Nuclear Safeguards and the International

Atomic Energy Agency

April 1995

OTA-ISS-615
ii

Cover Photo Credits: Top left: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Bottom left: Los Alamos

National Laboratory. Center: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear

Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OTA-ISS-615 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1995).
iii

oreword

he International Atomic Energy Agency, which has primary responsibility for verifying compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, plays a central role in preventing the spread of

nuclear weapons. But the limitations of the IAEA’s system of nuclear safeguards were highlighted in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian

Gulf War, when it was revealed that Iraq had mounted an extensive, covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, and partly in proximity to,

its open nuclear research activities that were under IAEA safeguards.

The following year, IAEA investigations in North Korea revealed that

the North Korean government was hiding information regarding the extent of its previous nuclear material production.

These cases showed that states could and did violate their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, offering concrete examples of what many

had previously considered an abstract and distant threat. They also

showed that the IAEA’s traditional mission of detecting the misuse of

safeguarded nuclear materials addressed only part—and probably not

the most important part—of the proliferation problem. It became clear

that if similar problems were to be avoided in the future, the IAEA would

have to assume the task of ensuring that states do not possess covert nuclear facilities, a mission that it had previously not been granted the

political support or the resources to conduct. Although the IAEA appears

to be winning the political backing it needs to assume this broader responsibility, its member states have so far not granted it the funds to do

so without impairing other safeguards functions.

This report analyzes what IAEA safeguards can and cannot be expected to accomplish, identifies areas where they might be broadened

and improved, and presents options for doing so. It is the sixth publication of OTA’s assessment on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, done at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs Committees. That request was endorsed by the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the (then) House Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and

Urban Affairs, and the (then) House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director
iv

dvisory Panel

James E. Goodby1

Chairman through March 23, 1993

Distinguished Service Professor

Carnegie-Mellon University

James F. Leonard2

Chairman since June 1, 1993

Executive Director

Washington Council on

Non-Proliferation

George Anzelon

Associate Division Leader

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratories

Will D. Carpenter

Chemical Industry Consultant

Lewis A. Dunn

Assistant Vice President

Science Applications International

Corporation

Randall Forsberg

Executive Director

Institute for Defense and

Disarmament Studies

Thomas R. Fox

Director

Office of National Security

Technology

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Alan R. Goldhammer

Director of Technical Affairs

Industrial Biotechnology

Association

John M. Googin3

Senior Staff Consultant

Martin Marietta Energy

Systems, Inc.

Robert G. Gough

Senior Member, Technical Staff

Sandia National Laboratories

Elisa D. Harris4

Senior Research Analyst

The Brookings Institution

Geoffrey Kemp

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Joshua Lederberg5

Rockefeller University

John W. Lewis

Center for International Security

and Arms Control

Stanford University

Lee W. Mercer

Corporate Export Manager

Digital Equipment Corporation

Matthew S. Meselson

Department of Biochemistry and

Molecular Biology

Harvard University

Stephen M. Meyer

Center for International Studies

MIT

Gary Milhollin

Director

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear

Arms Control

Marvin M. Miller

Senior Research Scientist

Department of Nuclear

Engineering

MIT

Janne E. Nolan

Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy

The Brookings Institution

________________

1Resigned March 22, 1993, to become Chief

U.S. Negotiator for Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons.

2Panel member until June 1, 1993; panel

chair after June 1, 1993.

3Deceased.

4Resigned January 29, 1993, to join National

Security Council staff.

5Ex-officio; Member of Technology Assessment Advisory Council.
v

William C. Potter

Director

Center for Russian and Eurasian

Studies

Monterey Institute of International

Studies

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

Division of Natural Sciences

State University of New York at

Purchase

Lawrence Scheinman6

Associate Director

Peace Studies Program

Cornell University

Leonard S. Spector

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Sergio C. Trindade

President

SE2T International, Ltd.

________________

6Resigned August 13, 1993, to become

Counselor for Nonproliferation in the U.S.

Department of Energy.

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members.

The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report

and the accuracy of its contents.
vi

roject Staff

Peter Blair

Assistant Director

Industry, Commerce, and

International Security Division

Alan Shaw

Program Director

International Security and Space

Program

PROJECT STAFF

Gerald L. Epstein

Project Director

Anthony Fainberg

Thomas H. Karas

CONTRACTOR

DAN FENSTERMACHER

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Jacqueline Robinson Boykin

Office Administrator

N. Ellis Lewis

Administrative Secretary

Don Gallagher

Secretary
vii

dditional Reviewers

George Bunn

Center for International Security

and Arms Control

Stanford University

Zachary Davis

Congressional Research Service

Washington, DC

Warren Donnelly

Consultant

McLean, VA

David Dorn

United Nations Special

Commission for Iraq

United Nations, NY

David Fischer

Consultant

Cambridge, United Kingdom

Leslie G. Fishbone

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Upton, NY

Victor Gilinsky

Consultant

Glen Echo, MD

Arnold Hakkila

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos, NM

William Higinbotham

Consultant

Bellsport, NY

Burton F. Judson

Consultant

Los Gatos, CA

David A. Kay

SAIC

McLean, VA

Robert E. Kelley

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos, NM

Michael Lawrence

U.S. Mission to the Multilateral

Organizations in Vienna

Vienna, Austria

Marvin Peterson

U.S. Mission to the Multilateral

Organizations in Vienna

Vienna, Austria

Joseph Pilat

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos, NM

Michael Rosenthal

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency

Washington, DC

Henry Sokolski

Executive Vice President

Aletheia Enterprises

William Walker

University of Sussex

Sussex, United Kingdom

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers

do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.
ix

1 Summary 1

Findings on IAEA Safeguards 3

Introduction 5

Options for Enhancing the Safeguards Regime 7

2 Introduction 23

A History of International Control Efforts 24

IAEA Safeguards 27

3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA

 Safeguards Regime 37

Overall Confidence in Safeguards 38

Strengthening Safeguards 45

4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/IAEA

Framework 89

Amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty 90

Reinterpreting the Non-Proliferation Treaty 92

Problem NPT States 94

Non-NPT “Threshold” States 99

Improvements in the International Nuclear

 Fuel Cycle 102

APPENDICES

A Safeguarding Reprocessing

Facilities 111

B Parties to the NPT, the IAEA, and

Safeguards Agreements 131

C Abbreviations and Glossary 137

INDEX 139

ontents
Summary

rom the dawn of the nuclear age, nuclear power has been

recognized as a “dual-use” technology. The same nuclear

reactions that give bombs the destructive force of many

thousands of tons of high explosive can, when harnessed in

a controlled fashion, produce energy for peaceful purposes. The

challenge for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime—

the collection of policies, treaties, and institutions intended to

stem the spread of nuclear weapons—is to prevent nuclear proliferation while at the same time permitting nuclear energy’s peaceful applications to be realized. One of the key institutions involved in meeting these two objectives is the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international organization

created in 1957 as a direct outgrowth of President Eisenhower’s

“Atoms for Peace” program.

The IAEA Statute, which creates the legal framework for the

agency, charges it to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of

atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the

world.” At the same time, it gives the agency the authority to enter

into so-called safeguards agreements with individual nations or

groups of nations to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, or

facilities are not used to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s

mission and its safeguards responsibilities were extended with

the enactment in 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (also known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or

NPT). The Treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon states that are

parties to the accord to enter into safeguards agreements with the

IAEA covering all nuclear materials on their territory (e.g., uranium and plutonium, whether in forms directly usable for weapons or forms that require additional processing before becoming

usable in weapons). | 1
2 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Today, the IAEA has a central role in the international community’s efforts to prevent the

spread of nuclear weapons. It has come under increasing scrutiny since the Persian Gulf War of

1991, when it was revealed that Iraq had mounted

a massive, covert nuclear weapon program in parallel with the public nuclear activities that were

declared to, and inspected by, the IAEA. Discovery of Iraq’s activities highlighted the need to ensure that other countries subject to IAEA safeguards were not also conducting nuclear weapon

activities at facilities totally unknown to the

IAEA. This assignment is considerably tougher

than the one that the IAEA’s member states had

implicitly assigned the agency before the war:

making sure that known, ostensibly peaceful facilities and materials were not being surreptitiously

used for weapon purposes.

Over the following two years, the IAEA took

a key role in exposing elements of North Korea’s

nuclear weapon program, and in verifying that

South Africa had dismantled its own weapon program. These high-profile, high-stakes activities,

in conjunction with a heightened interest in nuclear nonproliferation more generally, have focused additional attention on the IAEA and its

system of nuclear safeguards. In addition to their

direct contribution to nonproliferation, IAEA nuclear safeguards also affect the nuclear nonproliferation regime indirectly. For example, the confidence that parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

have in safeguards is certainly one factor in determining their commitment to that Treaty, which is

the centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime.

This report analyzes what the IAEA’s system of

nuclear safeguards can and cannot be expected to

accomplish, identifies areas where it might be

broadened and improved, and presents options for

doing so. However, the focus here on nuclear

safeguards should not be taken to imply that these

safeguards are the only, or even the most important, nonproliferation tool. As discussed in an earlier Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report, the nuclear nonproliferation regime also

includes a host of other measures: export controls,

international treaties, the extension of nuclear

“umbrellas” by states having nuclear weapons to

other states that might otherwise feel the need to

develop their own, provision of other diplomatic

and military commitments by nations to reassure

their allies and warn potential foes, unilateral national polices, and so on.1 This much wider set of

issues is not addressed in this report. For further

discussion, the reader is referred to that earlier report and to the other publications from OTA’s assessment on the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction.

This chapter summarizes the issues and options

for improving nuclear safeguards. Chapter 2 provides some background information about nuclear safeguards and the IAEA. Chapter 3 discusses various proposals for improving nuclear

safeguards, or otherwise tightening control over

nuclear materials, that could be implemented

without making major changes to existing institutions or international agreements. These proposals generally address various changes in IAEA operations that the agency already has the authority

to implement; indeed, many are already being implemented. Chapter 4 of this report addresses

measures that go beyond existing institutions and

agreements, whose implementation would require substantial changes or additions to the current regime (e.g., new treaties, or amendments to

agreements such as the IAEA Statute or the NPT).

Examples would include measures to address the

actions of states not party to the NPT, or new

1See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC559 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993). Other publications from this OTA assessment include The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry, OTA-BP-ISC-106, August 1993; Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115, December 1993; Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596, May 1994; and Proliferation and the

Former Soviet Union, OTA-ISC-605, September 1994.
Chapter 1 Summary I 3

agreements to place constraints on the production

or use of nuclear materials that go well beyond the

NPT.

OTA’s major findings are presented below. Following that, this summary chapter mirrors the organization of the rest of this report: it provides

some background information on IAEA safeguards, discusses various options to improve

those safeguards that can be implemented largely

within the existing regime, and concludes with

some options to augment the regime.

FINDINGS ON IAEA SAFEGUARDS

■ Some measure of subjectivity is inherent in

any system of nuclear safeguards, and it is not

possible to make an absolute determination of

such a system's effectiveness. While violations

of IAEA safeguards might be demonstrated unambiguously, compliance can never be established definitively.

Although the purpose of IAEA safeguards—

to verify that nuclear material “is not diverted

to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices” 2—may be simply stated, that goal does

not automatically translate into the complex

system of declarations, inspections, and evaluations that comprise the safeguards system. Assumptions must be made concerning the

amount of material whose diversion should be

detected (see discussion of “significant quantity” thresholds to follow), the period over which

those diversions are conducted, and the statistical confidence needed to assert that a diversion

might have taken place. No matter how small a

diversion the IAEA intends to be able to detect

in a certain period of time, for example, a state

might still successfully divert the same amount

of material by doing so over a longer period. Of

course, even in such a case, there is value in delaying a proliferant’s progress.

Statistical methods such as those used by the

IAEA to account for nuclear materials cannot

give absolute answers. A measurement that a

certain amount of nuclear material cannot be

accounted for could mean that the material has

been diverted out of a given facility—but it

could also mean that the material remains within the facility but has for some reason escaped

measurement, or even that all the material was

in fact present and measured but that due to the

inherent uncertainty in the measurement, some

of the material appeared to be missing.

■ The conventional “material accountancy”

safeguards methods now in use by the IAEA

appear unable to assure that the diversion of

a bomb's worth of plutonium per year from a

large plutonium reprocessing plant—e.g.,

one processing much over about 100 tons of

spent fuel per year— would be detected with

high confidence. No reprocessing plants this

large are now under full IAEA safeguards, but

one is under construction at Rokkasho-mura in

Japan. (The operating reprocessing plant at Tokai in Japan has a capacity of about 90 tons

spent fuel per year; whether or not it can meet

this standard depends on the details of its material accountancy system and its annual

throughput.)

New techniques such as “near-real-time accountancy’’-unproven at this scale by the

IAEA—must be adopted for large reprocessing

plants, and even these techniques may not be

able to measure material flows and inventories

accurately enough to detect the absence of as

little as one bomb’s worth of plutonium per

year. In that case, if the IAEA could not demonstrate that safeguards methods other than the

material accountancy techniques that form the

core of its current safeguards approach can be

relied on to detect diversion with a high degree

of confidence, it would have to conclude that it

could not safeguard such a plant to the same

standards it applies at smaller facilities. To

date, the IAEA has not considered the possibil2

International Atomic Energy Agency, “Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s,” IAEA Division of Public

Information, Vienna, Austria, December 1993, p. 11.
4 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

ity that it may be unable to safeguard large facilities such as the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing

plant, but neither has it been able to demonstrate that it can.

 Evaluations of safeguards effectiveness that

consider only the precision with which nuclear material inventories and flows can be

measured underestimate the effectiveness of

the overall safeguards system. Other techniques besides material accountancy—such as

physical containment, surveillance, and review

and verification of design information—can

serve to prevent some diversion scenarios, and

to make others less likely. These techniques

make important contributions to safeguards,

and the IAEA is improving its use of them.

However, their contribution is very difficult to

quantify, and it is hard to determine to what degree confidence in safeguards is improved

through their use.

 IAEA safeguards alone cannot prevent states

from developing nuclear weapons, but they

make it much more difficult for states to use

safeguarded nuclear facilities to make weapons without detection. IAEA safeguards are intended to detect—and therefore deter—diversion of civil nuclear materials into a weapon

program. However, they cannot keep states

from acquiring the technology needed to produce nuclear materials, or even from stockpiling fissionable material within civil programs

and then withdrawing from safeguards to produce weapons.

 The most fundamental limit to improving the

International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability

to detect nuclear proliferation is the extent to

which the states that subscribe to nuclear

safeguards are willing to cede additional sovereignty to the IAEA. Although any country

subscribing to an international agreement such

as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or a safeguards

agreement with the IAEA is understood to have

surrendered some sovereignty, states may not

necessarily agree to new measures that they believe go beyond their original commitments.

Therefore, the IAEA may not have the power to

impose some measures it might otherwise wish

to take to bolster its safeguards system. However, such measures could be voluntarily accepted by states subject to safeguards.

 The IAEA has no power on its own to compel

states to comply with its inspection requests.

However, it can refer disputes to the United

Nations Security Council, which has the legal

authority to enact and enforce resolutions

that are binding on U.N. members. Thus, if

the Security Council concludes that a state’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA threatens international peace and security, in principle it

can demand that the state comply with IAEA

requests or otherwise cease its provocative behavior, and the Security Council can ultimately

back up its demands by authorizing the use of

military force.

The IAEA’s authority to inspect sites within

a country is granted by the inspected country in

the safeguards agreement that the country concludes with the IAEA. In the case of NPT parties, these agreements grant the IAEA the authority to determine that all nuclear materials in

the state are exclusively in peaceful use.3 They

also give the IAEA—in consultation with the

inspected state, and with its permission—the

ability to inspect any site where the IAEA has

reason to believe nuclear-related activities are

being conducted, even if the inspected state has

not admitted to conducting nuclear activities

there. If the request for such a “special inspection” is refused, the IAEA can seek enforcement by the United Nations Security Council.

3The one exception is that nuclear materials that are in use for military, but nonexplosive, purposes such as naval propulsion are exempt

from IAEA safeguards. However, a state may not create a separate fuel cycle outside of safeguards to produce nuclear materials for these purposes.
Chapter 1 Summary | 5

Nevertheless, safeguards agreements do not

give the IAEA unlimited, “anytime-anywhere”

access.

Even though its access is limited, the IAEA

can conduct inspections that individual states

would not normally be permitted to undertake. For example, the IAEA took samples at

North Korean nuclear facilities that the United

States would almost certainly not have been

able to visit. As an international organization,

the IAEA is not generally thought of as pursuing the parochial interests of any single state,

and strives to be seen as politically neutral.

Ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear

facilities (i.e., those that a state hides from the

IAEA, in violation of the requirement that all

such facilities must be declared) is probably

more important to the international nonproliferation regime than is incrementally improving safeguards at declared facilities

(those that have been disclosed to and safeguarded by the IAEA). On the other hand, if

safeguards at declared facilities deteriorate to

the point where it becomes easy to divert materials without detection, diversion will become

more attractive.

The IAEA is exploring a number of means to

improve its ability to determine whether states

are pursuing undeclared nuclear weapon

programs. However, it is not an intelligence organization, and its ability to discover undeclared activities that states wish to keep hidden

from it will depend significantly on the willingness of other member states to share their own

intelligence information with the IAEA, as

well as on the ability of the IAEA to evaluate

and analyze all such information.

The steadily growing demands placed upon

the IAEA cannot be accommodated without

sacrificing effectiveness under the “no real

growth” funding policy that has been imposed upon the agency since 1985. New responsibilities—including additional states

subscribing to nuclear safeguards, expanded

efforts to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities in safeguarded states, and possible additional missions such as monitoring

surplus nuclear weapon materials from the

United States and Russia—need to be accompanied by new resources. However, who should

pay and how the additional funds should be allocated remain controversial. For example, it

will be politically difficult, if not impossible, to

increase the safeguards budget without also increasing the funds the IAEA devotes to its technical assistance programs.

INTRODUCTION

Production of fissionable nuclear material (highly

enriched uranium or plutonium) is the most difficult step in making a nuclear weapon. Consequently, constraining a would-be proliferant nation’s ability to produce such materials has always

been a central component of international nonproliferation efforts. One of the principal constraints

is the requirement that countries joining the NPT

as non-nuclear-weapon states accept international

monitoring of all facilities that might produce,

use, or otherwise handle nuclear materials. Such

monitoring is conducted under the IAEA’s system

of nuclear safeguards.4

IAEA safeguards are intended to impede nuclear proliferation by ensuring that the diversion

of nuclear materials from safeguarded nuclear facilities to weapon purposes will be caught and

made known to the world community. To the extent that they can assure a country that its neighbors or adversaries are not developing nuclear

weapons, safeguards lessen that country’s perceived need to develop its own nuclear arsenal.

4 IAEA safeguards can also constrain nuclear programs in non-NPT countries. Brazil, not party to the NPT, has nevertheless accepted IAEA

safeguards over all its nuclear facilities. Moreover, additional states such as Israel, Pakistan, and India have placed certain nuclear facilities—

usually imported ones—under safeguards as well, greatly complicating any attempt to use these facilities in their nuclear weapon programs.

(India has a reprocessing plant that is under safeguards only when reprocessing safeguarded fuel; its activities at other times are not constrained

by safeguards.)
6 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

In addition to imposing constraints on states’

nuclear activities, the NPT also calls for the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials,

and scientific and technological information for

the peaceful uses of atomic energy,” offering a reward to those states that subscribe to the Treaty

and forego their option to produce nuclear weapons. In return for concessions by the non-nuclearweapon states, the nuclear powers agree under the

NPT to strive toward nuclear disarmament (Article VI of the Treaty), and (in conjunction with

non-nuclear-weapon states who are in a position

to contribute) to share information on the peaceful

uses of atomic energy (Article IV). All NPT members are forbidden under Article III from exporting nuclear materials or facilities unless the recipients of those goods agree to place them under

IAEA safeguards.

❚ Origins of the IAEA Role in

Nonproliferation

Pursuant to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for

Peace” program, the United States in 1954 began

to enter into bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries. These agreements included provisions, called safeguards, by which the

United States could assure itself that its nuclear

materials and technology were not being put to

military use by other nations. At the same time,

the United States entered into negotiations to

create the International Atomic Energy Agency.

These negotiations concluded in late 1956 with

the drafting of the IAEA Statute. The agency itself

was formed the following year as an independent

intergovernmental organization affiliated with,

but not a subunit of, the United Nations.

The IAEA was not given highly intrusive powers of inspection or enforcement over its member

states, nor did it assert control over their nuclear

activities. Rather, it was given the authority to enter into safeguards agreements with individual nations or groups of nations that would allow it to

make certain inspections and measurements to ensure that nuclear activities were not being conducted for military purposes.

The first such agreement was concluded between the IAEA and Japan in 1959. By 1965, the

IAEA adopted a comprehensive system of safeguards that was to be applied, upon request, to individual nuclear activities within a state, and to all

activities receiving IAEA assistance. This type of

safeguards, set forth in the IAEA publication

known as INFCIRC/66, applies to individual

plants, shipments of nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between importers and exporters of nuclear

fuel or technology. It remains in use today as the

basis for nearly all agreements between the IAEA

and states that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered

into force in 1970, extended the scope of the

IAEA’s safeguards activities. By joining the NPT,

non-nuclear-weapon states—by definition, all those

except the United States, the Soviet Union (now

Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China—commit themselves to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or

explosive devices, and to submit to IAEA safeguards. Instead of covering only selected nuclear

facilities as volunteered by the state, safeguards

under the NPT—known as full-scope safeguards—are mandatory, and they must be applied

to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within a country’s territory or under its control.5 To implement this charge, the IAEA developed a more comprehensive standard safeguards

agreement—published in the IAEA document

known as INFCIRC/153—encompassing a state’s

entire nuclear fuel cycle. All non-nuclear-weapon

states that are parties to the NPT fall under IAEA

safeguards, but the converse is not true. There are

5Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, Article III(1), with the exception noted earlier for material used for military, but nonexplosive, purposes

(see footnote 3).
Chapter 1 Summary I 7

countries with safeguarded nuclear facilities, including a country (Brazil) about to conclude a fullscope safeguards agreement, that are not members

of the NPT.

The NPT requires that any nuclear equipment

exported by a member state be placed under safeguards by the recipient, even if the recipient is not

an NPT member. However, the treaty does not

oblige a member to require that countries receiving its nuclear exports adopt full-scope safeguards.

■ IAEA Safeguards

IAEA safeguards involve procedures for material

accountancy, control, containment, surveillance,

and verification of data, including onsite inspections, that are implemented through bilateral

agreements between the IAEA and individual

countries. They are designed primarily for two

purposes: 1) to detect proliferation activities that

involve diversion of materials from the civilian

nuclear fuel cycle, and 2) to provide warning of

any such occurrence to an international forum in

a timely fashion. Though they may deter proliferation by posing a risk of discovery, safeguards cannot predict a country’s intent or future activity, nor can they by themselves

prevent proliferation.

The safeguards process consists of three stages:

1. examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA

of those facilities where nuclear materials will

be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts formaterial transfers and shipments. States subject to

safeguards must establish so-called state systems of accounting and control, or SSACs, to

keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to

the IAEA for independent verification, much

like a bank auditor would be asked to provide

independent confirmation of the accuracy of a

bank’s accounting.

2. collection of data and independent information

by IAEA inspectors to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information,

or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual

findings.

3. evaluation by the IAEA of this information for

completeness and accuracy.

Any discrepancy of nuclear materials between

the recorded (book) inventory and the physical inventory determined by measurements and inspections is called material unaccounted for (MUF).

When MUF exceeds the amount attributable to

measurement uncertainties, the possibility of diversion exists and must be resolved by the IAEA.

OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING

THE SAFEGUARDS REGIME

OTA has explored a number of options for improving the nonproliferation regime, particularly

regarding controls over nuclear materials. Some

of these options can be implemented without making major changes to existing institutions or international agreements. Such proposals generally

concern various aspects of IAEA operations and

are discussed immediately below. Other options

would involve making substantial changes or

additions to the NPT or the IAEA Statute. These

are discussed in the section titled “Beyond the

Traditional NPT/IAEA Framework” that concludes this chapter.

■ Strengthening IAEA Capabilities

Resources available for IAEA safeguards.

In recent years, the demands placed upon the

IAEA for safeguards services have increased substantially. For example, countries with substantial

nuclear infrastructures have joined the NPT or

otherwise come under safeguards, not only significantly increasing the number of facilities needing

to be safeguarded but also requiring the IAEA to

devote considerable resources to verify as best it

can that all nuclear materials produced by the state

in the past can be accounted for. Perhaps more significantly, the IAEA has significantly expanded

its efforts to ensure that states under safeguards do

not have secret or undeclared nuclear facilities.

Despite these growing demands, however, the

IAEA’s safeguards budget has essentially been
8 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

held to zero real growth since 1985. A modest increase was approved in 1992, but was never realized due to the failure of the Soviet Union to make

any contribution at all that year. Even though the

United States interprets “zero real growth” as permitting increases to cover additional tasks that the

IAEA has no ability to refuse—such as concluding new safeguards agreements and adding new

facilities to existing agreements—the United

States has been unable to convince other IAEA

members to agree with this view. Therefore, every

new country and new facility coming under safeguards squeezes the funding available for existing

IAEA safeguards activities, let alone its new

thrust to detect undeclared sites. In addition, the

IAEA has constantly been subjected to late payments from member states, including the United

States.

Even if agreement could be reached to increase

funding for the IAEA, however, issues of fairness

and proportionality—both with respect to who

should pay more and how the added money should

be allocated between safeguards and other IAEA

programs such as technical assistance—complicate the debate over overall funding levels.

Increase U.S. contribution to the IAEA

safeguards program.

The United States, which provides just over 25

percent of the IAEA regular budget, is the IAEA’s

largest contributor. Its assessed contribution in

1994 totaled $49.9 million, with another $30 million provided in extrabudgetary contributions.6 A

total of $18.9 million of the U.S. assessed contribution went to fund safeguards activities. The

largest portion of the U.S. extrabudgetary contribution—$14.6 million—was allocated to the

IAEA’s fund for technical cooperation and assistance in nuclear technology, a program integral to

the IAEA’s mission of promoting nuclear technology. Politically, this program is linked very

strongly to the IAEA safeguards program, and

there will be great resistance within the agency to

increasing safeguards expenditures without corresponding increases in technical assistance. Some

$9.4 million of the U.S. extrabudgetary contribution in 1994 was devoted to improving safeguards.

Those supporting increased U.S. funding for

the IAEA believe that easing the fiscal pressures

on the IAEA would enable it to better fulfill its

current and future safeguards tasks and would be

worth the added cost. Those opposed to a U.S. increase may place higher priority on competing

needs for funds within the United States, or on the

desire to reduce federal spending in general or

contributions to international organizations in

particular. Even if the United States were to increase its contribution, other IAEA member states

may object to increasing their assessments or even

to allowing the U.S. increase to be spent on safeguards without a corresponding increase in the

technical assistance program.

Pay U.S. dues on time.

Differences between the U.S. and the IAEA budget cycles mean that the U.S. contribution is consistently late, causing cash shortages for the IAEA

and evoking criticism from the agency and from

other member states. The United States could consider paying its dues on time. Moving the payment

up, however, would incur a one-time charge equal

to a year’s dues because during that one fiscal

year, two years’ assessments would have to be

paid.

Allocation of inspection effort.

Whether or not the overall safeguards budget is increased, efficiency in the use of IAEA resources

is important. One inefficiency in present operations stems from the fact that safeguards are designed around nuclear material. Thus, much of the

6 Safeguards constitute some one-third of the IAEA’s regular budget—that part of the agency’s activities funded by assessment on its member states. The United States and many other states have committed to make extrabudgetary contributions in addition to their assessments. Budgetary figures for 1994 are from the U.S. Department of State, March 1995.
safeguards effort has ended up being directed toward countries with large nuclear fuel cycles—Japan, Germany, and Canada-rather than states of

greater proliferation concern. Furthermore, the

majority of the safeguards effort gets applied to facilities with the greatest amount of material (i.e.,

those associated with civilian nuclear power production), rather than to other nuclear research activities that might be more likely to benefit a weapon program.

Reallocate inspection effort toward

problem states.

It would be desirable for the IAEA to focus greater

safeguards efforts toward states either in regions

of political tension or with only marginal nonproliferation records (where, for example, some effort might be directed at environmental monitoring to look for undeclared facilities). However, the

IAEA is forbidden by its statute to discriminate

against member states, making such proposals

difficult to implement.

The IAEA already has some authority to adjust

routine inspection requirements (subject to certain limits) based on a country’s overall fuel-cycle

characteristics. This authority might be exploited

more fully, especially for future safeguards agreements. (Renegotiating safeguards agreements already in force would be much more difficult.) For

instance, more emphasis could be placed on a

country’s overall amount of direct-use fissile material (i.e., material containing plutonium or highly enriched uranium, including their chemical

compounds). 7 Or, if a country possesses enrichment or especially reprocessing facilities, additional inspection efforts might be justifiable even

if amounts of fuel being irradiated in various reactors were small.

Expansion of

Chapter 1 Summary I 9

IAEA safeguards via “enhanced transparency” measures.

“Transparency measures” refer to actions taken by

a state to enhance the visibility and openness of its

own activities in order to reassure others that it is

not threatening their security. In the area of nuclear safeguards, such measures might include

providing the IAEA with information, and offering access to inspectors, that is above and beyond

what is required by a state safeguards agreement.

Such actions can help a state assure others that it

is not conducting secret nuclear activities, and

they bolster the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.

One technique that can take advantage of such

transparency is the taking and analysis of environmental samples. The IAEA is exploring the potential for such environmental monitoring to detect

and/or to characterize undeclared nuclear facilities. It is also accepting invitations by states such

as Iran and South Africa for the IAEA to make

“visits”—rather than formal inspections—to sites

where questions may have been raised. As of August 1994, 20 states had agreed to participate in

field trials of environmental monitoring or other

techniques to strengthen safeguards. In addition to

strengthening safeguards, transparency measures

might allow the more efficient application of limited safeguards resources. In exchange for allowing IAEA inspectors much freer access to their territories, countries with large civilian fuel cycles,

for example, might receive lessened routine inspection effort, while overall confidence in the absence of undeclared facilities could be increased.

If the IAEA can satisfy itself that a state neither

possesses nor has access to any undeclared facilities, it will have increased confidence that nuclear

material at reactors and in storage has not been di7 Direct-use material includes unirradiated direct-use material, which can be used to make weapon components with little additional processing (e.g., highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium), as well as irradiated direct-use material, such as the plutonium contained in spent

fuel, which would have to be separated from the remainder of the fuel through chemical reprocessing before it could be used in weapon components.
10 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

verted to weapon use-even if the strict statistical

confidence levels now required for material accountancy are somewhat relaxed.

Encourage states to make, and the IAEA to

accept, offers to provide information and accept inspections not specifically required by safeguards

agreements.

NPT member states with nothing to hide might be

willing to accept inspections and offer information above and beyond what they are required to

provide, enhancing the IAEA’s ability to apply

safeguards. Moreover, such actions would reinforce a norm of openness for states wishing to

demonstrate their compliance with nonproliferation commitments. To formalize their commitment to the IAEA to provide this transparency,

states could add protocols to their safeguards

agreements with the IAEA.

One possible limitation on a state’s willingness

to volunteer such access might be security, proprietary, or constitutional concerns that could argue

against offering unlimited access. During the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,

which provides for quite intrusive “challenge” inspections of suspect sites, such concerns lead to

the development of “managed access” procedures

that obligate the inspected state to address the concerns that motivated the inspection request, but ultimately give it the right to limit inspector access.

By providing additional information, voluntary offers of openness will improve the IAEA’s

ability to do its job. However, they can also pose

some risk to the IAEA. First of all, acting on them

will require additional resources, exacerbating the

IAEA’s financial difficulties. Second, voluntary

invitations to conduct such visits can be retracted

at any time, as was demonstrated in North Korea.

Although North Korea initially offered IAEA inspectors the ability to visit sites in addition to

those that the North Koreans specifically declared

to the IAEA as nuclear facilities, this openness

rapidly broke down when the IAEA sought to investigate discrepancies concerning North Korean

plutonium production. Finally, and perhaps most

seriously, “technical visits” that do not uncover

suspicious activities might be overinterpreted (by

outside observers, even if not by the IAEA) to give

the inspected state a “clean bill of health.” All that

such a visit should imply is that nothing untoward

was discovered at that site at that time.

Encourage bilateral inspection regimes

and regional arms-control and confidence-building

measures.

In addition to acting on offers made by individual

states to make their nuclear activities more transparent, the IAEA can also work with groups of nations in tense regions of the world to encourage

confidence-building measures and promote regional arms control agreements. The model for

such regional nuclear inspection regimes has been

established by Argentina and Brazil, which have

implemented a quadripartite inspection regime involving the IAEA and a newly established agency

called ABACC (the Argentine-Brazilian Agency

for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials).

Both countries have also completed the steps necessary to bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

a regional agreement banning nuclear weapons in

Latin America and imposing the same constraints

on nuclear weapon ambitions as would the NPT.

Arrangements involving mutual visits to military

and nuclear installations have been discussed bilaterally in the Korean peninsula, but have been

fraught with difficulties while North Korea continues to violate its safeguards obligations with

the IAEA.

The regional inspection arrangements entered

into by Brazil, Argentina, and (if their bilateral

agreement comes into force) the Koreas all complement and extend these states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA. They have (or could have)

some role in reducing tensions-or in ratifying the

relaxation of tensions—in these regions. Similar

agreements might also play a role in helping resolve tensions among key states that are not now

under IAEA full-scope safeguards: Israel, India,

and Pakistan. Granted, the accomplishments

made so far in the in the Mideast peace process

shows that inspection regimes related to weapons

of mass destruction need not be among the first
items addressed in regional security negotiations.

It is difficult to imagine, however, that a long-term

settlement can avoid addressing the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

Definition of “significant quantity”

Many analysts have stated that the IAEA “significant quantity” (SQ) thresholds-the amounts of

fissile material whose diversion the IAEA safeguards system is designed to detect—me probably

higher than would be needed by nations attempting to make even their first nuclear explosive.

(The significant quantity of plutonium is 8 kilograms; it is 25 kilograms for uranium enriched to

20 percent or more of the uranium-235 isotope.)

The U.S. Department of Energy has all but confirmed this view in its recent declaration that 4 kilograms of plutonium are sufficient to make a nuclear weapon.8

Lower significant quantity thresholds.

Lowering the significant quantity thresholds

would call for greater inspection effort on the part

of the IAEA, including increased inspection frequency at several small facilities in states not yet

in possession of one SQ under the present definition. It would also make it more difficult in some

cases for the IAEA to achieve its inspection goals,

particularly at large “bulk handling” facilities—

those that handle nuclear materials in bulk form

(e.g., powders or solutions), rather than in discrete

units such as fuel rods (see discussion immediately below). In those cases where the IAEA is close

to or beyond the limits of its ability to verify diversion of one SQ in a timely manner, such as at large

plutonium reprocessing plants, reducing the SQ

would require the use of new safeguards techniques such as near-real-time-accountancy, and

even these might not be sufficient.

A major cause for

Chapter 1 Summary I 11

United States reluctance to

press the IAEA to lower the definition of the significant quantity has been the increased resources

that lowering this threshold would require. With

financial pressures on the IAEA making it difficult for the agency to fulfill its growing responsibilities under the present definition of the SQ,

lowering the SQ threshold without providing the

necessary additional resources would exacerbate

the IAEA’s financial difficulties and weaken current safeguards. Moreover, should the IAEA receive additional resources, it is not clear that

lowering the SQ-which would primarily affect inspections at declared sites in those states

with the largest nuclear programs-would be

the most effective use of those added resources.

Lower “timeliness” goals.

For each type of nuclear material under safeguards, the IAEA has established “timeliness

goals” to represent the maximum period of time

after a diversion of material might take place before the IAEA would be able to detect that diversion. These goals are based on estimates of the

nominal time it would take to convert a given type

of safeguarded material into a finished metal component for a weapon. However, timeliness goals

are not required to be less than these conversion

times for producing weapon components, and in

some cases they are longer. For example, although

the IAEA estimates that it might take as little as

one week to transform pure plutonium oxide into

a weapon component, the IAEA’s timeliness goal

for this material is one month. In practice, these

timeliness goals are at best an approximation,

both with respect to the time needed by any given

state to carry out a diversion of material and develop a weapon, and to the IAEA’s ability to raise a

clear warning flag in a particular instance of such

diversion.

8 Unclassified excerpt from U.S. Department of Energy, Classification Bulletin WNP-86, Feb. 8, 1994. This statement is not completely

equivalent to stating that the SQ should beset equal to 4 kilograms, since the SQ makes an allowance for material lost in processing and machining the plutonium for use in a weapon. However, much of these processing losses can be recovered. No such statement has been issued with

respect to uranium-235.
12 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA could change its timeliness goals for

various nuclear materials so that they were less

than the corresponding conversion times. Such

changes, however, would require considerably

greater inspection resources, which would have to

be weighed into the additional assurance that lessening these goals would provide. More significantly, the IAEA does not attain all of its timeliness thresholds today, due at least in part to

financial pressures. Achieving the timeliness criteria uniformly and comprehensively for all facilities—particularly those with “direct-use”

nuclear materials containing highly enriched

uranium or plutonium-is probably much

more important than adopting even more

stringent criteria as goals.

Safeguards uncertainties at nuclear material

bulk-handling facilities.

Large facilities that handle weapon-usable nuclear

materials in bulk form-for example, nuclear reprocessing plants that produce plutonium, enrichment plants that produce (or could produce) highly-enriched uranium, and fuel-fabrication plants

that process plutonium into “mixed-oxide”

(MOX) reactor fuel—pose the toughest safeguards challenges. For example, due to measurement uncertainties and the amount of plutonium handled per year in a large

reprocessing plant such as that being built by

Japan at Rokkasho-mura, conventional material accountancy techniques as currently practiced by the IAEA are not precise enough to ensure beyond a reasonable doubt that diversion

of a bomb’s worth of plutonium would be detected. Even with expected improvements, new

methods—unproven at this scale by the IAEA—

must be adopted if plutonium throughputs in

plants of this size are to be known accurately

enough to detect the absence of as little as one significant quantity of plutonium per year.

The most difficult aspect of safeguarding a

large reprocessing or MOX fuel fabrication plant

is meeting the one-month timeliness goal, as discussed in the preceding section, for the materials

processed in such plants. The IAEA’s ability to

provide warning within its timeliness criteria

of small but significant diversions from a large

reprocessing plant is not proven, given the difficulty in making precise inventory measurements (particularly during plant operation),

the time needed to identify anomalies in safeguards data that might indicate the diversion

of nuclear material, and the time needed to investigate these anomalies to see whether they

have a legitimate explanation. New techniques

that are substantially more intrusive than techniques in use for smaller plants will be required to

detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials in a timely manner from large reprocessing plants; these methods are being explored but have yet to be demonstrated by the

IAEA at the necessary scale.

Concerns about the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant, which because of its scale provides one

of the greatest technical challenges for IAEA safeguards, largely derive from the precedent it sets.

Even if Japan is judged unlikely to attempt to divert material from this plant (when it becomes operational) to a nuclear weapon, or to abrogate safeguards once a stockpile of plutonium has been

amassed, many states would likely be much less

sanguine about the effectiveness of safeguards if a

developing country in a politically unstable region of the world were to build a plant even a fraction its size. By its obligation to be nondiscriminatory, the IAEA cannot make politically based

judgments of trustworthiness, and it would have

great difficulty in justifying more stringent safeguards in one country than in another.

It has been argued, on the other hand, that a

country with a large reprocessing plant that

wanted nuclear weapon materials would be less

likely to divert a small amount than it would be to:

1) build a small clandestine nuclear infrastructure

outside of safeguards, 2) attempt to buy or steal
Chapter 1 Summary I 13

the nuclear material, now that there may well be an

active market in it,9 or 3) withdraw from the treaty

after announcing that its vital interests were no

longer served by NPT membership. In this view,

the primary objective of safeguards at reprocessing plants is to deny states a quick and direct route

to the production of large amounts of weapon-usable material in the course of a civil power program. With safeguards, the risk of undetected

diversion might not be eliminated entirely, but

it is nevertheless greatly reduced in both the

probability of undetected diversion and in the

amount of material subject to diversion.

Increase the use of containment and surveillance techniques.

Containment and surveillance (C/S) techniques

support the primary safeguards approach of material accountancy. After the nuclear material in an

item such as a nuclear fuel assembly or a container

of plutonium oxide powder has been measured,

for example, verifiable, tamper-proof seals are put

in place. So long as the seal is intact, the amount

of nuclear material present will remain known and

accounted for, avoiding the need to remeasure the

item at a later date. Surveillance devices (cameras

and motion detectors) are used to detect movement in facilities such as spent fuel ponds or other

storage areas, indicating when nuclear materials

might have been transferred in or out. C/S measures therefore can indicate how long a previous

measurement or inventory should still be considered valid, and hence provide what is known as

“continuity of knowledge.”

New methods that can make C/S techniques

even more effective, such as transmitting current

surveillance data via telephone or satellite links,

are technically feasible and have been demonstrated. Implementing them, however, faces significant obstacles, not the least of which is a state’s

willingness to be subjected to them. Surveillance

techniques also suffer from the fact that their usefulness is difficult to assess quantitatively. Unambiguous evidence of nondiversion can only be obtained for the material or area within a given

camera’s or motion detector’s line of sight, and

then only in the case of uninterrupted coverage.

Further, in cases where a large amount of legitimate activity is occurring, it may be difficult to detect some types of illegitimate activity. Further

analysis of specific applications of enhanced containment and surveillance is therefore needed to

determine whether cost-effective improvements

in safeguards would result.

Institute near-real-time accountancy and

surveillance.

Various techniques have been proposed, and partially tested, for continuously monitoring and reporting the flow of materials through a bulk-handling plant. Such “near-real-time-accountancy”

techniques permit more accurate measurement of

plant inventories. They also permit alarms indicating anomalous situations or status of equipment to be sent in near-real time to the IAEA. A

rapid response, including the introduction of inspectors, could be arranged, especially if there

were resident inspectors near the monitored site.

For example, Japan and the United States have

been developing and testing a robotic system for

monitoring nuclear materials. The system uses advanced sensors to monitor flows of nuclear materials at various locations and then transmit data by

satellite to a remote control center.

Near-real-time accountancy techniques now

under investigation, particularly at Britain’s large

THORP plutonium reprocessing plant, could provide inspectors with considerable information

concerning actual plant operation. (However,

since Britain is a nuclear-weapon state, most of

the THORP plant is not under IAEA safeguards.)

Such techniques, involving the provision to in9 The German interception of 350 grams of apparently Russian-origin plutonium oxide in August 1994, and the Czech seizure of 3 kilograms

of highly enriched uranium in December 1994, indicate that black market purchase of nuclear weapon material maybe more realistic than previously thought.
14 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

specters of process information, would help

verify the non-diversion of nuclear material.

However, some years of commercial operation—

which have not yet taken place—will be required

to fully prove these techniques. Moreover, plant

operators might object to providing this degree of

access to IAEA inspectors.

Declare that sufficiently large bulk-handling facilities cannot be adequately safeguarded.

Near-real-time accountancy techniques notwithstanding, nuclear material accountancy and control might not be developed to the point where the

amount of plutonium flowing through a large

bulk-handling facility can be monitored accurately enough to reveal the diversion of one significant quantity per year. If material accountancy to

this level of accuracy were to be the ultimate test

of the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, plants above

a certain size threshold (somewhere around 100

tons heavy metal capacity per year) could not be

adequately safeguarded by the IAEA. In this view,

the IAEA should then state that it could not apply

safeguards to plants above this threshold unless

states were prepared to accept declarations that the

IAEA was unable to certify their compliance with

their safeguards obligations.

On the other hand, many observers do not measure the adequacy of safeguards solely by their

ability to achieve this level of material accountancy, and they fundamentally disagree with the

premise that large reprocessing plants cannot be

safeguarded adequately. Any material diverted

from a plant has to be physically removed from it.

Therefore, techniques such as the evaluation and

verification of plant design, the adoption of containment and surveillance measures, and the monitoring of plant processes can provide additional—if not complete confidence that material is

not being diverted. Moreover, the threshold of one

“significant quantity” per year is a subjective one

to begin with, as explained above, and it need not

be taken as an absolute standard. Even if a material

accountancy system does not provide high confidence that a diversion of one significant quantity

per year will be detected, it nevertheless provides

some probability

and it can provide

of detecting small diversions,

high confidence that sufficiently large diversions would be caught. Therefore,

the inability to meet rigorous material accountancy standards might not be considered to imply that

a large bulk-handling facility could not be adequately safeguarded.

Improve ability to detect undeclared facilities.

Iraq’s most serious violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment was not the diversion of

safeguarded nuclear material into a weapon program (although it did reprocess a small amount of

plutonium in violation of safeguards), but rather

its covert development and construction of a massive undeclared complex of nuclear facilities to

produce weapon materials. Discovery of this secret infrastructure highlighted the importance of

verifying the absence of undeclared facilities—a

mission that the IAEA’s member states at the time

had not given it the political backing or the means

to conduct. Providing the IAEA with the resources, the information, and the political support it needs to look for undeclared sites may

turn out to be the most important aspect of a reinvigorated safeguards regime.

Increase intelligence sharing with the

IAEA.

The IAEA has repeatedly stated that its activities

will be significantly enhanced by increased access

to information-both open source and national intelligence information. Such information is essential if the IAEA is to learn of undeclared facilities.

Successful precedents in providing such information have now been set with respect to both Iraq

and North Korea. The United States could continue and enhance its sharing of information with the

IAEA, as well as encourage other nations to do so.

Concomitantly, if this occurs, the IAEA will need

to develop the capability to evaluate such information. Even when supplied with the best of

intentions, intelligence information may be ambiguous. Moreover, the IAEA will also need to

guard against the possibility that one state may
Chapter 1 Summary I 15

wish to discredit another by supplying disinformation to the IAEA.

Increase the mandate and frequency of

special inspections.

The IAEA has some authority to demand “special

inspections” of sites that have not been declared

to the IAEA or formally placed under safeguards.

Although no inspections at undeclared facilities

had ever been requested or carried out before the

upgrading of IAEA inspections following the

Gulf War, the agency has the authority under its

safeguards agreements to request inspections of

undeclared sites if such inspections are needed to

obtain further information or to carry out safeguards responsibilities.10 Such inspections could

help expose clandestine weapon programs, alleviate suspicions about such programs, or even deter

member states from undertaking them.

The efficacy of the IAEA special inspections

provision is limited by several factors, however.

One is that special inspections must be carried out

“in consultation” with the inspected state, which

effectively precludes short-notice inspections unless they are explicitly permitted by the state in

other agreements it has entered into with the

IAEA. Another limitation is that special inspections can have considerable implications for

IAEA credibility. Inspections have to be justified

to the country and possibly also to the Board of

Governors. Inspectors coming up empty-handed

too many times could erode confidence in the

IAEA’s ability to identify suspect activities, could

call into question the reliability or appropriateness

of national sources of information (if such had

been used), and could hinder the agency in conducting further special inspections.

A more fundamental limitation to the use of

special inspections is getting states to accept

them, a problem that has been highlighted by

North Korea’s refusal to permit IAEA special inspections at two suspected nuclear waste sites. Although the IAEA’s powers of enforcement are

quite limited, the agency’s General Conference

(consisting of representatives of all its member

states) or its Board of Governors could declare

that any failure to accept a special inspection will

be referred immediately to the United Nations Security Council and will result in the suspension of

a state’s right to receive technical assistance from

the IAEA. The IAEA Statute also provides that

member states that have “persistently violated”

the IAEA Statute, or any agreement (such as a

safeguards agreement) entered into pursuant to the

Statute, may be suspended from IAEA membership. 11 The U.N. Security Council could also declare in advance that failure to comply with a special inspection request would be considered a

threat to international peace and security that

could lead to enforcement actions under Chapter

VII of the U.N. Charter. However, the significance

of such a general declaration in the absence of a

particular case is questionable, particularly given

the Security Council’s inaction to date against

North Korea.

Even with limitations, the authority to carry

out special inspections, together with access to

national intelligence information, constitutes a

formidable tool to detect clandestine activities.

The recent examples of IAEA inspections in Iran

and North Korea imply that both special inspections and “technical visits’ ’-combined with increased sharing of intelligence by member

states—may become a more important tool than

10 The IAEA's inspections in Iraq after the Gulf War were not conducted pursuant to its “special inspection” authority but rather under the far

tougher provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which formalized the cease-fire that ended the 1991 Gulf War. This

resolution provides for “anytime, anywhere, no-right-of-refusal” inspections in Iraq and requires, inter alia, that Iraq nuclear weapon program

and programs to develop other weapons of mass destruction be eliminated.

11 IAEA Statute, Article XIX.B. Membership priveleges may be suspended if recommended by the Board of Governors, with the concurrence

of two-thirds of those members of the General Conference present and voting.
16 I Nuclear Safeguards and The lnternational Atomic Energy Agency

they have been in the past. Some precedent has

also been set within the Chemical Weapons Convention regarding challenge inspections, using

“managed access” to set the terms of resulting inspections.12 Although much of the information

upon which special inspections or technical visits

might be based will inevitably have to come from

national intelligence sources, some could come

from environmental sampling programs carried

out by the IAEA itself.

Special inspections will require advanced or

new kinds of portable instruments for field inspectors (e.g., compact multichannel analyzers) and

additional training for inspectors to learn what

they are looking for and how to react to unusual

information they might discover. Increased member state support and voluntary contributions for

equipment and training along these lines would be

beneficial.

The IAEA has a responsibility to verify the completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material inventories made by any state coming under

fill-scope safeguards. That is, it must ensure that

the state is not hiding nuclear materials, particularly those capable of being used in weapons. This

task is a challenging one whenever the state has a

substantial nuclear infrastructure, as is the case in

Kazakhstan and Ukraine. It is particularly important if the state is suspected or known to have

mounted a nuclear weapon program. Indeed, several such states have either come under or are

about to come under full-scope IAEA safeguards,

including Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and

North Korea.

To have confidence in the safeguards regime, it

is important not only to be able to verify these

states’ initial declarations of nuclear materials,

but also to ensure that any nuclear weapon

programs they may have once pursued have been

dismantled. South Africa’s willingness to demonstrate the rollback of its nuclear weapon program,

and the unprecedented access it granted the IAEA,

offers a good example of how such confidence can

be built. On the other hand, North Korea’s refusal,

as of this writing, to provide complete information

as to the extent of its earlier nuclear activities is at

the root of the current controversy concerning that

country’s nuclear program.

IAEA verification of the termination of a nuclear weapon program.

Although IAEA safeguards are focused on nuclear

materials, the IAEA might be called on (as it was

in Iraq and, in a very different way, in South Africa) to verify the dismantlement or the conversion

to peaceful uses of other elements of a nuclear

weapon program. The United States, the IAEA, or

the United Nations could make it clear that the former threshold or nuclear-weapon states have a

special obligation to declare prior weapon-related

activities and provide assurances that they have

been ceased. Such assurances might include demonstrating that scientific teams had been reassigned, that facilities had been dismantled or converted to nonweapon purposes, and that any prior

manufactured components and materials had been

destroyed. If agreed to by the states in question,

IAEA special inspections might then be used to

verify the completion of these steps. Short-notice

inspections could also be used to guard against the

possibility of a state’s transferring former bomb

materials to new facilities in order to hide them

from inspection, and thus enhance the confidence

in determining initial inventories of previously

unsafeguarded nuclear-weapon-usable material.

In opening its entire former nuclear weapon

program to the IAEA, South Africa has established a precedent in this area and has enabled the

IAEA to verify that its nuclear weapon program

has indeed been demolished.

12 See U.S. Congress, Offlice of Technology Assessment, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical ]ndustry, OTABP-ISC-106 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).
Chapter 1 Summary I 17

IAEA institutional weaknesses.

Some have argued that the IAEA has been excessively conservative and cautious, unable or unwilling to take on more vigorous safeguards activities. Part of this conservatism may be attributed

to the resistance of member states represented on

the Board of Governors to supporting a more

aggressive IAEA agenda, and part may stem from

a historically evolved institutional culture. Several options are available to the United States and

other member states to try to strengthen the IAEA

as an institution.

Encourage increased transparency on the

part of the IAEA.

Just as the IAEA requires access to facilities and

information to achieve its safeguards objectives,

so do those attempting to evaluate the adequacy of

IAEA safeguards need detailed information about

the functioning of the IAEA to determine how robust those safeguards objectives are, and how well

it is implementing them. Public confidence in the

IAEA’s effectiveness is difficult to earn in a closed

environment. Greater openness on the part of the

IAEA itself might also allow outside experts to

formulate more intelligent and constructive proposals for its improvement, which could ultimately serve to strengthen the overall safeguards regime.

Granted, the IAEA does deal with proliferation-sensitive and proprietary information. To its

credit, the agency has earned the reputation of being able to keep this information closely held

within its ranks. Nevertheless, the practice of protecting “safeguards confidential” information appears to extend into areas and types of information

that may, in fact, offer benefits in increased public

confidence in the safeguards system if they were

to be made available. For instance, annual Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIRS) are unavailable to the public; these present both an overall assessment of how well the IAEA has met its

safeguards goals for the year, including those

associated with timeliness, and problems it has

encountered with containment and surveillance

and other equipment. Distribution of SIRS is restricted despite a substantial effort to protect the

identities of any specific country or facility that is

discussed.

Encourage states not to abuse their right to

reject certain inspectors, and encourage states not to

delay granting visas to inspectors.

Under IAEA procedures, only those inspectors

that have been “’designated” for a certain country

can conduct inspections in that country, and states

have the right to reject the designation of any inspector. In light of the IAEA’s need to employ the

best inspectors available, especially in less cooperative countries, this practice interferes with

IAEA’s ability to manage its safeguards inspections. In extreme cases, wholesale rejection of inspector designations could bring the credibility of

inspections in that state into question. However,

most states are reluctant to give up control over the

entry of foreign nationals to their territory. The

United States, for example, does not accept inspectors from states it does not have diplomatic

relations with or from states that do not accept

United States inspectors. Moreover, it reserves the

right to deny access to inspectors found to be unacceptable, such as any that might have a serious

criminal record or are otherwise not eligible to enter the United States.

The IAEA could discourage rejection of inspectors by imposing the highest allowed inspection frequencies in states that have a history of

abusing inspector designations, or perhaps even

by calling for a certain number of special inspections at declared sites while the state deliberates

on accepting inspector designations. Alternatively, the IAEA might modify its guidelines to specify a maximum quota of such rejections, or a time

limit upon which to respond to inspector designations.

■ Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA

Framework

IAEA safeguards are only one element of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Many other policy options might be considered

for strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, some
18 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

of which would involve significant changes or

additions to the existing regime. Even if safeguards are not the central focus of these measures,

several of them could increase demands for IAEA

services or otherwise affect the way the agency administers safeguards.

Expanding safeguards by reinterpreting the

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Some of the limitations on the ability of nuclear

safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation are

built into the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as the

fact that production and stockpiling of nuclearweapon-capable materials are permitted as long as

they are under safeguards. Although amending the

NPT is, in theory, one way to address some of

these limitations, it is probably not a viable option

in practice for both procedural and political reasons. As an alternative approach, it might be possible for the signatories of the NPT collectively to

agree to reinterpret some of the Treaty’s provisions. Even though this approach may be nearly as

difficult to implement as an amendment, it might

be worth considering because such a reinterpretation could give considerably greater power to the

IAEA, resulting in more effective safeguards. The

problem, however, is that treaties, unlike domestic laws, generally have no authority that can issue

definitive and binding interpretations; they mean

what the states party to them agree that they mean,

subject to constraints found in their negotiating record, in presentations made to legislatures during

their ratification, and on past implementation

practice. Coming up with a collective reinterpretation—particularly concerning politically controversial provisions—would be no easy feat.

Reinterpret Article Ill of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to give the IAEA a greater role in monitoring

equipment and facilities beyond those directly related

to nuclear materials.

Article 111 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly requires non-nuclear-weapon state parties to

the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards over all nuclear materials within their territory. This provision has generally been taken to limit the IAEA’s

purview to nuclear materials and the facilities

used to process or store them. However, an alternate interpretation of that article would place

greater weight on its requirement to apply safeguards “. . for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of [a non-nuclear-weapon

member state’s] obligations. . .to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to

nuclear weapons.” In this view, IAEA safeguards

can justifiably cover a broader scope than just nuclear materials; instead, they might be applied to

other activities that could be associated with a nuclear weapon program. Indeed, some of the

Treaty’s drafters have written that this interpretation was the one they had in mind. However, it has

not been the one that has been implemented for the

last 25 years, and it would be difficult to gain international consensus behind this new interpretation, particularly since implementing it would require renegotiation of every safeguards agreement

between the IAEA and a non-nuclear-weapon

NPT party.

As an alternative, and at risk of creating a “twotiered” inspection system, this interpretation

could be adopted only for new safeguards agreements, for revisions to existing ones, or for states

that voluntarily accede to this new interpretation

by amending or accepting protocols to their safeguards agreement.

Problem NPT states.

“Problem NPT states” are those non-nuclearweapon state members of the NPT that are suspected of harboring nuclear weapon ambitions despite their treaty commitments. Any measures that

strengthen safeguards, particularly at undeclared

sites, will bolster the IAEA’s ability to deter, or detect, NPT violations. However, as stated above,

the NPT does not prohibit states from developing

and building facilities that could produce weapon

materials, or even from using these facilities to

stockpile weapon-usable materials, under the

guise of a civil program. Should such a state leave

the NPT, those facilities and materials would provide a substantial head start toward obtaining nuclear weapons. Measures that made it more diffi-
Chapter 1 Summary I 19

cult to withdraw from the NPT, or penalized a

state for doing so, might therefore impede such a

scenario, or at least encourage the international

community to respond more forcefully to it.

Seek to put additional constraints on the

ability of states to withdraw from the NPT on 90 days’

notice.

The United Nations Security Council could goon

record, for example, with a resolution declaring

(well in advance of any particular case) that if a

state withdrew from the NPT without surrendering all the direct-use nuclear materials it possessed under safeguards-and possibly any additional nuclear material or facilities that had

originally been provided by NPT states—then

that state would be considered a threat to international peace and security. Such a statement would

open up the possibility that the Security Council

would authorize coercive means—perhaps including military force—to remove that state’s

weapon potential. Such an approach could encounter difficulties, however; states maybe reluctant to take actions or set precedents that may limit

their own freedom of action with respect to other

treaties, even if they support the objective of making it more difficult to leave the NPT.

Attempt to implement general embargoes

of nuclear technology for problem NPT states.

Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have

agreed to withhold nuclear technology from states

that are not parties to the NPT and are not otherwise subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The

United States is seeking similar agreement to

withhold nuclear technology and many categories

of dual-use technology from Iran, a party to the

NPT whose nonproliferation credentials the

United States nonetheless judges to be dubious.

This policy is quite controversial. For example,

Iran and other observers argue that it violates not

only the spirit but the letter of Article IV, paragraph 2 of the NPT:

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the

fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information

for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to

the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing. . . to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of

the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of

the developing areas of the world.

The United States response is that paragraph 1

of Article IV explicitly requires that technical

cooperation be conducted “in conformity with Articles I and II,” which ban the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states. Although neither the United States nor the IAEA has

provided evidence that Iran has violated its NPT

commitments, the United States nevertheless believes Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore,

the United States does not consider itself obligated to provide technical assistance.

Capping nuclear weapon programs of nonNPT states.

Some countries that are not prepared to admit to

their nuclear weapon programs, or to formally reverse them by joining the NPT as non-nuclearweapon states, may nevertheless become willing

to limit or cap their unacknowledged activities.

One approach to this end is the Clinton Administration’s proposal, discussed below, to conclude a

worldwide convention banning the production of

nuclear materials for weapons or outside of safeguards. Other approaches are also presented below.

Expand the United Nations Security Council’s ability to expose and even to render harmless clandestine nuclear weapon facilities worldwide.

The IAEA has no authority to take coercive measures to expose or reverse nuclear proliferation.

However, in their January 1992 declaration that

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

constitutes a “threat to international peace and security,” the heads of state of all the members of the

U.N. Security Council raised the possibility that

the Council might take forceful measures against

proliferation under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
20 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

ter. The IAEA could contribute inspectors and expertise to such an effort, as it did in the case of the

U.N. Special Commission on Iraq. That commission’s role might be extended, or a similar body

created, to receive and evaluate national intelligence information concerning possible clandestine nuclear programs in other countries, and to interact with the IAEA. Such an organization would

be in a position to bring matters directly to the Security Council, eliminating the time that the IAEA

might require to evaluate evidence of a clandestine nuclear site or other safeguards violation, ask

for a special inspection to resolve its concerns,

bring allegations of noncompliance to its Board of

Governors (which might direct it to repeat its request to the state), and only then forward its concerns to the Security Council.

Establishing such an organization would have

far-reaching implications. Only in the case of Iraq,

whose invasion of Kuwait unambiguously

branded it a threat to international peace and security, has the Security Council asserted the power to

forcibly disarm a state of its capability to produce

weapons of mass destruction. It is extremely unlikely that the Security Council would (or even

could) delegate this power to any other organization, even one subordinate to it. Therefore, any

such situation in the future would almost certainly

require a case-by-case determination by the Security Council. In the absence of a grievous violation

of international norms, Security Council members might be very reluctant to impose such a

sanction again, fearing that they themselves might

some day face similar action. (Such an argument

could also be made with respect to members of the

IAEA’s Board of Governors, although the powers

of that body are far more limited.) The Security

Council’s five permanent members could protect

themselves with their vetoes, but they might be

very reluctant to take action that would be perceived as being so self-serving, and that would

call attention to the Council’s discriminatory

structure.

This option might also be opposed from two

different directions: because it goes too far, or because it doesn’t go far enough. Some would object

that the IAEA already has the authority to conduct

special inspections, and that creating a new organization for the same mission invites duplication,

if not confusion. On the other hand, the United

Nations’ and the IAEA’s memberships are largely

overlapping. If the IAEA is deemed institutionally incapable of taking forceful action against

one of its members, the United Nations may not

be much more successful.

Continued global production of materials usable for nuclear weapons.

As long as stocks of materials usable in nuclear

weapons are maintained and grow, the potential

for nuclear weapon proliferation remains. Even

nations that have agreed to the NPT may later decide to withdraw and use their formerly safeguarded fuels in weapons.

Push for multilateral agreements to end the

production of nuclear materials for weapons or outside

IAEA safeguards.

The Clinton Administration has proposed such a

ban in the hopes of at least capping, if not reversing, the production of nuclear materials for weapon purposes, especially among states not party to

the NPT. Such states, including India, Israel, and

Pakistan, might agree to join a global convention

banning the production of any additional nuclear

weapon materials provided that they were not required to admit to any previous production of such

materials. (Making such a ban universal, binding

nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon

states alike, would cap the arsenals of the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states as well as the
Chapter 1 Summary I 21

threshold states, and it would also avoid the explictly discriminatory aspects of the NPT. 13) Such

a ban would not directly affect the U.S. nuclear

weapon program, since the United States has already declared a moratorium on further production of weapon materials. A formal ban would

make such a decision by the United States more

difficult to reverse in the unlikely occurrence that

the nation would not only seek to build new nuclear weapons in the future but would also require

more than the tons of weapon material being made

available by ongoing weapon dismantlements.

A critical issue, however, is whether such an

agreement would have the effect of legitimizing

any nuclear arsenal such states may have. For example, any verification regime for such an agreement would implicitly or explicitly have to exclude stockpiles of weapon materials, since the

convention would only address future production.

Critics of this proposal believe that such an arrangement would damage more than help the nonproliferation regime. They also won-y that any

proposal that permitted the continued production

of weapon-capable material under safeguards

would enable states to amass a stockpile of such

material and then to withdraw from the convention, converting the material into weapons. Worse

still, they fear that the United States will aggravate

this possibility by assuring states that the convention indeed would permit the production of such

material under safeguards-in effect, creating an

“entitlement” to pursue activities that the United

States would be better off opposing.

If such a fissile material production limitation

agreement were enacted, a mechanism for verifying compliance would have to be instituted. Under

the Clinton Adminstration proposal, this mission

would be given to the IAEA, which has longstanding experience monitoring the production of nuclear materials. However, this additional mission

would require significantly greater resources for

IAEA safeguards. It would also have to be implemented in such a way that whatever special verification procedures were adopted for the nuclear

weapon and the nuclear threshold states did not set

precedents that would weaken current IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon NPT states.

Discourage or ban the production worldwide of all material usable in nuclear weapons, even for

civil applications.

Such an agreement would close the loophole in

existing safeguards, and in the cutoff convention

discussed immediately above, that would permit

states to develop production facilities and even to

stockpile weapon-usable materials under safeguards. Since the United States has long renounced pursuit of a plutonium fuel-cycle for its

commercial nuclear powerplants, a ban on producing plutonium for civil purposes (one component of a ban on the production of weapon-usable

material) would not affect U.S. plans for nuclear

power. However, under such a ban, the United

States would not be able to develop new research

reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium.

(Banning the production of weapon materials entirely would have no more effect on the U.S. nuclear weapon program than banning their production outside safeguards, since both would prohibit

the production of nuclear material explicitly for

weapon purposes.)

Although this measure would not directly affect the United States, states with substantial investment in plutonium fuel cycles, including Russia, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom,

would strenuously object to it. Despite the lack of

any economic incentives to do so for the foreseeable future, Japan and Russia, in particular, still

have active plans to pursue a plutonium fuel cycle

13 Such a cutoff would not discriminate among states in terms of their future activities, but by not addressing their past activities would leave

the discriminatory structure of the regime intact. Under such a cutoff, neither the declared nuclear states nor the undeclared threshold states

(India, Israel, or Pakistan) would be forced to reveal the existence of any already produced weapons or weapon materials, nor would they have to

place existing materials under safeguards.
22 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

for their nuclear industry. This measure would

prevent them from doing so.

Explore the feasibility of internationalizing

certain aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Some nonproliferation analysts maintain that no

system of international inspection of nuclear production facilities can provide sufficient protection

against or warning of a state’s decision to use

those facilities to produce nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation in the long run, they

argue, requires broad international operation of

such facilities. Under such a proposal, individual

states or small groups of states would be prohibited entirely from constructing or operating such

facilities, and the many billions of dollars worth

of such facilities would be internationalized or

closed. Given the massive institutional changes

from the existing status quo, such a policy decision would have far-reaching implications and

would face tremendous resistance.
Introduction

roduction of fissile nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) is the most difficult step in making a

nuclear weapon. Consequently, constraining a would-be

proliferant nation’s ability to produce such materials has

always been a central component of international nonproliferation efforts. (For this reason, the widespread availability of nuclear weapon material from the former Soviet Union on the black

market would deal a grievous blow to the nonproliferation regime.1) In particular, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires

those countries that join the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states

to accept international monitoring of all their facilities that might

produce, use, store, or otherwise handle nuclear materials. Such

monitoring is conducted by the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) through its system of nuclear safeguards.

Indeed, controls over nuclear materials and production facilities serve a number of purposes in nonproliferation policy. Safeguards play a role in each of the four basic categories of nonproliferation policies2:

1. obstacles to impede those working to acquire weapons of mass

destruction;

2. punitive measures to deter or punish proliferants;

1Potential leakage of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union is discussed in

some depth in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation and the

Former Soviet Union, OTA-ISC-605 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,

September 1994).

2These categories are described in detail in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTAISC-559 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993), esp. pp. 5, 19-25,

and 83-115.

| 23
24 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

3. rewards to increase the attractiveness of voluntarily forgoing these weapons; and, perhaps

most important of all,

4. regional or global security improvements to

reduce the perceived needs for the weapons.

IAEA safeguards are intended to impede nuclear proliferation by ensuring that the diversion

of nuclear materials from safeguarded nuclear facilities to weapon purposes will be caught and

made known to the world community. To the extent that they can assure a country that its neighbors or adversaries are not developing nuclear

weapons, safeguards lessen that country’s perceived need to develop its own nuclear arsenal.

Given the importance of the IAEA’s system of

nuclear safeguards to international nonproliferation efforts, this report analyzes what such safeguards can and cannot be expected to accomplish,

identifies areas where they might be improved,

and presents various options for accomplishing

this. Options analyzed in this report fall into two

broad categories: 1) those that could be implemented primarily within the current framework of

NPT constraints and IAEA safeguards, thus improving on institutions and practices already in

place; and 2) those that would extend beyond the

current framework. The latter include measures to

address actions of states not party to the NPT and

policies that would have to be undertaken outside

the domain of the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

The focus in this report on IAEA safeguards

and nuclear materials should not be taken to imply

that safeguards constitute the only nonproliferation tool. Many other measures, such as export

controls, classification of weapon-related information and data, security assurances, diplomatic and military commitments, and international treaties, are also essential to international

nonproliferation efforts.3

A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL

CONTROL EFFORTS

Even before atomic weapons were first used at the

end of World War II, some senior U.S. policymakers and scientific leaders realized that atomic energy might have to be controlled internationally.

This conclusion followed because:

 atomic weapons made devastation possible on

a scale that was not previously imagined;

 they derived from scientific knowledge that

was or soon would be available worldwide,

such that no nation would be able to maintain

a monopoly in atomic weapons; and

 some of the knowledge and technology needed

to produce atomic weapons was related to that

needed to realize whatever peaceful applications atomic energy might provide.

In January 1946, the fledgling United Nations

created a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and charged it with preparing proposals

for “the elimination from national armaments of

atomic weapons and of all other major weapons

adaptable to mass destruction,” together with “effective safeguards by way of inspection and other

means to protect complying States against the

hazards of violation and evasion.”4 Anticipating

this action, the U.S. Secretary of State had already

3See ibid. for a review of the array of policy tools that can be used to combat proliferation. For a discussion of evidence that might indicate

the production of weapons of mass destruction and technical hurdles that might provide opportunities to control their spread, see U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993). Dual-use export controls are analyzed in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994). Proliferation issues arising

from the breakup of the Soviet Union are addressed in Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union, op. cit., footnote 1.

4“Establishment of a Commission To Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,” United Nations General Assembly Resolution I, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First Session from 10 January to 14 February 1946,

United Nations Document A/64 (London, England: Church House, 1946), p. 9, quoted in Leniece N. Wu, The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy

Enters the Nuclear Age, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy

and Scientific Developments, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, August 1972, Committee Print, p. 8.
Chapter 2 Introduction | 25

impaneled a commission chaired by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson to “study the subject

of controls and safeguards necessary” to protect

United States interests under such a regime.

❚ The Acheson-Lilienthal Report

In turn, the Acheson committee commissioned a

panel of technical experts chaired by David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, to “apprais[e] all the relevant facts and formulat[e] proposals.” The Lilienthal panel

considered proposals by which nations would retain the capability to produce fissionable materials

but would pledge not to do so for weapon purposes, and would submit to international inspections that would forestall and detect such prohibited activities. However, the panel found that no

such approach was workable:

We have concluded unanimously that there is

no prospect of security against atomic warfare in

a system of international agreements to outlaw

such weapons controlled only by a system which

relies on inspection and similar police-like

methods.5

Verifiable nuclear disarmament, according to

the panel, required that individual nations be completely prohibited from producing fissionable materials or conducting other “dangerous” activities

that could directly support a weapon program. All

such activities would be undertaken exclusively

by an international organization established for

that purpose. Using nuclear fuel provided by the

international organization, nations would be permitted to operate nuclear reactors to produce power, or to use radioactive materials for research purposes, since such activities could not, according

to the panel, lead to the production of weapon materials.6 The scope of activity permitted to individual nations, however, would have to be strictly

limited:

So long as intrinsically dangerous activities

may be carried on by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so

great a pressure upon a system of international

enforcement by police methods that no degree

of ingenuity or technical competence could

possibly hope to cope with them.7

❚ Initial Failure of International Control

The Acheson-Lilienthal report was released in

March 1946. In the same month, President Truman appointed financier Bernard M. Baruch to

represent the United States at the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission’s negotiations over the international control of nuclear energy. Baruch’s proposal to the U.N. Commission in June 1946 was

largely based on the Acheson-Lilienthal report but

had some important differences, particularly regarding Baruch’s insistence that the international

control mechanism include specific provision for

enforcement that would not be subject to Security

Council veto. Known as the Baruch Plan, this proposal met a hostile reception from the Soviet

Union. Ultimately, the United States and the So5“A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,” U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946, 79th Congress, 2d Session, House Document 709, prepared for The Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy by a Board of Consultants: Chester I. Barnard,

J.R. Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, Harry A. Winne, David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, Mar. 16, 1946, p. 4.

6One of the assumptions of the Lilienthal panel was that nuclear materials suitable for nuclear power generation could be “denatured” so that

they would not be usable in nuclear weapons. For uranium, which can only be used in a nuclear explosive if it is highly enriched in the uranium-233 or -235 isotopes, this assumption is true. However, although the panel believed that plutonium, too, could be produced in a form that

would not be suitable for nuclear weapons without difficult additional processing, it is now known that so-called reactor-grade plutonium can

still be used in nuclear explosives. For several reasons, such plutonium is somewhat less desirable for weapon use than so-called weapon-grade

plutonium, but it is usable nonetheless. See Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit., footnote 3, pp. 131-133.

Indeed, the Lilienthal panel did anticipate that future developments might lessen or eliminate the barriers to using such “denatured”

nuclear materials in weapons. They therefore stated that the distinction between “safe” activities and “dangerous” ones be continually revisited

as technology advanced.

7“A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,” op. cit., footnote 5.
26 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

viet Union could not agree on issues such as the

process by which international control would be

phased in and the U.S. nuclear arsenal phased out,

the inspection rights that the international control

organization would have, and the mechanism for

enforcing the international control regime. Indeed, even had agreement on these issues been

reached, the U.S. Senate’s consent to the ratification of any such treaty would have been far from

assured.

In the absence of international control, subsequent U.S. efforts to constrain the spread of nuclear weapons took place in a context completely

different from that envisioned by the Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch plans. Rather than basing its

security on a binding international regime that

would eliminate all nuclear weapons in national

hands, the United States instead depended on the

retention and further development of its own nuclear arsenal. So long as the United States could

promise to respond to a nuclear attack with inkind retribution, it could relax significantly the requirements that would otherwise have been

placed on any international system to monitor and

control nuclear technology. In lieu of any such

system, proliferation did ensue; the Soviet Union

detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949, and Britain followed in 1952. Later, three other countries

would also carry out nuclear tests: France, in

1960; China, in 1964; and India, in 1974.

❚ Atoms for Peace

In December 1953, with both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals expanding, President Eisenhower

proposed that both nations make contributions

from their stocks of fissionable materials to a new

international organization that would put these

materials to peaceful use. This “Atoms for Peace”

program was intended to serve the dual purpose of

drawing down the stockpile of nuclear weapon

materials among the superpowers as well as fostering peaceful applications of nuclear technology, such as producing electric power and contributing to agriculture, medicine, and other branches

of science. In his speech before the United Nations

outlining his proposal, President Eisenhower suggested that a new International Atomic Energy

Agency be set up to take custody of nuclear material, ensure its security, and turn it to peaceful use.

In 1954, Congress amended the laws that severely restricted the transfer of nuclear materials

and technology, and the United States began to enter into bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

with other countries. These agreements included

provisions, called safeguards, by which the

United States could assure itself that its nuclear

materials and technology were not being put to

military use. At the same time, the United States

entered into negotiations to create the International Atomic Energy Agency. These negotiations

concluded in late 1956 with the approval of the

IAEA Statute, Article II of which gives the IAEA

the mission to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and

prosperity throughout the world.”8 The IAEA was

established the following year as an independent

intergovernmental organization, affiliated with—

but not a subunit of—the United Nations.9

❚ The International Atomic Energy

Agency

Created within the context of the existing international system, the International Atomic Energy

Agency is necessarily far weaker than the supranational international control organization that

would have been established under the AchesonLilienthal or Baruch plans. The IAEA was not given highly intrusive powers of inspection or enforcement over its member states, nor did it assert

control over their nuclear activities or material.

8The IAEA Statute was approved October 23, 1956 and entered into force on July 29, 1957.

9The Agreement Governing the Relationship Between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/11, Oct.

30, 1959, specifies the affiliation between the two organizations, establishing various administrative and reporting linkages. The two bodies,

however, are independently governed and have separate charters.
Chapter 2 Introduction | 27

Rather, it was given the authority to enter into socalled safeguards agreements with individual nations to ensure that any nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities offered up for inspection were

not used to produce nuclear weapons.

The first such agreement was concluded between the IAEA and Japan in 1959, but the agency

did not adopt a comprehensive safeguards system

until 1965.10 Now set forth in IAEA document

INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, this system of safeguards

was to be applied, upon request, to individual nuclear activities within a state and to all activities

receiving IAEA assistance. INFCIRC/66 safeguards apply to individual plants, shipments of

nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between states

supplying nuclear fuel or technology and states

importing it, and they are the basis for nearly all

agreements between the IAEA and states that are

not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty.11

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered

into force in 1970, extended the scope of the

IAEA’s safeguards activities. By joining the NPT,

non-nuclear-weapon states (e.g., all those except

the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,

France, and China) commit themselves to refrain

from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or explosive devices, and to submit

to IAEA safeguards. Instead of applying only to

selected nuclear activities on request, however,

safeguards under the NPT—known as full-scope

safeguards—are required of non-nuclear-weapon

states on all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territory or under their

control.12 To accommodate this new mission, the

IAEA developed INFCIRC/153, a more comprehensive model safeguards agreement encompassing every aspect of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle except the initial mining and milling of uranium ore.

All non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the

NPT are obligated to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, but the converse is not true.

There are countries with safeguarded nuclear facilities, including one (Brazil) that has concluded a

full-scope safeguards agreement, that are not

members of the NPT. Box 2-1 distinguishes

among states that are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, states that are members of the

IAEA, and states that have concluded safeguards

agreements with the IAEA.

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

IAEA safeguards are a system of procedures involving material control and accountancy, containment and surveillance, and verification (including onsite inspections at declared facilities)

that are implemented through agreements between the IAEA and individual countries. They

are designed primarily for two purposes: 1) to detect proliferation activities that involve diversion

of materials from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle;

and 2) to provide warning of any such occurrence

to an international forum in a timely fashion. (Exactly what constitutes “timely” warning is somewhat controversial, as explained in the section on

timeliness goals in chapter 3.) Though they may

deter proliferation by posing a risk of discovery, safeguards by themselves cannot prevent

proliferation; nor can they predict a country’s

intent or future activity.

The safeguards process consists of three stages:

1. examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, which covers design of facilities, inventories, and receipts for transfers and shipments of materials. States subject to safeguards

must establish so-called state systems of accounting and control, or SSACs, to keep track

10David A.V. Fischer, The International Non-Proliferation Regime, 1987 (New York: United Nations, 1987), pp. 4, 38

11Ibid., p. 38.

12Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, Article III(1). For non-nuclear-weapon states, nuclear materials that are in use for military, but nonexplosive, purposes such as naval propulsion are exempt from safeguards. However, a state may not create a separate fuel cycle outside safeguards

to produce nuclear materials for these purposes. To date, this exemption has never been invoked.
28 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, concluding a nuclear safeguards agreement with the international Atomic Energy Agency, and joining that agency are three independent actions. Taking any one of

them does not automatically accomplish any of the others. Membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

obligates a state to go on to conclude a so-called full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but

many NPT members (all with no significant nuclear facilities in their territories) have not yet done so. In

addition, neither of those actions depends on or affects a state’s decision to become a member of the

IAEA. Appendix B provides a list of countries in each of these three categories.

NPT Membership. States join the Non-Proliferation Treaty either as nuclear-weapon states or nonnuclear-weapon states. Nuclear-weapon states are defined in the NPT as those that had “manufactured

and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device” before January 1, 1967. The only

states that have done so are the United States, Russia (successor of the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China, all of which have joined the NPT. All other states are non-nuclear-weapon

states. Joining the NPT imposes a number of binding obligations on a state, depending on whether it is

a nuclear-weapon state or a non-nuclear-weapon state.

Safeguards Agreement. Non-nuclear-weapon states are required by the NPT to accept full-scope

IAEA safeguards over all their nuclear activities. Such safeguards agreements are modeled upon a

standard agreement known as INFCIRC/153 (see text). However, not all NPT members have concluded

such agreements with the IAEA. Non-NPT members can also enter into safeguards agreements with the

IAEA, either over all their nuclear activities as if they were NPT members, or (more often) over specific

nuclear activities within their territories. The limited safeguards agreements that cover only a specified

set of activities, materials, or facilities are modeled after a different IAEA standard known as INFCIRC/66.

Although not required to do so by the NPT, all the nuclear-weapon states have concluded so-called

voluntary offers in which they provide the IAEA with a list of civil nuclear facilities at which they will

voluntarily accept safeguards. From this list, the IAEA selects those facilities where safeguards will actually be applied. Due to resource constraints, it chooses to do so only at a few. Much of the text of these

voluntary offers parallels the text of INFCIRC/1 53, with the very important difference that there is no

obligation to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards, nor to refrain from using nuclear materials in

nuclear weapons (except that those materials under safeguards must not be used for weapons). Consequently, military nuclear activities in the nuclear weapon states remain outside the scope of these

offers. 1

IAEA Membership. Membership in the IAEA gives a state a voice in the governance of the agency,

including its role in implementing nuclear safeguards agreements between the agency and individual

nations. It also makes a state eligible to participate in various IAEA programs, such as those that offer

states technical assistance in peaceful applications of nuclear power. However, whether or not a state is

a member of the IAEA is completely unrelated to any obligations a state may accept by joining the NPT

or by concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States need not be members of the IAEA to

join the NPT or to enter into safeguards, and a state may join the agency without joining the NPT or

concluding a safeguards agreement.

1 The United States has offered to accept safeguards at any of its civil nuclear facilities and also at facilities where nuclear material

declared to be excess to its nuclear weapon program is stored.
Chapter 2 Introduction | 29

of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction.

The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA

for independent verification, much as a bank

auditor would be asked to provide independent

confirmation of the accuracy of a bank’s accounting.

2. collection of data and independent information

by IAEA inspectors, either to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.

3. evaluation by the IAEA of this information for

completeness and accuracy.13

Any discrepancy of nuclear materials between

the recorded (book) inventory and the physical inventory determined by measurements and inspections is called material unaccounted for (MUF).

When MUF exceeds the amount that the IAEA

can reasonably attribute to measurement uncertainties, the possibility of diversion exists and

must be resolved.14

❚ Subjectivity of Safeguards

For each of the different types of facilities under

safeguards (e.g., research reactors, power reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, enrichment plants,

reprocessing plants), the IAEA has formulated a

safeguards approach and developed safeguards

criteria that, when successfully attained, permit

the IAEA to assert that material has not been diverted from a given facility. Despite the objective, systematic way in which the IAEA nuclear

safeguards system has been codified and implemented, however, the underlying judgment

as to what the safeguards system needs to be

able to do and how well it needs to do it is inherently a subjective one. The stated purpose for

IAEA safeguards, as specified in the safeguards

agreements between the IAEA and those countries

that have accepted safeguards over all their nuclear facilities (usually as a consequence of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty), is:

...the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive

devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.15

However, this statement, by itself, does not

specify quantitative goals. What constitutes a

“significant quantity”? How soon need diversion

be detected to be “timely?” The answers to these

questions, as explained in chapter 3, are controversial; different observers will set different standards. (Even apart from determining a reasonable

estimate for the minimum amount of nuclear material necessary to make a bomb is the underlying

decision as to whether the safeguards system need

only be able to detect diversions of that size, or

whether it has to be sensitive to fractions of that

amount.) Over what period of time might a diversion take place before the IAEA deems it too slow

to have much chance of being detected? (This is a

different question from that of how soon after a diversion has been conducted should the IAEA be in

a position to report it, which is the criteria for

“timely detection.”) Is it sufficient for the IAEA to

attempt to detect diversions of one significant

quantity per year, as it now sets out to do? Or does

the agency need to meet the far higher (indeed, impracticably high) standard of assuring that a state

has not been able to divert one “significant quantity” since the dawn of its nuclear program, no matter how long ago that may have been? No matter

what minimum rate of diversion the IAEA

13Material in this section on IAEA safeguards is from Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit., footnote 3, pp.

185-189.

14This discussion is taken from ibid. For an extensive discussion of safeguards concepts and methodologies, see David A.V. Fischer and

Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (London: SIPRI, Taylor and Francis, 1985); and Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Nuclear Order (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1987), esp. ch. 4 and 5.

15INFCIRC/153, para. 28.
30 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

+aims to detect, a state willing to wait a little

longer might successfully divert material at a

slower rate.

Apart from determining parameters such as

these upon which the rest of the safeguards system

is built, the IAEA must also decide with what degree of confidence it needs to be able to assure that

a diversion has not occurred. No verification system can provide absolute certainty, and no

safeguards system can prove that diversions

have not occurred. All that can be done is to provide some level of confidence—which can be

quantified—that diversions have not taken place.

The resources required of the safeguards system

increase as the required confidence level increases; conversely, with given resources, the

minimum detectable diversion grows as the required confidence level increases. Moreover, at

some level, measurement uncertainties place fundamental limits on the sensitivity and the confidence levels that can be attained. As discussed in

chapter 3 and appendix A, large facilities such

as the reprocessing plant now under construction in Japan will reach or exceed these limits,

at least with the safeguards techniques now in

use.

The two objectives specified in INFCIRC/153

and quoted above make competing demands upon

the safeguards system. Ensuring the “timely

detection” of diversion of nuclear materials implies that the system must have a high likelihood

of success, and the IAEA now sets out the goal of

having a 90 percent probability of detecting diversions. However, the “deterrence of such diversion,” which is also set out as a goal in INFCIRC/153, might be accomplished with a much

less capable system. Even if the IAEA were to

have as little as 50 percent confidence in detecting

a diversion, anyone attempting to divert material

would be as likely as not to get caught, and a system with only a 10 percent chance of detecting a

diversion is sufficient to prevent a divertor from

having more than 90 percent confidence that its

activities would escape notice.

In particular, the difference between assured

detection and deterrence affects how one interprets the significance of the measurement uncertainties that are unavoidable in making any inventory of nuclear materials. Critics of IAEA

safeguards, particularly as applied to large plutonium reprocessing plants, imply that the uncertainty in a plant’s measured inventory gives the

amount of material that might be diverted without

detection. In other words, they argue that if the

amount of plutonium processed in the course of a

year is only known, for example, to +80 kilograms, a diversion of 80 kilograms might not be

caught.16 While it is true that in such a case, a diversion of that size could not be ruled out, it cannot be assumed that such a diversion would go undetected, either. Measurement uncertainties work

both ways, and nobody can know in advance

which way the measurement will be off. A diverting state might hope that an 80-kilogram diversion would be masked by a measurement that

would otherwise have been 80 kilograms too high,

yielding a measured throughput equal to what the

value should have been had there not been any diversion. However, the error in measurement might

equally likely go the other way, yielding a measurement that in the absence of diversion would

have been 80 kilograms below the expected value.

In this case, an 80-kilogram diversion would compound, rather than cancel, the 80-kilogram measurement error, resulting in a measurement 160 kilograms below what would be expected in the

absence of diversion—a discrepancy likely to attract attention. Such odds would prevent a state

from planning a diversion strategy with confidence.

16A measurement uncertainty of +80 kg means that about 68 percent of the time, the measured value for annual plutonium throughput will

lie within 80 kg of the true throughput. With such an uncertainty, there is about a 16 percent chance that the measured throughput would be more

than 80 kg higher than the actual throughput, and an equal chance that the measured throughput would be less than 80 kg lower. This uncertainty

of 80 kg—10 significant quantities—is chosen here purely for the sake of illustration. Chapter 3 and appendix A discuss the issues involved with

measurement uncertainties at actual and proposed large reprocessing plants.
Chapter 2 Introduction | 31

Since subjective determinations underlie

any safeguards system, it is impossible to make

an objective determination of effectiveness.

❚ Limitations of Safeguards

Despite their value in detecting and deterring nuclear proliferation, IAEA safeguards—and the

NPT regime that requires their adoption by nonnuclear-weapon states—have a number of limitations, from the perspective of preventing proliferation, that are difficult to remedy within the

current framework (see box 2-2). Although these

limitations have long been recognized, some of

them have been brought into clearer focus by the

Iraqi and North Korean violations of their safeguards obligations. These limitations include:

 States are not obligated to accept IAEA safeguards. Israel, Pakistan, and India, which have

acquired nuclear weapon capability while remaining outside the NPT, are not subject to

full-scope safeguards. Their nuclear weapon

programs therefore face no real constraints under international law. States that are parties to

the NPT can withdraw from the Treaty upon 90

days’ notice, ending their legal obligations.17

 IAEA safeguards focus on nuclear materials

and do not cover facilities unrelated to nuclear

materials that could nevertheless be used by a

nuclear weapon program. For example, they do

not address research and development (R&D)

for non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, nor does the NPT explicitly ban such

R&D. Although the NPT’s prohibition against

nuclear weapon “manufacture” has been widely interpreted to prohibit development of dedicated non-nuclear components, the Treaty provides no mechanism for verifying this

prohibition.18 Nevertheless, if discovered,

such development would call into question a

state’s commitment to abide by safeguards on

those facilities that were subject to them.

 The IAEA may face constraints on its ability

to verify that the state’s declaration is complete and accurate, even though NPT member

states are required to declare all inventories of

nuclear material to the IAEA, as well as all

installations and locations that contain or are

destined to contain nuclear material. The South

African government granted the IAEA an extraordinary degree of access and cooperation,

permitting the agency to verify independently

that the South African declaration of its nuclear

material inventory was reasonable. On the other hand, North Korea had made declarations

that proved to be incompatible with the IAEA’s

independent measurements and analyses, and it

has refused (in violation of its safeguards

agreement) to permit the IAEA to conduct the

inspections needed to resolve these discrepancies.

 Safeguards do not prohibit states from acquiring stockpiles of weapon-usable nuclear

material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) or the means to produce them, so long as

the stocks and facilities are for peaceful purposes and are placed under safeguards. In fact,

Article IV of the NPT explicitly allows for the

indigenous development and sharing of

technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As such, the NPT embodies a nuclear “bargain”: states gain access to peaceful nuclear

technology in return for giving up their weapon

options. Since much of the technology for developing nuclear energy is also applicable to

nuclear weapons, however, it could be argued

that this bargain is inherently self-defeating.

Nevertheless, without it, many states would

likely not have agreed to the international safeguards regime in the first place.

17Note that international agreements besides the NPT may also constrain nuclear weapon programs. For example, both the bilateral denuclearization agreement between North and South Korea (which has not been implemented yet) and the bilateral Agreed Framework between

North Korea and the United States contain provisions that impose stricter constraints than the NPT does on North Korean nuclear activities.

18See, e.g., George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, “Avoiding the ‘Definition’ Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban,” Arms Control Today, vol.

23, No. 4, May 1993, pp. 16-17.
32 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

It is not appropriate to evaluate nuclear safeguards solely from a nonproliferation perspective, since

they were never intended to serve only nonproliferation objectives. The basic bargain underlying the

nuclear nonproliferation regime is that non-nuclear-weapon states agree to forego weapon programs in

return for assistance and encouragement in pursuing civil nuclear programs under safeguards. Therefore, safeguards represent an answer to “How can applications of civil nuclear energy be pursued

without contributing to weapon programs?” rather than “How can nuclear proliferation best be opposed?” From a nonproliferation perspective, rolling back the spread of nuclear technology would be

preferable to encouraging the spread of that technology under safeguards. However, that choice was

not an available option. At the time that IAEA safeguards were being established, the alternative to the

spread of safeguarded nuclear technology would more likely have been the spread of unsafeguarded

nuclear technology.

Therefore, it is clear that even a perfectly functioning safeguards system has limitations from the

perspective of its ability to forestall proliferation. Recognizing the caveats above, these limitations include the following:

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

●

Safeguards are directed primarily to declared facilities. 1

Special inspections undertaken to resolve ambiguities must first gain cooperation of the inspected

state.

States have the right to reject particular inspectors designated for their country by the IAEA.

Development of nuclear fuel-cycle activities is encouraged (by NPT Article IV).

Production and possession of weapon-usable nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are neither prohibited nor discouraged by either the NPT or the IAEA.

Diversion of fractions of a “significant quantity” (SQ) from different locations can be difficult to detect.

Less than one SQ can be sufficient for a nuclear device.2

Exemptions from safeguards are allowed for material for military, nonexplosive applications (e.g.,

ship propulsion), as well as other purposes of less concern for potential diversion such as the

manufacture of ceramics and alloys, and scientific research in amounts too small to pose threat of

significant diversion to weapon purposes.

Safeguards are not applied at the very front end of the fuel cycle, that is, to material in mining or ore

processing activities.

I This represents the situation under “routine” application of safeguards. However, if the agency determines that it requires additional information to ensure that safeguards commitments are being honored, its built-in authority allows it to request both further

access to areas within declared facilities and special inspections at declared or undeclared facilities. If irreconcilable conflicts remain, the IAEA can take the issue to the U.N. Security Council, leading ultimately to the possibility that enforcement action be taken

under Chapter Vll of the U.N. Charter.

2Although the IAEA significant quantity for plutonium is 8 kilograms, the U.S. Department of Energy has stated that "Hypothetically, a mass of 4 kilograms of plutonium or uranium-233 is sufficient for one nuclear explosive device. ” (U.S. Department of Energy,

Classification Bulletin WNP-86, February 8, 1994. Although this sentence is unclassified, the full text of the bulletin is classified.) This

statement is not completely equivalent to stating that the SQ should be set equal to 4 kilograms, since the SQ makes an allowance for

material lost in processing and machining the plutonium for use in a weapon. However, much of these processing losses can be

recovered. No such statement equivalent to this Classification Bulletin has been issued with respect to uranium-235.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
Chapter 2 Introduction | 33

 Under safeguards, states can operate reprocessing plants to extract and store plutonium

from spent fuel, import highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors, and build

enrichment facilities capable of being converted to produce weapon-grade uranium.

Such activities bring states into close contact

with weapon-usable material and give them experience in its properties and handling.19 Many

countries unilaterally choose to withhold assistance in these nominally peaceful activities

from states whose motives are suspect, but they

are not required by the NPT to do so. Sometimes, states are even pressured within the

IAEA context not to withhold such aid.

 The IAEA, by itself, lacks an effective means

of enforcement. There are no agreed provisions that would allow the IAEA or the United

Nations Security Council to forcibly destroy

nuclear facilities or render them useless, even

if found to be in violation of the NPT or safeguards. The Security Council, however, could

take such measures on an ad hoc basis, as it has

done in Iraq.

 The IAEA is subject to diplomatic, legal, and

political pressures to treat all states equally,

making it difficult to select some as being of

particular proliferation concern and subjecting

them to closer scrutiny. As a consequence,

much of the IAEA safeguards budget today is

spent on the well-developed fuel cycles in Japan, Germany, and Canada, which are not generally regarded as countries of current proliferation concern.

In summary, the demise of the post-World War

II efforts to internationalize the control of atomic

energy, and the ensuing development of a far

weaker system of nuclear safeguards in which

states voluntarily yield some measure of sovereignty to submit their individual nuclear activities

to outside inspection, has put severe limitations

on the ability of any international institution such

as the IAEA to prevent nuclear proliferation. In

such a world, attempts to deny a country possession of nuclear materials and technology though

safeguards, export control, and other means will

not always work. As one analyst has stated:

Given the circumscribed powers and limited

resources granted the IAEA by the international

community...blaming this institution for failing

to stop proliferation is patently absurd.20

❚ Recent Events

In the last few years, several factors have coalesced to raise the profile of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As mentioned above, IAEA inspections in North Korea in 1992 proved that

North Korea’s declarations about its past plutonium reprocessing activities were, at best, incomplete and misleading. For many observers, these

revelations confirmed suspicions that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons in violation

of its NPT commitment not to do so, and that it

may, in fact, have already built one or more weapons. The year before, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, international inspections discovered an extensive clandestine nuclear weapon

program in Iraq, an NPT member state for which

19Reprocessing technology, for example, was declassified decades ago and is well described in the open literature. For an assessment of

technical hurdles facing a potential nuclear proliferant, see Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit., footnote 3, ch. 4.

20Janne Nolan, testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 102d

Congress, 2d session, part 2, “Arms Trade and Nonproliferation in the Middle East,” S.Hrg. 102-1021, Pt. 2, Mar. 13, 1992, p. 38.
34 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

no safeguards violations had been discovered or

reported by the IAEA before the war.21 The chief

impact of these discoveries will be, and to some

extent already has been:

...to focus the nonproliferation regime more

sharply on the risks of proliferation in the politically tense regions of the Developing World, to

find ways of enhancing the IAEA’s ability to detect clandestine programs, and to stress the role

of the U.N. Security Council as the supreme international authority for enforcing non-proliferation obligations.22

In April 1992, little more than a year after that

war, the major nuclear exporting countries (the

Nuclear Suppliers Group or “London Group”)

agreed to a major new set of export guidelines restricting trade in a wide range of dual-use technologies pertaining to nuclear weapons (e.g.,

technologies useful for producing nuclear weapons that also have legitimate civil applications),

and linking approvals for such trade to a country’s

overall nonproliferation credentials. Still more

important was the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s

agreement to prohibit exports of explicitly nuclear-related goods to states that were not subject

to full-scope IAEA safeguards (i.e., those covering every nuclear facility in the state’s territory).

This new policy had the effect of blocking a possible Russian sale of reactors to India and a French

project to sell one to Pakistan.23

Within the same period, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, with its vast nuclear weapon

stockpile and infrastructure spread among several

republics, presented dangerous new complications to the nonproliferation regime. At least three

republics other than Russia (Belarus, Kazakhstan,

and Ukraine) had nuclear warheads and nuclear

materials on their territories. With all these republics having become non-nuclear-weapon states

party to the NPT, they have committed to return all

nuclear weapons on their territories to Russia and

to place all of their nuclear facilities under safeguards.24

In addition, the conference held in April and

May 1995 to review and extend the NPT drew

worldwide attention to the treaty itself and to

the nuclear safeguards that it requires its nonnuclear-weapon state parties to adopt. The

outcome of this conference—a consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely—will shape

the nonproliferation regime into the next century.

Despite its weaknesses and the discrimination

between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” the

nonproliferation regime, centered as it is on the

NPT, has largely been successful. The total number of declared or de facto nuclear weapon states,

including the five which had declared their nuclear weapon status before the NPT’s signing, has

21Although carried out by the IAEA, the intrusive nuclear inspections conducted in Iraq since 1991 were mandated by U.N. Security Council resolutions 687, 707, and 715 and did not follow directly from Iraq’s safeguards agreements. The IAEA has long had the authority under its

full-scope safeguards agreements to conduct “special inspections” of undeclared sites. However, before 1991 it did virtually nothing regarding

such sites, primarily due to the lack of political support in the international community for such intrusions on the national sovereignty of member

states. It has since paid more attention to such sites, making its first—and so far its only—formal request for a special inspection of an undeclared

site in 1992. North Korea, the target of the request, refused to allow it. On the other hand, several nations have permitted the IAEA to make less

formal “visits” to undeclared sites.

22David Fischer, “Innovations in IAEA Safeguards To Meet the Challenges of the 1990s,” in The New Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Southampton, UK: Programme for Promoting

Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Sept. 1992), p. 27.

23Refusing to export explicitly nuclear-related goods to states that are not under full-scope safeguards amounts to imposing an economic

sanction on states unwilling to forego the nuclear weapon option. China has not agreed to abide by this policy, and it continues to export nuclear

technology to states that are not under full-scope safeguards. However, China is obligated under the NPT to insist that IAEA safeguards be

applied to nuclear-related items and facilities it exports, even if the recipient has not accepted safeguards on all its facilities.

24For further discussion of the former Soviet Union, see Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union, op. cit., footnote 1.
Chapter 2 Introduction | 35

remained at eight or nine, a fraction of what some

in the early 1970s were predicting. Forty states

succeeded, ratified, or acceded to the NPT between January 1, 1991 and May 25, 1995, including France, China, Russia (as successor to the

U.S.S.R.), and all of the other former Soviet republics, bringing the total number of parties to

178 (see appendix B).

Argentina and Brazil, two former “threshold”

states that had been thought to be pursuing nuclear

weapon programs in the past, have adopted strong

nonproliferation measures through their commitments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which requires

the implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards plus bilateral inspections of each other’s

nuclear activities through a newly formed agency

called ABACC (the Argentine-Brazilian Agency

for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials).

Argentina has also gone on to join the NPT. Finally, a major advance for the nuclear nonproliferation regime was achieved in South Africa’s accession to the NPT, for which it first dismantled its

small clandestine nuclear arsenal and subsequently opened all of its nuclear facilities (including its

ex-weapon facilities) to international inspection.

Despite growing adherence, however, the international safeguards regime has a number of

shortcomings, as summarized in this chapter. The

remainder of this report addresses various policy

options for remedying these shortcomings.
Enhancing

the Traditional

IAEA

Safeguards

Regime

he traditional International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime can be strengthened in two ways. One approach is to improve the IAEA’s ability to detect the diversion of “declared” nuclear materials—those materials that

a state makes known to the IAEA and processes at facilities open

to IAEA inspection. The other approach is to strengthen the

IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared materials and facilities where

a state may be attempting to conduct nuclear weapon activities in

secret. Until recently, international safeguards were restricted in

practice to the first of these approaches, dealing only with declared materials at known sites. Now, however, steps are being

taken to enhance the IAEA’s ability to discover undeclared nuclear facilities.

To improve its chances of detecting covert nuclear facilities,

the IAEA has already begun to incorporate new sources of information into its framework of implementing safeguards. It is

studying the use of environmental sampling to detect covert sites1

and is placing considerably more emphasis on determining the

completeness and accuracy of the initial inventory of nuclear material that a state must declare to the IAEA when first coming under safeguards. In particular, it has made heavy use of “ad hoc”

inspections for this purpose in states such as South Africa and

North Korea, which entered the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

after having already developed a substantial nuclear infrastructure. (“Ad hoc” inspections are those conducted before the

1See forthcoming OTA background paper on detecting nuclear facilities through environmental sampling (anticipated summer 1995), which examines the prospect of using

environmental samples to identify or characterize covert nuclear weapon facilities by detecting radioactive or other characteristic substances they might emit.

| 37
38 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

completion of the formal attachments to a state’s

safeguards agreement with the IAEA that govern

routine inspections at specific facilities.) With its

new emphasis on determining the completeness of

a state’s initial declaration, the IAEA has apparently been successful in verifying the consistency

of the South African case while uncovering clear

discrepancies in the North Korean one. It remains

to be seen, however, whether the enhanced efforts and projected capabilities will be effective

in states that refuse to cooperate fully with the

IAEA’s call for increased access and transparency, which has the potential to go well beyond

the full-scope, NPT-type safeguards specified

in INFCIRC/153.

OVERALL CONFIDENCE IN SAFEGUARDS

Through 1990, official IAEA statements all tended to reflect the conviction that safeguards had

continued to provide assurance that states were

complying with their safeguards agreements. The

only exceptions were two cases in 1981 and 1982,

when the IAEA was unable to confirm compliance

with safeguards at a Pakistani reactor and an Indian reactor due to the need to install additional

equipment and take other measures to assure the

absence of diversion.2 Safeguards were, therefore,

credited with playing a key role in preventing the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear

explosive devices.3 The IAEA has been cautious

to place its capability into the proper perspective,

deliberately calling attention to the fact that its

statements were limited to declared nuclear material, and that categorical statements about the absence of undeclared installations could not be

made on the basis of IAEA verification activities.

It has also pointed out that the safeguards system

is not so finely meshed that it would be likely to

detect diversion of less than a “significant quantity” (SQ),4 which it defines as “the approximate

quantity of nuclear material in respect of which,

taking into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear

explosive device cannot be excluded.”5

The most serious known violations of safeguards or NPT obligations—such as those uncovered in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War—have involved not diversion from safeguarded facilities,

but undeclared activities falling outside the domain of safeguards as it was then understood.

Only in Iraq, North Korea, and Romania has the

IAEA found violations that involved diversion of

nuclear material or improper activities at a declared facility (i.e., one that has been disclosed to

the IAEA and placed under safeguards). In Iraq

and Romania, the violations at declared facilities

involved quantities of nuclear materials that were

substantially less than the amount whose diversion the IAEA would consider a serious proliferation risk. In North Korea, where the quantities in

question could be significant, the concern is not

the diversion of material from safeguarded facilities but rather the failure to declare all existing nuclear materials to the IAEA before safeguards

were initiated. See box 3-1.

2The Indian situation was cleared up quickly, but Pakistan resisted installing the necessary equipment at its KANUPP power reactor for two

years before agreeing to do so. During this period, the IAEA was careful not to imply that material had indeed been diverted, although the possibility existed. David A.V. Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (London: SIPRI, Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp.

16-17; and David A.V. Fischer, The International Non-Proliferation Regime, 1987 (New York: United Nations, 1987), p. 41.

3For example, see the draft document of the 1990 NPT review conference, NPT/CONF/DC/1/Add.3(a), Article III and preamble paragraphs

4 and 5, as cited in Lawrence Scheinman, Assuring the Nuclear Nonproliferation Safeguards System (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council,

October 1992), p. 7.

4See statement by Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, to the General Conference of the IAEA, GC(XXXVII)/OR.353, Oct. 11, 1993,

p. 26.

5The definition also says that “significant quantities should not be confused with critical masses; the former take into account unavoidable

losses of conversion and manufacturing processes.” International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 1987 Edition (Vienna,

Austria: IAEA, 1987), p. 23. The definition of significant quantities of various weapon materials is discussed later in this report.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 39

Iraq. Iraq’s extensive violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty—by building and operating a number

of undeclared nuclear facilities and accumulating undeclared stocks of nuclear materials—have been

the most notorious breach of international nuclear safeguards. In addition, Iraq violated its safeguards

agreement with the IAEA by producing a small quantity of plutonium through the irradiation of indigenous, undeclared uranium fuel at an installation that was subject to IAEA inspection. Iraq’s safeguards

violations were detected only by inspections after the Gulf War.

North Korea. At best, North Korea made an incomplete declaration of its initial plutonium inventory

when it concluded its full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. At worst, the undeclared plutonium is evidence of a nuclear weapon program in violation of NPT and safeguards commitments. North

Korea did not conclude its safeguards agreement with the IAEA for six years following its ratification of

the NPT, in apparent violation of the treaty. (Safeguards agreements are to be completed within 18

months. Many other NPT parties have not met this deadline either, but they have no significant nuclear

facilities and certainly no facilities for production of weapon-usable nuclear materials.) North Korea has

refused to allow access to IAEA inspectors, both for routine inspections at declared facilities and for

special inspections at two suspected waste sites. Having first announced and then suspended its withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea has asserted that it has a unique status under the NPT and is not

subject to standard safeguards requirements. However, neither the IAEA nor other NPT parties recognize such a status.

The IAEA was able to discover discrepancies in the North Korean declaration of its initial inventory on the basis of its own sampling and analysis. Information supplied by member states contributed to the IAEA’s request to conduct special inspections of two undeclared sites.

Romania. Following the ouster of the Ceaucescu regime, Romania acknowledged producing small

amounts of plutonium without notifying the IAEA as required. In addition, it has admitted selling Norwegian-origin heavy water to India without requiring IAEA safeguards on the sale (it should have negotiated an INFCIRC/66 agreement with India) or reporting the sale to the IAEA, apparently in violation of

the NPT requirement for such transfers.

Pakistan. In the early 1980s, when Pakistan became able to produce its own fuel for its KANUPP

nuclear reactor, which was under IAEA INFCIRC/66 (non-NPT party) safeguards, the IAEA was unable

to certify that Pakistan had not diverted nuclear material from this reactor. For two years, until Pakistan

allowed additional equipment to be installed and procedures taken, the IAEA stated that it could not

rule out the possibility of diversion there. During this period, the IAEA was careful not to imply that material had indeed been diverted, although the possibility existed.

All the instances above relating to NPT parties (i.e., the Iraqi, North Korean, and Romanian

cases) became known to the IAEA after the Gulf War. Thus some argue that before Iraq’s clandestine

nuclear program was discovered, the IAEA not only remained free from pressure from its member states

to be more intrusive and forceful (in fact, some member states objected to any additional intrusiveness),

but had little incentive in this direction since no significant safeguards violations were known to have

occurred.

SOURCE: David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985) and Office

of Technology Assessment, 1995.
40 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

IAEA inspectors visiting a nuclear reactor in North Korea. By

analyzing samples taken during its inspections, the IAEA

determined that the North Koreans had not revealed all of

their plutonium production.

If IAEA safeguards did not exist, the diversion

of nuclear material from ostensibly civil facilities

would pose serious dangers to the nonproliferation regime. Given the existence of safeguards,

however, diversion of material from civil facilities

is probably not the easiest or the most efficient

route to obtaining weapon materials.6 Moreover,

in the past, states pursuing nuclear weapons such

as India, Israel, Pakistan, Iraq, and South Africa

have produced their weapon materials at undeclared-and therefore unsafeguarded-facilities. 7 Therefore, ensuring the absence of undeclared facilities for producing nuclear

materials is probably even more important to

the international nonproliferation regime than

is verifying with very high confidence that not

even a single bomb’s worth of nuclear material

could have been diverted from decklared facilities. Nevertheless, achieving a high probability

that the diversion of a significant quantity of fissionable nuclear material from a declared facility

will be detected—while maintaining a manageable false alarm rate—underlies the vast majority

of NPT international verification activities. Both

the application of safeguards to declared facilities

and the detection of undeclared facilities are important to the nonproliferation regime, and the

IAEA has a key role to play in both missions.

■ IAEA Organizational Culture

and “Mindset”

Many feel that the IAEA is more conservative and

more cautious than it should be or needs to be, and

that it cannot easily adapt to a new, more ambitious agenda.8 This attitude may stem from IAEA

practice before the 1991 Gulf War, when it was not

encouraged by its member states to seek undeclared facilities. Ten years earlier, former IAEA

inspector Roger Richter testified in a widely publicized congressional hearing that the IAEA actively discouraged inquiries into undeclared activities. He asserted that an inspector “must prepare

[oneself] mentally to ignore the many signs that

may indicate the presence of clandestine activities

going on in the facilities adjacent to the reactor

6 0ffice of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, December 1993), pp. 181-183. This statement is based on the existence of safeguards, on the fact that the vast

majority of nuclear material in the civil sector is in forms that are not directly usable or, if usable, not optimal for weapons, and on the uneconomic operating conditions that production of weapon materials would require in most commercial facilities.

7 Iraq’s undeclared activities violated its NPT commitments. The other states listed were not NPT members when they pursued their weapon

programs and were, therefore, under no legal obligation to declare their nuclear activities or place them under safeguards.

8 Lawrence Scheinman, Assuring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards System, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 26. See also, Gary Milhollin,

“The New Arms Race: The Iraqi Bomb,” The New Yorker, Feb. 1, 1993, pp. 47-55; and David Kay, “The IAEA—How Can It Be Strengthened?”

paper presented at the conference Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: Challenges and Opportunities, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington,

DC, Dec. 1-2, 1992, especially pp. 9-14.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 41

[under IAEA inspection].”9 After the revelation of

Iraq’s covert nuclear weapon program, an unnamed IAEA official was quoted as stating that

“we may have been too narrow” in the training

provided for IAEA inspectors in the past, implying that to some extent the earlier criticism may

have been warranted.10

As Lawrence Scheinman explains, there are

institutional pressures within the IAEA that have

acted to oppose the strengthening of safeguards:

Historically—and even in the present political context—there has been a continuing reluctance of the [IAEA] board members to agree to

new safeguards measures that will be any burden on themselves. Some member states accept

safeguards grudgingly, but even non-nuclearweapon states which are strongly committed to

effective safeguards and to non-proliferation are

chary of accepting new measures, even when it

is not their behavior that necessitates these measures in the first place.11

Moreover, he argues, “sovereignty remains a

vigorous and contradictory force against empowering international institutions with far-reaching

authority.”12 However, Scheinman ultimately

concludes that “with proper political leadership

there is no reason that the IAEA should not be able

to implement a more far-reaching and more intrusive safeguards regime. The basic responsibility

for ensuring this task rests in the hands of the governments of its key member states, especially the

United States.”13 It also rests with the Security

Council and its relationship to the IAEA. Indeed, a

number of potentially far-reaching steps have

been taken since the 1991 Persian Gulf war to

strengthen the IAEA, improve its nuclear safeguards, and otherwise bolster the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

❚ Recent Improvements

In January 1992, a communiqué was issued by the

U.N. Security Council in which its members,

through their respective heads of state, declared

that 1) “the proliferation of all weapons of mass

destruction constitutes a threat to international

peace and security”; 2) fully effective IAEA safeguards are integral to the implementation of the

NPT; and 3) Security Council members “will take

appropriate measures in the case of any violations

notified to them by the IAEA.”14 This statement

significantly strengthened U.N. support for the

goals of IAEA safeguards and implied firmer actions by the United Nations in the future.

In late 1991, IAEA Director General Hans Blix

called for several improvements to safeguards, including the need to incorporate outside intelligence about undeclared facilities, the need for inspectors to have the right to go anywhere

unimpeded, and the value of “powerful support,”

such as that provided by the Security Council.

Blix also established procedures within the IAEA

to receive information from outside sources. At its

meeting in February 1992, the IAEA’s Board of

Governors explicitly reaffirmed the IAEA’s “right

to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the IAEA

Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.” Specifically included in this reaffirmation

was the IAEA’s right to use information derived

9“The Israeli Air Strike,” Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, June 18,

19, and 25, 1981, p. 112.

10Mark Hibbs, “ ‘Special Inspections:’ A Transatlantic Turf War for Post-Iraq Powers: Nonproliferation After the Gulf War,” Nucleonics

Week, vol. 33, No. 5, Jan. 30, 1992, p. 14.

11Scheinman, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 42.

12Ibid., p. 28.

13Ibid.

14U.N. Security Council Press Release, SC/536, Jan. 31, 1992, as cited in Scheinman, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 6.
42 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

both from nonsafeguards activities (technical

cooperation, safety, and research activities) and

from non-IAEA or political sources.15

The Board also reaffirmed the IAEA’s right to

undertake “special inspections,” including their

use to ensure that all appropriate nuclear materials

have in fact been placed under safeguards. In doing so, the Board declared that the requirement to

engage in “consultation” with the state in question

(pursuant to INFCIRC/153, paragraph 77) did not

allow the state ultimately to deny the agency’s

right to special inspections.16 (In practice, of

course, the requirement for consultation can be

used by states to delay inspections, making shortnotice inspections impossible.) The IAEA had always had the authority to conduct special inspections, but before the Persian Gulf War of 1991,

none had ever been conducted at an undeclared

site. (The “anytime, anywhere, no-right-of-refusal” inspections conducted by the IAEA in Iraq

were not conducted under its special inspection

authority but rather under U.N. Security Council

Resolution 687, which was imposed on Iraq under

threat of force.)

Despite the Board’s affirmations, intrusive inspections and reliance by the IAEA on national intelligence sources are unwelcome by many countries. Since the IAEA has a strong institutional

commitment to maintaining political support

within its ranks, it will take some time to determine how successful proposals will be for increasing the scope of inspections or for the

agency to act upon additional amounts of national intelligence information. However, states

provided the IAEA with much of the information

it needed in the cases of Iraq and North Korea. In

the latter case, the IAEA proved able to act on such

information (in conjunction with its own sampling and analysis) to request a special inspection

of two undeclared waste disposal sites.

In 1992, the IAEA took additional steps to improve the quality of the information available to it

concerning safeguards-related activities. In February, the Board of Governors endorsed an IAEA

proposal that design information be provided at

the time of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of any nuclear facility, or to

modify an existing facility. Such information is to

be provided at least 180 days before construction

starts. (This is a much stronger requirement than

the prior practice, which held that such information be provided 180 days before fissile material

was to be introduced at the site.) With this additional notice, the IAEA will be better able to plan

for effective implementation of safeguards for the

facility.

The importance of early design information

was particularly stressed by the LASCAR (LArge

SCAle Reprocessing plant) study, a four-year

analysis of safeguards for future large-scale plutonium reprocessing plants. LASCAR, conducted

by representatives from France, Germany, Japan,

the United Kingdom, the United States, IAEA,

and the European Atomic Energy Community

(EURATOM), was an initiative that was proposed

and financed by Japan. Acting in an advisory capacity to the IAEA, the LASCAR forum formulated new guidelines for IAEA safeguards on such

facilities in May 1992.

15Some board members, however, argued that use of foreign intelligence information as the basis for inspections could be challenged, and

some developing states would consider Agency use of such as a violation of their sovereignty. The adopted text dropped an explicit reference to

foreign intelligence. The Board also declined to support establishment of a formal unit within the IAEA to process intelligence information.

16If a request by the Director General for a special inspection is refused, the Director General may bring the matter to the Board of Governors, who can request the state to take the required action without delay. If the matter remains unresolved, the Board has the obligation to report

to the Security Council the inability of the Agency to verify “that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded”

(INFCIRC/153, paragraph 19). The Security Council can then determine if the situation threatens international peace and security, in response

to which it could invoke options under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The initial decision to call for a special inspection, however, rests with

the Director General alone, and does not require action by the Board (though the latter can also request such an inspection). Scheinman, op. cit.,

footnote 3, pp. 12-13.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 43

To further enhance its information-analysis capabilities, the IAEA’s Board of Governors took

steps at its February and June 1992 meetings toward adopting universal reporting of: 1) exports

and imports of certain equipment and non-nuclear

material, and 2) exports, imports, production, and

inventories of nuclear material. However, these

measures did not cover production of non-nuclear

material and did not envisage routine verification

other than cross-checks within the IAEA.17 At the

September 1992 meeting of the IAEA’s General

Conference in Vienna—the annual plenary of representatives from all the IAEA’s member states—

Hans Blix announced that states able to begin such

reporting should do so on a voluntary basis. At the

February 1993 meeting, the Board of Governors

authorized the secretariat to implement proposals

for such a system of universal reporting, including

production of nuclear materials, specified equipment, and non-nuclear material commonly used in

the nuclear industry.18

If a substantial number of states comply, increased reporting to the IAEA of their imports and

exports of nuclear material and equipment will

significantly strengthen the safeguards regime.

Blix has claimed that if such data for Iraq had been

available, the IAEA would probably have requested special explanations and visits to Iraq.19

Many argue that such collection and analysis of

information is one of the most important parts of

the control system for weapons of mass destruction.20 Nevertheless, the plan for universal reporting is still in its infancy, and only a handful of

states provided information in 1992 and 1993, although many major suppliers are expected to

comply eventually.

The 27 members of the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG) adopted new Dual-Use Export

Guidelines in April 1992, extending international

export controls on items useful for manufacturing

nuclear weapons or weapon material.21 These

guidelines will tighten export restrictions on thousands of items in 65 categories of equipment and

materials related to producing nuclear weapons,

including specific types of lasers, carbon fibers,

oscilloscopes, certain high-purity materials used

in the nuclear industry or for weapon components,

and computer-numerically-controlled machine

tools. The NSG members also agreed not to export

explicitly nuclear-related goods to states that are

not subject to full-scope safeguards. According to

officials from the Foreign and Trade Ministries of

Japan, which has become the NSG’s de facto secretariat, the emerging regime would become the

largest international regulatory framework for the

export of dual-use items.22

The most significant nuclear supplier that has

not committed to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers

Group restraints is China. As a party to the NonProliferation Treaty, China is obligated to notify

the IAEA of exports to a non-nuclear-weapon

state of any nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities, and to place them under IAEA safeguards.

Beyond its NPT obligations, China has pledged to

17Some of the enhanced reporting requirements that are being considered would require reporting of any amount of plutonium or enriched

uranium transferred to or from either nuclear-weapon states or non-nuclear-weapon states (nuclear-weapon states already voluntarily report

transactions in excess of 1 effective kilogram—see glossary—of nuclear material for peaceful purposes), and they include reporting of inventories and transfers of material not yet suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment (such as uranium ore concentrates, U3O8) even if exported for

peaceful non-nuclear purposes. Scheinman, op. cit., footnote 3, pp. 16-17.

18Programme for Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation, Newsbrief, No. 21, First Quarter, 1993, p. 6.

19IAEA Press Release, Oct. 21, 1992, on Blix’s statement to the U.N. General Assembly.

20See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994).

21See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), app. 4-D.

22Arms Control Reporter, 1992, p. 602.B.219.
44 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

exercise restraint on nuclear exports. However,

the United States has repeatedly approached China concerning its nuclear export activities, particularly with respect to Iran. Argentina, like China

not a participant in the April 1992 NSG meeting,

declared that it would establish effective controls

over its exports of nuclear equipment and materials, and has committed to this under its quadripartite agreement with Brazil, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of

Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and the IAEA.23

❚ Current IAEA Thinking on Improving

Safeguards: “Programme 93 + 2”

With an eye toward strengthening and streamlining IAEA safeguards in the post-Gulf War political environment, the IAEA undertook a broadranging, internal evaluation of its safeguards

regime. In 1993, it put forth “Programme 93 + 2,”

a number of recommendations for improving the

efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards to be

addressed in the two years before the 1995 NPT

review and extension conference. This proposal

consists of six parts plus an integration phase:24

1. increased transparency measures,

2. increased use of states’ systems of accounting

and control (SSACs),

3. environmental sampling,

4. use of “anytime, anyplace” inspections,

5. analysis of additional sources of information,

and

6. expanded training of the inspectorate.

The intention is to integrate these improvements into the present system of safeguards in a

coherent way. The proposal is motivated both by

the need for cost savings and by a desire to increase the IAEA’s access to relevant facilities and

information sufficiently to provide assurances not

only that a country’s declared materials remain in

peaceful use, but also that it has no undeclared nuclear facilities.

Under 93+2, a number of avenues to strengthen

safeguards would be examined for their feasibility

and utility. The implications of changing the definition of “significant quantity” thresholds for nuclear materials would also be reexamined. Options for increased utilization of the SSACs

include using them to make the IAEA’s work more

efficient, sharing equipment and analytic capabilities, thus lessening the inspector’s workload, and

relegating some verification activities (e.g., for

natural or depleted uranium) almost entirely to the

state system.25 Investigation of environmental

sampling under 93+2 to detect undeclared facilities or activities would primarily be directed at applications where most believe it would be useful—in short-range monitoring of specific types

of activity in a small number of countries.26 In the

short term, it will concentrate on performing background calibrations at various distances from

known sites, developing a cleanroom analytic capability, and documenting various signatures

from reprocessing, enrichment, and reactor operations. Increased access and the concept of unan23IAEA document INFCIRC/404, as cited in ibid.

24International Atomic Energy Agency, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System: A Report

by the Director General,” GC(XXXVIII)/17, Aug. 29, 1994.

25The IAEA has also reached a new understanding with EURATOM for streamlining its relationship and procedures for carrying out their

overlapping safeguards responsibilities in Europe. This “New Partnership Approach” is intended to reduce significantly the inspection resources that IAEA must devote to EURATOM countries, while maintaining the IAEA’s ability to arrive at independent safeguards conclusions.

26As of August 1994, 20 states had agreed to participate in field trials of environmental monitoring or other techniques to strengthen safeguards. See IAEA General Conference, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System,” op. cit, footnote 24, p. 5. Field trials have shown that nuclear operations in coastal areas can be detected in water and sediment samples up to 20 kilometers

from the facility (p. 17).
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 45

nounced inspections will be studied on a voluntary basis in countries such as Australia, Canada,

Iran, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden, the eventual goal being in part to reduce some inspection activities (e.g., on spent fuel storage in Canada)

while maintaining or increasing overall effectiveness. Finally, various open source databases and

programs for organizing the kinds of information

most relevant to safeguards will be explored.27

Such data retrieval and analysis will be used to increase the utility of environmental sampling as

well as arrangements for voluntary access.

The 93+2 program is ambitious and will address many important areas needing improvement

within the IAEA. Nevertheless, a number of important issues remain to be addressed. These can

be divided into techniques and procedures for implementing safeguards themselves, and institutional issues concerning the IAEA broadly.

STRENGTHENING SAFEGUARDS

❚ Safeguards Objectives

The IAEA seeks to detect diversion of so-called

significant quantities of nuclear material, defined

as 8 kilograms of plutonium, or 25 kilograms of

uranium-235 when in the form of highly enriched

uranium. It has set its detection goals at 90 percent, with a false alarm rate of 5 percent (see box

3-2).28 The IAEA safeguards system does not attempt to disguise the fact that diversion of lesser

quantities may be more difficult to detect. Moreover, it does not aim to detect diversion of a significant quantity instantly, but rather to do so in a

“timely manner,” defined variously as monthly,

every three months, or yearly, depending on the

particular type of material and roughly the time required for it to be converted into a weapon. Detection thresholds are set at 90 percent for fissionable

Safeguards measurements for material accountancy and control are used by the IAEA to determine

the amount of nuclear material at a facility that is unaccounted for (“material unaccounted for,” or MUF)

and to compare it to the value reported by the facility’s operator. A sufficiently large MUF could indicate

that nuclear material had been diverted. Alternatively, it could reflect an unrecorded process loss. ldealIy, one would like measurements to result in a zero value for the MUF, thereby closing the books with all

of a facility’s nuclear material fully accounted for. However, measurement errors will, in general, produce

nonzero estimates of MUF, even if no material has been lost or diverted. Given the known or estimated

uncertainties in the measurements used to calculate MUF, it can be determined whether the MUF value

is significantly different from zero (i.e., a magnitude that measurement errors alone would be unlikely to

explain). Thresholds at which MUF is considered significant are determined after choosing acceptable

levels for two types of errors:

■ Fake alarms, or “Type I“errors. Claims of a diversion or loss of material when none has occurred. The

probability of a false alarm, meaning that analysis of material accountancy measurements will indicate that material is missing when none in fact has been diverted or lost, is represented by α.

■ Missed diversion, or “Type II” errors. Failure to conclude that a diversion or loss has occurred when

in fact it has. The probability that a true diversion or loss will be not be detected is denoted by β (see

figure a).

(continued)

27One such program, called INSIST, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest Laboratory to help implement long-term monitoring in Iraq. It incorporates and manages multimedia data including photographs, maps, and facility layouts.

28Such goals apply to the conclusions reached at the end of a material balance period, when the IAEA verifies a physical inventory (e.g.,

monthly, every 3 months, or yearly, depending on the type of material).
46 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

If either type of error occurs too frequently, it could

seriously erode the credibility of the entire system used

to make judgments. False

alarms can have political and

procedural costs and might

sometimes require extensive

consultations to resolve. It is

thus very important for the

IAEA to maintain a low false

alarm rate, and α = 0.05 has

been chosen as the maximum

acceptable value.1 Similarly,

missed diversions can be

very costly in terms of their

consequences for proliferation. The IAEA uses 90 percent detection probability for

detecting a “significant quantity” of diverted U-235 or plutonium in a form directly usable

for weapons, thus defining β

by 0.90 = (1- β ), or β = 0.10.

‘According to the

IAEA, the false-alarm rate

in practice is much smaller

than 5 percent, even for

material in bulk form, but

especially for safeguards

procedures that only require identifying and

counting complete items

(known as item accountancy). (See letter in response

to Office of Technology

Assessment questions,

signed by Jan Priest, Division of External Relations,

IAEA, and addressed to

Marvin Peterson, United

States Mission to the

United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Jan.

17, 1995, p, 5.) Each alarm

requires additional investigation, credible explanation by plant operators, or

other procedures to try to

resolve the discrepancy

and determine whether the

alarm is warranted.

– σ o σ 1.6450

MUF

Figure a. Expected probability distribution of MUF (material unaccounted for) measurements from a system with an overall uncertainty of σ, assuming that no diversion

of material has taken place and that no systematic errors act uniformly to shift all the

measurements to one side or the other. Measurements will fall between - σ and + σ 68

percent of the time. Measurements will fall above +1 .64505 percent of the time.

o d - σ d d + σ d + 1.645 σ

MUF

Figure b. Expected probability distribution of MUF measurements from the same system as

figure a) in the event that amount “d” of nuclear material has been diverted. Measurements of

missing or unaccounted-for material are most likely to be near d, falling between d-a and d+ σ

68 percent of the time.

(continued)
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 47

Curve 1: no diversion Curve II: diversion of amount d

o t d

MUF

Figure c. To tell the difference between a measurement that indicates material is actually unaccounted for and a measurement that might be due solely to measurement error, a threshold is typically established. Measurements greater than the

threshold—shown in this figure as “t’’-are assumed to represent the absence of material, whereas measurements below

the threshold are assumed to be consistent with all material being accounted for. Probability distributions for two different

cases are shown here: curve I represents the case where no material is actually missing, and curve II represents the case

where a diversion of amount “d” has been made. Therefore, the shaded area under curve I that is to the right of “t” represents the false alarm rate: the probability that measurements will appear to indicate diversion even when none has occurred. At the same time, the shaded area under curve II that is to the right of “t” represents the probability for detecting

diversion of size “d, since it gives the probability that a measurement will show that more than “t” material is missing when

“d” has actually been taken.

In sum, uncertainties associated with numerical measurements directly affect the uncertainty (and the

false alarm rate) of conclusions based on those measurements. No system can provide absolute certainty in detecting loss of material or the absence of loss. The best that can be done is to design a system

that has high detection probability and low false alarm rate. However, these two goals are in opposition, forcing a balance to be struck between them. For a given measurement system, detection probability can always be raised, but only at the expense of generating more false alarms.

Statistical analysis shows that by sounding an alarm when MUF values exceed 1.645a (where σ is the

uncertainty, or “standard deviation, ” with which MUF can be computed), the false alarm rate will be held

to 5 percent or less, while true diversions or losses of twice the alarm threshold (3.290) would be detected with 95 percent probability. There would be a 90 percent chance of catching diversions over

2.93a. For example, if a plutonium measurement system were characterized by a one-standard-deviation

uncertainty of ± 2 kg, sounding an alarm when MUF values exceeded 3.29 kg would have a 95 percent

chance of detecting diversions as big as 6.58 kg of plutonium. Similarly, false alarms would occur only 5

percent of the time (see figures a through c).

However, even smaller diversions would also have some chance of being detected, using the same

threshold and thus the same (low) 5 percent false-alarm probability. If a diversion equal to 3.290 has a

95 percent chance of being detected, for example, diversions at levels of 1 σ or 2 σ would have a 26

(continued)
48 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Figure d. The

size of the diversion to be Curve 1: no diversion

detected can

be reduced by

lowering the

alarm threshold. At the same

time, however,

the false alarm

rate will go up.

In this figure, an

alarm threshold

t’ is used that is

equal to half of

the threshold t

shown in figure

c. The area under curve I to -

the right of t’ is

I Curve II: diversion of amount d’

t’ d'

larger than it MUF

was in figure c, indicating that the false alarm rate will be higher in this case. Moreover, since less of the area under curve

II is to the right of the threshold t’ in this picture, the chances are lower that an actual diversion will be caught. In other

words, the detection probability will be lower.

percent or 64 percent chance, respectively, of being detected as well. Thus a plant operator who deliberately diverts any amount of material always has some chance of being discovered.2 This assumes, of

course, that the data used by the IAEA have not been falsified in some way by the operator

One option that has been considered for bulk-handling facilities (e.g., facilities that handle nuclear

material in bulk form, such as solution or powder—these plants are among the hardest to safeguard) is

to allow an increase in false alarm rate (e.g., to 20 percent or even 30 percent) in order to attain additional detection sensitivity.3 Given that a MUF value higher than the detection threshold does not automatically imply (nor is it ever immediately assumed to imply) that material has actually been diverted anyway,

these higher false alarm rates would be expected only to set in motion a more rigorous search for other

sources of the anomalous readings, and not to trigger a crisis. Such an increase in allowable false alarm

rates would be the result of lowering the detection threshold for sounding the alarm by about a factor of

two, thus making half-size diversions detectable with higher confidence.4 The disadvantage of such an

adjustment is that considerably more work would be required to investigate all the false alarms. If so

many false alarms lulled the inspectors into not taking this investigative effort seriously, the detection

sensitivity could in effect degrade to a condition worse than before the detection threshold were lowered.

2Even if he diverts nothing at all, there is still a 5 percent chance that measurements will indicate a diversion or loss—this is the

meaning of the false alarm rate. Therefore, during 5 percent of the accountancy periods, steps would have to be taken to resolve apparently discrepant measurements.

3See, e.g., R.D. Marsh and R.W. Foulkes, “Design of Safeguards Systems for Commercial Plutonium Processing Facilities,” in Nuclear Safeguards Technology 1986, Proc. IAEA Symposium, vol. 1, Nov. 10-14, 1986 (Vienna, Austria: IAEA, 1987), pp. 31-46.

4

For instance, if a given reprocessing plant’s measurement system can achieve a 95 percent detection capability with 5 Percent

false alarm rate only for diversions as Iarge as 16 kilograms of plutonium, a 79 percent detection capability could be achieved for losses

of just 8 kilograms if one could tolerate a false alarm rate of 21 percent. Such a change in detection capability would be accomplished

simply by halving the threshold for sounding the alarm from 1.645 σ, which has 5 percent of the normal probability distribution curve to

its right, to 0.823σ, which has 21 percent to the right. See figured.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 49

nuclear material not only to facilitate catching the

great majority of diversions, should they be taking

place, but also to deter them in the first place. Nevertheless, safeguards can neither predict diversions ahead of time, nor physically prevent them,

nor be guaranteed to detect them 100 percent of the

time, and they should not be expected to do so.

❚ Difficulties and Limitations

Technical difficulties can interfere with safeguards operations. For example, camera failure,

delays in taking samples or inventorying materials, or staffing limitations may prevent the IAEA

from fulfilling its safeguards objectives at particular facilities. In 1979, the IAEA was only able to

completely attain 27 percent of the inspection

goals it set for itself, although for material directly

usable in weapons its goal attainment was 60 percent. By 1984, this record had improved to 53 percent for all materials and 71 percent for weaponusable materials.29 At major facilities, the IAEA

attained 63 percent of its inspection goals in 1986

and 81 percent in 1990 before dropping back to 69

percent in 1992.30

Even if inspection goals are missed, the IAEA

may still be able to certify that materials have not

been diverted. However, it may not be in a position to do so within the deadlines it has established. All instances where missing information

might prevent the IAEA from detecting diversion

of material are investigated. Typically, additional

information, such as from a subsequent inventory,

provides proof that material was not in fact diverted during the period when inspection goals

were unmet. Except for the Indian and Pakistani

cases mentioned above, the IAEA ultimately certified the nondiversion of safeguarded material,

even though it has not always met its inspection

goals.

Two other fundamental limits on the ability of

the safeguards system to detect diversions are the

need for cooperation by the state and the IAEA’s

limited resources. Allowing international inspectors to regularly visit a country’s nuclear facilities

requires a country to relinquish some sovereignty,

and the allowed routine inspection effort is spelled

out in the comprehensive safeguards agreement a

country negotiates with the IAEA. There are specific provisions for stepping beyond the

constraints of such routine inspections, but these

are also restricted in certain ways and do not provide the IAEA with a “hunting license” to search

within the country arbitrarily. Although states are

usually receptive to IAEA requests to visit other

sites, they have no legal obligation to permit such

access beyond their requirement to accept these

restricted “special inspections” in cases where the

IAEA considers that the information made available to it by the inspected state “is not adequate for

the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities.”31

The limits imposed by finite resources are most

easily seen by a few comparisons. In the multibillion-dollar reprocessing plant to be built at Rokkasho-mura in Japan, tens of millions of dollars will

be spent on equipment to comply with safeguards

requirements, a substantial portion of which will

be used to construct an onsite analytic lab and the

rest for in-plant design features and measuring

29Fischer, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 42.

30D. Schriefer, D. Perricos, and S. Thorstensen, “IAEA Safeguards Experience,” Symposium Proceedings, International Nuclear Safeguards 1994, March 14-18, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 40.

31INFCIRC/153, Article 73(b)
50 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

equipment. 32 Comparing this capital expenditure

with the total annual IAEA safeguards budget of

about $70 million for carrying out safeguards

worldwide-covering over 40 countries, some

900 installations, and parts of at least four other reprocessing plants—indicates why the IAEA relies

on the basic structure of verifying the states’ systems of accounting and control and cannot install

complete monitoring and measurement systems

of its own.

The IAEA chose long ago to employ this strategy of exploiting the states’ own systems of accounting and control, while carrying out certain

procedures and independent measurements to authenticate and verify the state’s measurement systems and thus the state’s reports. 33 The IAEA is

thus dependent on the quality of the SSAC and

the cooperation of the state in implementing

safeguards. If the SSAC is very sloppy, suspicions will be raised, and the IAEA may even call

into question the validity of the state’s measurement systems or reject the reports. The IAEA is

not permitted to play the role of plant operator,

however, and would not have the resources to do

so even if it were.

■ Resources Available for Safeguards

Increase the financial resources available

to the IAEA for carrying out safeguards.

Under pressure from those countries providing

the bulk of its funding, the IAEA has been held to

virtually a zero-real-growth budget since 1985. In

addition, since 1991, the Soviet Union’s successor

states have been unable to maintain the U.S.S.R.

previous level of contributions, about 13 percent

of the agency’s budget. 34 Meanwhile, the IAEA is

constantly subjected to late payments from member states, including the United States. 35 Despite

its financial difficulties, the agency’s safeguards

responsibilities have been increasing:

■ Several countries with significant nuclear infrastructures, such as Argentina, Brazil,36

South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, have

32 For example, Rokksho will have ove r 25 tanks and several separate buildings between the initial dissolver tank and the final Plutonium

output stream-all connected by piping and monitored by various process-specific equipment. According to press accounts, construction of

Rokkasho is expected to cost between 1.8 trillion and 2 trillion yen, or roughly $18 billion to $20 billion. See N. Usui and A. MacLachlan, “Japan

AEC Looking at Delay in Startup of Reprocessing Plants,” Nuclear Fuel, Feb. 14, 1994, pp. 10-11.

Rokkasho will be the only reprocessing plant of this size under complete IAEA safeguards. The THORP reprocessing plant in the United

Kingdom and the French reprocessing plant at La Hague, which are even larger than Rokkasho, will have IAEA safeguards applied only to their

product-storage areas. Since both are located in nuclear weapon states, neither is required to be completely safeguarded by the IAEA.

33 Though the IAEA can perform some measurements independently by taking samples from the site (destructive assays) or by carrying

portable equipment to it (nondestructive assays), other measurements can only be “authenticated” by IAEA personnl, by verifying the integrity of plant measurement equipment, and by watching to see that plant operators do their job properly. IAEA inspectors can also verify the emplacement of the equipment during construction and may install tamper-resistant devices.

The THORP reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom and the French reprocessing plant at La Hague will have IAEA safeguards applied

only to their product-storage areas, and not to the entire plants, which is permissible since they are located in nuclear-weapon states.

34 As of December 31, 1994, the payment status of those former Soviet republics that are members of the IAEA is as follows: Armenia,

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have made no payments. Belarus and Ukraine, which had formally been members of the IAEA even while the

Soviet Union existed, are fully paid for 1991 but have not paid since then. Russia is fully paid for 1991 and 1992 and has paid 23 percent of its

1993 assessment and none of its 1994 assessment. Estonia has made a partial payment and Lithuania is fully paid for 1993 and 1994. From letter

of Jan. 17, 1995 from Jan Priest, Division of External Relations, IAEA, addressed to Marvin Peterson, United States Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, responding to Office of Technology Assessment questions, p. 3.

35 At just over 25 percent of the total, the U.S. contribution is the largest single contribution to the IAEA of any member state.

36 The 1991 agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

(ABACC), and the IAEA will add over $2 million yearly to the IAEA’s safeguards costs upon entry into force. David Fischer, “Innovations in

IAEA Safeguards to Meet the Challenges of the 1990s,” in The New Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International

Verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Southampton, U.K.: Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Sept.

1992), p. 29.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 51

recently concluded or are concluding fullscope safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as

required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco (in the case

of Argentina and Brazil) or the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (the others). These safeguards agreements require the IAEA to apply

safeguards to all nuclear facilities in these

countries, noticeably expanding the IAEA’s total workload.

 In the 1990s, almost a dozen safeguarded facilities will be handling plutonium. These activities, including reprocessing as well as fabrication of MOX (mixed oxide, consisting of

uranium oxide combined with plutonium oxide) fuel, make special demands on safeguards.

Total costs to the IAEA for safeguarding these

facilities will likely increase to $50 million per

year and require a “quantum leap” in inspection

effort.37

 The IAEA has greatly increased the attention

and resources devoted to finding undeclared

nuclear facilities, a mission it had not undertaken before the Gulf War.

Mitigating these additional expenses somewhat is the 50 percent reduction in IAEA inspection expenditures devoted to EURATOM states

that has been made possible through closer collaboration and coordination between EURATOM

and the IAEA. Through the New Partnership Approach, the IAEA and EURATOM intend to reduce redundancy in inspections of the same facilities while retaining the IAEA’s ability to make its

own independent assessments.38 Even with these

savings, however, a zero-growth budget makes

almost no sense in this environment. The

IAEA’s current responsibilities do not lessen

when it concludes new safeguards agreements, or

when new facilities are added to existing safeguards agreements.

The United States has suggested “real growth”

be interpreted to mean added expenditure above

and beyond that required to address these mandatory obligations. In this way, the IAEA would not

suffer financially from the imposition of new safeguards responsibilities that it does not have the

ability to avoid. However, the United States has

not been able to persuade other IAEA members to

accept its view. Fiscal hardliners, including close

U.S. allies such as Japan, Germany, the United

Kingdom, and France, are not willing to make

provision in the IAEA budget for these nondiscretionary increases.

Even if agreement could be reached to increase

funding for the IAEA, issues of fairness and proportionality—both with respect to who should pay

more and how the added money should be allocated between safeguards and technical cooperation programs—tend to complicate the debate

over overall funding levels, as discussed below.

Options for the United States:

 Pay IAEA dues on time. Although IAEA assessments for a given calendar year are due on

January 1, the United States delays its payment

at least nine months, until the following fiscal

year begins on October 1. (Delaying the payment from January 1 to October 1 had the effect

of creating a one-time reduction in the federal

budget the year the shift took place; moving the

payment back would require a corresponding

one-time increase.) This nine-month delay aggravates IAEA cash flow problems.

 Raise the U.S. extrabudgetary contribution

and level of technical assistance to safe37See, e.g., Frans Berkhout et al., “Disposition of Separated Plutonium,” Science & Global Security, vol. 3, Nos. 3-4, 1993, pp. 161-214.

38S. Thorstensen and K. Chitumbo, “Increased Co-operation Between IAEA and Euratom: The New Partnership Approach,” Symposium

Proceedings, International Nuclear Safeguards 1994, op. cit., footnote 30, p. 271
52 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

guards. The IAEA’s formal safeguards budget,

$68.6 million in 1994, is quite modest. It represents about one-third of the IAEA’s regular assessed budget, which that year totaled $200.1

million.39 In addition to the regular budget, the

IAEA also receives extrabudgetary contributions, some of which are devoted to safeguards.

Total United States funding for the IAEA in

1994 consisted of a $49.9 million assessment

and a $30.0 million extrabudgetary contribution. Of this $30.0 million, $14.6 million was

paid into the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation

and Assistance Fund, or TACF (see box 3-3).

Another $6 million went to specific technical cooperation activities that were not funded

from the TACF, and the remainder—$9.4 million—provided extrabudgetary support for

safeguards.40 Therefore, the United States contributed $28.3 million towards IAEA safeguards in 1994, an amount on the order of one

ten-thousandth of the United States national security and international relations budget.41

Given the extensive and increasing responsibilities of the IAEA safeguards program, and the U.S.

interest in strengthening them, the United States

might wish to consider greatly increasing its safeguards contributions. It has already pledged to increase its extrabudgetary contribution for 1995 to

$40.0 million, of which $16.2 million will be devoted to safeguards.42 Even at $100 million per

year, this contribution would be a tiny share of the

U.S. national security budget. Greatly increased

safeguards budgets would allow the maintenance

or even expansion of rigorous safeguards on “nonproblem” states as well as increased attention to

“problem” states. In this way, the IAEA could get

around the major political difficulty of targeting

safeguards efforts on the basis of any judgment of

proliferation risk.

Even if the United States were to increase its

own contribution, however, the IAEA faces institutional barriers to accepting the additional funds

entirely for safeguards purposes. First is the pressure from many member states to balance the

IAEA’s safeguards activities with nuclear promotion and technical assistance activities. Raising

one will almost certainly require raising the other

(see the option on removing the linkage between

safeguards and assistance, below). Second is the

reluctance of many states—including advanced

industrial states with large nuclear programs—to

increase the safeguards effort devoted to their own

nuclear facilities, particularly if they are required

to pay for it. Third is the perception that safeguards only matter to those few states that are paying the bulk of its expenses, and that therefore the

rest of the IAEA’s membership need not pay for or

care very much about them.

Options available to the IAEA:

 Relax safeguards standards (significant

quantities, timeliness goals, or achievement

of inspection goals). This is not an option any

party would like to see implemented, but rather

could be the de facto consequence of the increased demands that have been placed on the

IAEA if additional funds or efficiencies in operation are not found.

 Increase overall assessments charged to

IAEA member states. Over the past decade,

and particularly since the Gulf War, the IAEA’s

member states have been extremely reluctant to

39To minimize the effect of exchange rate fluctuations, the IAEA budget is assessed in a mix of U.S. dollars and Austrian schillings. However, changes in exchange rates may nevertheless introduce disparities between budget figures for different years, or between budgetary assessments and actual payments.

401994 budget figures are from “IAEA Funding in 1994,” provided by the U.S. Department of State, March 1995.

41The $28.3 million for safeguards breaks down into $18.9 million from the U.S. formal assessment, which represents 28.1 percent of the

IAEA’s regular safeguards budget, plus the $9.4 million in extrabudgetary safeguards support.

42 “IAEA Funding in 1994,” op. cit., footnote 40. In recent years, the United States has provided over 70 percent of the total extrabudgetary

cash contributions for safeguards. This percentage can be expected to increase significantly for 1995, given the increase in the U.S. extrabudgetary safeguards contribution.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 53

The IAEA has engaged in technical assistance and cooperation with member states since 1958, at first

in accordance with the “Atoms for Peace” program suggested by the United States and later in accordance

with Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That Article gives all NPT parties “the right to participate in

the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy ., . especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty, with due consideration to the needs of the developing areas of the world.” Its inclusion in the NPT

was one of the quids pro quo for the IAEA’s right to inspect sites containing nuclear material, under Article Ill.

In 1993, technical assistance funding supported 1,373 projects in 86 countries at a level totaling $45

million, an amount about two-thirds the size of that year’s safeguards budget. The largest share, or just

over 20 percent, of technical assistance funding was devoted to food and agriculture.2 Just under 20 percent went to nuclear safety programs: radioactive waste management, radiation protection, and safety of

nuclear installations. Assistance in physical and chemical sciences came to 18 percent of the total, followed by industry and earth sciences at 14 percent, human health at 14 percent, and nuclear power and

the nuclear fuel cycle (other than the safety program mentioned above), together at 9 percent. The bulk of

these funds, or $36,7 million, came from the IAEA’s Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, consisting

of voluntary contributions made by Member States (aimed at a target established by the Board of Governors) beyond their yearly assessed contributions to the IAEA. Member states also provided $5.6 million in

cash in addition to their contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, as well as $1.6

million in in-kind contributions. Finally, the United Nations Development Program provided $1,4 million for a

number of specific projects.

Top recipients of IAEA Technical Assistance, 1958-93

Country

Egypt

Brazil

Thailand

Indonesia

Peru

Pakistan

Philippines

Bangladesh

South Korea

Yugoslavia

Total of top 10 recipients

Total of all recipients

$ millions

24,7

18.5

16,1

15.0

13.8

12.7

12.4

11.8

11.7

11.7

148.4

617.5

(continued)

1 IAEA budgetary figures in this box are from International Atomic Energy Agency, The Agency's Technical Cooperation Activities

in 7993, Report by the Director General, GC(XXXVlll)/lNF/3, August 1994, tables on pp. 9, 10; table 7, Financial Summary, 1993, pp.

66-68; and table 8, Financial Summary: 1958-1993, pp. 69-71,

2Agriculture programs include a variety of projects based on the ability of radioactive isotopes to be traced as they Pass through

Iiving organisms. For example, radioisotopes are used to examine the abilityof different crops to fix nitrogen from the atmosphere, thus

reducing dependence on chemical fertilizers. Another agricultural area of study IS the development of superior strains of food plants

through radiation-induced mutations and subsequent selection. A third is pest control using nuclear techniques, such as using high

radiation doses to render insects sterile. When released into the environment in large numbers, these resects can overwhelm preexisting, fertile insects in competing for mates. In this way, further reproduction of the pest can be greatly reduced, A fourth area of research

is the use of radiation to preserve food by killing pathogens and other organisms responsible for causing it to spoil.
54 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

From its inception through 1993, the IAEA has provided $617 million worth of technical assistance in

three broad categories: expert advice, equipment, and fellowships and training programs. The table lists

the countries that received the most IAEA technical assistance through 1993.

Assistance programs in the areas of nuclear fuel cycle studies, and in physical and chemical sciences,

have given rise to some concern regarding the potential for proliferation. One recent example would be a

relatively large program of assistance ($0.8 million in 1993; $8.2 million total through 1993) to Iran, much of

which was devoted to development of a major cyclotron laboratory. Iran recently imported a cyclotron from

China for isotope production. Cyclotron-based techniques can also be used to separate isotopes on a

small scale, Such separation is necessary to produce radioisotopes for research and can also be used to

analyze how these isotopes are taken up by organisms. However, on a larger scale, this technology (electromagnetic isotope separation) is the very one used by Iraq in 1990 to produce highly enriched uranium

for its nuclear weapon program, If uninterrupted, Iraq would have produced enough material within a few

years to make nuclear weapons.

In general, assistance at the level and for the purposes provided by the IAEA makes little direct contribution to a nuclear weapon program. However, the skills and expertise that might be acquired by a state

through such assistance could be relevant, both in terms of basic knowledge in dealing with nuclear materials and nuclear technology, and also possibly in terms of extrapolating techniques a state first learns

through IAEA technical assistance, Even if such assistance might lend indirect support to a nuclear weapon program, though, the IAEA may not be able to refuse to provide it to a state that appears to be in full

compliance with its nonproliferation commitments. Both Article IV of the NPT and the IAEA Statute itself

mandate that assistance be provided to Member States. For example, although the United States believes

that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, neither the United States nor the IAEA has provided public evidence

that Iran has violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments. Therefore, the IAEA has no basis on which

to deny technical assistance to Iran.

More generically, questions could be raised about this sort of dual-use assistance to other states,

whether or not the United States considers them to be of special proliferation concern, For example, cyclotron help is provided to several states, including South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and, somewhat

disturbingly, North Korea. North Korea received $266,000 in technical assistance from the IAEA in 1993,

and a total of $6,4 million through 1993, before the IAEA’s Board of Governors suspended technical cooperation in June, 1994 over North Korea’s refusal to accept IAEA special inspections. Soon afterwards, North

Korea withdrew from the IAEA. According to the IAEA and to the NPT’s member states, North Korea remains legally bound by the terms of the NPT and its safeguards agreement. However, North Korea does

not consider itself so bound, and it is not in full compliance with this agreement as of this writing.

raise its budget despite the growing demands. the perception that these organizations do not

Even if they should agree to increase their re- spend their funds efficiently. Increased effispective assessments, they would still need to ciencies should be sought, in this view, before

deal with balancing safeguards against techni- assessments are increased. The IAEA, howcal promotion, and safeguards on the develop- ever, does not appear to share the widespread

ing world against those on the industrialized reputation attributed to U.N. agencies in generstates. al for fiscal and managerial laxity. A 1993 study

The reluctance of member states to accept of the IAEA safeguards program by the U.S.

increased assessments for many United Na- General Accounting Office, an organization

tions organizations stems at least in part from that among other things investigates allega -
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 55

tions of waste, fraud, or mismanagement, did

not raise such questions regarding the IAEA.43

 Weaken or remove the linkage between the

safeguards budget and technical assistance

programs. Many developing states view their

commitments to accept nuclear safeguards as

balanced by the provision of technical assistance in nuclear energy and other peaceful applications of nuclear technology—one of the

bargains built into the IAEA from its outset.

These states continue to apply pressure to

maintain a rough parity between the IAEA’s allocations for safeguards and those for promotional activities and “technical cooperation”

(see box 3-3).44 Since pledges and actual payments to the technical cooperation program

have declined, while demands on the safeguards budget have increased, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the “target ratio” between cooperation and safeguards.

Therefore, it has become correspondingly difficult to contemplate a significant redirection of

funds toward safeguards in developing states,

even if such funds were to become available.

The linkage between safeguards and technical cooperation, however, has been challenged

on a number of grounds. First, there is no inherent relationship between the risks of diversion of nuclear materials worldwide—and the

consequent demands on the safeguards budget—and the need for technical assistance and

promotion in the fields of nuclear science and

technology. Second, it is not clear that technical

assistance in nuclear-related technologies is the

most appropriate way to meet the needs of developing countries. Article IV of the NPT,

which calls for contributions “to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes,” holds that due consideration should be given to “the needs of the developing areas of the world.” If those needs are

not appropriately served by nuclear technology, Article IV would not seem to require nuclear solutions.

Despite these questions, the linkage between

safeguards and technical cooperation will be

difficult, if not impossible, to break. Without

the provision of technical assistance in nuclear

fields, many states would never have agreed to

submit to the safeguards regime at all. International organizations whose very existence depends on compromises that were made years

ago will not have an easy time reformulating

those compromises.

One possible solution would be to find some

mechanism to provide technical assistance in

energy technologies, medical technologies, or

agricultural technologies generally to supplement the narrower assistance provided by the

IAEA in the nuclear-related aspects of these

fields. The IAEA would probably not be the appropriate vehicle to provide this type of general

assistance, since its expertise and mission specifically involve nuclear technology. Moreover, the total amount of technical assistance

the IAEA can provide is very small compared

with funding available for development assistance in general. However, political agreements

or understandings might be made between donor and recipient states in which non-IAEA

sources of technical assistance would be increased at the same time that pressures that tied

the IAEA’s safeguards budget directly to technical assistance were relaxed.

❚ Reallocation of Inspection Effort

Whether or not overall resources devoted to safeguards are increased, it is important to use the

43United States General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Challenges Facing the International Atomic Energy

Agency, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-93-284 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1993).

44The total value of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Funds contributions delivered in 1993 amounted to $36.7 million. Total

assistance provided that year, including U.N. Development Program funds, member state extrabudgetary contributions, and member-state “inkind” contributions, totaled $45.3 million.
56 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

available resources efficiently. In the case of safeguards, efficiency means getting the most value

toward detecting safeguards violations and thereby deterring-or providing warning of—proliferation. Since IAEA inspection efforts depend on

the amount and type of nuclear material under

safeguards and the size of the facilities processing

it, a large portion of the total IAEA safeguards

budget (some 46 percent at present) is spent on

Germany, Japan, and Canada, the states with the

largest and most advanced nuclear programs under safeguards.45 None of these countries is regarded by most observers as a current proliferation risk, especially with respect to cheating on

safeguards or attempting to divert material from

civilian fuel cycles.46 In addition, the majority of

the safeguards effort is applied to facilities involving the greatest amount of material—those

associated with civilian nuclear power production—rather than to other nuclear activities, such

as research reactors, that are more likely to benefit

a weapon program. Various proposals for saving

money within the IAEA have thus focused on redirecting effort to countries that are thought to

pose a greater risk.

Reallocate inspection effort toward problem states.

Many feel that, given the constraints of a zeroreal-growth budget, there is a need to focus greater

safeguards efforts (including environmental monitoring to look for undeclared facilities) toward

states either in regions of political tension or with

only marginal nonproliferation records.

There is already some authority within INFCIRC/153 to adjust routine inspection requirements (subject to certain limits) based on a country’s overall fuel-cycle characteristics (see box

3-4). 47 This authority might be exploited more

fully, especially for future safeguards agreements, although renegotiating safeguards agreements already in force would be much more difficult. For instance, more emphasis could be placed

on a country’s overall amount of “direct-use” fissile material (e.g., material containing highly enriched uranium or plutonium). If a country possesses enrichment or (especially) reprocessing

facilities, additional inspection efforts might be

justifiable even if amounts of fuel being irradiated

in various reactors were small. (See the following

option for discussion of the converse approach of

reducing inspection effort in states that offer the

IAEA widespread access and technical visits, with

the aim of providing assurance that they do not

possess undeclared facilities.) Some have taken

this argument even further, suggesting that several

measures in addition to the INFCIRC/153 provisions mentioned above be used in determining a

country’s level of inspection effort. These measures might include the size or growth of a state’s

military forces, its possession or development of

vehicles suitable for delivering weapons of mass

destruction, its import of key dual-use technologies, its involvement in regional tensions, or even

its human-rights record.48

However, the IAEA is forbidden by its statute

to discriminate against member states. Therefore,

unless a reallocation of inspection effort could

45 The 46 peercent share is stated in the Jan. 17, 1995 letter from Jan Priest, IAEA, in response to Office of Technology Assessment questions,

op. cit., footnote 34, p. 3. Earlier estimates of the fraction of safeguards resources devoted to Japan, Germany and Canada had been higher; it was

given as 55 percent in Scheinman, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 20.

46 Even if governments seekking nuclear weapons were to come to power in such countries, they would probably be more likely to withdraw

from the NPT, which would permit the development of a large arsenal, than mount an expensive, difficult, and risky attempt to divert as little as

one bomb’s worth of fissionable material per year from safeguarded facilities.

47 See paragraph 81, INFCIRC/153.

48 For example, see David Kay, “The IAEA—How can It Be Strengthened?” paper presented at the conference Nuclear Proliferation in the

1990s: Challenges and Opportunities, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, Dec. 1-2, 1992, p. 16.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 57

The model safeguards agreement for NPT states, INFCIRC/153, lays out general guidelines for the

routine inspection effort that should be applied to various types of facilities, based on the type and

amount of nuclear material they use. Such guidelines are primarily in the form of ceilings on inspector

effort, called “maximum routine inspection effort” or MRIE (see definitions below).

The actual routine inspection effort (ARIE) for a given facility is negotiated by IAEA and the state

separately for each safeguarded facility.2 In practice, inspection frequencies are then chosen so that

the IAEA can meet its goals for detection times—i.e., so that it can detect the diversion of nuclear material on a time scale roughly comparable to what it would take to fabricate that material into a weapon—

according to the following:

Unirradiated direct-use material: one month

Irradiated direct-use material: three months

Indirect-use material: one year

MRIE. As specified in paragraphs 79 and 80 of INFCIRC/153, the “maximum routine inspection effort

(MRIE)” is the maximum number of person-days of inspection work (up to 8 hours of access to a facility

during one day) per annum allowable for a given facility. This limit depends on the larger of its inventory, annual throughput, or maximum potential annual production of nuclear material, which is denoted L

and expressed in effective kilograms (see definition below).

L <5 effective kilogram (ekg): one routine inspection per year

L >5 ekg:

Reactors and sealed stores: 50 Person-Days-Inspection (PDl)/year3

Facilities containing Pu or U enriched to more than 5 percent:

MRIE = 30x L1/2PD1/y, but not less than 450 PDI/y

All other cases: MRIE = (100 + 0.4L) PDI/y.

ARIE. “Actual routine inspection effort” is the estimated annual inspection effort under an INFCIRC/153 agreement, based on a plant operating fully according to its design data The ARIE is negotiated and included in the facility attachment. It cannot exceed the MRIE above. In accordance with

paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153, due consideration of the following factors should be given to the following when the ARIE is being established:

1.

2.

3.

The form and accessibility of the nuclear material (bulk form v. discrete items, chemical composition, enrichment);

The effectiveness of the State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC), the extent to which the operator is

functionally independent of the SSAC, the promptness and consistency of the State’s reports, and the value

and accuracy of the MUF as verified by the Agency;

The characteristics of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle, in particular the number and types of facilities and the

characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards (e.g., containment and ability to correlate information from different material balance areas);

1

IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 1987 Edition, op. cit , PP. 65-66

2The ARlE is usually significantly Iess than the MRIE for some types of facility, but facility-specific values are safeguards-confidential.

3Small research reactors typically contain less than 5 effective kilograms of HEU, but larger ones, such as the approximately 40

MW(th) Osirak reactor in Iraq, can contain more. The latter was being inspected 3 times per year prior to its being attacked by Israel in

1981, and inspection efforts would have increased had it become operational.

(continued)
58 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

4. The international interdependence of nuclear activities involved and any relevant IAEA verification activities; and

5. Technical developments in the field of safeguards (e.g., statistical and random sampling techniques).

In practice, since the ARIE cannot exceed the MRIE, these factors can only be used to reduce the

inspection effort, not to increase it. For instance, agreed ARIE person-days of inspection at reactors

vary and can be set at levels up to 50, but normally do not exceed an upper limit of 10 or 15.4 In addition, actual person-days of inspection can be less than the ARIE if there are extended shutdowns of the

facility,

Effective kilograms (ekg). The number of “effective kilograms (ekg)” for plutonium and uranium-233 is equal to their mass in kilograms. For uranium enriched to at least 1 percent uranium-235,

the ekg is the total amount of uranium times the square of the enrichment level. Thus 10 kilograms of 90

percent uranium-235 is 8.1 ekg, 10 kg of 20 percent uranium-235 is 0.4 ekg, and 10 kg of 5 percent

uranium-235 is 0.025 ekg. Thus, the actual mass of uranium-235 present at lower enrichments is considerably more than the ekg value.

Time Allowed Before Safeguards Must Come into Effect. Article Ill of the NPT requires a state’s

safeguards agreement to “enter into force” within 18 months of its ratification or accession to the NPT.

INFCIRC/153, paragraph 40, requires that Subsidiary Arrangements, which include Facility Attachments

specifying actual inspection procedures for each safeguarded installation, enter into force within 90

days of entry into force of a state’s safeguards agreement. Thus, there is no legal requirement for routine inspections to begin until 21 months after a state joins the NPT. However, the IAEA may conduct ad

hoc inspections of any facilities declared in a state’s safeguards agreement before, during, or after Subsidiary Arrangements are completed. Thus, inspections usually begin no later than up to about 18

months after a state joins the NPT.

4

J.E. Lovett, “Nuclear Materials Safeguards for Reprocessing,” International Atomic Energy Agency Report STR-151/152 (December 1987), pp. 208. Lovett also asserts that verification and sealing of spent fuel shipping casks at reactors would require levels of

effort that are neither possible within agreed ARIE levels nor feasible with currently available inspector staff levels

be justified under some objective criteria, the

IAEA would face serious institutional difficulties in making what would be perceived to be a

political determination that some states are

more trustworthy than others. Moreover, subjective criteria would be considered vulnerable

to political distortions, making them nearly

impossible for the IAEA to use when negotiating safeguards agreements. Certain member

states might feel that they were being unjustly

singled out. For instance, some states represented

on the Board of Governors have been known to

take a very conservative approach to such matters,

fearing that any more stringent requirements that

they allowed in another state might eventually

come back and be applied to them. Adding another discriminatory practice on top of the alreadyexisting distinction in the NPT between nuclear

“haves” and “have nets” might damage the political consensus behind that treaty itself.

If reallocating safeguards effort away from

states not thought to pose near-term proliferation

threats had the effect of relaxing safeguards standards there, long-term risks could arise-particularly for states with extensive nuclear fuel-cycle

infrastructures involving enrichment or reprocessing. If the continuity of safeguards were lost in

one of these countries and a new government that

sought nuclear weapons came to power, the IAEA

could have a great deal of difficulty reestablishing

a strict full-scope safeguards regime.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 59

It remains to be seen how far the IAEA can

push already existing authority to focus more

of its resources on states of greater proliferation concern, especially in countries whose

safeguards agreements have been in force for

some time. However, the United States, being

one of the most influential members of the

IAEA, could try to push the agency in this

direction, if it chose. INFCIRC/153 also gives

the IAEA authority to conduct “special inspections” if reasonably justified to carry out its safeguards obligations, and these could also be used

more effectively in problem countries. Some increased efforts along these lines have already been

taken in North Korea and South Africa, two countries that have recently completed their safeguards

agreements (albeit under extremely different circumstances). 49 Since special inspections can be

requested “if the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate

for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under

the [safeguards] Agreement,” some flexibility

would certainly seem authorized in invoking this

provision, and greater use could probably be justified in less cooperative states without overstepping this authority.

■ Expansion of Safeguards via

“Enhanced Transparency”

Transparency measures refer to actions taken by

a state to enhance the visibility and openness of its

own activities in order to reassure others that it is

not threatening their security, or in order to make

it more difficult for other states to hide their own

activities. In the area of nuclear safeguards, such

measures might include providing access to IAEA

inspectors above and beyond what is required by

a state’s safeguards agreement. Making transparency a norm of international behavior might enable the IAEA-or the world community-to become aware more easily of undeclared nuclear

facilities or other state practices that could indicate the existence of a nuclear weapon program.

As a result, IAEA safeguards would be bolstered,

and states would gain added assurance that their

neighbors were not mounting nuclear weapon

programs. Increased transparency might also be

associated with reduced routine inspection effort,

permitting more efficient application of the

IAEA’s limited safeguards resources.so

One technique that can take advantage of additional transparency is the taking and analysis of

environmental samples, which the IAEA is exploring as a means for detecting and/or characterizing undeclared nuclear facilities. The IAEA is

also accepting invitations by states such as Iran

and South Africa to conduct “visits’ ’-rather than

formal inspections—to sites where questions may

have been raised.

The United States could encourage states

to make, and the IAEA to accept, offers to provide information and accept inspections not specifically required by safeguards agreements.

If greater transparency by inspected states can

help the IAEA satisfy itself that all facilities capable of processing or producing fissile material are

safeguarded (i.e., that a given state lacks even the

potential to operate any undeclared facilities and

does not have access to such facilities anywhere

else), then the agency can have confidence that nuclear material at reactors and in storage has not

been diverted for weapon use-even if it has not

been accounted for with the high statistical confidence levels and timelines now required. 51 The

idea would be to move away from the traditional

49 Since South Africa volunteered very broad access to its territory, the IAEA was able to make so-called ad hoc visits to all the sites it wanted

to see without having to invoke the “special inspection” machinery of its safeguards agreement with that country. Lack of North Korean cooperation, on the other hand, forced the IAEA to demand special inspections there. As of this writing, these requests have not been granted.

50 See, e.g., David Fischer, op. cit., footnote 36, and Scheinman, op. cit., footnote 3.

51 Scheinman, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 41.
60 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

focus on strictly quantitative material accountancy methods (which are increasingly difficult to apply rigorously as facility throughputs get larger)

toward an approach that can also utilize the less

quantitative types of information that are volunteered through transparency measures. For

instance, the requirement for inspections every

three months of spent fuel containing significant

amounts of irradiated plutonium might be relaxed,

perhaps in conjunction with real-time, automated

monitoring of the spent fuel pond, if the IAEA could

be assured that a country had no reprocessing facilities nor access to any. As Scheinman explains,

[The value of these measures] lies not in the

ability of the agency to draw conclusions identical to those drawn from the system of material

accountancy—which it well may not be able to

do. Rather, [it] lie[s] in the contribution that a

flexible verification system makes to the perception of both the inspected party and outside

states about the risk of detection, and, consequently, the willingness of a would-be proliferator to take the risk in the first place.52

The right to tailor safeguards procedures to an

individual state’s facilities, control systems, and

behavior is implicitly incorporated into the original model safeguards agreement. Provisions for

modifying the frequency and notification requirements for safeguards inspections based on various

qualitative and quantitative aspects of a state’s

fuel cycle and reporting practices, as well as on developments in statistical techniques and random

sampling, are contained in INFCIRC/153 (paragraphs 81 and 84). Nevertheless, such safeguards

modifications have never been fully exploited,

since the factors upon which they would be justified are not easily quantifiable.

Apart from seeking to reduce their inspection

burden, states with nothing to hide may be willing

to accept inspections and volunteer information

not specifically required by their safeguards

agreements. In so doing, they not only provide

added assurance that they are complying with

their own commitments, but also encourage others to do likewise. However, they may also need to

balance such transparency against security, proprietary, or constitutional concerns that could argue against providing unlimited access. During

the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which provides for quite intrusive “challenge inspections” of suspect sites, such

concerns led to the development of “managed access” provisions. These provisions specify negotiation procedures and timeliness by which inspectors must be granted some access to the

requested site, and they obligate the inspected

state to address whatever concerns have motivated

an inspection request. However, they ultimately

give the inspected state the right to limit access

(see box 3-5). Similar protections would probably

be associated, implicitly or explicitly, with any offers of additional access to the IAEA.

In principle, the signature of the Chemical

Weapons Convention by 159 countries (as of this

writing) indicates widespread international acceptance of its monitoring and inspection provisions, offering the prospect that CWC signatories

may be willing to grant the IAEA a corresponding

degree of openness. However, this apparent acceptance is tempered by the much slower rate at

which the CWC signatories are ratifying it. (As of

the same date, only 27 countries had deposited

their instruments of ratification.) Moreover, since

the convention has not yet entered into force, no

inspections have been carried out, and nobody can

tell how its commitment to transparency will be

realized in practice.

By providing additional information, voluntary offers of openness improve the IAEA’s ability

to do its job. However, they can also pose some

risk to the IAEA. First of all, acting on them will

require additional resources, exacerbating the

IAEA’s financial difficulties. Second, voluntary

52Ibid., p. 23. Emphasis in original.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 61

Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a state party that suspects another party of violating

the treaty’s provisions can call for a challenge inspection of any site within the suspected violator’s territory.

The treaty and its associated Verification Annex specify a sequence of procedures and timelines under

which the inspected state must give international inspectors access to the suspect site, and they also provide for a series of negotiations to determine how much access the inspected country must provide. The

fact that 159 countries have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (as of February 1995) shows that

these provisions have gained widespread international acceptance, and it may indicate-although does

not guarantee-that states would be willing to grant equivalent access to IAEA inspectors. On the other

hand, the true commitment of states to these provisions has not been tested; as of the same date, over 25

countries had deposited their instruments of ratification for the CWC, but well short of the 65 ratifications

needed to bring the treaty into force. Therefore, no experience has yet been gathered in conducting such

inspections or in gauging states’ reactions to them.

CWC Challenge Inspections

The Chemical Weapons Convention creates a new international organization, the Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to implement the CWC’s provisions. In a role somewhat analogous to the IAEA, the OPCW will contain a Technical Secretariat to compile the data that member states

must submit under the CWC, and to conduct routine and challenge inspections. Any treaty party can initiate a challenge inspection by providing specific information about the site in question to the Director General of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat, who then passes it to the OPCW’s Executive Council. To prevent

abuses of the challenge inspection provisions, a 3/4 vote of the Executive Council can block an inspection

request judged to be “frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope of the treaty. ”2 Otherwise, the Director-General is obligated to conduct the inspection without delay. Unlike an IAEA special inspection, which must be

negotiated with the state to be inspected and therefore can at least be delayed, if not stalled indefinitely, a

challenge inspection under the CWC cannot Iegitimatly be delayed or blocked by state being challenged.

The inspected state must be notified of the location of the site to be inspected at least 12 hours before an

inspection team is to arrive at a point of entry.

Within 36 hours of the team’s arrival, the host state must transport it to the perimeter of the suspect site,

where it will be allowed to examine traffic logs, take photographs and videos, and visit other portions of the

perimeter. If the site perimeter requested by the inspection team is not acceptable to the host nation, the

host (with some conditions) can propose an alternate. Negotiations over the final perimeter can continue

for up to 72 hours from the team’s arrival at the perimeter, at which point—if agreement has not been

reached—the alternate perimeter will become the final perimeter. When the final perimeter is determined, the

inspection team will be allowed to take air, water, and effluent samples, and use monitoring instruments.

Managed Access

Within 108 hours of the inspection team’s arrival at the host nation’s point of entry, it must be allowed

access within the perimeter of the suspect site. The degree of access granted is to be negotiated between

inspectors and host under the principle of “managed access, ”by which the host state is obligated to allow

the “greatest degree of access” consistent with any “constitutional obligations it may have with regard to

(continued)

1 This box is based on U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S.

Chemical Industry, OTA-BP-ISC-106 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), pp. 5-6 and 27-28; on Amy

Smithson (cd.), The Chemical Weapons Convention Handbook, Handbook No. 2 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center,

September 1993), pp. 31-34; and on the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, formally known as the Convention on the Prohibition of

the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (denoted here as CWC), United

Nations, 1993.

2CWC, Article IX (“Consultations, Cooperation, and Fact-Finding”), paragraph 17.
62 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

proprietary rights or searches and seizures” and with the protection of national security information.3

The inspection team is required to conduct its inspection “in the least intrusive manner possible” that will

permit it to accomplish its mission.4 To protect sensitive installations or information, the host state may take

measures such as removing sensitive papers from offices, shrouding displays or equipment, turning off

computer systems, restricting sample analysis to determining the presence or absence of compounds indicative of treaty violation, or permitting access to a randomly selected fraction of buildings or rooms. In

those areas where full access is not granted, the host nation is obligated to make “every reasonable effort”

to provide alternate means to address the concerns that prompted the challenge inspection request.5 The

inspection itself may not last more than 84 hours, unless extended by agreement with the host.

After review by the inspected state, the inspection team’s report will be transmitted to the Executive

Council and to all other CWC members, with the provision that certain sensitive information may be retained within the Technical Secretariat. The inspection report is to include “an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted to the inspectors, ”6 Consequently,

the Executive Council and member states can draw their own conclusions from a determined effort by the

inspected party to frustrate the inspection, even if no overt evidence of violation is found.

3 CWC, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X (“Challenge Inspections Pursuant to Article IX”), paragraph 41,

4 Ibid., paragraph 45.

5 Ibid., paragraph 42.

6 Ibid., paragraph 59.

invitations to conduct such visits can be retracted gional arms control agreements. The model for

at any time, as was demonstrated in North Korea

(see box 3-6). Finally, and perhaps most seriously,

visits that do not uncover suspicious activities

might be overinterpreted to give the inspected

state a “clean bill of health.” All that such a visit

should imply is that nothing untoward was discovered at that site at that time.

Encourage the IAEA to support bilateral

nuclear inspection regimes and regional arms-control

and confidence-building measures.

In addition to accepting offers by individual

states to make their nuclear activities more transparent, the IAEA can also work with groups of nations in tense regions of the world to encourage

confidence-building measures and promote resuch regional nuclear inspection regimes has been

established by Argentina and Brazil, which have

implemented a quadripartite inspection agreement involving themselves, the IAEA, and the

newly established bilateral agency ABACC. Both

countries have completed the steps necessary to

bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a regional

agreement banning nuclear weapons in Latin

America and imposing the same constraints on

nuclear weapon ambitions as does the NPT.53

Largely due to the change from military to civilian

regimes in these two countries, both seem to have

renounced any nuclear weapon ambitions, making such disarmament measures possible.

On the Korean peninsula, arrangements involving mutual visits to military and nuclear installa53For discussion of how a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East might be implemented and verified, see United Nations, “Establishment of a

Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East,” Report of the Secretary-General, A/45/435, October 1990. Note that the verification requirements insisted on by states in the region would go likely go beyond those provided by the IAEA’s model full-scope safeguards

agreement, INFCIRC/153.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 63

In considering ways to improve the effectiveness of safeguards while reducing overall inspection

efforts, tradeoffs are often discussed between increased transparency and reduced (and possibly more

randomized) inspection frequency, The rationale for such an approach is that a state that has no access to undeclared enrichment or reprocessing plants has no way to process some types of safeguarded nuclear material (e.g., low-enriched uranium or spent fuel) to the point where it could be used

in a weapon, Therefore, diversion of such materials becomes less important, and inspection effort devoted to ensuring its lack of diversion can be somewhat relaxed. For example, a possible regime could

provide that a state that agreed in advance to some or all of the following measures could be a candidate

■

■

■

■

■

■

for substantial reductions in routine safeguards inspections:

Giving the IAEA the unrestricted right to carry out inspections and technical visits at short notice and

at any location at which the IAEA has reason to believe that there may be undeclared nuclear material.

(The state would be informed of such an inspection, but its prior right of consent would not be sought.)

From the IAEA’s perspective, a state would be much more persuasive in demonstrating the absence of undeclared facilities by giving the IAEA such an unlimited right of access than by simply allowing a finite number of “special inspections” when requested. Special inspections are

a specific provision within IAEA authority, but frequent special inspections that failed to find anything

suspicious could have serious repercussions on the credibility of the safeguards regime. Pre-accepted inspection provisions could be used more freely, resulting in stronger assurances overall. As

many IAEA officials stress, improving access would be the single biggest help in strengthening safeguards.2

Inviting the IAEA to utilize a similar, unrestricted right to make “surprise” (unannounced) inspections

at any facility that contains safeguarded nuclear material.3

Permitting the IAEA to take environmental samples at locations of its choosing in the inspected state.

Providing the IAEA with full information in advance about its nuclear program and, in particular, about

plans for the construction or export of any new nuclear plant, and consulting with the IAEA before

taking action so that any such plant may be designed in an easily safeguardable manner.

Permitting IAEA inspection of all nuclear facilities during construction.

Waiving visa requirements (or issuing long-term, multiple-entry visas) to IAEA inspectors carrying appropriate travel documents or, in appropriate cases, accepting resident inspectors.

Such a package of concessions in a given country could be met with a reduced inspection effort,

possibly combined with more randomized routine inspections.4 In principle, this may significantly reduce the overall costs of applying safeguards in countries willing to be extremely cooperative with the

IAEA. It might be particularly attractive for states that have substantial nuclear programs, but that lack

(continued)

1Material in this section is drawn from David Fischer, “Innovations in IAEA Safeguards to Meet the Challenges of the 1990s, ” in The

New Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency

(Southampton, U. K.: Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Sept. 1992), pp. 32-33.

2Some within the IAEA advocate widening the safeguards net to include uranium mines, which now fall outside the legaI domain of

safeguards. It is claimed that such access would significantly help in ruling out undeclared facilities and, as an example, would have

helped in determining the extent of Iraq’s nuclear program. Placing mines under safeguards could also allow the IAEA to use isotopic

techniques to trace the origin of nuclear materials back to individual mines, aiding in the verification of certain types of material transfers within a country’s fuel cycle

3

INFCIRC/153, paragraph 84 already provides the IAEA the authority to “carry out without notification a portion of the routine insections,” and such unannounced inspections are now part of the system of procedures known as the Hexapartite agreement for

safeguarding gas centrifuge enrichment facilities. Although not implemented, unannounced inspections have also been included as

an option in the Safeguards Criteria for low-enrichment fuel fabrication plants. Afield test of such inspections has been completed,

preliminary results may be found in L.G. Fishbone et al., “Field Test of Short Notice Random Inspections for Inventory Change Verification at a Low Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant. Preliminary Summary,” Symposium Proceedings (lAEA-SM-334/164), International Nuclear Safeguards 1994, 14-18 March 1994.

4Such a system is currently being discussed within the IAEA, and Sweden has volunteered to serve as a test case.
64 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

facilities for producing unirradiated direct-use nuclear materials (separated plutonium or highly-enriched

uranium), such as Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics. It might also provide a framework for eventually subjecting the nuclear facilities of nuclear-weapon states to safeguards,

without putting undue burden on the safeguards budget. The drawback to such proposals, however, is that

relaxation of routine inspection effort will translate, in quantitative terms, to lower confidence that an SQ or

more of materials has not been diverted. Unless these transparency measures actually provide the IAEA

with high confidence that the inspected states have not built and do not have access to covert enrichment

or reprocessing facilities with which to process any diverted materials, diversion could still pose a proliferation risk.

Transparency measures have precedents in a number of other arms control agreements and proposals,

including the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), “Open Skies, ” and the Chemical Weapons

Convention.

Nevertheless, details would have to be worked out to determine an equitable means of reducing the

inspection effort in any given country. Objections over fairness might be raised by countries with only rudimentary fuel cycles if benefits were seen to favor the larger industrialized states in Europe. An approach

that reduced overall inspection effort might also be inappropriate for Japan, since it is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon state operating a reprocessing plant that produces significant quantities of separated plutonium (and is building a second very large plant).

Iran, South Africa, Libya, North Korea, and other states have made statements at one time or other

volunteering to accept IAEA visits more intrusive than required by NPT safeguards (in some cases, practically amounting to “anytime/anywhere” inspections). The IAEA has taken advantage of these offers in Iran

and South Africa and, and, prior to March 1993, it had been permitted to visit undeclared sites in North

Korea. However, as the North Korean example shows, behavior and intentions can change, and such

promises must be born out in practice. Despite its pledge, North Korea threatened withdrawal from the

NPT when the IAEA pressed for access to two undeclared sites suspected of storing nuclear waste. Iran

poses another sort of problem. Its fuel cycle is still in its early stages, and even if it were planning to develop nuclear weapons, as the United States and other countries allege, it might not have reached the point

where it had built facilities it would wish to hide. Some countries, particularly the United States, would probably remain skeptical of Iran’s long-term commitment to nonproliferation even if it allowed greatly expanded

rights of inspection in the near term.5

Many in the IAEA feel that additional voluntary offers by states allowing relatively unrestricted ‘(technical

visits” of their facilities would be beneficial and should thus be encouraged in a number of countries, including countries such as South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan, which have admitted or have at

one time been suspected by other nations to have considered nuclear options. Visits to a variety of facilities, such as production facilities for armor-piercing shaped-charges or nuclear research centers based at

universities, could help add needed transparency to a country’s overall activities.

On the other hand, the IAEA’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), in informal comments, has strongly opposed placing substantial emphasis on such visits (although not to them

per se), since they can be manipulated by the country for propaganda purposes. In any case, such offers

should probably not be accepted unless made unconditionally and accompanied by a waiver of a country’s

right to reject IAEA designated inspectors, if not a waiver as well of the right to reject additional personnel

that the IAEA might like to include in such delegations, The latter could be particularly important for technical visits to any undeclared facilities, including those for nonnuclear activities, since it could be advantageous for the IAEA to include experts (perhaps with some nuclear weapon knowledge) not regularly assigned to inspections in those countries.

5 This does not imply however, that the United States would oppose such transparency by Iran; on the contrary, it could be expected to welcome it.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 65

IAEA inspectors making measurements on some of the highly

enriched uranium that the United States has placed under

safeguards at the Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

tions have been discussed bilaterally, but progress

remains stalled so long as North Korea continues

to violate its safeguards obligations to the IAEA.

Expand the scope of the nuclear facilities

subject to the United States’ “voluntary offer” to accept

safeguards not required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty

and encourage other nuclear-weapon states to do the

same.

The United States is taking a number of steps to

increase safeguards transparency. Since 1968, it

has volunteered to accept safeguards at its own

civil nuclear facilities, even though it is not required to do so under the Non-Proliferation

Treaty.54 In the past, however, due to both resource constraints and lack of urgency, the IAEA

has chosen to place only a few U.S. nuclear facilities under safeguards, and very few inspections

had been conducted in recent years.

In 1993, the United States for the first time

agreed to place under safeguards nuclear material

The United States could increase the scope of

its nuclear facilities and materials subject to its

voluntary safeguards offer, urge the IAEA to inspect a greater number of them, provide the resources to do so, and encourage other nuclear

weapon states to follow its lead. If a convention to

freeze the production of fissile material were implemented, the United States and other weapon

states could allow the IAEA to have access to former weapon-material-production facilities. Such

steps would reinforce the spirit of Article VI of the

IAEA inspector and Hanford employee handle a canister of

plutonium oxide during an IAEA safeguards inspection at the

Hanford plutonium storage facility Hanford, Washington.

determined to be excess to its nuclear weapon

program, and in 1994 it invited the IAEA to monitor some highly enriched uranium stored at Oak

Ridge, Tennessee, and plutonium stored at Hanford, Washington. The IAEA agreed to do so, and

monthly inspections began in January 1995.

Through its extrabudgetary contribution to the

IAEA, the United States is providing resources to

conduct these additional inspections so that they

do not detract from safeguards activities elsewhere in the world.

54 As a nuclear-weapon state, the United States is not obligated by the NIT to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. However, to

assuage concerns from non-nuclear-weapon states that this exemption placed the U.S. nuclear industry at an unfair advantage, the United States

has voluntarily offered to place any of its civil nuclear facilities under safeguards. (The other nuclear-weapon states have since made similar

offers, although sometimes—as in the case of China and Russia—to a much more limited extent.) From the list of civil facilities that the United

States offers, the IAEA decides which to accept for application of safeguards.
66 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

NPT that calls for progress toward nuclear disarmament, making it harder for other states to refuse

to follow suit.

The IAEA could expand the use of import

and export information submitted by member states.

As part of the enhanced safeguards activities

initiated after the Gulf War, the IAEA has established a registry of imports and exports of certain

equipment and non-nuclear material, and of imports, exports, production, and inventories of nuclear material. States supplying such information

make it harder for their trading partners to mount

covert nuclear activities. The IAEA could attempt

to cross-check and verify these submissions. Other options include broadening the scope of information to be reported to the IAEA, encouraging states more strongly to participate, and

making the information more widely available

than just within the IAEA. However, this last

point would likely raise proprietary concerns

among the reporting parties.55 Moreover, if such

reporting were not mandatory and universal, those

states choosing to report might suffer a disadvantage with respect to those who do not.

Expand the scope of safeguards to include uranium mining and milling activities that are not

now subject to safeguards.

Some observers have proposed expanding the

domain of safeguards to include monitoring a

state’s uranium mining and milling activities.

Currently, these activities fall outside of the

IAEA’s responsibility (see box 3-7), and they are

not addressed in existing full-scope safeguards

agreements. Further, while non-nuclear-weapon

states party to the NPT are required to inform the

IAEA of the export of yellowcake (U3O8, produced when uranium ore is refined), there is no requirement to verify or keep track of the shipment

after its importation. Placing uranium ore and yellowcake under safeguards would require either the

renegotiation of safeguards agreements or the voluntary acceptance of such safeguards on the part

of states conducting mining and milling activities.

Since it is very difficult to monitor and keep

track of the exact quantity of nuclear material produced by these activities (quantities of ore, in particular, can be very large), this concept might be

limited to mandatory reporting of all production

and transfers, perhaps with spot checks but without attempting to account rigorously for all mined

materials. While such measures would not satisfy

material accountancy requirements, they would at

least add transparency to the entirety of a state’s

nuclear activities and provide a rough idea of the

amount of uranium available from domestic

sources, thereby making it more difficult in some

cases for a clandestine program to be developed.

The cost of such an addition to safeguards efforts

would have to be weighed against whatever improvement in effectiveness was thereby achieved.

■ Improving the IAEA’s Technical

Capability

Lowering “SQ” or Timeliness Thresholds

The United States could encourage and

support the IAEA to lower “significant quantity” thresholds.

The IAEA significant quantity thresholds-the

amount of fissile material whose diversion the

IAEA safeguards system is designed to detect

(e.g., 8 kilograms of plutonium, or 25 kilograms

of uranium-235 in a form enriched to 20 percent or

more)—represent the approximate amounts that

the IAEA considers to be needed for a state to

make its first nuclear explosive.

Many analysts have stated that these quantities

are probably too high, and that even states attempting to make their first nuclear explosive

55 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994), especially pp. 34-35, for discussion of some of the issues involved with making export data public.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 67

■

m

■

■

■

■

Uranium mining and milling activities, including active mines, uranium-bearing ore, and (from inspection, but not from reporting exports) yellowcake before it is in a form suitable for further enrichment

or fuel fabrication (lNFCIRC/153, paragraphs 33-34).

Nuclear material for use in non-nuclear activities (such as production of alloys or ceramics) or in military non-explosive uses (such as naval propulsion, although only when actually in the ship’s reactor),

provided its removal from the nuclear fuel cycle is declared and specified in advance (paragraphs

13-14).1

Special fissionable material in gram quantities for use in sensing instruments, or plutonium containing

more than 80 percent Pu-238 (paragraph 36 of INFCIRC/153).

Up to 1 kg total of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (by uranium-235 content) or greater amounts

of low-enriched, natural, or depleted uranium, as specified by paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153, if requested by the state to be exempted from safeguards.

Records of plant operation and inventories more than 5 years old (paragraph 53). The IAEA would

therefore normally be prevented from examining or re-checking records of production more than five

years into the past (although South Africa voluntarily provided operating records as far back as 15

years in order to help the IAEA verify the accuracy and completion of its initial inventories of nuclear

material).

Detailed knowledge of the capabilities of equipment within material balance areas (such as centrifuge

design information) and access to such areas (implied by paragraphs 5, 8, and 76c, calling for

protection of commercial and industrial secrets, for using only minimum information required for carrying out purposes of safeguards, and for carrying out routine inspections only at predetermined strategic points).

1On this issue, INFCIRC/66 is more restrictive than INFCIRC/153, since the former does not allow any military use of nuclear materials,

might be able to do so with less.56 Indeed, the U.S.

Department of Energy has all but confirmed this

view, at least in the case of plutonium, in its recent

declaration that 4 kilograms of plutonium is suffi57 Lowering these cient to make a nuclear weapon.

thresholds would call for increased inspection effort and correspondingly greater inspection resources, and it would make it harder for the IAEA

to meet its inspection goals—particularly at bulkhandling facilities. (Large bulk-handling facilities

are difficult to safeguard even under the existing

definition of the SQ; see discussion below). Lowering the SQ would also require increased inspection frequency at several small facilities in states

not yet in possession of 1 SQ under the present

definition. If the IAEA could not meet its inspection goals with a lowered SQ, and if it were unable

to demonstrate that other safeguards techniques

could compensate for that inability, the agency

might have to “sound the alarm” more frequently

56See, e.g., Fischer, op. cit. footnote 36, p. 39; and Brian G. Chow and Kenneth A. Solomon, Limiting the Spread of Weapon-Usable Fissile

Materials (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1993), p. xiv. Note, however, that the SQ has never been meant to correspond to the minimum

amount of fissionable material needed in a weapon, since: 1 ) it includes provision for estimated material losses during manufacture (even

though much of this processing loss can be recovered), and 2) advanced weapon states with considerable experience and sophisticated designs

might be expected to get the same results with less material. See Fischer and Szasz, op. cit., footnote 2, p. xix.

57U.S. Department of Energy, classification Bulletin WNP-86, February 8, 1994, states that “Hypothetically, a mass of 4 kilograms of Plutonium or uranium-233 is sufficient for one nuclear explosive device.” (Although this sentence is unclassified, the full text of the Bulletin is classified.) No such statement has been issued with respect to uranium-235.
68 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

that it is unable to assure the nondiversion of an

SQ of materials—even if no diversion had actually taken place.

To the extent that the SQ overstates the amount

of nuclear material needed for a weapon, the actual diversion of even a fraction of an SQ should

warrant a loud alarm-yet the IAEA might not

readily notice such a diversion today. (Diversion

of less than 1 SQ can still be detected, but with a

lower probability than diversion of larger

amounts.) The possibility of a state’s obtaining 1

SQ or more by diverting lesser quantities from

multiple facilities must also be considered, since

such a scenario is in general more difficult to safeguard against. Indeed, new statements by the

IAEA in 1993 asserted the goal of detecting a cumulative diversion of an SQ or more from all of a

state’s facilities taken collectively. As a result, the

IAEA increased the inspection frequency from

once to four times per year for sites containing less

than 1 SQ of “direct-use” material (e.g., material

containing highly enriched uranium or plutonium) in states where the total amount of material

in such facilities exceeds 0.5 SQ. Otherwise, however, the safeguards criteria and approaches used

to achieve safeguards goals are still based on individual facilities and thresholds of 1 SQ for each of

the material balance areas within them.

Since the IAEA has no direct nuclear weapon

expertise, it relies on the nuclear-weapon states for

technical advice on matters such as the appropriate definition of an SQ. Existing definitions date

back to information provided by the nuclearweapon states in the mid- 1960s; in the absence of

subsequent guidance, the IAEA had no basis to revise them. In recent years, however, the IAEA has

become more concerned about this issue. In 1990,

Director General Blix asked the nuclear-weapon

states to provide updated guidance on whether the

definitions should

sponse.

be revised. He received no reThis question is also being examined to some

extent within the 93+2 program. Now that the

United States has declassified the fact that 4 kilograms of plutonium could be sufficient for a nuclear weapon, it may be easier for the United

States to engage in a discussion with the IAEA on

lowering the SQ. However, the United States has

been reluctant to contemplate this step in the past,

at least in part because doing so would place yet

additional demands on a safeguards system that is

already squeezed between increased responsibilities and fixed resources. Even if safeguards resources were to be increased, it is not clear that

lowering the SQ would be the most effective way

to use them.

The United States could encourage and

support the IAEA to reexamine timeliness thresholds.

The IAEA’s timeliness criteria are based on estimates of the time it would take a state to convert

a given safeguarded material into a finished metal

weapon component, once such material were diverted (see table 3-l). These conversion times

range from about a week for plutonium, uranium-235, or uranium-233 already in metal form,

to months for such material in irradiated fuel, to

about a year for thorium or uranium enriched to

less than 20 percent.58 Based on these conversion

times, the IAEA has established timeliness goals

for the maximum amount of time that may elapse

between diversion and its detection.

To detect diversion before the diverted material

could be fabricated into a weapon, timeliness

goals for various types of nuclear material would

have to be less than their corresponding conversion times. However, the only requirement be58 Intemational Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, op cit., footnote 2, paragraph 105, p. 23, and table II, p. 24. Conversion

time estimates do not include the time needed to accomplish the diversion or to move the diverted material to the site(s) where it is further processed. The estimates also assume that all facilities needed to produce weapons from the diverted material exist and that all non-nuclear components of such weapons have been made or can be completed in less time than it will take to process the nuclear materials into weapon components.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime

Conversion time Beginning material form

Order of days (7-10) Plutonium (Pu), highly enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium-233 metal

Order of weeks (1-3)a PU02

, PU(N03)4, or other pure plutonium compounds

HEU or uranium-233 oxide or other pure uranium compounds

Mixed-oxide fuel (MOX, consisting of plutonium and uranium oxides)

or other unirradiated pure mixtures containing plutonium and uranium

(uranium-233 or highly enriched uranium); or

Pu, HEU, and/or uranium-233 in scrap or other miscellaneous impure

compounds

Order of months (1 -3) Pu, HEU, or uranium-233 in irradiated fuel

Order of one year Uranium containing <20 percent uranium-235 and uranium-233, or thorium

a

This range is not determined by any single factor, but the pure plutonium and uranium compounds will tend to be at the

lower end of the range and the mixtures and scrap at the higher end.

SOURCE: IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 1987 Ed., IAEA/SG/INF/1 (Rev. 1) (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency,

December 1987), P.-24.

tween the two is that they should correspond “in

order of magnitude,” meaning they should be

within about a factor of 3 of each other.59 In practice, timeliness goals can exceed conversion

times. For example, according to the IAEA, fresh

reactor fuel containing plutonium or highly enriched uranium can be converted into weapon

components in one to three weeks (for highly enriched uranium [HEU] or plutonium oxides or

other chemical compounds) or seven to ten days

(for HEU or plutonium metal). However, the timeliness goal for such material is one month. Spent

(irradiated) fuel containing plutonium or HEU,

which would have to be chemically reprocessed to

yield HEU or plutonium, could be converted to

weapon components in one to three months, but

the timeliness goal for spent fuel is at the upper

59Ibid., paragraphs 108 and 109, P. 25, and paragraph 123, p. 29.

169

end of this range, at three months. Therefore, in

some cases, the IAEA’s timeliness goals for detecting diversion of nuclear material can exceed the amount of time it would take to convert that diverted material into weapon

components.

Some argue that it is not even sufficient for the

IAEA to be able to announce the diversion (or the

inability to certify nondiversion) of nuclear materials before that material could be made into a

bomb. Instead, they state that the international

community must be warned of a potential diversion far enough in advance so that pressure could

be applied to prevent the diverting state from making the weapon in the first place.60 Such a requirement is impossible to achieve in any safeguards regime that permits nations to produce,

60This more restrictive definition is the one adopted by the ’’timely warning’’language in the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of

1978, which governs United States nuclear cooperation with other countries. In particular, the NNPA sets the conditions under which U.S.-sup

plied nuclear material can be reprocessed. See, e.g., Leonard Weiss, “The Concept of ‘Timely Warning’ in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of

1978,” unpublished paper distributed by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Apr. 1, 1985.
70 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

stockpile, and use nuclear materials, such as

plutonium or HEU, that can be converted into

weapon components in less time than almost

any conceivable international response could

be mounted. Formulating, deliberating, approving, and implementing such a response would almost certainly take weeks to months, if not longer.

In such cases, detecting the diversion of nuclear

materials the instant it happened would not provide sufficient notice.

To make possible the degree of warning that

this definition would require, a much stronger system of international control would be required that

prohibited individual nations from producing or

stockpiling any nuclear materials that could be

converted to weapons on short notice. Such a system would resemble the Acheson-Lilienthal plan

more than it would the present system of IAEA

safeguards.

It might also be argued that the international

community does not possess—or at least would

never be willing to use-diplomatic, economic, or

military measures strong enough to prevent a state

from making a weapon out of diverted nuclear material. If this were indeed the case, no amount of

notice would suffice, and the only way to guarantee that proliferation could not occur would be to

prevent non-nuclear-weapon states from pursuing

certain elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. These

activities would have to be either banned completely, reserved for nuclear-weapon states alone,

or internationalized. Although some indeed urge

the banning of spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment could not be banned without shutting down

most civil nuclear power plants. Reserving enrichment and reprocessing for the nuclearweapon states would so badly aggravate the existing discriminatory nature of the international nonproliferation regime that this option must be considered politically untenable.

Internationalization is addressed in chapter 4.

Unlike changes in the definition of significant

quantities, which generally affect only the intensio of each individual inspection (e.g., the number

of samples taken or measurements conducted on a

certain batch of material stored in many containers), changes in the timeliness criteria require increased inspection frequency. Shorter timeliness

criteria, therefore, would have a large effect on the

safeguards efforts needed to achieve them.61

Moreover, achieving the existing timeliness criteria uniformly and comprehensively for all facilities-particularly those containing directuse materials-is probably much more

important than adopting even more stringent

criteria as goals. For example, in 1993, the timeliness goal for direct-use material was fully met at

only 63 percent of the facilities containing such

material, and either partially met or not met at 37

percent. 62 (See also the discussion of near-realtime accountancy, below).

Safeguards Uncertainties at Nuclear Material

Bulk-Handling Facilities

The United States could encourage and

support efforts to decrease uncertainty limits at bulkhandling facilities.

Facilities that process nuclear material in bulk

form include those for enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing. Though each type of facility poses unique challenges for safeguards, enrichment safeguards are probably the most

developed and easiest to implement of the three

(see box 3-8). One of the most difficult types of facility to safeguard effectively is the spent fuel reprocessing plant, because:

1.

2.

the plutonium produced is directly usable in

nuclear weapons;

plutonium in a reprocessing plant is somewhat

more difficult to assay accurately (on a kilo61 Lowering the definition of the significant quantity (SQ) will increase the inspection frequency for facilities that have less than 1 SQ under

the old definition but more than one under the new one.

62 Letter of Jan. 17, 1995 from Jan West, IAEA, in response to Office of Technology Assessment questions, op. cit., footnote 34, p. 2.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 71

Enrichment plants, like reprocessing facilities, are bulk-handling facilities that can potentially produce material directly usable in weapons: in this case, highly enriched uranium. 1 Currently, the IAEA

applies safeguards only to the following 7 enrichment facilities: Brazil (Resende)2

; Germany (URENCO,

Gronau); Japan (Ningyo, and Rokkasho-mura enrichment plants); Netherlands (URENCO, Almelo);

South Africa (Pelindaba); and the United Kingdom (BNFL centrifuge plant at Capenhurst). 3 Of these,

the Resende enrichment facility (using Becker nozzle technology) is unlikely to operate in the future.

However, Brazil’s Ipero gas centrifuge plant will be coming under safeguards now that Brazil has

agreed to apply safeguards to all its nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Since the United Kingdom is a weapon

state, its facilities are safeguarded under voluntary agreements. Of the remaining facilities, Germany,

the Netherlands, and Japan operate centrifuge plants and South Africa operates an aerodynamic separation process called Helikon. The latter technology had never been safeguarded by the IAEA prior to

South Africa’s accession to the NPT, but it shares some characteristics with gas centrifuge and some

with gaseous diffusion technology.

Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards

If covert reconfiguration of gas centrifuge plants can be detected, such plants can be safeguarded with high confidence. Using well-established measurement techniques, input and output

quantities of uranium hexafluoride can be assayed very accurately, both for amount and for isotopic

Gas centrifuge cascade at a URENCO uranium enrichment

plant. URENCO operates enrichment facilities in Almelo in the

Netherlands, Capenhurst in the United Kingdom, and Gronau

in Germany.

content. 4 It is harder to measure the amount

of uranium hexafluoride contained in gas

form within the centrifuge cascade than it is

to determine inputs and outputs, but this

“gas phase inventory” is relatively small, Given present measurement uncertainties,

plants with up to 2,000,000 separative work

units per year enrichment capacity (which

contain roughly 75 kilograms of uranium-235

in the process stream at any given moment)

appear safeguardable using current practices. A plant this size can produce enough

low-enriched uranium to fuel some 20 large

commercial power reactors. Urenco plants

are half this size, although Russian centrifuge plants are of this scale or slightly larger.

(continued)

I For discussion of different types of enrichment technologies, see US. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1993),

appendix 4-B.

2 This facility had been covered by an INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreement prior to implementation of full-scope safeguards under

the ABACC agreement and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

3 IAEA Annual Report for 1992, op. cit., p. 161.

4 2.5 ton (t) cylinders of UF6 gas are routinely measured to within +/-0,5 kilogram (kg), and 14 t cylinders to within +/- 1 kg. Uranium

purity (grams uranium per grams material) has a 1-o uncertainty of only O.05 percent, and isotopic assay for Iow-enriched uranium at

IAEA’s Seibersdorf Analytical Laboratory (based on the characteristic 186-keVgamma emission) has an uncertainty of 0.2 to 0.3 percent. David Gordon, group leader, Arms Control and Nonproliferation division, Brookhaven National Laboratory, private communication, 1993.
72 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The principal safeguards concerns associated with centrifuge plants involve the possibility of reconfiguring the cascade to produce higher enrichments, which is a particular concern because of the

speed at which such plants would start producing the higher enrichments after such a conversion. Covert production of highly enriched uranium would require the use of unsafeguarded feedstock in addition to reconfiguration of the cascade. Material imbalances would result if safeguarded feedstock did

not show up again as safeguarded, low-enriched output. To protect against either reconfiguration or

operation of the plant with undeclared material or in an undeclared manner, a consortium of centrifuge

technology holders in 1981 agreed with the IAEA and Euratom to implement a set of procedures for

safeguards, known as the Hexapartite agreement. This agreement represented a compromise between

protecting proprietary information relating to the technology and configuration of the cascade itself, and

restricting the opportunities for altering plant operation between inspections. Its principal strength is its

providing for short notice inspections within the cascade area of the plant, under guidelines called “limited frequency unannounced access” (LFUA),5 and for portable assay equipment to be taken into the

cascade area for determining whether the plant is producing HEU.6 In addition, uranium flows in and

out of the plant are monitored and controlled, with samples of the output measured for enrichment.

LFUA inspections inside the cascade area are allowed from 4 to 12 times per year, depending on

the size of the facility, Their degree of surprise can range from a totally unannounced arrival of inspectors at the plant (at which point operators would be allowed no more than 2 hours to hide from view any

proprietary equipment that might be exposed within the cascade) to unexpectedly calling for an inspection inside the cascade area during one of the routine monthly inspections at the plant. Although

there is no explicit routine verification measurement that can guarantee detection of undeclared feed

being introduced into the cascade, LFUA inspections area deterrent against such scenarios since they

add a probabilistic chance of spotting such material.7

Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plant Safeguards

The principal difficulties of safeguarding gaseous diffusion enrichment plants involve the large

amount of material normally present within the cascade (as much as 4 tonnes of uranium-235 in a large

plant), and the occurrence of some of that material “plating out” on the inside surfaces of pipes due to

small leaks.8 Both factors involve holdup material and thus lead to measurement inaccuracies and uncertainties in MUF. Argentina has the only gaseous diffusion facility under safeguards outside the nuclear weapon states, and its small size should make it relatively easy to safeguard effectively.

5Part of the agreed procedures involves safekeeping at the plant of original photographs Of the interior cascade area so that inspectors can compare them with the current layout. With the myriad of pipes, valves, and connections inside a cascade, however, the

visual acuity of the inspector can limit the utility of such comparisons.

6This equipment involves gamma analysis and x-ray fluorescence equipment using a portable cobalt-57 source. The software for

this instrument has been “blinded” so that it indicates only whether enrichment Ievels are greater than or less than 20 percent and does

not reveal the actual enrichment As with the LFUA compromise, the decision to Iimit the measurement equipment to this simple HEU/

LEU reading was made to protect sensitive plant information, such as the separative capacity of individual centrifuges or specific

portions of the cascade.

7The IAEA also has the option during routine inspections to require that every feed, product, and tail cylinder be verified before it is

fed into or shipped from the plant. A more reasonable plan would be a sampling program that would have a high probability of detecting a significant diversion.

8Unlike centrifuge plants, which run at low pressures and whose fast-spinning vacuum-encased rotors can easily crash if there

are leaks, diffusion plants can tolerate small leaks without major damage. (Sampling, which can introduce leaks, is thus done at many

places, whereas there are no inter-cascade sampling points in centrifuge plants.) Plating out is the result of water vapor reacting with

the fluorine in UF6 gas.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 73

nium, yet is significant in quantities less than

one-third that of HEU;

3. the material is in “bulk” form (e.g., in solution

or in the form of powder) throughout plant operations; and

4. extremely large quantities of plutonium (up to

8 tonnes per year, or 1,000 significant quantities) can routinely be separated in large commercial plants.

Mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants share

many of the safeguards difficulties of plutonium

reprocessing plants. However, MOX plants that

are now under safeguards have considerably

smaller plutonium inventories and throughputs

than the large commercial reprocessing facilities

built or under construction in England, France,

and Japan. Moreover, the IAEA has amassed considerably more experience to date with MOX facilities than with reprocessing plants.

Up until about 1990, IAEA criteria for safeguarding reprocessing plants had used as their

standard not the “significant quantity” but a quantity called the “accountancy verification goal”

(AVG). The AVG, which might be several times

larger than an SQ, was based on a realistic assessment of what then-current measurement techniques applied to a given facility could actually

detect. As analytic techniques and safeguards

practices have improved, however, the IAEA has

phased out use of the AVG, and the revised Safeguards Criteria introduced in 1991 make no reference to the concept.

Even though the AVG is no longer in use,

conventional material accountancy methods

alone appear unable to verify the absence of diversion or loss of material from large reprocessing plants to within annual uncertainty levels of 1 significant quantity of plutonium. At

present, this conclusion is moot, since the reprocessing plants that have come under full-time

IAEA safeguards to date are relatively small.

However, Japan is building a large reprocessing

plant at Rokkasho-mura that, when completed,

cannot be safeguarded with a simple extrapolation

of techniques in use at smaller facilities. While

several new methods being studied appear to hold

promise and are likely to improve detection sensitivity by a significant amount, the IAEA has not

been able to demonstrate that material accountancy methods at large reprocessing plants will be

able to assure, say, a 90 percent probability of detecting the diversion of as little as one weapon’s

worth of plutonium per year.

Reprocessing plants of this scale, therefore,

pose difficulties for the IAEA. Either the agency

will need to demonstrate that safeguards methods

other than the inventory measurements that form

the core of its existing safeguards approach can be

relied on to detect diversion with a high degree of

confidence, or it will have to conclude that it cannot safeguard such a plant to the same standards it

applies at smaller facilities. To date, the IAEA

has not considered the possibility that it cannot

safeguard large facilities such as the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant, but neither has it

been able to demonstrate that it can.63

Various techniques to improve the capability of

conventional material accountancy methods at

large-scale reprocessing plants have been proposed and tested over the last 10 to 15 years. Many

of these new techniques involve a concept known

as “near-real-time” accountancy (NRTA—see

next section), or the use of ongoing, continuous

measurements to keep track of nuclear materials

as opposed to the periodic taking of discrete inventories. Improved safeguards methods also apply various statistical models to the large amount

of process data (e.g., flows and concentrations of

nuclear materials and volumes of solutions in

63Rokkasho is the only reprocessing plant now envisioned to come under full-time IAEA safeguards with an annual plutonium production

rate as large as a few tonnes per year. The only other civil reprocessing plants of this size now operating are in nuclear weapon states: the United

Kingdom, France, and Russia.
74 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

tanks) available from such plants.64 Other improvements to supplement material accountancy

involve verification of design information and increased use of containment and surveillance (C/S)

measures.65 Application of these methods to safeguarding reprocessing plants is discussed in more

detail in appendix A.

Part of the difficulty in safeguarding large reprocessing plants is that the IAEA has no real experience doing so (though it has safeguarded several smaller ones in the past, such as Tokai in

Japan). Many of the measurement studies must

therefore rely, at least in part, on assumptions

about the actual plant operation and the obtainable

measurement uncertainties. Another problem is

that although the effectiveness of various safeguards techniques as applied to generic facilities

is discussed in the open research literature, the effectiveness of the specific statistical tests the

IAEA plans to use in a given case is facility-dependent. IAEA confidentiality would, therefore,

prevent it from being shared even with member

governments or the Board of Governors, let alone

with the public. Without knowing the specific

characteristics of the data set on which statistical models are to be applied, however, the effectiveness of those models cannot be assessed by

outside observers.

Since the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA) last examined this issue in 1977, substantial improvements have been made in IAEA safeguards practices, including those at reprocessing

facilities.66 Moreover, the level of concern that

should be attached to the material-accountancy

limits at large bulk-handling plants depends on

subjective judgments of what constitutes adequate deterrence against diversion. Many argue

that the primary value of safeguards at a large reprocessing plant in a country such as Japan is to

detect whether such a facility is being used to fuel

a large nuclear weapon program with many weapons’ worth of plutonium per year. No matter how

effective they may or may not be at the margins,

safeguards are well capable of detecting diversion

of plutonium on that scale. It could be argued that

the diversion of only a small amount of low-quality plutonium is very unlikely, given both the risks

of detection with even an imperfect safeguards

system and the political consequences for Japan of

being caught developing nuclear weapons.

Those holding this view speculate that if Japan

ever felt the need to develop a nuclear weapon option, it would be much more likely to: 1) build a

small clandestine nuclear infrastructure outside of

safeguards, 2) buy or steal the nuclear material,

now that there may well be an active market in it,67

or 3) simply withdraw from the NPT after announcing that the Treaty no longer served Japan’s

vital interests. Given the tremendous value that

safeguards have in helping deny states a quick and

direct way to produce large amounts of weaponusable material during civil power program, the

added value of tightening the threshold at which

small diversions from a reprocessing plant would

be detected with high confidence might be considered significantly less important. In other words,

64Near-real-time accountancy techniques are used at THORP in the United Kingdom and UP-3 in France.

65Containment and surveillance measures include items such as use of cameras and seals to ensure that a given storage location or piece of

equipment has not been disturbed. For reprocessing plants, C/S measures are quite useful and can be used to block many diversion paths—perhaps all of them if the plant’s flows are completely and correctly known by the inspectors. The IAEA has always considered, however, that C/S

measures supplement—but do not replace—material control and accountancy, and that absence of diversion can only be positively demonstrated by the latter.

66See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, OTA-E-48 (Washington, DC: Office of

Technology Assessment, July 1977); and B. Judson, “Needs and Obstacles in the International Safeguards of Large Reprocessing Plants,” NTIS

No. PB95-199170, OTA contractor report, December 1993.

67The German interception of 350 grams of apparently Russian-origin plutonium oxide in August 1994 and the Czech seizure of 3 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in December 1994 indicate that black market purchase of nuclear weapon material may be more realistic than

previously thought.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 75

safeguards might not eliminate the risk of diversion (see appendix A), but those risks are

nevertheless greatly reduced in both the probability of diversion of any kind and in the

amount of material subject to diversion.

Others, however, object to the above reasoning.

First, even a very small nuclear arsenal can have a

very large political and military effect. Second,

even if Japan is judged very unlikely to skim a

small amount of plutonium from a large reprocessing plant, the United States and other countries

would probably be much less sanguine if a developing country in a politically unstable region of

the world were to build a plant even a fraction the

size of Rokkasho. Since the IAEA is required not

to discriminate among its member states, it would

have great difficulty in justifying more stringent

safeguards in some places than in others .68 Therefore, the existence of safeguarded reprocessing

plants—even in countries not thought to pose proliferation risks—leaves the IAEA with few

grounds on which to discourage the development

of reprocessing plants in more questionable locations, or to require any additional safeguards measures to be applied there.

The United States could encourage and

support the implementation of automated near-realtime accountancy and alarm capability by the IAEA at

more facilities.

The concept of near-real-time accountancy has

traditionally been focused on reprocessing and

fuel-fabrication facilities in which the amount of

in-process inventory is large enough that timeliness goals are difficult to meet by conventional

material control and accountancy (MC&A) methods. MC&A practice at reprocessing plants traditionally has required physical inventories to be

taken and verified only once a year during a complete plant shutdown and cleanout. Monthly “interim inventories,” which do not require plant

shutdown, are less precise because of the difficulty in estimating in-process inventories. In any

case, interim inventories do not always meet

the one-month timeliness goal for detecting diversion of material, including the investigation

and resolution of anomalies.

One facility already incorporating the NRTA

approach is Japan’s Tokai Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF), where MOX fuel has been

fabricated for Japan’s Joyo and Monju fast-breeder reactors at a rate of 5 tonnes per year since

1988. 69 Unattended, tamper-proof instruments,

such as neutron coincidence counters in glove

boxes, measure plutonium levels at various locations, even in the absence of human inspectors.

Unmanned instrumentation allows safeguards

measurements in areas where worker-safety regulations restrict manned inspections, such as between plutonium-storage and fuel-assembly areas

in MOX plants. It is also intended to reduce manpower costs, although whether it will or not will

depend on factors such as the details of the installation, its monitoring objectives, and so on.

Despite its use of NRTA, allegations questioning the adequacy of safeguards at the PFPF have

been publicized, particularly concerning the

68 

Even though the IAEA cannot apply different safeguards standards to different nations, the rationale for pursuing reprocessing and the

risk of plutonium diversion is not uniform around the world. Energy-poor Japan—a nation that traditionally has taken a very long-term view—

argues that the plutonium fuel cycle is essential to achieving some measure of security for its energy supplies in the future, and that it is worth

utilizing even if it generates electricity that is significantly more expensive than electricity from other sources. Further, having a domestic plutonium supply would eliminate the need to reprocess plutonium overseas and then return it to Japan via highly visible and politically contentious

shipments. To ease concerns elsewhere, Japan has cooperated extensively with the IAEA in finding ways to make plants such as Rokkasho as

safeguardable as possible. As noted earlier in the text, LASCAR was a Japanese initiative, financed by Japan. In less cooperative states, the

IAEA’s job could be made much more difficult.

69 Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. promotional brochure, Tokyo, Japan, August 1992, p. 7.
76 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic

amount of plutonium—claimed to be 70 kilograms, or roughly 9 significant quantities-presumed to be held up in plant equipment.70 One

critic has concluded from this episode that this

plant cannot be safeguarded effectively.71 The

IAEA responded that the plutonium in question

has been measured in situ on a monthly basis, and

that to improve the quality of these measurements

the IAEA is discussing a schedule with Japanese

authorities for the recovery of this material from

this plant equipment where it is trapped.72 The

case does illustrate, however, the diffilculties of

performing in-process measurements in bulkhandling facilities.

The United States could encourage and

support the increased use of containment and surveillance techniques by the IAEA.

Containment and surveillance techniques are

used to supplement, rather than substitute for, the

primary safeguards approach of material accountancy. Once the quantity of nuclear material stored

in a particular location has been measured, for example, C/S measures such as cameras, motion detectors, or tamper-proof seals can be used to ensure that no material is added or removed,

drastically reducing the need to repeat the measurements at a later date.

C/S techniques as applied in safeguards, however, should not be confused with similarly named

methods to physically prevent material from being

diverted by unauthorized intruders or seized, either at facilities or during transport between facilities (although such events would very likely be

Energy Agency

detected by C/S methods or by subsequent IAEA

inspections). Prevention of these activities falls

within the domain of “physical protection,”

which is the responsibility of the state, not the

IAEA. 73 C/S techniques used by the IAEA are

employed mainly to reduce the need for inspectors

tore-assay material in storage or re-certify the integrity of previously inspected items—to maintain “continuity of knowledge.”

C/S techniques are being improved. For example, videotape-based Modular Integrated Video

Systems (MIVS) have already been installed to replace many of the older Minolta 8-mm cameras,

which are movie cameras modified to take one

frame every 10 to 20 minutes. 74 In addition, an

improved, digital-based surveillance system

called GEMINI is also being developed. New

seals have already been developed that can be read

Verification of seals using laser disk recording. With this

equipment, IAEA inspectors can determine whether seals

placed at safeguarded facilities have been tampered with.

70 Ppaul L. Leventhal, “The New Nuclear Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1994, op-ed page, and Nuclear Control Institute, ” ‘Astounding’ Discrepancy of 70 Kilograms of Plutonium Warrants Shutdown of Troubled Nuclear Fuel Plant in Japan, ’’press release, May 9, 1994.

71Ibid.

72 Intemational Atomic Energy Agency, “Japanese Material Under Full Safeguards,” press release, PR 94/23, May 25, 1993. Specific safeguards-related data concerning PFPF-and all other safeguarded facilities—are considered “safeguards-confidential” by the IAEA and are not

made public (see section on “Increase transparency within the IAEA itself,” below).

73 General guidelines for such measures are published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.”

These guidelines form the basis of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which came into force on February 8,1987

and has a membership similar to that of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

74 In 1990, for instance, 43 Modular Integrated Video system closed-circuit TV systems were being installed at 19 facilities.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 77

The digital-based Gemini surveillance system, an improvement over the MIVS system.

The Modular Integrated Video System (MIVS) surveillance unit

now jn use by the IAEA.

in the field for signs of tampering, rather than

needing to be sent back to IAEA headquarters in

Vienna.

Furthermore, there are several proposals for increasing the use of IAEA C/S techniques for nuclear facilities.75 In the early 1980s, the RECOVER program tested the concept of

transmitting information on the status of C/S

equipment directly to Vienna by telephone lines,

but the concept never gained IAEA acceptance. 76

More recently, the IAEA has conducted and is

evaluating test operations in Sweden, Finland,

and Hungary, in which state operators have been

allowed to change videotape or film and send it to

the IAEA, with special techniques used to prevent

tampering or substitution. This procedure saves

inspector effort in the collection of such tapes. A

remote-monitoring project being developed at the

U.S. Department of Energy’s Sandia National

Laboratories-originally designed to demonstrate remote monitoring of a deactivated

chemical facility—is examining the use of cameras and satellite links for real-time C/S. A system

has already been installed in Australia, and other

sites are being examined. Private companies such

as a Hughes-Canberra consortium and Unisys

have also begun to examine concepts for remotemonitoring techniques using satellite links that

could be used both for implementing better containment and surveillance and for enhancing nearreal-time accountancy methods.

To improve the instrumentation available for

remote monitoring of nuclear materials, Japan and

the United States have been developing and testing the Containment and Surveillance Data Authenticated Communication System at Sandia Na75 For a survey of ideas being discussed in the context of the European fuel cycle, see M. Cuypers and R. Haas, “Can Containment and Surveillance Play a More Important Role in Safeguards?” in Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Facility Operations-Safeguards

Interface, San Diego, CA, Nov. 24-Dee. 4, 1987 (La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1988), pp. 341-348.

76 The RECOVER system was not found to be cost-effective, among other reasons because it transmitted only status information about

safeguards instrumentation, rather than the actual data from those instruments.
78 I Nuclear Safeguards and the lnternational Atomic Energy Agency

Dry spent-fuel storage facilitu in Australia, monitored from

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Part of the International Remote Monitoring Project, this demonstration is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy Sandia National Laboratories, and the Australian Safeguards Office.

tional Laboratories in New Mexico since

mid-1992. The system uses advanced sensors to

monitor flows of nuclear materials at various locations and then transmits this data by satellite to a

control center in Japan. If such a system were used

in a safeguarded facility, anomalous situations

could immediately trigger alarms in a local control center, or back at IAEA headquarters. These

alarms, in turn, could initiate a rapid response.

Such proposals face significant obstacles, not

the least of which is a state’s willingness to be subjected to measures going beyond the traditional

requirements of safeguards, especially when data

from one of their facilities is to be transmitted outside the country without the government right to

vet the data first. Some of the techniques could

even lead to an increase in safeguards effort, rather

than a savings, through the need for site visits to

resolve ambiguous indicators, such as unexpected

motion, or to repair failed equipment. 77 On the

other hand, to the extent that remote surveillance

does eliminate the need for site visits, it will also

lessen the opportunity to gain the “on-the-ground”

presence that human inspectors provide. Many argue that this presence cannot be overestimated.

Containment and surveillance techniques also

suffer from the fact that their usefulness is difficult

to quantify. Unambiguous evidence of nondiversion can only be obtained for the material or area

within a given camera’s or motion detector’s line

of sight, and then only in the case of uninterrupted

coverage. Nevertheless, initial reports overall

have been promising. Further analysis of specific

applications of enhanced C/S is, therefore, needed

to determine whether it could result in cost-effective improvements in safeguards.

■ Improving the Ability To Detect

Undeclared Facilities

The United States could encourage states

to share intelligence information on potential safeguards violations with the IAEA.

The IAEA has repeatedly stated that its activities will be significantly enhanced by increased

access to information—both open source and national intelligence information. Before the Gulf

War, member states neither pressed the IAEA to

be aggressive in ferreting out clandestine facilities

nor supplied the IAEA with information that

would assist in such efforts. Nevertheless, successful precedents in providing such information

have now been set with respect to Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, and other countries. The IAEA

has also shown in South Africa that it has been

77 The anomaly and false a1arm rates with C/S measures are usually significantly higher than with material accountancy, but these anomalies

would almost never be expected to give evidence of an actual diversion. Normally these false alarms can be appropriately resolved through

further investigation, which in the extreme case can involve taking a special physical inventory. When that occurs, the C/S measures would in

effect have contributed only to timely detection of the need for taking another material balance. J.E. Lovett, “Nuclear Materials Safeguards for

Reprocessing,” International Atomic Energy Agency Report STR-151/152 (December 1987), pp. 218-219.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 79

able to independently verify the “completeness”

of a state’s declared inventory without being tied

to conclusions reached by national sources.78

While it is generally agreed that sharing intelligence with the IAEA is a good idea, member

states considering such sharing need to explore

several overlapping issues:

■

●

●

■

■

the form in which the information should be

shared (e.g., photographs, written communications, informal briefings, or isolated tips),

the means by which it can be assured that sensitive information is protected,

the confidence that the IAEA can have in information that is provided to it, especially if the

sources and methods by which it was derived

are not shared with the agency,

the mechanism for defending against planted

disinformation directed against a particular

state, and

the use that the IAEA makes of the information

once obtained.

Unlike national governments, which may agree

to participate in reciprocal exchanges of information, the IAEA is required to maintain strict confidentiality and cannot offer any return flow of information. As the recipient of information, the

IAEA must develop policies for evaluating it as

well as for shielding itself against charges of being manipulated for political purposes by being given information only selectively. It must

also be able to keep sensitive information about a

state out of the hands of nationals or sympathizers

of that state.

The fact that the IAEA is now receiving and using information supplied by member states, including the United States, represents a sea change

in behavior that is absolutely necessary if the

IAEA is to make a serious attempt to ensure that

states have not built and are not using clandestine,

undeclared nuclear facilities. The IAEA’s best defense against charges of “selective provision” of

intelligence is to accept information from any

party, to balance these charges against the quality

and implications of the information it is being provided, and to use its own judgment in coming to

any conclusions before acting on them. This will

require the agency to develop some expertise in

judging or in performing some analysis of the

information presented to it.

Increase the mandate and frequency of

special inspections, to include “anytime, anywhere” inspections.

In contrast to safeguards transparency measures, which would be completely voluntary, the

IAEA also has some authority to demand “special

inspections.” Although no special inspections at

undeclared facilities had ever been requested or

carried out before the IAEA’s investigations in

North Korea, INFCIRC/153 provides for them if

needed in order for the IAEA to obtain further information or to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. 79 The efficacy of this provision is limited

by several factors, however. One is that special inspections must be carried out “in consultation”

with the state, which as currently interpreted effectively precludes short-notice inspections such

as those provided for in the Chemical Weapons

Convention. 80 Without such consultation, many

countries would consider that such inspections by

the IAEA would violate their sovereignty. How78 1AEA Officials have said that the agency’s extensive verification activities have led to a high level of confidence that South Africa’s declared HEU inventory is essentially correct and complete. This contrasts to the situation in North Korea, where lack of cooperation has increased

the IAEA’s need for national intelligence information to reconstruct that country’s nuclear history.

79 Note that the term special inspection as used in INFCIRC/ 153 can refer to inspections requested either by the IAEA (e.g., to reconcile

differences or ambiguities it discovers during the course of routine inspections), or by the state. This discussion refers to the former.

80 Short-notice inspections might be useful to preclude the inspected state from quickly hiding evidence of violation of its safeguards agreements or international commitments. An analogy is the attempt of Iraq to hide its “calutron” uranium enrichment equipment from the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection team by driving them out the back of a facility when the team was at the gate. If the team had not arrived on short notice,

the removed calutrons might never have been found.
80 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

ever, states could agree to reinterpret or waive

their rights of consultation under this article to

give the IAEA more timely access.

Another limitation is that requests for special

inspections are taken very seriously, require

weighty political consideration, and, depending

on their outcome, have considerable implications

for IAEA credibility. Since they have to be justified to the country and possibly also to the Board

times could erode confidence in the IAEA’s ability

to identify suspect activities. False alarms might

also call into question the reliability or appropriateness of national sources of information, if such

had been used, and could preclude the IAEA from

calling for and conducting further special inspections. As such, special inspections within the current IAEA framework are no panacea and cannot

be expected to become significantly more

of Governors, coming up empty-handed too many frequent (see box 3-9). Most likely they will conWithin the context of strengthening IAEA safeguards, several different types of inspection have been

discussed. They differ according to several factors: who can request them; how much notification time (if

any) is afforded the inspected site; the legal authority (i.e., whether the state can refuse them); and which

facilities are covered. The following represent four principal types of inspection (summarized in the accompanying table):

■

■

■

Technical visits. Totally voluntary inspections on the part of the state to demonstrate openness or

allow the IAEA to observe activities at sites that mayor may not be related to safeguarded facilities.

Regular safeguards inspections. Can be carried out by the IAEA in either routine or ad hoc modes

under safeguards agreements negotiated between the IAEA and the state.

-Routine inspections are limited to material in declared facilities (under INFCIRC/153, for NPT

states), to declared facilities irrespective of their material content (under INFCIRC/66, for safeguarded facilities in non-NPT states), and to key “strategic” measurement points for specified material-balance areas. Once a safeguards agreement has been implemented, the state has only

very limited rights to refuse any given inspection, but may freely reject individual inspectors when

first selected by the IAEA.

-Ad hoc inspections verify initial declarations, establish baselines for the routine inspections that

follow, and verify design Information. They must be agreed to in advance by the state, but they can

be carried out as soon as a safeguards agreement is in force, even if negotiations to produce the

specific legal documents authorizing inspections (the Subsidiary Arrangements and Facility Attachments) have not yet been completed. To a certain extent and with reasonable justification, they

can encompass undeclared facilities.

Special inspections. AuthorizedbyINFCIRC/153 paragraphs 73 and 77 (for NPT non-nuclear weapon states) for the purpose of allowing the IAEA to verify or gather additional information needed to

fulfill its safeguards responsibilities.1 Special inspections can be requested by the Director General

or by the Board of Governors, and can be aimed at declared or, with reasonable justification, undeclared facilities, but must be individually notified and, in practice, agreed to by the state before being

carried out. If the state refuses, and the Board decides that the inspection is urgent to verify that no

diversion is occurring, the dispute can ultimately be taken to the Security Council for resolution. The

IAEA’s first request for a special inspection at a nondeclared facility was presented to North Korea

in early 1993 and was denied,

(continued)

1The United States, although not a non-nuclear-weapon state, has voluntarily offered to accept IAEA safeguards on a large number of selected civil nuclear facilities, and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA also contains language authorizing the IAEA to

conduct special inspections. However, the United States is under no obligation to declare military nuclear facilities or permit inspections of them. Therefore, special inspections of the United States would be limited to resolving questions concerning only the nuclear

material that was voluntarily put under safeguards, and they could not be used to investigate allegations of undeclared nuclear sites.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 81

■

●

Challenge inspections. The state would be notified, but would not be allowed to refuse. The IAEA

has no right to conduct challenge inspections, They have been included in the Chemical Weapons

Convention, however, which provides member states the opportunity to request challenge inspections at any locations or facilities in the territory of another member state. Requests for challenge inspections under the CWC maybe rejected by the Executive Council established by that treaty (somewhat analogous to the IAEA’s Board of Governors) if it determines the request to be frivolous, abusive,

or clearly beyond the scope of the Convention, However, once a challenge inspection has been approved by the Executive Council, the challenged state has no authority to refuse or delay it,

CWC challenge inspections are based on the principle of “managed access, ” in which the inspected

state is required to provide some access to the inspected site but enters into negotiations—and ultimately has the last word—concerning the level of that access. However, the inspected state is obligated to demonstrate that those locations to which full access was not granted are not being used

for prohibited activities. For more information on CWC challenge inspections, see box 3-5.

Surprise inspections. Short-notice or unannounced inspections that would not recognize a state’s

right of refusal—so-called “anytime/anywhere” inspections, The first such inspections pertaining to

weapons of mass destruction were directed at Iraq through U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 in

February 1991, as part of the terms of the ceasefire ending the Persian Gulf War, These go well beyond the authority given by INFCIRC/153. In practice, they have proven difficult to carry out thereon

a number of occasions, due to substantial Iraqi interference, but in other cases they were very successful in ferreting out equipment that Iraq was attempting to hide,

Characteristics of Different Types of Inspections

Inspection type Characteristics Model

Technical visit

Regular inspection

Special inspection

Challenge inspection

Surprise inspection

m

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

m

●

—

Volunteered by inspected state No standard model

No formal safeguards role

Routine or ad-hoc INFCIRC/153

Routine inspections are agreed-to well in advance

(with limited exceptions such as very short-notice

inspections of aspects of centrifuge enrichment plants)

Routine inspections look at declared facilities only

Limited rights of refusal (e.g., can refuse individual

inspectors)

Requested by IAEA Director General or Board of INFCIRC/153 paras, 73,77

Governors

Includes undeclared facilities (when justifiable)

Consultation with state required

Unresolved issues can be taken to U.N. Security

Council

State is notified, but cannot refuse or delay CWC “managed access”

Can be requested by any member state

Includes undeclared facilities

Short-notice or unannounced U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (Iraq)

No right of refusal

“Anytime/anywhere”
82 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

tinue to be invoked only in egregious circumstances, such as in North Korea.

Nevertheless, the authority to carry out special inspections, together with access to intelligence information, can constitute a powerful

tool to detect clandestine activities. Given what

has been discovered in Iraq and North Korea, it

can be expected that special inspections, or even

simply “technical visits,” when combined with increased use of intelligence supplied by member

states, may play a much greater role than they have

in the past. Some precedent has also been set within the Chemical Weapons Convention regarding

challenge inspections, using “managed access” to

set the terms of those inspections (see box 3-5).81

Once that Convention comes into force and some

experience has been gained with its challenge inspections, the IAEA could seek to apply any lessons learned to its own inspection activities.

Though Iraq is indeed a special case, the success in implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 depended on three factors, which are

applicable to special inspections more generally:

 access to relevant information on suspect locations,

 the right to timely and unrestricted access to

identified sites, and

 the assurance of predictable Security Council

backing when support for implementation was

necessary.

Although much of the information upon which

special inspections or technical visits might be

based will inevitably have to come from national

intelligence sources, some could come from environmental sampling programs carried out by the

IAEA itself. To persuade certain countries to allow or undertake environmental sampling programs on their territory, it might help if neighboring countries could be convinced to volunteer

first. For instance, the United States might urge

South Korea to allow for such sampling in an effort to persuade the North to follow suit. Of

course, there is no guarantee that this would work,

but such a tactic would further call into question

the motives of the North if it refused to follow a

South Korean lead.

In addition, special inspections will require advanced or new kinds of portable instruments for

field inspectors (e.g., compact multichannel analyzers or environmental sampling kits) and additional training for inspectors to learn what they are

looking for and how to react to unexpected information they might discover. Increased member

state support along these lines in the form of voluntary contributions, equipment, and training

would be beneficial.

❚ Initiating Safeguards for States with

Nuclear Infrastructures

When a state first comes under safeguards, for example upon acceding to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, it must declare to the IAEA all of its nuclear materials and the facilities where these materials are processed or stored. The IAEA has a responsibility to verify the completeness of this

initial declaration. That is, it must ensure that the

state is not hiding nuclear materials, particularly

those capable of being used in weapons. This task

is a challenging one whenever the state has a substantial nuclear infrastructure. According to

IAEA Director General Hans Blix:

There is an inherent difficulty in verifying the

completeness of an original inventory in a country in which a substantial nuclear programme

has been going on for a long time. It requires

much effort both by the inspectorate and much

openness and co-operation by the inspected

party—extending beyond declared facilities and

current records.82

Kazakhstan and Ukraine are in this category.

Both states had nuclear facilities and nuclear materials while part of the Soviet Union, a nuclear81See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry, OTABP-ISC-106 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).

82Hans Blix, Statement to the 36th Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Sept. 21, 1992.
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 83

weapon state that was not required to put its facilities under safeguards. Now that these states are

independent countries and parties to the NPT, all

their nuclear materials and facilities must be safeguarded, and the IAEA must make sure that the

initial declaration these states make is complete.

This task is particularly important if the state

entering safeguards is suspected or known to have

mounted a nuclear weapon program. Indeed, several such states have either come under or are

about to come under full-scope IAEA safeguards,

including Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and

North Korea. To help allay suspicions that a nuclear weapon program or capability might secretly

continue after the state comes under safeguards, it

is important to ensure that all nuclear materials

that may have been produced in the past are fully

accounted for, and that all activities that had been

related to the weapon program have ceased.

IAEA verification of the termination of a nuclear weapon program.

Several steps could be taken to help cement the

nonproliferation commitments of states thought

to have mounted nuclear weapon programs in the

past. First, the United States and other NPT parties could reemphasize the original meaning of the

NPT commitment not to manufacture nuclear

weapons. From the Treaty negotiating record and

from statements of William Foster, then-director

of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, activities prohibited under this commitment include all related development, component

fabrication, and testing activities specifically related to creating nuclear explosive devices. 83

Such a reaffirmation is especially important for

former threshold states, since IAEA safeguards

were originally set up to verify only one aspect of

such activities—the nondiversion of nuclear material from declared peaceful purposes.

Since the discovery of the Iraqi weapon program, the world community has expected more of

safeguards. The IAEA has accordingly placed

much more emphasis on: 1) verifying the completeness of a state’s initial inventory of nuclear

materials, ensuring to the extent possible that it

has not hidden a stockpile of weapon-capable materials, and 2) ensuring the absence of undeclared

nuclear facilities, eliminating to the extent possible the concern that the state is preparing to secretly violate its NPT commitment.

It could be made clear by the United States, by

the IAEA, or by the United Nations more broadly

that former threshold states have a special obligation to declare any such prior activities and to provide assurances that they have ceased, as well as to

accept full-scope safeguards. Such assurances

could include demonstrating that scientific teams

had been reassigned, that facilities had been dismantled or converted to non-weapon purposes,

and that any prior manufactured components and

materials had been destroyed. If agreed to by the

states in question, technical visits could then be

used to verify the completion of these steps (see

box 3-10). Short-notice inspections could also be

used to help guard against the possibility of a

state’s moving former bomb material or nuclearrelated equipment in order to hide it from inspection, and thus enhance the confidence in determining initial inventories of previously unsafeguarded nuclear-weapon-usable material.84 Such

inventories are particularly important instates that

are suspected of having gone very far down the

path of developing nuclear weapons.

■ Procedural and Institutional

Improvements to Safeguards

Make greater use of inspectors from nuclear-weapon states who have intimate knowledge of

nuclear explosive technology

83 George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, “Avoiding the ‘Definition’ Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban,” Arms Control Today, vol. 23, No.

4, May 1993, pp. 16-17.

84 Leonard S. Spector, “Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,” Foreign Policy, fall 1992. p. 35.
84 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Subsequent to the Persian Gulf War and IAEA activities under Security Council Resolution 687, the

IAEA has gained vital experience in at least two other countries of serious proliferation concern. In

North Korea, inspections in the months following that country’s signing of its first safeguards agreement

revealed anomalies that led to the request for special inspections at two sites suitable for containing

nuclear waste associated with reprocessing activities. In South Africa, the need to verify inventories of

HEU that had been associated with nuclear weapons resulted in the IAEA undertaking an unprecedented level of “nuclear archeology” to understand and reconstruct uranium production levels and nuclear

weapon development activities dating back well over a decade. As in Iraq, the IAEA has faced unique

challenges in these two states and, as a result, has shown its capability for assertive actions and thorough analysis. In both cases, a new emphasis has been placed on verifying with the highest confidence possible that initial declarations be not only correct, but also complete.

North Korea delayed signing its safeguards agreement with the IAEA from 1985 until 1992. Partly

through analysis of plutonium and other isotopes obtained from swipes taken around product handling

areas, the IAEA’s initial ad hoc inspections revealed evidence of inconsistencies in North Korea’s declarations, For instance, it became clear that waste the IAEA was allowed to sample was inconsistent with

the limited reprocessing that North Korea had declared, and that there must have been at least one

other reprocessing campaign. Information supplied by the United States and shared with the IAEA

Board of Governors showed that the North Koreans had concealed two sites probably containing nuclear waste, This information provided clear evidence of attempted deception on the part of the North

Koreans and buttressed radiochemical evidence that the IAEA’s own efforts had obtained. When the

IAEA made a request to conduct “special inspections” at these sites, North Korea refused and threatened to withdraw from the NPT. It did not carry out this threat, but—as of this writing—it has not yet

permitted the IAEA to inspect these sites and is therefore not in compliance with its safeguards agreement,

The South African program presented quite a different set of challenges. Here, the state was cooperating fully, but admitted to having run enrichment campaigns for over a decade producing substantial

quantities of HEU, some at very high enrichments. Given the foreseen transition of the South African

government from minority to majority rule, extreme political sensitivity surrounded the question of whether some of the highly enriched uranium produced by South Africa might have been hidden from

As an institution, the IAEA is not required to Such a proposal would be difficult to implehave nuclear weapon expertise. Indeed, since its ment beyond the level of informally assigning

membership and its technical staff draw from nuclear and non-nuclear states alike, the IAEA and

its staff must not be permitted to acquire weapon

information, lest the agency promote proliferation

in the process of helping fight it. Nevertheless, inspectors with nuclear weapon expertise may be in

a better position to detect weapon activities. Assigning them to inspection teams could bolster

confidence in an enhanced IAEA agenda that

sought to take a more vigorous approach toward

exposing covert nuclear weapon programs and undeclared nuclear sites.

particular individuals to inspection teams. The

IAEA makes no formal distinction between inspectors from weapon states and nonweapon

states. Weapon-state inspectors will face difficulty in sharing suspicions with other IAEA personnel—including their counterparts from other

weapon states—if doing so would force them to

reveal nuclear weapon information that is classified by their national governments.

The IAEA has already begun to grapple with

some of these issues following its inspections of

Iraq after the Gulf War. Since these inspections
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime 185

the IAEA and the incoming government. The Board of Governors therefore passed a special resolution

calling attention to the importance of verifying the “completeness” of South Africa’s initial declaration:

had it produced more material than it declared? To find out, the IAEA determined that past enrichment

history dating back almost 15 years needed to be fully understood. Operating records were gathered to

reconstruct this history.

Two problems were evident. First, given their focus on producing material for weapons, South Africa

had failed to keep detailed records of certain operating parameters that would have been useful for

calculating material balances, but were less relevant for production, such as the enrichment levels of

the waste product or “tails.” Second, frequent plant shutdowns, one as long as 2 years, had occurred

as a result of a peculiar problem with the South African Helikon process. Once these shutdowns were

properly taken into account and the complete set of operating records was verified as authentic, the

IAEA was finally able to conclude that the inventory estimates provided by South Africa were probably

correct.

Several lessons can be drawn from these experiences: the IAEA does its job best when the inspected country cooperates; the more difficult the inspection task, the more cooperation is needed. Second, intelligence data can significantly enhance the IAEA’s ability to unravel inconsistencies when it discovers them, though such data is not necessarily required nor always the final

word in explaining the nature of such anomalies. Third, while the IAEA has never been tasked to

verify any non-nuclear research or development activities associated with nuclear weapons, evidence

of such activity can indeed be sufficient for it to ask for more information regarding the nuclear material

inventory—which the IAEA does have ultimate responsibility for verifying. The Director General has emphasized this point in the context of states such as South Africa, where the IAEA verified dismantlement

of parts of the weapon complex not involving nuclear material. Such a precedent could have important

implications for other states having prior or suspected connections to nuclear weapon programs, such

as Argentina, Brazil, and North Korea, and if they were accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon

states, India, Israel, and Pakistan.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995

were conducted under the authority of U.N. Secu- cy of IAEA safeguards need detailed information

rity Council Resolution 687, rather than a typical

IAEA safeguards agreement, the IAEA was free to

accept assistance from, and to share inspection results with, whomever it pleased. However, special

procedures had to be developed to limit the access

of non-nuclear-weapon state personnel to sensitive Iraqi nuclear weapon design information. It

will be harder to make such a distinction in the

context of routine safeguards activities.

Increase transparency within the IAEA itself.

Just as the IAEA requires access to facilities

and information to achieve its safeguards objectives, so do those attempting to assess the adequaabout the functioning of the IAEA to determine

how robust those safeguards objectives are and

how well they are being implemented. To its credit, the IAEA has earned the reputation of being

able to keep proliferation-sensitive and proprietary information closely held within its ranks. In

fact, it is mandated to do so by Article VII(F) of

the IAEA statute, which instructs the Director

General and his staff to “not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information

coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the Agency.”

Nevertheless, the practice of restricting the dissemination of information appears to extend into
86 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

areas and types of information that might, in fact,

offer benefits in increased public confidence in the

safeguards system if they were to be made available. In contrast to “safeguards-confidential” information, which is generally not shared with

member states or the Board of Governors, many

reports by the IAEA Secretariat are distributed to

the member states, but are not released to the public. For instance, the 1991-1995 Safeguards Criteria document, which contains a detailed and updated description of the safeguards and inspection

activities that must be carried out at any given type

of facility, is not publicly available.85 Neither are

the annual Safeguards Implementation Reports

(SIRS) available. These safeguards reports present

an overall assessment of how well the IAEA has

met its safeguards goals for the year, including

problems it has encountered with C/S and other

equipment. Distribution of SIRS is restricted

despite the efforts made to protect the identities

of any specific country or facility discussed in

them. There are many IAEA technical papers and

analyses on safeguards whose distribution is not

explicitly restricted, but that are not widely publicized. 86 However, there is a large body of public

literature, available in various conference proceedings and journal articles, to which IAEA and

outside researchers both contribute.

Public confidence in the IAEA’s effectiveness is difficult to earn in a closed environment.

Greater openness on the part of the IAEA itself

might also allow outside experts to formulate

more informed proposals for its improvement, an

outcome which could ultimately strengthen the

overall safeguards regime.

The United States could encourage IAEA

member states to accept the IAEA's proposed assignments of inspectors to their territories, and to issue inspectors long-duration, multiple-entry visas.

Under INFCIRC/153, states are allowed to reject the IAEA’s assignment, or “designation,” of

inspectors to their country for any reason they

choose. (This provision is not unique to the IAEA;

the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, also permits states to exclude particular inspectors from their territory.) Although restricting

which inspectors may visit which countries generates inefficiencies, and can even lessen the credibility of IAEA inspections in certain areas, the

United States and almost every other IAEA member-state government have exercised this right to

exclude individual inspectors or classes of inspector at some time.87 Some of the restrictions imposed by states include requiring that inspectors

85 It is difficult to argue that withholding this document from the public makes it significantly harder to identify and take advantages of weaknesses in the safeguards system. Plant operators-who, if anyone, would be the ones to take advantage of such weaknesses-become intimately

familiar with this documents’ requirements during the routine course of safeguards inspections.

86 

For instance, there are extremely few entries in the 1990-92 IAEA catalogue of publications under the heading of safeguards. Although

the safeguards budget comprises over a third of the IAEA budget; only two pages of the catalogue’s 170 pages list safeguards publications, and

the majority of these are at least 10 years old. (The catalog lists publications that are for sale by the IAEA and does not include materials distributed free of charge.) According to the IAEA, the intention of the sales publications is to “compile state-of-the-art knowledge from the international nuclear community for dissemination to Member States to help them enhance their own abilities to apply peaceful, nuclear techniques in

medicine, industry, agriculture, etc.” Given the prominence that IAEA safeguards have attained due to the IAEA’s involvement in Iraq and

North Korea since 1991, the IAEA has made a conscious effort “to give corresponding weight to our technical assistance efforts that remain at

the heart of the bargain implicit in the ‘Atoms for Peace’ philosophy and of central importance for our developing Member States that are numerically in the majority.” Quotations are from letter in response to Office of Technology Assessment questions from Jan Priest, Division of External Relations, IAEA, January 17, 1995, op. cit., footnote 34, p. 3.

87 Fischer and Szazs, op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 63-64. For instance, it has been reported that in the 5 years preceding the 1981 Israeli bombing of

Iraq’s Osirak reactor, Iraq had allowed only Soviet and Hungarian nationals to carry out inspections on its territory. One inspector from

France-the country that had sold the reactor to Iraq—had also been accepted, but had yet to conduct an inspection (see Roger Richter, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Nuclear Nonproliferation, June 19, 1981).
Chapter 3 Enhancing the Traditional IAEA Safeguards Regime | 87

come from NPT states or from states that themselves are under IAEA safeguards; or requiring

that they speak the language of the inspected

state.88 The United States excludes inspectors

from states that do not accept U.S. inspectors, and

those from states that do not have diplomatic relations with the United States. Like practically all

other states, it also reserves the right to refuse to

issue visas to particular individuals that it deems

ineligible to enter the country (e.g., that are suspected of being terrorists).

Since few states will give up control over the

entry of foreign nationals to their territory, few

states will be willing to waive completely their

right to exclude proposed inspectors. The IAEA

can, however, discourage countries from abusing

this procedure, or from taking an unreasonably

long time to respond to lists of inspectors proposed for their territory. For example, it could

publicize such rejections and their justifications,

if any; impose the highest allowed inspection frequencies in states that have a history of refusing

the bulk of inspector designations; or perhaps

even call for a certain number of special inspections at declared sites while the state deliberates

on accepting inspector designations.

To reduce bureaucratic delays, and to help

make inspections more timely, countries could

agree to provide long-duration, multiple-entry visas to inspectors. Requiring IAEA inspectors to

obtain visas for each inspection visit makes it impossible for them to conduct short-notice inspections even if a state has agreed to accept such inspections as a transparency measure.

Director General Blix proposed in 1988 that

states waive their right to approve the designation

of individual inspectors for their territory, and

instead accept inspectors as approved by the

IAEA Board of Governors. It is understood that

such a waiver may be subject to reservations, and

may be withdrawn at any time. The United States

has accepted this proposal, and it provides IAEA

inspectors designated for the United States with

one-year, multiple-entry visas.89 In waiving the

right to approve individual inspector designations, the United States is presumably assuming

that the IAEA will not designate inspectors that

the United States finds unacceptable. Alternatively, the United States may be relying on its ability

to withdraw this waiver if necessary. The Director

General also offered a modified proposal in which

states that did not respond within a certain time to

the list of inspectors that the IAEA proposed for

their territory would be considered to have approved the list in its entirety. Under previous practice, if a state did not respond, the list was considered to be rejected.

Exclude non-NPT states or NPT states with

dubious nonproliferation credentials from membership

on the IAEA Board of Governors.

The IAEA grew out of the “Atoms for Peace”

era and was established more than a decade before

the NPT was signed. Despite its having been assigned the responsibility for conducting the principal verification activities of the NPT, the IAEA

is an independent institution that maintains certain inherent contradictions with respect to its role

in nonproliferation policies. One is its promotional role for nuclear energy and research, elements

of which arguably make it easier for certain states

to develop a nuclear weapon program. An alternate view, however, is that the IAEA’s promotional activities enhance the nonproliferation regime

since: 1) without them, fewer states may have

been willing to participate in the safeguards regime at all, and 2) promotional and technical

cooperation activities conducted under IAEA auspices can provide considerable insight—if the information is shared between the IAEA’s technical

cooperation and safeguards divisions—as to the

breadth and depth of a state’s nuclear technology,

88 Fischer and Szasz, op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 63-64.

89 Letter in response to Office of Technology Assessment questions, from Jan Priest, Division of External Relations, IAEA, Jan. 17, 1995.

op. cit., footnote 34, p. 2
88 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

including technology acquired independently of

the IAEA.

Another mismatch between the IAEA as originally created and the new responsibilities given it

by the NPT is the IAEA’s membership, and particularly that of its 35-member Board of Governors.90 In recent years, the Board has included

representatives from a number of states that, at the

time, were not NPT members: Argentina and Brazil (which were thought to have had nuclear weapon ambitions), India and Pakistan (both widely

believed capable of fielding nuclear weapons on

short notice), Algeria (whose imported research

reactor from China had caused concern), Ukraine,

and Cuba. The Board of Governors has also included NPT member Libya, which was widely reported to have sought to purchase nuclear weapons from China. Another NPT party on the Board

with a less-than-perfect nonproliferation record is

Romania, which as recently as 1992 admitted violating the terms of its NPT commitments under

one of its previous political regimes.

It has been suggested that the IAEA’s credibility is weakened by having non-NPT or would-be

proliferant nations on its Board of Governors sitting in judgment of potential proliferants.91 In this

view, the IAEA would better serve the NPT if its

Board of Governors could be restricted to NPT

members, if not to NPT members with robust nonproliferation credentials. Admittedly, it would be

difficult or impossible for the IAEA as an institution to make such a determination. As was demonstrated by the United Nations in the 1970s, the inclusion of countries with strongly contrasting

approaches to security can polarize an institution,

bogging it down with political infighting.

On the other hand, the Board—unlike the U.N.

Security Council—is not subject to vetoes, and a

small number of non-NPT states would not be

able to subvert the Board’s actions even if they

wanted to. Some IAEA officials argue that involving states such as India and Pakistan directly in

IAEA affairs actually has positive effects for nonproliferation by helping draw them into the circle

of responsible nations. IAEA officials also claim

that representatives of such countries have often

been helpful in Board decisions, commanding influence with G-77 (nonaligned) states and bringing to the IAEA valuable perspectives on nonproliferation norms. On decisions involving Iraq and

North Korea, the Board, including its NPT nonmembers, was able to act quite decisively once information was presented to it.

In any case, the IAEA Statute stipulates that

“The Agency is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members....,” making it

very difficult to establish new criteria for selection

for the Board of Governors that would exclude

some of the IAEA’s member states. The Statute

can be amended by a two-thirds vote of the Board

of Governors followed by two-thirds ratification

of the state parties, but states not accepting the

amendment are not bound to remain within the

IAEA. Restricting the Board of Governors could

thus push certain states to withdraw their membership altogether, along with their political, financial, and technical contributions. Perhaps more

importantly, it might alienate states who are unlikely to join the NPT but whose participation

would be desirable in future, related arms-control

activities such as a global comprehensive nuclear

test ban or a cutoff in the production of fissionable

materials for nuclear weapons. On balance, attempts at restructuring Board membership appear

to be fraught with significant obstacles and limited tangible benefits.

90States serving on the IAEA Board of Governors for 1994-1995 are noted in appendix B.

91See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety, op. cit., footnote 43, pp. 5, 22.
Beyond

the

Traditional

NPT/IAEA

Framework

he preceding chapters presented several options to bolster

controls over nuclear weapon material production that can

be implemented within the context of existing institutions

and agreements. However, that discussion also noted that

some issues simply cannot be addressed within the present regime. Put another way, even if safeguards worked perfectly in

those states agreeing to them, there would still be issues of concern for nonproliferation. For example, although the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the world’s most widely subscribed-to arms control agreement—with 178 members as of May 25, 1995 (see

appendix B)—it does not have universal adherence. While only

three holdouts—India, Pakistan, and Israel—are of any real proliferation concern, that concern is genuine, given that these states

almost certainly possess nuclear weapons or the capability to

make them on very short notice. Furthermore, while the Treaty

prohibits the use of nuclear technology for weapon purposes, it

also requires that states promote the transfer of peaceful applications of such technology. Under International Atomic Energy

Agency full-scope safeguards agreements, NPT parties are also

permitted to acquire and stockpile nuclear-weapon-usable material. Finally, even if the IAEA is able to detect violations of safeguards, it and the rest of the world community may be unable to

compel compliance, especially within the time necessary to forestall serious consequences.

From the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation, the current

regime to control nuclear weapon materials contains certain inherent contradictions and limitations. This chapter presents a

number of distinct policy options that might be pursued to miti-

| 89
90 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

gate or eliminate some of these limitations.1 The

various options are not meant to comprise a mutually consistent package, nor does discussion by

the Office of Technology Assessment necessarily

imply its support or opposition to any of them.

AMENDING THE NON-PROLIFERATION

TREATY

Despite the NPT’s limitations, amending it is

probably not a viable option for both procedural and political reasons. Procedurally, the

amendment process specified by Article VIII of

the NPT makes the Treaty extremely difficult to

strengthen in any significant way. Each proposed

amendment must be circulated by the Depository

Governments (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia) to all NPT members, and at least

one-third of the members (59 out of 177) must request a conference be convened to discuss the

amendment. Before entering into force, the

amendment must be approved and ratified by a

majority of all parties to the Treaty (89 out of 177),

including all the nuclear weapon states (now that

all are parties to the NPT) as well as all NPT parties that are represented on the IAEA’s Board of

Governors at the time the amendment is circulated. Even then, an amendment only binds those

states that approve it. Thus, it is possible through

such amendments that different versions of the

NPT could be in force at the same time. Moreover,

some states not approving the amendment might

use the opportunity to withdraw from the Treaty

altogether.

Politically, the problems may be even worse.

The NPT would never have been concluded if a

number of compromises had not been struck. For

example, non-nuclear-weapon states agree to

forego nuclear weapons, and in return nuclearweapon states agree to work toward nuclear disarmament. States agree to forego weapon applications of nuclear technology in return for access to

its peaceful applications. Re-opening any of these

debates—and possibly, re-opening any portion of

the Treaty—could rend these compromises asunder. Not only might a proposed amendment fail to

win widespread support, but a divisive debate

could ensue that would seriously damage support

for the rest of the Treaty as well. Many of these issues were raised at the Treaty’s 25th anniversary

review and extension conference in April and May

1995, but that conference only had the authority to

decide on the Treaty’s extension and was not empowered to amend it (see box 4-1).

In lieu of amending the NPT, other approaches

might be considered that could be less contentious, easier to arrange, and ultimately just as effective politically, although perhaps not legally

binding. Such alternatives could have included

making statements in the final consensus document of the 1995 NPT extension conference, although in fact no such document was issued by the

conference. They could also include adding protocols to the IAEA Statute; strengthening other

institutions related to the nonproliferation regime,

such as Nuclear Suppliers Group dual-use export

controls; implementing G-7 policies on foreign

aid and trade2; passing resolutions in the United

Nations Security Council; or enacting new multilateral agreements such as a fissionable material

production cutoff or a comprehensive test ban

treaty. Negotiation of a complete alternative or

successor to the NPT, however, would be a diffi1For a discussion of nonproliferation policy options in areas other than control of nuclear materials or IAEA activities, see U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, August 1993). Specific nonproliferation policies are also discussed in two other publications from this OTA assessment: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994) and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation and the Former Soviet

Union, OTA-ISC-605 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994).

2The G-7 countries are the major industrial economies of the world: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the

United States.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework 91

Unlike other major arms control treaties, the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not have unlimited duration.

At the time the Treaty was drafted in the late 1960s, it was not clear how successful the Treaty would be

at simultaneously arresting the spread of nuclear weapons among nonweapon states, reversing the nuclear arms race among the weapon states, and fostering the spread of peaceful nuclear technology. Its

negotiators did not want to assume that it would be desirable to maintain the situation that evolved under the NPT indefinitely. Therefore, Article X, paragraph 2 of the NPT states that:

Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the

Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional period or periods. This decision

shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

The conference specified in Article X, held in New York in April and May 1995, resulted in the indefinite extension of the NPT by consensus. This decision does not require ratification by the NPT parties,

which in ratifying the original Treaty (including Article X) have already agreed to delegate to the extension conference the power to extend the Treaty. However, the extension conference was not empowered to make any changes to the Treaty’s text. Revisiting any of the provisions of the NPT would

require amending the Treaty, a complicated procedure that most experts believe to be virtually impossible in practice. (See discussion on “Amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty” in the main text.)

The United States and many other NPT parties strongly supported indefinite extension of the NPT,

arguing that it is in every nation’s interest to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and that the NPT

represents the only international arms control agreement binding all the nuclear weapon states to make

progress toward nuclear disarmament. However, these sentiments are by no means unanimous. Other

nations came into the extension conference opposed to indefinite extension, at least in the absence of

significant additional measures toward nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states. In fact,

some argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be superseded by a “Nuclear Weapons Convention” that would ban nuclear weapons entirely, just as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions ban all parties from maintaining those types of weapon. In addition, some states also argued that

the industrialized NPT parties have not complied with their obligation to “participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful

uses of atomic energy. ”

Factors that were raised during the extension conference, many of which are beyond the scope of

this study, include:

■

■

■

m

m

the pace of superpower nuclear arms reductions, and progress toward a global comprehensive testban treaty1 or fissionable material cutoff;

U.S. or other nuclear-weapon state pledges of “no first-use” of nuclear weapons or other security guarantees made to non-nuclear-weapon states;

the West’s position on targeting NPT members such as Iran with export controls on nuclear-unique and

nuclear-related technologies;

progress in removing former Soviet nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—all now

non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT—to Russia;

the behavior of North Korea in resolving its conflicts with the NPT and IAEA over safeguards inspections and once-threatened Treaty withdrawal;

(continued)

1Although nuclear test bans by themselves cannot prevent proliferation of fission weapons and are therefore not essential technical ingredients to preventing proliferation, they have played an important political role in the proliferation debate, especially over the

NPT extension in 1995, See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Decemeber 1993).
92 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

■ the perceived effectiveness of the IAEA and the U.N. Special Commission for Iraq (UNSCOM) in enforcing the nonproliferation regime; and

■ improved international relations, reducing the need for a nuclear deterrent.

The alternatives to indefinite extension, as specified in Article X, are extension “for an additional period or periods. ” Extension for a fixed period would have terminated the NPT at the conclusion of that

period, since the Treaty makes no provision for a future extension conference to extend the Treaty once

its initial extension period has expired. By explicitly differentiating extension for additional periods (plural) from extension for an additional period (singular), the Treaty text does imply that the 1995 conference is empowered to do something other than either extend the Treaty for a single term or extend it

indefinitely. One possibility in between those cases would have been to extend the Treaty for an indefinite series of fixed periods, each concluded by a conference that would determine whether the Treaty

would continue through the following period.2 This option was the principal alternative to the indefinite

extension that was eventually adopted, but it was not supported by very many of the parties attending

the conference.

Only a simple majority of the parties to the Treaty was needed to decide on the Treaty’s extension.

However, a close vote would have been undesirable since it would indicate that a substantial fraction of

the Treaty’s membership was opposed to extension on whatever terms had been adopted, undermining

support for the Treaty. Therefore, it was important to the United States and other supporters of indefinite

extension that the conference reach its final result by consensus. This consensus was made possible

by creatively wording the extension resolution to read that “a majority exists among States party to the

Treaty for its indefinite extension. ”3

In this way, even countries that would not have voted for indefinite

extension could agree that a majority for indefinite extension existed, avoiding a recorded vote that

would have been divisive to the nonproliferation regime.

2George Bunn, “Extending the Nonproliferation Treaty: Legal Questions Faced by the parties in 1995, ” American Society Of International Law, Issue Papers on World Conferences, No. 2, October 1994.

3Draft extension resolution proposed by the NPT Conference President, “Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ” NPT/CONF. 1995/L 6, 9 May 1995.

cult and contentious affair that would have to con- the Hague for advisory opinions on treaty intertend with all the political difficulties that make

NPT amendment so difficult.

REINTERPRETING THE

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

International law differs from domestic law in that

under normal circumstances, there is no supranational governmental structure that can provide and

enforce authoritative interpretations of a treaty’s

provisions. U.N.-affiliated agencies such as the

IAEA can ask the International Court of Justice in

pretation, but these have no binding authority.3

The U.N. Security Council has the power to issue

and enforce resolutions that are binding upon all

U.N. member states, but it can do so only when

acting to “maintain or restore international peace

and security” under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Otherwise, the Security Council does not have

any binding authority to interpret treaties, although even a nonbinding resolution may carry

significant weight. In effect, therefore, a treaty

3Many treaties—not including the NPT—specify that disputes between parties over treaty provisions are to be referred to the International

Court of Justice.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework | 93

means what its members agree that it means,

providing at least the possibility that the members might collectively agree on a new interpretation of a treaty without formally amending it.

In practice, however, NPT reinterpretation may

not be much easier to accomplish than a formal

amendment. Should some member states disagree

with the consensus arrived at by the others, those

states may decide they are not bound by the reinterpretation. In case of dispute, treaty interpretation is based upon the treaty’s negotiating record,

upon presentations made to various legislatures

when their consent to the treaty’s ratification was

sought, and upon the record the parties have accumulated in implementing the treaty—none of

which will be very amenable to reinterpretation

after the fact.4

Treaty reinterpretation may be contentious

within governments as well as between them. In

countries such as the United States and Russia that

have legislatures that are independent of their

executive branches, those legislatures may object

to reinterpretations that are inconsistent with the

record that was submitted by the executive branch

when legislative consent to treaty ratification was

granted.

However, if the Non-Proliferation Treaty were

to be reinterpreted, an alternate reading of Article

III could require the application of tighter safeguards to non-nuclear-weapon states, as suggested in the following two options.5

Combine INFCIRC/153 safeguards required of all non-nuclear-weapon NPT members with

INFCIRC/66 safeguards that can provide greater coverage of selected plants, equipment, and facilities.

Apply safeguards to materials other than

fissionable or fissile materials that nevertheless have

relevance for nuclear weapons, such as tritium, lithium-6, and beryllium.

Article 111.1 of the NPT requires non-nuclearweapon states to accept IAEA safeguards over “all

source or special fissionable material [e.g., highly

enriched uranium, plutonium, or the materials

from which these materials are produced] in all

peaceful nuclear activities” within its territory. No

provision explicitly requires safeguards to be

placed on facilities independent of the nuclear materials they may contain, nor over any other type

of material relevant to nuclear weapon manufacture. Consequently, the IAEA’s INFCIRC/153

safeguards, developed to implement the safeguards mandated by the NPT, center on nuclear

materials. For any specific facility, INFCIRC/153

safeguards are not as stringent as the INFCIRC/66

safeguards that predated the NPT, which can cover

plant and equipment independent of any nuclear

materials they may contain, and can also encompass materials such as tritium, lithium-6, and beryllium that have relevance to nuclear weapons

but are not considered “special nuclear materials.”

An alternate interpretation of Article 111 of the

NPT would place greater weight on the requirement that safeguards be applied “... for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of [a

non-nuclear-member state’s] obligations . . . to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful

uses to nuclear weapons ...” In this view, IAEA

safeguards exist to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and they can justifiably cover a

broader scope than just the nuclear materials that

might be diverted to those weapons. However,

IAEA safeguards under the NPT have until

4 Treaty interpretation is addressed in the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, which is in force and reflects customary practice accepted by the United States, even though the United States has not ratified it. See discussion in footnote 19, p. 7 of George Bunn, “Extending the

Non-Proliferation Treaty: Legal Questions Faced by the Parties in 1995,” American Society of International Law, Issue Papers on World Conferences, No. 2, October 1994.

5 See, e.g., Leonard Weiss, “The NPT: Strengths and Gaps,” published paper distributed by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,

NOV. 18, 1994, p. 14.
94 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

now not been taken to be this encompassing,

and it would be difficult to gain international consensus behind this new interpretation. Moreover,

implementing such an interpretation would require renegotiation of every safeguards agreement

between the IAEA and a non-nuclear-weapon

NPT party.

PROBLEM NPT STATES

“Problem NPT states” are those states that are

members of the NPT but have obstructed the implementation of safeguards, have shown clear

signs of insincerity in fulfilling their nonproliferation commitments, or have pursued the development or acquisition of delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea is a prime

example. The NPT, along with the IAEA as its

verification instrument, is fundamentally limited in its ability to deal effectively with such

states. First, safeguards can only detect—and not

prevent (except by deterring)—the diversion of

nuclear materials to weapon use. In addition, safeguards cannot prevent NPT states from building

clandestine facilities outside of safeguards (although doing so would be a violation of the safeguards agreement), nor do they prohibit any of the

following activities:

 developing technologies related to non-nuclear

components of nuclear weapons,6

 building reprocessing and enrichment facilities

(thus providing a potential cover for weaponrelated material-production capability),

 stockpiling direct-use weapon material (e.g.,

material containing plutonium or highly enriched uranium) from such facilities, and

 withdrawing from the treaty if the state determines it is in its vital interest to do so, while retaining facilities and materials that were acquired while under the treaty.

Through the pursuit of such activities, a state

could position itself to manufacture nuclear weapons on relatively short notice. Therefore, the

United States has judged that countries such as

Iran, Iraq, and Libya should be discouraged from

acquiring civil nuclear technology of any kind,

whether or not full-scope safeguards are in place.7

This position does not necessarily imply a lack of

confidence in safeguards themselves, but rather in

the commitment of these states to remain under

them. Even a perfect safeguards system—one

that was certain to detect whether a state were

pursuing a nuclear weapon program—cannot

stop a country that wants nuclear weapons

more than it fears disclosure.

As a result, a former Department of Defense official offered the skeptical viewpoint that:

...[reprocessing and enrichment activities]

bring nations so close to having a bomb—within

days or weeks—that no amount of inspections

provide enough warning to prevent it. To assure

such warning we must limit the activities of inspected nations to those that are clearly ‘safe,’

that is, so distant from bomb making that inspections would afford years of warning.... We

should use this occasion [North Korea’s threat6Although technically not a safeguards violation, non-nuclear development that was weapon-related would probably violate the NPT’s

prohibition against “manufacture” of nuclear weapons. See footnote 9, and the related chapter text, for discussion of this point.

7Except in the case of a clear-cut safeguards violation or some other objective test, the IAEA is forbidden by its Statute from discriminating

against member states. It therefore cannot withhold nuclear technology from—or refuse to apply safeguards in—certain NPT parties thought by

some to be “problems.” A policy that drew such distinctions among NPT states could appear to conflict with those provisions of the NPT that

require the “fullest possible exchange” in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. (See the section later in this chapter on implementing general

embargoes of nuclear technology to problem NPT states.) Iraq is a special case, given that U.N. Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 prohibit Iraq from conducting nuclear activities “of any kind” (except for use of radioactive isotopes for medical, agricultural, or industrial purposes). These constraints go far beyond the NPT.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework | 95

ened withdrawal from the NPT] to dispel our

long-time fantasy that we can take assurances

from secretive, militant nations like North Korea and safeguard dangerous activities merely

by inspecting them.8

For clear historical reasons, the NPT does not

prohibit these so-called dangerous activities.

They were part of the bargain to induce states with

nuclear power or research programs to accept inspections and other infringements on their sovereignty by the IAEA; if they had been banned,

there never would have been a Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT does, however, require

states to refrain from “manufacturing” nuclear

weapons, which, under the so-called Foster interpretation, has come to mean engaging in any of the

activities directly associated with developing,

testing, or producing nuclear or non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons. 9 Since nuclear

weapons ultimately require nuclear materials, any

evidence of research or production efforts relating

to nuclear weapons—including their non-nuclear

components— would indicate the strong possibility that preparations are being made to produce,

divert, or otherwise acquire nuclear materials for

weapon purposes. Therefore, the IAEA’s current

position is that even though nuclear safeguards

agreements with states deal specifically with nuclear materials, any evidence of a nuclear weapon

program—even non-nuclear aspects of one—

would trigger requests for additional information

or special inspections to verify the absence of undeclared activities or materials, or of any preparations for such diversions.

Such a scenario is not without precedent. In

South Africa, both the admission by the government of having actually assembled six nuclear devices, as well as information obtained from technical visits to various types of facilities, led to a

very thorough and aggressive program of inspections by the IAEA. Nevertheless, these inspections were only made possible by the cooperation

of the South African government and its desire to

dispel any remaining doubts about the reversal of

its weapon program. They were also facilitated by

South Africa allowing outside nuclear weapon experts to accompany an IAEA inspection team.

To deal with problem NPT states, therefore, the

IAEA can encourage such cooperation and insist

that nuclear weapon experts be allowed to join inspection teams (if they are not already incorporated among the inspectorate), whether for technical visits, or routine, ad hoc, or special inspections. If such cooperation is not forthcoming,

the IAEA could also make maximum use of the

provision for special inspections under the rationale that “completeness” of the inventory or of all

declared activities cannot otherwise be assured.

Support placing additional constraints on

the ability of states to withdraw from the NPT on 90 days’

notice.

Article X of the NPT states that:

Each Party shall in exercising its national

sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the

Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have

jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations

Security Council three months in advance. Such

notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its

supreme interests. [emphasis added]

Such withdrawal clauses have now become

common in arms control treaties. Although the

NPT does not specify what would constitute “extraordinary events” or “supreme interests,” it is

clear that withdrawal is a very serious matter that

would not be taken lightly by the Security Coun8 

Henry Sokolski, U.S. Defense Department deputy for nonproliferation from 1989 until February 1993, “Non-Proliferation Fantasy: NPT

Will Not Quell N. Korean Nuclear Ambitions,” Defense News, vol. 8, No. 14, April 12-18, 1993, p. 20.

9 See discussion in George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, “Avoiding the ‘Definition’ Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban,” Arms Control

Today, vol. 23, No. 4, May 1993, pp. 16-17.
96 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

cil. (The first country ever to have begun the formal process of withdrawal from the NPT was

North Korea in 1993. 10)

One option for dealing with this contingency is

to clarify-perhaps via resolution of the U.N. Security Council—what it would take to constitute

legitimate grounds for treaty withdrawal: for example, a clear, newly emerging nuclear threat

from another country, imminent risk of invasion

by an overpowering military force, or some other

direct threat such as threatened or actual use of

other weapons of mass destruction. On the other

hand, clarifying reasons for withdrawal in this

reamer might make it easier for parties to leave

the Treaty. It could also damage the nonproliferation regime by implicitly assuming that the actual

possession of nuclear weapons might be needed to

deter aggression, and by diminishing the role of

other responses, such as looking to the international community for support or becoming allied

to an established nuclear weapon state. Moreover,

states may be reluctant to take actions or set precedents that may limit their own freedom of action

with respect to other treaties, even if they support

the objective of making it more difficult to leave

the NPT. One international legal expert, for example, suggests that the United States chose not to

seek a U.N. Security Council resolution challenging North Korea’s announced decision to withdraw from the NPT because it did not want to limit

its own freedom of action in the future.

This option could also encompass the formulation of policies for determining ownership and

setting forth the ultimate fate of the withdrawing

country’s safeguarded nuclear material. One option—admittedly unlikely to be enacted and difficult to enforce—would be for the withdrawing

state to forfeit any such materials immediately to

an international body for safekeeping. The U.N.

Security Council could goon record with a resolution declaring (well in advance of any particular

case) that if a state withdrew from the NPT without surrendering all the weapon-usable nuclear

materials it possessed—and possibly any additional nuclear materials and facilities that had

originally been provided by NPT states—then

that state would be considered a threat to international peace and security. Although such a resolution would not prevent withdrawal, it could clarify

that any state that amassed a stockpile of nuclear

weapon material under the cover of safeguards,

only to renounce its obligations and claim possession of that material, could open itself up to the

possibility that the Security Council would authorize coercive means-perhaps including military

force—to remove that state’s weapon potential.

Such an approach could encounter difficulties,

however, in its execution or its acceptance to

states already party to the NPT. The United Nations would have to decide what measures it

would consider appropriate to enforce such a takeback policy. Seizing material produced with little

or no foreign assistance would certainly meet with

considerable opposition. The use of military force

would quite possibly be required. Thus, such a

policy might have to be limited to fuel and other

nuclear materials produced or obtained with the

help of direct assistance from other NPT states—

and possibly only to fuel supplied after the Security Council resolution had been made. The Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) might be a useful forum

from which to stipulate such a condition of supply,

further bolstering its recent decision to require

full-scope safeguards as a condition of any significant new supply of dual-use nuclear technologies.

Attempt to implement general embargoes

of nuclear technology for problem NPT states.

Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have

agreed to withhold nuclear technology not only

from states that are not subject to full-scope IAEA

safeguards agreements, but also from those states

that are but whose commitment to comply with

them is considered questionable. In addition, the

guidelines adopted by the NSG in April 1992 ex1O North Korea suspended its withdrawal just before the 90-day period ended.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework | 97

plicitly state that a country’s eligibility to import

certain dual-use items (i.e., those having both

weapon applications and legitimate civil uses)

from an NSG member depends on factors such as

the recipient country’s statements and behaviors

regarding its nonproliferation commitments.

However, withholding assistance from NPT

parties poses a number of dilemmas. For instance,

which criteria should be used to determine the nations to be embargoed, or even to determine what

might constitute a given country’s “legitimate”

nuclear fuel-cycle requirements? So far, the

United States has been most interested in isolating

Iran, but has had little success in convincing its

European allies to join in an embargo of general

high-technology trade. (In part, this difficulty is

because Iran has thus far apparently abided by its

IAEA safeguards agreements.) In the case of Iran,

government officials had made alarming statements (later contradicted) indicating their desire

to develop nuclear weapons.

Many observers argue that this approach violates not only the spirit but the letter of the NPT,

since Article IV, section 2 states that:

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the

fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information

for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to

the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing . . . to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of

the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of

the developing areas of the world.

In response, the United States argues that section 1 of Article IV, while acknowledging the “inalienable right” of NPT parties to pursue nuclear

energy for peaceful purposes, explicitly makes

such activity contingent upon its being conducted

“in conformity with Articles I and II,” which ban

the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states. Analysts also note that there

should be some latitude for “consideration for the

needs” of countries seeking nuclear assistance.

For example, oil-rich states might be seen as having lesser needs for nuclear power, and states that

have not even built or operated nuclear power

reactors might be legitimately denied technology

for developing enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing capabilities. Since the Nuclear Suppliers

Group puts restrictions on dual-use export controls, for instance, that go well beyond what is required by the NPT (which does not address export

controls on dual-use items), it would appear that it

(or a subset of its members) could certainly apply

these kinds of considerations as well.

Argue for an expanded United Nations

Special Commission (UNSCOM) mandate to include

exposing, and possibly even rendering harmless, any

clandestine nuclear facilities in any non-nuclear-weapon NPT states worldwide, not just Iraq.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council created a Special Commission and

gave it extraordinary powers to ensure the “destruction, removal, or rendering harmless” of

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and its capability to produce more. 11 In the case of Iraq's nuclear weapon program, the U.N. Special Commission shares these powers with the IAEA.

UNSCOM is unique; only in Iraq, a militarily

defeated power, has the world community exercised the ability to reverse forcibly the development of weapons of mass destruction. Some have

argued that since the heads of state of the nations

comprising the U.N. Security Council have declared the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be a “threat to international peace and

security,” the Security Council should take similar

measures against other proliferant states, or at

least against those states that have committed not

to develop nuclear weapons but do so anyway.

One way to expose nuclear weapon facilities in

such countries might

special organization

be through the creation of a

like UNSCOM, under the

1 1U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687 (1991), Apr. 8, 1991.
98 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Destruction of an Iraqi nuclear facility at direction of the

United Nations Security Council.

direction of the U.N. Security Council, to receive

and evaluate national intelligence information on

possible clandestine nuclear programs. This

organization, with explicit prior U.N. backing,

would then direct the IAEA to conduct special inspections, possibly assisting in the inspections.

This new agency would deal with cases wherein intelligence information strongly indicated the

presence of a clandestine nuclear fuel-cycle facility, and the matter were serious, sensitive, and urgent enough to demand rapid and vigorous action.

The advantage of such an organization would lie

not in replacing the function of the IAEA, but in

pre-establishing the Security Council’s interest in

ensuring the investigation of clandestine nuclear

facilities in states that have foresworn them. Establishing such an organization and granting it the

needed authority might be extremely hard, however, since it would require U.N. Security Council

action and would be subject to a veto. Implementing missions to render any such discovered facilities harmless would be even more difficult, and

would almost certainly require explicit Security

Council action on a case-by-case basis. It is extremely unlikely that the Security Council would

(or even could) delegate to this new organization

the authority to force a state to accept an inspection or destroy a facility.

Since the IAEA already can request special inspections of locations that it has reason to believe

would reveal violations of a state’s safeguards

agreement, this approach is not necessary to obtain the authority to ask for access to such facilities. Where it would go beyond existing IAEA authority would be in short-circuiting the safeguards

process—which is primarily focused on declared

facilities anyway—and in demonstrating prior Security Council backing for inspections. That is,

under the present situation, before the IAEA can

report a matter to the Security Council, it has to: 1)

find an anomaly through routine safeguards activities or through other information made available

to it, 2) bring the problem to the attention of the

government involved, 3) attempt to resolve the

problem, and 4) request a special inspection if the

matter cannot be resolved. There are no preordained timelines within which special inspections

must be completed. Establishing a U.N. organization to deal directly with possible clandestine activities in NPT states would allow this procedure to

be streamlined in egregious cases, thus possibly

saving many months or more of time that might

otherwise be required by the standard escalating

sequences of IAEA procedures.

This option might be opposed from two different directions: because it goes too far, or because it

does not go far enough. In the first camp, some

would object that the IAEA already has the authority to conduct special inspections, and the creation of a new organization for the same mission

invites duplication, if not confusion. At the least,

relations between this organization and the IAEA

would have to be managed very carefully.

Those who argue that this proposal does not go

far enough, on the other hand, might prefer to see

the United Nations establish a body that would replace the IAEA—rather than work with it—for

this mission. They might, for instance, believe

that with its dual mission of safeguarding nuclear

facilities and promoting nuclear power, the IAEA

is not able to confront possible nuclear proliferation as vigorously as would anew United Nations

organization. However, this argument faces serious difficulties. First, replacing the IAEA’s authority to conduct special inspections would probably have a detrimental effect on the rest of the

IAEA’s safeguards activities, and it might entail

the costly duplication of existing IAEA functions.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework | 99

Second, since it is doubtful that the Security

Council would delegate the authority to force a

state to accept an inspection or destroy a facility,

having a standing UNSCOM-like organization

may not help much. Should the Security Council

decide to take such action in the future, it could reconstitute such an organization.

Finally, and most significantly, if the desire to

substitute a U.N. organization for the IAEA is

motivated by doubts that the IAEA would be

willing to take forceful action against one of its

own members, much the same doubts could

also surround any new U.N.-related organization. It might be added that in the case of North

Korea, it was the IAEA that uncovered discrepancies in the North Korean declaration, confronted

the North Koreans with its findings, and pressed

for special inspections. When the matter was referred to the U.N. Security Council, the Council

declined to take enforcement action. The United

Nations and the IAEA are each governed by their

respective memberships, which are largely the

same. In the current international system, states

may be quite reluctant to encourage the Security

Council to exercise its full powers, fearing that

these powers may someday be turned against

themselves.

NON-NPT “THRESHOLD” STATES

Bring threshold nuclear states at least partty into the nonproliferation regime by capping their production of weapon materials.

“Threshold states” are those, most notably India, Israel, and Pakistan, that are widely believed

to have a nuclear weapon capability or the ability

to deploy nuclear weapons on short notice, but

have never officially acknowledged it. Although it

is unlikely that these states would be willing to accept full-scope (INFCIRC/153-like) safeguards

under present circumstances, they might be willing to participate in greatly increased safeguards

coverage by joining a proposed universal (or nearly so) international convention to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or

outside safeguards. Such a convention, as supported by the Clinton Administration, would allow threshold states that may already have an

overt or latent nuclear weapon capability to place

all their current and future nuclear material production facilities under safeguards without having

to declare or acknowledge past material production or weapon development activities. The essential difference between this arrangement

and full-scope safeguards is that a verified fissionable cutoff would only look forward; it

would not seek to verify the absolute size or

whereabouts of current stockpiles of nuclear

material and would not address the issue of

weapon possession or past development. It

would be full-scope only with regards to facilities

and future production of materials, all of which

would have to be declared, safeguarded, and

constrained to peaceful applications. It would

therefore offer at least the benefit of assuring others that no participating country was producing

any additional materials that could be used in a

weapon program. It would also include identical

provisions for the nuclear-weapon states, thereby

avoiding the discriminatory aspect of the NPT.

Such a convention would have no effect on the

non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT,

which are already forbidden from producing nuclear materials for use in weapons or outside safeguards. It would, however, place additional

constraints upon the NPT nuclear-weapon states,

which are now free to produce nuclear weapon

materials without limit and are not even required

to place their peaceful nuclear programs under

safeguards. In so doing, it would be consistent

with the nuclear disarmament provisions of Article VI of the NPT.

A fissile-material production cutoff would not,

however, impose any significantly new burdens

on the United States, since the United States announced in June 1992 that it would not produce

any more highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Existing stockpiles of nuclear material were assumed to suffice for whatever might be done with

the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Where this convention

would affect the United States is in its verification

provisions. The U.S. government has not yet
100 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Former U.S. nuclear material production facilities would probably become subject to international monitoring—possibly by the

International Atomic Energy Agency—if a convention banning the production of nuclear materials for weapons were to come

into force. Left: the N-reactor, a former plutonium production reactor at the Hanford site in Washington state. Right: the interior

of a plutonium reprocessing facility at the Savannah River facility in South Carolina.

agreed either on what provisions the United States

would wish to see applied to other nations in order

to have confidence that they were complying with

the cutoff, or on what provisions the United States

could live with if applied to U.S. facilities.

Such a convention also for the first time would

place limits on any non-NPT states that chose to

join it. The inducement for countries such as Israel, India, and Pakistan to do so would involve

self-interest in advancing regional peace processes, as well as obtaining concessions from the

nuclear-weapon states by accepting binding

constraints on their own programs.

If such a convention could be implemented, it

could go a long way toward capping a nuclear

arms race in South Asia and contributing to the

Middle East peace process. However, even though

the convention itself would be silent as to any existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or weapon

materials among the threshold states, it might

harm the nonproliferation regime because it

may be viewed as legitimizing the existing nuclear capabilities of the threshold states. Any

verification regime for the convention, for example, would have to exempt (implicitly or explicitly) existing stockpiles of weapon materials, since

past production would not be covered. Such an exemption might be construed as lending legitimacy

to the excluded stocks.

A cutoff convention would also lock in perceived nuclear disparities among both threshold

and acknowledged nuclear weapon states, without

providing a clear recipe for further confidencebuilding measures or disarmament. It also would

tacitly legitimize the production of safeguarded

weapon-usable material, regardless of a country’s

fuel-cycle needs. (In this, though, it is no more

permissive than the NPT, which also allows such

production.) Indeed, some critics of a cutoff convention fear that in lining up international support

for the convention, the United States would promise other states freedom to pursue activities that

are not explicitly prohibited by the convention

(e.g., producing weapon-capable materials under

safeguards). In so doing, they argue, the United

States would have the effect of creating an “entitlement” for states to conduct activities that the

United States would otherwise oppose.

Cutoff proponents, in turn, counter that the

United States does not have to promise its negotiating partners that it would support their decision to conduct such activities. The United States

could make clear that it opposed such activities
Chapter 4

even while acknowledging that it was not yet able

to get international consensus on banning them.

Allow a one-time-only extension of the “nuclear club” while universalizing the NPZ 12

The concept of a one-time extension of the declared nuclear states would involve setting up a

time period in which de facto nuclear powers

would be encouraged to declare their nuclear

weapon status one way or the other, followed by

the U.N. Security Council issuing a binding resolution that any future acquisition of weapons of

mass destruction by any state (whether or not a

member of the NPT) would constitute a threat to

international peace and security that the Security

Council would be required to halt. 13 The deadline

for self-declaration of nuclear status would allow

states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan a chance

to establish themselves as nuclear-weapon states,

if they chose to do so, and thus avoid coming under the provisions of this declaration. Once declared as nuclear-weapon states, they would have

no political reason to stay outside a suitably

broadened NPT, which could then become universal. At the cost of expanding the nuclear club,

therefore, a universal (albeit still two-tiered) NPT

might be created that would be stronger than one

having several significant holdout states. Without

these holdouts, there would be great pressure on

the remaining states still outside the NPT to join,

making the NPT truly universal. If enforced by the

Security Council, such a treaty would probably be

more effective than the existing NPT at preventing

still further proliferation. There would be the

problem, however, of verifying that a claimant actually had a nuclear weapon. Otherwise, a state

could, in effect, reserve itself a slot in the nuclear

club in advance.

Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework I 101

The main problem with this proposal is that it

would require an amendment of the NPT, which is

crafted to make amendments virtually impossible

(see discussion earlier in this chapter). Moreover,

the admission of three more powers into the nuclear club might weaken international resolve

against proliferation if no untoward consequences

were to result for them. Other disadvantages of

this would be that it would force the hand of Israel,

India, and Pakistan, which already face serious security dilemmas. Each of these states has its own

reasons for keeping the status of its nuclear program secret, and these reasons are probably tied

primarily to regional security concerns. Such a

one-time extension approach also fails to explain

how regional or international security would be

enhanced by threshold countries declaring their

nuclear weapon capabilities openly, rather than

harboring them implicitly. The decision to announce a nuclear weapon program publicly would

be a provocative political act that might stimulate

a response. In addition, neighbors of the new nuclear states, who would now confront a newly

overt (if not new) nuclear threat, may in return

withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty on

the grounds that it does not address their security

needs. They may even conclude that they need at

least to explore a nuclear weapon option.

Possibly, states making such declarations could

then begin to work toward transparency (in an attempt to limit possibly destabilizing worst-case

analysis by their adversaries) and toward arms

control measures, such as were pursued by the

United States and the former Soviet Union/Russia

since the 1960s. But given the track record of superpower transparency and arms reductions, it

could be years, if not decades, before tangible

benefits could be derived from such an approach.

12 See David Kay, "The IAEA—How Can It Be Strengthened?”, paper presented at the conference Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: Challenges and Opportunities, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, Dec. 1-2, 1992 (footnote 23 of Kay’s paper).

l3 The heads of the Security Council members, meeting in January 1992 at U.N. Headquarters in New York, declared in a statement

that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction “constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” However, this statement did not have

the force of a binding Security Council resolution.
102 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

It might also be difficult to convince other states

that the Security Council was serious about this

extension of the nuclear club being indeed “onetime,” never to be repeated if world circumstances

were to change drastically.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

Work to achieve a worldwide cutoff-either

voluntary or negotiated with verification provisions—on

production of all weapon-usable materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium). 14

One of the most serious weaknesses of the current regime of controls over nuclear materials is

that states are permitted to produce and stockpile

weapon-usable materials—highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium—as long as they are

placed under safeguards. After amassing a stockpile, a state would be free to withdraw from NPT

and use its materials in weapons. One way to close

this loophole is to eliminate the production of

highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium

entirely. Such a policy goes beyond the fissionable material cutoff described earlier, which permits the continued production of these materials

under safeguards for nonweapon purposes.

■ Highly Enriched Uranium

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has little use in

the civil sector. Although a number of research

reactors were originally designed to use HEU, the

RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and

Test Reactor) program has developed high-density, low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels that can be

substituted for HEU fuel in a number of reactor

types. Many such reactors have been converted.

(See discussion below on the RERTR program.)

Some reactors, however, have yet to be converted,

and suitable fuels for others do not yet exist.

For example, Germany is considering construction of a new HEU-fueled research reactor to produce intense beams of neutrons for materials studies. (The United States has just cancelled its plans

for a similar reactor.) Conversion of this reactor to

run on LEU fuel would introduce cost, performance, and schedule penalties that the project’s

supporters view to be unacceptable. Another civil

use for HEU is for the initial fuel loading for

breeder reactors, which are reactors designed to

produce plutonium fuel. Under such a cutoff proposal, such reactors would not be allowed, so

HEU would not be needed to develop them. (See

discussion of banning plutonium, immediately

below.)

Cutting off the production of HEU is more

problematic for military purposes, since naval nuclear reactors run on HEU. Nuclear-weapon powers with surplus stocks of HEU may be able to

draw on those stocks to fuel their nuclear-powered

naval vessels for many years; otherwise, states

would need to consider conversion to LEU (if possible) or abandonment of those vessels.

Monitoring a ban on the production of HEU is

complicated by the fact that many enrichment

technologies can be rather easily converted from

LEU production to HEU production. Therefore,

special means might have to be found to assure

those participating in a fissionable production ban

that LEU production facilities were not being converted in this way. Such means of verification

might have to be more intrusive than the Hexapartite safeguards agreement already in place for centrifuge facilities (which allows only limited access

to the cascade area), and might have to extend to

all enrichment technologies. In many cases, these

means would have to involve very short-notice inspections, such as provided for under the Hexapartite agreement. Such short notice is possible in

Europe and Japan, because the IAEA has resident

inspectors either in-country or able to travel there

14 A brief but useful summary of the history and ramifications of various fissile cutoff proposals is contained in the National Resources

Defense Council report “Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Issues and Options for the Clinton Administration,” January 1993, pp. 20-22.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/IAEA Framework | 103

without lengthy border-crossing procedures. This

approach may not be so easily extended to enrichment facilities elsewhere in the world, were they

to be established there.

❚ Plutonium

Eliminating the production of separated plutonium would terminate exploration and exploitation of one fuel cycle that had been envisaged

since the dawn of nuclear power: the recovery of

plutonium from spent reactor fuel and the exploitation of that plutonium in either the current

generation or a future generation of reactors (see

box 4-2). Because of its adverse implications for

proliferation, the United States actively tried to

discourage the use of plutonium in civil reactor

programs overseas under the Carter Administration in the late 1970s. In 1984, the United States

terminated the Clinch River breeder reactor program in Tennessee, and as of this writing the

United States no longer operates any experimental

or prototype breeder reactors.15 However, several

countries around the world still use, or say they intend to use, plutonium-based fuel cycles.

Banning the separation of plutonium would

eventually foreclose the exploitation (and even

the study) of the breeder reaction option. For

many nuclear power proponents, such a step is unthinkable. It would be strenuously opposed, for

example, by Russia, Japan, France, and possibly

India, Kazakhstan, and the United Kingdom, as

well as by some nuclear power proponents in the

United States, which would see such a move as

putting the most attractive feature of nuclear power forever out of reach. Russia has more practical

reasons to oppose a ban on plutonium production:

the three plutonium production reactors remaining in operation in Russia are producing steam

heat and electricity for nearby towns, and are the

only source of employment for skilled nuclear scientists and engineers in the area.16 At present, the

spent fuel from these production reactors must be

reprocessed within about two years to avoid corrosion and radioactive leakage into the spent fuel

pond. At least as of now, Japan still plans to make

extensive use of plutonium, having broken ground

in 1994 for its large reprocessing facility at Rokkasho-mura, now envisioned to attain full operation in the middle of the next decade.

Even so, interest in breeder reactors is declining around the world, making it easier to consider

banning the use of plutonium than it would have

been 10 years ago (see box 4-3). A ban on the production of weapon-usable materials would be supported by those who are unwilling to allow nations

to stockpile such materials under safeguards, by

those who do not believe that safeguards on plutonium handling plants are adequate to ensure that

plutonium is not diverted, and by those who believe that shipping significant amounts of plutonium between nuclear facilities poses unacceptable safety and security risks even if diversions

15For discussion of the advanced liquid metal reactor, an advanced reactor capable of being configured as a breeder, see U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor, OTA-BP-ENV-126 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994). The reactor was terminated by Congress and the Clinton Administration in 1994.

16These reactors also have characteristics that give them inherent needs for reprocessing, despite the fact that the resulting plutonium, with

less than 1,000 MW-days/ton burnup, is necessarily of excellent weapon grade. The reactors at Tomsk, like those at Hanford, cycle through

roughly 1,200 ton of natural uranium fuel per year (as opposed to 35 tons of low-enriched uranium/year for a light-water reactor); storage facilities at the reactor are adequate for only 6 to 12 months of spent fuel (which cannot be stored for longer than two years in any case; see main text).

While options for conversion to coal- or gas-fired generators are being studied, there is no infrastructure to bring in these fuels, and most such

options appear to run up against budgets on the order of at least a billion dollars. Laurin Dodd, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, presentation at

NRDC/FAS meeting, Washington, DC, Dec. 16-17, 1993. U.S. Vice President Gore and Russian Premier Chernomyrdin agreed in December

1993 to shut down these reactors by the year 2000 while taking steps to provide alternative energy supplies, with U.S. assistance.
104 Nuclear Safeguards and the lnternational Atomic Energy Agency

Nuclear reactors today generate their energy from the uranium-235 form of uranium, which comprises only 0.7 percent of natural uranium, The remaining portion of natural uranium, almost entirely the

uranium-238 form, does not directly produce energy in civil reactors. Some small fraction of this uranium-238 is, however, converted to plutonium—which can generate energy-during the course of reactor operation, such that by the time a load of fuel in one type of civil reactor requires replacement, some

25 percent of the energy being produced by that fuel is actually generated by the plutonium that has

previously been created within it.

Plutonium and unused uranium can be recovered from spent reactor fuel in a procedure called

chemical reprocessing, with the plutonium subsequently being used in one of two ways: in present-generation “light-water” nuclear reactors in the form of “mixed-oxide” (MOX) fuel, or in next-generation

“breeder” reactors. MOX, which has been used in a number of reactors around the world, typically consists of a few percent plutonium oxide mixed with natural or depleted uranium oxide and formed into

fuel rods, (Depleted uranium is the byproduct of producing enriched uranium. It has a smaller fraction

of uranium-235 than natural uranium has.) Although MOX eliminates the need to enrich uranium, the

extraordinary expense of processing plutonium into MOX makes MOX fuel more expensive than enriched uranium fuel with the same energy content, In fact, processing costs are so high that MOX would

be more expensive than uranium even if the plutonium used to make it were free. (Even if uneconomic

in terms of fuel costs, reprocessing might still be done for waste management purposes. It separates

the most intensely radioactive, shorter-lived reactor byproducts from less radioactive, although longerIived, components of the spent fuel,)

In a breeder reactor, a “blanket” containing natural uranium surrounds the reactor core, which is

fueled initially either with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Uranium-238 in the blanket turns to plutonium when irradiated, and a breeder reactor can generate more plutonium than it consumes. In so

doing, it can extend uranium reserves by as much as a factor of 1,000, compared with what would be

available if low-enriched uranium fuel were stored as waste after being used in a nuclear reactor.1 When

the availability of uranium was thought to be the limiting factor to the spread of nuclear power, it was

assumed that the nuclear fuel cycle would eventually be based on the generation, recovery, and re-use

of plutonium. However, for both economic and nonproliferation reasons, plutonium reprocessing has

lost much of its initial allure, and interest in breeder reactors has similarly declined (see box 4-3).

1A factor of 100 comes from the relative abundance of uranium-238 compared with uranium-235; another factor of 10 represents

the additional Iow-grade uranium resources that might make sense to recover if the uranium-238 content were to be exploited to make

plutonium, but that would not be economic to mine if only the uranium-235 were used. See National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 53, (footnote 29 of the

Academy report).

were certain to be detected. In this view, foregoing Policies governing the production or use of

the civil use of plutonium would be the lesser of new plutonium will influence, if not determine,

two evils.17 the methods chosen to dispose of existing stock17As an alternative to recycling, while retaining some of the energy value of the plutonium, there has been some interest in a fuel cycle called

“DUPIC” or Direct Use of Spent Power Reactor Fuel in Candu reactors. This approach envisions using spent LEU fuel directly in Candu naturaluranium reactors. Canada has been pushing this as a long-term approach, and there is the possibility that countries such as South Korea might be

interested in the future. The 0.9 percent Pu contained in the spent LWR fuel going in is reduced to 0.2 percent Pu. The advantages of such an

approach are that it gets rid of much Pu, and what Pu is left has a smaller proportion than does the original spent fuel of the Pu-239 isotope that is

desirable for weapons. One disadvantage is that radioactive fuel must be loaded into the Candu. More seriously, by institutionalizing the processing of spent fuel into new fuel to obtain additional energy, such a fuel cycle might still awaken interest in chemical reprocessing of full-circle

spent fuel and the development of a plutonium fuel cycle.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework 105

Breeder technology—which poses proliferation concerns since it requires separating and recycling plutonium—is no longer being vigorously pursued outside of Russia, India, and Japan. France’s 1,200-MW Superphénix fast-breeder reactor (FBR) has been shut down for extended periods. It was connected to the French electrical

grid for two days in December 1994, reaching 20 percent power, but has not operated since then. Despite the

investment of more than DM4 billion (more than $2.5 billion) between 1974 and 1991, Germany’s controversial

300-MW FBR at Kalkar had never opened. In March 1991, German officials declared that the project had no hope

of being licensed and was being abandoned. ’ In August 1992, Britain confirmed its decision to shut down by

1994 the Dounreay 250-MWt (megawatts of thermal power) Prototype Fast Reactor in Scotland on the grounds that

commercial deployment of fast reactors in the United Kingdom would not be required for 30 to 40 years. The

United Kingdom is also pulling out of a joint European project in fast reactors.

Breeder programs are making better headway in Japan, although they still face obstacles. Japan’s Monju prototype FBR, with a generating capacity of 280 MWe (megawatts of electrical power), reached criticality in April

1994, a year and a half later than had been originally planned, using the plutonium shipped back from France at

the end of 1992. Completion of Japan’s larger scale demonstration fast-breeder reactor, which in 1991 was scheduled for the year 2000, has been delayed by at least a decade until 2010. Startup of the large commercial reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura has likewise slipped to about 2005, and a second proposed reprocessing plant

has also been delayed.2

Only in India, Russia, and possibly Kazakhstan does there appear to be a strong ambition in the near term to

pursue plutonium-based or plutonium-breeding fuel cycles. In the latter two countries, much of this ambition is

driven by a desire to derive energy, if not economic benefit, from the scores of tonnes of plutonium that are expected to be obtained from dismantled warheads. It is also part of an ambitious overall plan Russia has put forth in

an attempt to double its nuclear-generating capacity by 2010, including building 20 new reactors to produce an

additional 20 GWe (gigawatts electrical power) of generating capacity.3 The initial stage of the plan calls for

constructing a 630-MWe FBR reactor at Sosnovy Bor, to be followed by three FBRs.4 There is already a 600-MWt

breeder reactor (BN-600) in operation at Beloyarsk. Kazakhstan has plans to build a second 350-MWt FBR at Aqtau (formerly Shevchenko), where it already had a BN-350 (350 MWt; 60 MWe) reactor inherited from the U.S.S.R.

However, given the economic situation in these two countries, such optimistic plans for expansion may be unrealistic,

In India, the new, unsafeguarded breeder reactor and reprocessing facilities at Kalpakkam emphasize that

country’s continuing interest in the plutonium cycle.

Finally, in the United States, breeder reactors seemed to have reached a dead end with the termination of the

Clinch River breeder reactor at an early stage of construction in 1984. Recently, there has been a small revival of

interest in the nuclear industry and some national laboratories in developing the so-called ALMR—the advanced

liquid metal reactor (formerly called the integral fast reactor) —which would be collocated with reprocessing and

plutonium fuel fabrication facilities. There would be minimal access to plutonium-bearing fuel, whether fresh or

spent, and the collocation of the elements of the fuel cycle would add significantly to proliferation resistance. In

1994, however, the U.S. administration recommended terminating work in this area as well. Despite some efforts in

Congress to restore minimal levels of funding to pursue this option, the program was killed. Even if demonstrated

to be feasible, which would necessitate the investment of several billion dollars, the prospects for market acceptance of such a reactor within the next decade or two are highly questionable.

1 Arms Control Reporter, 1992, p. 602. B.234.

2

The latest Long-Term Nuclear Energy Development and Utilization Program, published in November 1994 by Japan’s Atomic

Energy Commission, states that the Rokkasho reprocessing plant “Is scheduled to be commissioned shortly after the year 2000” (p.

50 of unofficial English translation by the Atomic Energy Commission), but press sources indicate that the plant “won’t begin operating

until 2004 or so. ” See, e.g., N. Usui and A. MacLachlan, “Japan AEC Looking at Delay in Startup of Reprocessing Plants, ” Nuclear

Fuel, Feb. 14, 1994, pp. 10-11.

3Russia also has a small (11-MWt) breeder at Dimitrovgrad and a 800-MW breeder 10 percent complete at Yuzhnouval’skaya,

whose construction has been suspended.

4 Arms Control Reporter, 1992, p. 602. B.236.
106 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

piles of separated plutonium, including that recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons. Some

who advocate that surplus weapon plutonium be

“burned” in nuclear reactors-either as mixed-oxide fuel in existing light-water reactors, or more

directly in future breeders—do so in large part to

maintain interest in plutonium fuel cycles.18 Conversely, it will be difficult to pursue options for

burning weapon plutonium in nuclear reactors—

even in government reactors not connected with

civil power production—in an environment

where separation of plutonium for use in civil nuclear reactors is banned.

A variation on the option to ban the production

of weapon-usable nuclear materials would be a

ban on separating and stockpiling excess plutonium—any plutonium that would not be used immediately to fuel a nuclear reactor. Since the rate

at which plutonium is being loaded into Japanese

nuclear reactors has not kept up with the rate at

which Japan now plans to import plutonium separated from the spent fuel that it had earlier shipped

to European reprocessing plants, tons of separated

plutonium will begin to be stockpiled on Japanese

territory. Even if Japan does not give up the plutonium option, some observers have urged it to

delay its own reprocessing, and to stop accepting

shipments of separated plutonium from Europe,

until its plans to consume plutonium catch up to

its ability to produce it.

Reinvigorate the Reduced Enrichment for

Research and Test Reactors program, combined with

an expanded U.S. take-back policy for U.S.-supplied

HEU reactor fuel.

Research reactors are proliferation risks in two

ways: all of them are capable of producing plutonium, and in addition, many are fueled with highly enriched uranium. The quantities both of fuel

and of potential plutonium produced are roughly

proportional to the power of the reactor, and the

proliferation risks are small for reactors below

about 10 MW thermal power (MWt). These would

normally be fueled by considerably less than a

“significant quantity” (SQ) of HEU and could

produce only similar fractions of an SQ of plutonium per year, even if optimized for maximum

production. The risks become more significant,

however, for reactors of 30 to 50 MWt power levels. The issue of plutonium production is related

to the effectiveness of safeguards (see box 4-4).

The discussion here addresses the HEU aspect,

which can be affected by unilateral actions on the

part of the small number of suppliers of this specialized fuel (the United States being one of the

largest).

In the United States, Argonne National Laboratory has been addressing the issue of finding alternative (LEU) fuels for such reactors for over a decade, though its funding was scaled back

18 For extensive discussion of options for destroying weapon-grade plutonium in the United States and the Soviet Union, see U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-O-572 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993) and Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Pluutonium (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994). A major recommendation of the latter

study is that disposition of weapon plutonium be treated as an independent issue and not be subsumed under decisions concerning the future of

nuclear power and the adoption or rejection of plutonium fuel cycles. The report urges that separated plutonium from weapons rapidly be put

into a form where it would take at least as much effort to recover the plutonium as it would to reprocess plutonium from the much larger stocks of

spent fuel already existing worldwide. The report also concludes that once weapon plutonium has been converted to such a form— for example

by mixing it with radioactive waste to create “artificial spent fuel,” or by converting it to mixed-oxide fuel and partially burning it in a light-water

reactor—there is little point to proceeding to eliminate it entirely before addressing those stocks of spent fuel as well.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework 107

At present, safeguards requirements do not provide for full-time camera surveillance of nuclear material at small research reactors. This leads to the theoretical possibility of diverting reactor fuel and

clandestinely reprocessing it to obtain small amounts of plutonium. Iraq, for instance, reprocessed several fuel rods from its IRT-5000 reactor before the Persian Gulf war in lab-facilities (“hot cells”) it was

known to have, separating just over 2 g of plutonium. On that scale, this action—if done for civil, experimental purposes---did not need to be reported to the IAEA, and did not technically constitute a safeguards violation. However, Iraq also clandestinely irradiated its own, undeclared uranium fuel in this

reactor, separating 3 additional grams of plutonium. The undeclared production and separation of plutonium violated Iraq’s safeguards agreement. ’ Nevertheless, small research reactors produce plutonium so slowly that reprocessing their fuel to obtain material for a weapon would be impractical.2 If

extra precautions are desired, however, camera surveillance at such reactors would help detect diversion of significant quantities.3

The main difficulties in attaining safeguards inspection goals at research reactors and critical assemblies (RRCAs) tend to involve verifying both the irradiated fuel and the fact that there was no diversion

of 1 SQ or more of direct-use material if such material was produced through unrecorded irradiation. For

example, inspection goals are sometimes not attained at RRCAs because of a lack of a full set of containment and surveillance or other safeguards measures for confirming the absence of unrecorded irradiation of nuclear material. (Containment and surveillance measures are difficult to apply, or draw

conclusions from, because material and equipment in the reactor vault is frequently moved even during

normal operation.) Certain reactor design aspects can also make it difficult to access for verification

purposes the irradiated fuel located in the reactor core.

1Programme for promoting Nuclear Non-proliferation, Newsbrief, No. 15, Autumn 1991, p. 10, citing IAEA Press releases and

other sources.

2Reactors containing mostly uranium-238 in their fuel (natural uranium or a few percent enriched LEU) produce plutonium at low

burnups at a rate of roughly 1 g per MWt per day, such that a 30-MWt reactor would produce just over 8 kg of Pu per year if it were

operated 75 percent of the time. Reactors running on HEU are able to produce smaller amounts in uranium-238 targets placed in and

around their core; in practice only 0.5 to 0.65 g of plutonium per MWt per day is produced, due to neutron losses in control rods and out

of the reactor, and absorption by fission products such as xenon-1 35. See Marvin M. Miller, MIT, “The Potential for Upgrading Safeguards Procedures at Research Reactors Fueled with Highly Enriched Uranium: Part 11,” report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, July 1984.

3Statement of Hans Mayer, IAEA spokesperson, September 16-20, 1991 at the regular session of the IAEA General Conference in

Vienna, as cited in the Arms Control Reporter, 1991, p. 602. B.200.

significantly in the 1990s.19 Such fuels have been Energy Policy Act (Public Law 102-486) prohibdeveloped for a number of reactor types and have ited the export of directly weapon-usable HEU

been substituted into many U.S. and foreign reac- reactor fuel from the United

tors.20 In 1992, the Schumer amendment to the United States was developing

States unless the

suitable alternate

19Some believe that the suspension of the RERTR program may have been a political decision to delay the conversion of foreign research

reactors so as to avoid the pressure that would inevitably then be placed on the U.S. Department of Energy to convert its own HEU-fueled research reactors.

20As of 1990, the IAEA was safeguarding 42 research reactors or critical assemblies handling more than 1 SQ each of nuclear material, of

which 37 handled more than 1 SQ of direct-use material outside the reactor core.
108 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

fuels, and no HEU exports were made in 1993 or

1994.21

The RERTR program has made significant

progress in the past at finding alternate fuels. Continued funding would permit it to see its goals

through to the implementation stage for additional

types of reactors. Cooperative work with other

countries—particularly Russia—can further reduce

the use of HEU in research reactors through the

development of alternative fuels for reactors that

were not originally fueled with U.S.-origin HEU.

HEU Fuel Take-Back Policy

Since the 1950s, the United States has supplied

HEU fuel for a number of foreign research reactors, and since about 1960 it has had a policy to

take back spent HEU fuel of U.S. origin.22 During

the Carter Administration, the United States instituted a policy to develop the alternative LEU fuels

mentioned above while taking back HEU fuels

from reactors converted to the new fuels.

The take-back policy was suspended in 1988

because of the need to conduct an environmental

review, given the lack of any permanent repository for storage of radioactive used fuel in the

United States. Under pressure from the State Department and the IAEA, however, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) agreed on July 13,

1993 to prepare an environmental impact statement, as required by the National Environmental

Policy Act, for resuming shipments of HEU fuel

elements to DOE’s facility at Savannah River,

South Carolina. The environmental impact statement assesses the environmental consequences of

taking back the fuel and compares them to those of

alternate policies.

Of the some 22,700 fuel elements slated for return to the United States, 409 presented an immediate problem because they were stored at reactors that needed to discharge spent fuel but had no

remaining onsite storage capacity. If these elements could not be returned to the United States,

those reactors would be forced either to shut down

or to have the fuel elements reprocessed in conflict

with U.S. policy. After completing an environmental assessment in April 1994, DOE concluded

that the return of these elements was urgently

needed, and that it posed no significant environmental impact. The federal government then began accepting the fuel at Savannah River.

South Carolina challenged the return of this

fuel in court and obtained an injunction preventing DOE from accepting it. However, DOE won a

reversal of the injunction on appeal,23 and it has

received some 100 of the fuel elements at Savannah River pending resolution of the court challenge. Should the federal government prevail, the

remainder of the 409 elements will be returned to

the United States. Return of the full 22,700 fuel

elements awaits completion of the environmental

review process specified in the National Environmental Policy Act.

To further the goals of the RERTR program, the

United States can continue its development of alternate fuels, and it can continue efforts to encourage foreign reactor operators—including operators of reactors not originally fueled with

U.S.-supplied HEU—to convert to them. More21The amendment (now section 903 of the law) prohibits export of U.S.-origin HEU fuel to foreign research reactors unless three conditions

are met: 1) there is no alternative [LEU] fuel or target that can be used in that reactor; 2) the proposed recipient of the uranium has provided

assurances that whenever an alternative [LEU] fuel or target can be used in that reactor, it will use that alternative in lieu of HEU; and 3) the U.S.

government is actively developing an alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target that can be used in that reactor.

22According to a report prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the United States has exported a total of 25,875 kg of HEU, of

which 8,394 kg have been returned, leaving 17,489 kg of HEU in 51 countries that could be returned. (As cited in Michael Knapik, “DOE Drafting Policy on Taking Back HEU Fuel from Non-U.S. Reactors,” Nuclear Fuel, Apr. 12, 1993, p. 14.) This breaks down into the following (in

kilograms): 13,677 in EURATOM, 1,184 in Canada, and 1.973 in Japan. Other countries include Argentina, 58; Australia, 146; Austria, 39;

Brazil, 9; Chile, 12; Columbia, 3; Iran, 6; Israel, 34; Jamaica, 1; Mexico, 12; Norway, 4; Pakistan, 16; Philippines, 3; Romania, 39; Slovenia, 5;

South Africa, 10; South Korea, 25; Sweden, 127; Switzerland, 82; Taiwan, 10; Thailand, 5; and Turkey, 8. (Due to roundoff errors, individual

entries may not add to totals.)

23Department of Energy press release, “Court Blocks Shipment of Foreign Spent Fuel,” DOE News, September 13, 1994.
Chapter 4 Beyond the Traditional NPT/lAEA Framework | 109

over, U.S. nonproliferation objectives will be

harmed if the inability to take back spent HEU fuel

forces foreign reactor operators to reprocess U. S.-

origin fuel.

In a case that is not part of the RERTR program

but also involved the shipment of highly enriched

uranium to the United States, the Department of

Energy successfully brought some 600 kg of HEU

originating in Kazakhstan to its facility in Oak

Ridge, Tennessee. This transfer, known as Project

Sapphire, was undertaken to eliminate the possibility that the material might end up in unauthorized hands. Although it was conducted under

cover of secrecy, state and local officials received

classified briefings in advance. No court challenges were brought.

Undertake studies to look seriously at the

feasibility and desirability of internationalizing various

aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

A “mild” form of internationalization would

be to place stockpiles of separated plutonium

under international control or management at

perhaps one or a small number of agreed sites.

The IAEA Statute envisions such a role for the

IAEA, with Article XX.A.5 authorizing the IAEA

to require the deposit of surplus plutonium to prevent stockpiling. Such an international plutonium

storage system has been under study within the

IAEA, at varying levels of attention, since at least

the late 1970s.24 More recently, the IAEA revisited the idea and held a series of meetings beginning in 1992 and 1993 in Vienna. In 1995, the

United States placed highly enriched uranium and

plutonium declared excess to its weapon program

under IAEA safeguards (see discussion in chapter

3 of the United States’ “voluntary offer” to accept

safeguards.) However, this arrangement is strictly

a bilateral one. It does not involve international

ownership or control.

Difficulties in implementing international storage include issues of ownership of the contributed

material, the conditions under which a state would

be able to access and utilize plutonium that it had

contributed, and fears by some that creating such a

system would legitimize the production of plutonium. A more fundamental problem would be

gaining the participation of states that had rejected

the NPT and would not likely place their own plutonium under international control.

A more far-reaching change to the existing

nuclear regime than any option so far discussed would be to revisit some of the major assumptions underlying the current regime, such

as the assumption that nuclear weapon-usable

materials should be permitted to remain under

the control of individual states. One mechanism

for keeping weapon-usable nuclear materials out

of national control is to ban their production, as

discussed above. However, since individual nations or (in the case of enrichment consortia)

groups of nations would retain uranium enrichment capability under such an approach, they

would inherently retain the capability to produce

weapon-usable material by converting from LEU

to HEU production. A stronger mechanism for ensuring that countries do not develop nuclear weapon-usable materials would be to place those portions of the nuclear fuel cycle that are of greatest

proliferation concern under direct international

control. With the Acheson-Lilienthal report and

the Baruch plan, such an approach was discussed

at the beginning of the nuclear era; the events of

the 1990s have created fresh interest in the idea.

Instituting an international nuclear material control regime would involve the internationalization of enrichment, reprocessing, and,

possibly, fuel fabrication facilities. Such a regime would be based on the assumption that existing safeguards on such facilities will not be sufficient to meet nonproliferation goals, but that

banning these facilities entirely is neither desirable nor politically achievable. As such, an international control regime would involve drastic

changes to the way the uranium and plutonium

markets now operate, affecting the ownership and

24 David A.V. Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (London: SIPRI, Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 115-116.
110 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

operation of many billions of dollars worth of existing facilities. Dramatic changes would be required to the international legal regime, along

with extensive treaty negotiations.

It would be very difficult to create such a regime. Non-nuclear-weapon states would likely

object strongly to a regime that reinforced the discriminatory aspects of the NPT by denying them

the ability to operate nuclear fuel-cycle facilities

by themselves, while permitting the nuclear

weapon states to do so in their military programs.

Given the magnitude of the changes such a policy

would require, it would likely be possible only

with sustained effort over many years, if at all.

More detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the

scope of this report.
Appendix A:

Safeguarding

 Reprocessing

 Facilities

his appendix focuses on the issue of safeguards at reprocessing plants, a type of bulk-handling facility of particular

interest because it produces large quantities of plutonium

that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Although there

is only one currently operating reprocessing facility under INFCIRC/153-type safeguards (Japan’s Tokai plant), there are several large plants in operation or to be built in the future.1 The other

large plant that will be under INFCIRC/153 safeguards is the

Rokkasho-mura plant in Japan, which is expected to begin full

operation in about 2005 (see table A-1).2

The ability of safeguards to assure the nondiversion of “significant quantities” of plutonium from large reprocessing plants has

been the subject of considerable attention and controversy for

many years. The major technology holders have been studying

these issues under the auspices of the LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing) forum since the late 1980s and have completed a major study.3 This appendix will describe the basic safeguards ap1Those in operation, however, are in nuclear weapon states—France, the United

Kingdom, and Russia—that are not required to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA

safeguards. Parts of the several reprocessing plants in France and the United Kingdom are

safeguarded under the voluntary offer these states have made to place certain facilities under IAEA safeguards. However, these safeguards do not extend to the entire plant.

2N. Usui and A. MacLachlan, “Japan AEC Looking at Delay in Startup of Reprocessing Plants,” Nuclear Fuel, Feb. 14, 1994, pp. 10-11.

3The only publicly available document from LASCAR is the booklet Report of the

LASCAR Forum: Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards, STI/PUB/922 (Vienna,

Austria: IAEA, July 1992).

| 111
112 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Location Plant name Capacitya Operational status Safeguards status

NPT nuclear-weapon states (NWS):

France Cogema UP2b

, UP3 800 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr In operation; Limited IAEA safeguards

(Cap de la each; 1,600 t HM/yr UP2 since 196& through

Hague) total UP3 since 1990 nuclear-weapon-state

voluntary offer

LASCAR involvement with

UP3

France Cogema UP1 400 t HM (metal fuel)/yrd

1958- 2000? (EURATOM only)c

(Marcoule)

France (Marcoule) CEA APM 6 t HM (FBR fuel)/yr 1988- present (EURATOM only)

Russia Mayak 600 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr 1978- present No

(Chelyabinsk-40)

United Kingdom Windscale B205 1,500 t HM (magnox)/yr 1964-201 O? (EURATOM only)

(Sellafield)

United Kingdom Thermal Oxide 1200 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr In commissioning EURATOM; limited IAEA

(Sellafield) Reprocessing Plant safeguards under United

(THORP) Kingdom voluntary offer

to the IAEA

LASCAR involvement

United Kingdom Fast Reactor Fuel 7 t HM (FBR fuel)/yrd

In operation; Limited IAEA safeguards for

(Thurso) Reprocessing (1958 - 1995?) period (1980-1982)

Plant; through United Kingdom

(Dounreay) voluntary offer; training

and R&D

USA Nuclear Fuel Services 300 t HM (LWR fuel) / yr 1966-1972 (retired) Training and R&D

(West Valley) (NFS)

NPT non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) with potential for large reprocessing capability:

Germany Wiederauf-Arbeitungs 35 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr 1971-1991 IAEA NPT safeguards;

(Karlsruhe) Anlage Karlsruhe EURATOM

(WAK)

Germany Wiederauf-Arbeitungs 500 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr Canceled Planning, R&D;

(Wackersdorf) Anlage LASCAR involvement Wackersdorf

(WAW)

Japan Tokai Reprocessing 90 t HM (LWR/ATR fuel)/yr In operation IAEA NPT safeguards

(Tokai-mura) Plant (startup 1981)

Japan Rokkasho 800 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr Under construction IAEA NPT safeguards;

(Rokkasho-mura) Reprocessing Plant (startup 2005?) LASCAR involvement
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities 113

I I I I

Location Plant name Capacity Operational status Safeguards status

Japan Chemical Process Fast reactor R&D 1982-1987 IAEA NPT safeguards

(Tokai-mura) Facility reprocessing plantd

Japan Recycle Engineering 24 t HM (LMR fuel)/yr Under license review IAEA NPT safeguards

(Tokai-mura) Technology Facility

(RETF)

NPT non-nuclear-weapon states with small to medium scale reprocessing capability:

Belgium (Mel) Eurochemic 30-60 t HM (LWR and MTR 1966-1974 IAEA safeguards applied

fuel)/yr after plant shut down;

EURATOM

Italy (Saluggia) EUREX 20 t HM (LWR fuel)/yr Shut down IAEA NPT safeguards;

EURATOM

Italy (Rotondella) ITREC 4 t HM (Th fuel)/yr Shut down IAEA NPT safeguards

(EURATOM)

Italy (Ispra) Petra Experimental; Awaiting IAEA NPT safeguards

TRU waste R&D commissioning (EURATOM)

NPT (or otherwise safeguarded) states of past or current proliferation concern:

Argentina (near Ezeiza [5 t HM/yr] - Suspended 1990 Partly

Buenos Aires)

Brazil (Resende) [3 t HM/yr] Suspended 1980s Yes

DPRK Radiochemical Confidential Confidential Nominally IAEA NPT

(Yongbyon) Laboratory [pilot scale?] [1992?] safeguards, but now in

violation 1 I I 1

Iraq | No name given I Confidential | 1989-1991 | Violation

(Tuwaitha) [lab scale] (destroyed)

South Africa [Pilot scale] [1987 - ?] IAEA NPT safeguards

(Pelindaba)

Non-NPT states:

India PREFRE 100 t HM (Candu fuel)/yr In operation –

IAEA safeguards only when-

(Tarapur) (commissioned 1982) safeguarded fuel is

reprocessed

India B. A.R.C. 30 t HM/yr 1966 - 1974; [and No

(Trombay) 1983- present?]

India [100-200 t HM/yr?] Planned startup No

(Kalpakkam) 1993/1994?

Israel Dimona [50 -100 t HM/yr]? 1966? - present? No

(continued)
114 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Location Plant name Capacity Operational status Safeguards status

Pakistan Planned 100 t HM/yr Construction may No (but IAEA safeguards

(Chasma) have ended 1978 had been planned)

Pakistan New Labs [5 t/ HM yr?] Believed not to be No

(Rawalpindi) operating

a Capacity in tons per day is generally about 1/200 times the capacity given in tons per year. Items in [brackets] or with question marks represent

estimates or substantial uncertainty, respectively.

b UP2 operated at 400 t HM/yr capacity until 1990; its upgrade, UP2-800,” began operating in 1992. The latter, along with UP3, will be involved with

limited IAEA safeguards.

c All civilian nuclear material in European Community member states (even in France and Britain) is safeguarded by EURATOM under EC Regulation

3227/76. However, because they are nuclear weapon states, France and Britain are not obligated to place their facilities under IAEA safeguards.

d Because FBR fuel contains relatively Iarge fractions of plutonium, a given reprocessing capacity (in terms of spent FBR fuel) translates to a plutonium

throughput up to 15 times higher than would result from reprocessing the same amount of typical light-water reactor spent fuel.

KEY: CEA = Commissariat a’ l’E’nergie Atomique; Cogema = Compagnie Ge’ne’rale des Matie’res Nucle’aires; FBR = fast breeder reactor (liquid metal

reactor); HM = heavy metal; LASCAR = IAEA forum on large-scale reprocessing; LWR = light-water reactor; magnox = type of reactor; MTR = materials

test reactor; TRU = transuranic

SOURCE: Adapted from Thomas Shea et al., “Safeguarding Reprocessing Plants: Principles, Past Experience, Current Practice and Future Trends,”

Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, July 1993, p. 20; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and

High/y Enriched Uranium, 7992 (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press/SIPRl, 1993), p. 90; Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith,

NuclearAmbitiorts: The Spread of Abe/ear Weapons, 7989-7990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); and James E. Lovett, “Nuclear Materials Safeguards for Reprocessing,” International Atomic Energy Agency Report STR-151/152, December 1987, pp. 25-36.

preach and attempt to evaluate the current understanding of the safeguardability of reprocessing

plants.4

In general, nuclear safeguards are concerned

with monitoring items or amounts of material held

in material balance areas (MBAs). MBAs are

separate parts of a facility within whose boundaries reliable inventories of nuclear materials can

be established, and material flows in or out can be

monitored. Flows are measured at predetermined

locations known as “key measurement points,”

and samples may be taken from various tanks,

containers, and storage areas. Bulk-handling facilities may be divided into several MBAs: sometimes the first will encompass a receipt and storage area (for spent fuel, plutonium, or uranium)

and, for reprocessing plants, the head-end fuel

shearing and dissolution area, where spent fuel

rods are chopped up and dissolved; the second

comprises the process area; and the third, a product storage area (see figure A-1).5 Until recently,

the thinking in the safeguards community was that

increasing the number of MBA’s would increase

effectiveness. However, it is now realized that

multiple MBA’s require extensive reporting of inventory changes and separate material balance reports, increasing the work of operators, state authorities, and IAEA staff. The current approach is

to move toward increasing the amount of data in

the process available to the IAEA, enabling localization down to small process cells, through process monitoring and near-real-time accountancy

(NRTA), but without the burden of additional

MBAs.

4Additional information on safeguards of reprocessing plants is presented in Burton Judson, “Needs and Obstacles in International Safeguards of Large Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” contractor report to OTA, December 1993, NTIS No. PB95-199170.

5

Frans Berkhout and William Walker, “Safeguards at Nuclear Bulk Handling Facilities,“ in J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie (eds.), Verification

Report 1992 (London, U. K.: VERTIC, 1992), pp. 199-209.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities | 115

Plutonium metal from the U.S. weapon program. In civil

reactors, plutonium is practically always used in oxide, rather

than metallic, form.

As with other types of facilities, the basic safeguards approach for reprocessing plants is material accountancy, supplemented by containment

and surveillance (C/S) techniques. C/S is used primarily to keep track of items that have already

been measured in the input and product storage

areas, and particularly for items in transit from the

input storage area to the head end of the process

area. C/S is also intended to provide assurance that

plant operations conform to declarations given to

the IAEA—that there are no undeclared reprocessing campaigns or attempts to bypass key measurement points available to the IAEA. At the

head end, fuel assemblies are chopped into small

pieces and dissolved in nitric acid, transforming

them from discrete into bulk form. At this point,

verification requirements become less amenable

to C/S measures.. The C/S equipment currently in

routine use consists almost entirely of seals and

camera or video surveillance.

The “process area” consists of everything between the head end and the point at which the

separate plutonium (and uranium) product

streams are converted into solid form and transferred once again into discrete containers and

stored. 6 Because the plutonium in the process

area of reprocessing plants is dissolved in solution—and because large plants process so

much of it over the course of a year—accurate

material-accountancy measurements to assure

that none has been diverted pose significant

challenges. Further, much of the process involves

highly radioactive streams, which change chemical composition and concentration many times

and must be handled remotely behind thick radiation shielding. While a multitude of process variables are controlled and monitored by computers,

access to the actual materials for measurement

purposes is quite limited.

To address these challenges, the IAEA and operators of reprocessing plants have taken several

approaches. First, they have worked to improve

the accuracy associated with each of the various

measurement techniques used in applying material accountancy. Second, they have examined the

use of near-real-time accountancy techniques, in

which material inventories within various stages

of processing, as well as flows in and out of these

stages, are monitored daily or weekly. (See box

A-l.) NRTA methods improve the timeliness of

diversion detection over conventional materials

accountancy methods, since NRTA inventories

are monitored more frequently. NRTA can also

improve detection sensitivity by applying statistical tests to the much larger data sets that are generated. Third, the IAEA and plant operators have

sought to acquire a much more thorough understanding of safeguards-relevant design information for such plants by early reporting of design information, and by verification of plant designs

during construction. Finally, and most important,

there is increasing reliance on detailed process

monitoring by the IAEA to obtain real-time data

on inter-vessel transfers. This monitoring will

61 In some plants, however, including Rokkasho the reprocessing plant’s output, in the form of plutonium nitrate solution, is piped directly to

a separate conversion plant for metal-oxide fuel production, rather than converted to plutonium oxide powder and stored.
116 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Material : Material : Material :

balance : balance : balance :

area 1 area 2 area 3 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

u u : u :

cycle ----> product --- > storage --->

SeparaRemoval tion of

of fission uranium

products from

 plutonium

-----------------------------------L

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v v

— I

Pu Pu ----> Pu ---->

cycle -----> product : storage :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hulls Waste Waste

SOURCE: Modified from figure in S.J. Johnson and A. B. MN. Islam, “The Current IAEA Approach to Implementation of Safeguards in Reprocessing

Plants,” Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Facility Operations-Safeguards Interface, Albuquerque, NM, Sept. 29-Oct, 4, 1991

(La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1992).

help assure that the plant is being operated according to the operator’s declarations and also provides input data for NRTA.

Understanding design information complements the primary safeguards approach of material accountancy in much the same way as do C/S

techniques. An anomalous inventory measurement or large amount of material unaccounted for

(MUF) could indicate the possibility of diversion,

but it would rarely be definitive. If material is to be

diverted from the plant, it must be removed by

some physical means in a plausible way. Verification of plant design information plays an important role in giving added assurance against the existence of unmonitored diversion paths. It is also

necessary to ensure, for example, that what is purported to be drawn from a particular tank was indeed drawn from that tank and no other. For this

purpose, data from process monitoring is vital.

At each point in a reprocessing plant, diversion

of useful material would require overcoming significant obstacles. At vulnerable points where

items are routinely moved around (e.g., at the head

end and product areas), cameras and other monitoring techniques watch for the possibility of diversion. This is especially important before the

spent fuel rods are chopped up, and after plutonium output streams are converted into plutonium

oxide powder, sealed into cans, and placed in storage using automated material-handling equipment. Additional measures are taken to ensure that

areas such as the plutonium stores are heavily
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities 117

Through the mid-1980s, one of the criteria for successful application of reprocessing-plant safeguards involved meeting the so-called Accountancy Verification Goal (AVG). The AVG was set at either

8 kg plutonium or 3,3 percent of annual plutonium throughput, whichever was larger.2 For small plants

processing up to 30 t light-water reactor spent fuel per year, 3,3 percent of throughput does not exceed

8 kg and the difference between the AVG and the 8 kg significant quantity (SQ) is irrelevant. (Of all

reprocessing plants that had been fully safeguarded up to that point, only the Tokai facility, at 90 t/yr,

had exceeded this Ievel.3 In addition, the safeguards approach required the IAEA to apply various tests

of statistical significance to material unaccounted-for (MUF) values and to operator/inspector differences—the differences between values of various quantities (material inventories, etc.) as reported by

the plant operator and as independently verified by the IAEA.4 Discrepancies that were deemed significant by these tests required investigation. Nevertheless, the criteria for statistical significance were

often difficult to satisfy because the needed measurement-error-variance data either were incomplete or were not of sufficient quality to lend confidence to the conclusions. Without valid measurement uncertainty data, the whole question of detection probability becomes meaningless. Therefore, the practical result of not having good uncertainty data was that inspectors rarely had firm grounds

on which to challenge operator declarations.5 More recently, the IAEA has been estimating operator

measurement errors by comparing IAEA measurements with operator measurements of identical samples over time.

In large commercial reprocessing facilities, the uncertainty associated with the verification of material-unaccounted-for, or σ (MUF), can easily exceed 8 kg (1 SQ) at a year-end physical inventory. Thus,

3.3 σ (the size of a diversion that would be detected with 95 percent confidence at a 5 percent false

positive rate; see box 3-2 of the main text) can be much larger than 1 SQ. Therefore, even facilities

meeting their AVG might nevertheless have lost well over one SQ to diversion in the course of a year

without being detected by material balance evaluations, Recognizing this, and in an attempt to achieve

timely detection, facility operators and safeguards agencies have sought chiefly to improve upon traditional materials accountancy. At the same time, the IAEA has phased out use of the AVG, and the revised Safeguards Criteria introduced in 1991 make no reference to the concept,

Even though the AVG is no longer in use, conventional material accountancy methods alone

appear unable to verify the absence of diversion or loss of material from large reprocessing

plants to within annual uncertainty levels of 1 SQ of plutonium. At least four techniques to improve

upon conventional material accountancy have been described, The running book inventory (RBI) and

cumulative flux method techniques are similar and are only appropriate to plants operating in steady

(continued)

1This box draws significantly from Frans Berkhout and William Walker, “Safeguards at Nuclear Bulk-Handling Facilities, ” in Verification Report 1992 (London, UK: VERTIC, 1992), pp. 199-209.

2

J.E. Lovett, “Nuclear Materials Safeguards for Reprocessing,” International Atomic Energy Agency Report STR-151/152, December 1987, p. 138. This threshold is based on an overall measurement uncertainty (one standard deviation) of 1 percent of throughput times the factor of 3.3 by which a diversion must exceed measurement uncertainty in order to be detected with a 95 percent detection likelihood at a 5 percent false alarm rate. See box 3-2 in the main text,

3

lndia's PREFRE facility, at 100 t/yr, also exceeded this level, but it was only safeguarded during three campaigns between 1982

and 1985, when safeguarded fuel was present. Voluntary offers from the United Kingdom and France for safeguarding certain aspects of their own large reprocessing facilities came later, and in any case were usually limited in scope, such as being applied only to

spent fuel storage and product areas. As nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom and France are not required to put any of their

nuclear facilities under safeguards.

4

Lovett, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 138.

5

Ibid., pp. 140, 173.
118 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

state, and for which the in-process inventory is small. Neither is acceptable to the IAEA for large plants.

(These approaches have little value during periods of startup, shutdown, or other process upsets.)

Book inventories for a given plant are calculated simply by subtracting the plutonium outputs from inputs (each measured), with no attempt at measuring any portion of the actual in-process inventory. Diversion is assumed not to have taken place if these inventories fall within predetermined limits (smaller

than an SQ). An approach using RBI was being applied at the UP2(400) plant at La Hague. At that

facility, the amount of material being processed at any one time was normally quite small, passing

through the plant in two days to a week.

In contrast, adjusted running book inventory (ARBI) and near-real-time accountancy (NRTA) involve

in addition the direct measurement of in-process inventories, so that data are available with which to

apply various statistical tests to MUF figures (and their explanations in terms of measurement uncertainties). ARBI is distinguished from NRTA in its reference to past data on process variables in an MBA.

ARBI and NRTA are particularly necessary when wide variations in process inventories are expected,

as in the process areas at THORP in the United Kingdom and Rokkasho-mura in Japan, both of which

are designed with large buffer tanks that allow such wide fluctuations in process inventories. At THORP,

for example, process inventories may approach 0.6 tonnes of plutonium. Since at any time, more than

80 percent of this inventory may reside in the buffer and accountability tanks, it is amenable to direct

measurement.

The basic principle of NRTA is that the in-process inventory of plutonium is frequently monitored

(perhaps daily or weekly) using a combination of direct measurements from in-process instruments, offline analyses, and indirect measurements using computer simulations of the chemical process areas.6

Most tanks and many process vessels are amenable to measurement or estimation of actual inventory

or of minimum operating inventories. One obvious advantage is that the throughput over a short interval

is significantly smaller than that over an entire year, so that the effects of some of the overall measurement uncertainties are proportionally reduced. Another is that many more measurements are taken, permitting the use of various statistical tests on the additional data and effectively increasing the detection

timeliness over that of monthly interim inventories.

The in-process inventory measurement is evaluated by looking for unexplained trends in the derived

MUF values. However, to calibrate the NRTA system, a baseline must first be established by obtaining a

sequence of MUF values over a substantial length of time under conditions where it can be assured that

no diversion is taking place. Under such conditions, all deviations observed in MUF values must be due

to measurement error and to unreported plant losses such as hold-up (the retention of small amounts of

plutonium in pipes and at the bottom of tanks). During subsequent operation of the plant, MUF values

can be compared with this baseline, which represents the systematic errors in the measurement system, Use of this baseline data effectively reduces the magnitude of σ (MUF), improving the sensitivity of

detection. The development of a baseline is begun as part of the design information verification activities during cold and hot plant commissioning.

(continued)

6

For instance, direct measurement is not feasible in certain types of process equipment, such as Contractors and evaporators,

which might account for 10 percent of the total in-process inventory.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities 119

The statistical treatment of sequential MUF data has become highly sophisticated and the relevant

literature huge,7 although research has been narrowing the alternative tests down to a few.8 Statistics

derived from the sequences of data are tested against the hypothesis that a diversion has taken place.9

The detection sensitivity of different tests varies with the diversion scenario (a test known as Page’s test

allows parameters to be adjusted to improve the sensitivity for one type of diversion over another), and

no single test is most sensitive to detecting all types of protracted and abrupt diversions.

One saving feature, however, is that:

...detectionof the gross falsifications necessary to conceal an assumed abrupt diversion can be separated from the problem of the detection of a series of small falsifications which might conceal an assumed

protracted diversion. In the former case, verification must be timely but need not be highly accurate [since

the diversion is so large]; while in the Iatter case, it must be highly accurate but need not be timely [since the

diversion takes place over sufficient time that it will be detected before a significant amount is lost]. There are

no verifications which must be both.10

So far, NRTA has been investigated primarily at relatively small plants, such as Japan’s Tokai reprocessing plant, with a throughput of 90 tonnes heavy metal per year. However, it is also being explored at

the large British THORP reprocessing facility. In addition to periodic recalibration of measurement systems, it requires a “clean” set of data free from diversion or corruption, including freedom from an operator’s intentionally widening MUF values by adding and subtracting material randomly during the calibration period. IAEA’s plans for addressing this latter problem include scrutinizing any sequence of

MUF values that is large-not only when compared to the expected Target Values, but also to those

generated by similar plants operating in other countries. ” However, the total number of such plants is

very small, most of their designs unique, and the amount of experience in interpreting such comparisons virtually nonexistent. Thus, there may be considerable uncertainty in the ultimate performance of NRTA methods at large plants for some time.

(continued)

7An overview is given in Lovett, op. cit., pp. 111-135, and references 181-188 and 202-203 therein. Other representative articles

are R. Beedgen and R. Seifert, “Statistical Methods for Verification of Measurement Models, ” and Barry J. Jones, “Near Real Time

Materials Accountancy Using SITMUF and a Joint Page’s Test: Comparison with MUF and CUMUF Tests,” both in ESARDA Bulletin,

No, 15, November 1988, pp. 5-8 and 20-26; and M. Delange, “The Cumulated Flux Verification Approach ,“ in Proc. Third International

Conference on Facility Operations-Safeguards Interface, San Diego, CA, Nov. 29-Dee. 4, 1987 (La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1988), pp. 222-229.

8Two such tests are known as Neyman-Pearson with test statistic CUMUF, and Page’s test. The mathematics of Page’s test are

complex, but the concept is not. Rather than examining the absolute magnitude of CUMUF (the cumulative value of the MUF summed

over the various material balance periods), it examines the slope of a line describing the CUMUF data. At any point, the test asks

whether the most recent point is consistent with past data, in such a way that recent data is given more weight than older data. Lovett,

op. cit., p. 132. In other words, a sequence of cumulative MUF values in the absence of real loss would be expected to “random walk”

away from a zero value at a rate proportional to the square root of the number of MUF values used in the sum, but no faster than this. By

mathematically adjusting the CUMUF data to eliminate the effect of this expected wandering away from zero, one would expect a

best-fit line in the absence of loss to have zero adjusted slope. The actual slope is then compared and tested for statistical significance

using Page’s test. See also R. Beedgen and R. Siefert, “Statistical Methods for Verification of Measurement Models, ” ESARDA Bulletin,

No. 15, November 1988, pp. 5-8.

9Another statistical test, know as the Kalman filter, is a technique for obtaining a “best estimate” from a sequence of MUF data of

the amount of Ioss that has taken place per period. However, it is not useful from a safeguards perspective, because it fails to indicate

whether MUF data require further investigation. That is, it does not indicate whether the “best estimate” loss is significantly different

from zero, given uncertainties in measurement.

10IAEA, TASTEX, Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, Technical Report Series No. 123 (Vienna, Austria: IAEA,

1982), p. 111.

11Target values represent the expected current performance—in terms of achievable uncertainty limits—of various measurement

techniques. See P. De Bievre, “Random Uncertainties in Sampling and Element Assay of Nuclear Materials Target Values 1988, ”

ESARDA Bulletin, No. 13, October 1987, pp. 8-16.
120 Nuclear safeguards and the lnternational Atomic Energy Agency

The ultimate detection sensitivity of NRTA for abrupt diversion has not been precisely defined, and

indeed cannot be except in terms of a specific reprocessing plant and its specific measurement procedures. There has been some speculation among safeguards experts that an 8 kg abrupt diversion

detection goal may be achievable, even in the larger (800 t/yr) plants, but at least one study (albeit one

about a decade old) claimed a limit no better than about 17 kg plutonium, and 24 kg for protracted

diversion. 12 Another estimated that while NRTA might be able to lower detection thresholds by as much

as an order of magnitude from conventional material accountancy, such levels still amounted to uncertainties of 15 to 30 kg of plutonium.13

In any case, a considerable body of statistical data—more than 50,000 paired sets of data of IAEA

and operator measurements from a variety of types of bulk-handling facilities—are already being accumulated and analyzed by the IAEA. The variation of this data about its own mean provides a statistically

valid estimate of the total random error in its underlying measurement data, and the difference between

its mean value (over some period) and zero is a useful estimate of the net total of all uncorrected measurement biases. Statistically, much can be done with such data to evaluate the qualify of measurement

systems themselves, which is critical both for evaluating and improving overall material accountancy.

Some statisticians object to such a global approach, arguing in favor of a systematic measurement-bymeasurement analysis (allowing traditional error propagation studies). However, given the amount of

data that NRTA methods are expected to produce, an approach based on analyzing historical data appears to hold some promise.

12D. Gupta et al., “Investigations on Detection Sensitivity of the NRTA Method for Different Size Reprocessing Facilities,” Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, KfK 4017, December 1985, as cited in Lovett, op. cit., pp. 200, 203. The test for protracted diversion is

based on Page’s test.

13R. Avenhaus et al., ‘Comparison of Test Procedures for Near-Real-Time-Accountancy,” 6th ESARDA Symposium, Venice, May

14-18, 1984.

guarded and can only be entered by those posses- The latter scenario would require the solution

sing the right keys and codes.7 Diversion at points

early in the process area, after the spent fuel is dissolved in hot nitric acid but before the fission

products are removed, would be difficult because

of the intense radioactivity and low plutonium

concentration of the solution. At this stage in the

process, for instance, there might be only 2 g plutonium per liter of solution, requiring thousands

of liters to be bled off to divert 1 significant quantity (SQ) of plutonium.8

to be transported through additional pipes, valves,

or other means to a shielded location outside the

material balance area and to be clandestinely replaced with alike quantity of plutonium-depleted

solution. It would also require that material accountancy methods fail to detect the missing plutonium. Early submission of plant design information to the IAEA and its subsequent

verification during the construction of large plants

is thus a key element in helping to rule out such

7Berkhout and Walker, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 7. These measures guard against theft, but not diversion commited by the plant operator.

8

Plutonium concentrations increase as the process streams proceed through the plant. For example, to remove 8 kg of plutonium would

require diverting about 4,000 liters of solution from the dissolver, about 800 liters from the last extraction cycle, or 30 to 40 liters from the

concentrated evaporator liquor. J.E. Lovett, “Nuclear Materials Safeguards for Reprocessing,” International Atomic Energy Agency Report

STR-151/152 (December 1987), p. 161.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities | 121

diversion scenarios. The better a plant design is

understood, the more confidence the IAEA would

have in ruling out undeclared diversion paths.

This aspect of “safeguardability,” in fact, is being

taken very seriously in the design and construction of new plants.

Tests to be carried out during cold commissioning (i.e., with the use of unirradiated reactor fuel in

lieu of actual spent fuel) and hot commissioning

(i.e., with actual spent fuel, which is intensely radioactive) will also confirm the physical verification of plant systems and establish baselines for

comparing future observations. However, given

the complexity of large reprocessing plants, involving multiple buildings, underground pipes,

many large storage tanks, and inaccessibility of

various radioactive process areas once operating,

IAEA experts and others admit that such verification can never completely rule out the possibility

of hidden design features. The IAEA nevertheless

claims that by carefully examining the operation

of the plant, including the flows and material balances, during commissioning tests and over extended periods of time in near-equilibrium conditions, it is able to further verify the plant design

parameters, making diversions from the process

area more likely to be detected.

The intense radioactivity of the spent fuel being

reprocessed mandates that radiation shielding be

placed around process operations areas in a reprocessing plant. This shielding facilitates increased use of C/S techniques. However, containment of the process area is not absolute, since lines

must carry the spent fuel and other chemicals into

the process area and carry the plutonium product

and various wastes out. Numerous steam, vacuum, and instrumentation lines also penetrate the

shielding. (In general, though, both the intense

radiation and the corrosive nitric acid environment inside the shielded process area dictate that

nothing be placed inside the shielding if it is feasible to leave it outside.) The total number of shielding penetrations in a large reprocessing plant is in

excess of 1,000, including buried pipes to adjacent

process buildings and to waste storage tanks. Design verification is essential to ensure that pipes

suitable for plutonium transfer are identified and

controlled.9

Once a plant is operating, the experience of the

inspectors in understanding the plant operating

history becomes increasingly important in interpreting measurement results. For this reason, it is

very important to include some inspectors with industrial reprocessing experience. Safeguards experts point out that when various statistical tests

are applied to a sequence of process control data

and to measurements taken at various points in the

plant, and these measurements are combined with

a thorough understanding of the plant’s designed

operating conditions, sensitivity to diversion

detection improves over the case in which only

annual material balance measurements are used.

Nevertheless, no single statistical test is best

suited to detecting all types of abrupt and protracted diversion scenarios, and there is little

practical experience in directly applying these

tests to large plants.10 Furthermore, there remains considerable disagreement over the extent

to which more sophisticated statistical tests will

be able to improve the uncertainties over simpler

methods. The ultimate constraint is measurement

uncertainty, rather than statistical analysis methodology.11 Experience to be gained by EURATOM in safeguarding the large THORP reprocessing plant (in the United Kingdom) will be

useful in assessing these advanced data analysis

techniques. Furthermore, the problem is more difficult both for older plants, whose measurement

9Ibid., p. 213.

10Abrupt or protracted refers to the rate at which plutonium is surreptitiously removed from the plant. Use of multiple tests could be one way

to test for different types of diversion, but doing so can artificially increase and complicate the calculation of the false alarm rate.

11See, e.g., Marvin Miller, “Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?” Nuclear Control Institute, August

1990, p. 5.
122 | Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

systems may not be as reliable or as comprehensive as would be needed to thoroughly understand

plant operation, and for larger plants, whose large

throughput increases the size of measurement uncertainties. (Fortunately, there are very few large

reprocessing plants outside nuclear weapon

states.)

In addition to the need for accurate and precise

material-accountancy measurements, the IAEA

also requires accurate estimates of measurement

uncertainties in order to carry out its safeguards

functions. If uncertainties were overestimated, the

utility of measurements for detecting actual losses

would decline, while if the uncertainties were underestimated, excessive numbers of false alarms

would be generated. There have been extensive efforts over the years to make scientifically defensible estimates of measurement uncertainties based

on actual plant operating experience. Nevertheless, most of these so-called collaborative analysis

programs have involved measurements on wellbehaved, well-characterized materials (e.g., product materials) that have not been irradiated. Furthermore, samples taken for analysis by such

programs are often given special attention by the

best available analysts, which may not be the case

for safeguards during routine plant operations.12

The Working Group on Techniques and Standards for Destructive Analysis of the European

Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) has issued lists of “target values”

that laboratories should be able to achieve on a

routine basis—or that in some cases “must be met

in the near future if the large material throughput

of the new reprocessing plants under construction

is to be adequately safeguarded.”13 Some of these

are given in table A-2.

Based on a simple numerical argument using these uncertainties—and barring acquisition of additional measurements and use of

more sophisticated statistical analysis—many

analysts have concluded that measurements

are incapable of reliably detecting diversions of

one or even several significant quantities of

safeguarded material from large reprocessing

plants.14 The reasons for this are twofold. First,

random and systematic measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for many of the

techniques used to verify material inventories in

bulk-handling facilities are at best on the order of a

few tenths of a percent, and some are as large as a

few percent or more. At large plants, this fraction

of annual plutonium throughput is considerably

larger than 1 SQ. For example, table A-3 shows

that a large reprocessing plant with a nominal

measurement uncertainty of 1 percent and an

annual capacity of 800 tons of spent fuel per year

will have an uncertainty in plutonium throughput

of 64 kg. Under conventional material accountancy calculcations, a diversion would have to be 3.3

times this amount—211 kg, or 26 SQ—before

there would be a 95 percent probability of detecting it, assuming that false alarm rates were to be

kept under 5 percent. Even improving measurement precision by a factor of five in this example

would lower the corresponding diversion threshold to 5 SQ.

12Ralph Gutmacher, “Measurement Uncertainty Estimates for Reprocessing Facilities,” Los Alamos National Laboratory Report

LA-11839-MS (ISPO-315), October 1990, pp. 1-2.

13See P. De Bievre et al., “Random Uncertainties in Sampling and Element Assay of Nuclear Materials. Target Values 1988,” ESARDA

Bulletin, No. 13, October 1987, pp. 8-16.

14See, e.g., Miller, op cit., footnote 11.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities 123

Sampling/measurement point Instrument or Measurement Goal for Overall target

method onsite lab values

(percent (percent relative)

relative) Random Systematic

Head end/separation stage

Input tank solution HKEDG Plutonium =< 1 0.6 0.3

concentration

Buffer/feed tanks IDMS Plutonium =< 0.2 0.2- 0.4 0.1 -0.2

concentration

Scrub and waste tanks Pu(VI) spectro. Plutonium =< 25

concentration

MOX conversion

MOX canisters NDA in plant Plutonium 1

concentration;

total plutonium

MOX canning KEDG Plutonium =<0.2

concentration

Product area

Plutonium oxide powder T/C Plutonium 0.15 0.15

concentration

HLNC Total plutonium 1.0 0.5

KEY: HKEDG = hybrid k-edge densitometer; IDMS = isotope-dilution mass spectrometry; Pu(VI) spectro. = spectrophotometry; NDA = nondestructive assay (e.g., can include HKEDG, KEDG, and HLNC); KEDG = k-edge densitometer; T/C = titration/coulometry; HLNC = high-level neutron coincidence assay.

SOURCE: Adapted from Thomas Shea et al., “Safeguarding Reprocessing Plants: Principles, Past Experience, Current Practice and Future Trends,”

Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, July 1993, pp. 22,25.

Second, actual IAEA experience in safeguard- al plutonium balance following a plant washout

ing large plants is minimal, so that it is not known should be about+ 6.7 kg (1 σ ) and that the uncerhow well routine measurements will compare tainty in determining in-process inventory should

with their predicted performance.15 Thus, while be about+ 2 kg, it further noted that these precione analysis of the THORP facility, for example, sions are design targets and may not necessarily be

concluded that the uncertainty inclosing the annu- achieved. 16

15The six reprocessing facilities under IAEA safeguards at the end of 1992 were the DPRK’s “radiochemical laboratory” (where reprocessing activities have since been suspended, but where North Korean unwillingness to allow the IAEA to determine the extent of previous reprocessing operations constitutes a violation of safeguards obligations); WAK in Germany (being decommissioned); PREFRE in India (where only

stores of recovered PuO2 are safeguarded, not the chemical parts of the plant); EUREX and ITREC-Trisaia in Italy (now shutdown); and Tokaimura in Japan. IAEA Annual Report for 1992, p. 161. None of these qualifies as a “large” reprocessing plant. (See table A-1.)

16R.D. Marsh et al., “Effective Safeguards in a Commercial Reprocessing Plant,” in Proceedings of the Third International Conference on

Facility Operations--Safeguards Interface, San Diego, CA, Nov. 29-Dee. 4,1987 (La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1988), p. 46.

Note that to achieve a 95 percent detection probability with 5 percent false alarm rate requires a diversion of 3.3 σ , which in this case would be

almost 3 SQ. (See Box 3-4 in the main text, chapter 3.)
124 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Small reprocessing pIantb Medium reprocessing plantd Large reprocessing plante

Nominal (30 t HM/yrc

) (100 t HM/yr) (800 t HM/yr)

measurement

Monthly Yearly Monthly Yearly Monthly uncertainty Year/y

0.2 % 0.04 0.48 0.13 1.6 1.1 12.8

1.0%. 0.2 2.4 0.67 8.0 5.3 64

a Uncertainties given in kilograms of plutonium, assuming 0.8 percent plutonium by weight in spent fuel (nominal average of commercial spent fuel

from a mixture of 80 percent light-water reactors and 20 percent heavy-water “CANDU” reactors). Plutonium concentrations can range from under

0.1 percent in very low burnup fuel to about 1 percent in high burnup spent fuel from commercial LWRs.

b Similar in size to reprocessing facilities at Karlsruhe (Germany), Mol (Belgium), Saluggia (Italy), and Trombay (India). (See table A-1 for safeguards

and operational status.)

c t HM/yr = tonnes of heavy metal (spent fuel) processed by the Plant per year

d Similar in size to reprocessing facilities at Dimona (Israel), Tarapur (India), Tokai-mura (Japan), and one that had been planned in the late 1970s at

Chasma (Pakistan).

e Similar in size to reprocessing facilities at Cap de la Hague (France), Chelyabinsk-40 (Russia), Rokkasho-mura (Japan), THORP (United Kingdom),

and one that had been planned for Wackersdorf (Germany).

Note that if these represent one standard deviation uncertainties in MUF determinations, then the amount of diverted plutonium that could be detected

with a 95 percent detection probability and a 5 percent false alarm rate-the nominal safeguards goal—is 3.3 times the amount given in the table

Diversions of one times the amount could also be detected, but with only about 26 percent probability if the 5 percent false alarm probability is to be

maintained. See E.A. Hakkila et al., Materials Management in an Internationally Safeguarded Fuels Reprocessing Plant, vol. 1. Los Alamos Scientific

Laboratory, Report LA-8042, April 1980, p. 8. -

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS

IN IMPLEMENTING SAFEGUARDS

Experts within the IAEA claim that none of the

problems associated with safeguarding reprocessing plants has precluded inspection goals from being attained, yet they concede that “improvements

are needed to improve the technical credibility of

the safeguards applied, or to lower the costs of

safeguards implementation without adversely affecting safeguards effectiveness.”17 Many critics

feel that the “inspection goals” being referred to in

such statements are not as credible as they should

be in providing strong assurances against diversion of significant quantities of material. 18 On the

overall feasibility of safeguarding large plants,

opinions range from strong skepticism to bold

confidence. In the words of one of the more skeptical experts,

In existing large facilities of this capacity and

complexity, amounts of fissile materials that are

single-weapon significant can be lost in the

maze for months, and some in operations will

know how to take advantage of this for diversion. Without the best in data and statistics, the

problem is impossible. With the best in statistics

the problem has not yet been resolved. Even

those who operate a large reprocessing facility

with the best of intentions will not know where

significant amounts of materials reside all the

time and will not be able to detect small continu17Thomas Shea et al., “Safeguarding Reprocessing Plants: Principles, Past Experience, Current Practice and Future Trends,” Journal of

Nuclear Materials Management, July 1993

18Inspection goals refer to the ability of inspectors to meet “safeguards criteria” for a given type of plant. These criteria consist of a detailed

list of specific actions that must be carried out, including the records to verify, items to identify, count, or check for integrity (within various

agreed levels of confidence), C/S measures to evaluate, measurements to take, and so forth. The procedures to meet these criteria are negotiated

and set forth by the IAEA and the state as part of the Facility Attachment for each given plant.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities | 125

ing diversion by persons familiar with the

plant.19

IAEA officials knowledgeable on the subject

claim that such plants are indeed “safeguardable.”

In making such a claim, they refer to a number of

statistical methods, such as near-real-time accountancy, that will be used to reduce overall uncertainties. Nevertheless, they also note the following current limitations of safeguards at

reprocessing plants:20

 Biases in solution measurements, meaning

readings that are either consistently above or

consistently below their true value, persist at

levels 10 times greater than the expected “target

values” for these measurements (i.e., at greater

than 1 percent). Such inaccuracies are widely

agreed to be one of the principal sources of error

in closing material balances in reprocessing

plants.

 Determining the plutonium content of spent

fuel shipped to a reprocessing plant—to be

compared with the plutonium content recovered via reprocessing—is problematic. The

plutonium content of the fuel as it leaves the

reactor is calculated, not measured; moreover,

these calculations are inaccurate, particularly

for boiling water reactors. In addition, batches

of fuel with different plutonium content and

from different types of reactors are often mixed

during head-end operations at a reprocessing

plant. Thus, improvements are required in the

analysis of differences between plutonium content as declared by the shipper and as measured

by the recipient (so-called shipper-receiver differences, or SRDs).21

 Sample preparations at the facility, shipping of

samples to the IAEA Safeguards Analytical

Laboratory, and sample analysis and evaluation

can take up to three months.

 In some cases, it is not possible to assure that

samples taken for the IAEA are not altered prior

to shipment to the agency’s laboratory. This uncertainty can undermine confidence in the safeguards regime for a reprocessing plant.

 Continuing verification of design information

for operating plants (as recommended by the

IAEA Board of Governors) will require significant effort and may interfere with plant schedules. Limitations caused by radiation once a

plant begins operating will inhibit the ability of

inspectors to conduct physical verification.

The plants examined by LASCAR are designed

to process spent fuel in quantities about four times

larger than those of plants built in the 1970s22 and

involve plutonium throughput, in-process inventory, and storage capacity 10 to 50 times the levels

encountered in existing plants under IAEA safeguards.

23 Experts acknowledge that a considerable effort will be required to translate the LASCAR recommendations into specific working

19John M. Googin, senior staff consultant, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, private communication, September 1993.

20See, e.g., Shea et al., op. cit., footnote 17, pp. 24-26.

21An alternate view is that the problem of determining plutonium content of spent fuel assemblies is not important if there is proper item

accountancy of the assemblies, together with continuity of knowledge over the assemblies until their dissolution. In other words, if all the spent

fuel—and hence all the plutonium it contains—ends up in the reprocessing plant, it does not matter how well the plutonium content is known

before its first measurement in the reprocessing plant’s front end. However, although maintaining item accountancy of the spent fuel would

suffice to assure lack of diversion before the material enters the head end of the plant, an accurate, independent estimate of the plutonium content

in the spent fuel would provide an additional check against diversion before the fuel’s plutonium content had been measured. It would also

provide an independent measurement to complement the assay made once the plutonium is in solution.

22LASCAR report, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 1.

23EURATOM has some experience in safeguarding large British and French reprocessing plants, but their experience and specific approach

are independent and not shared with the IAEA.
126 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Robotic analysis of plutonium-containing samples at the

IAEA’s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory near Vienna. Use of

onsite laboratories at reprocessing plants can eliminate

delays due to packaging and shipping samples to Vienna for

analysis.

arrangements at new reprocessing facilities.

Problems associated in particular with safeguarding such large reprocessing facilities are the following: 24

■ Even if target values for measurement uncertainty are achieved, technologies to account for

the total amount of plutonium processed by

such a plant are insufficient for the anticipated

needs, since the 0.1 percent uncertainty target

for annual throughput may be greater than 1 SQ

of plutonium. (Box A-2 describes various measurement techniques associated with reprocessing plants, and table A-3 translates various

percentage measurement uncertainties into uncertainties in plutonium throughput for different size plants.)

Monitoring of process operations will be required in real-time, an arrangement more intrusive and requiring more frequent inspector inquiries than at present, unless some sort of

remote monitoring is employed.

Costs for implementing safeguards at these

new reprocessing plants will be substantial, requiring additional resources for staff, equipment, and operations, and straining the limits

of IAEA verification capabilities. For example,

roughly 45 inspectors will be needed to implement safeguards at each of the THORP and

Rokkasho facilities (see box A-3 on inspection

efforts), while the current IAEA inspectorate

has only about 200 inspectors and inspection

assistants on which to draw. This issue remains

unresolved.

New plants may employ new types of equipment (e.g., continuous dissolvers, centrifugal

contractors and continuous evaporators), requiring new inspection procedures. Specialized verification systems will tax the IAEA’s

ability to ensure reliable safeguards implementation unless aided by support from member states through programs with the cooperation of the plants’ operators.

Within the LASCAR forum and elsewhere,

however, much work has been done during the last

five years to address these problems. There are

several methods being implemented or considered for larger reprocessing plants:

■ Expanded use of unattended verification arrangements, telecommunications, and resident

inspector deployment as possible efficiency

measures. (Resident inspectors will substantially reduce the inspector staffing requirements, but will require “attractive arrangements” to bring inspectors to live in remote

areas.)

24 Shea et al., op. cit., footnote 17, pp. 24-26.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities 127

Measurement Categories (WHAT is measured):

■ Input and output solutions and solids: concentration; isotopic composition; volume, density, or weight

■ /n-process inventory: as above, for solutions

■ Wastes: leached hulls (short lengths of fuel-rod cladding after the fuel itself has been dissolved away);

other wastes, such as centrifuge sludge (the undissolved solids removed by a centrifuge from the spentfuel dissolver solution)

Measurement techniques (HOW measurements are made):1

■

■

■

■

●

■

■

■

m

—

Alpha spectrometry and isotope-dilution alpha spectrometry. Measures radioactive alpha particles

emitted by plutonium; measures the total plutonium in dissolver solutions, if the plutonium isotopic composition is known from other measurements.

Calorimetry. Measures heat generated by radioactive decay; primarily used for plutonium oxide product

material, when plutonium isotopic concentration and americium-241 content are known from other measurements,

Chemical titration. Measures electrical properties of a solution containing a compound that undergoes

a chemical reaction (e. g., changes valence states) while precisely measured amounts of another chemical are added; used to measure uranium and plutonium concentrations in dissolver solutions and product material; relative accuracies of 0.05 percent to 0.1 percent can be achieved at, for example, IAEA’s

Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at Siebersdorf.

Gamma-ray spectrometry Measures the energy of gamma rays produced by a specific type of radioactive decay (e.g., with resolutions of ±600 eV at 94 to 104 keV energy levels, which are relevant to plutonium isotopes); used to measure the concentration and isotopic composition of plutonium in product

solutions or in solid form.

K-edge absorption densitometry. Measures the absorption of x-rays generated by cobalt-57 and selenium-75 sources whose energies are close to the point at which plutonium absorbs x-rays most strongly

(e.g., around 110 to 120 keV); used for plutonium concentrations in product solutions, input solutions, and

process solutions (in-line measurements); machines cost around $300,000-$400,000 and are to be

installed in the field at Tokai and Rokkasho.

Manometers and vibrating-tube densimeters. Measures mass and density properties of liquids; used for

measuring the densities of solutions containing nuclear materials and for calibrating tank volumes. Electromanometers are used for on-line measurements.

Neutron techniques. Can be either passive and active; measure neutron emissions from various materials, such as uranium, fluorine, and chlorine, to determine their content in samples.

Spectrophotometry Determines the plutonium concentration of a solution by measuring light transmitted

through it at a wavelength which is absorbed by plutonium. This technique is widely used for process

control and material accountancy at all stages of the process, but less frequently used for safeguards

purposes.

Uranium gravimetry. Used to measure mass of uranium in product.

(continued)

1See e.g., Ralph Gutmacher, “Measurement Uncertainty Estimates for Reprocessing Facilities, ” Los Alamos National Laboratory

Report IA-1 1839-MS (ISPO-315), October 1990, pp. 14; and G. Robert Keepin, “State-of-the-Art Technology for Measurement and

Verification of Nuclear Materials,” in Kosta Tsipis et al. (eds.), Arms Control Verification: The Technologies that Make it Possible” (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), pp. 323-337.
128 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

■ Mass spectrometry and isotope dilution

mass spectrometry. Measures the mass of

ionized particles passed through a magnetic field; widely used for determining uranium and plutonium concentrations, and

especially for isotopic composition (e.g., of

samples containing isotopes ranging from

uranium-233 to plutonium-242); current

machines at the IAEA’s Siebersdorf Laboratory can characterize microgram samples routinely; machines appropriate for

clean-room facilities can characterize micron-sized particles containing only on the

Mass spectrometer at the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical order of picograms (10-12 grams) of materiLaboratory al. 2 Cost can be around $1 million for each

device.

■ X-ray fluorescence. Measures well-characterized emissions from various elements (ranging from sodium to the highest elements on the periodic chart) when they are stimulated by x-rays; has microgram

detection limits and gives rough estimate of amounts of each element present (but not individual isotopes); primarily used as online instrumentation for process solutions for accurate determination of plutonium/uranium ratio; often used in combination with K-edge measurement to determine plutonium/uranium ratio in low concentration solutions, for example, in plutonium dissolver solution.

2 David L. Donohue, head of the Isotope Analysis Unit, IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, Siebersdorf, Austria, Private Communication, Oct. 20, 1993.

■

■

●

The use of onsite laboratories to eliminate de- pletely independent measurement or surveillays in sample analysis, ensure integrity of the

samples once taken, and achieve verification

measurements of the main nuclear materials

streams with accuracies on the order of 0.1 percent.

Extensive use of NRTA methods for estimating

in-process inventory on a timely basis.

Greater use of data provided by the operator,

appropriately authenticated, where it would be

impractical for the IAEA to implement comlance systems.

These measures will certainly improve safeguards capabilities over current practice. However, the application of safeguards to such

large-scale plants is unproven, at least pending

more experience from safeguards application

at UP-3 in France and THORP in the United

Kingdom.
Appendix A Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities 129

For medium-size and large reprocessing plants, the “maximum routine inspection effort” (MRIE) ceilings are the following:

Medium reprocessing plant1

For spent fuel containing 0.8 percent plutonium, the nominal plutonium throughput would be 800

kg/yr, and the MRIE for such a plant as specified in INFCIRC/153 (see box 3-4 of main text) would be

30 times the square root of 800, or about 850 person-days-of-inspection (PDl)/yr. Since one PDI allows

one inspector access to the plant for up to 8 hours, this would translate into continuous presence of a

single inspector for about 280 days, If such a plant were operated for 250 days/yr, this level of effort

would provide for a single inspector 24 hours/day during operation plus about another 100 person-days

per year for additional activities.2

Large reprocessing plant3

For spent fuel containing 0.8 percent plutonium, the nominal plutonium throughput would be 6,400

kg/yr, and the MRIE = 30 times the square root of 6,400 = 2400 PDI/y. This would set the ceiling at 2

inspectors working around the clock, 365 days/yr, plus 210 PDI/yr of additional inspections. Note that

providing this level of inspection would require assigning 10 inspectors to the facility, since a full-time

workload for a single inspector is 40 hrs/week for 48 weeks per year, or 240 PDI per year per inspector,

1

Throughput of 100 t HM/yr---enough to reprocess spent fuel from about 3 commercial LWRs.

2Thomas Shea et al., “Safeguarding Reprocessing PIants: Principles, Past Experience, Current Practice and Future Trends,’’ Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, July 1993, p. 21,

3Throughput of 800 t HM/yr---enough to reprocess spent fuel from about 25 commercial LWRs.
Country

Afghanistan

Albania

Algeria

Andorra

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bahamas, The

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belarus

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bhutan

Bolivia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Appendix B:

Parties to the NPT,

the IAEA, and

Safeguards

Agreements B

Date of

joining

the NPT

Date of

joining

the IAEA

Safeguards

agreement

Nuclear

activities

2/4/70

9/1 2/90

1/1 2/95

6/1 7/85

2/1 0/95

7/15/93

1/23/73

6/27/69

9/22/92

8/1 1/76

11/3/88

8/31/79

2/21/80

7/22/93

5/2/75

8/9/85

10/31/72

5/23/85

5/26/70

8/15/94

4/28/69

3/26/85

9/5/69

3/3/70

3/1 9/71

6/2/72

1/8/69

1/8/69

10/24/79

10/25/70

1957

1957

1963#

1957#

1993

1957#

1957

1972

1957

1958

1963

1957#

1957

1958

1964

1957#

FS: 2/20/78

FS: 3/25/88

Partial

FS: 2/1/90”

FS: 3/4/94

FS: 5/5/94

FS: 7/10/74

FS: 7/23/72

FS: 6/1 1/82

FS: 9/12/94**

FS: 2/21/77

FS: 8/13/92’

FS: 10/24/89

FS: 2/6/95

FS: 3/4/94

FS: 11/4/87

FS: 2/29/72

FS: 5/21/92’

FS: 2/21/72

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

131
132 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Date of Date of

joining joining Safeguards Nuclear

Country the NPT the IAEA agreement activities

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Comoros

Congo

Costa Rica

Cote d’lvoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Dijibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia

Fiji

Finland

France

3/10/71

5/25/95

3/9/92

4/8/86

10/23/78

3/3/70

3/6/73

6129/92

2/1 0/70

1/1/93

1/3/69

8/10/84

7/24/71

3/7/69

2/26/81 1

7/11/72

11/1/84

3/16/95

1/7/92

2/5/70

7/14/72

2/5/69

8/3/92

1960

1984#

1960#

1965

1963

1992

1957#

1965

1993

1957

1957

1958

1957#

1957

1992

1957#

1958#

1957#

Partial Yes

VO: 9/18/89 Yes

FS: 12/22/82 Yes

FS: 11/22/79

FS: 9/8/83

FS: 1/19/95

Partial

FS: 1/26/73

FS: 3/3/729

FS: 2/21/7710

FS: 9/12/94**

FS: 10/1 1/73

FS: 3/10/75

FS: 6/30/82

FS: 4122175

FS: 6/13/86”

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FS: 2/24/9**

FS: 1212/77

FS: 3122/73

FS: 2/9/72 Yes

VO: 9/12/81 Yes

NOTES ON NPT MEMBERSHIP

NPT membership and accession/succession/ratification dates are as given in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fact

Sheet: Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2/1 4/95, with a correction for Tanzania and

the addition of states that joined the NPT after 2/14/95, according to information from the U.S. State Department, Dates given are the

earliest dates on which a country deposited its instrument of ratification or accession—whether in Washington, London, or Moscow.

In the case of a country that was a dependent territory which became a party through succession, the date given is the date on which

the country gave notice that it would continue to be bound by the terms of the Treaty.

NOTES ON IAEA MEMBERSHIP

IAEA membership as listed in the inside back cover of the IAEA Bulletin, the quarterly journal of the International Atomic Energy

Agency, vol. 36, No. 4, 1994, Vienna,

#Member of IAEA Board of Governors, 1994-1995.

NOTES ON SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

“FS” denotes states that have full-scope (NPT) safeguards agreements covering all nuclear material on their territories, as modeled

after INFCIRC/153. Unless otherwise indicated, the date shown is the date that the agreement entered into force. In some cases, the

date is the date of a full-scope safeguards agreement that has since been superseded by another such agreement. Data on the

status of full-scope safeguards agreements was provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency and is current as of 3/1/95.

“Partial” denotes states that have one or more safeguards agreements in force over individual facilities only. Such agreements, which

do not cover the state’s entire fuel cycle, are modeled after INFCIRC/66.

“VO” denotes nuclear-weapon states that have made voluntary offers to the IAEA to place some of their civil nuclear facilities under

safeguards, as of the date given.

*Safeguards agreement has been signed but has not yet entered into force.

 **Safeguards agreement has been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors following signature but has not yet entered into force.

NOTES ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

“Yes” indicates that the state has at least one power reactor or research reactor in operation or under construction, or has fissile material, as indicated in ‘(Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties, “Arms Control Today, vol. 25, No. 2, March 1995, pp. 33-34,

That table provides data on non-nuclear members of the NPT as of 3/1/95. Data on other states (states that have joined the NPT since

March 1, states that are not NPT members, and nuclear-weapon NPT states) provided by the Office of Technology Assessment,
Appendix B Parties to the NPT, the IAEA, and Safeguards Agreements 133

Date of Date of

joining joining Safeguards Nuclear

Country the NPT the IAEA agreement activities

Gabon

Gambia, The

Georgia

Germany, Federal

Republic of

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Holy See

Honduras

Hungary, Republic of

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait

Kyrgyzstan

Laos

Latvia

Lebanon

Lesotho

Liberia

Libya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macedonia

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Micronesia

2/19/74

5/1 2/75

3/7/94

5/2/751,2

5/4/70

3/11/70

9/2/75

9/22/70

4129/85

8/20176

1 0119/93

6/2/70

2/25/71 1

5/16/73

5/27/69

7/18/69

7/12/791

2/2/70

10/29/69

7/1/68

5/2/751

315/70

6/8/761

 2/11/70

2/14/94

6/1 1/70

4/1 8/85

12/12/85

4/23175

11/1 7/89

7/5/94

2/20/70

1/31/92

7/15/70

5/20/70

3/5/70

5/26175

4/20/781

9/23/91

5/2/75

4/12/95

10/8/70

2/18/86

3/5/70

4/7/70

2/10/70

2/6/70

1/30/95

10/23/93

4/8/69

1/21/691

4/1 4/95

1964

1957#

1960#

1957

1957

1957

1957

1957

1957

1957#

1957#

1958

1959

1970#

1957

1957

1965

1957#

1966

1994

1965

1957

1964

19918

1961 #

1962

1963

1968

1991

1958

1994

1965

1969

1961

1994

1974

1958#

FS: 12/3/79*

FS: 8/8/78

FS: 2/21/77

FS: 2/17/75

FS: 12/17/8111

FS: 2/1/82

FS: 1/6/75*

FS: 8/1/72

FS: 4/18/75

FS: 3/30/72

FS: 10/16/74

Partial

FS: 7/14/80

FS: 5/15/74

FS: 2129172

FS: 2/21/77

Partial

FS: 2/21/77

FS: 11/6/78

FS: 12/2/77

FS: 2/21/78

FS: 7/26/94’

FS: 12/29/90

FS: 4/10/92

FS: 11/14/75

FS: 11/22/91’

FS: 12/21/93

FS: 3/5/73

FS: 6/12/73

FS: 7/8/80

FS: 10/4/79

FS: 10/15/92

FS: 2/21/77

FS: 6/14/73

FS: 8/3/92

FS: 2/29/72

FS: 1O/2/77

FS: 11/13/90

FS: 1/31/73

FS: 9/14/73

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes15

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
134 Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Date of Date of

joining joining Safeguards Nuclear

Country the NPT the IAEA agreement activities

Moldava

Monaco

Mongolia

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar (Burma)

Namibia

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Palau

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russia

Rwanda

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent

and the Grenadines

San Marino

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

Somalia

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Suriname

Swaziland

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Taiwan7

Tajikistan

Tanzania

1 0/1 1/94

3/J 3/95

5/1 4/69

11/27/70

9/4/90

12/2/92

10/2/92

6/7/82

1 /5/70

5/2/753

9/1 0/69

3/6/73

10/9/92

9/27/68

2/5/69

4/1 4/95

1/1 3/77

1/1 3/82

214170

3/3/70

10/5/72

6/1 2/69

1 2/1 5/77

4/3/89

2/4/70

3/5/704

5/20/75

3/22/93

12/28/79

11/6/84

8/1 0/70

7/20/83

10/3/88

1 2/1 7/70

3/12/85

2/26/75

3/1 0/76

1/1/93

4/7/92

6/17/81

3/5/70

7/1 0/91

11/5/87

3/5/79

1 0/31/73

6/30/76

12/1 1/69

1/9/70

3/9/771

9/24/69

[1/27/70]

1/1 7/95

6/7/91

1957

1973

1957#

1957

1983

1957

1957

1977

1969

1964

1957

1957#

1966

1957

1957

1958#

1957#

1957

1976

1957

1957#

1962

1960

1967

1967

1993#

1992

1957

1957#

1957

1958

1957

1957#

1963

1976

FS: 9/5/72

FS: 2/18/75

FS: 4/13/84

FS: 6/22/72

FS: 2/21/77

FS: 2/29/72

FS: 12/29/76

FS: 2/29/88

FS: 3/1/72

Partial

FS: 12/22/88*

FS: 10/13/83

FS: 3/20/79

FS: 8/1/79

FS: 10/16/74

FS: 10/11/72

FS: 7/1/8612

FS: 10/27/72

VO: 6/1 0/85

FS: 9/1 2/94

FS: 2/2/90

FS: 1/8/92

FS: 2/23/77**

FS: 1/14/80

FS: 11/10/77*

FS: 10/18/77

FS: 3/3/729

FS: 12/23/7313

FS: 6/17/93

FS: 9/16/91

FS: 4/5/89

FS: 8/6/84

FS: 1/7/77

FS: 2/2/79

FS: 7/28/75

FS: 4/14/75

FS: 9/6/78

FS: 5/18/92

FS: 8/26/92*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Appendix B Parties to the NPT, the lAEA, and Safeguards Agreements 1135

Date of Date of

joining joining Safeguards Nuclear

Country the NPT the IAEA agreement activities

Thailand 12/2/72 1957# FS: 5/16/74 Yes

Togo 2/26/70 FS: 11/29/90’

Tonga 7/7/71 FS: 11/18/93

Trinidad and Tobago 10/30/86 FS: 11/4/92

Tunisia 2/26/70 1957# FS: 3/13/90

Turkey 4/1 7/8011957# FS: 9/1/81

Turkmenistan 9/29/94

Tuvalu 1/1 9/79 FS: 3/15/91

Uganda 10/20/82 1967

Ukraine 12/5/94 1957# FS: 1/1 3/95

United Arab Emirates 1976

United Kingdom5

11/27/68 1957# VO: 8/14/78

United States 3/5/70 1957# VO: 12/9/80

Uruguay 8/31/70 1963# FS: 9/17/76

Uzbekistan 5/2/92 1994 FS: 2/21/94”

Vanuatu

Venezuela 9/25/75 1957 FS: 3/1 1/82

Vietnam 6/1 4/82 1957 FS: 2/23/90

Western Samoa 3/1 7/75 FS: 1/22/79

Yemen 6/1/7961991

Yugoslavia [3/4/70] 1957 FS: 12/28/7314

Zaire 8/4/70 1961 FS: 11/9/72

Zambia 5/1 5/91 1969 FS: 9/22/94

Zimbabwe 9/26/91 1986

TOTAL: 178 NPT parties (not including Taiwan—see note 7-or Yugoslavia, which has dissolved)

122 IAEA members (including Yugoslavia but not Latvia—see note 8)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1 With statement.

2 The former German Democratic Republic, which united with the Federal Republic of Germany on 10/3/90, had signed the NPT

on 7/1/68 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 10/31/69.

3 Extended to Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

4 Russia has given notice that it would continue to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of the former Soviet Union under

the NPT.

5 Extended to Aguilla and territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom.

6 The Republic of Yemen resulted from the union of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The table indicates the date of signature and ratification by the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the first of these two states

to become a party to the NPT. The Yemen Arab Republic signed the NPT on 9/23/68 and deposited its instrument of ratification on

5/1 4/86.

7 On 1/27/70, an instrument of ratification of the NPT was deposited in the name of the Republic of China. Effective 1/1/79, the

United States recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state that

they will continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United States regards them as bound by the obligations imposed

by the Treaty. The IAEA applies safeguards to the nuclear facilities in Taiwan on a nongovernmental basis.

8 Latvia’s membership in the IAEA has been approved by the IAEA’s General Conference and will take effect once the required

legal instruments have been deposited.

9 The full-scope safeguards agreement concluded with Czecholovia on 3/3/72 continues to be applied to the Czech Republic

and to Slovakia.

10 The full-scope safeguards agreement with Denmark, in force since 3/1/72, has been replaced by the agreement of 4/5/73 between the non-nuclear-weapon states of EURATOM, EURATOM, and the IAEA.

11 The full-scope safeguards agreement with Greece, provisionally in force since 3/1/72, has been superseded by the agreement

of 4/5/73 between the non-nuclear-weapon states of EURATOM, EURATOM, and the IAEA, which Greece acceded to on 12/17/81.

12 The full-scope safeguards agreement with Portugal, in force since 6/14/79, has been superseded by the agreement of 4/5/73

between the non-nuclear-weapon states of EURATOM, EURATOM, and the IAEA, which Portugal acceded to on 7/1/86.

13 When Slovenia became an independent state, it succeeded to the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Yugoslavia.

A new safeguards agreement concluded with Slovenia was approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 6/8/94 but has not yet

entered into force.

14 The safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Yugoslavia continues to be applied in Serbia and Montenegro.

15 Iraq’s reactors are no longer operational.
ABACC

ALMR

CANDU

C/S

DA

Detection

probability

levels, as

defined by

the IAEA

Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor, a

relatively recent concept for a selfcontained breeder reactor, designed

so that reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities are collocated with the

reactor, and there is minimal access to

the fuel at all stages of the cycle

Canadian Deuterium-Uranium reactor,

a type of nuclear reactor fueled by

natural uranium and moderated by

heavy water

Containment and Surveillance

Destructive Assay

The IAEA’s safeguards criteria specify the detection probability with which

various types of measurements on

various types of materials are to be

made. For these purposes, low detection probability is defined as 10 percent, medium detection probability is

defined as 50 percent, and high detection probability is defined as 90 percent.

Appendix C:

Abbreviations

and

Glossary c

Direct-use Nuclear material that can be used for

material the manufacture of nuclear explosives

components without transmutation

(i.e., changing isotopes to different

isotopes) or further enrichment (i.e.,

increasing the concentration of some

isotopes at the expense of others). Examples are highly enriched uranium,

plutonium with less than 80 percent

plutonium-238, and uranium-233.

Note that chemical compounds or

mixtures of direct-use materials (e.g.,

MOX, see below) are also direct-use

materials, as is the plutonium contained in spent fuel. Unirradiated direct-use material (e.g., fresh highly

enriched uranium or separated plutonium) would require less processing

time and effort to make into a weapon

than irradiated direct-use material

such as spent fuel, which would need

to be reprocessed before it could be

used in a weapon.

EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community

FBR Fast Breeder Reactor (most common

type is the liquid-metal fast breeder

reactor, or LMFBR)

I 137
138 I Nuclear Safeguards and the lnternational Atomic Energy Agency

HEU

IAEA

IIV

Indirect-use

material

INFCIRC

LASCAR

LEU

LWR

MBA

MC&A

MOX

MUF

Highly Enriched Uranium (20 percent

or more in uranium-235)

International Atomic Energy Agency

Interim Inventory Verification (e.g.,

monthly for facilities holding substantial quantities of separated plutonium).

All nuclear material except direct-use

material. Natural uranium or low-enriched uranium, an indirect-use material, must be enriched (into highly enriched uranium) or transmuted (into

plutonium) before it can be used in

nuclear weapons. See direct-use material.

Information Circular; type of official

document published by the IAEA

Large-Scale Reprocessing (a forum

advisory to the IAEA)

Low-Enriched Uranium (< 20 percent

in U-235)

Light-Water Reactor

Material Balance Area

Material Control and Accountancy

Mixed Oxide Fuel (usually contains

natural or depleted uranium and plutonium oxides)

Material Unaccounted For

NDA

NRTA

PIV

PUREX

RSD

SAGSI

SIR

SQ

SRD

SSAC

Strata

Non-destructive Assay

Near-Real-Time Accountancy

Physical Inventory Verification (e.g.,

yearly)

Plutonium-Uranium Redox Extraction, the most common chemical

process by which spent fuel is reprocessed

Relative Standard Deviation

Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation

Safeguards Implementation Report

(the annual report by the IAEA to its

Board of Governors on its safeguard

activities for the past year)

Significant Quantity (8 kg of plutonium or uranium-233 or 25 kg of uranium-235 contained in a uranium

product enriched to 20 percent or

more in uranium-235)

Shipper-Receiver Difference

State’s System of Accountancy and

Control

Subsets of measured items or batches

that are chosen to be statistically homogeneous, for instance, having similar nuclear material content and measured using the same procedures
Index

A

ABACC. See Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

Accountancy verification goal, 73, 117

Acheson, Dean, 24-25

Acheson-Lilienthal report, 25,70

Actual routine inspection efforts, 57-58

“Ad hoc” inspections, 37-38,80

Adjusted running book inventory, 118

Advanced liquid metal reactors, 105

Algeria

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

Alpha spectrometry, 127

“Anytime, anywhere” inspections, 79-80,82

Argentina. See also Argentine-Brazilian Agency for

Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

full-scope safeguards, 16,50-51,83

gaseous diffusion facility, 72

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and

Control of Nuclear Materials, 10,35,44

Argonne National Laboratory, 106-107

ARIEs. See Actual routine inspection efforts

Atoms for Peace program, 1,6,26,53,87

Australia

provision of increased access to the IAEA on a

trial basis, 45

AVG. See Accountancy verification goal

B

Bangladesh

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

Baruch Plan, 25-26

Belarus

commitment to return nuclear warheads and materials to Russia, 34

Beryllium, 93

Black market

nuclear weapon material from the former Soviet

Union, 23

Blix, Hans, 41,43,68,82,87

Brazil. See also Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

full-scope safeguards, 16,27,50-51,83

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

Ipero gas centrifuge plant, 71

Resende uranium enrichment plant, 71

Breeder reactors

declining interest in, 103-104, 105

HEU for initial fuel loading, 102

Bulk-handling facilities. See also Reprocessing facilities; specific type offacility by name

safeguards uncertainties, 12-14,70,73-78

types, 70

c

C/S measures. See Containment and surveillance

measures

Calorimetry, 127

Canada

IAEA inspection of fuel cycle, 33

possible reduced inspections in return for increased transparency, 64

proportion of IAEAA safeguards resources allocated for, 56

provision of increased access to the IAEA on a

trial basis, 45

Carter Administration

discouragement of use of plutonium in civil reactor programs overseas, 103

policy to develop alternative LEU fuels while taking back HEU fuels, 108

Ceaucescu regime

IAEA safeguard violations, 39

Challenge inspections, 60,61-62

Chemical Weapons Convention precedent, 82

description, 81

Chemical titration, 127

Chemical Weapons Convention, 10, 16,60,61-62,

64,79,82,86

I 139
140 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

China

detonation of first atomic bomb, 26

export of cyclotron to Iran, 54

export of research reactor to Algeria, 88

lack of commitment to export controls, 43-44

NPT membership, 28

Clinch River breeder reactor, 103, 105

Clinton Administration

fissile materials production ban, 19,20,99

Containment and Surveillance Data Authenticated

Communication System, 77-78

Containment and surveillance measures, 4, 13,74,

76-77, 107, 115, 121

Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, 64

Covert nuclear facilities

“ad hoc” inspections, 37-38

completeness and accuracy of initial inventory,

37-38

ensuring absence of, 5,9-10,40

environmental sampling and, 37

improving detection of, 14-16,78-80,82

outside information about, 14-15,41,42

Cuba

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

Cumulative flux method for materials accountancy,

117-118

CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention

Czech Republic

possible reduced inspections for in return for increased transparency, 64

D

Databases

safeguards and, 45

Declared nuclear material

certification of compliance with safeguards limited to, 38

completeness and accuracy of initial inventory,

37-38

Design of plants, 42

Discrimination among IAEA member states, 56,58,

70,75, 110

Dual-Use Export Guidelines, 43,90,96-97

E

Effective kilograms, 58

Egypt

IAEA technical assistance to, 53,54

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1,6,26

Ekg. See Effective kilograms

Energy Policy Act, 107-108

England. See United Kingdom

Enrichment facilities

international nuclear material control regime and,

109-110

safeguarding, 70-72

Environmental sampling, 9,37,59

Programme 93 + 2 and, 44-45

EURATOM. See European Atomic Energy Community

Europe. See also specific countries by name

short-notice inspections, 102-103

European Atomic Energy Community, 42,51, 121

European Safeguards Research and Development

Association

Working Group on Techniques and Standards for

Destructive Analysis, 122

Export controls

as one nonproliferation policy tool, 24

expanding use of, 66

NSG Dual-Use Export Guidelines, 43

on HEU from the United States, 107-108

F

False alarms, 45-48,80

Finland

C/S test operation, 77

Fissile material production ban, 19-22,99-100

Former Soviet Union

breakup implications, 23,34

detonation of first atomic bomb, 26

initial inability to come to agreement with the

United States on international control, 25-26

Foster, William, interpretation of “manufacture” of

a nuclear weapon, 83,95

France

blockage of sale of reactor to Pakistan, 34

declining interest in breeder reactors, 105

detonation of first atomic bomb, 26

IAEA budget and, 51

LASCAR study, 43

NPT membership, 28

opposition to plutonium production ban, 103

plutonium fuel cycle, 21

reprocessing facilities, 73

Fuel cycles

internationalization of, 22, 109-110

plutonium, 21-22, 104

worldwide cutoff on production of weapon-usable

materials, 20-22, 102-106

Fuel fabrication facilities

international nuclear material control regime and,

12, 109-110

safeguarding, 70,73
Index 1141

G

G-7 countries, 90, 90n

Gamma-ray spectrometry, 127

Gas centrifuge enrichment plants, 71-72

Gaseous diffusion enrichment plants, 72

GEMINI surveillance system, 76-77

Germany

declining interest in breeder reactors, 105

former reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards, 123

Gronau uranium enrichment plant, 71

HEU-fueled research reactor, 102

IAEA budget and, 51

IAEA inspection of fuel cycles, 33

LASCAR study, 43

proportion of IAEA safeguards resources allocated for, 56

URENCO uranium enrichment plant, 71

Global production of materials usable for nuclear

weapons, ban on, 20-22

H

Heavy water

Romanian sale of Norwegian-origin heavy water

to India, 39

Helikon uranium enrichment process, 71

HEU. See Highly enriched uranium

Hexapartite agreement, 102

Highly enriched uranium

civil uses, 102

conversion time to weapon components, 69

converting to from LEU, 102-103

enrichment plants, 71-72

exemption from IAEA safeguards, 32,67

LEU substitutions for, 102

prohibition on export from the United States,

107-108

United States take-back policy, 108-110

Hughes-Canberra consortium, 77

Hungary

C/S test operation, 77

I

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency

IAEA safeguards. See also Inspections; Significant

quantities; Traditional safeguards

costs, 50-52, 126

detection probabilities and false alarm rates,

45-48

difference between assured detection and deterrence, 4, 30

evaluation of information, 14-15,29

full-scope safeguards, 6-7, 16,27,28,31,50-51,

83,89

limitations, 4,31-33,49-50

material unaccounted for, 29, 45

measurement uncertainties, 30,45-48, 122

nonproliferation policies, role in, 23-24

OTA findings, 3-5

process stages, 7,27,29

purposes, 3,7,27,29

quantification difficulties, 29-30

R&D programs and, 31

research reactors, 107

state systems of accounting and control, 27,29,

50

subjectivity of, 3,29-31

timeliness, 11-12,29,30,66-70

verification difficulties, 31

IAEA Statute, 1,6, 15,26

Import and export information, 66

In-process inventory, 118, 127

India

breeder reactors in, 105

detonation of first atomic bomb, 26

full-scope safeguards and, 31

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

IAEA inability to confirm compliance with safeguards, 38

NPT threshold state, 89,99-102

opposition to plutonium production ban, 103

possible purchase of reactors from Russia

blocked, 34

possible self-declaration of nuclear status,

101-102

reprocessing facility under partial IAEA safeguards, 123

Romanian sale of Norwegian-origin heavy water

to, 39

Indonesia

IAEA technical assistance to, 53,54

INFCIRC/66, 6,27,80,93

INFCIRC/153, 6,27,28,30,42,56,57-58, 59,60,

79,80,86,93, 111

Initial inventory of nuclear material. See also Termination of nuclear weapon program

“ad hoc” inspections and, 37-38

IAEA responsibility to verify completeness, 16,

82-83

nonroutine inspections in North Korea and South

Africa, 84-85

North Korean discrepancies, 16,39

Inspections. See also Special inspections

actual routine inspection efforts, 57-58
142 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

“ad hoc” inspections, 37-38, 80

challenge inspections, 60,61-62

characteristics of, 81

experience of inspectors, importance of, 121

INFCIRC/153 provisions, 57-58,60

legal limits on, 57-58

limited frequency unannounced access, 72

long-duration visas for inspectors, 17,86-87

managed access and, 16,61-62

maximum routine inspection efforts, 57-58

overinterpretation of openness to inspection visits, 10, 62

reallocation of inspection effort, 7-9,55-57,58-59

right of inspectors to go anywhere unimpeded, 41

routine, 80

South African openness to, 16,31,95

states’ yielding of sovereignty for, 4,33,49

types of, 80-81

voluntary openness and, 10, 16, 60,62,95

Inspector training, 41

International Atomic Energy Agency. See also

IAEA safeguards

Board of Governors membership, 88, 130-134

budget, 5,49-51,52,54-55

commitment to maintaining political support

within, 42

compliance issues, 3, 38-39, 89

conservatism of, 17, 40-41

design information proposal, 42

discrimination against member states, 56,58,70,

75, 110

establishment, 1, 26

goal attainment percentage, 49,70

increased transparency within, 17, 85-86

inspection authority, 4-5, 27

inspector training, 41

lack of enforcement means, 33

membership, 28, 130-134

outside information about undeclared facilities,

14-15,41,42,78-79

promotional activities, 53-54,87-88

proposed by Eisenhower, 26

regional arms control agreements, 10-11,62,65

resources available for safeguards, 7-8,50-53,

54-55

Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, 125, 127

special inspections right, 15-16,42, 49

Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, 64

Technical Cooperation and Assistance Fund, 52,

53-54

U.N. Security Council reporting process, 98

universal import/export reporting, 43

weakness of, 17, 26-27

International Court of Justice

treaty interpretation, 92

Iran

as a “problem NPT state,” 19, 94, 97

China’s nuclear exports to, 44

provision of increased access to the IAEA, 45,64

request for visits rather than formal inspections,

9,59

technical assistance to, 54

United States’ suspicions about nuclear weapon

program, 19

Iraq

covert nuclear weapon program, 2, 33-34, 38, 39,

41

declared facility safeguards violations, 38

HEU production, 54

intelligence information about, 14,78

NPT violations, 39

special inspection request, 42

Isotope-dilution alpha spectrometry, 127

Isotope-dilution mass spectrometry, 127

Israel

full-scope safeguards and, 31

NPT threshold state, 89,99-102

possible self-declaration of nuclear status,

101-102

Italy

former reprocessing facilities under IAEA safeguards, 123

J

Japan

breeder reactors in, 75, 105

Containment and Surveillance Data Authenticated

Communication System, 77-78

ease of short-notice inspections, 102-103

fast-breeder reactors, 75, 105

IAEA budget and, 51

IAEA inspection of fuel cycles, 33

LASCAR study, 42,43

Ningyo uranium enrichment plant, 71

NSG secretariat, 43

opposition to plutonium production ban, 103

plutonium fuel cycle, 21-22

possible nuclear weapon development scenario,

74-75

proportion of IAEA safeguards resources allocated for, 56

provision of increased access to the IAEA on a

trial basis, 45

reduced inspections for, 64

reprocessing facilities, 3-4, 12-13, 30,49-50, 73,

74, 111, 117, 123
Index | 143

Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant, 3-4, 12-13,

30,49-50,73, 111

Rokkasho-mura uranium enrichment plant, 71

safeguard agreement with IAEA, 6,27

Tokai Plutonium Fuel Production Facility, 75-76,

111, 117

Tokai reprocessing plant, 3,74, 111, 117

provision of increased access to the IAEA on a

trial basis, 45

K

K-edge absorption densitometry, 127

Kalman filter, 119n

KANUPP reactor

possibility of diversion of nuclear material from,

39

Kazakhstan

breeder reactors in, 105

commitment to return nuclear warheads and materials to Russia, 34

full-scope safeguards agreement, 50-51

opposition to plutonium production ban, 103

shipment of HEU to United States from, 109

verification of initial inventory, 82-83

L

Large Scale Reprocessing plant study, 43, 111, 114,

125-126

LASCAR. See Large Scale Reprocessing plant study

LEU. See Low-enriched uranium

LFUA. See Limited frequency unannounced access

inspections

Libya

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

attempts to purchase nuclear weapons, 88

provision of increased access to the IAEA, 64

Lilienthal, David, 25

Limited frequency unannounced access inspections,

72

Lithium-6, 93

London Group. See Nuclear Suppliers Group

Low-enriched uranium

converting to HEU, 102

RERTR development of, 102

M

Manometers, 127

Mass spectrometry, 127

Material accountancy, 3-4, 12,73-75, 115, 117-120,

122

Material balance areas, 114, 116

Material unaccounted for, 29,45, 116, 118-119

Maximum routine inspection efforts, 57-58

MBAs. See Material balance areas

Middle East peace process, 10-11, 100

Missed diversion, 45-48

Mixed oxide, 104

conversion time to nuclear weapon components,

69

demands on safeguards,51

safeguards uncertainties, 12, 73

Modular Integrated Video Systems, 76

MOX. See Mixed oxide

MRIEs. See Maximum routine inspection efforts

MUF. See Material unaccounted for

N

National Environmental Policy Act, 108

Naval nuclear reactors

HEU for, 4n, 27n, 102

Near-real-time accountancy, 3-4, 13-14,73-74,

75-76, 114, 115-116, 119-120, 128

Netherlands

Almelo uranium enrichment plant (URENCO), 71

Neutron techniques, 128

New Partnership Approach, 51

Neyman-Pearson test with statistic CUMUF, l19n

1991-1995 Safeguards Criteria, 86

Non-Proliferation Treaty, 51,53

amending options, 18,90-92

conference to review and extend, 34,91-92

Foster interpretation, 83,95

full-scope safeguards, 6-7,27,28

membership, 28, 89, 130-134

non-NPT threshold states, 99-102

non-nuclear-weapon state commitments, 27

“problem states,” 18-19,94-99

provisions, 1,6-7,23,27,89

reinterpreting, 18, 92-94

review and extension conference, 90,91-92

states signing, 35, 130-134

success of, 34-35

technology sharing for peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, 31, 53-54,97

time-limit on withdrawal from, 19,95-96

withdrawal from, 31

North Korea

“ad hoc” inspections, 37

declared facility violations, 2, 10,38

fill-scope safeguards, 16,83

initial inventory, 16,39

initial provision of increased access to the IAEA,

64

intelligence information about, 14,78, 84

nonroutine inspections, 84

NPT violations, 39

refusal to permit IAEA to inspect facilities, 16, 31
144 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

regional arms control agreement with South Korea, 62, 65

reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards, 123

special inspections, 15,42,59

suspicions about, 33

technical assistance to, 54

withdrawal from IAEA, 54,64, 84

withdrawal from NPT, threatened, 39,64, 84,96

NPT. See Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRTA. See Near-real-time accountancy

Nuclear Suppliers Group

Dual-Use Export Guidelines, 19,43,90,96-97

0

OPCW. See Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons

“Open Skies” treaty, 64

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 61

P

Page’s test, 119, 119n

Pakistan

full-scope safeguards and, 31

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

IAEA inability to confirm compliance with safeguards, 38

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

NPT threshold state, 89,99-102

possibility of diversion of nuclear material from

KANUPP reactor, 39

possible self-declaration of nuclear status,

101-102

purchase of reactors from France blocked, 34

Persian Gulf War

clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq, 2,

33-34,38,39,41

Peru

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

Phillipines

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

Plutonium

amount needed to make a nuclear weapon, 11,67

annual plutonium throughput uncertainties at reprocessing facilities, 124

conversion time to make nuclear weapon components, 69

demands on safeguards,51

effective kilograms, 58

eliminating production of, 103-104, 106

fuel cycle, 21-22, 104, 105

IAEA safeguards’ lack of prohibition on stockpiling, 4, 31

international storage system, 109

principal sources of plutonium measurement errors in reprocessing facilities, 123

production ban, 21

stockpiling excess, 106

Programme 93 + 2

environmental sampling, 44-45

intention, 44

significant quantities and, 68

Project Sapphire, 109

R

R&D programs. See Research and development programs

RECOVER program, 77

Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors

program, 106-110

LEU fuels for, 102

Regular safeguards inspections

description, 80,81

Reprocessing facilities

accountancy verification goals, 73

annual plutonium throughput uncertainties, 124

civil facilities, 112-114

containment and surveillance measures, 4, 13,74,

76-77, 115, 121

cumulative flux method for materials accountancy, 117-118

difficulties and limitations in safeguard implementation, 124-126, 128

diversion detection difficulties, 122-123

diversion scenarios, 116, 120-121

experience of inspectors, 121

IAEA experience in safeguarding, 74

international nuclear material control regime and,

109-110

material accountancy, 3-4, 115, 117-120, 122

material balance areas, 114, 116

material unaccounted for, 116

measurement categories and techniques, 127-128

near-real-time accountancy, 3-4, 13-14,73-74,

75-76, 114, 115-116, 119-120, 128

onsite laboratories, 128

plant design, 120-121, 125

plutonium content of spent fuel shipped to, 125

plutonium storage, 116, 120

principal sources of plutonium measurement errors, 123

process area, 115

radiation shielding, 121

resident inspectors, 126

routine inspection efforts, 129

running book inventory, 117-118

safeguards uncertainties, 12-14,70,73

shipper-receiver differences, 125
Index | 145

solution measurement bias, 125

target values, 119, 122, 126

RERTR. See Reduced Enrichment for Research and

Test Reactors program

Research reactors

proliferation risks, 106-110

Richter, Roger, 40-41

Romania

declared facility violations, 38

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

safeguards violations, 88

sale of Norwegian-origin heavy water to India, 39

Routine safeguards inspections, 80

Running book inventory, 117-118

Russia. See also Former Soviet Union

blockage of possible sale of reactors to India, 34

breeder reactors in, 105

NPT membership, 28

opposition to plutonium production ban, 103

plutonium fuel cycle, 21-22

s

Safeguards Implementation Reports, 17,86

Sandia National Laboratories

Containment and Surveillance Data Authenticated

Communication System, 77-78

use of cameras and satellite links for real-time

C/S, 77

Scheinman, Lawrence, 41,60

Schumer amendment to the Energy Policy Act,

107-108

Significant quantities, 29

definition, 11,38,66,68

lowering of thresholds, 66-68

Programme 93 + 2 and, 44

SIRS. See Safeguards Implementation Reports

Slovak Republic

possible reduced inspections for in return for increased transparency, 64

South Africa

accession to the NPT, 35

“ad hoc” inspections, 37

completeness of declared inventory, 2,78-79

fill-scope safeguards, 16,50-51,83

Helikon uranium enrichment process, 71

intelligence information about, 78

nonroutine inspections, 84-85

openness to inspection, 16,31,95

Pelindaba uranium enrichment plant, 71

provision of increased access to the IAEA, 64

request for visits rather than formal inspections,

9,59

South Carolina

Savannah River facility, 108

South Korea

IAEA technical assistance to, 53,54

provision of increased access to the IAEA on a

trial basis, 45

regional arms control agreement with North Korea, 62, 65

suspicions concerning nuclear weapon program,

64

Sovereignty

states’ voluntary yielding of, 4, 33, 41,49

Soviet Union. See Former Soviet Union

Special inspections, 15-16,42,49,59

“anytime, anywhere,” 79-80, 82

description, 80-81

increase in frequency of, 79-80, 82

new instrument requirement, 82

Spectrophotometry, 128

SQs. See Significant quantities

SSACs. See State systems of accounting and control

State systems of accounting and control, 27,29,44,

50

Strengthening traditional safeguards, 7-17,37

Surprise inspections

description, 81

Sweden

C/S test operation, 77

possible reduced inspections for in return for increased transparency, 64

provision of increased access to the IAEA on a

trial basis, 45

suspicions concerning nuclear weapon program,

64

Switzerland

possible reduced inspections for in return for increased transparency, 64

suspicions concerning nuclear weapon program,

64

T

Taiwan

suspicions concerning nuclear weapon program,

64

Take-back policy on HEU, 108-110

Target values, 119, 122, 126

Technical Cooperation and Assistance Fund, 52,

53-54

Technical visits, 10, 15-16,80,81

Tennessee

Oak Ridge facility, 65, 109

Tennessee Valley Authority, 25

Termination of nuclear weapon program. See also

Initial inventory

verification of, 83
146 I Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Thailand

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

THORP reprocessing plant, 13-14, 119, 121,123,

126

Threshold states, 99-102

Timeliness, 11-12,29,30

basis for, 68

goals for, 68-69

lowering of thresholds, 68-70

Traditional safeguards

bulk-handling facility uncertainties, 70,73-78

confidence in, 38,39-45

difficulties and limitations, 49-50,94

enhanced transparency, 9-11,59-60,62-66,85-86

exemptions from, 67

importance of ensuring the absence of undeclared

facilities, 9-10,40

lowering SQ or timeliness thresholds, 11-12,29,

30,66-70

objectives, 45, 49

procedural and institutional improvements, 83-88

reallocation of inspection effort, 7-9,55-57,58-59

resources available, 7-8,50-53,54-55

states with nuclear infrastructures and, 82-83

strengthening, 7-17,37

technical capability improvement, 66-71,73-78

undeclared facility detection improvement, 78-80,

82

Transparency measures

increased transparency within IAEA, 17, 85-86

options for enhanced transparency, 9-11,59-60,

62-66

tradeoff between increased transparency and reduced inspection frequency, 63

Treaty of Tlatelolco, 10,35,51

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. See Non-Proliferation Treaty

Tritium, 93

Truman, Harry S, 25

Turkey

IAEA technical assistance to, 54

u

Ukraine

commitment to return nuclear warheads and materials to Russia, 34

full-scope safeguard agreement, 50-51

IAEA Board of Governors membership despite

not being an NPT party, 88

verification of initial inventory, 82-83

Undeclared facilities. See Covert nuclear facilities

Unisys, 77

United Kingdom

BNFL uranium enrichment plant at Capenhurst,

71

declining interest in breeder reactors, 105

detonation of first atomic bomb, 26

IAEA budget and, 51

LASCAR study, 43

NPT membership, 28

opposition to plutonium production ban, 103

plutonium fuel cycle, 21

reprocessing facilities, 73

THORP reprocessing plant, 13-14, 119, 121, 123,

126

United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

Baruch Plan and, 25-26

creation, 24

United Nations Security Council

destruction, 101

covert facilities, power to expose and render

harmless, 19-20,97-99

IAEA enforcement and, 4,33,98-99

possibility of binding resolution concerning future

acquisition of weapons of mass reporting process, 98

possible resolution, in lieu of NPT amendment,

90

Resolution 687,42,82,84,85

resolution powers, 92

statement on proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, 41

withdrawal from NPT as threat to international

peace and security, 19,96

United Nations Special Commission, 20,97-99

United States. See also Carter Administration; Clinton Administration; specific federal agencies

and states by name

Argonne National Laboratory, 106-107

breeder reactors, 105

Containment and Surveillance Data Authenticated

Communication System, 77-78

discouraging some countries from acquiring civil

nuclear technology of any kind, 94

early bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, 26

early dependence on retention and development

of nuclear arsenal, 26

extrabudgetary contribution to IAEA, 51

fissile materials production ban and, 99-100

HEU take-back policy, 108-110

IAEA dues payments, 8,51

IAEA funding, 8,52

initial inability to come to agreement with the

Soviet Union on international control, 25-26

interest in isolating Iran, 97

LASCAR study, 43
Index 1147

NPT membership, 28

plutonium production ban, 21

skepticism of Iran’s nonproliferation commitment, 64

technical assistance to IAEA,51 -52

transparency encouragement, 59-60,62

transparency, increased steps, 65-66

voluntary offer to accept safeguards, 28,65-66,

109

Universal reporting of imports and exports, 43

Unmanned instrumentation, 75

UNSCOM. See United Nations Special Commission

Uranium. See Highly enriched uranium; Low-enriched uranium; specific types by name

Uranium-233

conversion time, 69

effective kilograms, 58

Uranium-235, 104

Uranium-238, 104

Uranium gravimetry, 128

Uranium mining and milling, 66,67

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 83

U.S. Department of Energy

environmental impact statement on HEU fuels,

108

HEU take-back from Kazakhstan, 109

Sandia National Laboratories, 77-78

statement on amount of plutonium needed to

make a nuclear weapon, 67

U.S. General Accounting Office

IAEA safeguards program study, 54-55

v

Vibrating-tube densimeters, 127

Visas

long-duration visas for inspectors, 17,86-87

Voluntary offers by nuclear-weapon states to accept

safeguards, 28,65-66, 109

w

Washington

Hanford facility inspections, 65

Wastes

definition, 127

x

X-ray fluorescence, 128

Y

Yellowcake, 66

Yugoslavia

IAEA technical assistance to, 53

z

Zero-growth budget for IAEA, 5,49-51