Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 376

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION I 

No. CV-16-1127

TARA LYNN WALLACE

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 

SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD

APPELLEES 

Opinion Delivered: June 7, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

EIGHTH DIVISION 

[NO. 60JV-15-1238] 

HONORABLE WILEY A. 

BRANTON, JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant Tara Wallace appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court order 

terminating her parental rights to her minor child, D.W. She argues that the State failed to 

present sufficient evidence supporting the circuit court’s order terminating her parental 

rights.1

 We affirm. 

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised emergency custody

over then two-month-old D.W. on September 22, 2015, upon notice of domestic 

violence that occurred in the home. On September 19, 2015, police officers responded to 

a call, where they discovered that Wallace had broken her apartment window to get 

someone’s attention because D.W.’s father had slapped her while she was holding D.W. 

The officers noted numerous drugs and paraphernalia around the apartment and 

 1

D.W.’s father’s parental rights were also terminated as part of the order, but he did not 

appeal. 
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2 

confiscated needles and spoons with drug residue. Wallace stated that she had a history 

with heroin, but she claimed that she was not using drugs at that time. A drug test 

revealed otherwise when she tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, 

benzodiazepine, and THC. D.W. was removed from Wallace’s custody due to her 

inability to supervise, protect, and care for D.W. given Wallace’s substance abuse.

On November 17, 2015, D.W. was adjudicated dependent-neglected based on the 

finding that D.W.’s parents subjected him to neglect and parental unfitness. The circuit 

court also found that the child had been subjected to “aggravated circumstances” as 

defined in the Arkansas Juvenile Code because it was unlikely that services to the family 

would result in successful reunification within a reasonable period of time. 

Seven months into the case, DHS filed its petition to terminate parental rights on 

April 22, 2016, and the goal of the case was changed to adoption. In June 2016, Wallace 

hired private counsel who sought a continuance of the termination hearing. As a result,

the circuit court converted that hearing to a second permanency-planning hearing and 

took testimony. The circuit court then set the case for a termination hearing, and DHS 

filed an amended petition for termination of parental rights. The petition alleged three 

statutory grounds against Wallace—twelve months out of the home of the custodial 

parent, subsequent factors, and aggravated circumstances—and that the termination was in 

D.W.’s best interest. The circuit court held a termination hearing on September 30, 2016. 
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3 

At the hearing, Wallace’s continued drug-abuse and her mental-health issues2 were 

the primary focus. Wallace testified that she had not completed inpatient substance-abuse 

treatment or followed the recommendation in the psychological evaluation. She admitted 

that she had not maintained a stable home as she had lived in five different locations over 

the course of the case. She confessed that the last time she used methamphetamine and 

marijuana was as recently as June 2, 2016. She passed a drug test five days later, but 

admitted it was because she had drunk a large amount of green tea to overcome the drug 

test. She explained that she had attempted rehab three times for substance abuse but had 

not yet completed a program. Wallace testified that, at the time of the hearing, she was 

stable on her medications. She stated that she suffers from memory loss due to a previous 

drug overdose. She recently moved to Rison, Arkansas, to be closer to her nephew.

Dr. George DeRoeck, clinical psychologist, testified as an expert witness. He had 

performed a psychological evaluation on Wallace. At the time of the evaluation, Wallace

indicated to Dr. DeRoeck that she was not stable in her moods and that “they were out of 

control;” she also admitted to drug use. Dr. DeRoeck identified Wallace as having a 

“dual-diagnosis issue” composed of bipolar disorder and substance abuse. He explained 

that some drug-treatment programs insist that the patient not be on medication when they 

are in treatment; he said “If she was on medication and stable and still failed the substanceabuse treatment, that would indicate that we’re looking at possibly that she may not be 

able to independently parent at all.” He said an individual needs to be on a therapeutic 

dose of the medication that he or she can tolerate. However, he had not evaluated her 

 2

Wallace was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 

psychosis. 
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4 

since January 2016, so he was unaware if she was stable on her medications at the time. 

Arkansas Cares, the first treatment facility Wallace attended, is a dual-diagnosis facility, but 

she was asked to leave, and Dr. DeRoeck was not sure if Wallace had been provided the 

dual-purpose treatment. He also explained drug use could render her medications 

ineffective. According to his testimony, her mental illness is a chronic condition that will 

be with her for the rest of her life. He explained that, given that she is on disability for her 

mental diagnosis, she would likely have difficulty responding effectively to any future 

treatment.

Harrison Williams, Wallace’s social worker, discussed conducting three months of

therapy with her. He explained that he thought Wallace had the ability to raise her child, 

but she had to demonstrate that she was done with drugs and alcohol, which she had failed 

to do. He illustrated this point when he testified that she was supposed to graduate from 

Recovery Centers of Arkansas, a drug-rehab facility, but relapsed the night before her 

graduation from the program.

Willie Baker, Wallace’s assigned caseworker, further testified to the three failed 

attempts at drug treatment. He explained that as recently as August 2016, Wallace could 

not pass a drug test, and that while drug tests go back ninety days and could have 

overlapped with the previous drug test, the August test indicated a new drug—cocaine—

that did not show up on the previous test. Wallace never got a sponsor even though she 

was asked to do so, and he could not foresee any services that could have been offered that 

had not been offered that might have reunited the child with her. He testified that an
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5 

intensive parenting class would not help her because she continued to use drugs and to be 

unstable. 

The circuit court terminated Wallace’s parental rights, finding that doing so was in 

D.W.’s best interest. In its written order, the court specifically found that 

[the mother] has a long history of mental health issues which will be with her for 

the rest of her life. The mother has not rid herself of her drug problem. The court 

continues to find that the mother is not credible and that she intentionally 

misrepresents material facts concerning her situation. The mother admitted that she 

drank green tea in order to avoid having a positive drug screen. The mother has 

made no material progress in this case and remains an unfit to [sic] parent this child. 

. . . Giving the [mother] 90 more days would not make a significance [sic] 

difference, nor would giving [her] six months. The mother lacks credibility. The 

court accepts that perhaps she has some memory problems, but allowing for 

memory problems, the mother still is not credible.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Lively v. Ark. Dep’t of 

Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 131, at 4–5, 456 S.W.3d 383, 386. It is DHS’s burden to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is in a child’s best interest to terminate 

parental rights as well as the existence of at least one statutory ground for termination. Id. 

On appeal, the inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that the disputed fact was 

proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly 

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, on the 

entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 

Id. We give a high degree of deference to the circuit court, as it is in a far superior 

position to observe the parties before it and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

The termination-of-parental-rights analysis is twofold; it requires the circuit court 

to find that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. The 

first step requires proof of one or more of the nine enumerated statutory grounds for 
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6 

termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Repl. 2015). The best-interest 

determination must consider the likelihood that the children will be adopted and the 

potential harm caused by returning custody of the children to the parent. Ark. Code Ann. 

§ 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). The court, however, does not have to determine that every factor 

considered be established by clear and convincing evidence. Spencer v. Ark. Dep’t of Human 

Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 96, at 5–6, 426 S.W.3d 494, 498. Instead, after considering all the 

factors, the evidence must be clear and convincing that the termination is in the best 

interest of the child. Id.

Because Wallace has not challenged the court’s decision as to the grounds 

for termination, we need not address those findings. Rather, the only issue before this 

court is whether there was sufficient evidence that termination was in D.W.’s best interest.

Wallace asserts that the circuit court based its decision to terminate, in large part, on its 

determination that she would never achieve minimum stability to properly parent because 

of her mental illness. She seeks reversal of the termination order to be given additional 

time to demonstrate that therapeutic levels of medication would allow her to parent 

independently.

In determining the best interest of the children, the court considers factors such as 

the likelihood of adoption and the potential harm to the health and safety of the child if 

subjected to continuing contact with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i), 

(ii) (Repl. 2015). The harm referred to in the statute is “potential” harm; the circuit court 

is not required to find that actual harm will result or to affirmatively identify a potential 

harm. Chaffin v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 522, at 5, 471 S.W.3d 251, 
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7 

255. Moreover, evidence on this factor must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and 

considered in broad terms. Id. In determining potential harm, the court may consider past 

behavior as a predictor of potential harm that may likely result if the child were returned 

to the parent’s care and custody. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 

180, at 13, 314 S.W.3d 722, 729. 

Here, Wallace does not challenge the finding that D.W. is adoptable, nor does she 

dispute that potential harm existed. Instead, Wallace argues that she was not provided with 

appropriate services to address her mental-health issues and that she needs more time to 

reach a point at which she will be stable enough to parent her child. However, as the 

circuit court noted, “[T]here remains a substantial question as to whether she has the 

motivation to quit using drugs.” Considering her past behavior, allowing Wallace more 

time would likely not be beneficial. At the time of the termination hearing, Wallace’s 

situation had barely changed. She exhibited a lack of initiative in complying with the case 

plan because she never obtained a sponsor, she tested positive for cocaine a month prior to 

the hearing, and she candidly admitted drinking green tea in an effort to defeat drug

screens. Notably, throughout the case, Wallace failed to appeal from any of the circuit 

court’s previous reasonable-efforts findings. Her lack of progress does not warrant 

additional time for improvement. 

The intent of our termination statute is to provide permanency in minor children’s 

lives in circumstances where returning the children to the family home is contrary to their 

health, safety, or welfare, and where the evidence demonstrates that the return cannot be 

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the children’s perspective.
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8 

Chaffin, 2015 Ark. App. at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 256. The child’s need for permanency and 

stability may override the parent’s request for additional time to improve the parent’s 

circumstances. Id. Parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment of the health and 

well-being of the child. Christian-Holderfield v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 

534, at 7–8, 378 S.W.3d 916, 920. 

This court is sympathetic to mental illness and the challenges of receiving the 

proper drug treatment at a dual-diagnosis facility, but in this case, we cannot say more 

time would have been beneficial and that a mistake has been made by the circuit court. 

D.W. has been in foster care for twelve of his fifteen months of life; his need for 

permanency overrides Wallace’s need for more time. 

 Affirmed. 

VIRDEN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.

 

Andrew Firth, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. 

Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor 

children.