IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

NATHANEAL SQUIER,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Appellee.

§

§ No. 192, 2022

§

§ Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 2103010390 (K)

§ 

§ 

§

Submitted: September 7, 2022

 Decided: October 14, 2022

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the opening brief, motion to affirm, and record on 

appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Nathaneal Squier, filed this appeal from a Superior Court 

order sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”). The State of Delaware 

has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on 

the face of Squier’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and 

affirm.

(2) In August 2021, a grand jury charged Squier with multiple crimes, 

including first-degree rape, strangulation, and third-degree assault. The victim was 

Squier’s girlfriend. On November 9, 2021, Squier pleaded guilty to strangulation 
2

and third-degree assault in exchange for the State entering a nolle prosequi on the 

remaining charges. The Superior Court sentenced Squier as follows: (i) for 

strangulation, five years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 120 days for one 

year of Level III probation; and (ii) for third-degree assault, one year of Level V 

incarceration,suspended for one year of Level III probation. The Superior Court also 

ordered Squier to obtain a mental health evaluation and not to have any contact with 

the victim.

(3) On January 26, 2022, the Department of Correction (“DOC”) filed an 

administrative warrant alleging that Squier had violated his probation, which he had 

started on December 14, 2021, by committing new domestic violence offenses 

against a different female victim. The subsequent VOP reports alleged that Squier 

had violated his probation by committing new crimes (strangulation, third-degree 

assault, intentionally or recklessly causing physical injury to another, and 

noncompliance with bond conditions) and failing to comply with the no-contact and 

mental health evaluation provisions of the sentencing order. At the first VOP 

hearing on February 4, 2022, the Superior Court granted the parties’ request for a 

continuance. 

(4) At the May 13, 2022 VOP hearing, the State advised the court that 

Squier had pleaded guilty to third-degree assault in his new criminal case. Squier 

admitted that he had violated his probation and had pleaded guilty to third-degree 
3

assault. After expressing concern about Squier’s pattern of serious violence against 

women, the Superior Court sentenced Squier as follows: (i) for strangulation, four 

years and eight months of Level V incarceration, suspended after three years, 

followed by one year of Level IV DOC discretion and one year of Level III GPS; 

and (ii) for third-degree assault, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended after 

six months, followed by six months of Level IV discretion and eighteen months of 

Level III GPS. This appeal followed.

(5) In his opening brief, Squier does not dispute that he violated his 

probation, but asks for the VOP sentence he says the State originally offered him 

(one or two years of Level V incarceration followed by a year of probation) and 

represents that he will take a domestic violence class and turn his life around. He 

claims that the Superior Court judge was biased against him. The State argues that 

Squier’s claims are without merit, but concedes that the eighteen-month Level III 

portion of the VOP sentence for the third-degree assault conviction exceeds the oneyear statutory limit established by 11 Del. C. § 4333(b)(3).1

(6) This Court’s appellate review of a sentence is extremely limited and 

generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within statutory limits.2If 

1 As the State notes, the period of probation does not include Level IV time. 11 Del. C. § 

4333(g)(2) (“As used in this section, the phrase ‘period of probation or suspension of sentence’

shall not include any period of a sentence that is designated by the sentencing court to be served 

at Supervision Accountability Level IV as defined in § 4204(c)(4) of this title.”). 

2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006).
4

the sentence falls within the statutory limits, “we consider only whether it is based 

on factual predicates which are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, 

judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.”3 

(7) Once Squier committed a VOP, the Superior Court could impose any 

period of incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V time remaining 

on Squier’s sentence.4 Squier’s VOP sentence does not exceed the Level V time 

remaining on his original sentence. In addition, the record does not support Squier’s 

conclusory claim of judicial bias. In sentencing Squier for his VOP, the Superior 

Court judge was understandably concerned that shortly after Squier started serving 

probation for crimes of domestic violence, he committed new crimes of domestic 

violence. 

(8) Although Squier’s claims have no merit, the State concedes that the 

eighteen-month Level III portion of the VOP sentence for the third-degree assault 

conviction exceeds the one-year statutory limit for felonies that are neither violent 

nor drug-related.5 We agree and conclude that the proper course of action is to vacate 

the Superior Court’s VOP sentencing order and remand for resentencing. Squier is 

entitled to be present and represented by counsel when he is resentenced. 

3

Id.

4

11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005).

5

11 Del. C. § 4333(b))(3) (providing that the period of probation for a crime that is not designated 

a violent felony under § 4201(c) or set forth in Title 16 shall not be more than one year).
5

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s

finding that the appellant violated the terms of his probation is AFFIRMED. The

Superior Court’s May 13, 2022 sentencing order is VACATED, and the matter

is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with

this Order. Jurisdiction is not retained.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice