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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. EDWARD CLYDE SILVIS Appellant No. 525 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000007-1970

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENK INS, J. MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 7, 2016 Edward Silvis appeals from an order dismissing his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9 541 et seq., which he styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus . We affirm. In 1969, Silvis was convicted of first degree murd er and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, on direct ap peal, affirmed his conviction and sentence. Commonwealth v. Silvis , 284 A.2d 740 (Pa.1971). He filed three unsuccessful petitions f or post-conviction relief, the third of which resulted in a published opinion, Commonwealth v. Silvis , 452 A.2d 1045 (Pa.Super.1982). He remains in sta te prison to this day. On November 12, 2015, Silvis filed the present peti tion in the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County, Pennsylvania. On Ja nuary 13, 2016, theJ-S73038-16

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Forest County court transferred the matter to the C ourt of Common Pleas of Armstrong County (hereinafter “the common pleas cou rt”), where Silvis had been tried and sentenced more than 45 years earlier

. Silvis’s petition alleged that he should be release d from custody based on what he claims is false information in his Depar tment of Corrections (“DOC”) records. In particular, he complained abou t two forms. The first form, a Form DC-23B (“Sentence Status Change Report ”) dated August 10, 1988, stated that Silvis was sentenced for “Murder 1 st Degree”. The use of these words, Silvis asserted, was erroneous because his sentencing order did not include a degree of murder. The second form, a Form DC-16E dated November 5, 20 04, listed Silvis’s offense as “CC2502-Murder,” which appears to be an abbreviation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502, the murder statute presently in the Crimes Code. Silvis argues that he was not convicted under section 2502 , and that this statute did not become effective until June 1973, after his date of sentencing. Silvis claimed that he was not challenging the lega lity or validity of his sentence but only objected to the DOC’s inclusion o f “false” information in its data system. But at the same time, Silvis asked th e court to order the DOC either to correct the information to match his sent encing order or release him from custody immediately. Noting that the respondent in the petition was the superintendent of SCI Rockview, where Silvis is imprisoned, the commo n pleas court deemed Silvis’s petition to be a petition for a writ of ma ndamus to compel the DOC toJ-S73038-16

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change items of information in its data system conc erning Silvis’s imprisonment. The common pleas court held that it lacked jurisdiction to order the DOC to take any steps, and that Silvis’s sole remedy was to file a petition for mandamus in the Commonwealth Court. On March 17, 2016, the common pleas court entered a n order dismissing Silvis’s petition. Silvis filed a timel y notice of appeal, and both Silvis and the common pleas court complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925. Silvus raises two issues in this appeal: 1. Whether [Silvis] was denied his constitutional right to a writ of habeas corpus ? 2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its di scretion when it failed to consider unlawful detention on writ of habeas corpus but instead without jurisdiction [held] a post conv iction hearing? Brief For Appellant, at 5. Silvis styled his filing as a habeas corpus petition, and the common pleas court construed his petition as seeking a wri t of mandamus against the DOC. We conclude, however, that Silvis actually se eks relief under the

PCRA. This Court has explained: It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9 542; Commonwealth v. Haun , [ ] 32 A.3d 697 ([Pa.]2011). Unless the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus. [ Commonwealth v.] Fahy

, [737 A.2d 214,] 223–224 [Pa.1999]; Commonwealth v. Chester , [] 733 A.2d 1242 ([Pa.]1999). Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be r aised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpusJ-S73038-16

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petition. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin , 722 A.2d 638 ([Pa.]1998); see also Commonwealth v. Deaner , 779 A.2d 578 (Pa.Super.2001) (a collateral petition that rai ses an issue that the PCRA statute could remedy is to be conside red a PCRA petition). Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus. Commonwealth v. Taylor , 65 A.3d 462, 465–66 (Pa.Super.2013). Styling a petition as a habeas petition in lieu of a PCRA petition does not remov e a petition from the subject matter of the PCRA, nor d oes it excuse a petitioner from complying with the PCRA’s requirements. Commonwealth v. Breakiron , 781 A.2d 94, 96 n. 2 (Pa.2001) (notwithstanding ca ptioning of petition, claims only cognizable to the extent they would be cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth v. Peterkin , 722 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa.1998) (PCRA subsumes habeas corpus and petitioner must abide by PCRA requirements). Here, Silvis argues that the murder statute listed in his DOC records, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502, was not in effect at the time of his trial and sentencing -- and on this basis, he requests (among other things) his release from custody. This request indicates that Silvis is cha llenging the legality of his sentence, a subject within the purview of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii). Therefore, we will treat Silvis’s petition as a PCRA petition. Before we address the merits of Silvis’s claim, we must determine whether the common pleas court had jurisdiction to review his petition. WeJ-S73038-16

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conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction to revi ew Silvis’s petition under the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C .S. § 9545(b). Section 9545 provides that a petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545( b)(1); accord Commonwealth v.

Bretz , 830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa.Super.2003) . No court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Monaco , 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson , 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.2003)). A judgment is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supre me Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(3). Three exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar provide for very limited circumstances under which a court may excuse the la te filing of a PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(1); Monaco , 996 A.2d at 1079. The late filing of a petition will be excused if a petitione r alleges and proves:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was t he result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated w ere unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the UnitedJ-S73038-16

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1 The 1995 amendments to the PCRA also provided that if the judgment of sentence became final before the effective date of the amendments (January 16, 1996), a PCRA petition could be filed within on e year, or by January 16, 1997. This grace period did not apply to second or subsequent petitions, regardless of when the first petition was filed. Commonwealth v. Thomas , 718 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa.Super.1999). Silvus filed se veral post-conviction petitions in the 1970’s and 1980’s, so this grace p eriod did not apply to him.J-S73038-16

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For these reasons, both the common pleas court and this Court lack jurisdiction over Silvis’s petition. Order affirmed. 2 Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum. President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott concurs in t he result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/7/2016

____________________________________________ 2 It does not appear that the errors that Silvus com plains of entitle him to release from prison. Although his DOC records refe r to a murder statute not in effect at the time of his trial and sentence (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502), another murder statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701, was in effect at that time. Our Supreme Court’s opinion affirming Silvus’s judgment of sent ence on direct appeal provides: “ Appellant was tried before a jury which ultimately rendered a verdict of first-degree murder. After disposition o f post-trial motions, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment.” Silvus , 284 A.2d at 741. Obviously, Silvus was convicted of first degree mur der, and sentenced to life imprisonment, under section 4701. The clerical err ors in his DOC records are harmless.