THE MILITARY-NEWS MEDIA RELATIONSHIP: THINKING FORWARD

Charles W. Ricks

December 1, 1993
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The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the Director of Research by calling

commercial (717) 245-4086 or DSN 242-4086.
FOREWORD

One of the realities of modern military operations has been

that they are often subjected to intense scrutiny by the

international news media. Under most circumstances, the

deployment of U.S. forces attracts large numbers of print and

broadcast journalists dedicated to providing their audiences with

near real-time information of varying accuracy and completeness.

This extraordinary availability of information may well affect

the agenda of the executive and legislative branches of

government and have important impacts on military decisionmakers

in operational theaters.

Over the course of the next six months, the Strategic

Studies Institute will examine the impact of the media's

technological advances on strategic and operational level

planning and policymaking, first in an overseas theater, and

subsequently on decisions made at the national level. The first

of these two studies recognizes the complexity of executing

military operations under the scrutiny of a very responsive, high

technology world news media. Given the volatile, unstable, and

ambiguous environment in which armed forces can find themselves,

the actions of field forces have a greater chance than ever

before of affecting subsequent strategic decisions made at higher

levels. The pressure on field commanders to "get it right the

first time" is demonstrably greater than ever.

The author intends that these thoughts provide commanders

with an understanding of the high technology and competitive news

media environment they can expect to experience and offers

specific suggestions for successfully communicating with

reporters. To that end, and as a departure from its normal focus

on strategic issues, the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased

to publish this monograph to assist operational commanders and

their staffs and to contribute to improving the efficiency of the

relationship between the military and the news media.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CHARLES W. RICKS is a retired Army officer who now works as a

researcher and advisor on news media relations. He has lectured

and conducted training on the subject throughout Europe and the

United States to include meeting with officials of former members

of the Warsaw Pact and other nations. In addition to his service

with armor and cavalry units, his public affairs experience

includes assignments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and Allied Command Europe at SHAPE, Belgium. He specializes in

crisis management issues and has developed policies, plans and

procedures for communicating with reporters covering a variety of

national and international military activities including working

with journalists in the former Soviet Union during airlift

operations. He holds a BBA in Marketing from the University of

Wisconsin-Madison and an MA from the University of Kentucky; he

taught at the U.S. Military Academy and at the Armor School at

Fort Knox and was Director of the Broadcasting Department of the

Defense Information School.
SUMMARY

Some of the more enduring images of Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm involved soldiers in observation posts with

forests of television cameras and still photographers packed

tightly around their positions. In such situations, those troops

couldn't even have seen the enemy, let alone report about

him.There were also the news conferences with questions often

shouted so loudly and randomly that they couldn't be

distinguished, let alone answered. More recently, Marines landing

in the darkness on the beaches near Mogadishu, Somalia, found

themselves surrounded and illuminated by scores of journalists.

And through it all have been the descriptions of conflict and

bitterness, and journalists' charges of deliberate deception by

the military.

Much work has been done to trace the origins of the

persistent tension between the military and the news media. Often

the research strives to outline the history of the relationship

and seeks to identify similarities in institutional culture and

purpose on which to base agreements to guide future contacts. Yet

it seems inevitable that such schemes collapse in the first

stressful stages of a crisis or conflict as they are inevitably

artificial. This is because the military and the news media

pursue very different objectives and often hold very different

values.

This study seeks to move the discussion forward by

acknowledging the diversity and examining those news media issues

which will most affect commanders as they execute their assigned

missions. It makes no pretense at providing a template for

conducting successful media relations operations. However, it

does identify various planning factors which should be considered

as commanders prepare their public affairs' concepts of

operation.

At the very least, commanders' concerns focus on their

annoyance at the numbers of reporters, wariness over the news

media's advanced technology and frustration at the lack of

knowledge so many journalists display while covering the

military. These reactions often cause commanders to distance

themselves from reporters or attempt to control them while

gathering the news in the hope that such supervision will reduce

the risks of security violations and confusing news reports. The

American experiences in Grenada (1983) and Desert Shield/Storm

(1990-91) and the British actions in the Falkland Islands (1982)

are often cited as models for learning coping strategies for

dealing with the news media.

Yet those are not reliable precedents. In each case the

journalists had to be imported because there was no significant

news media presence indigenous to the areas of operation. It

would seem that the experiences in Panama (1989) and, especially,

Somalia (1992-93) are more useful models for understanding the
evolving environment of news media coverage of military

operations. History records that there were nine civilian war

correspondents on the island of Tarawa in the South Pacific in

1943 and fewer than 30 on the invasion beaches of Normandy in

1944, but those figures are now only of passing interest. The 600

reporters in the entire Pacific Theater in World War II were

nearly matched by the 500 journalists who quickly appeared on

tiny Grenada and in Panama City, and clearly surpassed by the

more than 1,500 who covered the Persian Gulf War and the disaster

relief operations in Florida (1992).

There is no longer a question of whether the news media will

cover military operations. Regardless of mission, they will

inevitably be interested in the drama, uncertainty and emotion.

As in Somalia, journalists will likely precede the force into the

area of operation; and they will transmit images of events as

they happen, perhaps from both sides of any conflict. Thus the

commander's operational task is to develop a well resourced and

responsive infrastructure to conduct news media relations.

Failure to do so will not affect the scale of news media

coverage; it will, however, limit the command's ability to

communicate effectively and risk distorting the public's

perception of the military's effectiveness. In the face of such

challenges, efforts at control are meaningless.

Whereas once the military trained to fight outnumbered to

win, today's news media environment has generated a new

imperative: For every operation, commanders must also communicate

outnumbered to succeed. While difficult to measure, that success

is defined in terms of credibility with the news media and with

the various American and international publics. Thus, mutual

understanding and accommodation are more useful than evasion or

angry confrontation.

Commanders can best prepare for their encounters with the

news media by understanding the roles and capabilities of the

journalists who cover military operations; accepting the

inevitably and desirability of their access to the force;

appreciating the importance of technology and its impact on

operations security; identifying and providing the resources

necessary for timely support for the media relations mission; and

recognizing the necessity for appropriate education and training.

 If ignored, each of these represents a potential flashpoint for

future disagreements. If addressed comprehensively, they can form

the basis for cooperation in the midst of what will inevitably be

complex and confusing situations.
THE MILITARY-NEWS MEDIA RELATIONSHIP: THINKING FORWARD

The Operational Environment.

There is a popular view that the often tense relationship

between the military and the news media is a recent product of

hard feelings and misunderstandings generated during the Viet Nam

War. In contrast, this perspective claims, the contacts between

the two institutions during World War II were usually amicable

and cooperative. This view of history appears to be overly

simplistic and not entirely accurate. Shelley Smith Mydans, a

Life magazine war correspondent in the Pacific Theater 50 years

ago, suggests that a sense of common purpose at that time (the

defeat of America's enemies) should not be misinterpreted as

unquestioning news media support of the political decisions and

military actions taken in pursuit of that goal.1

It is interesting that a survey of the writings of various

war correspondents and discussions with others of that era reveal

that the issues of concern today were just as important to the

journalists covering the military in those earlier years. In

addressing this phenomenon, Hodding Carter has said in the case

of military-news media relations, "the wheel often gets

reinvented, but it travels over very different terrain.2 Then, as

now, the central news media concern involved the fear of

censorship. But issues such as access to the forces,

communications, operations security, transportation and logistics

support also were of interest. In recent years, deficiencies in

any of these have been interpreted by many in the news media as

attempts by the Department of Defense to impose censorship

indirectly. For instance, using news media pools to cover combat

units during the Persian Gulf War or relying on slow ground

transportation to deliver news media products were seen as

deliberate efforts to restrict journalists from covering stories

or to delay their reports once produced.

The important realization is that the issues really haven't

changed nor, by extension, have the commanders' responsibilities

to ensure that their organizations are in the best position to

conduct professional news media relations programs appropriately

tailored to their assigned missions. Quite simply, the commanders

most likely to succeed will be those who have accurately assessed

the level of news media interest in their operation and have

anticipated and provided the assets necessary to accomplish the

news media relations mission.

The instinctive military need for control is irrelevant in

the face of an institution which can field, depending on the size

of the operation, thousands of reporters who are equipped with

instantaneous communications capabilities and who often

understand alarmingly little about the stories they are covering.

Once again, the challenge and the failure to adapt aren't new. In

speaking about his experiences at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, Frank Tremaine (United Press) reported that "the military

was no more prepared to handle news coverage than for handling

the Japanese."3 Yet it is always important to be selective in

reviewing earlier experiences.

Lessons derived from anecdotal discussions about the

circumstances surrounding Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) and

Operations Desert Shield/Storm are limited by the fact that they

were unique situations not likely to be replicated. Like the

British efforts in the Falkland Islands, geographical and

political circumstances dictated that the news media had to be

imported and matched up with the forces. The challenges presented

by reporters during Operations Just Cause (Panama) and Restore

Hope (Somalia) are far more relevant for study because of the

presence of significant numbers of journalists in place before

operations began and their open access to most areas of

operation.

Similarly, news coverage of the fighting in the former

Yugoslavia has been conducted for several years by numerous

independent, well-equipped journalists who move about freely and

flood the international news media with their often compelling

reports.

Media relations in any operation cannot be left to chance or

to a particularly clever public affairs staff. While language

like "handling journalists" and "coping with reporter demands"

sounds defensive and may appear to revert to attempts at control

of the news media, it is useful for understanding the

requirements facing field commanders. A carefully-planned,

well-resourced and decisively-positioned infrastructure is

necessary for communicating through the news media to the

American and, increasingly, international publics. This means

that organizations need to be "proactively-reactive": reactive to

the extent they must be responsive to news media interest;

proactive in that knowledgeable assessments, comprehensive

planning and advanced preparation will inevitably determine how

effectively they will be able to respond.

Unity in the media relations effort is achieved through the

development of public affairs guidance which assists the entire

chain of command in communicating consistent and credible

information. Although the public affairs plans are approved by

the Office of the Secretary of Defense,4

 commanders at each level

have a role in formulating the policy, news statements,

information packages, and media support arrangements which make

up the plan.This effort ensures that those most knowledgeable

about the operation play a major role in developing the messages

to be communicated. Effective command information programs are

also important to ensuring that everyone likely to encounter

journalists will understand the mission and their role in it,

aspects which are always of interest to reporters covering the

military.
To succeed, commanders must "think forward" historically,

operationally, and geographically. The perpetuation of

confrontation and debate over events past is not useful. Attempts

to look back and justify specific decisions or actions do help in

gaining understanding, but they also serve to reinforce the sense

of conflict between the institutions. Continuing to focus on

historical events can cause both the military and the news media

to appear to be preparing themselves to conduct media relations

as they did in the last conflict or deployment. As with any

operational task, the only relevant lessons of the past are those

which can be applied to improve readiness and performance in the

future.

Additionally, the success of the media relations program

rests on the ability of the commander and staff to assess the

intensity of news media interest in the mission at hand and to

anticipate the personnel, communications, transportation, and

deployment requirements necessary to communicate through the news

media during every stage of the operation. In the complexity of

today's international security environment, this will often

require rather creative applications of judgment. This is

especially true since the news media will inevitably appear

before commanders are fully prepared to accommodate them.

Therefore, regardless of mission, commanders should immediately

designate an official source of information (normally the public

affairs officer) and activate an information center. Taking the

early initiative in these efforts will usually serve to channel

reporters to those trained to communicate with them, thus

reducing their random movement throughout the area of operation

and their unplanned, sometimes disruptive visits to units. These

outcomes are also desirable for journalists in their efforts to

cover the story and will assist in establishing a constructive

dialogue.

Finally, the true challenge for the Department of Defense

and its military commanders does not reside in the formal

briefing room where well-trained spokespersons are prepared to

answer news media questions. It lies, instead, in the

forward-deployed units where young leaders, inexperienced with

the news media and facing a kaleidoscope of important tasks, are

confronted by reporters competing with their colleagues for a

unique angle on the operation. Guidance and training for the

tactical commander should become a regular part of operational

preparations. The education process should begin with a simple

orientation to the military—news media relationship in the

officer basic course and continue with increasing complexity

through the advanced courses and the Combined Arms and Services

Staff School to the senior military schools. A similar pattern

should become part of the education system for NCOs.

Since news media contacts with the tactical leadership are

inevitable, commanders and their public affairs staffs must

concentrate on thinking forward in their planning for the media

relations mission. From a commander's perspective, the thoughts
generated by the discussion of the issues identified in this

study should become planning factors for the development of a

responsive news media relations infrastructure.

The Military-News Media Environment.

It is ironic that much of the disagreement between the

military and the news media is based on an element of essential

agreement. Both institutions view the information available in

operational units to be very important and vitally interesting.

But their reactions to this common judgment vary significantly:

The military's response has often been to prevent the release of

such information because of various concerns ranging from

potential embarrassment to operations security, while the news

media's response is typically to seek immediate release because

of the "public's right to know."

Shortly before the invasion of Normandy, General Dwight D.

Eisenhower addressed this tension with reporters: "The first

essential in military operations is that no information of value

shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper

work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and

mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse

considerations."5 In these words lie the basis for cooperation

through the development of ground rules and procedures which seek

to define "information of value" and outline parameters for its

reporting.

History records that the effort was generally successful. At

the entrance to the American Cemetery at St Laurent, France,

overlooking Omaha Beach, rests the following plaque: "In memory

of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and the forces under his command

this sealed capsule containing news reports of the June 6, 1944

Normandy Landings is placed here by the newsmen who were there."6

This simple remembrance represents a sincere expression of mutual

respect and shared experience often seen in the genre of the war

correspondent from all conflicts; it is not a reflection of

unquestioning support or "cheerleading" for the attack.

General Walter E. Boomer, the commander of Marine Forces

during the Persian Gulf War, has said that among commanders there

is a "mythology" of mistrust despite the fact that relatively few

have ever had sustained contact with the news media.7

 Often this

is because the two institutions generally have very little

dealings with each other except during crises or war. Aside from

reporters who cover the Pentagon, there are very few journalists

who specialize in military and national security issues; and

their numbers are decreasing as the trend continues toward

reporters with "general" expertise. Further, most reporters don't

have the time or support to visit and learn about the military,

even during exercises.

Interestingly, given this history of unfamiliarity, both the
military and the news media expect the other to perform with

understanding and efficiency when events bring them together. 

Further, while reporters on the ground focus immense effort on

covering the military unit, their presence is only one of the

many variables competing for the attention of the responsible

commander. When things don't go well, minor irritants grow into

major issues, and, unfortunately, the two institutions often tend

to focus on their mutual competition rather than on their shared

responsibility to communicate information to the public. Once

again, the fact that both institutions speak to a common audience

should lead to cooperation based on mutual interest instead of

confrontation often based on stereotypes or past disagreements

and misunderstandings.

Yet the differences in institutional perspective are

important to understand. Increasingly, reporters see themselves

as participants in the events they cover, not merely as

chroniclers of those experiences. In the post-cold war world,

national leaders and agenda setters regularly appear on

international television networks like CNN and the BBC to

communicate diplomatic messages and warnings. This practice is

also true, although perhaps less dramatically, for radio and

print media. Additionally, during the Persian Gulf War, one of

the "status symbols" among reporters was the number of prisoners

of war each was able to "capture." The increasing role of the

news media in outlining the public agenda has led to debate over

the apparent linkage between news media coverage of events,

especially in television and still pictures, and the decision of

nations to act in response. Recent examples include international

efforts during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq,

humanitarian assistance to the former Soviet Union, Operation

Restore Hope in Somalia, and various actions in the former

Yugoslavia, as well as the pace of the domestic response to the

Hurricane Andrew disaster in Florida.

An unexpected military consequence of this new role involves

providing security for reporters covering an operation. While

journalists say that their security is not a military concern and

DoD policy calls for working with journalists without regard for

their safety, events have proven otherwise.8

 Participants in

conflicts are becoming increasingly sensitive to the perception

that news coverage often leads to unwanted external intervention.

Thus what can be interpreted as retaliatory actions have been

taken against reporters to include bounties for those covering

U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia. More than 30

journalists have been killed in fighting there since 1991, and

four reporters died in Somalia on July 12,1993 in what has been

characterized as an act of revenge by an angry mob. News media

demands for assistance when reporters were trapped in hotels in

Panama City (1989) and Mogadishu (1993) and after the capture of

Bob Simon of CBS Television by Iraqi forces (1991) clearly

indicate that the security of journalists will remain a

persistent, high visibility issue confronting commanders.
While absolute security cannot be guaranteed, those

reporters who accept the protection afforded by military units

are probably in the best position to cover the story

comprehensively and survive. Yet the situations above, especially

that of Simon, involved conscious decisions by reporters to

function outside of the established news media relations

procedures and to conduct reporting entirely on their own. In

response to such behavior, commanders who understand that

sustained contacts between military forces and the news media

result in the most complete and accurate stories about their

units should seek to convince reporters that the acceptance of

reasonable military ground rules and the integration of

journalists into operational units are in the best interests of

both institutions. However, it is inevitable that some reporters

will choose not to cooperate. In those cases, commanders have no

special responsibilities for such individuals and should,

instead, focus their attention on the reporters who desire to

abide by the procedures outlined for the operation.

Any discussion of contacts between the military and the news

media must address the expectations of reporters covering the

operation. Logically, journalists are limited by the same factors

of terrain, visibility and information flow that affect the

forces with which they travel. Yet reporters don't always

understand this. In his book on the Persian Gulf War, John

MacArthur, the publisher of Harper's Magazine, quotes Molly Moore

of The Washington Post as saying, "I had no idea what was going

on, and I was right in the middle of the war" (traveling with

Marine commander LTG Boomer).9 Precisely so! A critical step in

developing cooperation between the military and the news media is

the explanation of the reality that the mere presence of

journalists, regardless of background, will not grant special

insight not available to the military personnel they are with.

Once again, dialogue and explanation improve the quality of the

reporters' experience and, inevitably, of their news products.

News Media Access.

Major General Paul E. Funk has written that, on returning

from the desert, "I was upset to find that people did not know

that the 3d Armored Division (his command) and VII Corps had been

in a very heavy fight under great contact with some of the

enemy's first-rate units. The story was not told well enough

about the people who did the fighting—the companies, platoons and

task forces. . . . Invariably, if you allow the media to look at

what you are doing and put them with the soldiers, it comes out

fine."10

Both the military and the news media share an interest in

providing a more complete picture of military operations than is

available at a news briefing. This can best be accomplished by

ensuring personal contact between the members of the force and

reporters covering the story. Such access is important from the
news media's perspective because the information available at

news conferences communicates only part of the total story.

Similarly, for commanders, there is no more effective way to meet

their obligations to communicate with the public than through the

perspectives and the experiences of the members of their

commands. Yet while commanders have a responsibility to assist

journalists in gaining access to military forces, the large

number of reporters who inevitably appear in an operational area

make it impossible to accommodate them all simultaneously.

After the Persian Gulf War, Pete Williams, the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and his staff met with

various news media representatives and developed guidelines for

the coverage of DoD operations. The first of these directly

addresses the issue of access. In contrast to the news media

pools which were necessary in the environment of Operation Desert

Storm, the first guideline states that "open and independent

reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S.

military operations."11 Essentially, this recognizes the practice

of individual journalists moving about an area of options and

reporting for their own news organizations without sharing their

information with their colleagues, a central feature of pool

operations.

In fact, this principle is an acknowledgement of reality,

not an operational objective. As the events on the beach at

Mogadishu, Somalia, clearly revealed, the news media have

essentially solved the primary issue of access. In most cases,

commanders can assume that reporters will be in position to cover

any military activity from the earliest stages. In recent

history, this has resulted in images of military personnel

performing their tasks while surrounded by reporters who often

seem to be regarding them as objects of curiosity. These

situations can be as harmless as organized visits to forward

positions where tactically deployed combat units become

overwhelmed by reporters taking advantage of a photo opportunity;

or they can be as potentially dangerous as on the beach in

Somalia where the cultures of the military and the news media

converged in their most dramatic collision.

The more relevant challenge for commanders is to decide how

to include reporters within their organizations. This is

particularly true for the Army and the Marine Corps because the

story resides with those who execute the mission, and reporters

will find their way to the widely-dispersed units who are

performing various tasks far from the "influence" of the public

affairs staff. Air fields and ships are far less accessible

without military assistance. Once again, it is clearly not

possible to accommodate simultaneously every journalist desiring

to cover the operation. During Operation Desert Storm, one

assessment called for the inclusion of 13 reporters in an Army

division.12 In future operations, circumstances may allow for

more or dictate fewer.
While inclusion represents the most volatile flashpoint in

the relationship between the military and the news media, it also

offers the best opportunity for the dialogue necessary for the

most effective reporting and understanding. Journalists who are

assigned to operational units bring to life the dry facts of the

news conference by providing the texture, explanation, and

context of what is going on. Further, they communicate a human

face by telling the stories of those directly involved with the

mission. It has become increasingly true that such reporting is

often the only contact most Americans have with the men and women

who make up their military establishment.

In every case, commanders must address two related

questions: How many reporters can I include in my unit without

degrading its operational effectiveness? and, How do I

accommodate those journalists who merely appear in a unit area

with the desire to report on its activities? A credible answer to

the first question reduces the complexity of the second.13

Reporters working outside a unit possess limited utility as they

are only able to gather images of what is happening and provide

their own interpretations. Those included in the units are

valuable to both the news media and the military as they tend to

produce more accurate, complete, and informative stories because

of their access to those who are performing the mission.

The first hours of Operation Restore Hope (December 1992)

provide a useful example. In the wake of the controversy about

the landing at Mogadishu, it is important to remember that those

reporters on the beach, squinting into the darkness and

transmitting shadows, had not coordinated with the joint task

force and were essentially outside of the story. In fact, it is

probable that the careless use of lights resulted from a basic

misunderstanding of military requirements. In contrast, the

public affairs plan included more than 20 journalists who spent

several days with the Marines in preparation for the operation

and actually participated in the amphibious assault.

Once ashore, efforts began to include the "outsiders," such

as by arranging interviews with network anchors perched on the

roof of the local airport. This action answered the second

question by accommodating those who waited for the force to come

to them. Thus the complete media relations plan was flexible

enough to include, when events permitted, those journalists who

were unable or unwilling to join the Marines before coming

ashore. For the commander and the public affairs staff, the task

is to achieve inclusiveness, not to grant preference.

Thus it would seem that, once an operation begins, the

priority effort for the public affairs staff should involve

establishing an identifiable information center, appropriate to

the situation, to sustain the efforts of those journalists

accompanying the units and to communicate with those journalists

outside of the operation. Initially, the facility may consist of

no more than an officer and NCO with a satellite telephone around
which to build a larger structure. That is sufficient as long as

reinforcing personnel and resources arrive at a pace to prevent

them from being overwhelmed by the information demand. Such a

step ensures that a credible media relations infrastructure is in

place which increases the efficiency of the reporting process and

reduces the chances of having uninformed and uncooperative

journalists disrupting the operation.

In any case, commanders should remain sensitive to the fact

that all journalists are increasingly capable of employing

sophisticated technology to provide real time coverage of

military activities. Therefore, it is important to have public

affairs and operational personnel available to furnish brief, but

effective, explanations to provide context to the transmitted

images and reports. Without such command assistance, there is a

chance that misperceptions and misunderstandings can result and

that efforts to clarify them can seriously detract from the

communications objectives for the mission.

For example, a simple survey of TV network newscasts and

daily newspapers reveals that most regularly present identical

video and still images of the events in the former Yugoslavia.14

What sets off specific stories as particularly interesting or

compelling are those from journalists on the scene. "Raw" video

of operational events, without explanation, doesn't inform very

effectively. Once again, today's technology often moves images

faster than journalists can provide context, possibly distorting

the perceptions of those who view them. A commander's deliberate

plan to include journalists reduces the chances for

misunderstanding and assists in raising the quality of the

reporting and the level of public understanding.

The most effective news media relations programs will be

those which provide the widest variety of experiences. While the

efforts of "frontline" units may appear to be the most dramatic,

the news media and, ultimately, the public are best served by

gaining an appreciation for the complexity of all the tasks

performed by the force. Additionally, the operational story is

best told by shedding the "zero defects" mentality and by

exposing reporters to every aspect of the mission and letting

them appreciate that military operations are tough challenges

where the shape of the final outcome is seldom clear. Making it

look easy raises news media and public expectations for future

successes and establishes standards which may not be possible to

meet. Sounding a theme similar to MG Funk's, Molly Moore provides

perspective by writing, "to the men and women who fought it and

the commanders who directed it, there was nothing easy about the

ground war."15 Arguably, that story about the "doers" is the most

important of any operation and the one which commanders can most

affect positively.

Another aspect of the discussion of inclusion concerns

escorts. The expectation that all journalists will be accompanied

by trained public affairs personnel is unrealistic. In the first
place, there are not enough to match up with the large numbers of

journalists who will cover military operations. This was

especially true during the large scale efforts of Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and it was certainly the case in

Somalia where the public affairs staff would have had to land

before the assault force to ensure a public affairs presence (not

a reasonable course of action). Further, public affairs

personnel are probably not the most qualified to act as escorts

because it is unlikely that they will have the expertise to

explain the activities of the diverse units participating in the

operation.

The sixth guideline for combat coverage addresses this

issue: "Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons

but should not interfere with the reporting process."16 The

thrust of this principle is that the responsibility of the public

affairs staff is to assist the news media by arranging for their

inclusion in operational units and to prepare those units for

their arrival. The requirements for navigation, security and

logistical support establish the need for escort assistance, but

both institutions are best served by having members of the unit

serve those functions. These arrangements need not necessarily

place special demands on the commander. Reporters can move

forward with supply columns or with any transport which

inevitably shuttles among organizations in an area of operation.

Journalists are there to cover the functioning of the unit, not

to impose upon it as visitors or inspectors.

Technology and Support For The News Media Relations Mission.

What is more remarkable about reporters than their numbers

is their range of technological capabilities, and commanders have

become properly wary about the implications of the live reporting

of military activities. In early December 1992, Pete Williams and

Dave Bartlett, the president of the Radio and Television News

Directors Association, discussed the likelihood of live

battlefield or operational coverage before a group of military

public affairs officers. While each proposed different timelines

(Williams predicted 4-5 years; Bartlett 2-3), they agreed that

such an event was not imminent. Yet it was only one week and one

hour later that the lights went on at Mogadishu beach as the

Marine Reconnaissance Force came ashore, demonstrating the fast

pace and unpredictability of advances in technology.

It seems that technology has always been central to the

relationship of the military and the news media. The Civil War

brought the telegraph which raised serious concerns about the

security of troop movements and operations. Carrier pigeons later

added a different dimension to news coverage as reporters sent

dispatches tied to pigeons' legs. Today, experience teaches that

the news media bring with them sophisticated communications

equipment, computers, and television and radio resources.

Especially in the earliest stages of an operation, they appear
with equipment demonstrating superior capabilities which they can

deploy faster and sustain longer than those available to military

public affairs staffs. This results in situations in which

commanders lag behind the news media in telling the story of

their operational efforts.

Legitimate concerns over today's technology recall those

expressed about the telegraph 130 years ago. During Operation

Desert Storm, controversy arose over the movement of news

products, both print and broadcast, from forward deployed

reporters to transmission sites in the rear. Current and emerging

technologies are no longer tied to arrangements which depend on

ground or air transportation. Radio and television signals can be

sent over satellite equipment which is increasingly easy to move

about the operational area and set up to provide real time

coverage. Continuous broadcast transmission capabilities exist

using available satellites, and commanders can expect to confront

such sophistication today. Emerging technology is resulting in

smaller cameras, editing equipment and uplink facilities which

will be even easier to deploy, employ and sustain. Cumbersome

television satellite equipment which had to be transported on

aircraft pallets to Panama and in pickup trucks in the desert

soon will be carried in a few small cases by a reporter and

photographer. In areas where the infrastructure exists,

television images can already be sent over cellular telephones;

similar radio capabilities have existed for several years using

satellite and cellular telephones.

Immediate reporting capabilities also exist for print

reporters who are capable of transmitting news products from

their portable computers through satellite telephones to their

newsrooms in the United States. Kirk Spitzer of USA Today

demonstrated this capability on July 20, 1993, using the

satellite telephone assigned to the Department of Defense

National Media Pool. Major national and international wire news

services also possess and deploy this technology. While print

reports may appear to lack the immediate drama of still pictures

or video, they are regularly picked up and broadcast by radio and

television networks. In fact, a print report, transmitted through

a 60 pound satellite telephone uplink, may become the trigger for

broader news media coverage. Recall also that CNN's dramatic

reports from Baghdad, Iraq, on the first night of Operation

Desert Storm were sent by telephone; the pictures were added days

later.

Of particular concern at the operational and strategic

levels is the interest the television networks have expressed in

acquiring and broadcasting images obtained from satellite

overflights. This capability, demonstrated during coverage of the

Persian Gulf War, could be a significant factor during sensitive

military operations. As with any technological capability,

seeking control over the employment of satellite imagery is

largely a futile effort. What is necessary is continuous, candid

dialogue with individual reporters and news organizations so that
they clearly understand the consequences of reporting information

which violates operational coverage ground rules and which could

jeopardize the outcome of the mission or the safety of the force.

The technological capabilities of the news media are an

operational fact of life for the commander and public affairs

staff as they prepare for the media relations mission. While it

is not always necessary to understand fully the functioning of

such technology, it is important to recognize that, even in the

most austere conditions, information moves from journalist to

medium (wire service bulletin, television report, newspaper

story, radio broadcast) at incredible speeds. Therefore, it is

often true that the most pressing task of communicating through

the news media is to be able to provide timely detail and context

so that the ultimate audiences can understand, as nearly as

possible, the facts and implications of any story. This means

that the military must also field a credible technological

capability.17

Those responsible for communicating with the news media must

possess the freshest public affairs guidance and unclassified

operational information to respond effectively. To do so, public

affairs staffs should be equipped with satellite and, as

appropriate, cellular telephones; facsimile machines; data

transmission devices; and secure transmission means. Currently

they are not. Without these capabilities, those designated to

communicate with reporters could find themselves the least

informed about current situations, and commanders could find

their operational efforts characterized as uncoordinated and

their spokespersons portrayed as confused. Resulting doubts about

the effectiveness of military activities can severely limit the

commander's ability to communicate effectively and result in

intense efforts to regain credibility rather than disciplined

programs to sustain it.

The cost of purchasing current technology is severe for both

the military and the news media and often prevents commanders

from obtaining the necessary equipment. The acquisition process

begins with a complete assessment of necessary capabilities and a

survey of the technology available to support the news media

relations mission. It may be found that the leasing of technology

is more practical than the actual purchase. There are several

advantages to this approach. First, leasing will generally be

less expensive, resulting in lower fixed costs. Additionally,

leasing offers flexibility as mixes of necessary technology can

be developed to support specific missions. Finally, this approach

assures that the most current technology is available. Purchased

equipment becomes obsolescent rather quickly; establishing and

updating leases for capabilities will ensure that commanders are

best able to communicate through the news media.

But technology is merely an aspect of the larger issue of

support. Like the other operational functions, those performing

news media relations tasks must be able to deploy, concentrate
essential resources and communicate in those areas most central

to the public's understanding of the military mission. Once the

point(s) of maximum news media interest has been identified, the

commander should assign a high priority to respond to that

interest. To borrow a sports analogy, the effort to engage the

news media using a man-to-man, matchup "defense" is futile; there

are simply too many of them. By establishing responsive resource

"zones," commanders can accommodate reporters who enter their

areas of responsibility and then pass them on to other

commanders. This approach also provides the flexibility to manage

surges of journalists at particular points of interest by

shifting assets from less committed areas. This can only be done

if commanders are thinking forward and preparing in advance to

establish an infrastructure which provides trained public affairs

personnel with appropriate communications, transportation, and

logistics assets.

This requirement is particularly challenging as no

organization, regardless of size, can accomplish this task

without reinforcement. Most importantly, all support should be

provided on a dedicated basis since it is impractical to rely on

those assets deployed for other operational tasks which are often

given higher priorities. Thus the planning process must specify

the public affairs support requirements, identify the sources

(components, supporting CINCs, the Military Departments), and

deploy the resources at a pace to meet the information

requirements of the journalists on the ground.

To enhance their news media relations plans, commanders,

especially those at the operational level, must also have access

to timely summaries of print and broadcast reports prepared by

the news media. In the earliest stages of an operation, the daily

transmission of the Early Bird news summary product from the

Pentagon should meet this requirement. As the operation matures,

providing this capability will be a major challenge as it

requires current technology such as facsimile machines, wire

service printers, television and radio sets, and downlink

facilities to obtain the necessary reports.

Commanders at every level should be interested in what is

being said about their efforts. Those at the tactical level will

often learn of these from the reporters integrated with their

units or from news summaries several days old. They don't have to

like or agree with what is being said about them, but they do

have to understand what is being reported. After all, the public

obtains its information about the operation from the news media,

and those reports help to shape public perceptions and opinion

about the command's effectiveness. An efficient media relations

program is aware of any differences between what the command

knows to be true and what the news media are reporting. Relying

on technology, their own assessments, and their news media

relations plans, commanders and their public affairs staffs have

to work continuously to ensure that the inevitable gap is as

narrow as possible.
In an exercise environment, commanders and their public

affairs staffs are usually able to establish and operate such

complete infrastructures, but that is often after several years

of preparation. The track record is not as successful when the

planning and deployment time frames are compressed to a few days

as in a crisis. To date, for instance, there has never been a

consistent solution for establishing communications with public

affairs personnel in the earliest stages of an operation.18

Public affairs staffs have had to rely on borrowing satellite

phones from reporters (Somalia) or struggling with undependable

indigenous communications systems as in Macedonia where only 12

commercial international telephone lines exist (July 1993). Thus

it is necessary that all contingency planning specifically

identifies the necessary assets and builds their movement into

all deployment schedules. Timeliness is particularly important

because, as discussed, reporters will probably be in the area of

operations when the forces arrive. Failure to anticipate and

respond to this presence will shift the initiative to the news

media and distract the commander who then must expend

considerable effort to catch up rather than to communicate as an

equal partner in the process.

By maximizing their technology, creating their own logistics

support, and renting their own vehicles (as witnessed in the

desert, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and elsewhere), it

appears that the news media have met most of their own resource

requirements. Yet commanders can always assume that journalists

will call upon them to provide specific assistance such as

medical care or potable water. Commanders should anticipate these

situations and develop response strategies. Such planning will

also be a factor when unique requirements evolve such as during

those contingencies which call for chemical protection equipment.

Furthermore, while commanders should focus their primary

support efforts on their own public affairs infrastructure, a

review of the guidelines for the coverage of DoD operations

reveals some responsibility for supporting the news media. In

those situations in which "open and independent reporting" is the

norm, military communications, transportation, and logistical

support should be provided on a space-available basis.19 There

are, however, other factors which affect such support. For

instance, when transmission security is a factor, commanders may

establish a ground rule that reporters will use available

military communications to file their stories. If discussed in

advance, this arrangement would probably work, but increased

priority must be given to those stories to ensure timeliness and

reduce suspicion. Similarly, commanders may find it desirable to

provide journalists with transportation to avoid having

brightly-colored, light-reflective rental vehicles accompany

ground forces. Each of these is situationally dependent and will

require individual judgments. In those cases when it is necessary

to form news media pools, commanders assume full responsibility

for news media support.20 This reality and the demands it would
place on limited resources should guide commanders as they assess

the need for such pools.

News Media Relations Support Structure.

Organizing for the media relations mission requires the same

disciplined planning as any other operational task. As noted

earlier, failure to do so limits the response capabilities of the

command and can result in underinformed news reports which can

misrepresent the direction and effectiveness of the military

effort. This lack of preparation serves neither the military

forces nor the reporters sent to cover them. Thus it is not

unusual to find that reporters are equally interested in ensuring

that procedures and facilities exist to facilitate effective news

coverage.

Support efforts for both the public affairs staff and the

news media merge at the information bureau established by the

commander and subordinate to the command's public affairs

officer. This will generally be a Joint Information Bureau (JIB)

which supports the Joint Task Force commander; component

commanders should also set up service-unique facilities to

represent their own roles in the larger effort and to assist

journalists seeking to visit forward units. In those operations

conducted with international coalition or alliance partners,

commanders will operate Combined or Allied Press Information

Centers (CIB/APIC). Regardless of type, these facilities serve as

the primary source of information, transportation,

communications, and logistical support for all aspects of the

media relations mission.

Reporters entering an area of operations will normally seek

out a JIB, CIB, or APIC to obtain information about the

developing situation and to request assistance in gaining access

to the deployed forces. Contingency planning should set the

establishment of the information bureau as a priority mission

with the deployment pace of necessary resources tied to the

assessed level of news media interest. The size of the public

affairs effort should be linked to the anticipated news media

presence, not to the size of the military force. Thus in June and

July of 1993, the public affairs challenge was to develop a

public affairs presence appropriate to the news media coverage of

the initial deployment of U.S. forces into Macedonia; the fact

that the force of 300 ground troops would not normally require

public affairs support was not a factor. The arrival of 20

members of the Berlin Brigade on July 5, 1993 triggered

considerable international news coverage, with video images

appearing very quickly on CNN. Additionally, each course of

action should allow for surges of news media interest at various

locations within the area of operation and at specific times in

the movement of the force (recall that the coverage from

Macedonia faded soon after the arrival of the main body of

troops).
Such situations could be addressed with the efficient

deployment and employment of whatever support resources are

available. For instance, the British media plan for Operation

Desert Storm called for the placement of a Forward Transmission

Unit (FTU) in the vicinity of their division headquarters. It

consisted of processing and uplink capabilities for both still

and video products which greatly reduced the transmission time

between the FTU and permanent facilities located outside the area

of operations. Though often subjected to a system of security

review more restrictive than that imposed by U.S. forces, British

journalists were able to provide timely and dramatic reports

without venturing very far from the units to which they were

assigned.

Operations Security (OPSEC).

Logically, technology which allows for the real time

reporting of military activities has enormous implications for

OPSEC. The December 9, 1992 beach scene in Somalia represented

the essence of every commander's fears over the violation of

operations security. The news media have since accused the

military of overreaction because there were no negative

consequences. In fact, one television producer claimed that the

use of lights was an act of deterrence because any hostile gunmen

could clearly see the imposing nature of the forces coming

ashore.21 This "no harm, no foul" justification is of no solace.

That no one was attacked or injured was because of variables

beyond the control of both the military and the news media. Quite

simply, the event was benign only because no gunman decided to

take advantage of the illuminated target area containing both the

U.S. Marines and the news media whose coverage had helped to

bring them there.

Yet there are other troublesome, though less obvious,

examples of OPSEC violations. At 2:30 PM on January 13, 1993,

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater announced that Allied

aircraft had attacked a variety of air defense facilities in

Southern Iraq 75 minutes earlier. Little of his information about

this classified operation was new. That was because two hours

earlier, the Reuters News Service had broken the story that the

attack had been launched; this report originated in Washington,

DC, not on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk or from some unidentified

airbase. For the next two hours, CNN and others competed to

provide details about the attack by calling on their various

military experts. They were able to provide disturbingly accurate

reports of the numbers of aircraft and the types and locations of

targets. After Fitzwater's announcement, the only fresh

information about the attack and, most specifically, those who

conducted it flowed from journalists embarked on the aircraft

carrier. Much of that reporting was quite good, reinforcing the

importance of including reporters with the force.
During the "CBS Evening News" on June 16, 1993, National

Security Correspondent David Martin, drawing on his well-placed

sources, presented a remarkably complete outline of the U.N.

operation against a warlord in Mogadishu, Somalia. This action

differed from the earlier example because Martin's report aired

after the operation began. Under similar conditions several days

earlier, Jamie Mclntyre, CNN's Military Affairs Correspondent,

and the CNN staff delayed the reporting of operational

information they had obtained because of concern that to do so

could directly warn the target of the U.N. effort. Although

perhaps not up to military OPSEC standards, each demonstrates

sensitivity to military security concerns.

While most journalists would not compromise OPSEC

intentionally, there is always the chance for an inadvertent

release of information by inexperienced or careless journalists.

It seems inevitable that information will leak, and journalists

understandably believe that they are being given information so

that it can be reported. It simply makes no sense to provide

classified information to journalists and expect that they will

secure it for you. There will be cases, especially at the

strategic and operational levels, where "senior officials" will

provide sensitive information to assist reporters in telling the

complete story, but only after they have agreed to withhold its

release until after a time specified in the ground rules or

provided the reporters will remain with the unit until OPSEC

concerns are no longer relevant to the specific situation

(operational and tactical levels).

Because of the pervasiveness of news media presence, the

speed of technology, and the apparent inevitably of information

leaks at the strategic level, traditional efforts at ensuring

OPSEC are being overtaken by events beyond the control of

commanders. This is especially true at the operational and

tactical levels where intelligence and sensitive information are

the most perishable. The solution to much of the concern over

security of information lies in a comprehensive plan for the

inclusion of news media, reinforced by ground rules and supported

by procedures for providing explanation and context about the

sensitivity and complexity of the military actions. Penalties for

OPSEC violations are also important.

In establishing OPSEC parameters and outlining the

consequences of reporting sensitive information, both the

military and the news media should consider the following

questions: Would the release or reporting of specific information

assist the enemy in being more prepared than he would have been

otherwise? Would it compromise a deception plan? Identify the

main effort? Are the facts the military is providing or the news

media are gathering merely helpful in understanding the complete

story, or are they central to the success of the operation? In

other words, would the disclosure of this information affect the

course of events?
Applying these standards to the earlier examples, it would

appear that the intense coverage before the airstrike in January

posed a significant threat to OPSEC, while the release of details

once the U.N. operations began was less likely to influence the

outcome. That none of the reports apparently affected the course

of events is not relevant; a benign result does not justify the

reporting of information whose knowledge could have changed the

outcome. Prior notification could increase enemy preparedness and

should be a matter of common concern for both the news media and

the military.

Journalists often argue that some events, such as the

launching of aircraft, are clearly visible to any observer and

that their reporting could probably be matched by a phone call by

an enemy agent. Perhaps, but it is also very likely that the

"real time" reporting by radio and television could reach the

enemy's decision makers much faster and more efficiently than a

phone call, once again confirming the importance of technology.

It is clear that the mere presence of a reporter in an

operational area exposes that person to important information.

Further, it is apparent that a journalist can only report the

complete story if provided background information to understand

the full context. Personal acquaintance and trust may often

ensure that sensitive information is not revealed. When such

credibility does not exist, it may well be that certain reporters

can be told little or nothing in advance. To preclude doubt or

the possibility of confusion, specific ground rules should be

developed in each situation to identify that information of

concern and specify the parameters for its release.

The fourth Guideline For The Coverage of DoD Operations

addresses both the establishment of ground rules and the need for

sanctions should they be violated.22 The facts that both

institutions have acknowledged that security concerns are

important enough to establish reasonable limits on reporting and

that suspension and expulsion can be legitimate remedies if these

are ignored encourage commanders and their staffs to outline a

set of ground rules appropriate to the mission and to make them

central to the inclusion arrangements with the news media.

There has been considerable discussion about the need for

the "Security Review" of news products to ensure that ground

rules are not violated. No mention of this issue is made in the

guidelines because the DoD and news media representatives could

not agree on wording that was acceptable. Thus there will always

be the potential for controversy. In the wake of the Persian Gulf

War, to date, there have been no instances of security review.

However, commanders have periodically mandated that news stories

be embargoed (delayed) as part of the ground rules until an

operation has passed its most critical moment. The exceptional

reports from those journalists deployed on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk

on January 13, 1993, embargoed until after the White House

announcement, represent a classic success story.
There are new standards for OPSEC emerging. For example, the

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff conducted a detailed operational briefing several days

before the Marines arrived in Somalia. That session reflected an

awareness that openness or transparency of action were more

appropriate than steps to conceal information. Logically, each

situation will require commanders to tailor specific ground rules

to their assigned mission. Those for a combat operation (Desert

Storm) probably won't resemble those for humanitarian assistance

(Somalia), and certainly won't look anything like those for

disaster relief (Florida).

Education and Training.

Both the military and the news media are woefully deficient

in their knowledge of the other institution and in their training

for those tasks necessary to make and report news during a

military operation. What is particularly alarming about this

situation is that the personalities of those involved in the

relationship have a huge impact on the success of the media

relations mission. While the military can only directly affect

its own behavior, it has a stake in improving the level of news

media understanding and including them in realistic exercise

scenarios. With fewer opportunities to serve in the military and

the continuing trend in the news media to generalists, the

cultural gap between the military and the news media can only

widen. It is important to understand, however, that the news

media are concerned about their own deficiencies.23

Because they want to retain their most experienced reporters

at the Pentagon and at the theater headquarters, news media

decision makers will send their best qualified nonmilitary

experts to cover the troops in the field.24 Thus commanders and

their public affairs staffs must prepare to accommodate reporters

with limited expertise in situations of great stress and

uncertainty. At other times, such as in educational settings and

during exercises, it is in the best interest of both institutions

to increase contact, mutual understanding and trust and to

decrease suspicion. At the tactical and operational levels, the

most likely venues for those least experienced, reporters should

understand military organizations and basic military doctrine. As

often as possible they should train with military forces to

develop their own field skills, determine their personal

equipment needs, and come to understand how individuals function

together to form effective units which work to achieve assigned

objectives.

Of greatest importance to the success of the military's news

media relations program is the commander's commitment to be as

accepting of close news media scrutiny during an operation as of

the favorable publicity available during an exercise. They are

dramatically different environments. During an exercise,
reporters tend to focus on the efforts of units to perfect their

operational skills, and there is more time to explain, educate

and inform journalists about what they are experiencing. Further,

most stories are features which tend to be favorable in tone. By

contrast, the tension and pace associated with operational

deployments do not always allow for the cordial relationships

typically associated with exercises. Questions and requests for

information, normally welcomed by the military during exercises

as opportunities to explain, are often legitimately regarded as

unwelcome distractions during an operation and can create

friction among those involved. Additionally, the uncertainty of

operational situations not governed by structured exercise

scenarios can result in stories which are not as comfortable or

as forgiving as those from exercises.

In an adaptation of a familiar principle, commanders should

ensure that exercise scenarios cause their organizations to train

as they would communicate in an actual contingency. More

specifically, it is imperative that commanders prepare themselves

and their units to communicate operationally by exercising those

specific tasks most related to the media relations mission. This

begins by ensuring that public affairs personnel have roles to

play in both command post exercises, which hone assessment,

planning, and response skills, and live field training exercises

where the logistical support of the news media is a central

feature.

Even in the absence of a dedicated public affairs scenario,

media relations training is an integral part of any command post

exercise. Since virtually every event, issue, plan, and decision

contains some public affairs aspects, commanders and their staffs

should derive exercise news media "play" from the rest of the

exercise flow. Without the need to actually communicate with

reporters, commanders and their public affairs staffs can

increase their proficiency in assessing the public affairs

implications of evolving courses of action, develop and

coordinate appropriate guidance, issue exercise news releases,

and "establish" and equip information bureaus. A CPX can also

assist commanders in becoming comfortable with reviewing and, as

appropriate, responding to events and perceptions reported

through the news media (an aspect which should be built into

every exercise scenario). Additionally, the kind of precise

staffing necessary for the development and deployment of public

affairs resources can best take place in the CPX environment. The

staging of an exercise news conference, to include preparation

and rehearsal, would also be useful because, after all, such

sessions have become standard features of every operational

deployment.

If well-conceived, many of the irritants which appear during

actual deployments should reveal themselves during exercises.

That they often do not is evidence of the artificiality often

seen in public affairs exercise efforts. It is understandable

that live exercise planning generally focuses on a few
highly-visible and interesting events to attract reporters who

may not otherwise have the inclination or the time to attend. Yet

the support for journalists who participate should go beyond

rehearsed exercise briefings and the observation of those events

from areas marked off by white engineer tape. The exercise

reliance on elaborate information facilities; numerous

telephones, facsimile machines and photocopiers; vans, buses, and

on-call helicopters; and full public affairs staffs is often

artificial and can create expectations that such support is

always appropriate and, more naively, always available.

Generally, this is not relevant training because of its

artificiality. As with any operational task, exercise

organizations, equipment and procedures for news media relations

should be adapted to resemble as closely as possible those

required for an actual mission. The administrative treatment of

reporters should not be confused with the demands of news media

relations during an actual deployment.

Journalists attending exercises should be treated as they

would when they arrive to cover military forces conducting any

mission along the continuum of operations. They should be

informed of the activities of all units involved in the exercise;

included in the normal functioning of those units to the extent

that they actually live with them for several days; transported

in organic tactical vehicles; and encouraged to conduct

interviews and file stories. To the extent possible, such an

approach can yield a sense of common effort which echoes the

shared experience of those war correspondents who came ashore at

Normandy. Like military forces, those journalists who have

experienced rigorous training deployments, such as to the

National Training Center, speak coherently and enthusiastically

of their new understanding and increased skill proficiency. Such

positive response should be reinforced through sustained contacts

between the military and journalists.

Various initiatives have sought to assist journalists in

understanding the complexities of military life and of military

operations. The annual "Media Days" at the various war colleges

and the periodic appearance of journalists before military

audiences generally result in brief epiphanies of understanding,

but they seldom survive the pressures of an actual deployment.

Thus a broader agenda of training opportunities like those

outlined earlier and detailed background briefings during actual

operations will always be needed to ensure that journalists are

prepared to the extent possible to cover the story. More

accurate, complete and interesting stories will result as

reporters learn about and understand the military culture and how

it functions.

Additionally, the military can only benefit from increased

exposure to journalists. It is vitally important that these

experiences are balanced in their presentation and not geared to

reinforce stereotypes. An Associated Press story, in May 1993,

reported that training in Germany to prepare U.S. troops to
deploy to the former Yugoslavia included "`reporters and

cameramen' who pop up and try to make the soldiers say something

outrageous."25 The training technique is sound, but its tone

could be unnecessarily threatening. While meetings with

journalists can be stressful and risky, the vast majority of such

encounters will be simple conversations, constrained by OPSEC

concerns, designed to obtain information to produce news stories.

Efforts to reduce the fear and distrust of journalists are far

more useful than those that reinforce the myth that the role of

the news media is to undermine the military effort and to

discredit the members of the force.

Media relations training, most often emphasizing the

principle of "Security at the Source," is necessary for those

operating at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and

should be provided in both service schools and exercise

environments. The dialogue between the military and the news

media is not simply the concern of the public affairs staff. In

fact, such dialogue is less important to reporters who are

increasingly interested in speaking directly with those making

the decisions and performing the tasks of the operation. The

early realization and acceptance of that fact argue strongly for

a broad-based orientation to the news media and energetic

scenarios which develop and exercise skills necessary to sustain

the dialogue.

Any training agenda must consider the increasingly

international character of security missions and news media

coverage. In the wake of the controversy over the beach scene in

Mogadishu, one explanation offered by the news media was that it

was only the foreign journalists who were using lights. Such

explanations are nonsense, and such distinctions are no longer

relevant. Commanders and their public affairs staffs must be

sensitive to the reality of full international coverage as

represented by CNN, the BBC World Service (radio and, now,

television), SkyNews (British), and Reuters television. Of

course, various wire services (notably Reuters and the Associated

Press) have long had international impact, but never to the

degree generated by contemporary broadcast news media. Yet

Americans in several cities awoke on July 6, 1993 to front page

pictures (some in color) of U.S. troops arriving in Macedonia.

The source of those photographs emphasized the international

nature of news: they were provided by Agence France-Presse.

Recent experience has also taught much about the challenges

of working with public information officials (the international

term) from other nations. In addition to Coalition efforts in

Desert Shield/Storm and Somalia (before and during the U.N.

mission), American public affairs personnel have participated

with their NATO allies during Operation Southern Guard (the NATO

response during the Persian Gulf War), the naval blockade of

Serbia and Montenegro, and Operation Deny Flight over

Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the past, only the United States and

Canada have fielded trained public affairs/public information
personnel; that is no longer true. Several NATO nations have

developed strong cadres of public information specialists with

experience in NATO, U.N., WEU (Western European Union), and other

combined operations. This relationship is further complicated by

new information initiatives from the Russian Federation and other

nations with whom the United States has not maintained

traditional contacts. Training programs and exercise scenarios

must be developed to ensure the most efficient possible coverage

of those international military operations in which the United

States will play important roles.

Missions and Messages.

Once again, virtually every military activity will have

public affairs implications because of news media and public

interest; this is true even if OPSEC and other factors dictate

that no public discussion is possible other than a standard

disclaimer about not discussing security measures or future

operations. Regardless of mission, commanders can expect the

predeployment and deployment phases to attract considerable news

media attention. This fact offers commanders and their public

affairs staffs excellent opportunities to take the initiative in

the media relations mission. Even if there is no public

acknowledgement that specific units have been alerted,26 there

will be enough visible signatures to lead to speculation. During

the deployment to Southwest Asia, the presence of large numbers

of soldiers in civilian stores purchasing sunscreen and bottled

water clearly indicated an alert status.27 To retain

credibility, some explanation should be available when the

reporters call.

Most importantly, efforts in these initial stages can allow

commanders to achieve some early objectives at a time when

commanders can expect reporters to be functioning at full

tempo.28 As appropriate, deployment plans should allocate seats

for local and regional journalists to travel with the force into

the operational area. First, this step ensures that news media

are included with the force, an important initial goal; there is

no reason to wait until arrival to accomplish this task.

Additionally, those journalists who have covered the organization

regularly and perhaps have participated in various exercises are

more likely to be familiar with the military in general and with

the deploying units in particular; are immediately available for

inclusion because they live close to the deployment base; and are

particularly helpful to the total public affairs effort because

their stories are sent back to the towns and regions in which the

force lives and assist in informing those who remain behind,

including the families.

In our uncertain international security environment, the

military is facing a variety of unfamiliar challenges.

Preparations for news media relations will vary significantly

depending on the mission, OPSEC concerns, and the tone of the
message to be communicated. In addition to familiar combat

contingencies, commanders could also find themselves as

participants in complex crisis management efforts, humanitarian

aid and disaster relief missions, and

peacekeeping/peacemaking/peace-enforcement operations. Strict

limits on OPSEC which are familiar in combat contingencies give

way to transparency in humanitarian aid, disaster relief and

peacekeeping operations.

All military missions provide the types of activities and

information on which journalists inevitably focus. Regardless of

circumstances, the first rule of communicating with the news

media is to speak within the limits of one's own expertise and

responsibility. A very inefficient approach is to prepare a list

of subjects that anyone speaking with a reporter may discuss. In

fact, it is usually easier to focus on those issues respondents

should not talk about. In general, the relationship between the

reporter and the soldier is simple: That which is said is

reported. Thus it is important that military personnel understand

the concept of "security at the source" which establishes the

standard that information known to be classified or sensitive

should not be provided to a reporter.

Since every mission will have different OPSEC concerns,

operational planning should establish and update subjects which

should be candidly acknowledged as sensitive and, thus, not

subject to discussion. Within the context of "security at the

source," the following provides general guidance for response:

• Who: Which units? What equipment? Weapons systems?

• What: Performed what missions?

• Where: Self-explanatory.

• When: Could be sensitive. Discuss in advance? Announce as

it happens? Wait?

• Why: Emphasize the general mission statement. Provide

context.

• How: Discuss doctrine, operational art, and tactics (a

good opportunity to educate).

To the extent possible, this information should be

disseminated through the public affairs guidance (PAG) prepared

for each mission; equally essential is the need to update the

guidance regularly. Once again, an intelligent assessment of what

is truly sensitive opens up opportunities for the open discussion

of all other issues, emphasizing the full range and complexity of

the military effort.29 Commanders and their public affairs staffs

"possess" the story and can most efficiently communicate by

facilitating inclusion of the reporters and assisting in their

understanding of what they are experiencing and reporting.
The Way Ahead.

Traditionally, one of the functions of the news media has

been to provide the first draft of history through the reporting

of the events, issues and personalities of their times. While the

emerging trend is for journalists to become participants in those

events, definers of the issues and some of the most influential

personalities, their basic role remains unchanged. In response to

the pace and complexity of events and issues and the speed of the

reporting process, it will be increasingly important for the

military to become active, visible participants in the dialogue

leading to the production of news reports. It is no longer

sufficient to remain passive in the face of news media scrutiny,

reluctantly accept the visit of a reporter, and then complain

about the results. The facts are that the age of activist

journalism places special demands on the time and resources of

the commander and often results in confrontations with the

military.

There is a view that the tension between the military and

the news media will diminish with the evolution of younger

officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel who have matured, not just

watching television, but by having their growth and development

recorded on home video cameras. While it is perhaps inevitable

that the comfort level of the military with the news media will

thus improve, this trend will be matched by ever decreasing

levels of familiarity and understanding which young reporters

will have for their contemporaries in the military. Further,

budget constraints on news coverage have led to the practice of

"parachuting" in which reporters are "dropped" into a story with

little preparation and are left there only long enough shoot some

video, take a few pictures, and record a variety of observations

before being extracted and assigned to another story. Such

superficial reporting could have a significant impact on public

perceptions about the operation. Thus the need for regular

contact through educational opportunities, training visits and

exercises will remain at least as important as now.

This is especially true as the news media's impact on the

public agenda and public discussion continues to grow, but in new

ways unfamiliar today. While traditional television and radio

networks, newspapers and magazines may become less relevant,

emerging computer technology which will enable citizens to select

their own print and broadcast stories from an extensive menu of

news services will open fresh opportunities to reach the public,

but only if the message and the messenger communicate credibility

and retain the public's trust. Obviously it is not possible for

military leaders to speak personally with each member of the

public, domestic or international. Thus the bond of

interdependence strengthens between the military as the source of

the message and the news media as the messenger.
Traditional concerns about technology will also remain

central to the relationship between the military and the news

media as will its increasing impact on OPSEC and public

understanding. Additionally, because of new capabilities, the

public forum for the military will no longer be limited to those

local journalists who live around bases or even to the national

reporters who cover security issues at the Pentagon. News media

coverage has come to rely on a vast international system of

electronic images, text and data which ensures that stories about

events in the most remote areas can be made quickly available to

any interested news organization. The historic arrival of the

first NATO aircraft in Baku, Azerbaijan, on February 5, 1992, was

covered by a young radio reporter who was employed as a

"stringer" for an American radio network. She then produced two

sets of reports and interviews: one for her local audience and

one for transmission to the United States.30

Ultimately, however, technology only affects the speed of

the reporting process and not the quality of the stories

themselves. Both institutions will continue to share a common

interest in ensuring the accuracy and completeness of every

report before it is transmitted over a satellite telephone, video

uplink or data line. For the military commander, this will

involve the development of a comprehensive news media plan and

the commitment of knowledgeable personnel and dedicated resources

at the earliest stages of the dialogue with journalists, whoever

they are and whatever news organization they represent. Chasing a

story once it is produced is far less efficient because it

requires the correction of misperceptions and the repeated

restatement of the military position, distracting commanders from

the events and stories which continue to move forward. Typically,

a delayed response which focuses on a published news media report

sacrifices the initiative to the reporters, confuses the public

and contributes to the persistent tension with the news media,

thus making the next story more difficult to tell.

In thinking forward about the news media relations mission,

commanders should not fear the inevitable news report. What they

should be concerned about are those stories which contain factual

errors, misrepresent the goals of an operation, or create false

expectations for performance. Fortunately, commanders can affect

the quality of reporting by preparing a tailored package of

public affairs policies, plans and support packages appropriate

to each assigned operation. Normally, commanders will find that

most journalists are interested in improving the quality of their

own reporting even if it means adapting to reasonable ground

rules and procedures outlined by the military. Yet commanders,

operational staffs and public affairs practitioners can only

directly affect their own assessments, policy judgements,

planning and news media relations decisions. They cannot control

the news media's reactions or behavior and should not waste

effort, time and resources to do so.

Thinking forward takes the initiative by seeking confident
engagement with the news media rather than uncertain avoidance or

defensive conflict. This includes holding reporters to standards

of accuracy and completeness and developing strategies to

"correct the record" if events or comments are misrepresented.

The relationship between the military and the news media can

allow for both institutions to act as equal partners in the

communications process. From the military's perspective, the

effort should be directed toward assessing the levels of news

media interest to be expected in any assigned mission;

determining how many reporters can be accommodated in the

operational units and what procedures are necessary to assist in

their inclusion; and identifying what technology is required,

and, like all support packages, ensuring that it is available

early enough to affect positively the news media relations

environment. Central to the entire effort is the need to make

certain that the public affairs plan efficiently supports the

commander's scheme of maneuver to include the requirements of

OPSEC.

Ultimately, of course, the goal is that the next time the

lights come on, either literally or metaphorically, the situation

will be interpreted as an opportunity to tell the military story,

and that the soldiers, regardless of position, will be trained

well enough to respond candidly, explain effectively, and

continue the mission.

ENDNOTES

1. Comments made at The Admiral Nimitz Foundation Symposium,

"The Role of the War Correspondent," San Antonio, Texas, May 5,

1993.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Department of Defense Directive 5122.5, Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), August 4, 1983, paragraph

F4. Expanded on in (Draft) Department of Defense Directive, Joint

Public Affairs Operations and Joint Pub 1-07 (Draft), Doctrine

For Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

5. General Eisenhower quotation extracted from regulations

for war correspondents accompanying Allied Expeditionary Forces

in World War II, 1944.

6. Plaque located during a personal trip to Normandy,

France, in May 1990.

7. LTG Boomer's response to a question after a presentation

he and his U.S. Marine Corps briefing team made at the Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Casteau, Belgium,

June 1992.
8. Department of Defense Directive 5400.XX (Draft), Joint

Public Affairs Operations, paragraph D.4.(b).

9. John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and

Propaganda in the Gulf War, New York: Hill and Wang, 1992, p.

159.

10. Major General Paul E. Funk, U.S. Army, "Accommodating

the Wartime Media: A Commander's Task," Military Review, April

1993, p. 79.

11. Department of Defense Directive 5122.5, Enclosure 3 (May

19,1992) and new DoD Directive and Doctrine. I have included them

here for ease in reference:

Guidelines For Coverage of DoD Operations

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal

means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of

covering U.S. operations. But pools may sometimes

provide the only feasible means of early access to a

military operation. Pools should be as large as

possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—

within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of

early-access pools will not cancel the principle of

independent coverage for journalists in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be

appropriate for specific events, such as those at

extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by

the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a

clear set of military security ground rules that

protect U.S. Forces and their operations. Violation of

the ground rules can result in suspension of

credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the

journalist involved. News organizations will make their

best efforts to assign experienced journalists to

combat operation and to make them familiar with U.S.

military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to military

units. Special operations restrictions may limit access

in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as

liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting

process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders

will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles
and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be

responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will

supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure,

compatible transmission of pool material and will make

these facilities available whenever possible for filing

independent coverage. In cases when government

facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as

always, file by any other means available. The military

will not ban communications systems operated by news

organizations, but electromagnetic operational security

in battlefield situations may require limited

restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the

operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool

System.

12. Various conversations with Mr. Robert W. Taylor,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

and Colonel William I. Mulvey, U.S. Army, Director of the Joint

Information Bureau in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during the latter

stages of Operation Desert Shield and all of Operation Desert

Storm; I have worked for both. The number was arrived at by

assuming three reporters per ground maneuver brigade and three

for other divisional units and the headquarters.

13. In a February 8, 1993 discussion with reporters from the

Reuters News Service and CNN, both agreed that commanders who

have included journalists within their organizations should not

be expected to exceed a reasonable number by accepting more. They

also promised that they would continue to seek access to other

units which had not included journalists. Thus a responsible

assessment of the number of reporters who can be accommodated

increases a commander's credibility when dealing with others who

appear in their unit areas.

14. A simple survey of news coverage on various networks,

both domestic and international, reveals that the same video

images repeat themselves, apparently the result of the tape being

sold to multiple news media outlets. The only difference (besides

the quality of the reporting) lies in the different logos which

appear as a result of the Persian Gulf War (to prevent networks

from pirating video) and are usually placed in the bottom right

hand corner of the screen.

15. Molly Moore, A Woman At War: Storming Kuwait With the

U.S. Marines, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, p. xiii.

16. Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations (Endnote 11).

17. Department of Defense Directive (Draft), Joint Public

Affairs Operations, Enclosure 2, paragraph 3, contains a detailed
listing of necessary capabilities. Also included in Joint Pub

1-07 (Draft), Doctrine For Public Affairs in Joint Operations,

Chapter IV, paragraph 4.

18. U.S. European Command has developed a deployable

resource package for the operation of a Joint Information Bureau.

Popularly known as the "JIB In A Box," it should provide the bulk

of the required assets, especially those for the earliest stages

of an operation. The concept awaits final funding and

acquisition. Such an arrangement would be useful for every

combatant commander.

19. Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations.

20. Ibid.

21. Personal discussion with a network television producer

(assigned to the Pentagon) some 20 minutes after the first

Marines arrived on the beach at Mogadishu, Somalia.

22. Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations.

23. Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, Cantigny

Conference Series, Reporting the Next War, Chicago, Illinois:

Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1992, pp.17-19. Discusses

shortfalls in background and proposes various solutions for

consideration.

24. Comments made by several news bureau chiefs during a

discussion on alternatives for educating reporters, held at the

Capitol Hilton Hotel in Washington, DC, April 27, 1993.

25. Wire service report from the Associated Press covering

preparations of U.S. forces at Hohenfels, Germany, May 11, 1993.

26. During the initial stages of Operation Restore Hope in

Somalia (December 1992), public affairs guidance authorized those

units alerted to participate to acknowledge their status. This

openness will not always be appropriate to the mission.

27. Obtained from discussions with a news director and

reporters at KCEN-TV in Waco, Texas, and WTHR-TV in Indianapolis,

Indiana.

28. At least one American television network has established

a "response team" which can rapidly deploy within six hours to a

developing story. Other than the public affairs escorts who would

accompany the DoD National Media Pool, no similar capability

currently exists to support deploying U.S. forces in their

preparations to meet with reporters.

29. Joint Pub 1-07 (Draft), Appendix B, "Guidelines For

Discussion With the News Media," provides assistance for those

developing response strategies for contacts with journalists.
30. I was the information officer on that NATO mission which

placed American liaison teams on the ground in preparation for

the humanitarian airlift to the former Soviet Union. We had a

similar experience with a television crew in Ulan Ude (a Siberian

city of the Russian Federation).
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Ricks, USA-Ret.

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple