### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON May 20 , 2003 Ses sion
TOWN OF OAKLAND v. TOWN OF SOMERVI LLE, ET AL 

### . An Appeal from the Chancery Court for Fayette C ounty No. 12928 L. T. Lafferty, Sr., Special Judge

No. W2002-02301-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 7, 2003

This is an anne

xation cas e. The pl aintiff m unicip ality pa ssed an ordinance annexing adjoining pr op er ty. The anne

xation was t

o be eff ective n inety day s later. T

he prope rty to be anne

xed was als o near the defe ndant muni cipalit

y, which had a gr ea te r p op ul at io n t ha n t he pl ai nt if f m un ic ip al it y. After the plain tiff munic ipality

passed th

e annexat ion ordina

nce, pri or to its eff

ective date, the defendant passed a n ordinance to annex the same propert y. A lmost two years la

ter, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant’s annexation ordinance was invalid, because it attempted to annex property that the plaintiff had already

annexed. The trial court granted the defenda

nts’ mo tion to dismi ss, deter mining th at the pla

intiff ha d had nine

ty d ay s in which t

o chall enge the ordinance in a quo warrant o action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-103, andits failure to do so within th at time limit was fat al to its cl aim. T

he pl ainti ff no w app eals . We reverse, finding that the r emedy of decla ratory judgmen t was ava ilable to challenge the validity

of
an annexation ordinance, and that the ninety -day requirement for a quo warrant o action does not apply to such a d

eclara tory judgmen t lawsuit. Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appeal as of Right ; Judgme nt of the Cha

ncery Court is Reversed and Remanded

H OLLY M. K IRBY , J., delivered the opinion of the cour t, in w hich W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., and A LAN E. H IGHERS , J., joined. Richard J. Myers, Memphis, Tennessee , for the appellant, Town of Oakland.

J. Kevin Walsh and James R. Newsom, II I, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Town o f Somerville , et al.

OPINION

The Plaintiff/Appellant Town of Oakland (“Oakland”) and th e Defendant/Appellee Town of Somerville (“Somerville”) are both municipalities in Fay ette County, Tennessee

. Somerville’s1 Hidden Springs , LLC, i s an entity like W RH Ente rprise s that ow ns pro perty in Fayette County on the “ Oakland

side” of W arren Ro ad. A long w ith Hyneman, Hidde n Springs also sought t o have its property annexed by Oakland and to de velop reside ntial sub divisio ns on its p rop erty.
-2- population is greater than Oakland’s. B oth Oaklandand Somer ville hav e develo

ped along side State Highway 64, with Oakland being on Somerville’s immed iate we st side. Warren Road runs perpendicular

to Hi ghway 64, ro ugh ly e quid istant between Oakland and Somerville. I n the complaint below, Oa

kland all eged th at it had a

n agreement wit

h Somerville that Warren Roadwould be the boundary se

parating the easter

n and we stern annexation reserve areas for Oa kland and Somerville, respectively . Under the alleged ag reement, Oakland

and Somerville were bound not to annex property in the other town’ s annexation reserve area.

William Russell Hy

neman, d/ b/a W. R. H. Enter

prises L LC (“ Hyneman”) , owned pr operty in the annexation reserve area on the west side, or the “Oakland side,” of Warren Road. On July 8, 1999, Hyneman pe

titioned Oakland to annex his property with the intent of est ablis hing a residential subdivision. 1 Oakland and Hy neman entered

into an agreement under which Oa kland would annex the property, a

nd Hyneman would c ontribute $1.8 million towards Oakland’s construction of a sewe r treatment plant to serve Hyne

man’s pro pose d subdivision. Accordingly, on Septe mber 30, 1999, Oaklandpassed on final reading Ordinance No. 1-9-99 (“Oakland’s ordinance” ) annexing, among other things, Hynema

n’s property. The ordin ance sta ted that it would be “effective ninety days from and after its passage,” which would f all on December 30, 1999.

On October

11, 1999, a

fter pa ssage o f the Oak

land ordinance but prior to its effective date, Somerville

passed on first reading Ordinance No. 99-18 (“S omervill e’s ordinance”) to annex the
sameHyneman prope

rty. The next day , October 12, 1999 , before the “operative date” of the Oaklandordinance, Somerville sent Oakland a notice informing Oa kland that it had begun annexation procee dings fo r Hy neman’spropert

y. I n the notic e to Oakla

nd, Somerv

ille asse rted tha t,
as the larg er munic ipality , Somerville had pr iority to annex Hy

neman’sp ro pe rt y, as set fo rth in Tenness ee Code A

nnotated § 6-51-11 0(b). Th

is statute states: (b) If two (2) municipalities which we re incorporated in the same cou nty shall initiate annex ation procee dings with respect to the same territory , the proceedings of the municipality having the large r populat ion shall have precedence and the sma ller muni cipal ity's proceedings shall be hel d in abeya nce pending the outcome of the proceedings of such larg er municipality.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-110(b) (1998). As is provided in the statute, Somerville’s notice informed Oaklandthat Oakl and was r equired to hold its an nexation proceedings in abey ance pending the outcome of Somerville’s an nexatio n proceedings. On October 28, 1999, Somerville adopted Ordinance99-18 on final reading, annexing Hy neman’s property

. After Somerville’s annexation of Hyneman’s p roperty, Hy neman refused to give Oakland the a greed upon $1.8 million to fu n d construction of the proposed sewage tre atment facilities.2 Som erville insis ts that the tri al court also reached the conc lusion tha t Som erville p rop erly exe rcised its priority pursuant t o Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 6-51-110(b). We disagree. The t rial court mer ely h eld th at, bec ause a quo
wa rran to proceeding was available to Oakland during the perti nent ti me fr ame, i t was the excl usi ve re medy availab le to cha llenge S ome rville’s ord inance

. -3- On December 21, 1999, Hy neman filed a quo warranto action a gainst Somerville, arguing that Somerville’s annexation of his property wa s unreasonable. On November 30, 2000, the parties settled the matter and Hy

neman voluntarily non-suited his lawsuit ag ainst Somerville.

On August 6, 2001, Oakland filed a complaint for a dec laratory jud gme nt and breach of contract in the trial court below. Oakland named as defendants Somerville, its mayor a nd aldermen, Hyneman, and Hynema

n’s business entities. In the la wsuit, Oakland asserted that Somerville’s ordin ance annexing

the Hy neman pr operty was inva lid beca use Somer

ville had no statutory authorit

y to annex prop erty

that had a

lr ea dy been annexed by O akland. The complaint also alleged that S omerville

breach ed its ag reemen t to refr ain from a

nnexing p

roperty in Oakland’s annexatio n reservearea. F

inally , Oakland alleg ed that Hy neman br eached its contra ct with Oakland to pay

$1.8 million for the proposed sewage facilities.

On March 6, 2002, the

defenda nts filed a motion to dis miss pursua nt to Rule 12.02(6) of

the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion asserted that Oakland’s lawsuit should be dismissed because: (1) Oaklandfaile d to ch allen ge Somerville’s ordinanc e in a timely manner; and (2) since Oakland did not timely file a quo warrant

o suit challenging the annexation, Oakland did not have standing to challenge Somerville’s ordina nce under the Declaratory

Judgment Act.

On September

3, 2002, the trial court

granted Somerville’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that Oakland’s lawsuit was barred because it was filed more than ninety days after the final reading of Somerville’s annexation ordinance, that is, beyond

the ninety-day

deadline for filing a quo warrant o action. The trial court also determined that declaratory

relief was not available to Oakland on the facts of the case. 2 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A). I n effect, the trial court held that a quo warranto action was the exclus ive remedy available to Oakland to challenge Somerville’s ordinance

. After the dismiss al of thos e claims, Oakland non-suite d its rema

ining cl aims ag ainst

Hy nema n, rendering the trial court’s prior order final and appea lable. Oakland now appea ls the trial court’s order of dismissal.

On app eal, Oakland argues that, bec ause it is challenging the validity of the Some

rvill e ordinance, rather than the reasonableness of the a nnexat io n, Oakla

nd was au

thorized to

file this action pursuant

to the Dec larator

y Judg ment Act. In su

pport, Oa kland cit es the Te nnessee Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol , 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1998), arguing that Earhart

ho ld s t ha t a mu ni ci pa li ty m ay f il e a n a ct io n u nd er th e D ec la ra to ry J udgme nt Act to allege that an a

nnexation o

rdinanc e is invalid

or exceeds the authority de legated by

the legislature. If the action is properly broug ht under the Declaratory

Judgment Act, Oakland argues, then it is not bound by the ninety-day limitation applicable to quo wa rran to actions. In re sponse, So merville3 Tha t statute provides:

If the county or any ot

her agg r ieved owner of propert y does not contest the ann exati on ordinance under § 6-51- 103 withi n ninet y (90) day s of f

inal passage of

the ann exati on ordinance, the ordi ance shall be com e op erative ninety (9 0) d ays after fina l passa ge ther eof.

Te nn. Co de A nn. § 6 -58-1 08( b)(4 ) (19 98)

. -4- argues that Earhart should be narrowly c onstrued, claiming that its holding applies only in casesin which a quo warrant

o procee ding wa s unavail able to the plaintif f. Somerville claims that, bec ause Oaklandcould have brought a quo warranto action wi thin ninety

day s after t

he final readin g, bu t failedto do so, it is not p ermitted now to collaterally

challenge Somerville’s annexation ordinance.

We review the grant of a motion to d ismiss un der Rule 12.02(6) de novo , affording no presumption of correctness to the decision of the trial court. Robinson v. Su ndquist , No. M2001- 01491-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21169480, at *1 (Ten n. Ct. App. May

20, 20 03). We must assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and deter mine whether the allegations state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. “A motion to dismiss should only be g rantedif ‘it appears that the plaintiff can establish no facts supportingthe claim that would warrant relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Doe v. Sundquist , 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn.1999)). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review. Wilkins v. Kellogg Co. , 48 S.W.3d 148 , 151 (Te nn. 2001) ; State
ex rel. Comm’r of Transp . v. Medic ine Bird Blac k Bear White Eagle , 63 S.W.3d 734, 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). I

n constru ing the s tatutes a

t issue, in t

his case , we must

give effect to the legislative intent “primarily from the na tural and ordinary

meaning of the languag e used . . . .” Earhart , 970 S.W .2d at 951 (quot ing Worrall v. Kroger Co. , 545 S.W.2d 7 36, 738 (Tenn. 1977 )). “Sta tu te s relating to the same subject or sharing a common purpose must be construed toget h er ( in pari materia ), ‘in order to advance their common purpose or intent.’ ” Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C. , 70 S.W.3d 710, 716 (T enn. 2 002) ( quot ing Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co. , 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997)); see Lens C rafters, Inc. v. Sundquist , 33 S.W.3d 772, 777 (Tenn. 2000). Such statutes should be c onstrued so as to ad

vance th e intent of t he legi slature a nd arriv e at the mo st harmonious result possible. Frye , 70 S.W.3d at 716.

“The annexation of territory is not a common rig htof municipalities. . . .” City of Watauga
v. City of Joh nson City , 589 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tenn. 1979). Rather, “[i]t is the exclusive prerogative

of the Legislature

to crea te municip alities a

nd to alter, shrink or enlarge their boundar ies at will.” Id. In the exercise of that prerogative, the legislature has delegated

to municipalities the power to annex by ordinance a ccording to t he terms a

nd conditi ons in the a

nnexation s tatutes, Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-101, et seq. Id. Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-102,
a municipality may , by ordinance , “extend its corporate limits by annexation of such terr itory adjoi nin g its existing boundaries as may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and propert y owners of t

he affected ter

ritory as well a s the munic ipality as a whole . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-102(a) ( 1) (1998) . That section also p rovides “that the o

rdinanc e shall not become op era tive until thirty (30) day s after final passage there of.” Id. In 1998, however, the leg islature
en acted Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-58-108(b)(4), w hich appears to amend this time frame t o ninety day s. 3 Comporting

with this tim

e limitation, both the Oakland and the Somerville ordinances state that t hey would becom e opera tive n inety days aft er thei r pass age on fi nal rea ding.4 Quo wa rran to , li teral ly t ransl ated, mean s “by wh at aut hority.” B LACK ’ S L AW D I CTI ONARY 1264 (7t h ed. 1999).
-5- The statutes regarding annexation also affor d the owner of property

in an annexed area the authority to challe

nge the reasona bleness o f th e annexation in aquo warrant o 4 action under Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-103. Earhart , 970 S.W.2d a t 952. Tha

t st atut e provide s in pertine nt part: (a)(1)(A) Any ag grieved owner of property wh i ch borders or lies within territory which is the subject of an annexation ordinance prior to the operative da te thereof, may file a suit in the nature of a quo war rant o proceeding in a

ccorda nce with t

his part, § 6-51-301 and

title29, chapter 35 to contest the validity thereof on the ground that it reasonably may

not be deemed

necessary

for the welfare

of the residents and propert y owners o f the af

fected territor y a nd the muni cipality

as a whol e and so consti tutes an exercise of power not conferred by law. Notwithstanding the provisions of

any othe

r section in this chapter, for purposes of this section, an “aggrieved

owner of

propert y”does not include an y mu nicipalit y or public corporation createdand defined unde r title 7, c

hapter 8 2 which owns proper ty bordering or lying within the territory which is the subject of an annexation ordinance requested by the remaining

property owne

r or owner s of

the terr itory and whose propert y and services are to be allocated a nd conveyed in accordance with § 6- 51-111, § 6-51-11 2 or § 6-51 -301, or a ny c ontract

ual arr angeme nt oth erwis e providing for such allocation and convey ance.
Tenn. Code A nn. § 6-51-103 (a)(1)(A) (1998). Thus, this statute allows an “a ggrieved owner of pr op er ty” to challenge an

annexation ordinance on the ground that it is not reasonably necessary

for the safety a

nd welfare of

the residents involved. See Earhart , 970 S.W.2d at 952. The Tennessee Supreme Court has delineated factors to consider in determining whe ther an ann exatio n is reasonable:

a. the necessity

for, or u se of, mun

icipal se rvices;

b. the present ability and intent of the municipality to render municipal services when and as needed;

c. whether the annexation is for the sole purpose of increasing municipal revenue withoutthe ability and intent to benefit the anne xed area by

rendering municipal services. City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enters., Inc. , 562 S.W .2d 808, 812 (Tenn. 1978); see Saylors v. City of Jackson , 575 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tenn.1978). Additional factors include whether the annexation will benefit the citizens of the municipality, and whether failing to annex the territory would inhibit th e g ro wt h o f t he an ne xi ng mu ni ci pa li ty. See Bowevil Exp., LLC v. City of Henderson , No. W1999-02137-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 204211, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).-6-

Prio rto 1974, a municipality had no standing to challenge the annexation ordinance of another municipality, because the statute authorizing sucha chall enge applied only to an “a ggrieved
owner of prope rty ” who live d in the annexed territory. City of Gallati n v. City of

Hendersonville , 510 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tenn. 1974 ). In 1974, in response to the decision in Gallatin , the General Assembly enacte d section

6-51-110 (f), whi ch state s: (f) W he n a la rg er mu ni ci pa li ty initiates annexati on proceedings for a territory which could be subject to annexation by a smaller municipality, the smaller municipa lity shall have standing

to challe nge the procee dings in

the chancery

court of the county whe

re the territory

proposed to be annexed is located.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-11 0(f) (1 998). Thu s, since that statute was enacted, a smaller municipa lity has “the same standing to challenge a nnexation that [has] theretofore [been] granted to own ers o f property in the ter

ritory to be anne

xed, no more no less.” City of Watauga , 589 S.W.2d at 906.

We now turn to Oakland’s argument that it can challenge the validity of Somerville’s annexation ordinance pursuant to the Declaratory

Judgment Act. In essence, the issue turns on an interpre ta tion of the Court’s holding in Earhart . In that case, the city of Bristol passed an annexation ordinance in 1989 that purported to annex the right-of-way of Highway 11E. Id. at 949. Six ye ars late

r, in 19 95 , t he ci ty a do pt ed tw en ty- fo ur (2 4) an ne xa ti on or di na nc es , a nn ex in g t we nt yfour separate parcels of pr

operty adjac ent to the portion of Highway 11E included in the 1989 annexation ordinance. Id. at 950. Within thirty (30) day s, the owners of fifteen of the twenty-four parcel s filed a quo warranto and declaratory judgment action contesting the annexations. The propert y owners alleged

that the 1995 ordinances were invalid because the 1989 hig hway right-ofway annexation, on which the 1995 annexations were based, was “null and void.” They asserted that the underly

ing 1989annexatio n was void because it did not annex peop le, private property , or commercial activities as required under Tennessee Code Annota ted § 6-51-102. Id. The jury found that all of the 1995 ordinances were reasona ble, and the trial court entered a judgment on the verdict

. In addition, the trial court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to declaratory

relief regarding the validity of the 1989 ordinance

. The inter mediate a ppellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted ce

rtiorari to address, inter alia , whether the plaintiffs co uld collater ally ch al le ng e t he 19 89 or di na nc e o ut si de of th e s ta tu to ry quo warranto procedures. Id.

In Earhart , the Cour

t first obs erved th at quo warrant o procee dings were the

appropr iate vehicle to contes t an anne

xation on the

ground s that the a

nnexation i s not reasonably necessary to the safety and welf are of t he inhabi tants and property

involved. Id. at

952. The Court then stated:
But, where the quo warrant o procee ding is not availab le, alter native e quitable
re medies ar e n ot ba rr ed . [ W] he re th e r em ed y by quo warrant o is availa

ble, it i s usually held that here is n o concur

rent re medy in equity, unless by

virtue of statutory provision. But if quo warrant o is not an a

dequate remedy , it will not b e a bar t o alternative remedie s.” The a vailability o f other r

emediesis specif

i cally acknowledged

in section 6-51-113 (1992), which provides, “Except

as speci fically providedin this part, the po wers conferred by this part shall be in addition and supplemental to, and the limitations imposed bythis part shall not affect the powers conferred by any ot her gen eral, special or local law.” The Tenne ssee Declaratory5 Som erville attempts to dis tinguis h Jeffers on County from the instan t case b ased on the fact that the cour t in

that case addressed the issue of whi ch annexation law to apply when t he legi slat

ure had amended the ann exati on stat utes and the ef

fect ive dat e of th e amended stat ute was aft er the fin al read ing of the challen ged ord inance

. W hile the fac ts in Jeffe rson Co unty and those in the i nstant case are not i dentic al, t hat does not expl ain why the Jeff erson Co unty cour t’s bro ad inte rpre tation o f Earh art should not apply i n thi s case.

-7- Judgement

Act is just such another general law confe rring the power to challenge the validity and cons truction o f statute s and municipal ordin ances.
Id. at 952-53 (citations omitted). Thus, the Earhart Court noted that section 6-51-113 refers to the availab ility

of remedies other than a quo warrant o proceeding, providing that the quo warrant o rem edydoes not “affect the powers confer red by any

other general . . . law.” Id. at 952. It then determi ned that the Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act constitutes “any other general law” that confers power to

challenge the v alidity

of an annexation ordinance. Id. at 952-53. The Court stated that, although objections to the reasonab leness of an ordinance canbe raised in a quo warrant o action, the validity

of an ordinanc e is subje ct to cha llenge under the Declar atory Judgment Act. Id. at 954. The Court found that, while a quo warrantopr oc ee di ng mu st be br ou gh t w it hi n t hi rt y da ys (now ninety day s), that time limitation does not apply to a declara tory judgment a

ction contesting the validity of an anne

xation ordinance. Id. It

stated plainly that “[t]he validity of an annexation ordinance alleged to exceed the authority de legated by

the legislature is subject to challenge unde r the Declaratory

Judgment Act.” Id. at 954.

This Court subsequently applied Earhart , emp hasizi ng t hat, “[w]hile quo warrant o is the exclusive means by

which a party

may challenge the reasonab leness of an annexation, the

Supreme Courthas held that ‘[t]he validit y o f an anne

xation ordin ance alleged t o exceed t

he author ity delegated by the legislature is subject to challenge under the Dec laratory Judgment Act.’ ” Jefferson County v. City of

Morristown , No. 03A01-9810-CH-00331, 1999 WL 817 519 , at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 19 99) (q uoti ng Earhart , 970 S.W.2d at 954 (emphasis added)). 5 Thus, Earhart applies in
cases in which it is alleg ed that the annexing municipa lity has exceeded its authority in passing the annexation ordinance.

Somerville

argues that Earhart

holds that using the Declaratory Judgm ent Ac t to ch allen ge the va lidity of an annexation ordinance is per missible only when quo warrant o is comple

tel y unavaila ble to the plain

tiff. I n support, Somerville

cites thislangua

ge fro m Earhart : “[W]here the remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually held that there is not concurrent remedy in eq ui ty, unless by virtue

of statutory provision. But if quo warranto is not an adequate remedy , it will not be a bar to alternative remedies.” Earhart , 970 S.W.2d at 952 (qu o ting 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warra nto § 7 (1972)). Somerville in effect urges t his court to adopt the nega

tive infe rence f rom this language, i.e., whereth e r em ed y by quo warrant o is available, thenthere is no co nc ur re nt re me dy. The Earhart

Court, however, sp ok e o nl y of th er e b ei ng no co nc ur re nt re me dy in equity , and specific ally

excepted remedies pursuant to a statute such as the Declar atory Judgment Act. I

ndeed, Earhart found statutory authority for an action un der the D eclaratory Judgment Act “by virtue of statutory provision ,” and did

not rely on th e fact th at quo warrantorelief was not available to the plaintiff s.6 Som erville argue s that City o f Ga llatin v. C ity of H end erson ville , 510 S.W .2d 5 07 ( Te nn. 19 74) , supp orts its argument that

it properly exerci sed its st atutory prior ity in initiating ann exatio n pro ceed ings on the H ynem an pr ope rty afte r Oakland ’s final reading. We do no t address in this Op inion that iss ue or any othe r rel ati ng t o the subs tanc e of Oa kland ’s petition . Rathe r, we lea ve tho se issues fo r the trial co urt to d eterm ine in the first insta nce o n rem and

. -8- Moreover, in this case, although quo warrant o would have been availabl e to Oakla nd if it desiredto contest the reasonableness of Somerville’s annexation ordinance, that is not what Oakland sought to do. Oakland alleges that the Somerville ordinance is void beca us e it was enacted after Oakland’s annexation ordinance on the same property had been passed on

final reading, albeit before the effective date of the Oakland ordina nce. Oakland al so all ege s that Some rville br eached its agreement

with Oaklandregarding

annexation of properties in Oakland’s “annexation reserve” a rea. Thus, Oakland

clearly sought to

contest th

e validity of the annexation, not its reasonablene ss, an acti on whic h Earhart

clearly holds is per

missible under the Declaratory Judgment Act and not subject to the time restrictions applicable to quo warrant o procee dings.

Somerville

argue s that City of Bristol v. Town of Bluff Cit

y , 868 S.W.2d 2 82 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1993), which involved the same 1989 annexation of Highway 11E at issue in Earhart , supports its position. In that case, Bluff City , which is smaller in population than Bristol, sought to annex the
sameproperty a s that annexed by Bristol in 1989. See City of Bristol , 868 S.W.2d at 282. Bristol filed an action to negate Bluff City ’s attempt to annex the area based on its priority as the larger
mu ni ci pa li ty. Bluff City filed a c ounter-claim for declaratory relief, alleging that Bristol’s previous 1989 annexation was invalid. Id. The trial court held that the Bristol’s annexation was illegal and void

. The appellate court reversed, finding that Bluff City could not cha llenge the validity

of the annexation because it did not file a quo warranto action wi thinthe time limit provided by statute. The appellate court held that a quo warranto action would include a challenge to the validity of an annexation. The c ourt s tate d tha t “[a] Quo Warranto proceeding reache s governmental exercise of authority unlawfully asser

ted . . . .” Id. at 283. That holding is consistent with Somerville’s position that a quo warranto procee ding is the exclusiv e avenu e for ch alleng ing an a nnexation o

rdin ance , even if the chall enge relates to unlawfully a sserted authority. City of Bristol , however, was decided prior to Earhart

and is at odds with Earhart’s later holding that the quo warrant o time limitation “does not apply to suits contesting the validity of an ordinance which

purportsto annex an area that

. . . [is] void.” Earhart , 970 S.W.2d at 954. Un der thes e circumstances, we decline to adopt the reasoning in City of Bristol

. Ac co rd in gl y, we conclude that Oaklan d was authorized to maint ain this declaratory judgment action challengingthe valid ity o f the Some

rville an nexation or

dinance , and con sequentl

y reverse the trial court’s grant

of Somerville’s motion to dismiss. Our decision pretermits other issues raised on this appe al. 6

The decision of the trial court is reversed, and this c ause is remand ed for f urthe r proce edings not inconsistentwith this Op inion. Costsare to be taxed to the

appelle es, Town of Somerville, et al ., fo r w hi ch ex ec ut io n m ay i ss ue , i f n ec es sa ry.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KIRBY, JUDGE