IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-60080

Summary Calendar

INGRID RUIZ-LAJU,

Petitioner

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A205 730 265

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ingrid Ruiz-Laju, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions this court 

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing her 

appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(CAT). She contends that the BIA erred in concluding that she had failed to 

show that she was a member of a particular social group, comprised of a subset 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 22, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-60080 Document: 00514358009 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/22/2018
No. 17-60080

2

of her nuclear family that was threatened by extortionists after her parents 

failed to pay the demanded money. The BIA acknowledged that a family unit 

could constitute a particular social group. However, the BIA concluded that 

Ruiz-Laju had not shown that she was targeted on account of her family 

membership but instead in an effort to compel her mother to pay. See RamirezMejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 492 (5th Cir. 2015).

In addition, Ruiz-Laju asserts that the BIA erred in concluding that she 

did not suffer persecution on a protected ground. This court has held that 

unfulfilled threats against an individual typically do not rise to the level of 

persecution. See Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2004). The 

BIA also noted that Ruiz-Laju was not entitled to relief because the threats 

arose from her parents’ failure to pay extortionists and this court had held that 

economic extortion does not rise to the level of persecution based on a protected 

ground. See Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 2014); CastilloEnriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d 667, 668 (5th Cir. 2012). Although Ruiz-Laju 

correctly notes that the extortionists did not demand payments from her 

personally, she has not shown that the record compels a contrary conclusion 

from that reached by the BIA. See Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 

2009).

Ruiz-Laju also challenges the BIA’s conclusion that she failed to 

establish a reasonable fear of future persecution because she was able to 

relocate within Guatemala. Because she did not establish past persecution, 

Ruiz-Laju was required to establish that internal relocation would not be 

reasonable. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i). She argues that because it was possible 

that the extortionists could find her family despite her parents’ move to a rural 

area, relocation was not feasible. The fact that her parents had not been 

harmed or targeted during the years since their move weighs against a finding 

 Case: 17-60080 Document: 00514358009 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/22/2018
No. 17-60080

3

of a reasonable fear of persecution. See Eduard, 379 F.3d at 193. She also 

maintains that relocation to the area where her parents now lived would not 

be reasonable because its rural nature would make it difficult for her to find a 

job commensurate with her advanced education, she may not receive adequate 

medical care if she became ill, and she would be limited socially. See

§ 1208.13(b)(3) (listing factors to consider in determining the reasonableness 

of relocation). Even if some of the pertinent factors weigh against relocation, 

she has not established that the record compels a conclusion that relocation 

would be improper, given that her parents have not been harmed and RuizLaju would have the support of her family. See id.; Wang, 569 F.3d at 537.

In her final ground for relief, Ruiz-Laju maintains that the BIA wrongly 

found that she was not entitled to withholding of removal. Because she “has 

failed to establish the less stringent ‘well-founded fear’ standard of proof for 

asylum relief,” Ruiz-Laju is “necessarily also unable to establish an 

entitlement to withholding of removal.” Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 658-59 

(5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ruiz-Laju has 

not challenged the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, and any such claim is deemed 

abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, Ruiz-Laju’s petition for review is DENIED.

 Case: 17-60080 Document: 00514358009 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/22/2018