Opinion filed April 29, 2016

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-14-00144-CV

__________

MATTHEW LEE LACEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 15182-B

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On May 27, 2005, the jury found Matthew Lee Lacey guilty of the offense of 

burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. Appellant elected to have the 

trial court assess punishment, and on July 5, 2005, the trial court assessed 

punishment at confinement for a term of eight years and a fine of $500. The trial 

court suspended the imposition of the confinement portion of the sentence and 

placed Appellant on community supervision for a term of eight years.

On August 17, 2011, after the State had filed numerous motions to revoke 

Appellant’s community supervision, the trial court ultimately entered a judgment by 
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which it revoked Appellant’s community supervision and sentenced him to 

confinement for six years.1 On August 19, 2011, the trial court issued an “Order to 

Withdraw Funds” from Appellant’s inmate trust account with the Texas Department 

of Criminal Justice. This type of order has been referred to in the statutes and case 

law as a withdrawal “notification.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.014(e) (West 

Supp. 2015); Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 316 n.1 (Tex. 2009). The order 

contains a notation that a copy of the order was sent to Appellant. On April 8, 2014, 

Appellant filed his pro se “MOTION TO CORRECT AND/OR TO RESCIND 

ORDER TO WITHDRAW FUNDS.” The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on 

April 30, 2014. We affirm.

In Harrell, the Texas Supreme Court held that a withdrawal notification in 

which the trial court directs prison officials to withdraw money from an inmate 

account pursuant to Section 501.014(e) is a civil matter. Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 

317–18. It is much like a garnishment action or an action to obtain a turnover order. 

Id. at 318–19. The inmate’s due process rights are satisfied if he receives notice of 

the withdrawal notification and an opportunity to contest the dollar amount and the 

statutory basis of the withdrawal in the form of a motion to rescind or modify the 

withdrawal notification. Id. at 320–21. The trial court’s disposition of such a motion 

creates an appealable order. See Ramirez v. State, 318 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). We review a trial court’s ruling on the motion under 

an abuse of discretion standard. Bretz v. State, No. 11-13-00313-CV, 2015 WL 

6511508, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Williams v. 

State, 332 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied).

In his first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied his motion to correct or rescind the order to withdraw to

the extent that it relates to the $500 fine. He takes the position that the $500 fine 

 

1The trial court actually signed the written judgment on August 31, 2011.
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referenced in the order to withdraw “has and had not been imposed and/or 

pronounced against the Appellant at the time of sentencing.” As best we can 

understand Appellant’s issue, he maintains that, when the trial court revoked his 

community service, it did not again sentence him as far as the fine is concerned. He 

further claims that, even so, there is a provision in the judgment, a punishment 

option, under which he is allowed to pay the fine when released from prison. 

Additionally, Appellant can be taken to contend that, after his community 

supervision was revoked, the judgment of the trial court contained nothing about a 

fine.

First, Appellant is incorrect when he takes the position that the fine was not 

referenced in the judgment that the trial court entered after his community 

supervision was revoked. The original judgment provided for a fine of $500 and 

confinement for eight years. The trial court suspended only the imposition of the 

confinement portion of the sentence; it did not suspend the imposition of the fine. 

When the trial court revoked Appellant’s community supervision, it reduced the 

confinement portion of the sentence to a period of six years and imposed that 

sentence, and the judgment again referenced the $500 fine. We note that, in a case 

such as this one that involves regular community supervision, as opposed to deferred 

adjudication, the original fine is appropriately included in the judgment revoking 

community supervision. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1998). It is not necessary that the trial court re-pronounce the fine when it revokes 

regular community supervision. Abron v. State, 997 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, insofar as Appellant complains of error in the 

judgment of conviction or the judgment of revocation, we cannot address his 

complaint in this appeal. See Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 766–67 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2011).
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As far as that portion of Appellant’s argument is concerned wherein he claims 

that the judgment allows him to wait until he is out of prison to pay his fine, he is 

incorrect. The judgment provides that, upon his release from prison, he is to report 

to the Taylor County Collections Department and pay or make arrangements to 

finish paying the unpaid balance remaining on his fine. To pay or to wait to pay is 

not a “punishment option” open to Appellant, as he appears to suggest.

We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

Appellant’s motion as it related to the withdrawal of funds in connection with the 

$500 fine. We overrule Appellant’s first issue on appeal.

In his second issue on appeal, Appellant maintains that the trial court abused 

its discretion when it ordered the withdrawal of funds in connection with court costs. 

Appellant reiterates the claim that he made in connection with the fine: he could wait 

and pay the costs when he was released from prison. Again, this clearly is not an 

option for Appellant to choose but, rather, is a requirement that, when released, he 

was to contact the Taylor County Collections Department and either pay or make 

arrangements to pay the unpaid balance that remained due on the costs. Appellant 

also claims that the cost figure contains elements that reflect expenses that were not 

incurred by him or that are not “allowed under applicable law.”

The first judgment that the trial court entered on July 5, 2005, contained the 

amount of the court costs. On September 7, 2011, Appellant was served with a 

“NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE.” The notice contained copies of 

the judgment and sentence, the bill of costs, and the order to withdraw funds. The 

amount of the court costs was again set out in each of five separate orders by which 

the trial court, at various times, amended the terms of Appellant’s community 

supervision. The judgment by which the trial court finally revoked Appellant’s 

community supervision also contained not only a statement as to the amount of the 

court costs, but also a detailed listing of the charges. The order to withdraw funds 
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also contained a statement as to the amount of the costs. Yet Appellant never 

objected to any of the items included in the bill of costs until some thirty-two months 

had passed after entry of the withdrawal order. Generally, a party must complain in 

the trial court before he will have preserved a complaint for appellate review. 

Landers v. State, 402 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The requirement 

assumes, however, that the party had the opportunity to raise it there. See 

Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (the defendant did 

not allege that he did not have an opportunity to object when sentence was 

pronounced and, therefore, failed to preserve error). As we have outlined, Appellant 

missed many opportunities to object to the amount or makeup of the court costs. 

Appellant’s complaints are criminal matters that cannot be raised in this appeal. See 

Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 766–67; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 103.008 (West 2006). Further, on appeal, Appellant has not complained that he 

did not have an opportunity to timely raise a complaint about the court costs. We 

hold that Appellant has failed to preserve this issue for review. We overrule 

Appellant’s second issue on appeal.

We affirm the order of the trial court.

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

April 29, 2016

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.