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Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Sturgis CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LARENCE LEONARD STURGIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C098617

(Super. Ct. No. 21FE010736)

After his motion to suppress was denied, defendant Larence Leonard Sturgis pled

guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to two 

years eight months in prison. On appeal, Sturgis argues the gun and ammunition found in 

his pocket should be suppressed because both the traffic stop and subsequent frisk were 

not supported by reasonable suspicion. We conclude the record does not contain 

sufficient articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and will 

reverse.
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BACKGROUND

The information alleged Sturgis was a felon in possession of a firearm and 

ammunition. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1).) It also alleged 

Sturgis had a prior strike conviction. (Id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)

Pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, Sturgis moved to suppress the gun and 

ammunition officers found in his pocket. At the suppression hearing held in conjunction 

with the preliminary hearing, Officer Conner Mills testified he had worked for the 

Sacramento Police Department for five and a half years and was assigned to the north 

gang enforcement team. Officer Mills reported he encountered many firearms in his job 

and there had been a recent trend of people carrying firearms in cross-body style satchels.

On the date of this arrest, Officer Mills, Officer Derek Goetting, and Sergeant 

Zach Eaton were on a routine patrol in the north area of Sacramento at about 1:30 p.m. 

Officer Mills noticed three people (a woman, Sturgis, and a man (H.B.)) standing in front 

of a tire shop that was next to a nearby liquor store. H.B. was wearing a cross-body style 

satchel. Officer Mills testified, “As we drove past, it appeared they became fixated on 

our presence and kind of started walking in different directions.”

The man wearing the cross-body style satchel (H.B.) went into the liquor store. 

Officer Mills was not sure if the satchel was zipped up when H.B. went in, but when he 

came out it was unzipped. Sergeant Eaton went into the liquor store to look around but 

there is no evidence in the record that anything was found.

The three people got into a car. The woman was in the driver seat. Sturgis was in 

the front passenger seat, and H.B. was in the back passenger seat. 

As Officers Mills and Goetting walked up to the car, the car drove off. Because 

the officers were not sure that the three people in the car saw them approach, the officers 

could not tell if they were just trying to drive away or drive away from them.

The officers got into their patrol car, followed the car, and made an enforcement 

stop. Officer Mills testified he effected a traffic stop on the car because it “had window 
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tint affixed to the front driver window and passenger window.” When asked, “And 

what’s wrong with having window tint affixed to those two windows that you 

mentioned,” Officer Mills responded, “It makes it difficult to see inside the vehicle, not 

only for other people, but also for the driver. It obscures their vision looking out the 

windows, especially at certain times — at night.” On cross-examination the officer 

testified it was his opinion that having tint on your front windows is illegal under state 

law.

Officer Mills contacted the female driver. While he did so, he saw a beer can in 

the back seat. When it was handed to him, he noted it was about one-third full and 

smelled like alcohol. Officer Goetting conducted a records check and determined the 

driver had a suspended license and Sturgis had a history of firearm-related charges.

Officer Mills decided to have the driver step out of the car to conduct a probable cause 

search of the car based on the open container of alcohol. Officer Goetting searched 

H.B.’s satchel and found no firearms inside of it. Officer Goetting also asked Sturgis to 

step out of the car and during a brief patdown search discovered a loaded handgun that 

had three bullets in the magazine. Sturgis said he found the handgun somewhere in the 

North Sacramento area. 

A brief 24-second body camera video of the patdown was submitted into evidence. 

Despite that the video shows there were three officers involved, each with a body camera, 

this was the only footage the People introduced at the hearing. During the colloquy with 

counsel, the trial court said it had reviewed the video of the stop that showed the front 

passenger window rolled down with only “1 to 2 inches, or so, protruding from the door.” 

The trial court described that window as tinted and later described the windows as 

appearing “to be somewhat darker than clear but they’re not black.” We have viewed the 

video as well. It shows the front passenger window almost all the way down with only a 

little over an inch showing above the doorsill. We can see through the window.
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After briefing and oral argument, the trial court summarized the issue as follows: 

“The officers testified they observed the vehicle traveling with dark film attached or 

tinting to the front driver and passenger side windows in violation of Vehicle Code 

Section 26708. The prosecution claimed that for this reason the officers lawfully 

effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle and detained the occupants within while the 

officers investigated the violation. [¶] The defense contends the stop was unlawful 

because there was insufficient evidence of window tinting or the nature of the tinting to 

justify [the] stop.” The trial court stated it did not appear any Court of Appeal has 

published an opinion under the current statutes as to whether an officer can stop a vehicle 

that has a front driver and passenger window that is not clear, not colorless, or not 

transparent. The trial court found the fact that this window was not clear, not colorless, 

and not transparent was a legal basis for the officers to stop the car and denied the motion 

to suppress.

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On January 26, 2022, Sturgis filed a motion to dismiss the information under 

Penal Code sections 995 and 1538.5, subdivision (i). On June 16, 2022, the trial court 

denied that motion. Sturgis then pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm and admitted his prior strike conviction. On May 17, 2023, the trial court 

sentenced him to two years eight months in prison. Sturgis timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Sturgis argues the traffic stop based on tinted windows was not supported by 

reasonable suspicion and as a result the evidence of the gun must be suppressed. We 

agree.

1 The trial court also discussed the legality of the patdown search, but as this case turns 

on the propriety of the stop, we will not discuss that finding.
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A. Standard of Review

“In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, 

select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts to determine whether the law as applied has 

been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under 

the deferential substantial evidence standard.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 

505.) “ ‘We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts 

presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” 

(People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.)

B. Analysis

“A traffic stop is a seizure subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution.” (People v. Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937.) The 

police may conduct a traffic stop if the circumstances show “ ‘at least reasonable 

suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law.’ ” (People v. 

Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 734-735.) Reasonable suspicion exists “when the 

detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the 

totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person 

detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 

231.) At the trial court level, it is the People’s burden to demonstrate the legality of the 

stop. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128.) “Although an officer’s 

reliance on a mere ‘ “hunch” ’ is insufficient to justify a stop, [citation], the likelihood of 

criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 

considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” (United 

States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.)

If the stop does not meet this test, any resulting search or seizure violates the 

detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights and a motion to suppress any evidence obtained 

pursuant thereto must be granted. (People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 434 
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[“As a general rule, evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure is 

inadmissible against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution”].)

Sturgis argues that the windows appearing darkened was by itself insufficient to 

amount to reasonable suspicion of illegal tinting. The People counter arguing the 

window tint was not clear, colorless, and transparent thus, the affixed tint described by 

the officer is a violation of the Vehicle Code. We conclude Sturgis is correct.

The People argue that “the affixed tint is the issue at bar, and not the tint of the 

‘windows themselves.’ ” However, the blanket assertion that having any tint “affixed” to 

a car window is a violation of the Vehicle Code is inaccurate. To the contrary, the 

statutory scheme is centered, in large part, on the actual degree of tint because not all tints 

are illegal, as windows tinted with certain light transmittance are permitted. Vehicle 

Code2section 26708, subdivision (d)(1) and (2) appear to provide that having tinted 

material applied or affixed is only impermissible if the visible light transmission is less 

than 88 or 70 percent, respectively. (See Sen. Com. on Transportation, Rep. on Assem. 

Bill No. 2320 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 1998.) Officer Mills did not 

provide any articulable facts indicating that the tint affixed was darker than permitted by 

statute. 

Contrary to the trial court’s description, Officer Mills did not testify the car had a 

dark film or tinting on the window; he did not testify at all about the coloring or shading. 

Instead, the officer testified he stopped the car Sturgis was a passenger in because “[i]t 

had window tint affixed to the front driver window and passenger window.” When asked 

why having window tinting was a problem, the officer responded broadly: “It makes it 

difficult to see inside the vehicle, not only for other people, but also for the driver. It 

obscures their vision looking out the windows, especially at certain times -- at night.” 

The nature of the question, the fact that the windows were mostly rolled down, and 

2

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
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Officer Mills’s response make it ambiguous at best as to whether the officer was talking 

about car windows with tinting in general or this particular car’s windows. Because the 

window visible in this record was almost all the way down, it is not possible any tinting 

made seeing into this car difficult. There were no specific articulable facts testified to as 

to whether Officer Mills’s ability to see into the car was obscured in any way, nor any 

facts provided about the degree of tint on the windows.

With no specificity about the degree of tint, it is inaccurate to blanketly assert that 

window tint that is not clear, colorless, and transparent, violates the Vehicle Code and the 

officer was incorrect that having tinted windows is a per se violation of the Vehicle Code. 

Section 26708, subdivision (a)(1) states: “A person shall not drive any motor vehicle 

with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied upon the 

windshield or side or rear windows.” Additionally, section 26708, subdivision (a)(2) 

prohibits driving “any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, 

installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s 

clear view through the windshield or side windows.” But the Vehicle Code provides for 

exceptions generally, as noted above, allowing “clear, colorless, and transparent material” 

designed “to block the sun’s harmful ultraviolet A rays” may be affixed to the front side 

windows if the “material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent” and 

the “window glazing with the material applied meets [the federal] . . . specified minimum 

light transmittance of 70 percent . . . .” (§ 26708, subd. (d)(1)-(3); People v. Niebauer

(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1291-1292.) Thus, having tint on windows is not per se 

illegal, and does not by itself support a traffic stop. Relying on the fact of tint alone to 

provide reasonable suspicion, without testimony about the degree of tint, would 

improperly shift the burden to the defendant to prove the officer lacked reasonable 

suspicion. Instead, the officer must provide something more to demonstrate the tint is of 

the type prohibited by the Vehicle Code and the officer here did no such thing.
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Appellate courts have held that an officer’s testimony that window tint is illegal, 

without more, is insufficient to support a stop. For example, in People v. Butler (1988) 

202 Cal.App.3d 602, 604, the officer who conducted a traffic stop saw that the “side and 

rear windows [of the defendant’s vehicle] were darkened.” The trial court denied the 

defendant’s motion to suppress based on the testimony regarding the window tint. (Id. at 

pp. 605, 607.) On appeal, the appellate court “disagree[d] with the People’s suggestion 

that seeing someone lawfully driving with tinted glass raises a reasonable suspicion of 

illegality such that a reasonable inquiry is justified. Without additional articulable facts 

suggesting that the tinted glass is illegal, the detention rests upon the type of speculation 

which may not properly support an investigative stop.” (Id. at p. 607.) The simple fact 

the car’s windows were darkened did not suggest that the officer “had a reasonable 

suspicion that the windows in the [vehicle] were made of illegally tinted, rather than 

legally tinted, safety glass.” (Id. at p. 606.)

In People v. Niebauer, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, an officer testified that he 

initiated the traffic stop because “the windows were darker than normal and he could only 

see [the defendant’s] outline through the window.” (Id. at p. 1292.) The officer further 

testified that “he had stopped other drivers with the same type of tinting material on their 

vehicle windows and those drivers had to roll down their windows at night in order to see 

where they were turning.” (Id. at p. 1293.) On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted in dicta 

that “the facts presented would also justify . . . a stop in this case. [The officer] testified 

to additional facts giving him reasonable suspicion [the defendant] was driving with 

illegally tinted windows other than merely the bare statement [the defendant’s] truck had 

tinted windows.” (Ibid., fn. 10.) 

More recently, in People v. Roberts (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1149, the appellate 

court upheld the constitutionality of a stop based on tinted windows where the officer 

testified he “could not see through the driver’s tinted side window from the open 

passenger side window,” and “believed the view from the windows was obstructed by the 
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tint in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708.5, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 1190.) In so 

holding, the court found that “the underlying facts for the stop were specific and 

reliable.” (Id. at p. 1191.)

Likewise, in People v. Hanes (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6, 8, the arresting 

officer, who had conducted 400 traffic stops based on suspicion of illegal window tinting, 

testified that the front right window of the defendant’s black car was “ ‘so black that it 

kind of matched the color of the car.’ He also testified that he was unable to see the 

occupants of the vehicle.” On that basis, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 

(Ibid.) On appeal, the appellate department of the superior court concluded that the 

arresting officer’s testimony provided the kind of additional articulable facts required by 

the court in Butler. (Id. at pp. 9-10.)

Here, the People presented no additional articulable facts suggesting the tinted 

glass was illegal here. The solitary observation presented to the trial court of the vehicle 

Sturgis was in prior to initiation of the traffic stop was that the windows were tinted. 

Officer Mills did not testify as to any specific articulable facts suggesting that the tint was 

illegal, such as that he had difficulty seeing through the window, or that the window was 

demonstrably dark. This is all the more true here given that at the time he stopped the 

car, the front passenger window was rolled down almost completely. Officer Mills’s

generalized comment that tints make looking inside a car difficult could not have 

referenced this car as the only window shown in the record was rolled down almost all 

the way, such that it would not have affected any view into the car. Accordingly, the 

record does not support the trial court’s finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion 

to stop Sturgis.

We acknowledge that in People v. Carter (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, the Second 

District held that “[w]hen a police officer sees a vehicle with tinted front and side 

windows, the officer may stop the car and cite the driver for a violation of Vehicle Code 

section 26708, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 529.) That court included no analysis to 
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support this holding, but merely cited Niebauer, even though Carter contradicts the 

holding in Butler. As we have already noted, Niebauer’s analysis relied on the existence 

of additional facts beyond the windows merely having been tinted. Accordingly, we 

decline to follow Carter and instead follow Butler and Niebauer.

Because the record contains no specific articulable facts suggesting that the tinted 

glass was illegal, this stop violated Sturgis’s Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, all 

evidence obtained pursuant to the stop must be suppressed.3

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded. On remand, the trial court 

shall vacate its June 16, 2022 order denying Sturgis’s motion to suppress and enter a new 

order granting that motion, and shall conduct further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

 /s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

I concur:

 /s/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

3 Given our conclusion the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we 

decline to address Sturgis’s arguments concerning the propriety of the officer’s protective 

frisk of Sturgis.
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RENNER, J., Dissenting.

The majority suggests having tint affixed to a front driver and passenger window 

may not violate the Vehicle Code because “section 26708, subdivision (d)(1) and (2) 

appear to provide that having tinted material applied or affixed is only impermissible if 

the visible light transmission is less than 88 or 70 percent, respectively.” (Maj. Opn. 

ante, at p. 6.) This is a misstatement of the law. Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision 

(d) allows only a “clear, colorless, and transparent material” to be affixed to the windows 

at issue and only if the material also meets each the following additional conditions:

“(1) The material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent.

“(2) The window glazing with the material applied meets all requirements of 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (49 C.F.R. 571.205), including the 

specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent and the abrasion resistance of AS-14 

glazing, as specified in that federal standard.

“(3) The material is designed and manufactured to enhance the ability of the 

existing window glass to block the sun’s harmful ultraviolet A rays.” (Veh. Code, 

§ 26708, subd. (d).) 

It has long been settled that tint that is affixed to a window cannot satisfy these 

requirements. (People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1292.) At a minimum, 

a tint that is affixed to the window as opposed to a safety glass and/or glaze cannot meet 

the applicable federal standards. (Id. at p. 1291 & fn. 8.) The majority has failed to 

acknowledge their departure from settled law on this point. (See id. at p. 1292 [“If an 

officer forms an opinion in a commonsense examination of a vehicle that there is a film 

placed upon the vehicle’s windows in an unauthorized place . . . such evidence will be 

sufficient to support conviction under [Vehicle Code] section 26708[, subdivision ](a) if 

the trial court believes the officer; no further evidence or scientific testimony need be 

presented”].) 
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The majority relies on People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602, which noted 

that tinted windows are not necessarily unlawful if the windows are “made of the type of 

tinted glass meeting the requirements of subdivision (b) of Vehicle Code section 

26708.5.” (Id. at p. 606.) (Maj. Opn. ante, at p. 8.) There, the court found no facts in the 

record to suggest that the officer “had a reasonable suspicion that the windows in the 

Cadillac were made of illegally tinted, rather than legally tinted, safety glass.” (Butler, 

supra, at p. 606.) Butler is distinguishable because here it is undisputed the tint was 

affixed, which would preclude the possibility that what the officer saw was tinted safety 

glass in compliance with Vehicle Code section 26708.5, subdivision (b). The majority’s 

analysis misses the distinction between tinted safety glass and affixed tint. (E.g., Maj. 

Opn. ante, at p. 9 [“Here, the People presented no additional articulable facts suggesting 

the tinted glass was illegal here”].) For this reason, I dissent.

 /s/

RENNER, J.