[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15413

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cr-00115-RBD-GJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

MARCO MAURICE HEATH, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 5, 2015)

Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 14-15413 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 1 of 6 
2

Marco Heath appeals his conviction of one count of knowingly possessing a 

firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e)(1). On appeal, Heath argues that the district 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police unlawfully 

detained him at the time his girlfriend consented to the search of the house where 

the weapons were eventually discovered. Heath contends that the stop exceeded its 

permissible scope when the officers prolonged his detention in order to conduct an 

exploratory search of the neighborhood for weapons an officer had previously 

observed on Heath. 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence for clear 

error as to factual findings and de novo as to its application of the law. United 

States v. Watkins, 760 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2014). We review a district 

court’s determinations of reasonable suspicion or probable cause de novo. Ornelas 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). We may affirm 

the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record. 

Watkins, 760 F.3d at 1282. The facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the 

Government. Id. at 1279. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and in 

the absence of a warrant, a search is only reasonable if it falls within a specific 

exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1278. A warrantless search preceded 

Case: 14-15413 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 2 of 6 
3

by valid consent is one such exception. Id. at 1279. The consent of one co-tenant 

who possesses common authority over the premises is valid against an absent, 

nonconsenting co-tenant. Fernandez v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 

1133 (2014). This is true even where the police could have asked the absent cotenant for consent to search. See id. at 1132-33. An occupant who is absent due to 

a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent 

for any other reason. Id. at 1134.

The Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to conduct a brief, 

warrantless, investigatory stop of an individual when the officer has reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 

1305-06 (11th Cir. 2002). We determine whether an investigatory stop was legal 

under the Fourth Amendment by ascertaining (1) “whether the stop was justified at 

its inception,” and (2) “whether the stop was reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that justified the stop in the first place.” United States v. Griffin, 

696 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 2012).

An investigatory detention is justified at its inception if, based on the totality 

of the circumstances, the officer conducting the stop had a “reasonable, articulable 

suspicion based on objective facts that that the person has engaged in, or is about 

to engage in, criminal activity.” United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1290 

(11th Cir. 2007). The reasonable suspicion must be more than “an inchoate and 

Case: 14-15413 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 3 of 6 
4

unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id. An officer may form a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity by observing exclusively legal activity, even if such 

activity is seemingly innocuous to the ordinary observer. Id. Police may “draw on 

their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and 

deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well 

elude an untrained person.” Id. at 1291 (quotation omitted). In addition, an 

individual’s proximity to illegal activity may be considered. Hunter, 291 F.3d at 

1306. Reasonable suspicion can be determined from the collective knowledge of 

the officers involved in the stop. United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1524 

(11th Cir. 1989).

In order to determine if a valid investigatory stop exceeded its scope and 

transformed into an arrest that must have been supported by probable cause, we 

consider four nonexclusive factors: (1) the law enforcement purpose served by the 

detention; (2) the diligence with which the officers pursued the investigation; 

(3) the scope and intrusiveness of the investigation; and (4) the duration of the 

detention. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006). When 

balancing these factors, we focus on “whether the police diligently pursued a 

means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 

which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted). We 

have concluded that a stop of approximately 30 minutes, the majority of which was 

Case: 14-15413 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 4 of 6 
5

spent awaiting assistance, was not unreasonable. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.3d 

1479, 1492 (11th Cir. 1991).

In this case, the district court did not err in concluding that Heath was 

lawfully detained, and thus the consent to search provided by his girlfriend was 

valid as to Heath because he was legally considered absent. First, the initial stop 

was justified by reasonable articulable suspicion under the totality of the 

circumstances. See Lindsey, 482 F.3d at 1290. An officer observed Heath riding 

his bicycle with weapons strapped to the handlebar in a high crime area. The 

officer who stopped Heath recognized him from prior encounters and knew that he 

was a convicted felon, which, combined with the first officer’s earlier observation 

that Heath had been carrying firearms, produced a reasonable suspicion that Heath 

had engaged in criminal activity. 

Second, the investigatory stop did not exceed its permissible scope. Heath 

no longer had firearms (or anything else) on his bicycle, and his answer to the 

officers that he had been carrying garden tools on his bicycle rather than weapons 

was inconsistent with what the first officer had observed earlier. Therefore, 

Heath’s detention while the officers searched the area where he had been stopped 

and seen earlier was reasonably related in scope to the purpose behind the 

detention, that is, to investigate whether Heath had been in possession of firearms. 

See Street, 472 F.3d at 1306. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the 

Case: 14-15413 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 5 of 6 
6

Government, the officers diligently pursued the investigation by searching the area 

soon after stopping Heath in order to confirm their suspicions that he had hidden 

the weapons. See id. The stop was not overly intrusive, as Heath was not 

handcuffed. See id. Finally, the duration of the detention lasted around 30 

minutes, which we have concluded to be reasonable and does not alone transform 

the encounter into an arrest. See Courson, 939 F.3d at 1492.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-15413 Date Filed: 08/05/2015 Page: 6 of 6