IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Frank Thorne, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

by and through The Pennsylvania :

State Police, : No. 233 M.D. 2016

Respondent : Submitted: December 16, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: March 20, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by and through The Pennsylvania

State Police (PSP) filed a preliminary objection1in the nature of a demurrer to Frank 

Thorne’s (Thorne) Petition for Review and Application for Writ of Mandamus 

(Petition) filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction. The sole issue before the Court is 

whether Thorne’s Petition states a claim upon which relief may be granted. After 

review, PSP’s preliminary objection is overruled.

On October 27, 2004, Thorne was sentenced to probation in Ohio for 

unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.

2

That sentence included a ten-year registration 

 

1

The PSP labeled its filing as “preliminary objections;” however, there is only one objection 

described therein.

2

Thorne’s reference to unlawful “contact” with a minor in his Petition, Petition at 1, is in 

error. See Section 2907.04 of the Ohio Crimes Code, R.C. § 2907.04 (entitled “[u]nlawful sexual 

conduct with a minor”).
2

pursuant to Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law.3Thorne complied with all registration 

requirements, and obtained lawful permission to relocate to Pennsylvania in 2005.

Pennsylvania’s Act commonly known as Megan’s Law III4 was enacted on 

November 24, 2004, and was in effect at the time that Thorne relocated. In 

accordance with Megan’s Law III, Thorne began registering as a sex offender in 

Pennsylvania on February 8, 2005.

The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)

5 was 

enacted on December 20, 2011, and became effective a year later on December 20, 

2012. Section 9799.13 of SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13, requires individuals 

convicted of sexual offenses to register with PSP. Section 9799.14 of SORNA, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.14, classifies sexual offenses in a three-tiered system. Section 

9799.15(a) of SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a), specifies the length of time 

registration is required based upon whether the offense is classified as Tier I (15 

years), Tier II (25 years) or Tier III (lifetime). Section 9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA

further provides that “[a]n individual subject to registration under [S]ection 

9799.13(7.1) [of SORNA] shall register for the period of time equal to the time for 

which the individual was required to register in another jurisdiction . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.15(a)(7).

In December 2012, PSP notified Thorne that he is a Tier III offender

subject to lifetime registration under SORNA. On April 2, 2016, Thorne filed his 

Petition alleging that PSP misapplied SORNA in his case because Section 

 

3 Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law in effect at the time Thorne was sentenced was enacted in 

1996, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, and was significantly amended in 2003 

by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6558.

4 Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 1243 formerly, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9.

5

Sections 9799.10-9799.41 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. Courts 

also refer to SORNA as the Adam Walsh Act or Megan’s Law IV. Megan’s Law III expired on 

December 20, 2012, pursuant to Section 9799.41 of SORNA.
3

9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA compelled his removal from the Megan’s Law registry on 

October 27, 2014. On June 2, 2016, PSP filed its preliminary objection asserting that 

Thorne’s reliance on Section 9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA is misplaced.

This Court’s review of preliminary objections is limited to the pleadings. 

Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 

909 A.2d 413 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), aff’d, 924 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 2007). 

[This Court is] required to accept as true the well-pled 

averments set forth in the . . . complaint, and all inferences 

reasonably deducible therefrom. Moreover, the [C]ourt 

need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted 

inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or 

expressions of opinion. In order to sustain preliminary 

objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will 

not permit recovery, and, where any doubt exists as to 

whether the preliminary objections should be sustained, the 

doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the 

preliminary objections.

Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).

PSP first argues that Section 9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA does not apply to 

Thorne’s case because he was not required to register under Ohio’s version of 

Megan’s Law when SORNA was enacted. We agree. 

Section 9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA provides: “An individual subject to 

registration under [S]ection 9799.13(7.1) [of SORNA] shall register for the period of 

time equal to the time for which the individual was required to register in another 

jurisdiction or foreign country.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(7). Section 9799.13(7.1) of 

SORNA provides: 

An individual who, on or after the effective date of this 

section, is required to register in a sexual offender 

registry in another jurisdiction or foreign country based 

upon a conviction of an offense set forth in [S]ection 

9799.14(b)(23) [of SORNA] (relating to sexual offenses 

and tier system) and:
4

(i) has a residence in this Commonwealth or is a transient;

(ii) is employed within this Commonwealth; or

(iii) is a student within this Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(7.1) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has explained:

Our interpretation [of a statute] is guided by the polestar 

principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act [of 

1972 ],

[6]

. . . which has as its paramount tenet that ‘[t]he 

object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to 

ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General 

Assembly.’ 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 1921(a).

As we have often recognized, ‘[t]he General Assembly’s 

intent is best expressed through the plain language of the 

statute.’ Commonwealth v. Brown, . . . 981 A.2d 893, 897 

([Pa.] 2009); Commonwealth v. McCoy, . . . 962 A.2d 1160, 

1166 ([Pa.] 2009). Therefore, when the terms of a statute 

are clear and unambiguous, they will be given effect 

consistent with their plain and common meaning. This 

means ascribing to the particular words and phrases the 

definitions which they have acquired through their common 

and approved usage. It is only in instances where the words 

of a statute are not explicit, or they are ambiguous, is there 

need to resort to consideration of the factors in aid of 

construction enumerated in [Section 1921(c) of the 

Statutory Construction Act,] 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 1921(c). McCoy,

. . . 962 A.2d at 1166; Commonwealth v. Fithian, . . . 961 

A.2d 66, 74 ([Pa.] 2008); see also 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 1921(b)

(‘When the words of a statute are clear and free from all 

ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the 

pretext of pursuing its spirit.’).

Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, the 

statute is “clear and unambiguous.” Id. 

Upon moving to Pennsylvania, Thorne was required to register in 

Pennsylvania. Thus, as of February 8, 2005, when he began registering in

Pennsylvania, he was no longer “required to register in a sexual offender registry in 

 

6

1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
5

[Ohio] another jurisdiction[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(7.1). Accordingly, Section 

9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA does not apply to Thorne on this basis.

7

PSP next argues that Section 9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA does not apply to 

Thorne because his offense is classified as a Tier III offense, not a Tier I offense.8 

Section 9799.13(7.1) of SORNA expressly applies to individuals 

convicted “of an offense set forth in [S]ection 9799.14(b)(23) [of SORNA.]” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(7.1). Section 9799.14(b)(23) of SORNA states: “A conviction for 

a sexual offense in another jurisdiction or foreign country that is not set forth in this 

section, but nevertheless requires registration under a sexual offender statute in the 

jurisdiction or foreign country.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(b)(23) (emphasis added). 

 

 

7

Thorne relies on Jackson v. Commonwealth, 143 A.3d 468 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), to support 

his position. In Jackson, the petitioner, like Thorne, had a previous conviction in another 

jurisdiction requiring a 10-year registration when he moved to Pennsylvania. Unlike Thorne, the 

petitioner had already completed his 10-year registration in other jurisdictions before SORNA’s 

enactment. The Jackson Court held that 

[b]ecause [the petitioner] was convicted of an offense similar to an 

enumerated Pennsylvania Megan’s Law predicate offense, he was 

required to register as a sex offender with the PSP for ten years. If 

[the petitioner] is not given credit for the time he registered out of 

state, his ten-year period of required registration under Megan’s Law 

II[, Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 74, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791–

9799.7] would not have expired until 2014. SORNA states that 

individuals ‘who had not fulfilled [their] period of registration as of 

December 20, 2012’ were subject to its provisions, including the 

lifetime registration requirement. See [S]ection 9799.13(3)(i) of 

SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3)(i). [The petitioner] would fall 

under this provision of SORNA because he had not completed his 

ten-year period of registration prior to December 20, 2012, unless

he was unconstitutionally denied credit for the years he registered in 

other states.

Jackson, 143 A.3d at 473-74 (bold emphasis added). Because Thorne had not completed his 10-

year registration in any state before SORNA’s enactment, Jackson is inapposite.

8

 Thorne argues that labeling him as a Tier III offender without notice is a due process 

violation. However, no such allegation appears in his Petition. Thus, this argument is not before 

the Court.
6

Thorne was convicted of violating Section 2907.04 of the Ohio Crimes Code, 

entitled: “Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.” R.C. § 2907. Section 2907.04(A)

of the Ohio Crimes Code provides: “No person who is eighteen years of age or older 

shall engage in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the offender, 

when the offender knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less 

than sixteen years of age, or the offender is reckless in that regard.”

9

 R.C. § 2907.04

(emphasis added). 

The PSP does not state which Tier III offense it contends Thorne was 

convicted therefor, nor does it develop its statement: “[Thorne’s] offense in Ohio was 

an equivalent offense under Pennsylvania’s law[.]” PSP Br. at 8 n.2. Section 

9799.14 of SORNA provides in relevant part:

(a) Tier system established.--Sexual offenses shall be 

classified in a three-tiered system composed of Tier I sexual 

offenses, Tier II sexual offenses and Tier III sexual 

offenses.

(b) Tier I sexual offenses.--The following offenses shall be 

classified as Tier I sexual offenses:

. . . . 

(23) A conviction for a sexual offense in another 

jurisdiction or foreign country that is not set forth in 

 

 

9

Thorne acknowledges that Tier II sexual offenses include Section 6318 of the Crimes 

Code, “18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with minor).” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(c)(5). 

Section 6318 of the Crimes Code states, in relevant part:

A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a 

minor, . . . for the purpose of engaging in an activity prohibited under 

any of the following, and either the person initiating the contact or the 

person being contacted is within this Commonwealth:

(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual 

offenses).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (emphasis added). However, Thorne maintains that because Section 6318 of the 

Crimes Code does not include the element of recklessness, it is not the same offense. 

Notwithstanding, only Tier III offenses require lifetime registration.
7

this section, but nevertheless requires registration under 

a sexual offender statute in the jurisdiction or foreign 

country.

(c) Tier II sexual offenses.--The following offenses shall 

be classified as Tier II sexual offenses:

. . . . 

(5) 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with 

minor).

. . . . 

(d) Tier III sexual offenses.--The following offenses shall 

be classified as Tier III sexual offenses:

(1) 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901(a.1) (relating to kidnapping).

(2) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 (relating to rape).

(3) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b) (relating to statutory sexual 

assault).

(4) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse).

(5) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault).

(6) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2(a.1) [(relating to institutional sexual 

assault of a minor)].

(7) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent 

assault).

(8) 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7) [(relating to indecent contact 

with a complainant less than 13 years of age)].

(9) 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302(b) (relating to incest).

(10) 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (relating to aggravated sexual abuse).

(11) 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (relating to sexual abuse).

(12) 18 U.S.C. § 2244 where the victim is under 13 years of 

age.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14 (text emphasis added). The most similar offense to Thorne’s 

crime enumerated under Tier III appears to be Section 3126 of the Crimes Code10

 

10 Section 9799.14(d)(8) of SORNA.
8

entitled: “Indecent assault” as it relates to “indecent contact with a person less than

13 years of age.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (emphasis added). However, because Thorne’s 

conviction was for a sexual offense that specifically refers to a minor as one who is 

“thirteen years of age or older[,]” R.C. § 2907.04 (emphasis added), we cannot state 

with certainty that Thorne’s conviction was for a Tier III offense. This conclusion is 

especially true here where there is a Tier II offense which appears to be similar to the 

offense of which Thorne was convicted. See supra note 9.

Because Thorne’s conviction may not be classified as a Tier III offense,

Section 9799.15(a)(7) of SORNA may apply to Thorne. Accordingly, accepting 

Thorne’s allegations as true, and resolving all doubt in his favor, as we must, it does 

not “appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery[.]” Pa. State Lodge, 

Fraternal Order of Police, 909 A.2d at 415-16 (emphasis added). 

Based on the foregoing, PSP’s preliminary objection to Thorne’s 

Petition is overruled.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Frank Thorne, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

by and through The Pennsylvania :

State Police, : No. 233 M.D. 2016

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2017, the preliminary objection 

filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by and through The Pennsylvania State 

Police (PSP) in the nature of a demurrer to Frank Thorne’s Petition for Review and 

Application for Writ of Mandamus (Petition) is overruled. PSP is ordered to file its 

answer to the Petition within 30 days of the date of this order.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge