IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 24, 2018

JAMES ROBERT OLIPHANT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County

No. CC-17-CR-127 Lisa N. Rice, Judge

No. E2017-02147-CCA-R3-HC

The petitioner, James Robert Oliphant, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for 

writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1983 Washington County Criminal Court 

conviction of assault with intent to commit second degree murder. Discerning no error, 

we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,JR., JJ., joined.

James Robert Oliphant, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The petitioner, originally charged by the Washington County Grand Jury in 

case number 14673 with burglary and assault with intent to commit first degree murder, 

was convicted of assault with intent to commit second degree murder in the Washington 

County Criminal Court in 1983 and received a three-year sentence. The petitioner’s trial 

was apparently held in Unicoi County, and the judgment form states that the judgment 

was entered in the Criminal Court for Washington County, Tennessee “being held in 

Unicoi County, Tennessee.” In 1986, the petitioner was convicted of burglary of a 

vehicle in case number 15965, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment as a 

habitual offender. See State v. James Robert Oliphant, No. 228 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Knoxville, Oct. 14, 1987), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 28, 1987). During the 

sentencing phase of that trial, the State proved that the petitioner “had been convicted on 

one occasion in Florida for burglary and involuntary sexual battery, on a second 

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occasion, in Tennessee, for second degree burglary and receiving stolen property, and [in 

case number 14673], also in Tennessee, for assault with intent to commit murder.” Id. 

The petitioner then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief, in which he asked the 

court “to void the 1986 conviction and previous convictions used to establish habitual 

criminality,” but his conviction in case number 14673 was not included in that petition. 

Oliphant v. State, 806 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

On September 15, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because his crime was committed 

and charged in Washington County but he was convicted in Unicoi County. In addition, 

the petitioner argued that his 1983 conviction was erroneously used to enhance his 

sentence in case number 15965. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the 

petition, concluding that the petitioner had failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas 

corpus relief.

In this appeal, the petitioner reiterates his claim that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction and that his void conviction was improperly used to enhance his later 

sentence. The State responds that the habeas corpus court’s dismissal was appropriate 

because the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. 

“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a 

question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. 

State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Our review of the habeas corpus court’s 

decision is, therefore, “de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the 

[habeas corpus] court.” Id. (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 

406, 408 (Tenn. 2006)). The writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, see

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15, but has been regulated by statute for 

more than a century, see Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 29-21-101 provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained 

of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may 

prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and 

restraint.” T.C.A. § 29-21-101. Despite the broad wording of the statute, a writ of 

habeas corpus may be granted only when the petitioner has established a lack of 

jurisdiction for the order of confinement or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate 

release because of the expiration of his sentence. See Ussery, 432 S.W.2d at 658; State v. 

Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326 (1868). The purpose of the state habeas corpus 

petition is to contest a void, not merely a voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom v. 

Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968). A void conviction is one which strikes at 

the jurisdictional integrity of the trial court. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.

1993); see State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn. 1979); Passarella 

v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
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To obtain release from custody via a habeas corpus proceeding, the 

petitioner must establish that he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty “as a direct 

consequence” of the judgment being challenged. Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 24 

(Tenn. 2004). “Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a 

separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus 

challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has 

expired.” Id. at 23. 

In our view, the petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to habeas 

corpus relief. His sentence in the challenged conviction expired over 30 years ago, and 

its use to enhance his sentence in case number 15965 was “merely a collateral 

consequence” of the judgment at issue. Id. at 24. Thus, “habeas corpus is not an 

appropriate avenue for seeking relief.” Id. at 23. Moreover, nothing indicates that the 

judgment at issue is facially invalid. The judgment reflects that it was entered in the 

Criminal Court for Washington County, Tennessee “being held in Unicoi County, 

Tennessee.” The petitioner offers nothing aside from his bald assertion that he never 

consented to the change of venue, and “a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief 

unless that petitioner can show from the record or the face of the judgment that the court 

of conviction lacked jurisdiction or is otherwise void.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 

631 (Tenn. 2000) (emphasis added). 

Although “[a] petition for habeas corpus may be treated as a petition [for 

post-conviction relief] when the relief and procedure . . . appear adequate and 

appropriate,” T.C.A. § 40-30-105(c), the instant petition was filed more than 30 years 

after the petitioner’s challenged judgment became final, which is well outside the oneyear statute of limitations, see T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a). Furthermore, neither the statutory 

grounds nor due process principles mandate the tolling of the statute of limitations. 

The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable ground for habeas corpus 

relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE