UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LINWOOD GRAY,

Plaintiff,

v. 

WILTON D. GREGORY, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 22-cv-1856 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

While the Catholic Church and Big Tobacco are frequent targets of litigation, this is the 

rare, if not only, case where both are named as defendants in the same lawsuit. Plaintiff 

Linwood Gray brings this pro se action against the Catholic Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., 

the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and one “Father Ginny,” a priest who Gray claims hooked 

him on Lucky Strike cigarettes as a juvenile ward beginning in the late 1950s. Gray seeks 

damages totaling $185 million to remediate a variety of serious ailments purportedly caused by 

his resulting addition to nicotine. See Compl. at 1, 9. 

The Archdiocese has moved to dismiss Gray’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of federal jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to file suit within 

the applicable statute of limitations. Finding jurisdiction wanting, the Court will grant the 

motion on that basis and need not address the Archdiocese’s statute of limitations argument. 

Gray invokes this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Compl. at 2. Diversity jurisdiction 

exists when a case is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a person is a citizen of the 

state where he is domiciled. See Momenian v. Davidson, 878 F.3d 381, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A

corporation is a citizen “of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it 
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has its principal place of business.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (cleaned up). 

Diversity must be “complete,” meaning no plaintiff and defendant can be domiciled in the same 

state. Nytes v. Trustify, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2018). A plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Lopes v. 

Jetsetdc, LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 238, 241 (D.D.C. 2014). 

Gray’s complaint indicates that he lives in Washington, D.C., and it lists D.C. addresses 

for both the Archdiocese and R.J. Reynolds. Compl. at 1, 3. (Gray does not say where “Father 

Ginny” lives, in the unlikely event he is still with us.) The Archdiocese has submitted a 

declaration from in-house counsel Patrick Burke confirming that its place of incorporation is the 

District of Columbia. Burke Decl. ¶ 2, Reply Ex. 1. Mr. Burke explains that the Archdiocese 

was formed as a “corporation sole” by an Act of Congress in 1948. Id. at ¶ 3. “A ‘corporation 

sole’ is a corporation ‘consisting of only one person whose successor becomes the corporation on 

his death or resignation.’” K.W. ex rel. Edgerton v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Wash., No. 

CIV. A. 06-01167 HHK, 2007 WL 902316, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007) (quoting Black’s Law 

Dictionary 342 (6th ed.1990)). The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, currently 

Cardinal Wilton D. Gregory, is the Archdiocese’s only director and thus the “sole” embodiment 

of its corporate form. Burke Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. Assessing similar evidence, another court in this 

district treated the Archdiocese as a D.C. corporation for diversity purposes, noting, among other 

indicia of D.C. residency, that “[t]he Act creating the Archdiocese empowers it to act under ‘the 

laws in force in the District of Columbia[.]’” K.W. ex rel. Edgerton, 2007 WL 902316, at *1. 

The Archdiocese thus contends that it is domiciled in Washington, D.C. and, because Gray is 

also domiciled in D.C., complete diversity of citizenship is lacking. Mot. at 2–3.
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Gray’s only retort is to assert that Cardinal Gregory resides at an address in Hyattsville, 

Maryland. Opp’n at 6. Mr. Burke avers in response that the Hyattsville address is the location 

of the Archdiocese’s Pastoral Center, “which contains mostly administrative offices,” not 

Cardinal Gregory’s residence. Burke Decl. ¶ 6. Regardless, the location of the Cardinal 

Archbishop’s personal residence is irrelevant here because “any suit against the Archdiocese is . . 

. brought against the Archbishop in his corporate capacity.” K.W. ex rel. Edgerton, 2007 WL 

902316, at *1 (quoting Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768, 770 n. 2 (D.C.

1998)). So, the question is not where Cardinal Gregory lives, but where the Archdiocese is 

domiciled as a corporation. Nor would it matter if the Pastoral Center is the Archdiocese’s 

principal place of business; its domicile would then be both D.C. and Maryland, and diversity 

still would not exist. 

Accordingly, Mr. Gray has not met his burden to establish federal jurisdiction, and the 

Court will grant the Archdiocese’s motion and dismiss the case. A separate Order will follow.1 

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: February 8, 2023

1 Although R.J. Reynolds and “Father Ginny” remain defendants, subject matter jurisdiction 

generally is assessed as of the filing of the complaint. See Landmark Health Sols., LLC v. Not 

For Profit Hosp. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas 

Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004)). Because diversity was lacking from the outset, and the 

Court declines to exercise its discretion under Rule 21 to proceed with respect to any diverse 

defendants, the entire case will be dismissed.