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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DAVID FINNEY, an individual,, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., a 

foreign corporation; TAKATA U.S.A. 

CORPORATION d/b/a TAKATA 

CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; 

TAKATA SEAT BELTS INC., a foreign 

corporation; TAKATA RESTRAINT 

SYSTEMS INC., a foreign corporation; 

TAKATA NORTH AMERICAN INC., a 

foreign corporation; and TAKATA INC.; a 

foreign corporation, and TAKATA 

CORPORATION; a foreign corporation 

 Defendants. 

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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 3:06-cv-622 

ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 Defendant Takata Corporation, (“Defendant”) files its answer to the Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint as follows: 

First Defense

 1. Takata Corporation is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a 

belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 1. 

 2. Takata Corporation is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a 

belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 2. 

 3. Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

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Corporation denies the allegations of Paragraph 3 to the extent those allegations can be construed 

to be alleged against Takata Corporation and demands strict proof thereof. 

 4. Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation denies the allegations of Paragraph 4 to the extent those allegations can be construed 

to be alleged against Takata Corporation and demands strict proof thereof. 

 5. Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation denies the allegations of Paragraph 5 to the extent those allegations can be construed 

to be alleged against Takata Corporation and demands strict proof thereof. 

 6. Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation denies the allegations of Paragraph 6 to the extent those allegations can be construed 

to be alleged against Takata Corporation and demands strict proof thereof. 

 7. Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation denies the allegations of Paragraph 7 to the extent those allegations can be construed 

to be alleged against Takata Corporation and demands strict proof thereof. 

 8. Takata Corporation admits that it is headquartered in Tokyo, Japan. As phrased, 

the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph 8 are denied and Takata Corporation demands 

strict proof thereof. 

 9. As phrased, Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 9 and 

demands strict proof thereof. 

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 10. As phrased, Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 10 

and demands strict proof thereof. 

 11. The allegations of Paragraph 11 are in the form of a definition, rather than an 

allegation, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation denies the allegations if Paragraph 11 to the extent those allegations can be 

construed to be alleged against Takata Corporation, and demands strict proof thereof. 

 12. As phrased, Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 12 

and demands strict proof thereof. 

 13. Upon information and belief, Takata Corporation admits that the accident made 

the basis of this lawsuit occurred in the state of Alabama within this judicial district, and further 

admits that venue is proper in this court. To the extent that Paragraph 13 alleges other or further 

allegations, Takata Corporation denies those additional allegations and demands strict proof 

thereof. 

 14. Takata Corporation admits that there is complete diversity of citizenship between 

the parties and that Plaintiff alleges that jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. §1332. Takata 

Corporation further admits that Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $75,000 exclusive of 

interests and costs. 

 15. Takata Corporation admits that this court has jurisdiction over Takata 

Corporation. To the extent that further or other allegations exist in Paragraph 15, Takata 

Corporation denies those additional allegations and demands strict proof. 

 16. The allegations of Paragraph 16 are in the form of a legal conclusion, to which no 

response is required. 

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 17. Takata Corporation incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully verbatim herein, 

its answers and defenses to all preceding paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

 18. Takata Corporation admits that it designed (in part), manufactured (in part), and 

distributed restraint systems which were incorporated into 1992 Nissan Sentra automobiles. To 

the extent Paragraph 18 makes other or further allegations against Takata Corporation, then, as 

phrased, Takata Corporation denies those additional allegations and demands strict proof thereof. 

 19. Takata Corporation admits that it designed (in part), manufactured (in part), and 

distributed restraint systems which were incorporated into 1992 Nissan Sentra automobiles. To 

the extent Paragraph 19 makes other or further allegations against Takata Corporation, then, as 

phrased, Takata Corporation denies those additional allegations and demands strict proof thereof. 

 20. As phrased, Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 

and demands strict proof thereof. 

 21. As phrased, Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 

and demands strict proof thereof. 

 22. Paragraph 22 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of 

Paragraph 22 and therefore denies those allegations and demands strict proof thereof. 

 23. Takata Corporation admits that it designed (in part), manufactured (in part), and 

distributed restraint systems which were incorporated into 1992 Nissan Sentra automobiles. To 

the extent Paragraph 23 makes other or further allegations against Takata Corporation, then, as 

phrased, Takata Corporation denies those additional allegations and demands strict proof thereof. 

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 24. As phrased, Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 

of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

 25. Takata Corporation admits that it designed (in part), manufactured (in part), and 

distributed restraint systems which were incorporated into 1992 Nissan Sentra automobiles. To 

the extent Paragraph 25 makes other or further allegations against Takata Corporation, then, as 

phrased, Takata Corporation denies those additional allegations and demands strict proof thereof. 

 26. Takata Corporation is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the 

truth of the allegations of Paragraph 26 and therefore denies those allegations and demands strict 

proof thereof. 

 27. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 28. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 29. Takata Corporation incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully verbatim herein, 

its answers and defenses to all preceding paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

 30. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 31. Paragraph 31 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not apply to Takata 

Corporation and, therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Takata 

Corporation is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of 

Paragraph 31. 

 32. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 32 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

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 33. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 34. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 34, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 35. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 35 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 36. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 36, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 37. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 37 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 38. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 38 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 39. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 40. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 41. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 41 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 42. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 42, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 43. Takata Corporation incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully verbatim herein, 

its answers and defenses to all preceding paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

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 44. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 44 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 45. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 45 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 46. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 46 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 47. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 47 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 48. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 48 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 49. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 49 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 50. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 50 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 51. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 51 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 52. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 52, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 53. Takata Corporation incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully verbatim herein, 

its answers and defenses to all preceding paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

 54. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 54 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

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 55. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 55 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 56. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 56 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 57. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 57 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 58. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 58 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 59. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 59, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 60. Takata Corporation incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully verbatim herein, 

its answers and defenses to all preceding paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

 61. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 61 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 62. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 62 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 63. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 63, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 64. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 64 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 65. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 65, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

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 66. Takata Corporation incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully verbatim herein, 

its answers and defenses to all preceding paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

 67. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 67 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 68. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 68 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 69. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 69, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 70. Takata Corporation denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 70 of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. 

 71. Takata Corporation denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 71, and its 

subparts, and demand strict proof thereof. 

 The unnumbered, WHEREFORE paragraphs in the First Amended Complaint do not 

require a response by these Defendants; however, to the extent responses are deemed required, 

these Defendants deny the material allegations of same and demand strict proof thereof. 

Second Defense

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, in whole or in part, fails to state a claim against Takata 

Corporation upon which relief may be granted. 

Third Defense

Takata Corporation states that it is not guilty of the things and matters alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

Fourth Defense

 Takata Corporation pleads the general issue. 

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Fifth Defense

Takata Corporation states that the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages 

alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint may have been the actions, nonactions, or negligence 

of a person or persons other than Takata Corporation for whose actions, nonactions, or 

negligence Takata Corporation is in no way liable. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover 

from Takata Corporation in this action. 

Sixth Defense

Takata Corporation states that the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages 

alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint may have been the combination of actions, nonactions, 

or negligence of a person or persons other than Takata Corporation for whose actions, 

nonactions, or negligence Takata Corporation is in no way liable. Plaintiff is therefore not 

entitled to recover from Takata Corporation in this action. 

Seventh Defense

Takata Corporation states that the injuries and damages alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint may have been caused by an intervening, superseding action for which Takata 

Corporation is in no way liable. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover from Takata 

Corporation in this action. 

Eighth Defense

Takata Corporation states that the proximate cause of the injuries and damages alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint may have been the misuse and/or abuse of the product for which Takata 

Corporation is not responsible. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover from Takata 

Corporation in this action. 

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Ninth Defense

Takata Corporation states that Plaintiff may have assumed the risks of the injuries and 

damages alleged in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover from 

Takata Corporation in this action. 

Tenth Defense

Takata Corporation states that Plaintiff may have failed to exercise ordinary care for his 

own safety. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover from Takata Corporation in this action. 

Eleventh Defense

Takata Corporation denies that any conduct on its part was negligent or wanton. 

Twelfth Defense

 Takata Corporation denies that it breached any express or implied warranty. 

Thirteenth Defense

 Plaintiff’s claims for breach of warranty are barred because Plaintiff failed to give Takata 

Corporation proper or timely notice of any alleged breach of warranty or nonconforming 

condition, and Takata Corporation had, thus, no opportunity to cure any alleged defect. 

Fourteenth Defense

Takata Corporation denies that the product allegedly designed, manufactured, and/or 

distributed by it was defective or unreasonably dangerous on the occasion giving rise to 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Fifteenth Defense

 The Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, which in effect is the doctrine 

of strict liability, that Plaintiff’s product liability claim implicates in this case is constitutionally 

void in that: 

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(a) It operates to create a conclusive presumption that is arbitrary and operates to 

deny a fair opportunity on the part of the manufacturer and/or seller to rebut such 

conclusive presumption and acts to substitute judicial fiat in place of fact in 

judicial determination of an issue involving property of Takata Corporation with 

the result that: 

i. It deprives Takata Corporation, separately and severally, of property 

without due process of law to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

Constitution of the United states and specifically to those portions of the 

Constitution proscribing any state from depriving a person of property 

without due process of law; and 

ii. Separately, it deprives Takata Corporation of property without due process 

of law contrary to Article I, § 6, of the Constitution of the State of 

Alabama and specifically contrary to said provision of the Constitution of 

the State of Alabama providing that no person shall be deprived of 

property except by due process of law, with the result that Plaintiff are not 

entitled to recover in this case against Takata Corporation. 

(b) It denies Takata Corporation the equal protection of the law contrary to the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and specifically 

contrary to that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment proscribing any state from 

denying “to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws” in that 

it discriminates against the manufacturer and seller in favor of other potential 

defendants in this litigation for the reason that it imposes a higher duty upon the 

manufacturer and seller than was or is imposed upon other persons who are 

defendants under circumstances where the imposition of a higher duty upon the 

manufacturer and/or seller would amount to an unreasonable classification, and 

hence Plaintiff are not entitled to recover against Takata Corporation. 

(c) The attempted imposition of strict liability in this case against Takata Corporation 

operates to deny Takata Corporation equal protection of the law contrary to the 

provisions of the Constitution of the State of Alabama that require the state to 

afford all persons equal protection of the law with the result that Plaintiff are not 

entitled to recover against Takata Corporation in this case. 

Sixteenth Defense

 The product at issue was not defective within the meaning of the Alabama Extended 

Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine because of the following: 

(a) It had been altered or modified prior to the accident and was not in substantially 

the same condition at that time as when it left the possession and control of 

Takata Corporation. 

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(b) The product was not unreasonably dangerous. 

(c) The product was not unreasonably dangerous because it was not more dangerous 

than the ordinary user would have contemplated. 

(d) The manufacture and design of the product was well in keeping with the state of 

the art at the time of the manufacture of the product. 

(e) There was no reasonable alternative design for the product. 

Seventeenth Defense

 Takata Corporation contends that the AEMLD is constitutionally void as to them and as 

applied to acts and circumstances in this case in that: 

(a) It operates to create an arbitrary and capricious method and manner for the jury’s 

assessment in determination of damages, without regard for the quality and 

quantity of culpability of other potential defendants joined in this one action. 

(b) It operates to deny Takata Corporation a fair opportunity to have the jury assess 

damages based on their alleged culpability for negligence, which cannot be 

segregated from allegations of negligence against other defendants joined in this 

action. 

(c) In failing to provide for joint contribution and an apportionment of damages 

among defendants, it deprives Takata Corporation of property without due 

process of law contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

Constitution of the United States and specifically to those portions thereof 

proscribing any state from depriving any person of property without due process 

of law. 

(d) In failing to provide for joint contribution and an appointment of damages among 

defendants, it deprives Takata Corporation of property without due process of 

law contrary to Article I, § 6 of the Constitution of the State of Alabama, which 

provides, insofar as in germane, that no person shall be deprived of property 

except by due process of law. 

Eighteenth Defense

 The claims alleged against Takata Corporation in the Complaint are barred by the 

Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because they would, if allowed, impose an 

undue burden on interstate commerce. 

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Nineteenth Defense

 Takata Corporation avers that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which punitive 

damages may be awarded. 

Twentieth Defense

 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which costs may be awarded. 

Twenty-First Defense

 Takata Corporation pleads lack of causal relation. 

Twenty-Second Defense

 The restraint system at issue in this case is in conformity with applicable safety statutes 

and regulations, including Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, at the time of manufacture. 

Twenty-Third Defense

 Takata Corporation pleads that some or all of Plaintiff’s claims may be preempted. 

Twenty-Fourth Defense

 Takata Corporation pleads the defense of open and obvious. 

Twenty-Fifth Defense

With respect to punitive damages, Takata Corporation asserts: 

(a) Takata Corporation denies it is guilty of conduct referable to which punitive 

damages could or should be awarded, and denies that Plaintiff has produced clear 

and convincing evidence sufficient to support or sustain the imposition of punitive 

damages against Takata Corporation. 

(b) Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against Takata Corporation because 

such an award, which is penal in nature, would violate Takata Corporation’s 

constitutional rights protected under the Alabama Constitution of 1901, as 

amended, and the Constitution of the United States unless Takata Corporation is 

afforded the same procedural safeguards as are criminal defendants, including, but 

not limited, the right to avoid self-incrimination, the right to forego production 

and disclosure of any incriminating documents, and the right to the requirement of 

a level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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(c) Subjecting Takata Corporation to punitive damages, or affirming an award of 

punitive damages against Takata Corporation in this case, would amount to and 

constitute a denial of due process as afforded by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and by the Due Process 

Clause of the Article I, Section 13, of the Alabama Constitution, as separation of 

property without due process of law, or standards or criteria of due process of law, 

based upon the following grounds and circumstances, separately and severally 

assigned: 

(i) Any award of punitive damages against Takata Corporation under the 

evidence in this case would necessarily be based upon an evidentiary 

standard less than a standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt; 

(ii) There is a lack of reasonable standards necessary to instruct the jury on the 

propriety and amount of any punitive damages award, and such an award 

is subject to no predetermined limits; 

(iii) Any punitive damages award would not be subject to post-trial or 

appellate view on the basis of suitable and sufficient objective standards 

and criteria; 

(iv) The power and authority imposed upon the jury under Alabama law as to 

the amount of punitive damages is so relatively unfettered that there is 

lacking any reasonable or logical standard, uniform criteria, or guidance in 

the assessment of the amount of the award of punitive damages; 

(v) Under Alabama law and procedure, there is no objective, logical, or 

rational relationship between the award, or the amount of the award, of 

punitive damages and Takata Corporation’s alleged wrongful or culpable 

conduct; 

(vi) Under Alabama law and procedure, there is no objective, logical, or 

rational relationship between the award, or the amount of the award, of 

punitive damages and the interests or goals of the State of Alabama 

referable to the imposition or allowance of punitive damages; 

(vii) Under Alabama law and procedure, there is no objective or rational 

criteria for the amount of the award of punitive damages as relates or 

compares to the assessment of compensatory damages, or the amount of 

compensatory damages; 

(viii) In the event that a single verdict be mandated against all defendants herein 

for an award of punitive damages in this case, such a single verdict would 

be imposed regardless of the degree of culpability of a particular 

defendant, and such a non-apportionment rule could result in a joint and 

several verdict against all defendants whereby punitive damages could be 

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assessed against one defendant based in part upon culpability of another 

defendant, and such a joint verdict the single amount could be enforced 

against a defendant for any portion of that judgment regardless of 

defendants culpability or relative culpability; 

(ix) Should the Court require the award of punitive damages in a single, joint, 

and several verdict of one amount, an adoption of this non-apportionment 

rule would be contrary to the objective of punishing specific misconduct, 

and would be contrary to the objective of assessing punitive damages 

according to culpability of conduct; 

(x) Where joint and several punitive damages award is mandated to be in a 

single amount against each defendant, such a rule additionally violates a 

defendant’s right to trial by jury as the jury would be prohibited from 

apportioning damages against the defendants according to the degree of 

culpability of the conduct of the respective defendants; 

(xi) An award of punitive damages should not be permitted to be assessed 

against defendant for unauthorized acts of an agent or agents without any 

additional requirement of knowledge or fault on the part of the defendants; 

(xii) An award of punitive damages should not be permitted to be assessed 

against Takata Corporation vicariously as a principle without any further 

proof of independent, wrongful conduct, or ratification by Takata 

Corporation; 

(xiii) Alabama procedures, pursuant to which amounts of punitive damages are 

awarded, permit the imposition of different penalties for the same or 

similar acts; 

(xiv) Under Alabama law and procedures governing the award in assessment of 

punitive damages there is no objective, logical, or reasonable standard or 

criteria which governs the award or the amount of the award of punitive 

damages; 

(xv) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to 

provide a reasonable limit on the amount of the award against Takata 

Corporation; 

(xvi) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded are 

unconstitutionally vague; 

(xvii) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded fail to 

provide a clear post-trial or appellate standard of review on an award of 

punitive damages; 

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(xviii) The procedures pursuant to which punitive damages are awarded may 

permit admission of evidence relative to punitive damages in the same 

proceedings during which liability and compensatory damages are 

determined; and 

(xix) An award of punitive damages would constitute an arbitrary and 

capricious taking of property of Takata Corporation without due process 

of law. 

(d) Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages from Takata Corporation pursuant to 

the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 

(e) The claim of Plaintiff for punitive damages against Takata Corporation is barred 

by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the 

Alabama Constitution. 

(f) Imposition of punitive damages in this case against Takata Corporation would 

contravene the commerce clause of the United States Constitution in that such an 

award would constitute, if imposed, an undue and unreasonable burden on 

interstate commerce. 

(g) To award punitive damages against Takata Corporation in this case would have a 

chilling affect upon Takata Corporation’s rights to open access to the courts of 

this State in violation of the United States Constitution and the Alabama 

Constitution, separately and severally. 

(h) Imposition of punitive damages in this case would violate the Excessive Fines 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 15, of the Alabama Constitution. 

(i) To award punitive damages against Takata Corporation in this case would violate 

the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution, as 

an award of punitive damages would impair contractual obligations. 

(j) Based upon Alabama procedures relative punitive damages, which provide no 

objective, logical, or reasonable standards or criteria to govern the award, in the 

amount of the award of punitive damages, Takata Corporation is denied equal 

protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 6, and 22, of the Alabama Constitution, 

separately and severally. 

(k) Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages violates the rights of Takata Corporation to 

due process of law and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United 

States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution in that the procedure for posttrial review of punitive damages as set forth in Hammond v. City of Gadsden and 

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Green Oil Company v. Hornsby is unconstitutionally vague and inadequate in the 

following respects: 

(i) The Hammond and Green Oil procedure provides no clearly defined 

standard for courts to apply in reviewing punitive damages; 

(ii) The Hammond and Green Oil procedure provides inadequate review as to 

the need to deter, whether deterrence has been accomplished, and whether 

punishment is appropriate for Takata Corporation; 

(iii) The Hammond and Green Oil procedure provides inadequate review and a 

vague standard regarding the relationship of the punitive damages award 

to the harm; 

(iv) The Hammond and Green Oil procedure does not address, nor does it cure 

the lack of guidelines to be given to the jury in the assessment of punitive 

damages; 

(v) The Hammond and Green Oil procedure is inadequate in that the trial 

court “may” take certain factors into account and these procedures lack 

predictable and objective standards of review, allow for inconsistent 

application of the factors, and allow for unpredictable and inconsistent 

results; and 

(vi) The Hammond and Green Oil procedure fails to provide definite and 

meaningful constraints on the jury’s discretion in awarding punitive 

damages. 

(l) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint seeks to make Takata Corporation liable for 

punitive damages. Takata Corporation adopts by references the defenses, criteria, 

limitations, and standards mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), 

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S. Ct. 

1678 (2001), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. 

Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 155 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2003). 

(m) The demand for punitive damages in the instant case is subject to those limitations 

established by the Alabama Legislature and set forth in Section 6-11-21, Code of 

Alabama. 

(n) If multiple punitive damages awards were assessed against Takata Corporation in 

different jurisdictions, or in the same jurisdiction, it would violate the 

Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Alabama, violating Takata 

Corporation’s rights to due process and to a jury trial and violating Takata 

Corporation’s right against double jeopardy. 

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(o) If punitive damages were assessed against Takata Corporation for conduct or 

events allegedly occurring in states other than in the forum state, Takata 

Corporation would be denied due process of law, the right to trial by jury, and the 

right against double jeopardy under the Constitutions of the United States and the 

State of Alabama. 

(p) The imposition of punitive damages sought by Plaintiff violates Takata 

Corporation’s rights to due process and equal protection of the laws under the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the prohibition 

against excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution in that: 

(i) Alabama law and the Alabama punitive damages scheme, both facially 

and as applied in this case, provide no constitutionally adequate or 

meaningful standards to guide a jury or the court in determining whether, 

and if so, in what amount, to award punitive damages; there is no 

sufficiently clear definition of the conduct or mental state that makes 

punitive damages permissible, and no sufficient clear standard for 

determining the appropriate size of such an award. Alabama law and the 

Alabama punitive damages scheme leave the determination of whether to 

award and, if so, the amount of punitive damages to the arbitrary 

discretion of the finder of fact without providing adequate or meaningful 

guidelines for, or limits to, the exercise of that discretion. 

(ii) Takata Corporation had no notice or means of ascertaining whether, or if 

so in what amount, it might be subject to a penalty for the conduct alleged 

by Plaintiff in this case. That lack of notice was compounded by the 

absence of any adequate or meaningful standards as to the kind of conduct 

that might subject Takata Corporation to punitive damages or as to the 

potential amount of such an award. 

(iii) Under Alabama and the Alabama punitive damages scheme, the jury is not 

instructed on the limits of punitive damages imposed by the purposes for 

which such damages are assessed. 

(iv) Under Alabama law and the Alabama punitive damages scheme, the jury 

is not expressly prohibited from awarding punitive damages, in whole or 

in part, on the basis of unduly discriminatory characteristics, including the 

corporate status of the defendant. 

(v) No provision of Alabama law or the Alabama punitive damages scheme 

provides adequate procedural safeguards consistent with the criteria set 

forth in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, BMW of 

North America, Inc. v. Gore, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. 

Haslip, and Matthews v. Eldridge, exist for the imposition of a punitive 

damages award. 

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(vi) Alabama law and the Alabama punitive damages scheme do not provide 

for adequate post-trial review of punitive damages awards or the amount 

thereof and do not provide objective standards for such review. 

(vii) Under Alabama law and the Alabama punitive damages scheme, there is 

no limit to the number of times Takata Corporation could be held 

accountable for punitive damages based on the same alleged conduct as 

that alleged in this case. 

(q) Another effect of Alabama’s punitive damages scheme is to impose punitive 

damages in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner. The lack of 

adequate guidelines or review inevitably leads to variations in result without any 

rational basis for differentiation, and without serving any legitimate governmental 

purpose or interest. As a result, the constitutional mandates for equal protection 

of the laws as provided under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution are violated. 

(r) Insofar as the punitive damages awards sought by Plaintiff seeks to impose 

punitive damages under Alabama law for conduct in other states, the award 

violates: 

(i) Takata Corporation’s rights to due process and due course of law under 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 

guarantees of due process of law provided under the Alabama Constitution 

of 1901; 

(ii) The dormant or negative commerce clause derived from Article I, Section 

8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution; 

(iii) The full faith and credit clause of Article IV, Section 1 of the United 

States Constitution; 

(iv) The requirement of the United States Constitution that a state respect the 

autonomy of other states within their spheres; and 

The prohibition against excessive fines in the United States Constitution 

Twenty-Sixth Defense

Takata Corporation has not had an opportunity to conduct a sufficient investigation or to 

engage in adequate discovery touching on the circumstances of the Plaintiffs’ allegations. 

Takata Corporation intends to act as best it can to inform itself as to the pertinent facts and 

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prevailing circumstances surrounding any reported injury or damage to the Plaintiff as alleged in 

the Complaint and hereby gives notice of its intent to assert any further affirmative defenses that 

its information-gathering process may indicate is supported by fact and law, including but not 

limited to, a defense that the action is barred in whole or in part by any applicable statute, 

contract, release, covenant, the doctrine of laches, the Plaintiff’s assumption of risk, the 

negligence of the operator of the product at issue in failing to keep a reasonable and proper 

lookout and in otherwise failing to exercise due care. Takata Corporation thus reserves the right 

to amend this Answer to assert any such defenses. 

WHEREFORE having fully answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Takata 

Corporation prays that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be dismissed; that judgment be rendered 

in favor of Takata Corporation; that Plaintiff recover nothing in this action from Takata 

Corporation; and that Takata Corporation have such other and further relief as this Court deems 

just and proper. 

s/ Charles A. Stewart III 

Charles A. Stewart III (ASB-4955-a56c) 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP

The Alabama Center for Commerce 

401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 

Montgomery, AL 36104 

Telephone: (334) 956-7700 

Facsimile: (334) 956-7701 

Attorneys for Takata Corporation 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 23, 2007, I electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send 

notification of such filing to the following: 

Joel Lee DiLorenzo 

Jackson and Tucker, PC 

Black Diamond Building 

2229 First Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Email: joel@ksjpc.com

Joseph Luther Tucker 

Jackson and Tucker, P.C. 

2229 1st Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Email: josh@jacksonandtucker.com

Kenneth S Jackson 

Jackson and Tucker, P.C. 

 

Black Diamond Building 

2229 1st Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Email: 

steve@jacksonandtucker.com

Walter B. Calton 

Calton & Rutland LLC 

PO Box 696 

Eufaula, AL 36027-0696 

Email: wcalton@bellsouth.net

Robert C Khayat, Jr. 

King & Spalding LLP 

1180 Peachtree St, NE 

Atlanta, AL 30309 

Email: rkhayat@kslaw.com

and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to 

the following non-CM/ECF participants: 

None. 

s/ Charles A. Stewart III 

Charles A. Stewart III (ASB-4955-a56c) 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP

The Alabama Center for Commerce 

401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 

Montgomery, AL 36104 

Telephone: (334) 956-7700 

Facsimile: (334) 956-7701 

E-mail: cstewart@bradleyarant.com 

1/1481053.1

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