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79–885 PDF 2003

S. Hrg. 107–467

CIA NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THROUGH 2015

HEARING

BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND

FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 11, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

RICHARD A. HERTLING, Minority Staff Director

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director

MITCHEL B. KUGLER, Minority Staff Director

BRIAN D. RUBENS, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1

Senator Collings ............................................................................................... 2

Senator Cochran ............................................................................................... 10

Senator Domenici ............................................................................................. 15

WITNESS

MONDAY, MARCH 11, 2002

Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency ................ 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

APPENDIX

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,

Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate .................................................. 39

(1)

CIA NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF

FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THROUGH

2015

MONDAY, MARCH 11, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION,

AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:37 p.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka, Cochran, Collins, and Domenici.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I

want to welcome all of you to our hearing today on the intelligence

community’s assessment of foreign missile threats to the United

States.

I would like to thank Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs at the National Intelligence

Council, for being with us today. His report describes the threat

posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. It examines when a country

could deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile based on technical, industrial, and economic capabilities, as well as when they

are likely to do so based on potential technical problems, political

developments, and economic delays.

We last held a Subcommittee hearing on the National Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threats in February 2000. At

that time, senior North Korean official were preparing to come to

Washington to discuss the missile moratorium. In May 2001, North

Korea extended their voluntary flight test moratorium until 2003,

provided negotiations with the United States proceeded. But negotiations have not proceeded. Relations with North Korea have

soured. A key question for this hearing is the current status of

North Korea’s missile program.

There are some notable differences between this report and the

one discussed at our February 2000 meeting. The previous report

listed Russia as the chief threat. An increase in the danger of an

attack by North Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq, as well as the intelligence community’s unanimous assessment that the Russian arseVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:50 Jan 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 79885.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
2

nal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by the year 2015, have

reduced the threat assessment from Russia. In fact, the report

states that the threats to the U.S. homeland will come from dramatically fewer warheads than today owing to significant reductions in Russian strategic forces.

The estimate also emphasizes the threat from non-missile delivery means for WMD, especially from terrorist groups. While emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the risks to U.S.

forces, interests, and allies throughout the world, the intelligence

community judges that the U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with WMD using non-missile means.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 have demonstrated that

our enemies can strike American soil directly without having to put

the time and money into a ballistic missile with a return address.

I am concerned about this growing interest by rogue nations and

terrorist groups in unmanned aerial vehicles. During our Subcommittee hearing earlier this month on Iraq’s WMD programs,

our witnesses described how Iraq is adapting trainer aircraft and

specially modified spray tanks that could be used in a biological

weapon attack. This information is quite chilling.

We all fear the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass

destruction, but our policy cannot be one of constructing moats

against imagined threats. We must have a policy that counters real

threats in an effective and cost efficient manner. Some of these

dangers may, in the medium- to long-term, come from intercontinental ballistic missiles.

At this time, I would like to call on my colleague, Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want

to thank you for your leadership and that of Senator Cochran in

this very important area. It is of utmost importance for this Subcommittee to continue to examine responsible methods for protecting against the threat of foreign missiles. Today’s hearing will

contribute substantially to our growing understanding of the threat

and assist us in developing appropriate policy responses.

I would note, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is particularly appropriate that you are holding this hearing exactly 6 months after the

terrorist attack on our Nation. I do not think any of doubt that had

Osama bin Laden had access to the kinds of missiles that we are

discussing today that he would have hesitated in any way to use

them.

The magnitude of the threat is extraordinary and it is growing.

As the estimate notes, because of reductions in Russia, the raw

number of ballistic missiles that threaten our homeland will likely

decrease substantially. The number of nations and non-state actors

posing a threat, however, will likely increase. For example, North

Korea’s multiple-stage Taepo Dong missile, which is capable of

reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-size

payload, may be ready for flight testing.

Looking more broadly, most intelligence community agencies

project that before the year 2015, the United States most likely will

face intercontinental ballistic missile threats from North Korea,

3

1The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole appears in the Appendix on page 29.

2 ‘‘Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Trheat Through 2015,’’ summary of

a National Intelligence Estimate, appears in the Appendix on page 39.

Iran, and possibly from Iraq, barring significant changes in their

political orientations, in addition to the longstanding missile forces

of Russia and China. And while the number of Russian missiles

will likely decline, the intelligence community projects that Chinese

ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by the year 2015.

Moreover, these are not the only nations that pose threats. Iran

is pursuing long-range missile capabilities and Iraq wants a longrange missile and all agencies agree that Iraq could test different

long-range concepts before 2015 if U.N. sanctions were lifted.

Non-state actors also pose threats. According to the estimate, terrorist groups continue to express interest in obtaining chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and the means to deliver

them. Threats to our homeland are also posed by short-range missiles launched from forward-based ships or other platforms, and according to the estimate, some countries are likely to develop such

mechanisms before 2015.

In light of these very real and growing threats, I look forward to

hearing Mr. Walpole’s testimony, and again, I appreciate your convening this hearing.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, for your

comments and statement.

I welcome our witness to today’s hearing and look forward to an

interesting discussion later. At this time, I would welcome any

opening statement or comments you may have, Mr. Walpole.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT WALPOLE,1 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WALPOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, for

the opportunity to be able to testify before your Subcommittee on

the missile threats to the United States and its interests.

The ballistic missile remains a central element in the military

arsenals of nations around the globe and will retain this status for

at least the next 15 years. States willingly devote often scarce resources to develop or acquire ballistic missiles, build infrastructures to sustain development and production, and actively pursue

technologies, materials, personnel on the world market to compensate for domestic shortfalls, gain expertise, and speed development.

As you know, the SSCI requires that the intelligence community

produce annual reports on the missile threat. These reports are

also required to include a discussion of non-missile threats, as well.

Our most recent report was published in December of last year as

a National Intelligence Estimate, or what we call an NIE. My testimony today is drawn from the unclassified summary of that NIE.

In the interest of time, I will limit my opening remarks but would

like to submit for the record my compete statement and a copy of

the National Intelligence Estimate.2

Senator AKAKA. The statement will be included in the record.

Mr. WALPOLE. The summary of that estimate. Thank you.

4

Our NIE describes missile developments and our projections, as

you noted, of possible and likely ballistic missile threats to the

United States, our interests overseas, and our military forces or allies through the year 2015. It discusses the evolving proliferation

environment and provides a summary of forward-based threats and

cruise missiles.

To address the uncertainties associated with this work, particularly projecting out 15 years, we assess both the earliest date that

countries could test various missiles, based largely on engineering

judgments made by experts inside and outside the intelligence community, on the technical capabilities and resources of the countries

in question, and in many cases, on continuing foreign assistance.

We also assess when the countries are likely to test such missiles,

factoring into the earlier assessments potential delays caused by

technical, political, or economic hurdles.

I want to underscore that we judge that the countries are much

less likely to test by the hypothetical ‘‘could’’ dates than they are

by the projected ‘‘likely’’ dates.

Now, with that as a backdrop, I would note that most U.S. intelligence community agencies project that during the next 15 years,

the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North

Korea and Iran and possibly Iraq. Of course, that is in addition to

the strategic forces of Russia and China. One agency assesses that

the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015. That is different than the earlier estimate, where it was

unanimous.

I would underscore that short- and medium-range ballistic missiles already pose a significant threat overseas to U.S. interests,

military forces, and allies. Emerging ballistic missiles continue to

increase the range—reliability—I am sorry. Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy

of their missiles, posing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests,

and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, the Scud was the

emerging missile of concern. Today, it is the No Dong. During the

next few minutes, I will discuss the missiles of tomorrow.

The proliferation of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise, especially by Russian, Chinese, and North

Korea entities, has enabled emerging missile states to accelerate

missile development, gain new capabilities, and expand their capabilities to acquire longer-range systems. North Korea has assumed

the role as missile technology source for many. North Korean willingness to sell complete missile systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities much earlier.

The North has also helped countries to acquire technology to serve

as the basis for domestic development efforts. Meanwhile, Iran is

expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.

States with emerging missile programs inevitably will run into

problems that will delay their development programs. Most emerging missile states are highly dependent on foreign assistance, but

the ready availability of assistance from multiple sources makes it

likely that most emerging missile states will be able to resolve such

problems, albeit with a slippage in development time.

All this leads us to assess that the probability that a missile with

a weapon of mass destruction will be used against U.S. forces or

5

interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it

will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries

mature. More nations have ballistic missiles. They have already

used missiles against the U.S. forces and allied forces during the

Gulf War, although those missiles did not deliver weapons of mass

destruction, Iraq had weaponized ballistic missile warheads with

biological and chemical agents and they were available for use.

Moreover, some of the states armed with missiles have exhibited

a willingness to use chemical weapons with other delivery means.

In addition, some non-state entities are seeking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and would be willing to use

them without missiles. In fact, we assess that the U.S. territory is

more likely to be attacked with these materials from non-missile

delivery means, most likely from terrorists, than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means are less costly, easier to

acquire, more reliable and accurate. They can also be used without

attribution.

Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue to grow, in part because missiles become important regional weapons in the arsenals

of numerous countries. Moreover, missiles provide a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence than non-missile means. In

short, the intelligence community must work both threats. We do

not have the luxury of choosing to work one at the exclusion of the

other. Neither is a ‘‘no likelihood’’ situation.

Let me turn now to some of the countries with missile forces or

programs. First, Russia, which maintains the most comprehensive

ballistic missile force capable of reaching the United States, although force structure decisions resulting from resource problems,

program development failures, weapons system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and arms control treaties have resulted

in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear forces over the last

10 years. From approximately 10,000 warheads in 1990, Russia

now maintains fewer than 4,000 warheads on its ICBMs and

SLBMs.

In the current day-to-day operational environment, with all procedure and technical safeguards in place, an unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian strategic missile is highly unlikely. Russia faces ballistic missile program delays and the requirement to simultaneously extend the service lives of older systems while maintaining newer, more capable systems. Unless Moscow significantly

increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will

decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015, with or without arms

control. Nevertheless, Russia has the most technologically evolved

and best-equipped, maintained, and trained theater ballistic missile force in the world today, providing a rapid, precision-guided

theater deep-strike capability.

Let us look next at China. We project that Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015, but Beijing’s current

ICBM force, deployed primarily against the United States, will remain considerably smaller and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia or the United States. China’s current ICBM

force consists of large liquid propellant missiles armed with single

nuclear warheads. China also has a medium-range JL–1 submarine-launched ballistic missile.

6

Beijing is concerned about the survivability of its strategic deterrent of about 20 missiles against the United States and has a longrunning modernization program to develop mobile, solid propellant

ICBMs. We project that by 2015, most of China’s strategic missile

force will be mobile. China has three new mobile strategic missiles

in development, the road-mobile CSS–X–10, sometimes referred to

as the DF–31, which is being flight tested, a longer-range version

of the DF–31, and the JL–2 SLBM. This modernization effort,

which dates to the 1980’s, forms the foundation of Beijing’s efforts

to field a modern, mobile, and more survivable strategic missile

force. China could begin deploying the DF–31 ICBM during the

next few years and the DF–31 follow-on and the JL–2 SLBM in the

last half of the decade.

We have differing projections amongst analysts on the overall

size of the Chinese strategic ballistic missile force, deployed primarily against the United States, over the next 15 years, ranging

from about 75 to 100 warheads. Deployment of multiple reentry vehicles on missiles and missile defense countermeasures would be

factors in the ultimate size of that force. China has had the capability to develop and deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for

many years, including what we call multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs. We assess that China could develop a multiple RV system for the CSS–4 within a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and

SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be

costly.

On the theater front, China maintains a robust CSS–5 mediumrange ballistic missile force and continues to increase significantly

the capabilities of its short-range ballistic missile force, deployed

opposite Taiwan. Beijing’s growing SRBM force provides a military

capability that avoids the political and practical constraints associated with the use of nuclear armed missiles. That is because the

SRBM force is conventionally armed. We project an SRBM force in

2005 of several hundred of those missiles.

Now to North Korea, which has hundreds of Scuds and 1,300 kilometer-range No Dong missiles and continues to develop the

longer-range Taepo Dong–2 missile. In May 2001, as was already

noted, Kim Chong–il unilaterally extended the moratorium until

2003, but it is a flight test moratorium. It has not stopped development, and development continues. The multi-stage Taepo Dong–2,

which is capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear-size

payload, may be ready for flight testing. The North probably also

is working on improvements to that current design.

The Taepo Dong–2 in a two-stage configuration could deliver a

several hundred kilogram payload up to 10,000 kilometers, sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United

States. If the North uses a third stage, similar to the one used in

the Taepo Dong–1 launch of 1998, the Taepo Dong–2 could delivery

a several hundred kilogram payload up to 15,000 kilometers, which

is sufficient to strike all of North America.

The intelligence community judged in the mid-1990’s that North

Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. Since

then, the North has frozen plutonium production activities at

7

Yongbyon in accordance with the agreed framework of 1994. North

Korea also has chemical and biological weapons programs.

Let me turn now to Iran, which is pursuing short- and longrange missile capabilities. Iran’s missile inventory is among the

largest in the Middle East and includes a few hundred SRBMs,

some 1,300 kilometer range Shahab–3 MRBMs, and a variety of

unguided rockets. Tehran’s longstanding commitment to its ballistic missile programs for deterrence and war fighting is unlikely

to diminish.

Iran is likely to develop space launch vehicles to put satellites

into orbit and establish a technical base from which it could develop ICBMs or intermediate range ballistic missiles, capable of delivering nuclear weapons to Western Europe and the United States.

Iran certainly is aware of the North Korean space launch and missile program and the benefits Pyongyang has tried to gain from the

inherent ICBM capability posed by the Taepo Dong–1 and Taepo

Dong–2.

All intelligence community agencies agree that Iran could attempt to launch an ICBM about mid-decade, but believe Iran is

likely to take until the last half of the decade to do so. One agency

further judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve a successful test of

an ICBM before 2015.

Iranian acquisition of complete systems or major subsystems,

such as a North Korean Taepo Dong–2 or Russian engine, could accelerate this capability to flight test an ICBM. If Iran were to acquire complete Taepo Dong–2 systems from North Korea, it could

conduct a flight test within a year of delivery, allowing time for

them to build a launch facility. Iran is unlikely to acquire a complete ICBM or space launch vehicle from Russia.

Foreign assistance, particularly from Russia, China, and North

Korea, will remain critical to the success of Iranian missile program for the duration or estimate, which is 15 years. The intelligence community judges that Iran does not yet have a nuclear

weapon. Most agencies assess that Tehran could have one by the

end of the decade, although one agency judges it will take longer.

All agree that Iran could reduce this time frame by several years

with significant foreign assistance. Iran has biological and chemical

weapons programs.

Next, Iraq, which is constrained by international prohibitions but

probably retains a small covert force of Scud-variant missiles with

conventional chemical and biological warheads. Baghdad also

wants a long-range missile. Iraq’s goals of becoming the predominant regional power and its hostile relations with many of its

neighbors are the key drivers behind Iraq’s ballistic missile program. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had several programs to extend

the range of the Scud SRBM and became experienced working with

liquid propellant technology. Since the Gulf War, despite U.N. resolutions limiting the range of Iraq’s missiles to 150 kilometers,

Baghdad has been able to maintain the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop longer-range missile systems.

We cannot predict with confidence how long U.N.-related sanctions and prohibitions will remain in place. They plausibly will constrain Iraq during the 15-year period of our estimate. Scenarios

that would weaken those prohibitions several years from now are

8

also conceivable. They would allow Iraq to reconstitute its missile

infrastructure and begin developing the longer-range missiles before the end of the decade.

Should U.N. prohibitions be significantly weakened in the future,

Iraq probably would use the first several years to reestablish its

SRBM inventory to pre-Gulf War numbers and pursue mediumrange missiles to keep pace with its neighbors. Once its regional

security concerns are being addressed, Iraq may pursue a first generation ICBM or space launch vehicle. Initially, Iraq is likely to resume production of the pre-Gulf War 650-kilometer range Al Hussein, the 900-kilometer range Al Abbas, or other Scud variants, and

it could explore clustering and staging options to reach more distant targets.

Iraq could resume Scud-variant production with foreign assistance quickly after U.N. prohibitions ended. With substantial foreign assistance, Baghdad could flight test a domestic mediumrange ballistic missile by mid-decade. An imported medium-range

missile could be flight tested within months of acquisition.

After observing North Korean missile development for the past

few years, Iraq would be likely to pursue a three-stage Taepo

Dong–2 approach to an ICBM or space launch vehicle which would

be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-size payload to the

United States. If Iraq could buy a Taepo Dong–2 from North Korea,

it could have a launch capability within a year, again, time to build

a launch facility. It could develop and test a Taepo Dong–1 type

system within a few years. If it acquired no Dongs from North

Korea, it could test an ICBM within a few years of acquisition by

clustering and staging those motors. If Iraq bought Taepo Dong– 2 engines, it could test an ICBM within about 5 years. Iraq could

develop and test a Taepo Dong–2 system within about 10 years of

a decision to do so by itself. These are all presuming the U.N. prohibitions have weakened and been eliminated.

Most agencies believe that Iraq is unlikely to test before 2015

any ICBMs that could threaten the United States, even if U.N. prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced. Some believe if

prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years, Iraq would be

likely to test an ICBM, probably masked as a space launch vehicle,

before 2015, possibly before 2010 with significant foreign assistance. Iraq relied on foreign assistance before the Gulf War and will

continue to seek such assistance to expand its current capabilities.

Baghdad had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon for

missile delivery in 1990, but coalition bonding and IAEA and

UNSCOM activities significantly set back the effort. The intelligence community estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, would take

several years to produce enough fissile material to make a weapon.

Baghdad has admitted to having biological and chemical weapons

programs before the Gulf War. We believe Iraq maintains those

programs.

Now to Libya. The imposition of U.N. sanctions has impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer-range missile

programs. Nevertheless, Libya wants longer-range missiles, even

beyond the No Dong class medium-range missile. Tripoli would be

likely to continue to try for longer-range systems to increase the

number of U.S. and NATO targets it can hold at risk. If a missile

9

were offered with a range sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into

Europe, Libya would try to obtain it. Libya’s paths to obtaining an

ICBM during the 15-year period of our estimate probably would be

to purchase a complete missile system or to set up a foreign assistance arrangement wherein the scientists and technicians went to

Libya, developed the infrastructure, and developed the missile

right there.

Libya has biological and chemical weapons programs. Libya

would need significant foreign assistance to acquire a nuclear

weapon, but Tripoli’s nuclear infrastructure enhancements remain

a concern to us.

Let us look briefly at Syria, which maintains a ballistic missile

and rocket force of hundreds of Scud and SS–21 SRBMs and FROG

rockets. Syrian regional concerns may lead Damascus to seek a

longer-range ballistic missile capability, such as North Korea’s No

Dong medium-range missile. We judge that Syria does not now

have and is unlikely to gain an interest in an ICBM capability during the next 15 years. Foreign assistance will remain critical to

Syrian efforts to improve its production capabilities and to gain access to export controlled components and technology.

Syria has developed chemical warheads for its Scuds and has an

offensive biological weapons program. We remain concerned about

Syria’s intentions regarding nuclear weapons.

Let me turn briefly to India and Pakistan. New Delhi believes

that a nuclear-capable missile delivery option is necessary to deter

Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and thereby preserve the option to wage limited conventional war in response to a Pakistani

provocation in Kashmir or elsewhere. Nuclear weapons also serve

as a hedge against a confrontation with China. Growing experience

and an expanding infrastructure are providing India the means to

accelerate both development and production of new systems. India

continues to push towards self-sufficiency, especially in regard to

its missile program. Nevertheless, New Delhi still relies heavily on

foreign assistance.

Pakistan sees missile-delivered nuclear weapons as a vital deterrent to India’s much larger conventional forces and as a necessary

counter to India’s nuclear program. Since the 1980’s, Pakistan has

pursued development of an indigenous ballistic missile capability in

an attempt to avoid reliance on any foreign entity for this capability, although foreign support for Pakistan’s ambitious solid-propellant ballistic missile acquisition and development program has

been and remain critical.

Several countries are technically capable of developing a missile

launch mechanism to use from forward-based ships or other platforms to launch SRBMs and MRBMs or land attack cruise missiles

against the United States. Some of these are likely to develop and

deploy such systems in the next 15 years. Nevertheless, long-distance strikes against the United States probably would be operationally difficult.

An SRBM or MRBM could be launched at the United States from

a forward-based sea platform within a few hundred kilometers of

U.S. territory. Using such a sea platform would not pose a major

technical problem, but the accuracy of the missile probably would

be reduced significantly because of the movement of the ocean.

10

One to two dozen countries probably will possess land attack

cruise missile capabilities by the year 2015 via indigenous development, acquisition, or modification of other systems. Most of these

cruise missiles will have a range of only a few hundred kilometers,

again, sufficient to be used in a forward-deployed air or sea platform.

Non-missile means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, as

I noted earlier, do not provide the same degree of prestige, deterrence, or coercive diplomacy associated with ICBMs. Nevertheless,

concern remains about non-missile delivery means. Ships, trucks,

airplanes, and other means may be used. In fact, as noted earlier,

the intelligence community judges that U.S. territory is more likely

to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction using non-missile

delivery means primarily because such means are less expensive

than developing and producing ICBMs, can be covertly developed

and employed to evade retaliation, probably would be more reliable, accurate, and more effective for disseminating biological agent

than ICBMs, and would avoid missile defenses.

Foreign non-state actors, including terrorists, insurgent or extremist used, have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. Most of

these groups have threatened the United States and all of them

have the ability to attack the United States or its interests. The

events of September 11 and its aftermath have caused the intelligence community to focus significantly more resources on the

threat from terrorism and we are obtaining more information on

potential terrorist actions.

Let me close my opening remarks with that and take any questions you have.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement.

At this time, I would like to ask my colleague, Senator Cochran,

for any comments or statements he may have.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CIA estimate

in Mr. Walpole’s statement, I think is a very timely reminder that

even as we fight terrorism, the threat of ballistic missile attack

against our Nation continues to grow. The new estimate, as you describe, suggests that the threat has in some ways worsened in the

2 years since the last estimate was issued. This is very troubling.

In the portion of my opportunity to ask questions, I will explore

some of these changes, but I think it is significant to note that instead of getting better, the situation is getting worse.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Cochran.

I want to thank our witness for his statement and would like to

proceed with some questions.

Experts say that to be effective, missile defense needs an accurate assessment of missile and countermeasures capabilities. The

National Intelligence Estimate states that North Korea is nearly

self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles. Do you

have any intelligence on North Korea’s countermeasure technology?

11

Mr. WALPOLE. Since this is an open session, I do not want to

walk through what intelligence we have on specific countries on

that because of how important it is to ballistic missile defense.

But I do want to note that countermeasures are just that. They

are counter to something else. So at this point, countries do not

have to commit themselves to specific countermeasures they will

employ. Until they see what system the United States would deploy as a missile defense, they have the luxury at this point of pursuing multiple types of countermeasure options and we have assessed and said in unclassified fora before that countries like China

and Russia that have countermeasure technologies probably would

be willing to sell some of those technologies to others.

Senator AKAKA. Some have argued that countermeasures produced by emerging missile states will be crude and, therefore, not

as much a concern as countermeasures deployed by Russia or

China. Have you seen any activity on the part of Russia and China,

as well as emerging missile states, to acquire more advanced countermeasures? Are Russia and China exporting countermeasure

technologies?

Mr. WALPOLE. Numerous countries have been looking at various

options for dealing with missile defense, whether it is a theater

missile defense or a national missile defense. And, of course, ways

to deal with that—one simple way to deal with that is simply deploy more missiles. Make sure you have more missiles deployed

than the other side has defense deployed.

But in addition to that, they have looked at other means for deploying those. Those means include such ideas as decoys or using

jammers or making the systems more accurate, other type of evasion technologies. Again, I do not want to get into specifics country

by country in an open forum, but countries are looking at that and

we are working with Department of Defense with letting them

know what we are seeing specifically so they can plan for that.

Senator AKAKA. The 1998 North Korean rocket launch was later

determined to be a space launched vehicle and a failed attempt to

put an object in orbit. Do you believe North Korea’s program has

advanced sufficiently that it could orbit a satellite, and if so, how

could this be accomplished without operational tests?

Mr. WALPOLE. You are correct. You are completely accurate in

saying that we later discovered it was a space launch vehicle. We

had expected a missile launch. We had expected a two-stage missile

launch for the Taepo Dong–1. We had been following that program

for some time and it went off. We thought something went wrong,

we could not figure out what, and it took us a while to sort out

what was happening. Meanwhile, North Korea announced they had

put a satellite in orbit. Well, that made us relook at the data to

figure out what it was we had missed.

I point that out and go over that painful memory of what had

happened just to show that we are getting a little insight into these

programs and we have to make projections as to where they are

going. But it also underscores there is very little difference between

a space launch vehicle and a missile. The difference is, you put a

satellite up with a space launch vehicle and you attack somebody

with a missile. Otherwise, the booster is identical, and so we could

not discern it immediately.

12

It also underscores that we did not know about the existence of

the third stage until that launch. So when you ask me a question,

could North Korea have progressed from 1998, 4 years later, 31⁄2

years later, to where we are now, to where they can put a satellite

into orbit, my answer would have to be yes on the ‘‘could’’ front and

even on the ‘‘likely’’ front would have to be yes. Since we did not

see that third stage until it was flown and it almost put the satellite into orbit even then, it would be hard for me to argue that

the probability, the likelihood of success is slim. I think the likelihood of success would be much higher now.

Senator AKAKA. Iraq continues to work on converting L–29 jet

trainer aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles. These refurbished aircraft are believed to have been modified to deliver chemical or biological weapons. Will future estimates be expanded to include unmanned aerial vehicles?

Mr. WALPOLE. There are actually two estimates at play and we

are looking at a way to either merge them or link them better.

Mine is the ballistic missile estimate and we mentioned a few comments about cruise missiles. The National Intelligence Officer for

Conventional Military Issues, General John Landry, does the cruise

missile estimate and he would look at that. But I think next year’s

ballistic missile NIE will even have more of that in it, but that type

of issue is definitely being looked at.

Senator AKAKA. Ballistic missiles receive top priority because

they are already widely available, while land attack cruise missiles

have only begun to emerge as a threat. Have you seen an increase

in the number of states interested in cruise missiles?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes, it is fair to say that we have. Part of the reason for the continued interest in ballistic missiles is the range. In

order to reach the United States, Iran and Iraq would need 10,000-

kilometer range, 9,000, 10,000 kilometers. That is a pretty hefty

cruise missile and a ballistic missile is going to be easier for that.

No one has really deployed a 10,000-kilometer range cruise missile

before. It is doable. The United States can certainly create something like that if it wanted. That is why you are going to see continued interest in ballistic missiles. That said, cruise missiles, particularly given yourself several hundred kilometer range, is an alternative that countries are looking at.

Senator AKAKA. What is the likelihood of terrorists acquiring ballistic missiles with the intent of using them against the United

States?

Mr. WALPOLE. That one is hard to calculate the likelihood on, in

large part because the infrastructure required to launch a ballistic

missile generally implies nation state. So if you are talking about

a terrorist that is supported by a nation state, then acquisition—

it may not even be the right word. You are still talking about the

nation state itself.

If you are talking about a terrorist group that is not getting nation state support, then they would need somewhere to either develop or store the missile and then some platform. Even if the platform is a Scud on a Scud launcher, putting it on a surface ship and

bringing it to the United States, that still requires some steps

along the way. It is not the same as getting a shoulder-launched

missile you could then try to shoot an aircraft down with.

13

Senator AKAKA. I will yield to my friend, Senator Cochran, for

any of his questions.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the significant differences between this estimate that you

described today and the one previously described 2 years ago is the

way you word the description of the threat from Iran. The previous

estimate in 1999 said that we would face ICBM threats most likely

from North Korea and probably from Iran, but now the estimate

says we will most likely face ICBM threats from North Korea and

Iran. Could you explain why that has changed and what significance does that wording change have?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. It is significant. Before, we had, let us call

it three tiers, we had most likely North Korea, probably Iran, possibly Iraq. What has happened is Iran has moved up with North

Korea. There is most likely North Korea and Iran. Iraq is still possibly. There is nobody in the ‘‘probably’’ category, which is fine. The

significance is, Iran has moved up. I would rather not go into the

details for our moving it up in an open session, but simply say that

our concerns about Iran pursuing an ICBM have gone up enough

to move that.

Senator COCHRAN. One other significant change that we have

noted is in connection with the range of the North Korean missile

capability. The 1999 estimate suggested that the Taepo Dong–2,

the two-stage missile, was capable of delivering a large payload to

Alaska and Hawaii, which is a range from 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers. Now, that missile is assessed at having a 10,000-kilometer

range with the same size payload, which would not only put them

in position to strike Alaska and Hawaii, but much of the Western

United States. Is that, in your estimate, a significant change?

Mr. WALPOLE. That is significant, as well, and that takes into account—as I said before, even though a flight test moratorium is in

place, development moratorium is not, and so it takes account for

different things they could do to structure, materials, and even

payload lightening to give it an increased range for the system.

Senator COCHRAN. Is this change in your assessment the result

of things that North Korea has done to improve its missile or because you have a better understanding of the performance of the

missile?

Mr. WALPOLE. I know the answer to that. I am trying to think

of what to do in open session. Let us just say both.

Senator COCHRAN. In assessing the Taepo Dong–2, if Iran were

to acquire that missile, would it be able to strike the United States

with a nuclear weapon-size payload? How does this change the new

assessment of Iran’s ability, if any to strike the United States if it

were to acquire a Taepo Dong–2?

Mr. WALPOLE. Definitely with a three-stage, it could strike the

United States, maybe with a two-stage. I do not know if I mentioned it to the Subcommittee 2 years ago, but North Korea has the

advantage—I mean, we all know the earth rotates, but because of

the rotation of the earth, North Korea is launching in a direction

that they get the benefit of that rotation to strike the United

States. Iran would be launching over the pole and they do not get

that benefit. So a 10,000-kilometer range missile would go—it almost sounds silly, but it would go longer launched from North

14

Korea to the United States than it would from Iran, but I think

it would still be able to reach parts of the United States.

Senator COCHRAN. You mentioned that North Korea continues to

develop technologies and capabilities in this ballistic missile area

even though they have not had flight tests. They have adhered to,

I suppose, according to your estimate, the moratorium that they

announced?

Mr. WALPOLE. For the flight test, yes.

Senator COCHRAN. For the flight testing. But are they likely to

conduct other tests that could improve the reliability of their missiles without flight testing?

Mr. WALPOLE. Oh, I would expect so, yes.

Senator COCHRAN. So there is no moratorium on improving the

technologies or enhancing the performance capabilities of the missiles they have without flight testing?

Mr. WALPOLE. No moratorium and we expect they are doing just

that.

Senator COCHRAN. Is the North Korean missile program more advanced today than it was 2 years ago when you testified before our

Subcommittee?

Mr. WALPOLE. I would say so, yes.

Senator COCHRAN. Could you spell out ways that it is different

or has been improved?

Mr. WALPOLE. Not any more than I have already done, again, in

open session.

Senator COCHRAN. OK. There has been some discussion about delivering weapons of mass destruction using non-missile delivery

means, such as truck bombs. People say that is more likely than

the development and use of a ballistic missile for that purpose, and

that is in your estimate, as a matter of fact. Does this mean we

should not be concerned with your assessment that the capabilities

continue to grow in these states that do have ballistic missiles, of

using the missile, the capability of using the missile to deliver

weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. WALPOLE. No. In fact, as I said, we feel that we have to work

both. Neither is a ‘‘no likelihood’’ situation, and we have got to

cover both threats.

Senator COCHRAN. If these other ways of delivering a weapon of

mass destruction are easier to build and may be less costly, why

would the nations who do have ballistic missiles continue to spend

resources and efforts to develop longer-range ballistic missiles?

Mr. WALPOLE. The non-missile delivery means do not provide the

prestige, coercive diplomacy, deterrence that the long-range missile

does. You can let people know you have it or hint that you have

it with the space launch capability and you have gained that. The

non-missile means are primarily terrorist-type weapons. You have

to surprise somebody by using it. If you surprise the United States

and say, ‘‘We have got a ship right out there that has got a Scud

pointed at you,’’ I would hope that we would do something about

it pretty quickly. It is a different type of threat. In fact, ‘‘threat’’ is not even the right word. It is more like just a use situation. That

is why the nation states go after the missiles.

Senator COCHRAN. Is it a part of your estimate, then, that nation

states like North Korea and Iran will continue these programs,

15

they will not abandon these ballistic missile programs and their efforts to increase the range and even the lethality of their weapons

of mass destruction?

Mr. WALPOLE. Not only do we not see them abandoning those, we

project that they will not abandon those.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.

I would like to yield to Senator Domenici for any statement or

any questions you may have.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran,

it is good to see you this afternoon.

Have there been questions on Iran and Iran’s contribution in this

area already? I do not want to repeat them.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. We are completing the first questioning

round.

Senator DOMENICI. No, I mean, did somebody ask questions

about Iran’s participation in this area?

Senator COCHRAN. One small question.

Senator DOMENICI. There was a two-part article in the Washington Post that suggested that Iran—they have a drive to obtain

long-range missile capability. This article said that drive and what

they had accomplished was overstated. It cited interviews with

Russian missile technicians who had been in Iran and described

their missile program as modest, at best. This has been echoed by

some U.S. experts who say that the Russian assistance is only at

the basic research level and that Iranian capability has been overestimated by our intelligence and the intelligence community. It

concluded that Iran may be shifting its emphasis away from longrange missiles to short-range solid-fuel missiles to use against regional threats, Israel, U.S. forces, and the like.

It is pretty obvious to me that their intentions are pretty murky,

not clearly defined, but let me just ask, as you know, there have

been defense experts in this country that dispute this estimate

finding concerning the capabilities of Iran. They say Russia’s assistance to Iran in the area of technology in missiles is low-level,

at best, and that the Iranian program is highly disorganized, as I

indicated. Can you give us a sense of the voracity of these reports,

that is, on the level of Russia’s assistance to Iran as well as the

state and focus of the Iranian program?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. First, I do not know which Russian experts

are talking now, but I had some tell me in mid-1998, right after

we had done the March 1998 missile report, that we were overestimating Iran’s and North Korea’s capabilities. Of course, then in

August 1998, North Korea almost gets a satellite into orbit. So the

next time I met with those experts, I said, the Taepo Dong–1

moved the North Korean threat from hypothetical to real, because

they were telling me before that all I was doing was talking about

hypothetical, what could happen. Well, when North Korea did that,

it became reality.

So I guess I would say they tend to underestimate both what

North Korea and Iran could do and I am not surprised there.

16

Second, I do not think Russia is going to want to tell us the extent of their assistance with Iran because they do not want us to

know. That is disconcerting on both fronts, both because of what

Iran is getting and what Russia is doing, or at least Russian entities.

And the third point is one that we did discuss before. Without

getting into details, the intelligence was sufficient this year in the

estimate that we moved Iran in the hierarchy. Two years ago, we

said, most likely North Korea, probably Iran, possibly Iraq for an

ICBM threat to the United States. Now, we have moved Iran up

with North Korea and say most likely North Korea and Iran, possibly Iraq, and I told Senator Cochran that I could not give the details in an open session, but it was sufficient for us as a community

to say that Iran has moved up.

And even the agency that took the alternative view is not viewing that Iran has not moved up in concern. They are just saying

they do not think they will be successful. So I think that the experts that are looking at this are not looking at everything I am

looking at.

Senator DOMENICI. Of the countries that have this capability,

which ones are disseminating the most anti-ballistic missile technology from themselves to others? Who are the leaders in transferring? Is Russia one of them?

Mr. WALPOLE. Transferring, you mean helping counter measures?

Senator DOMENICI. Helping another country enhance its capability.

Mr. WALPOLE. Oh, its ballistic missile capability?

Senator DOMENICI. Yes.

Mr. WALPOLE. I do not know where—we rank three right up at

the top, and it is Russia, China, and North Korea. I have not tried,

and I am not sure that we have tried to pick one out because they

have different clients, there are different ways they go about it and

different things they are helping with. I would rather just keep all

three right there of top concern.

Senator DOMENICI. Without going too far afield, and just asking

this one question in this regard, it is being said that the risk to

the United States is far greater from somebody carrying in a missile of mass destruction or driving it in or bringing it over on a boat

or assembling it here, one of the three. Which is easier for the intelligence community to detect, the evolution of an interballistic

missile system that can carry weapons of mass destruction or the

technology and activities that would lead to a portable weapon of

mass destruction?

Mr. WALPOLE. Oh, the development of ballistic missile capability

would be, by far, easier to follow——

Senator DOMENICI. And the development of nuclear weapons in

any traditional sense would be easier than those that are mobile,

that you carry around, is that correct?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Senator DOMENICI. So in our homeland defense, we have a more

difficult job, of homeland defense versus the potential for a weapon

of mass destruction here, our job is more difficult versus the carryVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:50 Jan 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 79885.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
17

on mobile type than it is from countries that might have a missile

that could deliver the weapon here.

Mr. WALPOLE. Oh, yes, and for these types of weapons, whether

it is just manufacturing the weapon here in the United States and

putting it in a water supply or something, I mean, those are the

types of scenarios we are looking at and those are very hard for intelligence to track, whether it is domestic intelligence, FBI doing

it, or whether we are trying to do it overseas.

Senator DOMENICI. Over the years, in speaking with the national

laboratories experts at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Livermore, they always were of the impression that we could do more to put ourselves

in a position of being able to discern activities in the weapons of

mass destruction area and that they thought there were some

things we could do even homeland-wise with reference to mobile activities that we were not doing.

Are you familiar with what they are talking about and what

things we might be doing in our homeland defense in that regard

versus what we are doing now?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. I do not know exactly what they would be

talking about today, other than I know on the nuclear front, which

is where I work, mostly the nuclear missile side in terms of sensors

and things like that. I am sure they are thinking the same situation on biological and chemical. Even post-use, the capability to

identify exactly what the agent was or whether there was an agent

there, you would not want to have an incident occur that you

thought was simply a conventional explosive and then find out 4

days later that it released something and people were starting to

get sick. So you want to have those kind of detection capabilities.

If that is what they are referring to, I am familiar with that, but

it could be much more than that that they are thinking of.

Senator DOMENICI. I thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.

Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Walpole, our forward-deployed forces and

overseas interests face threats from both short- and medium-range

ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Which do you believe is the

greater threat today?

Mr. WALPOLE. What are the two that I am comparing, the forward-based threats—— Senator AKAKA. The medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise

missiles.

Mr. WALPOLE. Oh, ballistic versus cruise?

Senator AKAKA. Yes.

Mr. WALPOLE. Well, there are more ballistic missiles, so I guess

I would have to throw in with the ballistic missiles. But I want to

qualify the answer a little bit in that when we are talking about

short-range missile use, whether it is cruise missile or ballistic missile within their own region, these countries develop these for warfighting purposes. They plan on using them. They are almost an

extension of artillery, whether it is a cruise missile or a ballistic

missile. So the likelihood of use in a conflict is higher than a missile they would develop for deterrence or coercive diplomacy purposes.

North Korea would be more likely to launch a short-range system

in a conflict, I would think, than it would to be launching an ICBM

18

against the United States, particularly if the short-range system

was conventionally armed. It would be a conventional conflict,

where the long-range missile would probably be nuclear. You just

crossed a lot of thresholds, and so that kind of factors into that

likelihood there.

But the short-range systems are a system developed for use

where the longer-range systems are systems developed for a threat.

Does that make sense? You get the coercive diplomacy out of one

and you have the war-fighting capability out of the other. Now, if

there is a major conflict and the country is going down the tubes

fast, those lines all of a sudden blur. Does that help with that question?

Senator AKAKA. Yes.

Mr. WALPOLE. OK.

Senator AKAKA. One agency participating in the estimate judges

that Iran is unlikely to achieve a successful test of an ICBM before

the year 2015. Does this agency base its conclusion on technical capabilities or political conditions?

Mr. WALPOLE. It is both. We all have to look at the track record

and then try to forecast where that track record will go. That includes foreign assistance and so on, and difficulty getting foreign

assistance and what it translates to. Most of the agencies have

looked at that and said, yes, they are moving down this path and

this is about when we see that they will be flight testing this system, and even given a couple of failures, we expect there to be

something to happen about this time frame. The other agency

looked at it and said, no, they are going to have more failures than

that along the way and we think it is going to be longer. That is

really what it comes down to. But both are looking at technical and

political factors.

Senator AKAKA. The National Intelligence Estimate states that

Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology. To whom are

they trying to sell missile technology and have you identified the

next generation missile states?

Mr. WALPOLE. I do not want to do that in open session. We almost—we had to work real hard even to get that line in the unclassified piece because we were worried about that. We thought, no,

we ought to be able to say this much, but that is about as far as

we can go.

Senator AKAKA. The estimate uses space launch vehicle programs

as an indication of an increased ICBM threat. While I appreciate

that much of the technology is the same, is there a documented

case of a Nation converting a space launch vehicle system to an

ICBM?

Mr. WALPOLE. It has probably, generally, been the other way

around, but that does not undermine the judgment any. The Chinese CSS–4 ICBM, the ICBM that I talked about that they could

put multiple RVs on top of, that they have about 20 of, that booster

is the same as the Long March–3, the mainstay of their space program. Our Titan ICBM was not a whole lot different than our

Titan space launch vehicle.

When we did the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union

and then Russia, we were both looking at options to, rather than

waste ICBMs, converting them for space launch purposes. That is

19

because we all recognize that the booster is basically the same. The

conversion is not even so much the issue.

That said, we look at these issues, and part of it is in terms of

hostile intent. Japan has a space launch vehicle, but you do not see

our estimate talking about a Japanese ICBM. The reason is obvious. India, even though we talk about India and Pakistan’s missile

forces, India has an ICBM—a space launch vehicle that could be

flown on an ICBM trajectory if they wanted. It would be really big

and would not work the way we would want an ICBM to work, but

it could do that. We do not include that in here because of the intent situation.

So a country that has space launch capabilities has an inherent

ICBM capability, but we factor hostile intent into our—or just hostile feelings, anyway, into our assessments. But rest assured that

the boosters for space launch vehicles and ICBMs are so close to

identical that if you see a country with hostile intent developing a

space launch vehicle, you had better be worried.

Senator AKAKA. Did your assessment consider whether or not

Russia might choose to maintain their nuclear weapon production

capability or to include multiple reentry vehicle warheads to keep

up with the sizable responsive force proposed by the administration

in its recent nuclear posture review?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. We factored all of that in and we are still getting them coming down. That is why I say with or without arms

control.

Senator AKAKA. Missiles are just a delivery mechanism. So the

threats we face are not due to missiles, but from the payloads they

carry. What we need to address is the WMD threat. How have our

nonproliferation and assistance programs to the former Soviet

Union factored into your threat assessment?

Mr. WALPOLE. Nonproliferation programs to the former Soviet

Union?

Senator AKAKA. Yes, nonproliferation and assistance programs to

the former Soviet Union. How did that factor—— Mr. WALPOLE. You mean keeping Russian fissile materials secure

and things like that, or—I mean, it all factored in, yes.

Senator AKAKA. And their assistance programs, and how did that

factor into your threat assessment?

Mr. WALPOLE. As far as controlling fissile material, or their nuclear warheads, for that matter, it factors in our calculations for

how quickly countries could get a nuclear weapon. As far as nonproliferation efforts to try to convince Russia not to help some of

these other countries, the best case is Iran, where, again, Russia

does not want us to know how much they are helping Iran, but

they are helping Iran more than Russia is willing to admit. Obviously, that factors in, as well, because we are seeing this foreign

assistance continue and we track that out for our projections 15

years.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I will yield to Senator Cochran for

any questions.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, on that subject, it is perplexing when you discuss this issue with the Russians. You come

away with a realization that they want us to believe that there is

no official approval or participation, that there is no state program

20

of assistance to Iran. But they know there are people, or other entities, and you used the phrase ‘‘entities’’ a while ago, that are based

in Russia or that are from Russia that are involved, clearly, in assisting in the missile development programs and maybe weapons of

mass destruction development programs.

To what extent does your estimate try to point out the difference,

if there is a difference? And if there is a difference, does it matter

if it is an officially endorsed or sanctioned program or if it is one

that just involves other entities that are based in Russia? Does it

make any difference?

Mr. WALPOLE. Generally, it does not make a difference for the

threat assessment whether it is a Russian entity or Russia officially, or Chinese entity or China officially. I say ‘‘generally’’ because you might get better assistance from some official sources because you are going to get, perhaps, access to others. But generally,

it is not.

We do not really go into a big distinction there. I used the word ‘‘entity’’ in the estimate because that is what we are getting from

the nonproliferation experts. In fact, I have used the word ‘‘entity’’ more the last several years in these type of estimates than I have

ever used in any other job before.

There are experts that are trying to look at that specific problem

for Russia, for China, for North Korea, for that matter, and that

is in the WINPAC, the Weapons Intelligence Proliferation and

Arms Control Center that was organized a little over a year ago to

try to sort out what tools could help slow or stop the proliferation.

There, it makes a difference if it is just an entity, as opposed to

official, how you go about getting it stopped. But for the threat estimate, it is not a big difference.

Senator COCHRAN. You were talking a while ago about the value

of a long-range missile capability in terms of the threat, in terms

of the coercive nature of that power. In that connection, is it necessary for a country to actually threaten us in order for the capability to be valuable to them as a matter of national policy or influence? Do they have to actually threathen us or is just the existence

of the capability the threat?

Mr. WALPOLE. A couple of answers to that. Secretary Rumsfeld,

while he was chairman of the Rumsfeld Commission, had pointed

out that had Iraq had either an IRBM capable of striking Europe,

London, or an ICBM capable of striking the United States prior to

the Gulf War, how would votes on the Hill had gone? How would

public support have gone? Even if Iraq had not done any overt

threat, the mere existence of that system could have changed people’s feelings, the first point that I make.

The second one is, look at how much mileage North Korea has

gotten out of a failed Taepo Dong–1 launch and an unflown Taepo

Dong–2 system. Now, I am one of the players in this because I

have to write intelligence assessments on what this thing is capable of doing. They have not had to threaten anybody with it. They

still claim it is a space launch vehicle.

I mean, the answer to your question, I think, is built in both of

those situations. That is why we lay out in our estimate both what

could happen and what we judge is likely to happen, because I cannot—we were surprised by the third stage. I do not want to be surVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:50 Jan 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 79885.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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prised again, but I do not want to have readers think that our

‘‘coulds’’ are the only judgments we have. I think that would be

wrong if all we published was the ‘‘could’’ judgments. We have to

publish our best estimates, but we have to tell you, we might be

wrong in that and this thing could go faster and this is where it

could fall.

Senator COCHRAN. In comparing the value of a long-range missile

threat with a more primitive way of delivering a weapon of mass

destruction, do you think North Korea could have achieved the

same benefits if it had developed a non-missile means of delivering

its nuclear weapons, if it has nuclear weapons?

Mr. WALPOLE. Only if—yes. If you do not know about it, you cannot feel threatened by it. So if they developed a non-missile delivery means, they would have to have somehow let the world know

they have it so that you could feel threatened by it, and it would

have to be secure enough that you could not eliminate it.

All of it depends on intent. If your intent is simply to kill a lot

of people, there are easier ways to do that than a ballistic missile.

If your intent is to hold a policy or a doctrine or a group of people

hostage to a potential strike, then the missile has some value that

the other does not.

Senator COCHRAN. One of the changes in the estimate this year

from 2 years ago suggests that proliferation has increased between

these two dates, and there is more foreign assistance flowing to the

countries that are trying to improve their capabilities. So the estimate concludes that a substantial decrease in assistance would

delay an Iranian ICBM program, for example.

Has there been any change in terms of halting or slowing down

or reducing foreign assistance to Iran in the last 2 years?

Mr. WALPOLE. I do not think so. What has changed significantly

in this is that you are now getting the second tier proliferators,

North Korea stepping out as a proliferator, Iran stepping out as a

proliferator, so that all of our efforts to try to get, first our allies,

then Russia and China to back off, we are now having the next tier

come along and unsharing.

Senator COCHRAN. It is kind of like the cat is out of the bag sort

of thing, or is that an analogy?

Mr. WALPOLE. That is how some people would put it.

Senator COCHRAN. But even if this assistance were halted today,

do you think Iran would still be able to develop an ICBM?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes, it would just take a lot longer.

Senator COCHRAN. Do you want to tell us how much longer? Is

that something you can tell us?

Mr. WALPOLE. It is hard for me to even think hypothetically that

all of it stops, because I guess I do not see that happening. I get

asked that sometimes and I struggle with it because it is hard for

me to fathom. But let us just assume that all of it stops completely.

I think you are pushed into the next decade and perhaps well into

the next decade.

Senator COCHRAN. There appears to be a difference of opinion

within the Intelligence Community about the timing of the maturation of the ICBM programs. Is there any debate about whether

Iran is attempting to acquire or develop an intercontinental ballistic missile?

22

Mr. WALPOLE. No, that is why I underscored the agency that said

they dissented was only on success, not on intent.

Senator COCHRAN. Do you think there is consensus in the community that Iran could develop and flight test an ICBM before the

year 2010?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes, again with the caveat of success.

Senator COCHRAN. So the debate appears to be over whether Iran

will have a successful flight test by 2010 or 2015?

Mr. WALPOLE. Right.

Senator COCHRAN. So how difficult is it, then, to predict whether

a Nation will or will not have a successful flight test?

Mr. WALPOLE. Well, now you have hit on the crux of the matter.

I have a hard enough time projecting when a country could and is

likely to test. I do not know how I would project whether it was

successful or not. Again, you look at the Taepo Dong–1. We were

looking at that and thinking it was a failed two-stage test, then we

thought, no, it was a failed space launch vehicle, but gee, the first

two stages worked just fine. And that is looking at data after the

fact.

So projecting 15 years out, 10 years out, I would have trouble

projecting success or failure. We tend to think in terms of success

because we are not just writing an estimate saying, oh, well, all of

our dates are based on failures. We do not think there is really a

threat out there. We are just projecting failure.

We are trying to project success, so to be fair to that other agency, that is where we are leaning. But they have then cut that line

a little bit thinner and said, but everything that happens before

2015 will be a failure. I do not have confidence in making that

judgment.

Senator COCHRAN. My last question about Iran is that your estimate suggests that Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology. Does Iran have technology that other countries would be interested in acquiring, and could it become a supplier of ballistic

missile technology?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions

about Russia and China. Should I go ahead and do those, or would

Senator Domenici like to ask some more questions?

Senator AKAKA. Let me yield to Senator Domenici.

Senator DOMENICI. I have two questions, Senator Cochran, and

I will finish.

You know, we are now concerned in our war against terrorism

with determining who has weapons of mass destruction and under

what conditions, and it would appear to this Senator that we are

not doing that just to find out, but we are doing that to find out

who it is that has them. It seems to me we have made a calculation

that it is one thing for India and Pakistan to have nuclear weapons, which they have now. We did not try to take them out. We

did not say to them as we saw them developed—and surely we did,

they did not just come dropping out of the sky, you all told us

about them on a regular basis as they evolved from the trucks

building an area, cleaning it up, and getting it ready to 12 years

later a missile, I mean, a nuclear weapon.

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Today, you look at the world—you who help a President make a

decision—and you must try to calculate not only where they are,

but who is it that controls them, and there must be a distinction

by our leadership as to what we should do about who holds them

or who is about to develop them. So that if you listen to the President’s speech today in the White House Rose Garden—I happened

to be there—I think it is a very, very important speech for people

that keep talking about Iraq and what are you going to do about

that to read.

I came away with an impression that I thought myself, and that

was that we cannot let a country that has no conscience and has

a record of not caring about human life, we cannot sit by and watch

them develop weapons of mass destruction. That is paraphrasing,

but that is pretty close.

Can you tell me, who makes the decision? How does that process

take place in the United States, the determination that that country is not the right one to have weapons of mass destruction but

maybe this one is OK? We do not want that to happen, but it is

OK. Do you help in that? Does the CIA help in that?

Mr. WALPOLE. We prepare estimates of where various countries

are in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. We have given

short summaries in this unclassified paper, but you can imagine,

while I can talk more openly about ballistic missile developments,

it is going to be really hard to talk about countries’ nuclear weapons developments just because of the fragility of the intelligence.

But we do assessments on——

Senator DOMENICI. But they may go together in some instances.

They may go together——

Mr. WALPOLE. Oh, they may go together.

Senator DOMENICI [continuing]. But flight testing, infrastructure,

and so on for ballistic missiles are——

Senator DOMENICI. I understand.

Mr. WALPOLE [continuing]. They are harder to hide and so on. It

is just easier for me to do that openly and not lose sources. If I

start talking about some of the ins and outs of our nuclear analysis, then we would not be able to do the work anymore.

But we do those assessments. Some of those conclusions are

factored into what I have even covered today for the various countries. So we submit that information, how long it would take Iran

to get a nuclear weapon, how long Iraq, all the way down all the

countries, what they have got in terms of infrastructure, in terms

of aspirations, and so on, and the same with chemical. Larry

Gershwin does biological. John Landry and other national intelligence officers do chemical weapons. All that information is forwarded to the policy committees that work through those questions.

I do not know who makes that decision, but part of our assessment in India and Pakistan, in Iran, wherever, where we can discern who in that country would control those weapons, what type

of nuclear doctrine they would have, command and control, security, and so on, all of that is factored in. You can imagine that we

were constantly covering requests, some of them coming from the

Hill, on Pakistan’s command and control and security of those

24

weapons given what was taking place. So that all gets generated

with the Intelligence Community for others to make that decision.

Senator DOMENICI. It seems to me that it is almost a political decision in the end, a decision on what kind of person, people, are

going to control the weapon, and that is not a decision that is made

based on total objectivity. It is also based on some subjectivity as

to what they are apt to do with a weapon, right?

Mr. WALPOLE. I would imagine it would be, yes.

Senator DOMENICI. I would assume there is no other way to do

it.

Now, let me just ask my last question with reference to Russia.

I did not, for today, add up the money we are giving to Russia for

programs that we are calling nonproliferation, everything from

Nunn-Lugar to other programs we have put in the appropriation

process to help them make sure that the proliferation ingredients

are not spread all over and that they can take inventory of them

and that they can better police them and money to pay scientists

so they are not just running around selling the secrets. But, in essence, they get quite a few billions of dollars from all of that combined each year.

What would you say the impact on Russia’s continuing to supply

information, supplies, and the like regarding nuclear weapons or

intercontinental ballistic missiles or other weapons of mass destruction, what would you say about the relationship of us giving

them this money and then them doing those kinds of acts in the

world in a clandestine manner? Should there be a relationship?

Should we say, why should we keep on? That is going to come up,

and it would be nice to hear what somebody in the intelligence field

thinks about it.

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. The question is going to come up. The question has come up, and I think what you have to do in looking at

those types of calculations is what would it be—it is not a, thus

much money is going to this and they are doing this much to help

over here. They ought to cancel each other out. It ought to be, what

would the situation be if we were not doing this? What would the

situation be if Russia’s weapons were not as secure as we have

helped them to be, if Russia’s material was not as secure as we had

helped it to be?

When you make that sort of comparison, then, what is going on

in helping Iran, while still not something you want to see happen,

takes on a different light and I think you have got to make the

comparison that way. The world is not a perfect place and we have

to set up schemes that will make it better. We probably will not

make it a perfect place, but make it better, and that type of calculation is essential to that.

Senator DOMENICI. What seemed to me, though, that there is

some relationship that is a little more than that and that might be

how much is all of the aid they receive, which we are saying that

aid is good for us, not for Russia, or we would not be giving it to

them, right? But you get to a point where the aid and the activity

that we do not want them to do may become quid pro quo. It may

be where it could get bad enough where we would say, look, we

know about it. You continue to do it. We are just not going to have

any of these programs.

25

Now, if it is not that, what leverage do we have? Certainly what

we give them by way of this exchange of resources under NunnLugar would have no relevancy unless they knew that we might at

some point cut it back if they did not so-called ‘‘behave,’’ is that not

true?

Mr. WALPOLE. I think that would factor in, as well. Of course,

all of that is what I would expect the policy makers are doing. We

give them our assessments on where the programs are going, how

the money is being used as far as security of the weapons, and

what proliferation activities we are seeing made and then somebody, thank goodness, at the other end has to figure out what to

do with all of that.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

The French have opened negotiations, we understand, with

South Korea about providing French rocket technology for future

South Korean space launch vehicles. There have been concerns in

the past regarding South Korea’s missile program that would be

seen as violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Do

you still have concerns that the South Korean program might violate the MTCR?

Mr. WALPOLE. I will leave it to policy makers to determine violations and so on, but as I have said before, we view space launch

technology as directly applicable to missile technology, and whether

France is helping South Korea or whether France is helping Iran

or Iraq—I mean, you see where I am going with this—it does not

matter what country it is, we have got to view space launch technology as aiding and abetting a ballistic missile program. So from

an intelligence perspective, of course, we are concerned.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, there was a report released recently on the safety and security of Russia’s nuclear weapons and

materials by the Intelligence Community. Is it the view of the Intelligence Community that the Russians retain adequate security

on their operationally deployed nuclear warheads?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Senator COCHRAN. Could Russia retain more deployed warheads

without an increased risk of nuclear weapons proliferation?

Mr. WALPOLE. I think Russia is going to have trouble retaining

more warheads, proliferation notwithstanding, and that was why

the laugh. The problem for Russia is maintaining the warheads,

not that they are trying to do it in a secure manner, and it is really

the delivery systems for the warheads.

When we say that they will fall below 2,000 with or without

arms control, the problem is aging systems, economic constraints.

They got out of cycle with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, I

mean, all of those things have got them to the point where they

are going to have a difficult time maintaining those.

So the best way to answer your question is, I do not think they

can maintain more, but if they could, they could do it without causing proliferation problems. Does that make sense?

Senator COCHRAN. Yes.

Mr. WALPOLE. OK.

26

Senator COCHRAN. Are you aware of any instances of an attempted theft of Russian nuclear weapons?

Mr. WALPOLE. Other than what was in the paper?

Senator COCHRAN. Well, that is an instance, if it is in the paper

or not.

Mr. WALPOLE. Right.

Senator COCHRAN. Are you aware of any attempted thefts?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Senator COCHRAN. Could you tell us about it and how serious

that would be in terms of endangerment and whether or not we

should be concerned and try to take steps to protect ourselves?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. In the paper, we cite two examples. One was

weapons-usable material seized in Bulgaria in 1999, and the other

was one that was not independently confirmed, but it was reports

of a theft in 1998. The claim was sufficient material to produce an

atomic bomb. It did not have any corroboration of that type of

thing.

Our concern, as we note in the paper, and I want to confirm that

we did this in the unclassified—yes. We published both the classified and the unclassified version of this report. We said, ‘‘Weaponsgrade nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian institutes. We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, although

we do not know the extent or magnitude of undetected thefts. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the total amount of material that

could have been diverted in the last 10 years.’’

Our point in putting that together, and there are similar words

in the classified version, but our point in putting that together was,

look, we are only detecting what we are detecting. We cannot tell

you what we are not seeing. And we are concerned, based on what

we are seeing, that over a 10-year period of time, perhaps enough

could have gotten out that somebody could do something with.

Senator COCHRAN. You are talking about the theft of nuclear materials. Do you know of any instance where there has been an attempted theft of a Russian nuclear weapon?

Mr. WALPOLE. No, not confirmed. I mean, you have seen the reports. We all see the reports all the time. They end up in the press.

Senator COCHRAN. But you are not aware of any attempted theft

of a Russian nuclear weapon?

Mr. WALPOLE. No.

Senator COCHRAN. The estimate that you have described to us

today says that China is modernizing its strategic missile forces.

Can you tell us how long this modernization effort has been underway?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes, since the mid-1980’s. China became concerned about the survivability of its silos when the U.S. deployed

the Trident II–D5 because it could then hit those silos.

Senator COCHRAN. What do you think are the factors that are behind China’s desire to modernize its military forces, and strategic

military forces?

Mr. WALPOLE. Largely to move to mobile, more survivable systems.

Senator COCHRAN. Do you think they will expand their forces beyond the 75 to 100 assessed in your estimate now that the United

States has withdrawn from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty?

27

Mr. WALPOLE. Our 75 to 100 takes into account U.S. decisions toward missile defense, and we look at them doing multiple different

options, but the 75 to 100 really reflects two different approaches.

Seventy-five is more missiles, no multiple RVs on missiles. One

hundred is fewer missiles but multiple RVs on the CSS–4s and we

do not know which way they would go and so we are only speculating. When the report came out, one of the Chinese leaders had

said that it was just baseless on speculation. One out of two is not

bad. It is speculation. We are speculating, but it is far from baseless.

Senator COCHRAN. But is there any relationship or correlation

between our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on what they are

doing?

Mr. WALPOLE. I think there is a relationship. I think the relationship would be both the numbers of weapons they would put together and the types of weapons, because they would want to carry

countermeasures on these that they would use. But the modernization program to develop the two mobile ICBMs and the one SLBM

that I talked about date clear back to the 1980’s.

Senator COCHRAN. The estimate also says that China’s development of a multiple reentry vehicle capability for its mobile ICBMs

and its new SLBM would encounter significant technical hurdles

that could be costly. How many missiles will China be able to place

multiple reentry vehicles on?

Mr. WALPOLE. In the near term, it would be about 20 CSS–4s

that they have, the big, large ICBMs. The mobile ICBMs are smaller and it would require a very small warhead for them to put multiple RVs on them.

Senator COCHRAN. My final question is, do you think that China

will attempt to develop a multiple warhead capability for its new

missiles?

Mr. WALPOLE. Over time, they might look at that. That would

probably require nuclear testing to get something that small, but

I do not think it is something that you would see them focused on

for the near term. They might look at developing a larger mobile

ICBM. I mean, we had the MX at one point. We were looking at

the Peacekeeper, looking at being mobile. Russia has the SS–24

mobile. Those lent themselves to MIRV-ing because they were so

large. That is an option, but then neither of those systems were

very mobile.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, while I do not have any more

questions, I think this is really a very timely hearing and I commend you and the staff of the Subcommittee for scheduling this.

Ironically, we are having this hearing on the 6-month anniversary

of the attacks by the terrorists on our Nation. Senator Collins

made that comment in her opening statement. While a lot of our

attention is focused on the war against terrorism, what this hearing has shown and the estimate has shown is that we have to be

reminded that the threat of ballistic missile attack against our Nation continues to get more serious and this new estimate shows

that, in some ways, the situation has gotten worse since we had

the hearing 2 years ago to talk about the Intelligence Community’s

assessment of the threat.

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So it has been a very important exercise for us. I know I have

learned some new things and our Subcommittee will learn new

things and the Senate will be better prepared to recommend ways

that we can protect ourselves against these new threats. Thank you

very much.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your comments, Senator Cochran.

I want to thank our witness, Mr. Walpole, for testifying this

afternoon. There is no question that this has been stimulating and

useful to this Subcommittee.

I must say that I am concerned over the greater sophistication

in both missiles and weapons by the countries that continue to develop them. Yes, fewer countries are developing missiles, but the

ones that do so are devoting considerable effort to expanding their

range and capability and this is a compelling reason for continuing

a missile defense program. It is also a compelling reason to continue using diplomacy to enhance our international arms control

agreements.

At the same time, we have to keep focused on present and future

threats. We need to rank these dangers, prioritizing our precious

time, energy, and resources in a comprehensive national strategy.

Today, as has been noted, is the 6-month anniversary of the terrorist attacks on American soil. Unfortunately, this marks a tragic

and all-too-real example of how the greatest immediate threat we

face is from terrorists using means other than missiles or weapons

of mass destruction to attack America. Mr. Walpole’s testimony

supports this disturbing conclusion.

As we confront the implications of the range of possible threats

against the United States, we must balance the resources needed

to confront immediate enemies against those needed against future

enemies. This hearing has contributed to the public debate that is

needed in this country as we formulate our national security policy.

I appreciate the willingness of Mr. Walpole and his colleagues

from the Central Intelligence Agency to discuss this topic with us

publicly.

Mr. Walpole, we have no further questions at this time. However,

Members of the Subcommittee may submit questions in writing for

the witness. We would appreciate a timely response to any questions. The record will remain open for these questions and for further statements from our colleagues.

Again, I wanted to say thank you very much for your responses

today.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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