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S. HRG. 109–508

THE ROLE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE IN THE CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF AVIAN INFLUENZA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.agriculture.senate.gov 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Chairman 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

MICHEAL D. CRAPO, Idaho 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas 

DEBBIE A. STABENOW, Michigan 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

KEN SALAZAR, Colorado

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Majority Staff Director 

DAVID L. JOHNSON, Majority Chief Counsel 

STEVEN MEEKS, Majority Legislative Director 

ROBERT E. STURM, Chief Clerk 

MARK HALVERSON, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

HEARING(S):

The Role of U.S. Agriculture in the Control and Eradication of Avian

Influenza ............................................................................................................... 01

Thursday, November 17, 2005

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY SENATORS 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, a U.S. Senator from Georgia, Chairman, Committee 

on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry ............................................................. 01

Harkin, Hon. Tom, a U.S Senator from Iowa, Ranking Member, Committee 

on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry ............................................................. 12

Stabenow, Hon. Debbie, a U.S. Senator from Michigan ....................................... 03

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

DeHaven, Ron, DVM, Administrator, Animal Plant and Health Inspection 

Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC .............................. 03

Gerberding, Julie L., MD, MPH, Director , Centers for Disease Control adn 

Prevention U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Atlanta,

Georgia .................................................................................................................. 06

PANEL II 

Irwin, Gretta, Executive Director, Iowa Turkey Federation , Ames, Iowa ......... 27

Kleven, S.H., DVM PhD, Regents Professor, College of Veterinary Medicine, 

Poultry Diagnostic and Research Center University of Georgia, Atlanta, 

Georgia .................................................................................................................. 25

Waldrip, Donald, DVM, Diplomat, American College of Poultry ......................... 23

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Harkin, Hon. Tom ............................................................................................ 34

Stabenow, Hon. Debbie .................................................................................... 35

DeHaven, Ron, DVM ........................................................................................ 38

Gerberding, Julie, MD ...................................................................................... 47

Irwin, Gretta ..................................................................................................... 82

Kleven, S.H., DVM, PhD .................................................................................. 80

Waldrip, Donald, DVM ..................................................................................... 76

DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Cochran, Hon. Thad ......................................................................................... 90

Conrad, Hon. Kent ........................................................................................... 92

Roberts, Hon. Pat ............................................................................................. 94

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Harkin, Hon. Tom ............................................................................................ 98

Dayton, Hon. Mark ........................................................................................... 100

(1)

THE ROLE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE IN THE 

CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF AVIAN

INFLUENZA 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2005

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SR–328A, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Saxby Chambliss, 

chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present or submitting a statement: Senators Chambliss, Talent, 

Coleman, Harkin, and Stabenow. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

I want to welcome you all this morning to this hearing to consider the Role of U.S. Agriculture in the Control and Eradication 

of Avian Influenza. 

I appreciate our witnesses who have traveled here today to 

present testimony on this important topic, and I welcome and 

thank those who are listening via our website. 

The topic before us today is important to all of American agriculture, but holds particular significance to my home State of Georgia. Poultry is our largest agricultural industry, and the State of 

Georgia leads the Nation in poultry production. In fact, if the State 

of Georgia were a country, it would be the fourth largest producer 

of poultry in the world. In 2004 the total farm value of poultry and 

eggs produced in Georgia was 3.26 billion, and the statewide economic impact of the overall poultry industry was an estimated 

$13.5 billion. 

In addition, Atlanta, Georgia is the home to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which plays a critical role in protecting human health against disease threats such as avian influenza, and Athens, Georgia is the home of the Department of Agriculture Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, which conducts 

critical research on avian diseases. 

My interest in this topic is understandably high, not only for the 

Georgia poultry industry, but for the U.S. poultry system. 

Recent media reports have discussed avian influenza and what 

many in the media have called an impending pandemic. While 

there is legitimate concern, there has also been a great deal of conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
2

fusion and misinformation. We must be clear: avian influenza is 

first and foremost an animal disease. The current outbreak in 

Southeast Asia and parts of Europe is affecting poultry and a limited amount of humans that have been in direct contact with infected animals. The virus has not yet demonstrated the ability to 

efficiently pass directly from human to human, and it is not clear 

at this time if this avian influenza virus will ever mutate to allow 

for a human pandemic, but the potential does exist. As such, it is 

very important that we pursue a sincere yet cautious approach in 

preparing to address potential outbreaks, both here and abroad. 

The most effective way to combat a potential pandemic is to control and eradicate the virus in poultry before it has a chance to 

negatively impact humans. It is my hope that this hearing today 

will help the members of this committee and the public to better 

understand the topic and how it may impact U.S. poultry production. 

We are privileged to have before us today some of the top experts 

on avian influenza, along with producers and processors with realworld experience. I hope they will help us cut through the noise 

and understand where we should and where we should not be focusing our concerns. One especially important point relates to the 

role of U.S. poultry in any future potential avian influenza outbreak. As I understand it, there is a great difference between the 

mostly weak strains of avian influenza occasionally found in U.S. 

birds, and the more potent H5N1 strain that is causing concern in 

Asia and Europe, a strain that has never been identified in the 

U.S. 

In addition, it is my understanding that U.S. public health officials do not see U.S. poultry as a likely source of any significant 

potential human avian influenza outbreak. Rather, it seems that 

the travel of humans from affected areas to the U.S., not our domestic poultry, is what we most need to keep our eyes on. I look 

forward to clarifying that point today. 

Second, I think it is important that we hear more about the safety and the biosecurity efforts of the Federal Government and the 

U.S. poultry industry. In recent conversations with USDA and industry officials, I have been encouraged to learn of all the measures that are taken to isolate U.S. commercial poultry from any 

diseases carried by wild bird populations. That is an important distinction between U.S. poultry production and the production systems in Asia. I look forward to hearing more about that topic as 

well. 

As we move toward the Thanksgiving season, we are again mindful of all the ways that this Nation has been so blessed. The security and abundance of our food supply should certainly rank highly 

among those blessings. However, despite all the hard work and 

science-based measures that make U.S. poultry the safest in the 

world, we are always striving to do better. I hope that through this 

exchange today we can reassure consumers regarding the safety of 

U.S. poultry, and identify any additional actions that may be needed to further enhance the safety and wholesomeness of this important component of the U.S. food supply. 

Again, I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to their testimony. 

3

Our first panel today consists of Dr. Ron DeHaven, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture. Dr. DeHaven has been a leader in the 

area of animal disease, and, Dr. DeHaven, we certainly look forward to hearing from you this morning. 

Also on the first panel is Dr. Julie Gerberding, Director, Centers 

for Disease, Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services, headquartered in Atlanta. Dr. Gerberding 

has been at the forefront of any number of issues in her tenure as 

head of the CDC. She does just a wonderful job down there. She 

happens to be a very good personal friend, and somebody that I 

have great respect and admiration for with the job that she has 

done addressing the more difficult issues facing health care around 

the world, not just in the United States, certainly not just in Georgia, but literally around the world. Dr. Gerberding, we are glad you 

are here this morning also. 

We will at this time hear from Dr. DeHaven. Any members, Senator Stabenow, that wish to make an opening comment, you have 

that opportunity right now or we can go straight to Dr. DeHaven. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBBIE STABENOW, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM MICHIGAN 

Senator STABENOW. Mr. Chairman, I would just thank you very 

much for this hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witness 

today. Obviously, this is a critical issue, and we have talked about 

it from a public health standpoint, but not as much from an economic standpoint, and we need to be doing both. 

My home State, Michigan State University, is very much involved as one of the leaders as it relates to what we need to be 

doing, and I welcome both of you to be with us today, and think 

that there is a lot we have to do. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Stabenow can be found in 

the appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. DeHaven, we look forward to your comments. 

STATEMENT OF RON DEHAVEN, DVM, ADMINISTRATOR, ANIMAL PLANT AND HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the Department 

of Agriculture’s extensive efforts to protect the United States poultry from avian influenza. 

In recent months, as you indicated, a highly pathogenic strain of 

H5N1 avian influenza virus has been spreading across poultry populations in several Southeast Asian and Eastern European countries. There have also been documented cases of the virus affecting 

humans who have been in contact, direct contact, with the sick 

birds. There is worldwide concern that this H5N1 virus might mutate, cross the species barrier, and touch off a human influenza 

pandemic. 

It is with this in mind that USDA’s poultry health safeguarding 

programs are more important than ever, and we have bolstered our 

4

efforts across the board in response to the evolving disease threats 

from overseas. 

We also believe that it is critical to effectively address the disease in poultry populations in these affected countries. Implementation of effective biosecurity measures in concert with control and 

eradication programs will go a long way toward reducing the 

amount of virus in these H5N1–affected countries, and thereby 

minimize the potential for this virus to spread to poultry in other 

parts of the world. These actions, if effectively implemented, would 

diminish the potential for a human influenza pandemic. 

Last week I attended an international meeting on avian influenza, and I can report that there is indeed widespread concern regarding this disease, as well as a strong commitment to work 

through international organizations to address the disease and improve the animal health infrastructure in countries in the region. 

That is why it is imperative that the United States remains engaged and share resources and expertise with officials in these 

countries. 

Here in the United States the National Strategy for Pandemic 

Influenza, announced by President Bush on November 1st, reflects 

the importance of these proactive measures on the animal health 

front. The President requested $91.35 million in emergency funding 

for the USDA to further intensify its surveillance here at home and 

to deliver increased assistance to countries impacted by the disease 

in hopes of preventing further spread of avian influenza. 

With that introduction I want to touch on a few of the key points 

that I think will help to frame our discussion this morning. With 

regard to birds, avian influenza viruses are divided into two 

groups, low pathogenic AI or low path AI, as we say, and highly 

pathogenic or high path AI. Highly pathogenic viruses typically 

produce far more severe clinical signs and higher mortality in birds 

than the lower pathogenic avian influenza viruses. 

Low path AI has been identified in the United States and around 

the world since the early 1900’s. It is a relatively common finding 

to detect low path AI, just as human flus are a relatively common 

finding in people. However, most avian influenza viruses found in 

birds do not pose any significant health risks to humans. 

Highly pathogenic avian influenza has been found in poultry in 

the United States three times, in 1924, in 1983 and again in 2004. 

The 1983 outbreak was the largest, ultimately resulting in the destruction of 17 million birds in the States of Pennsylvania and Virginia before the virus was finally contained and eradicated. In contrast, the 2004 outbreak was limited to a flock of 6,600 birds in 

Texas. That detection was fond very quickly and quickly contained 

and eradicated. There were no significant human health implications or reports of human health problems in connection with any 

of these outbreaks of highly pathogenic AI. 

In domestic poultry the greatest concern has been infections with 

the H5 and H7 subtypes, which can be either highly pathogenic or 

low pathogenic. The low pathogenic H5 and H7 subtypes are always of concern because of their potential to mutate into the highly 

pathogenic form of the disease. Given these risks, APHIS safeguarding systems against avian influenza is robust, encompassing, 

among other things, trade restrictions on poultry and poultry prodVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
5

ucts from overseas, anti-smuggling programs, aggressive targeted 

surveillance in commercial poultry operations, and the live bird 

marketing system in the northeastern United States, cooperative 

efforts and information sharing with States and industry, and outreach to producers regarding the need for effective, on-farm biosecurity measures. 

The USDA and our partners, including the Department of Interior, have also been looking for signs of avian influenza in wild 

birds in the United States, particularly in the Alaska Migratory 

Bird Flyway. As we know, these birds can serve as a reservoir for 

the disease. 

Our ability to respond to a detection of avian influenza is designed to be just as robust as our safeguarding system. For highly 

pathogenic AI, as well as for low path H5 and H7 subtypes, APHIS 

would work with States to quarantine affected premises and clean 

and disinfect those premises after the birds had been depopulated 

and properly disposed. Positive highly pathogenic AI flocks would 

be depopulated, and meat from the infected flocks would not enter 

either the animal feed or human food chains. Surveillance testing 

would also be conducted in the quarantine zone and the surrounding area to ensure that the virus has been completely eradicated. 

On the trade front there is an important new world organization 

for animal health, or OIE, standard for avian influenza that obligates member countries to report any positive, notifiable avian influenza test result. This includes the reporting of all highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses as well as low pathogenic H5 or H7 

subtypes that are detected in commercial poultry operations. The 

OIE does not recommend trade restrictions for non-H5 or H7 low 

pathogenic subtypes. 

APHIS continues to work with its trading partners to promote 

application of this new OIE standard, and in the event of any avian 

influenza outbreak in poultry in the U.S., we would, of course, 

work to control and eradicate the disease, and also to demonstrate 

to trading partners that the measures put in place were effective 

in controlling and eradicating the virus. APHIS would then urge 

trading partners to regionalize the United States for the disease, 

effectively allowing for trade in poultry and poultry products to 

continue from the unaffected areas. 

Even though no human cases of avian influenza had been confirmed from eating properly prepared poultry, I would still like to 

end by reinforcing a few key food safety messages. These are especially important as we look forward to the Thanksgiving holiday. 

The proper handling and cooking of poultry provides protection 

from all manner of viruses and bacteria, including avian influenza. 

Important food safety steps include washing hands, utensils and 

surfaces that have come in contact with raw poultry, fish and 

meats simply with warm soap and water. Avoid cross-contamination of other foods with raw meat, poultry, fish and their juices. 

And of course, cook meat thoroughly and use a food thermometer. Cook ground turkey and chicken to a temperature of 165 degrees Fahrenheit, chicken and turkey breast to 170 degrees Fahrenheit, and whole birds, legs, thighs and wings to 180 degrees 

Fahrenheit. Obviously, never consume raw or undercooked poultry 

6

or poultry products, and all meat products and other perishables 

should be refrigerated promptly after serving. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will end my statement, but I do look 

forward to answering any questions that may come up. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. DeHaven can be found in the appendix on page 38.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Gerberding. 

STATEMENT OF JULIE L. GERBERDING, MD, MPH, DIRECTOR, 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 

Dr. GERBERDING. Thank you. As a citizen of the poultry capital 

of the world, we are very grateful for your leadership and your interest in this issue, Senator, and thank you very much for including CDC in this hearing. 

Dr. Lonnie King is a veterinary scientist who is now with CDC, 

but he was the Dean at the Michigan State School of Veterinary 

Medicine, and he has been very instrumental in helping CDC create linkages to APHIS and the animal health kingdom, so we are 

increasingly understanding that to protect human health, we also 

have to be very engaged with animal health protection. I think it 

is great that we are here with the Agriculture Committee, and that 

is a step forward for health protection in a number of fronts in the 

future. 

What I wanted to do is to give a context of where we are with 

the avian epidemic today, so that we can think ahead about what 

are the additional steps that we need to take to protect animal and 

human health. 

I think point No. 1 is illustrated on this graphic, which is a 

timeline of epidemics that have occurred over the past century. 

Three large ones most people are familiar with: the Spanish flu 

epidemic, and two smaller ones. But the point here is that 

pandemics happen. They happen periodically, many times over the 

past centuries, and sooner or later it is very likely that we will 

have another pandemic whether or not it is a pandemic caused by 

this particular H5N1 avian virus. 

On the next graphic I have presented a snapshot of where the 

outbreaks are today in Asia and Eastern Europe. We have active 

outbreaks in 11 countries right now. Most of the countries that 

have surveillance, have detected at least some infected birds at one 

time or another. And we have some countries such as Burma or 

Malaysia where we have very little information about the status of 

infection in poultry, and because they lack surveillance systems 

and transparency, we are unable to really predict what the true 

state of affairs is in Asia. 

I was able to travel to Asia with Secretary Leavitt in a U.S. delegation that included the Director of the World Health Organization, 

scientists from USDA and others, and we were impressed with the 

scope and magnitude of the challenge of containing this virus in 

birds in that region, in large part because of the cultural practices, 

7

where you have the ducks and the migratory waterfowl that may 

be an important asymptomatic carrier of the virus, housed and 

transported to market next to the poultry that are used to provide 

a major source of protein and a major source of the economy in this 

region. There are people literally living in the water where these 

migratory birds are and having very close personal contact with infected animals. 

The next graphic portrays, the point about how this disease is 

transmitted. This is a disease of birds, but people are exposed 

when they have intimate contact with the birds. One of the most 

compelling stories to me was a little boy who had a pet chicken in 

his yard, and the chicken acquired the H5N1 virus, and the little 

boy was nurturing the chicken, trying to bring it back to health, 

and of course he caught the virus from the chicken’s droplets and 

died of a very, very severe case of this influenza. But it points out 

that it is the chickens that have the viruses, the ducks that have 

the virus, and that this is primarily a bird infection, not a people 

inflection, and you acquire it by having close contact with sick 

birds, not through the means that we would normally acquire influenza. 

On the next graphic, just a reminder of the migratory bird 

flyways. We do not know if the H5N1 is going to move further than 

it already is traveling across Western Asia and into Eastern Europe, but certainly the overlapping flyways suggest that that could 

happen, and we need not be surprised if somewhere, someday, a 

bird carrying H5N1 enters the United States. We need to prepare 

people for this and have the confidence that APHIS and our Department of Agriculture and our Department of Interior are doing 

all the things that they need to be doing to protect our domestic 

bird populations, as well as the people who come in contact with 

those birds. 

So the fear here is not arrival of a pandemic on the wings of a 

bird. It is here because of the potential for the virus to change and 

become more transmissible person-to-person. And as you pointed 

out in your remarks, Senator, it may be the arrival of a new virus 

strain from person-to-person transmission that we should be focusing our attention. 

Where we are today in the WHO’s list of steps that typically precede a pandemic. We have certainly seen widespread and spreading 

H5N1 infection in migratory and domestic birds with a broad host 

range. 

We have checked off the box that indicates continued outbreaks 

among domestic poultry. These have not come and gone. They continue to crop up in the parts of the world that have these cultural 

practices that promote spread. 

We know this virus can infect mammals and infect mammals 

with lethal infection, including cats, pigs; we have seen tigers in 

the zoos who are fed contaminated chicken meat, get sick and die, 

and the infection has high lethality. 

We know the virus continues to evolve. The strain that we isolated from Vietnam and made the prototype vaccine to has evolved 

now into a new clade that has some different antigenic properties 

and may have some different biological properties. 

8

We know this can infect humans, mostly young and healthy people, probably because they come in contact with the sick chickens. 

The case fatality rate is very high, and some recent work done in 

CDC’s laboratories indicate that the reason for this is probably the 

virus itself. It has a very lethal configuration that causes a very 

severe invasion of the lungs, much like the 1918 virus that was so 

fatal in young and health people. 

The box not checked here is the most important box. We have not 

seen sustained person-to-person transmission, although we have 

seen isolated cases where the virus has spread from one person to 

another, and it is the absence of that box that reassures us. 

Finally, what is the big picture of the approach to dealing with 

this problem? I think the President spelled it out in his national 

strategy, and Secretary Leavitt has created a very comprehensive 

doctrine on our containment efforts. 

First of all, we will assume that if there is a human outbreak 

anywhere, it is a threat everywhere, and we will proceed accordingly. 

Second, if feasible, we will take every step to contain the problem. First and foremost, that is containment in animals as my colleague has pointed out. But if it emerges in people, we will act aggressively to quarantine, isolate, treat and prophylax anyone in the 

localized area of an outbreak that we can in an effort to quench the 

virus. If that proves to not be feasible, then of course we will move 

into a phase of trying to slow down its spread from one region to 

another or one community to another, and the antiviral and the 

vaccine production capability that the President has proposed and 

Congress has proposed are extremely important components of a 

broad pandemic preparedness, whether it is H5N1 or any other 

virus. 

And finally, I think the most important issue here is the collaboration, communication and transparency. You are seeing evidence 

of how the Federal agencies are working together, and I think we 

are very proud of those connections, but we are also very actively 

engaged in collaborations with the World Health Organization, 

with the OIE and the FAO, with Ministers of Health and Ministers 

of Agriculture from around the world, and certainly business leaders, private sector leaders and citizens who have these concerns. 

So with this network of preparedness, I think we have a good 

chance of being able to ward off a pandemic, and an excellent 

chance of being able to do more to contain this particular virus. 

Thank you for your interest. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gerberding can be found in the 

appendix on page 47.] 

[The charts of Dr. Gerberding can be found in the appendix on 

pages 68-75.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for very strong statements and 

very informative statements. 

Dr. Gerberding, there have been some recent press reports regarding the possible infection of individuals in Southeast Asia with 

the H5N1 virus. It is my understanding, from what you just said, 

and also, Dr. DeHaven, from what you said—and I want to make 

sure that this is absolutely clear—that there is no indication at this 

9

point in time that there has been any human-to-human transfer of 

that virus. Is that correct? 

Dr. GERBERDING. That is not entirely correct. There have been 

two or three examples where one person has transmitted the virus 

to another. In those cases it has been because of very close personal contact with a very sick and sometimes dying patient; so 

health care worker context or a family context where a family 

member is providing direct care to another family member. But we 

are convinced in the couple of cases that have been very thoroughly 

investigated that that has happened. It has not been efficient and 

it has not spread beyond those single next closest contact. 

We would be worried if we saw person-to-person-to-person transmission. That would suggest that the virus was adopting to be 

more efficiently moved in that way. 

The CHAIRMAN. There is a story in the Washington Post this 

morning where China has confirmed two bird flu cases. Does your 

office stay in contact with countries such as China regarding this 

situation? 

Dr. GERBERDING. We are very pleased because we actually have 

one of our most senior scientists in China right now with the World 

Health Organization team, and she is investigating those cases 

alongside the Chinese scientists. So unlike previous situations, the 

Chinese asked for assistance early. They have opened up the scientific investigation to external experts and they have been very 

transparent in this particular province, in allowing us to understand what is going on. But we do believe that there have been 

three cases of avian influenza there, and the two deaths may not 

be officially reported yet, but we believe those are accurate reports. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DeHaven, I think I understand what you 

said is that if an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 

were to occur in the United States, our main priorities would be 

the swift identification, control and eradication of the disease. In 

order to effectively accomplish this goal, local, State and Federal 

authorities must pursue a coordinated detection and response plan. 

It is my understanding that APHIS is the lead agency in addressing a domestic outbreak of avian influenza, but that several other 

agencies are involved in a coordinated effort. Can you please describe how the detection and response plan for avian influenza is 

coordinated within the Department of Agriculture, and are you satisfied with the responsiveness and coordination from other Federal 

agencies to ensure the orderly and timely flow of information? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. I think 

it is very timely in that APHIS has been dealing with avian influenza viruses for decades, and it is important to recognize that, 

given the context of the current H5N1 situation, that we in fact already have in place mechanisms for exclusion of avian influenza—

if it does enter the United States—for early detection and rapid response, so we in fact have been in the avian influenza eradication 

business for decades. 

Our response mechanism in fact is at the State level, where in 

any given State we have prepositioned people, prepositioned plans 

where our senior Federal veterinarian, our area veterinarian in 

charge, would work directly with the State veterinarian in co-directors in a State level response. We have created a animal laboratory 

10

network. We currently have 36 State laboratories, for example, that 

have been trained to do PCR testing for avian influenza. So if we 

were to have a widespread outbreak, we would have the laboratory 

capacity needed for diagnosis. While our response would be at the 

State level, we virtually have that level of response in all States, 

so that we have the resources in unaffected States to divert toward 

those States that might be affected so that we can have a regional 

response. 

FEMA has also recently identified an additional Emergency Support Function, No. 11, for food, agriculture and water, so just as all 

of the resources of the Federal Government would come to bear in 

a natural disaster, we similarly would have access to resources of 

all of the Federal Government in a widespread outbreak through 

this emergency support function for food, agriculture and water, in 

which APHIS is a lead agency. So I think we have a number of response mechanisms in place. We have had the opportunity to use 

those in real life situations very effectively, and we are constantly 

doing test exercises to test our preparedness. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DeHaven, you have certainly traveled extensively and dealt with any number of countries relative to this issue. 

What is your assessment of the veterinary capability of countries 

where this deadly strain of avian influenza is present and are there 

things that need to be done that are not being done? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. I think it is prudent that we continue, as Dr. 

Gerberding has pointed out, to prepare for the potential for a 

human pandemic, and with the President’s strategy there is lots of 

preparation that is ongoing. At the same time the President’s strategy also provides resources for us to better attack the virus at its 

source, namely the birds, in countries that are affected with this 

particular virus. It would appear from the reports that I have received that in fact the ability of the various affected countries to 

respond varies greatly. Some countries in fact have the large commercial poultry operation capability, they have good veterinary infrastructure, and their ability to respond and eradicate this virus 

is quite good. 

On the other hand, some of the lesser developed countries in fact 

do not have that infrastructure. Their commercial industry really 

is made up of individual producers who are raising poultry for their 

own consumption or very limited distribution of their product and 

they simply do not have the infrastructure. Part of what we need 

to do is work more effectively through international organizations 

and international partners to provide the expertise and to provide 

the resources to better attack this virus. Indeed, by reducing the 

virus load in affected countries, then we at the same time reduce 

the potential for this virus to mutate and become the pandemic 

virus that we are concerned about. 

So again, I think the resources are there in the President’s request for additional funding. Many of those activities that we 

would participate in internationally through international organizations would go toward just that effort, reducing the virus load in 

poultry in the affected countries. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask this question to both of you. You 

mentioned the funding that has been requested by the President. 

11

In your opinion, is that level of funding adequate in the opinion of 

each of you? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. I will address it from an animal health perspective. And indeed, there are some very important items in that 

strategy on the animal health side that would go a long way toward helping to reduce the threat. Of the $91.35 million that has 

been identified for the Department of Agriculture, for example, $8 

million would be directed toward surveillance and diagnostic activities in wildlife, poultry and swine populations in the affected countries. We would envision placing consultants on a long-term basis 

in the affected countries, consultants that can provide expertise in 

diagnostics, in eradication and control efforts, in epidemiology. 

So working collectively with the international community, with 

other like-minded countries who recognize the importance of attacking this virus at its source, but working through international 

organizations such as the WHO, FAO and OIE, we think that these 

resources collectively with those resources made available through 

the international community can go a long way toward reducing 

the virus load in those countries and reducing the potential for this 

to become a pandemic virus. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gerberding? 

Dr. GERBERDING. As a public health official who has struggled 

now for many years to try to deal with the problem of seasonal influenza and our vaccine shortages, I looked on these budget proposals for pandemic preparedness as amazing days in the history 

of public health, that we finally can imagine a situation where we 

could take the vaccine problem off the table, modernize the vaccine, 

build the production capability and rescue our vaccine manufacturers. 

I also think it is important to recognize that what has been proposed as emergency supplemental investment comes on top of other 

money and resources that we are already spending, just as APHIS 

is already spending resources for influenza and pandemic preparedness, and we cannot look on it as a one-shot solution. It is going 

to take a sustained investment over time to really do this, but 

without the supplemental there is no way that we could make the 

kind of rapid-scaled progress that we need to achieve. 

The last perspective, again from the public health domestic view, 

in a situation like this we are only as protected as the weakest link 

in our network, and that means that we have a shared responsibility with State and local health agencies, with health care organizations, with the business sector and with schools, and we have got 

to bring every single part of that network into our safety network 

to really deal with the problem of a spreading pandemic, particularly if it happened before we had a vaccine. So we really need to 

be using these investments and leveraging them to prepare the 

whole system, not just look at vaccine and antivirals. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have in part answered my next question, which is, by having all this focus and attention right now on 

this particular strain of avian influenza in Southeast Asia and certain parts of Europe, are we distracting our attention away from 

other potential health threats that may be out there that could be 

an even bigger problem than this? 

12

Dr. GERBERDING. From a human health perspective, I do not 

think so. Secretary Leavitt has pointed out several times how valuable these pandemic investments are in other ways. With these investments we will finally have a seasonal flu vaccine that could 

save 36,000 lives every year. We will have a surveillance network 

that will allow us to recognize and detect nationally and internationally when new viruses emerge, and we will have in some 

sense the peace of mind of appreciating that that is one set of 

threats that we have taken a giant step forward in being able to 

recognize. 

I think a fourth component of that really is the intersection of 

animal and human health. I mean I just have to keep mentioning 

that so assertively because 12 out of the last 13 important new infectious disease threats in people have arisen from animals. So if 

we do not figure out how to connect our surveillance systems and 

how to work collaboratively in these infectious disease arenas, we 

will continue to have these emergences and these problems. So this 

pandemic environment gives us an opportunity to really create a 

new paradigm for human and animal health protection. 

The CHAIRMAN. Last, because a week from today there are going 

to be folks all across America who are going to be eating poultry 

products, I want to make one thing absolutely clear, coming from 

two of the top experts in the world relative to this issue. Can you 

please tell the American people if there is a danger from avian influenza that could affect individuals who are going to be eating turkey, chicken and other poultry products next week? What do they 

need to do to make sure that there is no disease, whether it is this 

disease or something else, in their poultry products? Would both of 

you just comment on that for the record, please? 

Dr. GERBERDING. Food safety generically is an important part of 

every household at holiday time or other time, and I think the common sense steps that my colleague pointed out in his opening testimony of attention to proper food preparation and the appropriate 

cooking temperatures, using a thermometer and just using the 

same common sense things that we practice at any time that we 

are focusing on food safety. 

There is no special threat associated with eating turkey or chicken or any other good food on this holiday, and I hope everyone has 

a wonderful holiday time with their families. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. I would just echo Dr. Gerberding’s comment. First 

of all, we do have very good surveillance in place for the poultry 

in the United States, and there is absolutely no evidence that we 

have this Southeast Asian of H5N1 either in animals of humans in 

the United States, and indeed we have good surveillance looking 

for it. Even if it were here, simple good food practices, food sanitation practices in the kitchens are critical whether it is for avian influenza or any of the other bacteria that might represent a risk. So 

at the end of the day, there is no greater threat this Thanksgiving 

than any Thanksgiving with regard to avian influenza or other 

pathogens. 

So I would hope that all Americans would feel comfortable enjoying the poultry over the Thanksgiving holiday. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great. 

Senator Harkin. 

13

STATEMENT BY HON. TOM HARKIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

IOWA 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want 

to welcome our two witnesses, Dr. Gerberding and Dr. DeHaven, 

and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing to take a 

look at the role of U.S. agriculture and this whole threat of a pandemic. 

I do not think we have given enough attention to the threat of 

avian flu to agriculture. It is more highly likely that this will come 

to the United States via birds than humans because it is already 

widespread in flyways and can cross over from birds to poultry. I 

think avian flu in our poultry probably has the ability to instill a 

lot of fear in the American people, and that could be more devastating than the disease itself in poultry. 

Obviously, for my State I have a great interest in this. We are 

the top producer of eggs. We are the 10th largest turkey producer. 

I know we have on our next panel, Gretta Irwin from the Iowa Turkey Federation to bring Iowa’s perspective on this and how the industry is preparing for it. There is one other aspect, we are also 

the largest producer of hogs. And as Dr. Gerberding pointed out, 

avian flu has been found to cross over into swine, and the interesting thing about swine is swine can have both the avian flu and 

also human flu viruses can coexist in the same animal. So many 

experts have said that swine is sort of the mixing vessel that might 

lead to a pandemic since both of these can coexist in swine at the 

same time, transform it into a virus that can infect humans. 

That may be a remote possibility right now, but, again, we need 

to buildup our surveillance capacity in general to make sure we 

keep on top of this. 

The other point that I am concerned about is whether or not 

there is enough of, say with the Department of Agriculture and the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, are you conversing, is 

there enough of a open system there so that you two are talking? 

I will have a question about that. I am concerned about the information sharing in both Department of Agriculture and the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention. 

Mr. Chairman, I just ask that the remainder of my statement be 

made a part of the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Harkin can be found in the 

appendix on page 34.] 

Senator HARKIN. Dr. Gerberding, a couple of years ago I asked 

Under Secretary Hawks at a hearing here regarding the implementation of the national animal ID system if USDA was bringing in 

entities like the Centers for Disease Control for guidance, given 

that some animal diseases such as avian flu could someday cross 

over into humans. Under Secretary Hawks said they were open to 

comments from whomever, but was not seeking the CDC out while 

developing the animal ID system. This concerned me, so I followed 

up and wrote to then-Secretary Ann Veneman, and asked what 

USDA had done to seek out guidance from CDC. In response, a letter to me said there was ongoing coordination with agencies responsible for protecting public health and safety, including the 

CDC and Department of Homeland Security. 

14

I guess I will just ask both of you. I will start with Dr. 

Gerberding. Are you aware of how frequently the USDA seeks out 

CDC’s guidance while implementing an animal ID system, and 

what role has the CDC played to ensure that public health concerns are adequately addressed within this animal ID system? 

Dr. GERBERDING. Senator, I am not familiar with the animal ID 

system, and I have not been involved in those conversations. But 

we do have a USDA scientist who physically works at CDC now. 

It is Tom Gomez, who is our USDA liaison, and he generally is the 

conduit that helps us connect those dots. This is a relatively new 

thing for us, so I will check. 

Senator HARKIN. Let me ask Dr. DeHaven. Dr. DeHaven, how 

often do you consult with CDC? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. As Dr. Gerberding mentioned, with Tom Gomez, 

one of our veterinary medical officers whose duty location is at the 

CDC in Atlanta, that dialog is ongoing on a daily basis involving 

animal ID and a number of issues. We can certainly check, Senator, in terms of what specific communication there has been and 

when with regard to animal ID, but I look at it as more of an ongoing dialog. 

I can tell you though, for example, we both on the human health 

and animal health side are developing laboratory networks, networks that would need to communicate in the event of a disease 

outbreak situation that was zoonotic in nature, affecting both animals and humans, and through our linkages between those laboratory networks. So I think the communication is good. We recognize 

the need to continue to nurture that relationship and see it grow. 

As Dr. Gerberding has pointed out, most of the new emerging 

disease threats are in fact zoonotic in nature. There is an animal 

and a human component. We recognize that communication is 

good, but needs to get better. 

Senator HARKIN. I will ask a question. You might just respond 

on the record if you want later on, but does USDA’s national animal identification plan, as currently envisioned, allow CDC to adequately coordinate and protect human health in the even of an animal disease outbreak if such a disease were to cross over to humans? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. The network, as envisioned, would provide access 

to the Department of Agriculture for all of the disease tracking 

purposes that we need. To the extent that that information would 

be useful in a situation that also involved a human health component, I have no doubt that there would be that communication. 

We can respond, Senator, for the record in terms of what formal 

discussions there have been as we develop the national animal ID 

system. 

Senator HARKIN. I would like to follow up with that. 

Two other questions. What is the current structure of animal disease surveillance in the U.S., Dr. DeHaven? I mean who is responsible? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

is responsible for animal disease surveillance and——

Senator HARKIN. And you are in charge of that? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. I am indeed, yes. We have created a National Surveillance Unit. In the past surveillance has been on a disease-byVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
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disease specific basis, so if we wanted to know about the prevalence 

of brucellosis in cattle, we have had a cattle brucellosis program. 

We recognize the need for a coordinated comprehensive surveillance program. Hence, the creation of this National Surveillance 

Unit. If we are taking a sample of blood from a swine, for example, 

and there is some concern about potential for swine to be affected 

with an avian influenza virus, then in fact let’s use that sample for 

multiple disease purposes. 

Senator HARKIN. What assurance can you give us that if a bird, 

a chicken, turkey, domestic duck, dies, that samples are taken of 

that to determine what it died of, that we would know right away 

whether or not it was caused by an avian flu? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. We have a number of surveillance in place for 

poultry and other birds in the United States. Through our National 

Poultry Improvement Program virtually every breeding flock in the 

country is under surveillance. Any company that wants to export 

poultry to another country is required to test those birds of the 

birds from which that meat would be derived for avian influenza. 

We have required testing for birds going to our live bird markets 

in the Northeast, and hope to expand that to live bird markets everywhere else. 

Because of the Exotic Newcastle disease situation a couple of 

years ago in the southwestern part of the United States, we have 

reached out to individual backyards of flocks. We have a network 

of laboratories that will do testing there. 

I think it is also important to realize that this particular virus 

that is in parts of Asia and Europe, as well as any other highly 

pathogenic avian influenza virus, would be first notices because it 

does produce mortality. So our commercial industry, turkey, chickens, as well as the commercial duck industry, is acutely aware of 

any increase in mortality, any drop in egg production in laying 

flocks, and I feel confident that that kind of change would be quickly notice and diagnosed at one of our networks of laboratories. 

Senator HARKIN. You have a high level of confidence that you 

would know rapidly. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Indeed. I think that situation in Texas in 2004 

points that out, as we limited that outbreak to one flock. 

Senator HARKIN. Right. In an article that the chairman referred 

to this morning, it said that China was getting ready to inoculate 

a billion birds. I do not know where they get all that vaccine. But 

you have how much, $18 million—well, it is 91 million for USDA 

avian flu prevention and control activities. If avian flu were to 

break out here, would that be a course of action we might want to 

take, like China is doing, to inoculate every chicken and turkey and 

domestic duck or whatever in the United States? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Senator, vaccination is one of the tools that we 

want to have in our toolbox. But if we were to have an outbreak 

of avian influenza, either low pathogenic or highly pathogenic, this 

H5N1 or another virus, our first course of action typically is going 

to be to depopulate, to eradicate that virus, rather than to vaccinate and control the virus. 

Having said that, we do want to have vaccination as one of the 

tools. We currently have a bank of avian influenza vaccine, 40 million doses in the bank for just that purpose. Typically we would use 

16

that vaccine to ring vaccinate, to try and contain an outbreak situation while we eliminated it. But typically because of trade implications of vaccination, as well as not wanting to live with the virus, 

our first course of action is to depopulate, to eradicate that virus 

completely. There may be instances where vaccination may be part 

of a broader eradication effort. 

Senator HARKIN. You rely upon State veterinarians for a lot of 

your information, right, for surveillance? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. We work in cooperation very closely with State 

veterinarians and State Departments of Agriculture, yes, sir. 

Senator HARKIN. I just openly wonder if they have the funds they 

need in the State level to do an adequate job. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Some of the monies that are requested in the 

President’s emergency funding request, $10 million in fact, would 

go toward additional cooperative agreements with the States. Of 

course we already have cooperative agreements in place with the 

States to help fund some of their activities in our disease programs. 

Senator HARKIN. I see that $10 million. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stabenow. 

Senator STABENOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am so pleased to hear that Dr. Lonnie King is working with you 

at CDC, and I know you are in good hands then with Michigan 

State represented. 

A question on our emergency preparedness. Right now one of the 

questions that we have to resolve is to make sure that there is a 

clearly defined emergency preparedness plan with clear protocols 

relating to the Federal Government and the State Government. Do 

we have that now? 

Dr. GERBERDING. What we have, first of all, is a national strategy that puts all of the components of Government on notice that 

they may have a role to play. Secretary Leavitt and CDC and others in the Department of Health and Human Services have the National Health Plan that was just presented a couple of weeks ago, 

which defines all of the components of preparedness that are necessary throughout our States and local communities. 

What we are doing now is working directly with the leaders of 

those enterprises to translate sort of this hard copy of a plan into 

something that would actually operate in the context of an emergency, and Secretary Leavitt will be having a summit with leaders, 

and then we will be going out to communities all over the country 

to really translate a book of planning into some actual plans that 

make sense at the local level. 

Senator STABENOW. So we are not there yet. So we are at a point 

where the intent is there, the statements about the fact the local 

communities and States may be involved and so on, but we are not 

there yet. 

Dr. GERBERDING. What we have is the strategy, the doctrine. The 

roles and responsibilities have been clearly articulated, at least for 

the public health side of the house. But now we just have to get 

that knitted together in a network that does not have any gaps in 

it. That is a tall order, and we will do it as quickly as we can. 

17

Senator STABENOW. Do you feel confident then that the State of 

Michigan, as an example, or any State, knows what their role is 

right now from the health standpoint? 

Dr. GERBERDING. I hope they have read the plan, but we will be 

meeting. The State of Michigan has been invited to a summit with 

Secretary Leavitt and other leaders in the next couple of weeks, 

and we will be sitting down and walking through all of those roles 

and responsibilities in each element to be sure that the leaders 

really understand what we think needs to be done, and will learn 

something from that too because there are States that have already 

taken some important steps forward and we want to disseminate 

those advances that the leaders at the State and local level have 

already presented. 

Senator STABENOW. What about from the USDA side of the equation? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. We have in place in virtually every State a State 

level animal health emergency response organization. Most of what 

we accomplish in APHIS we do so in concert with the State Departments of Agriculture, so our State level response organization 

would be coordinated by the State veterinarian as well as our senior Federal veterinarian in each State. So whether it is preparation 

for an outbreak of avian influenza or foot and mouth disease or Africa swine fever, I think that we are well prepared. 

Those State level response then would be coordinated regionally 

through our regional offices and then nationally. All of our employees are being trained in incident command systems, so I think that 

preparing for emergencies and in fact responding to emergencies is 

what we do. 

We have taken our emergency plans and we are customizing 

them, if you will, for the specific threat that this H5N1 virus represents, so that I think we are prepared, but we want to make sure 

that our preparations include any unique requirements that might 

come from this particular virus. 

Senator STABENOW. I understand that funds are being discussed 

as to States and also farmers directly in planning and becoming 

prepared. I am wondering are there currently available funds for 

on-farm biosecurity? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. There are indeed, and I think that while we also 

re-partner with our State colleagues, we also partner very effectively with the poultry industry. 

A couple of years ago, largely in response to an outbreak of Exotic Newcastle disease, another devastating poultry disease, we had 

a $4.4 million campaign called ‘‘Biosecurity for the Birds.’’ It was 

directed at commercial poultry, but also backyard flocks, for the 

sole purposes of identifying that there are threats out there, educating producers as to what they might see if there a problem, and 

directing them to contact the appropriate officials, typically a State 

official, if they have a problem. 

Part of the request that the President has made would include 

additional monies for outreach, but I think we could buildupon that 

Biosecurity for the Birds campaign that is already in existence and 

buildupon that. 

I feel comfortable that the commercial industry in particular understands biosecurity. They understand that with a reservoir of 

18

wild birds for avian influenza viruses, they are at threat all the 

time for the introduction of an unwanted pathogen. So by practicing good biosecurity, taking some very common sense easy measures to keep unwanted pathogens off the farm and out of the poultry houses, that they in fact have been very effective. There is certainly a heightened awareness right now with the current threat. 

Senator STABENOW. One final question. Overall right now, do you 

feel prepared or how soon will you be prepared for what has been 

discussed here as a huge threat to us in terms of the kind of pandemic that we are talking about from a public health standpoint? 

Dr. GERBERDING. I do not think any of us feel prepared for a pandemic at this point in time. I do not think anyone in the world is 

prepared for a pandemic right now. But we feel hope, and hope has 

come in the form of a lot of hard work that has been going on for 

several years, and certainly been escalating in the context of H5N1. 

But I think it has also been accelerated by the leadership, by the 

President’s proposal, by Congress’s awareness and willingness to 

take this seriously, to recognize the scope of investment that is necessary to accelerate what we are doing. And again, the single biggest advance, in my view, is the potential that we really will have 

a vaccine for flu that will ultimately allow us to take this problem 

off the table. 

Senator STABENOW. The question is, though, how soon—I mean 

at this point it is great and I am hopeful, we are all hopeful, but 

are we fast enough moving on the track in providing the resources 

that we are going to be able to address what is coming? 

Dr. GERBERDING. We hope we will have the resources we need. 

That has not happened quite yet. And we also recognize that even 

with those investments, we are not talking about something that 

is going to get fixed overnight. It will take several years to get the 

vaccine problem solved. It will take a couple of years to get an 

antiviral stockpile built up. We need new antivirals. We need a 

level of preparedness that is significantly beyond where we are 

today. But it is a big step, and I think we need to look on that as 

a challenge and make the very best use of these investments that 

we can. 

Senator STABENOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Dr. DeHaven, I understand the chairman asked a very pertinent question about Thanksgiving turkeys, and what folks know, 

we can all enjoy turkey over Thanksgiving. In your written testimony—I want to make sure I understand this—you indicate that 

no human case of avian influenza have been confirmed eating properly prepared poultry. And then you kind of go through a nice kind 

of litany of the right things to do, to cook the meat, poultry properly using proper temperatures, food thermometer check. Then you 

kind of go further then talking about always refrigerate perishable 

foods within 2 hours of taking it out of the refrigerator, et cetera, 

et cetera. 

This issue of refrigeration, that is simply good food handling. 

That does not have to do with avian flu. In other words, once you 

kill it, if you have cooked it properly, you are not worried about if 

you do not chill it, refrigerate it. The issue is not about it regenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
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erating, right, it is simply you do not want to get some other problem caused by improper handling of food. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. You are exactly correct, Senator Coleman, the 

comments go toward just good food sanitation practices. This particular virus, all avian influenza viruses are quite susceptible to 

normal cooking temperatures, and so we are just espousing good 

food sanitation in the kitchen. 

Senator COLEMAN. So it does not have any special regenerative 

qualities once you have killed the virus? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Absolutely not. 

Senator COLEMAN. You indicated in response to my colleague’s 

question about working with State veterinarians. Minnesota has a 

poultry industry that has a 25–year record of actively looking for 

various concerns including AI, specifically designed surveillance 

programs. Tell me, how USDA utilized lessons learned from existing programs? Are there things that we are doing on a State level 

that provides some insight or helping? I am just trying to understand the coordination between the stuff that appears to be working pretty solidly at the State level and what we are doing at the 

Federal level. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. I am very proud of all of the accomplishments of 

APHIS in the disease, control and eradication front, and particularly with regard to some of our eradication of the introduction of 

foreign animal diseases. But I cannot say that in good faith without 

also recognizing that everything that we accomplish virtually in 

APHIS is done in concert with our State colleagues in the State Departments of Agriculture. So at the State level it is the State veterinarian working side-by-side with our Federal area veterinarian 

in charge that carries out all of our programs. Our emergency response mechanism is directed at the State level, here again directed by the senior Federal veterinarian and the senior State veterinarian in each State. 

So the fact that we are now working with avian influenza, we 

have worked side-by-side in, in fact, avian influenza and Exotic 

Newcastle disease eradication efforts. This is just one more threat 

where we are working collectively to increase and bolster our ongoing efforts. 

Senator COLEMAN. Dr. Gerberding, as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee, we did hearings on SARS and you came before 

us, and there was this great fear that SARS was going to be a pandemic and it did not happen. I note in the Reuters article that the 

Chinese Premier says, ‘‘In 2003 we defeated SARS. This will inspire us to victory over bird flu.’’ What is the difference here? Did 

we miss something with SARS or did we overreact? Are we overreacting here? It is perhaps a two-part question. We have seen now 

cases, human cases. What is it going to take to trigger—how does 

this pandemic get triggered? It is already now in humans. What is 

going to happen that has not happened so far that we should really 

worry about? 

Dr. GERBERDING. The feared change is that the virus itself will 

either evolve slightly and become more adaptable to person-to-person transmission, which is very inefficient right now, or as Senator 

Harkin pointed out, the avian virus would infect a swine or some 

mammal and that mammal would also be infected with regular 

20

seasonal flu that already is easily transmitted person-to-person, the 

genes would be exchanged and we would end up with a hybrid that 

had the worst features of both. Those things have happened in the 

past, and we have no knowledge right now from a scientific perspective that would allow us to predict when and if they will happen again. We just know that it is possible, and that is why we are 

putting so much attention on this particular virus, hoping that this 

will not be the one that emerges, and that it will be some future 

virus that will give us more time to prepare for. 

Senator COLEMAN. If you were in the habit of placing some odds, 

could you give us any measure of the possibilities; are we looking 

at something that is one in a million, or are we looking at something that is one in 30, one in 50? 

Dr. GERBERDING. I wish I was a gambling woman, and I am not, 

and I really could not possibly speculate on the odds. I just know 

that it is not zero, and it is one of those dilemmas in public health 

where the statistical probability is either small or unknown, but 

the consequences are so enormous that we have to do what the 

Federal Government should do to prepare. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Talent. 

Senator TALENT. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for this important hearing. 

Dr. DeHaven, I am inclined to define success in this area as complete prevention, in other words, we just do not see a case of this 

in the United States. Would you agree with that? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Certainly. 

Senator TALENT. I mean that is the ideal, that is success. Do you 

feel like the Department got enough of the President’s proposal for 

money? I looked at it, and out of everything that he proposes, like 

90 million—I do not want to be parochial on behalf of the Department—that just did not seem to me to be a lot of that funding. Did 

you get what you thought you needed? Maybe another way to approach that would be, discuss the top two or three things that you 

are doing to prevent this disease from reaching our poultry population, and if there was one area where you could get some money, 

of those two or three or four things, what would it be? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Senator Talent, I think we need to look at it in 

the context of what is already in place. We already have an animal 

disease emergency response mechanism in place. We already had 

an avian influenza program in place, and with a recent additional 

line item specifically for low pathogenic avian influenza, that infrastructure is what will help us in preventing the introduction, or 

should it be introduced, a response to any avian influenza virus, 

whether it be this H5N1 or any other virus. 

We are currently going to, are in the process of bolstering our domestic program. We are going to increase wild bird surveillance in 

North America as well as in parts of Asia. That provides I think 

a very good early warning system. 

But I think we need to do more in terms of attacking this virus 

at its source, specifically the birds that are being affected in the 

countries that have the virus. Part of what we would do would be 

to use the monies that the President is requesting to put in-country 

experts into those countries on a long-term basis to help them conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
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trol and eradicate the virus, and do so in a way that is appropriate 

for the infrastructure and the industry in those specific countries. 

We need to work very closely in consultation not only with out public health colleagues within the United States, but work through 

organizations like the World Health Organization, the FAO and the 

OIE, who already have the contacts and the infrastructure in place, 

and so that the United States would be one country out of many 

participating in that international arena. So the monies that would 

be made available to the United States would only be part of the 

total resources available through the World Bank, through other 

developed countries, in attacking the virus at its source in those 

countries. 

Senator TALENT. So what I am hearing you saying is that there 

already is an emergency response mechanism in place, which certainly ought to be your answer, because this is not the first potential disease that you have had to fight. You are pretty comfortable 

saying we need some more money for additional surveillance, and 

then beyond that you want to intensify your efforts to cut this off 

at the source. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. That is a very good summation, and indeed, the 

resources that would be made available through the President’s request for emergency funding allows us to do all of those things 

from enhancing domestic surveillance to working with the affected 

countries through international organizations to attack that virus 

at its source. 

Senator TALENT. I am not going to argue with you about it, and 

I think that is actually comforting for you to believe that—yes, 

there is always more we can do, but this did not just spring on you, 

you have anticipated it and other things, and it is also good in the 

context of what we have had all said here, that our poultry supply 

is safe and people need have no concerns about that, precisely because we anticipate and prevent these kinds of outbreaks before 

they happen. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. While I have no doubt about the safety of poultry 

in the United States, I think if we ever get to the point where we 

feel totally comfortable that we are prepared is a dangerous situation. We can always do more to prepare both domestically, and I 

think in this particular case there is more that we can do and will 

be doing to attack this virus at its source, and in doing so, we not 

only help those countries, we reduce the risk to the United States. 

There is always more that we can do. 

Senator TALENT. Well, I will quote you, and I am sure we all will 

when we do our Thanksgiving interviews back home and we get 

the question, ‘‘Is the turkey safe?’’ And we will tell on your authority that it is, but that there is always more we are going to try and 

do. I appreciate your answers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DeHaven, from what I think we have gleaned 

from this, there is no question that the domestic poultry industry 

is healthy, but it appears that the easiest way that the domestic 

poultry industry could be infected is through the importation or 

smuggling of some bird into the domestic flock. Are you comfortable 

with the mechanisms that you have in place to prevent smuggling 

22

from countries that have seen an outbreak of this particular strain, 

into the United States? 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Mr. Chairman, we have taken a number of steps 

to address this particular situation. Back in 2003, when this H5N1 

virus was first identified, we imposed restrictions on the importation of poultry, poultry products and birds from any affected countries. We put out alert to our colleagues in Customs and Border 

Protection to be especially vigilant, to look for poultry, poultry 

products from affected countries coming into the United States either accidentally or through smuggling type activities. We have a 

team of some 100 people within APHIS whose sole purpose is to 

look for smuggled product, and indeed, they have been looking specifically for poultry, poultry products being smuggled into the 

United States from affected countries, and indeed, they have in fact 

found some product that was being illegally brought into the 

United States. 

I think we have all of those mechanisms in place. We have issued 

a number of alerts to our Customs and Border Protection colleagues. They are acutely aware of the situation, so I feel good that 

they are aware and addressing it as well. 

To the extent that we can be comfortable, again, I am hesitant 

to say that we should ever feel comfortable. We need to be ever 

more vigilant and maintain our guard, particularly with regard to 

this new threat. 

The CHAIRMAN. Likewise, Dr. Gerberding, are there appropriate 

methods in place from the standpoint of the CDC to prevent the 

introduction of disease into the United States from humans that 

may have contracted this disease in other parts of the world and 

travel to the United States? 

Dr. GERBERDING. Senator, this is a very difficult challenge. This 

virus, if it is like regular flu, may be infectious before the individual has symptoms. So a person could actually be capable of 

spreading a flu virus to others that they come in contact with before they even recognize that they have it. Right now we have no 

evidence of this kind of sustained person-to-person transmission, so 

there are no travel advisories, no travel alerts, and no special precautions for returning people, other than advising people not to go 

to the wet markets and the poultry farms in the countries where 

the problem is in outbreak form. 

But we are using the investments that Congress has made in our 

Global Disease Detection Program and our Quarantine Program to 

scale up our quarantine stations, so that at least if there was a sick 

passenger on a plane or someone recognized a potential case, that 

we would have the appropriate procedures and medical supervision 

at our airports and ports of entry to be able to help the problem. 

In the last 2 years, because of our investments in global disease 

detection, we have been able to go from eight quarantine stations 

in United States airports to, I believe, 18 at this point in time. We 

will have 25 by the end of next year. We will have medical officers 

who have the knowledge and capability of quarantining a 747 full 

of passengers if that became necessary. We have been examining 

that and trying to scale this process for flu or any other problem, 

but it is very difficult. 

23

That is why we are so concerned, that from the Secretary’s doctrine the first step is to deal with the problem at its source in the 

birds internationally. The second step is if it does come more transmissible person-to-person that we collaborate with our international partners and do everything possible to quench it at its 

source by supporting access to antivirals, the technical support 

CDC has, the laboratory capability we have, and the overall public 

health infrastructure training and support that we can provide. So 

it is most important that we try to develop now in those regions 

that are lacking it so that we have at least a chance of seeing this 

as it emerges and can act aggressively there before it gets here. 

There is no guarantee of that, and that is why we also have to 

prepare every community in this country to take the steps that it 

needs to take to do the same thing here in the domestic front, and 

that is a very, very big challenge. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank both of you again for being here 

today for this very informative testimony, and we look forward to 

staying in touch. If we continue to see other cases develop, particularly those cases that maybe move our way, we may want you to 

come back, and update us. But we thank you very much for being 

here today. 

Dr. DEHAVEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. GERBERDING. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will now move to our second panel, which is 

comprised of Dr. Don Waldrip, Director of Health Services, Wayne 

Farms, Oakwood, Georgia; Dr. Stan Kleven, who is a veterinarian. 

He is a Regents’ Professor, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Georgia, Athens; and Ms. Gretta Irwin, Executive Director, 

Iowa Turkey Federation, from Ames, Iowa. 

Welcome to all three of you. We appreciate very much you being 

here today to provide additional information to the committee as 

well as to the American public about this very critical issue, and 

we look forward to your opening statements. Dr. Waldrip, we will 

start with you, and then Dr. Kleven and Ms. Irwin. 

STATEMENT OF DONALD WALDRIP, DVM, DIPLOMATE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF POULTRY VETERINARIANS, AND DIRECTOR, ANIMAL HEALTH AND LIVE PRODUCTION, WAYNE 

FARMS, LLC, OAKWOOD, GEORGIA, APPEARING ON BEHALF 

OF THE NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL 

Dr. WALDRIP. Chairman Chambliss and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear today on behalf of 

the National Chicken Council, which represents companies that 

produce, process and market about 95 percent of the chicken sold 

in the United States. I am Don Waldrip, Director of Animal Health 

and Live Production for Wayne Farms in Oakwood, Georgia. 

Let me start by stating some facts that should be obvious, but 

somehow seem to get lost in the media hype and coverage, for the 

possibility of a worldwide flu pandemic. 

First and most important, the H5N1 highly pathogenic strain of 

avian influenza, referred to as Asian flu, does not exist in the 

United States, and has never been present in chickens in this country. Avian influenza virus, capable of causing a pandemic with sustained human-to-human spread is not known to exist anywhere in 

24

the world today. If the disease should enter the United States, it 

would be quickly detected through testing and surveillance. Disease would be eradicated by isolating the affect flocks, destroying 

all birds in the flock, and testing all birds in a controlled area. 

Finally, if the H5N1 virus, now in Asia and Eastern Europe, 

should change and evolve sufficiently to become a direct threat to 

humans in the United States, it is logical to assume that the virus 

would be spread from human to human, rather than from birds to 

humans. 

As referenced earlier, the United States has multiple lines of defense against Asian H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza. First, 

the United States has never imported any poultry products from 

the countries now affected. They have never been authorized to 

ship poultry products into the U.S. We already have extensive surveillance and testing programs in place for the commercial poultry 

industry, and anticipate the level of testing will continue to increase. The Federal Government, State Governments and the poultry industry work cooperatively in this area. 

The U.S. Department of Interior routinely tests migratory waterfowl in Alaska and along the Pacific flyway, looking for any signs 

that wild birds might carry the virus to this country. Thus far they 

have found no H5N1. 

The chicken industry has adopted a policy identical to that of the 

U.S. Government, that no one that has been to an area where the 

Asian flu is present should visit a U.S. poultry farm or hatchery 

for at least 7 days thereafter. 

Perhaps the most important point I could make is that the poultry industry in the United States is structurally different, that is, 

extremely different, from the industry in those Asian countries 

where H5N1 has posed a major problem. Poultry production in the 

affected areas of Asia relies mostly on small farms and free-roaming backyard or village poultry of mixed species that come in frequent and close contact with people. The virus is present in wild 

birds, especially waterfowl, and there is often a commingling of several domestic and wild avian species. In addition, live bird markets 

are popular in most Asian countries. These markets create almost 

perfect conditions for the perpetuation of avian influenza viruses. 

In stark contrast, chickens in the United States are mostly 

raised in enclosed houses, a practice which greatly reduces the risk 

of exposure to wild birds and predators. Good biosecurity practices 

are followed on the farms and throughout our production, our live 

operations, and the health status of the flocks are monitored 

throughout the grow-out cycle. We believe our commercial poultry 

industry and the U.S. Government have good practices in place to 

prevent the introduction of Asian H5N1 virus into this country. We 

also believe that our monitoring and surveillance programs, and 

good biosecurity practices will help us deal promptly and effectively 

with any mild form of AI that could occur in the future. 

Despite all the media attention and talk of a possible human 

pandemic, no one can say with certainty there will be one. In its 

current form, H5N1 does not easily infect people. Perhaps the best 

way we can prevent a pandemic or keep the Asian flu from spreading to other countries including the U.S., is to step our efforts to 

deal with the problem and tackle the disease at its source. A top 

25

official with a food and agriculture organization was quoted last 

week as saying, ‘‘The fight against bird flu must be waged in the 

backyards of the world’s poor, where hundreds of millions of chickens dwell beyond the reach of vaccination or government scrutiny.’’

The resources needed to stamp out the H5N1 virus at its source 

are staggering. While no one knows for sure how much has been 

spent to date on trying to eliminate H5N1 from poultry worldwide, 

the World Bank estimates that on the basis of current programs 

and pledges, more will be spent on stockpiling flu drugs than on 

efforts to control the disease in poultry at its source. 

We believe it would be a good use of resources for nations that 

can afford it to help those that cannot afford to eradicate H5N1 

virus. That may be one of the most important weapons in our arsenal to prevent the spread of H5N1 virus to the U.S. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Waldrip can be found in the appendix on page 76.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Kleven. 

STATEMENT OF S.H. KLEVEN, DVM, PhD, REGENTS’ PROFESSOR, COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE, POULTRY DIAGNOSTIC AND RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, ATHENS, GEORGIA 

Dr. KLEVEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the opportunity to be here today. My name is Stan Kleven. 

I am a Regents’ Professor at University of Georgia at the Poultry 

Diagnostic and Research Center. We are located in Athens, Georgia. 

This is a unit that is very, very well-known worldwide. We obviously come from the largest poultry producing State in the United 

States, but we have an extensive teaching program. We have a 

training program for veterinarians to train them in poultry disease 

diagnostic and prevention. We have an extensive research program 

and also we have a diagnostic laboratory where we provide services 

to the poultry industry. 

Risking a little bit maybe repeating some things that other people have said, I want to go back and talk a little bit more about 

some of the basic ideas around influenza viruses. For example, we 

have to remember that most influenza viruses are not pathogenic. 

There are quite a large host range of influenza viruses, but the 

most common species involved would be birds of pigs, horses, 

whales, seals and humans. One of the most important things to remember about influenza viruses is their ability to change, and their 

ability to surprise us, and this is constantly going on. 

Occasionally mutations occur which increase the virulence or 

mutations occur which cause a virus to jump from one species to 

the other, and we really do not know a lot about exactly how this 

occurs or exactly what mutations need to occur. We do know that 

the so-called melting pot for development of new virus screens appears to be wild waterfowl, which are apparently infected with lots 

of strains and there is lots of different strains that occurs in wild 

waterfowl, and sometimes mutations occur, or sometimes contacts 

occur with domestic animals that allows the virus to jump into anVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
26

other species. We think that the very common jumps from the 

other species are from the wild waterfowl into domestic poultry, or 

a lot of times it could be into pigs. 

I would like to say a little bit more about the nomenclature also. 

We talk about the N types and the H types. That is only the beginning of the story. The designation H5N1, for example, tells us nothing about virulence. There are other H5N1s that have occurred 

many times in other places that are not virulent, and may even 

have infected species other than the chicken. 

The term ‘‘high path’’ and ‘‘low path,’’ I want to clarify some of 

the terminology there because highly pathogenic strains or the terminology ‘‘highly pathogenic’’ refers to chickens only. That is a designation based on challenge of chickens with the virus, and a strain 

which is high path in chickens, for example, may or may not be another species. We know, for example, over the years that there 

have been several devastating viruses that have occurred in turkeys that really, when you challenge chickens, they are not high 

path by definition. So we need to remember that ‘‘high path’’ refers 

to chicken only. 

Dr. Waldrip reminded us that we are free of AI in the United 

States, and he talked about the surveillance. We have heard a lot 

about the surveillance programs that are going on here. I would 

just like to remind everybody that a lot of this is done by State laboratories and university laboratories, and there are a lot of poultry 

veterinarians around the poultry industry in the United States 

that are very, very familiar with this disease, and I think it is 

highly unlikely that any AI in the United States could pop up, especially anything that is highly pathogenic that would not be recognized almost immediately. 

The low path strains, which may not cause much overt disease, 

I think we would pick them up also relatively quickly because of 

the surveillance programs that we have talked about already. 

What are some of the consequences of an AI outbreak? Well, the 

mortality and a loss of production is obvious, but there is also the 

disruptions that would occur, the disruptions in the movement of 

birds to market, and movement of feed from the feed mill to the 

farms, the movement of birds to processing, all this may be highly 

disrupted, and obviously, the loss of international trade that would 

result from the cutting off trade with our trading partners. 

A lot has been said about the asiatic strain. I do not think I am 

going to go into that to any extent except to say that I think it is 

clear to everyone that the longer that exists, the longer that problem exists in Southeast Asia or in Asian countries, the greater the 

likelihood that that virus is going to make that jump and start to 

spread from human to human. If we are really concerned about the 

human disease, we need to do what we can to get at the virus at 

the source. 

A couple of words about vaccines. We have heard a little bit 

about those today. Vaccines can be very effective in preventing disease and preventing clinical signs. What the vaccines will not do 

is stop infection, and one of the reasons I think that vaccines are 

not part of the eradication programs is that vaccinated birds will 

test antibody positive, and it can be difficult to differentiate beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:39 Oct 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\28423.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
27

tween vaccinated birds and birds that might actually carry the 

virus. 

We have talked a lot about the danger to humans. I do not think 

I will go into that any more.I would like to say a few things about 

resources. We heard some words about resources this morning. For 

one, I have heard that—I do not know details, but I understand 

that a lot of the funding that is being proposed is for monitoring, 

surveillance and emergency programs. I think perhaps there is a 

danger that we might be neglecting to do some funding for research 

here. It is difficult for people at the university level, for example, 

to obtain funding to work with avian influenza, and it is difficult 

for many of us to actually propose to work with the highly pathogenic strains because there are very, very few laboratories that 

have the facilities that will allow this. One of the very few facilities 

in the United States that actually can work with the highly pathogenic strains is USDA’s Southeast Poultry Research Lab. That laboratory is well-known around the world, with some of the most 

competent scientists in avian influenza you will find. 

I do not know if you have ever visited that laboratory, but they 

are crowded. They do not have a place to put another person. Their 

animal care facilities are filled up. And as good as they are, I think 

they could do better if they had some better facilities and a better 

place for people to work because they are very, very crowded. 

We have also heard about the National Poultry Improvement 

Plan and the program that has been set up. My understanding is 

that that plan is still in the rulemaking stage, and it is tied up. 

The plan was approved by the Biennial Conference almost a year 

and a half ago now. And my understanding is that it is still tied 

up in rulemaking changes or the rulemaking process, and it could 

be quite some time before the actual process is finished and the 

plan actually put in place. I think that anything that could be done 

to speed this along would be very, very helpful. 

I have covered a lot of ground. I may have skipped over a few 

things, but I really appreciate this chance, and thank you very 

much for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kleven can be found in the appendix on page 80.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Irwin. 

STATEMENT OF GRETTA IRWIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IOWA 

TURKEY FEDERATION, AMES, IOWA 

Ms. IRWIN. Good morning. My name is Gretta Irwin and I am the 

Executive Director of the Iowa Turkey Federation. I am testifying 

today on behalf of the National Turkey Federation, and we appreciate the opportunity of being here. 

Iowa is the Nation’s 10th largest turkey producing State, and we 

rank fifth in turkey processing. West Liberty Foods in West Liberty, Iowa, and the Sara Lee Foods facility in Storm Lake, Iowa 

process about 18 million turkeys between them, and nationally, the 

turkey industry will raise almost 270 million turkeys this year, 

producing more than 5 billion pounds of turkey meat. 

Turkey producers and processors in Iowa, and across the United 

States, have been fighting avian influenza, or AI, long before it 

28

started making headlines. For our industry avian influenza poses 

a triple threat. It threatens the health of our turkeys we raise. It 

threatens the economic livelihood of our processors and the family 

farmers who grow the birds. And it threatens to create a negative 

public health threat for our product. And so we want to keep that 

perception under control as well. 

Fortunately, I am here bearing good news today. The U.S. turkey 

industry has been extraordinarily successful in fighting against 

avian influenza. The one fact that must be underscored at this 

hearing is that there has never been a single case in the United 

States of Asian type of avian influenza. We believe Iowa has played 

a role in this success story by developing a model program of industry and Government cooperation to control the disease and prevent 

significant outbreaks. 

I had the privilege of being involved in the development of our 

emergency poultry disease plan, which again we started over 3 

years ago. Since September of 2003, the State of Iowa has required 

that every turkey and every chicken flock in the State be tested for 

avian influenza. These are any turkeys that enter our State, and 

we do bring almost half of our processing kill capacity in from the 

States surrounding the State of Iowa, so we are testing those birds 

as well. 

Iowa State University’s diagnostic laboratory then tests all of the 

cases for us, and they also have a test that they can, within two 

to 3 hours, detect the highly pathogenic avian influenza strains. If 

a positive H5 or H7 is found, our program requires that the farm 

is quarantined by the State veterinarian for a minimum of 3 

months after the last positive sample is found. We have procedures 

in place for the disposal of the manure, cleaning of the barn, delivery of feed, rescheduling the replacement flocks and pest control 

are outlined in this program. And again, our producers had an active part in producing this plan, and so its buy-in across the industry is very strong. 

Iowa is not alone in preparing for this emergency. Similar programs have been designed in every turkey-producing region of our 

country. Programs like ours in Iowa have helped build this track 

record, but several other critical factors are at work as well. First, 

the modern production techniques used in commercial turkey, 

chicken and egg industries place a premium on biosecurity, not 

only with AI but with all diseases. So by not allowing our birds to 

come in contact with wild birds, we are helping control that spread 

of the disease into our flocks. 

Second, the vertically integrated model of our turkey industry 

gives us a unique advantage to respond and to continue to contain 

any type of disease outbreak. Turkey companies have veterinarians 

that help monitor the flocks. The growers are in the barns every 

day, checking the health and well-being of their turkeys. So if a 

flock of turkeys begins to show a sign of any disease, those producers and the processors would do testing immediately to see if 

there is any serious problems that need to be taken care of. 

Finally, as I noted earlier, special protocols are in place to detect 

and control any form of AI. This excess gives the turkey industry 

confidence, but it does not make us cocky. A series of isolated regional outbreaks of low path AI in 2002 and 2004 remind us of the 

29

need for continued vigilance and underscore the challenge posed by 

live bird markets which were the source of these outbreaks. Surveillance of these markets is a key component to the new USDA 

program. 

We have three specific recommendations for the way that this 

committee can help further enhance our preparedness. Continue to 

work closely with your colleagues on the Appropriations Committee 

to continue funding USDA’s long term, low path AI control program at the maximum level necessary. In the rush to enhance our 

ability to protect human population from a possible pandemic, do 

not forget that prevention begins on the farm. While we commend 

President Bush for calling on Congress to provide the $7.1 billion 

in emergency funding, we are dismayed that less than $100 million 

is targeted toward USDA. Congress should make sure USDA’s AI 

research programs are fully funded, and that the research facilities 

are modern and up to date and able to conduct the most sensitive 

research. 

Finally, the United States should take the lead in the world in 

fighting against avian influenza in poultry. Too often AI has become a tool in trade battles. Countries like the United States that 

have successfully controlled H5 and H7 should be rewarded for 

their efforts, not forced to report harmless strains and punished for 

embargoes when these nonthreatening strains appear. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Irwin can be found in the appendix on page 82.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks to each of you for those very informative 

statements. 

Dr. Waldrip, in your testimony you mentioned that the good biosecurity practices of the U.S. poultry industry are critical to preventing an outbreak of avian influenza in the United States. Can 

you provide more detail on the U.S. poultry industry’s biosecurity 

practices and how they can effectively limit disease introduction 

and spread? 

Dr. WALDRIP. Most companies have a staged biosecurity program: 

Normal business, normal procedures, more danger, increased biosecurity, and then in the state we are in now, we call it high level. 

In those higher levels we do the things that we might not have 

done earlier under normal circumstances that would protect us 

from the incursion of this disease or any other disease. 

All the companies that I am aware of are stepping up their efforts in this area, that include restriction on people movement, increased clothing that would protect against the virus, increased 

things that would help prevent the incursion of any virus that 

might occur in the area. It is a threat to our business and we are 

responding appropriately. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Again, Dr. Waldrip, on October 14, 

2005, the government of Iraq announced a prohibition on imports 

of poultry products from all sources, citing concerns over the spread 

of highly pathogenic avian influenza. There was an immediate disruption in U.S. poultry meat exports and sales to the region. I understand that the U.S. Government has recently received a letter 

lifting the restrictions on poultry from countries not affected by 

30

highly pathogenic avian influenza, officially allowing trade to flow 

from the United States. A specific concern was the flow of product 

across the Turkish border into Kurdish areas of Iraq. Do you have 

any additional information to report, and can you confirm that U.S. 

product is indeed moving across the border into Iraq? 

Dr. WALDRIP. Our company is a moderate exporting company, 

and I do not think we export in that area, so as far as I know product is flowing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kleven, there has been much speculation on 

the role of wild bird populations in the spread of avian influenza 

from Southeast Asia to parts of Europe. There is also a concern 

that the disease may spread to the Middle East, parts of Africa and 

potentially the United States. Can you comment on the role of wild 

birds in disease spread and the measures we have in place to ensure that this disease does not reach the U.S. from wild birds? 

Dr. KLEVEN. Most influenza viruses do not clinically affect wild 

birds. This is one that is different. This one has been reported to 

actually kill some wild birds or wild waterfowl. Fortunately, the 

natural flyways around the world are north and south, and with 

very little transfer from the Asiatic-European continent over to the 

Americas, but there is a little bit. And there are several agencies, 

State agencies, an agency in Athens, Georgia, for example, the 

Southeast Cooperative Wildlife Study, that have very active surveillance programs going on. And hopefully, and I think with some 

confidence, that if such an exchange occurs, that it will be picked 

up pretty quickly. 

But in addition to just that virus, wild waterfowl are known to 

carry all kinds of influenza viruses, and as a matter of good practice, I think that our method of raising poultry by keeping birds 

confined is a very, very good barrier between the wild birds and the 

domestic birds. 

I guess one other comment that I would make on this is the regulations on organic poultry raising. My understanding is that there 

is a requirement to label your product as organic poultry. These 

birds have to have the ability to gain access to the outdoors, and 

this is an absolute requirement, as far as my understanding, for 

the organic label. And I think that it would be a very, very good 

idea if we could do something to change that, to make that at least 

optional so that these birds could be confined and sheltered from 

wild birds. 

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony you cite concern with live bird 

markets. Can you clarify the situation in live bird markets for 

members of the committee and comment on the Federal Government’s role in the monitoring and surveillance of these areas? 

Dr. KLEVEN. The main concern with live bird markets in the 

United States is the New York/New Jersey market. That market, 

we are quite certain, was involved with exposing the commercial 

poultry industry in Pennsylvania back in—I do not remember, 1990 

something—and caused that big epidemic. After that there has 

been a large State-industry-Federal effort made to increase surveillance in those wild bird markets, to institute a program for sanitation, periodic cleanup, and I think they have made a lot of good 

progress on that, but they are still making isolations of an H7N2 

virus, which seems to be quite pathogenic and still remains, in my 

31

view, just as big a risk to the U.S. poultry industry as the H5N1 

from Asia. 

I think we also should not forget that Mexico has an endemic 

H5N2 influenza virus and that we need to maintain surveillance 

from that direction also. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Irwin, I do not think we can overemphasize 

this enough, particularly with Thanksgiving coming up. One of the 

dearest traditions, obviously, is the gathering of folks to eat turkey 

on Thanksgiving Day. Mentioned in today’s testimony, and a point 

I want to confirm and highlight for the American people is the fact 

that avian influenza is not in our food supply, and that even if it 

was, the proper handling and cooking of food would protect us as 

we gather around the table to eat and give thanks next week. Any 

comments that you would like to add to what has been said today 

relative to that? 

Ms. IRWIN. As a home economist and working with consumers in 

the State of Iowa, I continue to emphasize on that as well, that our 

surveillance plans that we have in place and the monitoring that 

we are doing, and the knowledge of our producers to look for this, 

and the processors’ concern and care for this as well, should ensure 

all consumers that the products that they will enjoy, any of the 

poultry products, including the turkey, is perfectly safe this holiday 

season. 

The CHAIRMAN. You described in your testimony a comprehensive 

State response system to deal with potential introduction of AI. To 

what extent is Iowa’s response plan integrated with neighboring 

States, and is there a marginal benefit to establish and implement 

regional response plans focused on protecting the agricultural sector? 

Ms. IRWIN. The plan we have in Iowa was really modeled after 

a plan that Minnesota has been using for about 20 years, so as we 

continue to test birds, similarly they are doing the same thing in 

Minnesota and some of the surrounding States. And as I mentioned 

in my comments, almost half of our processing capacity comes in 

from those surrounding States. 

So I know that in working with Dr.Schultz, our State veterinarian, that if there was something that showed to be a positive 

and that bird originated from one of those other States—which our 

processors would know that because when the tests come back we 

actually know which county anything would come through if there 

was something positive—that that State veterinarian then would in 

turn work with the other veterinarians in the other States, and the 

Federal veterinarian in charge of our region would be involved 

automatically as well. 

So the communication has started and is really pretty well in 

place to help make sure that all of our surrounding States within 

that central region of the United States would communicate quite 

quickly and very effectively. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me again thank each one of you for 

being here today, and helping give comfort to this committee and 

the American people about this issue, and we look forward to staying in touch with you if there are additional problems that arise 

relative to this. We would like to have you available as a resource 

to help us work through the issues from a legislative perspective. 

32

We will leave the record open for the remainder of the day. If 

there are any written questions, we will direct them to you, and 

we would appreciate your response right away. Thank you very 

much. 

This hearing is concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X

NOVEMBER 17, 2005

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

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