Secre tary Napolitano is automatica lly substitut ed for

Michae l Chertoff, pur suant to Fe d. 1 R. Civ. P . 25(d). Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is not at issue in the pending motion. 2 J UNE LANGL EY, Plaintiff,
v. J ANET NA POL I TANO , De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 08-1580 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (January 6, 2010) Plaintiff, J une L ang ley , filed the a bove-c aptioned lawsuit ag ainst her f ormer e mploy er, Def endant Janet Napolitano, Sec reta ry of the De partment of H omeland Secur ity (the “Secr etar y ”). Plaintiff, a forme r Mana g ement Ana ly st with the Depar tment of Homeland 1 Se c ur ity (t he “ De pa rtme nt” ), a lle g e s th at sh e wa s k no wi ng ly and int e nti on a lly

su bje c te d to dis pa rate tr e atme nt a

nd a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt b a se d o n r a c e and c olo r a nd un lawf ull y reta liated ag ainst based on pr otected a ctivity in violation of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Currently pendingbefor e the Court is the Secr etar y ’s par tial Motion t o Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary J udg ment, which foc uses solely on Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt and re prisal claims. The Sec reta ry makes two princ ipal arguments. First, the Sec reta ry contends 2 that Pla int if

f’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt a

nd re pr isa l c la ims sh ou ld b e dis mis se d und e r F e d. R.2

Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), or in the a lternative, that judgment a s a matter of law should be a

war ded to the Secre tary under F ed. R. Civ. P. 56, because Plaintiff fa iled to administratively exhaust her
reme dies with respe ct to these c laims. Second, the Secr etar y argues in the alter

native that Plaintiff’s repr isal and hostile work e nvironment claims fa il on their merits beca use (a ) the conduct a lleg ed is neither se vere or per vasive, a s is required to support a hostile work
e nv ir onme nt c la im, and

(b ) P la int if

f h a s n ot e sta

bli sh e d th e re qu ir e d c a

us a l e le me nts ne c e ssa

ry to
make out a

re pr isa l c la im. In r e sp on se , Pl a int if f a c kn ow le dg e s th at sh e did no t a dmi nis tr ativ e ly exhaust her re medies with respe ct to her r eprisal c laim and there fore voluntarily withdraws that claim. Plaintiff, howeve r, opposes the Sec reta ry ’s motion with respect to her hostile work
e nv ir onme nt c la im. Ac c or din g ly , a s Pla int if f h a s v olu nta ri ly wi thd ra wn he r c la im o f r e pr isa l, the re by re nd e ri ngthe Se c re tary ’s mot ion moo t a s to that is su e , th e on ly c la im r e ma ini ngin dispute is Pl aintiff’s hostile work e nvironment claim. The Sec reta

ry has styled her

now-pe nding motion as a partial Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary J udg ment. As an initial matter, to the extent she moves for dismissal pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), the motion is more appropr iately construed a s a motion for judgme nt on the pleading s under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) bec ause the Secre tary has alre ady

filed an Answer to Plainti ff’ s Complaint, seeAns., Docke t No. [9] , and her motion to di smiss under Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6) is there fore untimely
. SeeFe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b) ( “A motion asser ting a ny of the se de fe ns e s mu st b e ma de be fo re ple a din gif a re sp on siv e ple a din gis a llo we d. ” ); se e als o Do ug las s v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 605 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D.D .C. 2009). Nonethele ss, as the sta nd ard s f or re vie w a re the same un de r e ith e r F e d. R. C iv. P. 1 2( b) or 12 (c ), c ourt s r outin e ly treat motions to dismi ss that are filed af ter a responsive ple adinghas bee n made a s a motion forThe e x hibits attached to the motion include Plaintiff’s administrative c omplaint, a letter 3 from Plaintiff amendingher a dminist rative c omplaint, ag ency corr espondenc e re g ardingthe investigation into P laintiff’s administrative c omplaint, Pl aintiff’s a ffidavit provide d as par t of the investigation below, and a tr anscr ipt of Plainti ff’ s interview with the a g ency investigator. See Def .’s MSJ , Ex s. A-G. 3 judgme nt on the pleading s. Do ug las s , 605 F. Supp. 2d at 161. More importantly , howeve r, the Court finds that the Sec reta ry ’s motion should i n fac t be
co n s tru edas a m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en tra th er

th an a m o t i o nfo r j u d gm en to nth e p l ea d i n gs (or a motion to di smiss). I n filing he r motion, the Secre tary attache d various exhibits to her filing that bo th p art ie s h ave re lie d u po n in the ir br ie fi ng . Whil e so me of the atta c he d e xhibi ts 3 (spec ifically , Plaintiff’s administrative complaint and amendment there to) are ref err ed to in the civil Compl aint, others ar e not incorpor ated in or r efe renc ed by the Complaint and are there fore arguably outside the scope of

the pleading s in this m atter. Mor eover , as the Sec reta ry filed the motion as a motion for summary judgme nt in the alternative, both parties have submitt ed state me nts of

mate ri a l f

a c t pu rs ua nt t o L CvR

7( h) and Pla int if f h a s th e re fo re ha d a

re a so na ble opportunity

to respond to the attac hed mater ials. The Court, in an abunda nce of caution, thus
c on str ue s th e Se c re tary ’s mot ion a s a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt p ur su ant t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 56. See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(d) ( “I f, on a motion under Rule 12( b)(6) or 12(c ), matters outside the pleading s are prese nted to and not excluded by the cour t, the motion mus t be treated as one for summary judgme nt under Rule 56. All par ties must be give n a re asonable opportunity to present
a ll the mate ri a l th at is pe rt ine nt t o th e mot ion .” ); see also Marshall Co. Health Care Auth. v. Sh ala la , 998 F.2d 1221, 1226 n. 6 ( D.C. Cir. 1993) (advisingthat it is “probably the better prac tice for

a district cour

t alway s to convert to summary judgme nt so as to avoid . . . qu e sti on [s]” a s to wh e the r atta c he d e xhibi ts w e re pr op e rl y c on sid e ri ngin r

uli ngup on

a mot ion to4

dismiss under Rule 12( b)(6) ). Upon thorough consideration of the parties’ submissi ons, the
atta c hme nts the re to, the a pp lic a ble c a se law, statut or

y a uth or ity , a

nd the e nti re re c or d o f t

he c a se
as a whole, the Court shall DENY the Secre tary ’s [11] partial Motion for Summary J udg ment. Specifica lly , the Secr etar

y ’s motion is DENI ED AS MOOT with re spect to Plaintiff’s re prisal
c la im, a s Pla int if

f h a s v olu nta ri ly wi thd ra wn that c la im, and

is D EN I ED wi th r e sp e c t to Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim, as Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative
reme dies and the Sec reta

ry has not shown that the cla im mustfail on the mer its, for the re asons that follow. I. BACKG ROUND As indicated a

bove, the Sec reta

ry , in setting for

th the rele vant bac kg round in her motion for summary

judgme nt, has relied upon a nd cited to var ious ex hibits drawn from the a g ency i n v es t i gat i o ni n t o P l ai n t i ff ’s E qu al E mp l o y

m en tOp p o rt un i ty

(“ E E O” ) c o mp l ai n t . Ins o d o i n g, the Secr etar

y has in essenc e assumed the truth of Plaintiff’s alleg ations — as set for th both in the administrative investig ation below as w ell as in the civil Complaint — arguing that Plainti ff’ s hostile work environme nt claim fails eve n if Plaintiff’s fac tual alleg ations are acc epted a s true. Th e Se c re tary

ha s n ot s ub mitte d a

ny c on tr a dic tor

y e vid e nc e , b ut h a s in ste a d r e fe rr e d o nly to Plaintiff’s own unre butted fac tual alleg ations. Acc ording ly , in summarizi ngthe fa ctual background re levant to the pendingmotion for summary judgme nt, the Court shall do the same. A. Factual Back

ground Plaintiff, an Afr ican Ame rica n fema le, has wor

ked for the Fe dera l gove rnment for approximately

34 y ear s, most rece ntly

as a G S-12 Manag ement Ana ly st with the Fac iliti es Mana g e me nt B ra

nc h, Re so ur c e Mana g e me nt D ivi sio n o f t he I mmi g ra

tio n a nd Cus tom sAs a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, the Court

no te s th at it

str ic tly a dh e re s to the te xt of

L oc a l Civ il 4 R u l e 7 ( h ) , w h i c hr e qu i r e s th at“ [ e ] a c hm o t i o nf o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n ts h a l l b e a c c o mp an i e d b y a statement of mate rial fa cts as to which the movingparty contends ther e is no g enuine issue,” and that “[a]n opposi tion to such a motion shall be acc ompanied by a sepa rate concise statement of g enuine issues settingforth all mater ial fac ts as to which it is contended ther e exists a ge nuine iss ue ne c e ssa

ry to b e lit ig ate d. ” Al tho ug h b oth pa rt ie s f ile d th e re qu ir e d s tate me nts , b oth statements ar e spar se and la rg ely unhelpful to the Court in setting f orth the re quired ba ckg round. Acc ording ly , in most i nstance s, the Court cites direc tly to the attache d exhibi ts rather than to the Def endant’ s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“D ef.’ Stmt .”) or Plaintiff’s Response to Def endant’ s Stmt . (“Pl.’s Resp. Stmt.”). 5 En fo rc e me nt w ith in t

he De pa rtme nt f ro m D e c e mbe r 2 00 4 thro ug h Apr il 2 00 6. Com pla int , Do c ke t N o. [1], ¶

¶ 3 , 5 ; se e als o De f. ’s MSJ, D oc ke t N o. [11], Ex. F (P la int if f’ s E EO Af

fi davit ) (her einaf ter, “ EEO Af

fidavit”), at p. 1. Whil e wor king a s a Mana g ement Ana ly st with the 4 Depa rtment, Plaintiff’s immediate super visor was Judit h Duval, a Ca ucasia n fema le. Compl., ¶ 5. In September of

2005, Plaintiff reque sted approva l for adva nced sic k leave . Compl. ¶¶ 6-7;
se e als o Def

.’s MSJ , Ex . A (Plaintiff’s EEO Complaint) (here inafter , “EEO Complaint”), at p. 3. Although D uval, as Plaintiff’s immediate supe rvisor, had a lway s been r esponsible for a pproving Plaintiff’s reque sts for leave , Duval re fused to appr ove the r equest in this instance a nd instead forwa rded the reque st to her own immediate supe rvisor, Ga ry Crevonis, a Cauc asian male
. See De f. ’s Stmt . ¶

8; see also EE O C omp l. at p. 3; E EO Af f. at p. 2. Pla int if

f d id n ot a g re e wi th Duval’s de cision to forwa rd her reque st for leave to Crevonis bec ause he was ne w to the offic e
and did no t kn owPla int if

f. Com pl. ¶ 6 ; E EO Af

f. at p. 2. Whe n Pl a int if

f a sk e d D uv a l to e xpla in to C re vo nis the pa

rt ic ula r c ir c ums tanc e s r e g ard ingPla int if f’ s r e qu e st f

or le ave — s pe c if

ic a lly that Pla int if

f h a d a ne g ativ e sic k le ave ba lanc e be c a us e sh e ha d p re vio us ly

take n s ig nif

ic ant t ime off to ca re f or her sick fathe r and husba

nd — Duval re fused. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7; EEO Compl. at p. 3; EEO Aff

. at p. 2. Crevonis ultimately denied Plaintiff’s r equest for advanc ed sick lea

ve6

beca use Plaintiff was in the ne g ative sick lea ve categ ory

and had a

larg e annua l leave ba lance ; he advised Plaintiff that she wa s require d to use annua l leave or take lea ve without pay . Def

.’s Stmt . ¶ 9. Pla int if f t he re a ft e r a

pp ro a c he d D uv a l to e xpre ss h e r c on c e rn s r e g ard ingthe de c isi on to forwa rd her reque st for leave to Crevonis. Duva l became upset and told Plaintiff that she had asked Cre vonis to transfer Plaintiff beca

use Duva l did not want to work with her. Compl. ¶ 8; EEO Compl. at p. 4. Duval also y elled at Plaintiff, told her that she did not care if Plaintiff filed a g rieva nce, a nd attempted to slam the door in Plaintiff’s fa ce. Compl. ¶ 8; EEO Compl. at p. 4. When Plainti ff attempted to apolog ize to Duval the next week, Duval told Plaintiff that her behavior was inexcusable a

nd that she wa s g oing to “ file the fullest mea sure of reta liatory

action ag ainst [P laintiff].” EEO Compl. at p. 5. Duval also made false c laims about what occ urre d, falsely acc using Plaintiff of “ putting her hand on her

hip and pointing at Duval, and be ing loud
and a bu siv e .” Com

pl. ¶ 9 . Pl a int if

f atte mpt e d to a dd

re ss t his inc ide nt w ithma

na g e me nt, inc lud ingCr e vo nis , b ut n o o ne re sp on de d. Com pl. ¶ 9 ; E EO Af

f. at p. 3. Ul tim ate ly , a s a re su lt of this incident, on September 13, 2005, D uval proposed Plaintiff be suspended f or five da y s. SeeDe f. ’s Stmt . ¶

11 ; see also Compl. ¶ 10; EEO Compl . at p. 5. Shortly there afte r, on September 15, 2005, Plaintiff became ill at work and ha d to seek immediate medica l attention. Compl . ¶ 11. Plaintiff’s doctor a dvised her that her blood pre ssure
was at a dang erously

high le vel and that she could not return to wor k g iven her

medical condition. Id. ; E EO Com pl. at p. 7. Pla int if

f p ro vid e d h e r d oc tor ’s state me nt t o D uv a l. C omp l. ¶ 11; EEO Compl. at p. 7. Plaintiff did not return to work a fter Septe mber 15, 2005, a nd used 240 hours of a

nnual leave befor e beingplace d on leave without pay . Compl. ¶ 11.7

On April 14, 2006, af

ter be ing on le ave f

or appr ox imately

seven months, Crevonis issued a letter to Plainti ff that: (1) terminated he r leave without pay status effe ctive Apr il 16, 2006; (2) suspended he r fr om pay

and duty status for five cale ndar da y s eff ective A pril 17, 2006 (base d on the pre vious proposed five- day suspension); and (3) direc ted her to report to wor

k on April 24, 2006, afte r the c onclusion of the five -day suspension, indicating that if she fa iled to do so, she would be conside red a

bsent without leave ( “AWOL ”) a nd additional action may

be take n, including r emoval fr om Fede ral ser vice. Compl. ¶ 12; Def

.’s MSJ , Ex . B ( Plaintiff’s Amendment to her

EEO Complaint) (her einaf ter, “ EEO Amendme nt”). Plaintiff wa s still under her doc tor’s ca

re at that time and had not bee n rele ased to re turn to work. Compl. ¶ 12; EEO Am e nd . D e sp ite Pla int if

f’ s r e pe ate d e ff

or ts t o c onta c t Cr e vo nis by

e ma il, fax, and

te le ph on e to inform him that she had not y et bee n rele ased by her doc tor and to find out what ty pe of me dical documentation wa s neede d, he re fused to communicate with Plaintiff. Compl . ¶ 12; EEO Amend.; EEO Af

f. at pp. 7-8. A s a conse quence , Plaintiff “was f orce d to resig n.” EEO A ff. at p. 7; se e als o Compl. ¶ 13. As Pl aintiff explains, she “fe lt that the only thing that [she] could do
was re sign . . . be cause if [C revonis] totally ignor ed [her] doctor and [] put [her] on AW OL , then [she] assume[d] he would start a ction to fire [her].” EEO A ff. at p. 8. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, she was subjec ted to such treatment beca use she is Afr ican Am e ri c an. EE O C omp l. at p. 6. In p art ic ula r, Pla int if f a sse rt s th at ot

he r e mpl oye e s, and

in particula r, Cauca sian employ ees, w ere absent fr om work for extended periods of time without havingaction take n ag ainst them by manag ement. EEO A ff. at p. 9. I n addition, Plainti ff contends that other

employ ees did not have their doctor’ s advice ignor ed. Id. Pla int if f a lso
asser ts that during the rele vant per iod of time, Duval provided pr efe rential tre atment to a8

Ca uc a sia n c o- wo rk e r, wh ile tr e atin gPla int if f a nd oth e r A fr ic an A me ri c an e mpl oye e s in a ho sti le
mann e r. Com

pl. ¶ 1 5; se e als o EEO Compl. at pp. 5-6. B. Procedural Bac kground Plaintiff initi ally

contac ted an EEO counselor on Septe mber 14, 2005, a nd filed a f

ormal complaint on Fe bruar

y 1, 2006, which wa s subsequently amende d on May

10, 2006. SeeCom

pl. ¶ 1 4; see also EEO Compl. at pp. 1, 2; EEO Amend. B y letter dated April 14, 2006, the EEO
acc epted f

or investig ation Plaintiff’s alleg ations that she was discr iminated ag ainst beca use of
rac e and c olor based on ma nag ement’s de cision on or ar ound September 7, 2005 to de ny her reque st for adva

nced sic k leave . Def

.’s Stmt. ¶ 15. The EEO subseque ntly amende d the
acc epted issues to include discr imination because of ra ce a nd color ba sed on Plaintiff’s alleg ations that: she had bee n issued a five -day suspension eff

ective A pril 17, 2006; she was
re fu se d p e rm iss ion

to c on tin ue on le ave wi tho ut p ay , s uc h th at sh e wo uld be c ha rg e d w ith AWOLif she fa iled to return to wor k on April 24, 2006; and she ha d been f orce d to resig n from her position on April 26, 2006. Id. ¶ 16. As more than 180 da

y s passed without final ac tion by the Depa rtment, Plaintiff filed the above- captioned c ivil action on September 15, 2008. SeeCompl. Alt houg h Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to contain only one count f

or an unspe cified “ Violation of Title VI Iof the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. S ection 2000e- 2(a) ,” seeCom pl. ¶¶ 16 -1 9, the pa

rt ie s a ll ag ree that Plaintiff has in fac t asserte d three distinct claims in thi s civil action: namely , claims for dis pa rate tr e atme nt a

nd a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt b a se d u

po n r a c e and

c olo r a s w e ll a s a

c la im for r eprisal ba sed on protec ted EEO a ctivity
. See De f. ’s . M SJ at 1 ; Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 1; se e als o Com pl. ¶ 1 9 ( a lle g ingthat “ De fe nd ant k no wi ng ly a nd int e nti on a lly

su bje c te d M s. L ang le y

to9

disparate treatment, and a hostile work e nvironment, and e ng ag ed in unlawf ul discrimination based on r ace and color , and re prisal”) . Eac h of these c laims in turn appear s to be based upon the same fa ctual alleg ations outlined above. Spec ifically , as set for th in Pl aintiff’s Complaint, she
a sse rt s th at th e fo llo wi ngsame e ve nts su pp or t e a c h o f h e r c la ims fo r d isp arate tr e atme nt, ho sti le
wo rk e nv ir onme nt a

nd re pr isa l: (1) on Septembe r 7, 2005, the Ag ency denied her request for a dvance d sick leave ; (2) in Sept ember 2005, Duval propose d to suspend Ms. L ang ley for f ive day s, and on Ap ri l 14 , 2 00 6, Ms. L ang le y wa s su sp e nd e d f

or fi ve da y s; ( 3) on Ap ri l 14 , 2 00 6, Ms. L ang ley was infor med that she [ sic ] her absenc es would be considere d discipline and char g ed as a

bsent without leave, and if she failed to return to work on April 24, 2006, she could be terminated; and (4) the Agenc y constructively discharg ed Ms. L ang ley on April 26, 2006. Compl. ¶ 19. The Sec reta

ry subsequently

filed the now- pendingMotion to Dism iss or in the Alternative for Summary J udg ment. SeeDe f. ’s MSJ, D oc ke t N o. [11]. Pla int if f f ile d a tim e ly Opposition, seePl.’s Opp’n, Docke t No. [14] , and the Sec reta ry has since f

iled a Reply , see Def .’s Reply , Docke t No. [15] . The pa rties’ brie fingis now complete, a nd the Secr etar

y ’s motion for partial summary judgme nt is therefor e ripe for r eview a nd resolution by

the Court. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Court construe s the Secre tary ’s motion as a motion for summary judgme nt. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a party is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the plea dings, the discovery and disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any
mate ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (c ); see also Tao v. Free h , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the moving pa

rty bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the10

ba sis fo r [i ts] mo tio n, and ide nti fy ingtho se po rt ion s o f t

he ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to int e rr og ator ie s, and

a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s w hic h [it ] be lie ve [s] demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 31 7, 32 3 ( 19 86 ). In r e sp on se , th e no n- mov ingpa rt y mus t “ g o b e y on d th e ple a din g s a nd by [its] own af fidavits, or depositions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, ‘desig nate’ specific fac ts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 324 (interna l citations omitted). In this case, a s the Secre tary has assumed the truth of Plaintiff’s alleg ations for purposes of the pendingmotion and has not introduced a ny contra dictory

or re buttal evidence , there are no fac tual disputes. III . D ISC USS ION Th e Se c re tary

a dv anc e s tw o p ri nc ipa l argume nts a s to why summa ry jud g me nt i s appropr iate with re spect to Plaintiff’s hostile work e nvironment claim, name ly , that: (1) Plaintiff did not raise her

hostile work environme nt claim duringthe administrative EEO pr ocee dings a nd there fore has fa iled to exhaust her administrative re medies; and (2) the alleg ed conduc t asserte d in support of her hostile wor k environment c laim, even if true , is neither suff iciently sever e or pe rv a siv e , a

nd Pla int if f’ s c la im the re fo re fa ils on the me ri ts a s w e ll. Th e Court sh a ll a dd re ss
eac h argument in turn. A. Plaintif

f has Exhausted her Adm inistrat ive Re medies It i s w e l l e s t a

b l i s h e d th atani n d i v i d

u a l c o mp l a i n i n go f

a l l e g e d v i o l at i o n s o f

T i t l e V II must first ex haust his or her a dminist rative r emedies be fore proce edingto fede ral district cour t. See Park v. H

oward Univ. , 71 F.3d 904, 906- 07 (D.C. Cir. 1995). F urthermor e, any civil action that follows an administrative c omplaint of discrimination is “limi ted in scope to c laims that are11

‘like or r easona

bly related to the alleg ations of the [administrative] charg e and growingout of such alleg ations.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Cheek v. W estern &Southern Life Ins. Co. , 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7 th C ir . 1 99 4) ); see also Na’im v. R ice , 5 77 F . Su pp . 2 d 3 61 , 3 69 -7 0, 37 2 ( D. D. C. 2 00 8) . In th is
c a se , th e Se c re tary

argue s th at Pla int if

f’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im mus t f a il b e c a us e Pla int if f d id n ot a sse rt

a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im i n h e r a dmi nis tr ativ e c omp la int no r d id Plaintiff raise a

ny such alleg ations duringthe cour se of the E EO investig ation. Def .’s MSJ at 5- 6. The Court does not agree . To the contra

ry , it is apparent that Plaintiff did in fac t sufficiently asser t a hostile work environment c laim in her EEO Complaint. First, in filing her f ormal complaint, Plaintiff indicated that she had bee n discriminated ag ainst beca use of r ace and color . EEO Compl. at p. 2. Se c on d, Pla int if

f s pe c if ic a lly c omp la ine d o f b e ing“ su bje c te d to [] co ns tant h ara ssm e nt b y Ms. Duval, which c reated both a hostile and stre ssful work envir onment.” Id. at p. 6; se e als o EEO Aff. at p. 7 (“This bec ame a very hostile workingenvironment. . . .” ). The D .C. Circuit has pr e vio us ly

he ld t hat si mil ar l angua g e in a

n a dmi nis tr ativ e c omp la int su ff ic ie ntl y ra ise d a ho sti le workingenvironment c laim for purpose s of administrative exhaustion. See Ste ele v . Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 694 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (re jectingargument that plaintiff had not asse rted a hostile work
e nv ir onme nt c la im i n h e r c omp la int be c a us e the “ c omp la int

a lle g e s ‘ dis c ri min atio n, ’ whic h in principle include s a hostile work e nvironment theory” and spe cifica lly included a r equest for “re assig nment ‘to a less hostile workingenvironment’” ). Fur thermore , Plaintiff complained in her EEO Complaint of the ver y same c onduct that she now a sserts forms the ba sis of her hostile work e nvironment claim in this lawsuit. See generally EEO Complaint. I n addition, Plainti ff’ s EEO Complaint includes further detailed12

alleg ations supporting he r hostile work e nvironment claim, including , for e x ample, that Duva l y elled at Plaintiff and ma de fa lse ac cusations about her behavior ; that Plainti ff “ was unde r constant har assment from Ms. Duva l;” and that Duva l “constantly hara ss[ ed] [ Plaintiff] minuteby -minute” a

nd made “ unrea sonable de mands, hurlingacc usations and informing[her] of new str ing e nt w or

k s c he du le s th at sh e pla

nn e d to imp os e on ly

on [Pla int if f]. ” Ac c or din g ly , e ve n if the Court we re to f ind , c on tr ary

to i ts c on c lus ion

a bo ve , th at Pla int if

f h a d n ot s pe c if

ic a lly
art ic ulate d a

ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im i n h e r E EO Com pla int , th e Court

wo uld nonetheless c onclude on this basis that Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim is “‘like or
rea sonably

related to the alleg ations’” in her EEO Complaint. Se e Na’ im , 577 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (“B eca use the plaintiff ne ed not spec ifically alleg e a hostile wor

k environment c laim, and beca use she supports he r hostile work e nvironment claim with fac tual alleg ations also contained in her . . . for

mal EEO complaint, the c ourt conc ludes that she has a dequate ly exhausted administrative re medies for the claim.”) . The Sec reta ry ’s ar g uments to the contrar y are without merit. In particula

r, the Sec reta

ry ’s re liance on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Pa rk is mispl ace d,
a s th e a lle g atio ns in t

he EE O c ha

rg e and the c ivi l c omp la int

in t hat c a se dif

fe re d s ig nif

ic antl y from the a lleg ations in the case at hand. Pa rk, 71 F.3d a t 907-08 (findingplaintiff had not administratively

exhausted hostile work environment c laim where the plaintiff’s c harg e bef ore the EEO did not include a ny ref ere nce to a

“hostile work e nvironment” a nd lacke d “any

fac tual
a lle g atio ns su

pp or tin gsu c h a

c la im” ); cf. Perry

v. Clinton , __ F. Supp. 2d __, Civ. Act. No. 08- 12 16 , 2 00 9 WL

47 99 29 0, *6 (D .D .C. De c . 1 0, 20 09 ) ( ob se rv ingthat th e “ [c]a se s in wh ic h c la ims have be en dee med unre lated involve a muc h g reater distinction betwee n the alleg ations in the EEO complaint and those raised in f eder al cour

t”) (c ompiling ca ses). The Secre tary ’s motion for13

pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt i s th e re fo re DENI ED to t he e xtent sh e c on te nd s th at Pla int if f f a ile d to
a dmi nis tr ativ e ly

e xha us t he r h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im. B. TheSe c re tar

yHa s No t Sh own tha t P lai nti ff’ s H os tile W or k En v iro nm e nt C

lai m Fa ils on theMe rit

s Th e Se c re tary

a lso a sse rt s th at summa

ry jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr iate wi th r e sp e c t to Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim beca use the c onduct alleg ed, eve n if true, is neither sufficie ntly

sever e or pe rvasive. “ To establish hostile work environme nt claims under Title VI I , . . . plaintiffs ‘must show hara ssing be havior ‘suf ficiently sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the conditions of [t heir] employ ment.’” Ste e le , 5 3 5 F. 3 d

at6 9 4 (qu o t i n g Pennsylv ania State Police
v . S ud e rs , 5 42 U. S. 1 29 , 1 33 (2 00 4) ). In th is c a se , th e Se c re tary ur g e s th at “ the re is a

c omp le te and utter la ck of f

acts that c ould constitute a hostile work environme nt.” Def .’s MSJ at 7. That is, the Secre tary

argues that Plaintiff’s cla ims, even if “taken as true ,” do not “r ise to the leg al require ment that the har assment be se vere and per vasive.” Id. Unfortunately

for the Sec reta

ry , her a rgument is based upon a mischa rac terization of Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim. As outlined above a nd as re peate d by

Plaintiff in her op po sit ion

br ie fi ng , Pl a int if

f’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im i s b a se d n ot o nly up on the e ve nts that occur red in Septembe r of 2005 ( i.e., alleg ations that her r equest for leave was de nied, and that Duval y elled at he r, attempted to slam the door in her fa ce, ma de fa lse ac cusations about her
and ult imate ly

pr op os e d s us pe nd ingPla int if f f or fi ve da y s) , b ut o n th e e ve nts that oc c ur re d in Ap ri l of 20 06 a s w e ll ( i.e. , that her le ave w ithout pay status was terminate d; that she was suspended f

or five da y s and told to report to work or she would be c onsidered a bsent without leave ; that her super

visors ref used her repe ated e ffor

ts to contact them to discuss her doc tor’s14

repor t; and that Plaintiff was construc tively discharg ed as a

result). In other wor ds, fairly rea d, Pla int if f’ s Co mpl a int

a sse rt s th at th e a lle g e d Se pte mbe r 2 00 5 a nd Ap ri l 20 06 e ve nts fo rm

pa rt s of a whole and that he r hostile work e nvironment claim is based upon the se cumulative inc idents. The Sec reta

ry , howeve r, in arguing that Plainti ff’ s claim for a hostile work environme nt must fail, has cha

rac terized the cla im as based only on the eve nts that occurr ed in September of 20 05 and ha s e nti re ly

ig no re d th e Ap ri l 20 06 inc ide nts that a lso fo rm pa rt of Pla int if f’ s h os til e work e nvironment claim. F or example, in her ope ning me morandum, the Sec reta ry argues that Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim “esse ntially levels only

one alleg ation that Ms. Duval
ra ise d h e r v oic e at [Pla int if f], a sk e d [Pla int if

f] t o le ave he r o ff

ic e , a nd a lle g e dly atte mpt e d to slam a door in Plaintiff’s fa ce.” Def .’s MSJ at 7. Althoug h the Secr etar y slightly expands her
c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of Pla int if f’ s c la im i n h e r r e ply

br ie fi ng— d e sc ri bin gthe c la im a s “ e sse nti a lly alleg [i ng ] t hat Ms. Duval y elled at he r, attempted to slam a door in her fa ce, pr oposed a f

ive-da y suspension for insubordination, and that her sec ond level super visor did not return her

calls” — the Secr etar

y at no point addre sses the April 2006 alleg ations surroundingPlaintiff’s alleg ed constructive disc harg e fr om work. SeeDef .’s Reply at 7. The Sec reta

ry ’s fa ilure to do so is fatal to her pe nding motion.

“ In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a n a c tio na ble ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im e xists , [c ourt s] look to ‘ all th e circ um stances ,’ inc lud ing‘t he fr e qu e nc y

of the dis c ri min ator

y c on du c t; i ts
sever ity ; whether

it is phy sically

threateningor humiliating, or a mere offe nsive utteranc e; and whether it unreasona

bly interfe res with an e mploy ee’ s work per formanc e.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. M

organ , 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (e mphasis added) . In this case, Plaintiff alleg es a hostile wor

k environment ba sed on the a lleg ed eve nts occurr ing in both September15

2005 and Apr il 2006. Although Plaintiff was a bsent from wor

k at all times after

September 2005, the D.C. Circuit has re jected “ a per se rule a g ainst consideringincidents alleg ed to have
occur red while an employ ee w as phy sically absent fr om the workplac e.” Gree r v. Paulson , 505 F.3d 1306, 1314 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). In so holding, the D .C. Circuit reasone d that, for e x ample,

“ [w]he n a n e mpl oye e c la ims that he r ‘ ina bil ity to r e tur n to wo rk re su lt f ro m th e [em

plo y e r’ s] ill tr e atme nt o f h e r, ’ .
. . c omm un ic atio ns wh ile on

le ave may

fo rm an e sse nti a l pa

rt of a ho sti le environment c laim.” Id. (qu o t i n g Jense n v. He nderson , 315 F.3d 854, 861- 62 (8th Cir. 2002)). A fa ir rea ding of

Plaintiff’s Complaint i n this case sug g ests she has a lleg ed just that — that the
e ve nts in A

pr il 2 00 6 w e re a

c on tin uatio n o f t

he same ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt s he wa s a lle g e dly subjected to in September 2005. Acc ording ly , in evaluatingthe merits of Plaintiff’s c laim, the Court must consider “a ll the circumstanc es” a lleg ed, includingthose eve nts occurr ing a fter Plaintiff took leave f

rom the De partment in September of 2005. As the Sec reta

ry has not addre ssed those alleg ations, focusinginstead only on the portion of eve nts that occurr ed bef ore Plaintiff’s absenc e fr om work, the Sec reta ry has not demonstrate d that she is entitled to summary judgme nt with respec t to Pl aintiff’s hostile work e nvironment claim. The Court empha siz es that in so holding, it expresses no view a s to the merits of Pla int if f’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im. Th e Se c re tary ha s f a ile d to c omp re he ns ive ly

a dd re ss Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim, and it is not for the Court to advanc e ar g uments on be ha lf of the pa rt ie s. Ac c or din g ly , whe the r P la int if f i s u lti mate ly

a ble to s uc c e e d o n h e r c la im i s a question for

another day . I t is sufficient for the prese nt purposes to note only that the Secr etar

y has not demonstrate d that Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim, as alleg ed in her Complaint, m ust fail. The Sec reta ry ’s motion for par

tial summary

judgme nt is therefor e16

DENI ED to the extent she contends that she is e ntitled to judgment as a matter of la

w on Pla int if f’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im.

IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, the Court DENI ES the Secre tary ’s [11] partial Motion for Summary Judg me nt. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e Se c re tary ’s mot ion is D EN I ED AS M OO T w ithre sp e c t to Plaintiff’s repr isal claim, which Plaintiff has voluntar ily withdrawn, a

nd is DENI ED with respe ct to Plainti ff’ s hostile work environment c laim, as Plaintiff has exhausted her a dminist rative
reme dies and the Sec reta

ry has not shown that Plaintiff’s claim must fail on the mer its. An appropr iate Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: J anuar

y 6, 2010
/s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge