Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-994 | November 27, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Alexander L. Hoover

Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, 

P.C.

Nappanee, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tiffany A. McCoy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ronald Victor Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 27, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-994

Appeal from the Marshall Superior 

Court

The Honorable Robert O. Bowen, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

50D01-1804-F3-6

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-994 | November 27, 2019 Page 2 of 11

[1] Ronald Victor Johnson appeals his conviction for dealing in a look-a-like 

substance as a level 5 felony and asserts his sentence is inappropriate. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 2, 2017, Johnson discussed selling marijuana to a confidential 

informant (“C.I.1.”), negotiated the weight of the marijuana, and selected to 

meet at the Family Express. While an undercover officer and C.I.1. were at the 

Family Express, “the message came through saying that . . . D would drop it 

off,” and Deandre Pickford met C.I.1. and sold her marijuana. Transcript 

Volume II at 77. On October 6, 2017, Johnson sold marijuana to a second 

confidential informant (“C.I.2.”).

[3] On November 30, 2017, Johnson contacted C.I.2. and stated he had liquid 

morphine available for purchase which he had obtained from his grandfather. 

He indicated he might have “D” meet C.I.2. Id. at 63. Johnson met with 

C.I.2., C.I.2. handed money to Johnson, and Johnson poured a substance into 

a water bottle because C.I.2. was not buying the entire bottle. C.I.2. believed he 

was buying morphine.

[4] On April 2, 2018, the State charged Johnson with three counts of dealing in 

marijuana as level 6 felonies as Counts I, II, and III, and one count of dealing 

in a schedule II controlled substance as a level 3 felony as Count IV.1

 The State 

1 Count I alleged dealing on September 21, 2017.
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also filed a notice of intent to seek an enhancement based upon a prior 

conviction with respect to Counts I, II, and III. On February 27, 2019, the 

State filed an amended charging information modifying Count IV to dealing in 

a look-a-like substance as a level 5 felony. 

[5] The court held a bench trial and found Johnson not guilty on Count I and guilty 

on Counts II, III, and IV. At sentencing, Johnson apologized to his family and 

stated jail helped him understand that he has so much more to offer. Johnson’s 

counsel mentioned Article 1 Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution and the rule 

of proportionality and argued:

Now that particular article indicates that if he commits one (1) 

set of – commits an offense and the facts in those particular 

offense would also be grounds for conviction in a . . . situation 

where it’s a lower felony, the Court should take that into account 

in terms of sentencing. I point that out because under 35-48-4-4.5 

Dealing in a Substance Represented to be a Controlled Substance 

what he did fits in that particular situation because it says a

person who knowingly or intentionally delivers a substance other 

than a controlled substance, which that was the case, or a drug 

for which prescription is required, which it is for morphine, 

under federal or state law that is expressly or impliedly 

represented to be a controlled substance. That’s a Level 6 

Felony. They charged him under a Level 5 on the exact facts 

that he would be guilty of a Level 6, so, I think, under the 

Constitution, I think the Court can’t sentence him beyond the 

Level 6 framework. So we’re asking the Court to impose just an 

advisory sentence on all of the sentences, run them concurrent, 

which I think the Court has to do and we’d ask the Court to 

sentence him in that fashion.

Id. at 96-97.
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[6] On April 4, 2019, the court sentenced Johnson to one and one-half years for 

Counts II and III and four years with one year suspended for Count IV to be 

served concurrently. The court also stated that it would consider a sentence 

modification if Johnson successfully completes the clinically appropriate 

substance abuse treatment as determined by the Department of Correction 

(“DOC”) and is free of conduct violations during incarceration. 

Discussion

[7] Johnson argues that he should not have been convicted under Count IV of 

dealing in a look-alike substance pursuant to the doctrine of proportionality 

under Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. He also argues that his 

sentence is inappropriate because the facts do not warrant any enhancements

and he was contrite, battled with illicit substances, and was only twenty-five 

years old.

[8] As for Johnson’s proportionality argument, Article 1, Section 16 provides that 

“[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” It is violated 

only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature 

of the offense. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1289 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 

S. Ct. 978 (2015). Though we “cannot set aside a legislatively sanctioned 

penalty merely because it seems too severe,” Article 1, Section 16 requires us to 

review whether a sentence is not only within statutory parameters, but also 

constitutional as applied to the particular defendant. Id. at 1290. “A sentence 

violates the Proportionality Clause when ‘offenses with identical elements [are] 

given different sentences.’” Johnson v. State, 103 N.E.3d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-994 | November 27, 2019 Page 5 of 11

2018) (quoting Poling v. State, 853 N.E.2d 1270, 1276-1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), 

reh’g denied), trans. denied.

[9] The State charged Johnson with Count IV under Ind. Code § 35-48-4-4.6(a),

which at the time of the offense and sentencing provided:

A person who knowingly or intentionally:

(1) manufactures;

(2) finances the manufacture of;

(3) advertises;

(4) distributes; or

(5) possesses with intent to manufacture, finance the 

manufacture of, advertise, or distribute;

a substance described in section 4.5 of this chapter commits a 

Level 5 felony.

(Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 80-2019, § 27 (eff. July 1, 2019)).

2

 The 

amended charging information alleged that Johnson “did knowingly distribute 

a substance other than a controlled substance or a drug for which a prescription 

is required under federal or state law, said substance being expressly or 

impliedly represented to be a controlled substance, to-wit: Ronald Victor 

2 The legislature amended the statute in 2019 to provide that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally . . . 

distributes . . . a substance represented to be a controlled substance commits a Level 6 felony. However, the 

offense is a Level 5 felony if the person has a prior unrelated conviction under this chapter.” Ind. Code § 35-

48-4-4.6; see Pub. L. No. 80-2019, § 27 (eff. July 1, 2019).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-994 | November 27, 2019 Page 6 of 11

Johnson advised he has 15ml of purported Morphine Sulfate Oral Solution . . . 

.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 120. 

[10] Johnson points to Ind. Code § 35-48-4-4.5, which at the time of the offense

provided:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally delivers or finances 

the delivery of any substance, other than a controlled substance 

or a drug for which a prescription is required under federal or 

state law, that:

(1) is expressly or impliedly represented to be a controlled 

substance;

(2) is distributed under circumstances that would lead a 

reasonable person to believe that the substance is a 

controlled substance; or

(3) by overall dosage unit appearance, including shape, 

color, size, markings, or lack of markings, taste, 

consistency, or any other identifying physical 

characteristic of the substance, would lead a reasonable 

person to believe the substance is a controlled substance;

commits dealing in a substance represented to be a controlled 

substance, a Level 6 felony.

(b) In determining whether representations have been made, 

subject to subsection (a)(1), or whether circumstances of 

distribution exist, subject to subsection (a)(2), the trier of fact 

may consider, in addition to other relevant factors, the following:

(1) Statements made by the owner or other person in 

control of the substance, concerning the substance’s 

nature, use, or effect.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-994 | November 27, 2019 Page 7 of 11

(2) Statements made by any person, to the buyer or 

recipient of the substance, that the substance may be resold 

for profit.

(3) Whether the substance is packaged in a manner 

uniquely used for the illegal distribution of controlled 

substances.

(4) Whether:

(A) the distribution included an exchange of, or 

demand for, money or other property as 

consideration; and

(B) the amount of the consideration was 

substantially greater than the reasonable retail 

market value of the substance.

(Subsequently repealed by Pub. L. No. 80-2019, § 26 (eff. July 1, 2019)). 

[11] Johnson asserts that “each and every element could have been checked off 

under former Ind. Code § 35-48-4-4.5 just as easily as former Ind. Code § 35-48-

4-4.6(a)” and that “the nature of the offense was exactly what is described 

under Ind. Code § 35-48-4-4.5 in that [he] was attempting to deal a substance 

represented to be a controlled substance.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. He requests 

that we remand with instructions to sentence him under a level 6 felony as 

opposed to a level 5 felony. 

[12] The State asserts that convictions under Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-4.5 and 4.6 do not 

require proof of identical elements. It points out that to convict a defendant 

under subsection 4.5(a) it was required to prove that a defendant delivered or 

financed the delivery of a look-a-like substance, while subsection 4.6(a) required 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-994 | November 27, 2019 Page 8 of 11

it to prove that a defendant distributed a look-a-like substance described in 

subsection 4.5. It also correctly points out that Ind. Code § 35-48-1-11 defines 

“[d]elivery” as “(1) an actual or constructive transfer from one (1) person to 

another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency 

relationship; or (2) the organizing or supervising of an activity described in 

subdivision (1),” and that Ind. Code § 35-48-1-14 defines “[d]istribute” as “to 

deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance.”

[13] In Conner v. State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ind. 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court 

mentioned the distinction between Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-4.5 and 35-48-4-4.6. In 

that case, James Conner conveyed sixteen small plastic bags of plant material to 

a police informant in exchange for $1,600. Subsequent testing found no traces 

of marijuana in the various test samples of the plant material. 626 N.E.2d at 

804. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court observed that “[i]f only James 

Conner had filled his sandwich baggies with real marijuana instead of the 

harmless moist plant material he sold to the police informant” and that “[t]o his 

surprise and dismay, under Indiana’s drug statutes selling fake marijuana is 

classified as a much more serious crime than selling actual marijuana.” Id. The 

Court observed that Conner’s sentence was twice as long as the maximum 

penalty he would have faced had the chemist found any evidence of marijuana 

and that “dealing nearly ten pounds of real marijuana exposes one to less 

criminal liability than distributing even one gram of fake marijuana.” Id. at 

805. The Court found that the six-year prison term he received was twice the 

maximum penalty available had he sold actual marijuana to the police 
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informant and that such a doubling of the penalty was out of proportion to the 

nature of the offense. Id. at 806. The Court noted:

The distinction between dealing (§ 35-48-4-4.5) and distributing 

(§ 35-48-4-4.6) is less than precise. The structure of § 4.6 suggests 

it is geared to larger, commercial operations, prohibiting 

manufacturing, financing the manufacture, advertising, or 

distributing substances represented to be controlled substances.

Unfortunately, the term “distribute” also appears in § 4.5’s 

prohibition on dealing in such substances. For example, subsection (a)(2) refers to substances which are “distributed under 

circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that 

the substance is a controlled substance,” (emphasis supplied), 

and sub-section (b)(4)(A) focuses on whether “the distribution

included an exchange of . . . money,” (emphasis supplied).

Though cognizant of this ambiguity, we decline to find fault with 

the prosecution’s decision to charge Conner under § 4.6.

Id. at 805 n.4.

[14] Unlike in Conner, Johnson informed C.I.2. that he had liquid morphine 

available for purchase. Further, while the Court noted that the distinction 

between dealing (Ind. Code § 35-48-4-4.5) and distributing (Ind. Code § 35-48-

4-4.6) is “less than precise,” it suggested a distinction existed and declined to 

find fault with the prosecution’s decision to charge Conner under Ind. Code § 

35-48-4-4.6. The record reveals that Johnson, who previously dealt marijuana 

to two separate confidential informants, poured liquid out of a bottle he alleged 

to contain morphine and sold it to C.I.2. We do not find a violation of Article 

1, Section 16.
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[15] With respect to Johnson’s argument that his sentence is inappropriate, we note 

that Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we 

find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender.” Under this rule, the burden is on the defendant 

to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. 

Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[16] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 provides that a person who commits a level 5 felony shall 

be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one and six years with the advisory 

sentence being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 provides that a person who 

commits a level 6 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six 

months and two and one-half years with the advisory sentence being one year.

[17] Our review of the nature of the offense reveals that Johnson twice sold 

marijuana and sold what he asserted to be morphine. Our review of the 

character of the offender reveals that Johnson pled guilty to dealing in 

marijuana as a class A misdemeanor in 2017 and had other pending cases 

involving charges for disorderly conduct as a class B misdemeanor, battery 

resulting in bodily injury as a class A misdemeanor, battery as a class B 

misdemeanor, theft as a class A misdemeanor, and theft of a firearm as a level 6 

felony. The presentence investigation report indicates that Johnson reported

using marijuana and morphine on a daily basis and that he had never been in 

treatment. It also states that his overall risk assessment score using the Indiana 

risk assessment system places him in the moderate risk to reoffend category.
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[18] After due consideration, we conclude that Johnson has not sustained his burden 

of establishing that the concurrent sentences of one and one-half years for 

Counts II and III and four years with one year suspended for Count IV is 

inappropriate. Additionally, the court’s order states that it would consider a 

sentence modification if he successfully completes the clinically appropriate 

substance abuse treatment program as determined by the DOC and is free of 

conduct violations. His sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character. 

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Johnson’s convictions and sentence.

[20] Affirmed.

Tavitas, J., concurs.

Altice, J., concurs in result without opinion.