, do 

not assume that each community has the same concerns or

problems or that each community should respond similarly 

to certain problems. One product that would result from 

the effort to create, deliver, and measure these communityoriented programs and surveys is a data base on which a

department or a division within a large department could

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 123
customize a pro-active or interactive problem-solving

approach. Pressure to build a portfolio of problems solved

successfully and improved attitudes toward the police 

could become as intense as current pressures to maintain 

low crime rates and quick response times.

Managing the transition to the new strategy

One of the most difficult problems faced by police 

managers in the short run is the awkward period of 

transition to the new strategy. The new programs will not 

be up and operating, and the new measurement systems 

will not be working and widely accepted. Yet the police 

will still be accountable to the public. Thus, they will have 

to develop measures that can keep them accountable during

the transition.

One method is to identify the particular investments and

efforts that are required to implement the new strategy of

policing and report progress on these activities. If new

training is required, they can report on the development of 

the new curriculum and the number of participating 

officers. If the formation of community groups is 

identified as important, that progress can be monitored and

recorded. If the development of a new call management

system or a new scheduling system is required, that too, 

can be monitored. The point is simply to identify and 

monitor the key organizational investments that are 

required. Unfortunately, no data sets exist on which to 

begin an analysis. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has

 compiled the most comprehensive data set (Law Enforcement Management and Administration Statistics —

LEMAS) but its elements do not include many of the 

critical measures discussed in this paper (Reaves, 1992).

124 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Toward a new strategy

The urgent need today in measuring police performance 

is to move away from a sterile conversation about performance measurement as an abstract technical problem and 

to understand it as a device that can be used managerially 

to shape the future of policing. This is neither a question 

of the essential unchanging measures that finally capture 

the value of policing nor a discussion of outcomes versus

outputs nor a discussion of single versus multiple measures 

of performance. Instead, it is a discussion about a strategy 

of policing that will work in the future and how to measure 

its effects. Current measures of policing are holding police

departments in their current mold and are keeping them 

mired in the past. These current measures need to be

supplemented by innovative policing and new ways to

measure their successes.

Our suggestion has several organizational elements that 

must be added to the traditional components already existing in many police departments. The police initiative must

stress the need to learn about the residents and business

people in their neighborhoods and to see them in situations

that are not always defined as negative or at best neutral.

This increased role for the police must include two basic

approaches. First, a method must be devised to solicit

information from members of the community. This 

method can incorporate meetings or citizens’ advisory and

focus groups with the police and can be enhanced by

community surveys to determine attitudes and suggestions

concerning the police and the police role. Another 

important dimension of this information gathering is the

analysis of what Skogan has found to be measures of

neighborhood decline and disorder (Skogan, 1990). 

Second, the police must use this information to reduce

isolation between police and the citizens. The strategy is 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 125
to assign officers for an extended period, supervised by

command staff and advised by community groups. This 

move toward stability will increase the identification of an

officer with the residents, geography, politics, and other

issues in a given neighborhood. 

These operational elements require proper training, 

feedback mechanisms, and an institutionalized reward 

system. Additionally, it is important that these efforts are

measured, analyzed, and evaluated by the police officers,

command staff, and members of the public.

Neighborhood training

Neighborhood training involves two basic questions 

the police must answer according to the needs of each

community or neighborhood: what to do and how to do it. 

In other words, the priority of police resources, whether

fighting crime or providing social services, changes from

neighborhood to neighborhood. Police officers must 

identify these needs from their own experiences and

expectations, from the perspective of the consumers, and 

from that of the police administration. Neighborhood 

training can effectively inform the officer as to what he or 

she can expect from the residents, physical surroundings, 

or other influences. This in-service training can introduce

officers to community characteristics while they are working the streets under a supervisor (in a way similar to a 

field training officer). What to do can be determined 

by problem-solving techniques. How to do it is the

all-important style of policing that needs to be developed 

and supervised by command staff. 

Distinct differences may exist among officers, administrators,

and citizens concerning style. Matching the style of policing

to community needs and requirements will improve both the

126 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
police and the community. This can be achieved through

training based upon knowledge of community values and

beliefs as well as the attitudes and priorities of police 

officers. A necessary aspect of this is the continuous 

dialogue between residents and the police. Research 

on attitudes, expectations and evaluation of services 

of both the police and the members of the community 

is critical.

Monitoring 

The final component of this strategy includes institutionalized monitoring and a formal reward system. This

requires an ongoing system to monitor both the community

and the police. The needs of the community can be

determined by periodic social surveys, which, if linked to

census data and local planning information, can inform

officials of the changing nature of a given neighborhood.

While it is relatively easy to identify what constitutes

negative behavior, it is difficult to specify exemplary

behavior. The proper use of good research, including

appropriate sampling and a panel design, could provide a

clear snapshot of the needs expressed by a given 

community. Police officers and administrators can work

together to identify critical questions and a research design

that can answer them. A Blue-Ribbon Committee studying

the Miami Police Department concluded that while crimefighting activities are important, service activities are 

equally as important in term of the new paradigm. In 

the final report, the committee noted:

It is our conclusion that a minor organizational change 

can have a major impact on community relations and on 

the interrelationships between citizens and police. We 

believe that confidence in the police will be enhanced if 

the police measure and make more visible the activities 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 127
they perform. Moreover, police work is usually rewarded 

by the gratitude an officer receives from those whom he 

or she helps. Status in the department, promotions, 

raises, commendations, etc., rest largely on his or her

crime-fighting activities, the number of arrests, crimes 

he or she solves, etc. As a result, the patrol officer may 

regard service calls as a necessary evil (Overtown Blue 

Ribbon Committee, 1984: 199).

These creative data, together with traditional law enforcement information, will permit the development and

maintenance of neighborhood profiles. Analyzing and

monitoring these profiles can assist the police in improving

their training, tactical decisions, effectiveness and 

efficiency.

Rewarding the officers

Most police departments provide incentives for their 

officers. These include traditional promotions, merit

increases, and “officer-of-the-month” recognition. Many

departments offer several opportunities for their officers to

receive or earn rewards. Traditionally, these rewards have

been based upon aggressive actions that led to arrest(s), the

capture of a dangerous felon, or some other heroic activity.

These criteria for rewarding police officers are important 

and serve to encourage similar actions from others. Yet 

other types of police behavior deserve recognition but 

remain lost and hidden behind the visible, aggressive

activities of police officers. Activities that should receive

more attention include exemplary service to the 

community and the reduction or diffusion of violence. 

Those who provide meritorious service may be recognized 

but often their actions are lost behind the brave shooting

incident or heroic rescue. The local community needs to

recognize officers who serve their “beat” or neighborhood 

128 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
in an exemplary fashion. A “Best Cop on the Block”

recognition would be an important reward, if provided by

local residents or merchants. When an officer avoids a

shooting or talks a suspect into custody, his or her superiors

may not find out; if they do, the officer may be labeled as 

a “chicken” or one who cannot provide needed back-up 

to his fellow officers. Nonaggressive behavior that reduces 

violence needs to be reinforced, rewarded, and established 

as the model for other officers to copy.

An institutional reward system should be established for

officers who avoid or reduce violent situations and who 

avoid the use of force, especially deadly force, when avoidance is justifiable. When command officers, from the chief 

to the sergeants, support and reward violence reduction, 

private business and service groups can be enlisted to 

provide symbolic and monetary rewards for such behavior.

The institutional support for the effective policing of a

neighborhood can only encourage others to consider a 

change in priorities and style. While this is only one aspect 

of a neighborhood intervention and community evaluation

model, it could serve as a successful step toward meeting 

the joint needs of the citizens and the police.

Data on these activities should be collected, assessed and

evaluated to help determine police departments’ performance to do justice and promote secure communities. 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 129
Summary and conclusion

Police departments around the country have instituted one 

or more of the foregoing organizational components into

community policing programs, but we are not aware of 

any agency that has incorporated them all or that uses 

many of these nontraditional performance measures. 

The components of the suggested program need coordination and individual assessment as well as analysis as a total

effect. 

Effective neighborhood policing requires that police

administrators acquire adequate information on the specific

neighborhood, including knowledge of the informal 

control structure of the neighborhood, attitudes about the

police, and policing strategies and styles. This information

can be obtained from citizen surveys, census data, 

community advisory groups, and community leaders. 

After accumulating the information, police administrators 

can decide how to deal with any incongruence between the

neighborhood context and police policies, strategies, and

styles. Some of these differences can be reduced by

campaigns to educate the citizens and change public 

opinion and attitudes. In other cases, discrepancies can be

reduced by training programs for officers who are assigned 

to the areas. The training can focus on neighborhoodspecific strategies, appropriate styles for the specific neighborhood, and placing priorities on tasks consistent with the

neighborhood’s expectations. Subsequent to appropriate

neighborhood-based training, police administrators need to

create and institutionalize a system of monitoring and

rewarding police officers’ behavior. The police officers

assigned to the neighborhood provide the final link

integrating the formal control system of the police with the

informal system in the neighborhood. 

130 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Officers must apply the training principles appropriately

through their use of discretion.

From data collected from the neighborhoods, a good plan for

neighborhood intervention and community evaluation can

bring modern police work in line with our modern world.

Moore and Kelling (1983: 65) have previously summarized

these ideas quite well:

Police strategies do not exist in a vacuum. They are 

shaped by important legal, political, and attitudinal 

factors, as well as by local resources and capabilities, all 

factors which now sustain the modern conception of 

policing. So there may be little leeway for modern 

police executives. But the modern conception of 

policing is in serious trouble, and a review of the nature 

of that trouble against the background of the American 

history of policing gives a clear direction to police forces 

that wish to improve their performance as crime fighters 

and public servants.

The two fundamental features of a new police strategy 

must be these: that the role of private citizens in the 

control of crime and maintenance of public order be 

established and encouraged, not derided and thwarted, 

and that the police become more active, accessible 

participants in community affairs. The police will have 

to do little to encourage citizens to participate in 

community policing, for Americans are well practiced at

undertaking private, voluntary efforts; all they need to 

know is that the police force welcomes and supports 

such activity. Being more visible and accessible is 

slightly more difficult, but hiring more “community relations” specialists is surely not the answer. Instead, the 

police must get out of their cars, and spend more time in 

public spaces such as parks and plazas, confronting and 

assisting citizens with their private troubles. This is

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 131
mundane, prosaic work but it probably beats driving 

around in cars waiting for a radio call. Citizens would 

surely feel safer and, perhaps, might even be safer.

Private citizens working together and through community

institutions can have a profound impact on policing. Those

community organizations and police agencies that have

developed reciprocal relationships will enjoy more success

than those attempting to work without the benefit of the

others’ knowledge and information. 

The maintenance and analysis of administrative statistics 

can provide community members and police supervisors 

with performance outcomes that promote justice. Patrol

officers can be in the best position to understand the varied

and changing needs of the community, and with input from

research and training, appropriate activities can be devised 

to do justice and promote safe communities and develop a

new meaning for the phrase “professional policing.” 

132 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Table 1

The mission of the police consists of many diverse 

activities, not objectives in themselves but which are 

directed toward the protection of life. Goals include doing

justice, promoting secure communities, restoring crime victims, and promoting non-criminal options. 

Police: Goals, methods, and performance indicators

Goals 

Doing Justice. Treating citizens in an appropriate manner

based upon their conduct.

Methods/activities

Balancing formal and informal social controls, responding 

to calls for service, patrolling tactics, issuing traffic tickets,

conducting investigations, writing reports, making arrests, 

and assisting in criminal prosecutions.

Performance indicators

Nature and type of patrolling strategy, number of traffic

tickets issued, known crimes that are cleared by audit or

arrest, quality of reports, analysis of who calls the police,

evaluation of policies emphasizing values over rules, time

invested and quality of investigations, number of known

crimes cleared by conviction, arrests and arrests cleared 

by conviction, cases released because of police misconduct, citizen complaints, lawsuits filed, and results of dispositions and officer-initiated encounters.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 133
Goals

 

Promoting secure communities, enabling citizens to enjoy 

a life without fear of crime or victimization.

Methods/activities

Preventing/deterring criminal behavior and victimization,

problem-solving initiatives, training for community differences, assisting citizens by reducing fear of crime and 

victimization.

Performance indicators

Programs and resources allocated to crime prevention programs, inter-governmental programs, resources, both time 

and dollars dedicated to problem-solving, rewards and

monitoring of police, public trust and confidence in police

performance, public attitudes toward police actions and

public fear of crime, and home and business security 

checks.

Goals

 

Restoring crime victims, by restoring victims’ lives and

welfare as much as possible.

Methods/activities

Assisting crime victims to understand the criminal justice

system, assisting crime victims with their difficulties 

created by the victimization, assisting crime victims 

to put their lives back together.

134 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Performance indicators

Number of contacts with victims after initial call for

assistance, types of assistance provided to victims, including 

information, comfort, transportation, and referrals to other

agencies. 

Goals

 

Promoting noncriminal options, by developing strong 

relationships with individuals in the community.

Methods/activities

Develop and assist with programs that strengthen

relationships between police and members of the community

and among community members, increase human and social

capital in the community and linkages with private industry.

Performance indicators

Programs and resources allocated to strengthening relationships between police and the community and among 

community members, including traditional community 

relations programs, school programs and resources spent 

to meet with the public in a positive alliance. Innovative

programs to develop a sense of community, organizational

measures of decentralization, community storefront 

operations and officer contacts with citizens for positive 

relations and feedback on performance are aspects of 

developing strong relationships with members of the 

community.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 135
References

 

Alpert, Geoffrey, and Roger Dunham. Policing Urban

America. Prospect Heights, Ill. Waveland Press. 1992.

Alpert, Geoffrey, and Roger Dunham. Policing Multi-Ethnic

Neighborhoods. New York: Greenwood Press. 1988. 

Alpert, Geoffrey, and William Smith. “Developing Police

Policy: Evaluating the Control Principle.” American Journal

of Police. Forthcoming, 1993.

Bazelon, David. Questioning Authority. New York: Knopf.

1988.

Bennett, Trevor. Community Policing in Britain. Paper

presented to the International Conference on Community

Policing. Institute of Criminology, University of Heidelberg,

Heidelberg, Germany. September 1992.

Bureau of Justice Statistics. Crime and the Nation’s

Households, 1991. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice

Statistics. 1992. 

Bureau of Justice Statistics. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice

Statistics, 1991. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice

Statistics. 1992.

Bureau of Justice Statistics. Report to the Nation on Crime

and Justice, 2nd. Ed. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice

Statistics. 1988.

Cole, George. The American System of Criminal Justice.

Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. 1992.

136 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Department of Justice. Operation Weed and Seed:

Reclaiming America’s Neighborhoods. Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Justice. 1991.

DiIulio, John. Rethinking the Criminal Justice System:

Toward a New Paradigm. Washington, D.C.: Bureau 

of Justice Statistics. December 1992.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime in the United States

1991. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of

Justice. 1992.

Furstenberg, Frank, and Charles Wellford. “Calling the

Police: The Evaluation of Police Service.” Law and Society

Review 7:393-406 (1973).

Gallup, George. The Gallup Poll Monthly, Report No. 318.

Princeton, N.J.: The Gallup Poll. 1992.

Goldstein, Herman. Problem-Oriented Policing. New York: 

McGraw-Hill. 1990.

Greene, Jack, Geoffrey Alpert, and Paul Styles. “Values and

Culture in Two American Police Departments: Lessons from

King Arthur.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 8:

183-207 (1992).

Kelling, George. “Measuring What Matters: A New Way 

of Thinking About Crime and Public Order.” The City

Journal Spring 2:21-34 (1992).

Metro-Dade Police Department. Survey of AfricanAmerican Males 15-30 Years of Age. Metro-Dade 

Police Department. Miami: 1992. 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 137
Metro-Dade Police Department. “Jammin’ with the Man”

Project Summary. Metro-Dade Police Department. Miami: 

1993.

Moore, Mark, and George Kelling. “To Serve and to 

Protect: Learning from Police History,” The Public 

Interest 70: 49-65. 1983. 

Overtown Blue Ribbon Committee. Final Report. City 

of Miami, 1984.

Petersen, Thomas. Personal communication. February 1993.

Reaves, Brian. Law Enforcement Management and

Administrative Statistics, 1990: Data for Individual State and

Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers. Washington,

D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1992.

Short, James F. Delinquency in Society. Englewood Cliffs,

NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1990.

Skogan, Wesley. Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral

of Decay in American Neighborhoods. New York: Free

Press. 1990.

Skogan, Wesley, and George Antunes. “Information,

Apprehension and Deterrence: Exploring the Limits 

of Police Productivity.” Journal of Criminal Justice 7 (1979).

Sparrow, M., M. Moore, and D. Kennedy. Beyond 911: 

A New Era for Policing. New York: Basic Books. 1990.

U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Who’s Guarding the

Guardians? Washington, D.C.: USGPO. 1981.

138 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
Walker, Samuel. The Police In America. New York: 

McGraw-Hill. 1992.

Whitaker, Catherine. Crime Prevention Measures.

Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1986.

Wilson, O.W., and Roy McClaren. Police Administration,

4th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1977.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 139
About the authors

Geoffrey P. Alpert is Professor of Criminal Justice at 

the University of South Carolina and Research Professor, 

Institute of Public Affairs. He has been a Visiting Fellow at

the Bureau of Justice Statistics and has served as the 

Director of Research in the Georgia Department of

Corrections. He has extensive experience in criminal justice

agencies and research. For the past 10 years, he has 

focused his interests on evaluation research. His research

efforts include the evaluation of multi-ethnic policing, 

the police use of deadly force, the impact of indicators of

unrest on the prevention of civil disturbances, how police

pursuit driving policies affect outcome, the effect of social

programs on keeping high-risk students in school, and the

effectiveness of tactical narcotics teams. He has published

more than a dozen books and monographs and has contributed

to legal, sociological, and criminal justice journals.

Mark Moore is the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim 

Professor of Criminal Justice Policy and Management 

and Faculty Chairman of the Program in Criminal Justice,

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. For a decade he served as the Founding Chairman of 

the Kennedy School’s Committee on Executive Programs.

His intellectual interests lie in criminal justice policy, in

public management, and in particular, the intersection of 

the two fields. He has led national “executive sessions” 

on the future of juvenile justice, policy, and prosecution. 

140 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
In the domain of crime policy, he is the author of Buy and

Bust: The Effective Regulation of an Illicit Market in Heroin

and the co-author of Dangerous Offenders: Elusive Targets;

From Children to Citizens: The Mandate for 

Juvenile Justice; and Beyond 911: A New Era for 

Policing. In the domain of public management, his 

co-authored works include Inspectors-General: Junkyard

Dogs or Man's Best Friend; Public Duties: The Moral

Obligations of Public Officials; and Ethics in Government: 

The Moral Challenges of Public Leadership.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 141
Measuring Performance When 

There Is No Bottom Line

by John J. DiIulio, Jr.

The great scholar of American government, Wallace Sayre,

promulgated the “law” that “public and private management are fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects.”

Many leading thinkers — Graham T. Allison, Jr. of Harvard

University and James Q. Wilson of UCLA, to cite just two —

have echoed this view.1

As Wilson has noted, to a “much greater extent than 

private bureaucracies, government agencies (1) cannot

lawfully retain and devote to the private benefit of their

members the earnings of the organization, (2) cannot 

allocate the factors of production (land, labor, capital) 

142 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 1See Graham T. Allison, “Public and Private Management: 

Are They Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Respects?” 

in Richard J. Stillman, III, ed., Public Administration: Concepts 

and Cases, Fifth Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,

1992), chapter 10, pp. 282-288, and James Q. Wilson, 

Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why 

They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
in accordance with the preferences of administrators, and 

(3) must serve goals not of the organization’s own choosing.

Control over revenues, productive factors, and agency goals is

all vested to an important degree in entities external to the

organization — legislatures, courts, politicians, and interest

groups.”2

With few exceptions, the human and financial resources 

of public managers are contingent upon the goodwill of

legislators and other policymakers, not the goodwill of

customers and other consumers. Relative to private

managers, public managers in civil service bureaucracies 

have little discretion in hiring, firing, and promotion

decisions; and, their ability to innovate — to change the 

way work gets done — is far more constrained.

Unlike most private corporations, most government 

agencies have no market-test of output. The managers of a

smokestack company are out to turn a profit; the managers 

of the Environmental Protection Agency are out to “protect

the environment.” The executives of television networks

contrive to generate dividends for shareholders; the heads 

of the Federal Communications Commission contrive to

regulate airwaves in “the public interest.” At most, public

managers have proxies for outputs: for example, increasing

weapons stockpiles as a proxy for “enhancing combat

readiness” and “strengthening national defense.”

Thus, as Allison observes, there is “little if any agreement 

on the standards and measurement of performance to 

appraise a government manager, while various tests of

performance — financial return, market share, performance

measures for executive compensation — are well 

established in private business.... Governmental managers

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 143

 2Wilson, Bureaucracy, p. 115.
 rarely have a clear bottom line, while that of a private

business manager is profit, market performance, and 

survival.”3

 Or, in Wilson’s words, “whereas business

management focuses on the ‘bottom line’ (that is, profits),

government management focuses on the ‘top line’ (that is,

constraints).”4

Thus, the essential differences between public and private

management are rooted in the nature of their respective 

goals. Basically, there are two types of goals: operational 

and nonoperational.5

 An operational goal is an image of a

desired future state of affairs that can be compared

unambiguously to an actual or existing state of affairs. 

A nonoperational goal is an image of a desired future state 

of affairs that cannot be compared unambiguously to an 

actual or existing state of affairs.

Some examples are in order. “Keeping America first in 

space technology” is a nonoperational goal; “Putting an

American on Mars by the year 2010” is an operational 

goal. “Improving the quality of public education in America” is a nonoperational goal; “Increasing the average 

verbal and math SAT scores of public school students by 

20% between the year 1992 and the year 2000” is an

operational goal. “Making America’s welfare system 

work” is a nonoperational goal; “Instituting work-based

welfare programs that get 50% of all participants off the 

rolls in their first 7 years of operation” is an operational 

goal. “Reforming criminals” is a nonoperational goal;

“Doubling the rate of inmate participation in prison 

industry programs” is an operational goal.

144 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 3Allison, “Public and Private Management,” pp. 285-286, 

summarizing the ideas of John T. Dunlop.

 4

Wilson, Bureaucracy, p. 115. 

 5

I am indebted to James Q. Wilson for this distinction.
Generally speaking, public managers have nonoperational

goals, while private managers have operational goals.

Moreover, public managers often work in the context 

of multiple and contradictory nonoperational goals.

Correctional agencies and forestry services are two classic

examples. For much of American history, correctional

agencies were authorized to “punish, deter, incapacitate, 

and rehabilitate” convicted criminals. Most employees 

of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, are

“correctional officers” responsible for the “care and 

custody” of prisoners. By the same token, most employees 

of the U.S. Forest Service are “forest rangers” charged with

“multiple-use management” (hunting, fishing, timber 

cutting, timber sales, fire prevention, flood control). The

correctional officers are “social workers, prison guards, and

managers” all rolled into one; the forest rangers are

“executives, woodsmen, and planners” all rolled into one.6

 

In both cases, the multiple and contradictory nonoperation-

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 145

 6For a discussion of correctional management, see John J.

DiIulio, Jr., Governing Prisons: A Comparative Study of Correctional Management (New York: Free Press, 1987); No 

Escape: The Future of American Corrections (New York: Basic

Books, 1991); and Principled Agents: Leadership, Administration, and Culture in a Federal Bureaucracy (New York: Oxford

University Press, forthcoming). The best single account of

forestry management remains Herbert Kaufman, The Forest

Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior (Baltimore and

London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960). For a more

recent look at the U.S. Forest Service, see Terrence J. Tipple and

J. Douglas Wellman, “Herbert Kaufman’s Forest Service Thirty

Years Later: From Simplicity and Homogeneity to Complexity

and Diversity,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

American Society for Public Administration, Los Angeles, 

Calif., April 10, 1990, 26 pp.
al nature of the agency’s goals renders inapplicable the

much-misunderstood concept of efficiency.

Efficiency refers to a relationship between valued inputs 

and desired outputs: maximizing outputs from a given set 

of inputs, or minimizing the inputs necessary to achieve a

given level of outputs. In many, perhaps most, government

agencies, the relationship between valued inputs (people,

money) and desired outputs (less crime, better public 

health) is ambiguous. Where goals are nonoperational, and

the technologies necessary to achieve them are either

uncertain, or completely unknown, or simply unavailable, 

the quest for a “bottom line” is a fool’s quest. To the 

extent that goals are vague or inconsistent, the concept of

efficiency is irrelevant.7

 The concept of efficiency is thus

irrelevant to many, if not most, public management tasks.

Defining and measuring nonoperational goals:

What is to be done? 

Because public management and private management are

indeed fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects, it

makes little sense to lament the fact that “government isn’t

run like a business,” or to assume that government 

agencies are inherently less “efficient” than private firms.8

 

As Allison concludes, “the notion that there is any 

significant body of private management practices and skills

146 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 7I am indebted to Edward C. Banfield of Harvard University

for this insight.

 8

For arguments and evidence that support this view, see

Charles T. Goodesell, The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public

Administration Polemic, Second Edition (Chatham, N.J.: 

Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1985), and James W. Fesler 

and Donald F. Kettl, The Politics of the Administrative Process

(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1990).
that can be transferred directly to public management tasks 

in a way that produces significant improvements is 

wrong.”9

It is yet possible, however, for public managers to 

strengthen the relationship between administration and 

goals, inputs and outputs, process and performance. The

multiple and contradictory nonoperational character 

of most public management goals — the lack of a market-test

of output in much of the governmental sector — is neither 

an immovable barrier to defining appropriate measures for 

the goals of public agencies, nor an inexhaustible excuse 

for the failure to do so. As Wilson notes, if someone set 

out to measure “the output of a private school, hospital, 

or security service, he or she would have at least as much

trouble as would someone trying to measure the output 

of a public school, hospital, or police department. Governments are not the only institutions with ambiguous products.” In recent years, in fact, a number of major public

policy reforms were launched as efforts to define 

appropriate measures for the goals of government 

agencies. There is no reason why the field of criminal 

justice cannot or should not follow suit.

A first step in defining appropriate measures for the goals 

of the criminal justice system is for practitioners to ask four

questions:

• What do we want to achieve?

• What human and other resources do we have (or can we

obtain) that might enable us to achieve it?

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 147

 9Allison, “Public and Private Management,” p. 294.

 10 Wilson, Bureaucracy, p. 373.

 11One example is welfare reform; see Richard P. Nathan, 

Social Science in Government: Uses and Misuses (New York:

Basic Books, 1988).
• How can we know the relationship between the levels 

and modes of our resource deployments, on the one hand, 

and the achievement of our goals, on the other?

• How can we measure routinely the extent to which we 

are achieving what we want to achieve, or moving toward

achieving it?

These may seem like an incredibly obvious set of conceptual questions to ask, but they are ones that public 

managers have not asked with sufficient regularity or

seriousness of purpose. This is true even in public management sectors like defense, where there has been no

shortage of well-funded experimentation with different

managerial approaches and performance-appraisal 

techniques.12 It is even truer for a public management 

sector like criminal justice, where the occasions for such

experimentation have been severely limited both by fiscal

constraints and frankly, by intellectually hide-bound

management traditions.

A second step in this direction is to translate the agency’s

nonoperational goals into measurable process and

performance criteria. 

In a recent volume, a group of public management specialists analyzed “impossible jobs in public management.”13 

An “impossible job” is defined by —

148 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 12For a discussion of the need for operational concepts in

defense planning, see Glenn A. Kent, A Framework for Defense

Planning (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, August

1989), especially pp. 21-24.

 13Erwin C. Hargrove and John C. Glidewell, eds., Impossible

Jobs in Public Management (Lawrence, Kansas: University 

Press of Kansas, 1990).
• agency goals that are multiple, contradictory, and

nonoperational

• strong political cross-pressures by competing external

constituencies who favor one or another of the agency’s goals

to the exclusion of the rest

• a lack of public confidence in the professional expertise of

agency workers

• clients whose mental and behavioral characteristics make

them difficult to serve. Examples include the jobs of

contemporary big-city police chiefs, State mental health

commissioners, public health commissioners, human 

services (welfare, Medicaid) commissioners, and 

corrections commissioners. Although they varied widely

across time, place, political and organizational context, 

and nature of task, the reputationally successful public

managers in these fields were found to employ certain

“coping strategies,” chief among them a strategy for

translating nonoperational goals into measurable process 

and performance criteria.

An example from corrections: The Federal 

Bureau of Prisons

A good example of this strategy in action is the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Established in 1930 and situated 

in the United States Department of Justice, the BOP is 

a career civil service agency. It has long enjoyed a 

reputation as one of the finest correctional agencies in 

the country, and one of the best managed agencies 

of the Federal Government. Contrary to the “Club Fed”

stereotypes of the agency, the BOP has not always enjoyed 

“a better class of criminals,” been less crowded, spent more

per inmate, or had a lower inmate-to-staff ratio than State

systems of comparable size and complexity. Instead, its

success in running safe, clean, programmatic, and

cost-effective prisons has been the hard-won product of

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 149
management innovations made under five consecutive

directors.

Historically, the core of the BOP management approach 

has been to translate its multiple, contradictory, and

nonoperational goals (punish, deter, incapacitate, 

rehabilitate) into measurable process and performance

criteria. For example, the agency’s fourth director, 

Norman A. Carlson (1970-87), was an award-winning Federal executive. He self-consciously managed the agency

around three criteria: safety, humanity, and opportunity.

Essentially, safety meant the incidence of things that either

threatened the physical and emotional well-being of 

inmates and staff, or placed the public at direct risk, or both

(assault, homicide, escape). Humanity meant the incidence 

of things that made for decent living and working 

conditions behind bars (decent food, clean quarters,

recreation). Opportunity meant the incidence of things that

enabled inmates to better themselves (programs in remedial

reading, job training, drug treatment). Thus, in the recent

agency publication Bureau of Prisons Goals for 1992 and

Beyond, we read: “The Federal Bureau of Prisons protects

society by confining offenders in the controlled 

environments of prisons and community-based facilities 

that are safe, humane, and ... provide work and other selfimprovement opportunities....”

Many correctional agencies have such mission statements.

But few have actually managed themselves around

measurable process and performance criteria as the BOP has

done from 1930 to the present. A good contemporary

example is the agency’s Key Indicators/Strategic Support

System (KI/SSS). Begun in 1983 and carried out under

Carlson’s successor, J. Michael Quinlan (1987-92), the BOP

has elaborated “safety, humanity, and opportunity” into

KI/SSS, a personal computer-based management 

150 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
information system that provides managers at all levels with

comprehensive, up-to-date, system-wide information on a

wide range of specific performance variables.

Invariably, such innovations begin with managers who —

• ask themselves basic questions about the relationship

between what they want to achieve and what they actually 

do 

• recognize the need to translate their agency’s multiple,

contradictory, and nonoperational goals into measurable

performance criteria.

For example, in 1988, as the KI/SSS was still being

developed, participants at the BOP’s annual wardens’

conference received a perceptive four-page progress report

that read in part: “Unlike private agencies and companies, 

the Bureau of Prisons is expected to respond to a wide 

variety of overall objectives, often conflicting, often 

difficult to obtain.... The Bureau has stated that its mission 

is to provide humane control of inmates (and) ... 

opportunities to those inmates who choose to use them....

(W)e need to ... translate that broad goal into more specific

measures.”

Between 1983 and 1992, they did so, and it helped the 

agency to manage successfully a doubling in its prisoner

population and a concomitant growth in the number of its

staff and facilities.

The measurement net: How tight a weave?

Putting the example of the BOP to one side, but continuing

for the moment with our focus on correctional agencies, the

central question is “How do we define a comprehensive set 

of appropriate measures for the goals of corrections that 

can be used on a day-to-day basis by the field’s practitioners?” The answer is far from obvious, but some progress 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 151
has already been made. The Study Group’s Professor 

Charles H. Logan of the University of Connecticut has

defined eight distinct “dimensions of the quality 

of confinement” (security, safety, order, care, activity, 

justice, conditions, management), each of which can be

measured on four or more “subdimensions” via staff and

inmate surveys and institutional records.14 Logan’s work

dispels one concern about the possibility of defining such

measures and raises a second. On the one hand, it dispels 

the worry that any such measurement scheme is bound 

to be based exclusively on one or another moral or ideological view of the “ends of criminal justice.” His quality 

of confinement measurements encompass and satisfy every

major school of thought about “what prisons are for.”

On the other hand, however, Logan mixes process and

performance measurements in a way that may or may not

represent the final state of the art. For example, his 

“security” dimension has six subdimensions: security

procedures, freedom of inmate movement, community

exposure, staffing adequacy, significant incidents, and 

drug use. Arguably, the first four of these security

subdimensions are process measures, while the last two are

performance measures. The same sort of indiscriminate

mixing of process and performance measures is present 

in the BOP’s aforementioned KI/SSS. Whether it is either

intellectually worthwhile or practically useful to distin152 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 14Charles H. Logan, “Criminal Justice Performance Measures

for Prisons,” Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice

System (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1993).
guish more cleanly between process and performance

measures remains an open question.15

Be careful of what you measure, for you 

may (or may not) get it

But before one even begins to treat with such questions, at

least four flags of caution should be waved over any effort 

to define appropriate measures for the goals of criminal

justice agencies, or, for that matter, any governmental

agencies.

First, it is naive to assume that what government agencies

actually do on a day-to-day basis can be much affected by

how, whether, or to what extent their managers define 

goals. In the preface to his study of administration in the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug

Enforcement Agency (DEA), Wilson observes that the 

tasks of government workers “are supposedly chosen,

defined, revised, or discarded as a result of efforts by

administrators to achieve organizational goals,” but “tasks 

are defined by forces far more profound, and accordingly

more resistant to change....”16

Second, even if what government agencies actually did 

was a simple function of how their goals were defined and

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 153

 15For a general discussion of this issue that argues in favor 

of distinguishing process from performance measures, see John 

J. DiIulio, Jr., “Recovering the Public Management Variable:

Lessons from Schools, Prisons, and Armies.” Public

Administration Review, Volume 49, Number 2, March/April 

1989, pp. 127-133.

 16James Q. Wilson, The Investigators: Managing FBI and

Narcotics Agents (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 8.
measured, that would not necessarily be a good thing in all

cases. There is always a danger that measurement-driven

government workers will, so to speak, “set up the target in

order to facilitate shooting,” and give rise to perverse and

unintended administrative routines. Criminal justice 

agencies furnish many examples: FBI agents of the 

Hoover era who padded “the stats” on bank robberies; 

DEA agents in the 1970’s who persisted in street-level

“buy-and-bust” operations rather than more demanding

investigative chores that might not succeed.17

Third, it is often the most dedicated and caring government

workers who are anywhere from suspicious to downright

dismissive of any attempt to define and apply such 

measures. For example, a hard-working veteran correctional counselor at a maximum-security prison dismissed 

the need for such measures and was heedless of what he

judged to be the pseudo-intellectual justifications for them:

“Experience on the ground is the only way to understand 

the effects of a place like this.” An equally dedicated coworker of his stated: “I believe in this way of doing things.

I’d do it this way even if it didn’t make any difference.”18 

Similarly, a committed participant in a major communitypolicing demonstration project was perturbed by the

suggestion that the study would help to define appropriate

measures for the goals of police agencies: “It’s not about

measuring anything, it’s about doing things differently.”19

154 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 17Wilson, The Investigators, especially chapter 5.

 18Quoted in DiIulio, No Escape, p. 144.

 19Interviewed for John J. DiIulio, Jr., “Crime,” in Henry

J. Aaron and Charles L. Schultze, eds., Setting Domestic

Priorities: What Can Government Do? (Washington, D.C.:

The Brookings Institution, 1992), Chapter 4.
Fourth, even under the best of conditions, efforts to act on

appropriate measurements of agency goals can be blocked 

by personnel regulations and administrative behavior 

within government. Unfortunately, there are many 

examples. In a recent study of the Federal procurement

process, Professor Steven Kelman of Harvard University

studied managers who sought to withhold contracts for 

poor performance and secure the best possible deal for 

the Nation’s taxpayers; paradoxically, they were defeated 

by procedural regulations intended to promote competition 

in contracting.20 In another recent study, Gerald J. Garvey 

of Princeton University had a similar tale to tell about

change-oriented management within Federal regulatory

bureaucracies.21

None of these cautions, however, should be sufficient 

to discourage one from exploring new and better ways 

of defining appropriate measures for the goals of criminal

justice agencies. 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 155

 20Steven Kelman, Procurement and Public Management: The

Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance

(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1990).

 21Gerald J. Garvey, The Challenge of Organizational Change:

Living and Dying in a Federal Bureaucracy (San Francisco,

Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1992).
The Problem of Defining 

Agency Success

by James Q. Wilson

For the most part, I agree with what DiIulio says in the first

essay in this compendium, and I am generally sympathetic 

to the Study Group’s ideas on performance measures for

prisons and police departments. But let me reformulate the

question this way: How can government agencies with

nonoperational goals best develop performance measures?

The best way to approach this issue is to ask how private

organizations with nonoperational goals (schools, colleges,

hospitals) cope with the problem of defining success. 

In principle, they need not define it, for in a competitive

market, success will be defined for them by survival 

or failure. The heads of most such organizations are

unwilling to wait for this Darwinian verdict; instead, they 

try to anticipate it by looking at the following measures:

156 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
• Client satisfaction (student enrollments and tuition

payments, hospital accounts receivable, and so forth).

• Donor contributions (Federal subventions, alumni

donations, foundation grants).

• Employee attachment (the ease or difficulty with which 

the organization can recruit and retain skilled — or at least

highly credentialed or well-thought-of — employees).

• Personal, up-close, or professional evaluations 

(impressions gained by executives as they move about the

organization or read and hear the judgments of professional

peers).

• Proxy measures of goal attainment (for example, 

percentage of high school graduates accepted at elite 

colleges, SAT scores, Medicare reimbursements, cure 

rates).

Two things need to be said about this list. First, the proxy

measures at the bottom of the list are somewhat crude and

quite easily misinterpreted. A very good inner-city high

school may send few students to Princeton but may have

many graduates who get jobs at Lockheed or the Bank of

America. The number who do, however, may be unknown

because no routine reporting system captures it and the

employment decision may come a year or two after

graduation. In a hospital, the percentage of admitted 

patients who get better, given a certain disease, may say 

more about the personal habits and self-care of the patients

than about what the hospital does. As the government

increasingly subjects private agencies to constraints

experienced by public agencies, private organizations are

forced to place greater weight on crude proxy measure-

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 157
ments like the ones mentioned above because the government

places great weight on them. 

Second, the executives of private organizations have more

opportunity to engage in personal exploration of their

organizational environment — so-called “soaking and

poking” (soaking up information and poking into corners) —

than do their public counterparts. This greater opportunity is

because of three factors: 

• On the average, private organizations are smaller than 

public ones (both in total size and in size of the overhead 

staff that must be managed). 

• Private executives need to spend less time satisfying

external political demands than do the heads of public

agencies. 

• The compensation and tenure of private executives are 

more variable than those of public executives, and so the

former have a greater incentive to find ways of anticipating

(and, if necessary, correcting) adverse market trends. Good

executives can be found among public agencies, but they 

are rarer. For example, the principals of more effective 

public schools are almost invariably ones who engage in a

great deal of soaking and poking and who devote a lot of

effort to student and teacher motivation. The literature on

this subject makes it clear that this is not routine behavior 

for principals and often requires for its existence strong, 

even eccentric, personalities.

The case of big city police agencies

Most of the efforts to improve performance measures for

policing have concentrated on finding either real measures 

158 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
of overall effectiveness or plausible proxy measures. Not

much has come of these efforts for reasons that should be

obvious. There are no “real” measures of overall success;

what is measurable about the level of public order, safety, 

and amenity in a given large city can only partially, if at 

all, be affected by police behavior. (For example, if the

murder or robbery rates go up, one cannot assume that this 

is the fault of the police; if they go down, one should not

necessarily allow the police to take credit for it.) Proxy

measures almost always turn out to be process measures —

response time, arrest rates, or clearance rates — that may or

may not have any relationship to crime rates or levels of

public order.

In my view, the search for better measures of police

performance is doomed to failure so long as it focuses on

city-wide or even precinct-wide statistics. Most police 

chiefs will agree on this point, I think. No matter how we

improve the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or the National

Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), they will not tell 

us very much (and certainly not very much in a timely

fashion) about what difference the police make in the lives 

of the citizens.

Nor can most of the other devices available to private firms 

be applied to policing. There are no client payments or 

donor contributions; police appropriations tend to reflect

fiscal constraints and past funding levels modified, from 

time to time, by generalized concerns over crime increases

and police misconduct. Professional evaluations are not 

very reliable; policing is not a profession with clear standards enforced by knowledgeable peers, except on the rare

occasions when an outside group is brought in to evaluate 

a department in trouble. But small-scale soaking and 

poking may be applicable.

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 159
These considerations lead me to suggest that the better

approach to defining police goals and performance 

measures involves thinking small and from the bottom up. 

Let me clarify this suggestion by asking what citizens want

that is related to police behavior. They want several 

things, but in the interests of brevity I will focus on just 

one.1

 People want to live in safe, orderly neighborhoods.

Wesley Skogan has shown in his recent book that there is a

high degree of consensus across demographic categories as 

to what a safe, orderly neighborhood is.2

 It includes streets

free of drug dealers, rowdy juveniles, threatening derelicts,

soliciting prostitutes, and predatory criminals; buildings

without graffiti or other signs of decay; no drive-by 

shootings, and so forth.

The police ought to make the production of safer, more

orderly neighborhoods (not lower crime rates or more drug

arrests or more traffic tickets) one of their goals. They 

ought to design ways of assessing the conditions of

neighborhoods before and after various police interventions. They ought to use that assessment to modify their

deployments and tactics.

Adopting this view implies certain actions, none easy but

none impossible:

160 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System

 1I omit fair play, civil behavior, prompt response, and many

other important factors. Taking all these into account would

complicate my argument but not change it.

 2

Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the

Sprawl of Decay in American Neighborhoods (Berkeley and Los

Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).
• Categorize all neighborhoods by two criteria: 3

--What is the level of disorder and danger? 

--How amenable is that level to improvement by a 

given, feasible level of police and public action? 

(Some neighborhoods are almost self-policing and 

require only police response to calls for service. Some 

are almost beyond repair, given feasible levels of

intervention, because they are highly transient 

or have other problems contributing to decay. Some 

are amenable to improvement, provided existing 

resources are carefully used.)

• Specify as concretely as possible the features of a given

neighborhood that are strategic and must be improved if the

quality of life is to be improved. For example:

--A landlord who allows his building to be used by 

drug dealers

--A deli or spa that allows teenagers to hang out in 

front of it in ways others find threatening

--A bar that is the scene of frequent brawls

--A public housing project with poor maintenance and

security

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 161

 3I do not here define “neighborhood.” This is an important

issue that cannot be resolved conceptually. In rough terms, a

neighborhood is what people think it is. The size and shape will

vary from place to place and be affected by natural boundaries

(for instance, parks, street-car tracks) institutions (grammar

schools or shopping centers or churches), ethnic composition, 

and traffic patterns. I wish to stress that the area should be

relatively small and its boundaries easily understood by most

people living there.
--A bus or subway stop that is dominated by aggressive

panhandlers or homeless people sleeping on public 

benches

--A residential burglary gang that is working the

neighborhood

--A park that is the scene of muggings and rapes.

• State the methods to be used to remedy the situation (for

instance, filing nuisance abatement charges against the

landlord, meeting with the teenagers and the deli owner 

about how the sidewalk is used, arranging to expel 

disorderly public-housing tenants, using saturation patrol 

for a limited period, stationing uniformed officers next to

suspected drug dealers, and so forth).

• Put in place a micro-level measure of success. These 

might include the following:

--Tracking calls for service from a specific address or 

its immediate neighbors

--Hiring a resident to make regular observations of life 

on the street by, for example, at stated intervals 

counting the number of panhandlers, suspected drug

dealers, sleeping vagrants, soliciting prostitutes, 

and so on

--Conducting a telephone survey of residents (using

random-digit dialing to minimize sample selection 

bias) to assess their perceptions before and after the

intervention.

These micro-measures are likely to be among the few valid

measures of police performance. They may well lead to

conclusions quite at variance with city-wide, aggregate 

data. For example, the “crime rate” might be getting worse

162 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
at the same time that the conditions of life in neighborhoods has measurably improved, or vice versa.4

 For a

thoughtful and more detailed proposal along these lines, 

the reader should consult a recent essay by George Kelling,

especially his account of Operation Crossroads in New 

York City’s Times Square.5

Just as important as the measures themselves will be the

requirement that the police agency define its operational 

goals as improving the conditions of life in specific

neighborhoods. The attentive reader will have noticed that

this way of defining police goals is similar to what many

advocates of community-oriented policing (COP) propose.

This is not an accident. But my argument is not that COP 

has such mystical, ideological, or historical importance that 

it ought to govern police decisions as a matter of principle.

My argument is that if the police are serious about defining

goals and measuring progress toward them, they will

inevitably have to do so by identifying problems relevant 

to citizen concerns at the neighborhood level, specifying

possible solutions, and measuring the effect of those

strategies. This is what is meant by problem-oriented 

policing (POP) which, in my view, is the heart of COP

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 163

 4Some will object that neighborhood measures ignore

spillover effects. Up to a point, that is true. But such evidence

as we have on burglary and robbery, drug-dealing, and other

offense suggest that the displacement of crime from one area to

the next is usually much less than 100%. A lot will depend on

the mobility of offenders, and that will be constrained by ethnic

identity, profit opportunities, the desire for local “cover,” the

threats of rival gangs elsewhere, and the depressing effect 

of laziness and/or opportunism.

 5

George Kelling, “Measuring What Matters,” The City Journal

(Spring 1992), 21-33.
and what makes POP (and COP properly defined) different

from police-community relations.

Note the parallels between POP and the More Effective

Schools (MES) literature. Both focus on small spaces

(neighborhoods, individual schools); both require the

identification of specific problems (unruly teenagers, gang

fights, and so forth); both can be evaluated only by 

specifying significant changes in the behaviors of 

particular people (fewer fights, quieter classrooms); both 

try to improve the preconditions of better lives (safer

neighborhoods, more orderly classrooms) without directly

attacking ultimate outcomes (crime rates, SAT scores) 

which have multiple causes; both require that the executive

(police captain, school principal) spend a lot of time

observing and talking to the affected people. And, a final

parallel: only a minority of police chiefs (like the minority 

of school officials) are likely to want to do these things. 

164 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System
About the author

Since 1985 James Q. Wilson has been the James Collins

Professor of Management at the University of California 

at Los Angeles (UCLA). Before that he was for 26 years the

Shattuck Professor of Government at Harvard University. 

He is the author or coauthor of 13 books, including The 

Moral Sense, Thinking About Crime, Varieties of Police

Behavior, Political Organizations, Crime and Human 

Nature (with Richard J. Herrnstein), Bureaucracy, and 

Essays on Character. He has in addition edited or 

contributed to books on urban problems, government, 

regulation of business, and the prevention of delinquency

among children, including Crime and Public Policy, From

Children to Citizens: Families, Schools, and Delinquency

Prevention (with Glenn Loury), Understanding and 

Controlling Crime (with David Farrington and Lloyd 

Ohlin), and Drugs and Crime (with Michael Tonry).

He has served on a number of national commissions

concerned with public policy. He was chairman of the 

White House Task Force on Crime in 1966, chairman 

of the National Advisory Commission on Drug Abuse

Prevention (1972-73), a member of the Attorney General’s

Task Force on Violent Crime in 1981, a member of the

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1985-

90), and a director of The Police Foundation (1970-93). 

 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System 165
He is currently chairman of the board of academic advisers 

of the American Enterprise Institute.

He has been elected a member of the American Academy 

of Arts and Sciences and a fellow of the American

Philosophical Society. In 1990 he received the James

Madison award for distinguished scholarship from the

American Political Science Association and in 1991-92

served as that organization’s president. Educated at the

University of Redlands (A.B., 1952) and the University of

Chicago (Ph.D., 1959), he has received honorary degrees

from five universities. He grew up in Long Beach, Calif., 

and attended public schools there. From 1953 to 1955, 

he served in the U.S. Navy. He is married to the former

Roberta Evans; they have two children.

166 Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System