Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Vol. I

October 1993

OTA-O-567

NTIS order #PB94-134640

GPO stock #052-003-01356-8
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Preparing for an Uncertain

Climate--Volume I, OTA-O-567 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, October 1.993).

II

For Sale by the U.S, Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -042986-2
Foreword

P

reparing for an Uncertain Climate is OTA’S second report on climate change. In

1991, we published Changing by Degrees: Steps to Reduce Greenhouse Gases,

which focused on ways to reduce the buildup of greenhouse gases in the

atmosphere. Slowing the rate of growth in these emissions continues to be very

important, but most analyses conclude that despite international efforts, the Earth is likely

to warm several degrees over the next century.

Climate change poses many potential problems for human and natural systems, and

the long-term effects of climate change on these systems are becoming increasingly

important in public policy. For example, international agreements were recently signed on

both climate change and biodiversity. Recognizing the potential problems, Congress asked

OTA to examine how the Nation can best prepare for an uncertain future climate. This

assessment tackles the difficult tasks of assessing how natural and human systems maybe

affected by climate change and of evaluating the tools at our disposal to ease adaptation to

a warmer climate. Volume 1 addresses coastal areas, water resources, and agriculture;

volume 2 includes wetlands, preserved lands, and forests.

OTA identifies more than 100 options in the full report that could help ease the

transition to an uncertain climate. We categorized a subset of these options as ‘first steps.

Options that fall into this group are near-term concerns because they will take a long time

to complete, address ‘front-line” or urgent issues that need attention first in order to make

better decisions later, can be approached through efforts already under way, are beneficial

for reasons other than helping to prepare for climate change, or represent near-term ‘targets

of opportunity.‘‘

The United States has put in place an ambitious Global Change Research Program to

“observe, understand, and ultimately predict global and regional climate change. ” This

effort, which has so far been based overwhelmingly in the physical sciences, is not geared

to help make natural resource planning and management decisions, to identify ecosystemlevel responses to climate change, or to readily provide policy guidance on mitigation or

adaptation. While scientists continue to reduce uncertainty, policy makers will continue to

reauthorize environmental legislation, manage natural resources, and develop energy

policy. Having mechanisms for integrating research and evaluating reasonable policy

routes while we are completing the science would be a valuable addition to the Federal

effort. This assessment could help guide these needed improvements.

Preparing for an Uncertain Climate was requested by three congressional

committees: the Senate Committees on Environment and Public Works and on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

OTA appreciates the support this effort received from hundreds of contributors. Workshop

participants, reviewers, contractors, and informal advisors gave us invaluable support as we

attempted to sift through the voluminous material on this subject. OTA, however, remains

solely responsible for the contents of this report.

Roger C. Herdman, Director

Iii
Helen M. Ingram, Chairman

Director

Udall Studies in Public Policy

University of Arizona

Richard M. Adams

Professor of Resource Economics

Department of Agricultural and

Resource Economics

Oregon State University

Vera Alexander

Dean, School of Fisheries

and Ocean Sciences

University of Alaska

Michael J. Bean

Senior Attorney

Environmental Defense Fund

Margaret Adela Davidson

Executive Director

south Carolina sea Grant

Consortium

J. Clarence Davies

. Director

Center for Risk Management

Resources for the Future

Baruch Fischhoff

Professor of Engineering

and Public Policy

Carnegie Mellon University

Michael H. Glantz

program Director

Environmental Impacts Group

National Center for Atmospheric

Research

George Hoberg

Assistant Professor

Political Science Department

University of British Columbia

Henry D. Jacoby

Director, Joint Program on the

Science and Policy

of Global Change

Sloan School of Management

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Waiter Jarck

Corporate Director

Forest Resources

Georgia-Pacific Corporation

David N. Kennedy

Director, California State

Department of Water Resources

Jon Kusier

Executive Director

Association of State Wetlands

Managers

Douglas MacLean

Associate professor

Philosophy Department

University of Maryland

Jerry Mahlman

Director, Geophysical Fluid

Dynamics Laboratory/NOAA

Princeton University

Barbara Miller

Senior Civil Engineer

Tennessee Valley Authority

Steve Peck

Director, Environmental Sciences

Department

Electric Power Research Institute

Herman Shugart

Department of Environmental

Sciences

University of Virginia

Phil Sisson

Director, Commodities and

Economic Analysis Division

Quaker oats

Don Wilhite

Director

International Drought

Information Center

University of Nebraska

Gary Yohe

Professor

Department of Economics

Wesleyan University

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panelmebrs.

The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility:

for the report

and the accuracy of its contents.

iv
Clyde Behney

Assistant Director, OTA

Health and Environmental

Sciences Division

John Andelin

Assistant Director,

to Aug. 31, 1993

Robert Niblock

Program Manager

Oceans and Environment

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Kathleen Bell

Office Administrator

Kimberly Holmlund

Administrative secretary

Sharon Knarvlk

CONTRIBUTORS

Bob Friedman

Beth Robinson

Mark Zinniker

EDITOR

Cynthia Allen

Editorial services

ROSINA BIERBAUM

Project Director

Michael Bowes

Senior Analyst

William Westermeyer

Senior Analyst

Jacqueline Courteau

Analyst

CONTRACTORS

Timothy Beatley

University of Virginia

Stanley Changnon

Illinois State Water Survey

William Cline

Institute of International Economics

Charles Cooper

San Diego University

William Easterling

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Jae Edmonds

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Project Staff

Environmental Defense Fund

David Gillilan

University of Arizona

Patrick Halpin

University of Virginia

Robert Lilleholm

Utah State University

Janice Longstreth

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Geraldine McCormick-Ray

University of Virginia

Sherry Showell

Analyst

Nadine Cutler

Research Analyst

Elise Holland

Research Analyst

Julie Phillips

Indexer

Frank Potter

consultant

Carleton Ray

University of Virginia

Theodore Schad

consultant

Daniel Sheer

Water Resources Management, Inc.

Joel Smith

RCG/Hagler, Bailley, Inc.

William Smith

Yale University

Nick Sundt

consultant

Richard Wahl

University of Colorado

Scott Warren

Connecticut College

Daniel Willard

Indiana University

Mary McKenney

consultant

Walt Oechel

San Diego State University
workshop

WORKSHOP ON WETLANDS

Tom Bancroft

National Audubon Society

Ann Bartuska

U.S. Forest Service

Michael Bean

Environmental Defense Fund

Elizabeth Bokman

U.S. Department of the Interior

Dieter Busch

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Douglas Canning

Washington Department of Ecology

James Chambers

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Kevin Erwin

Kevin L. Erwin Consulting

Ecologist, Inc.

Lee Foote

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Taber Hand

Association of State Wetlands

Managers

Suzette Kimball

University of Virginia

James Kundell

The University of Georgia

Jon Kusler

Association of State Wetlands

Managers

Bruce Moulton

Texas Water Commission

Walter Oechel

San Diego State University

Participants

Richard Park

Indiana University

Karen Poiani

Cornell University

Michael Sauer

North Dakota Department of Health

Charles Segelquist

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

John Simpson

Massachusetts Department of

Environmental Protection

James Titus

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

John Toliver

U.S. Forest Service

Richard Tomczyk

Massachusetts Department of

Environmental Protection

Virginia Van Sickle-Burkett

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Don Voros

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Scott Warren

Connecticut College

Dennis Whigham

Smithsonian Environmental

Research Center

Daniel Willard

Indiana University

Tom Winter

U.S. Geological Survey

Irene Wisheu

University of Ottawa

Donald Witherill

Maine Department of Environmental

Protection

WORKSHOP ON FORESTS

Robert Bailey

University of Georgia

Richard Birdsey

Northeastern Forest Experiment Station

Bruce Bongarten

University of Georgia

J.E. de Steigeur

U.S. Forest Service

Phil Dougherty

Southeastern Forest Experiment Station

Lauren Fins

University of Idaho

Michael Fosberg

U.S. Forest Service

Kathleen Geyer

U.S. Forest Service

Robin Graham

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Robert Haack

Michigan State University

Edward Hansen

U.S. Forest Service

Roy Hedden

Clemson University

Arnold Holden

U.S. Forest Service

David Le Blanc

Ball State University

F. Thomas Ledig

U.S. Forest Service

Robert Lilleholm

Utah State University

VI
Rex McCullough

Weyerhaeuser Company

Stephen Nodvin

University of Tennessee

David Parsons

National Park Service

Phillip Riggan

U.S. Forest Service

Clark Row

consultant

Con Schallau

American Forest Council

Hank Shugart, Chair

University of Virginia

William Smith

Yale University

Alan Solomon

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Jack Winjum

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

John Zerbe

Forest Products Laboratory

Robert Ziemer

U.S. Forest Service

WORKSHOP ON

WESTERN LANDS

Cecil Armstrong

U.S. Forest Service

Will Blackburn

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Terence Boyle

Colorado State University

Michael Cassity

University of Wyoming

Stan Coloff

Bureau of Land Management

Charles Cooper

San Diego State University

Doug FOX

U.S. Forest Service

Helen Ingram, Chair

University of Arizona

Linda Joyce

U.S. Forest Service

John Kelmelis

U.S. Geological Survey

Gil Lusk

Glacier National Park

Mitch McClaran

University of Arizona

Gary McVicker

Bureau of Land Management

Ron Moody

U.S. Department of Agriculture

David Mouat

Desert Research Institute

Walter Oechel

San Diego State University

Pat Reece

Panhandle Research and Extension

Center

Patrick Reed

University of Georgia

Tim Seastedt

University of Colorado

Richard Stroup

Political Economy Research Center

Eleonora Trotter

University of New Mexico

Sara Vickerman

Defenders of Wildlife

Mary Wallace

University of Arizona

WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE

TREATIES AND MODELS

Dan Bodansky

University of Washington

Tony Brenton

Harvard University

Herman Cesar

Tilburg University

Joel Darmstadter

Resources for the Future

Hadl Dowlatabadl

Carnegie Mellon University

Jae Edmonds

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Howard Gruenspecht

Us. Department of Energy

James Hammitt

Rand Corp.

William Hogan

Harvard University

Ted Parson

Harvard University

Steve Rayner

Pacific Northwest Laboratoratory

John Reilly

Massachusetts Institute

of Technology

Joel Scheraga

Us. Environmental Protection Agency

Dennis Tirpak

Us. Environmental Protection Agency

David Victor

Harvard University

John Weyant

Stanford university

Don Wilhite

University of Nebraska

vii
WORKSHOP ON

AGRICULTURE

Richard Adams

Oregon State University

Robert Chen

Consortium for the International Eart h

Science Information Network

Ralph Chite

The Library of Congress

John Clark

Battelle Institute

Roy Darwin

Us. Departmcnt of Agriculture

William Easterling

University of Nebraska

Dean Ethridge

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Gary Evans

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Steven Hollinger

University of Illinois

Marvin Jensen

Colorado state university

C. AlIan Jones

Texas A&M University

Jan Lewandrowski

Us. Department of Agriculture

Robert Loomis

University of California

Robert Mendelsohn

Yale university

Calvin Quaiset

university of California

Wayne Rasmussen

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Steve Rawlins

U.S. Department of Agriculture

John Reilly

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Norman Rosenberg, Chair

Battelle Institute

Cynthia Rosenzweig

Columbia University

Vernon Ruttan

University of Minnesota

Paul Unger

U.S. Department of Agriculture

John van Es

University of Illinois

WORKSHOP ON ECOLOGY

AND REMOTE SENSING

Jim Bunce

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Leonard David

Space Data Resources and Information

Ruth Defries

University of Maryland

Irv Forseth

university of Maryland

Robert Hudson

University of Maryland

David Inouye

university of Maryland

Tony Janetos

National Aeronautics and

Space Administr “ “ ation

Michael Kearney

University of Maryland

Penelope Koines

university of Maryland

Bill Lawrence

University of Maryland

Eileen McClellan

University of Maryland

Aian Miller

University of Maryland

Raymond Miller

University of Maryland

Rob Nicholls

university of Maryland

Karen Prestegaard

University of Maryland

Steve Prince

University of Maryland

Alan Robock

University of Maryland

John Townshend

university of Maryland

Richard Weismiller

University of Maryland

Robert Worrest

Consortium for the International‘Eart h

Science Information Network

WORKSHOP ON EOS AND

USGCRP: ARE WE ASKING

AND ANSWERING THE

RIGHT QUESTIONS?

Dan Albritton

National Oceanic Atmospheric

Administration

James Anderson

Harvard University

Francis Bretherton

University of Wisconsin

Ronald Brunner

University of Colorado

William Clark

Harvard University

Robert Corell

National Science Foundation

viii
Jeff Dozier WORKSHOP ON

University of California WATER RESOURCES

John Eddy Tony Bagwell

Consortium for the International Earth Texas Water Development Board

science Information Network Stanley Changnon

Diane Evans Illinois State Water Survey

Jet Propulsion Laboratory Hanna Cortner

James Hansen University of Arizona

National Aeronautics and Space

. . Stephen Estes-Smargiassi Administration Massachusetts Water Resources

Tony Janetos Authority

National Aeronautics and Space

, Myron Fiering Admininstration Harvard University

Jerry Mahlman

. Kenneth Frederick Princeton University Resources for the Future

M Patrlnos

U.S. Dep

Jerome Gilbert artment of Energy Water Transfer Associates

Robert Watson

National Aeronautics and Space Michael Glantz, Chair

. . National Center for Atmospheric Administration Research

Helen Ingram

University of Arizona

William Kellogg

National Center for Atmospheric

Research

Steve Macaulay

California Department of water

Resources

Barbara Miller

Tennessee Valley Authority

Peter Rhoads

South Florida Water Management

District

John Schefter

U.S. Geological Survey

Nell Schild

U.S. Department of the Interior

Rusty Schuster

Bureau of Reclamation

Joel Smith

Us. Environmental Protection Agency

Eugene Stakhiv

Us. Army Corps of Engineers

Dan Tarlock

Chicago-Kent College of Law

Richard Wahl

University of Colorado

Don Wilhite

University of Nebraska

Dennis Lettenmaier

University of Washington

lx
I—

contents

1 Synthesis, Summary and

Policy Options 1

The OTA Assessment 3

The Problem of Climate Change 7

Choosing Adaptation Strategies 15

Overarching Policy Themes 19

Near-Term Congressional Action 35

Summaries and First Steps for Each

Resource Chapter 39

Chapter 1 References 57

2 A Primer on Climate Change and

Natural Resources 65

How Do We Know Climate Is Changing? 66

What Causes Climate Change? 71

What Changes in Climate Are Predicted? 71

How Will Climate Change Affect Natural

Resources? 79

Which Natural Resources Are Most Vulnerable

to Climate Change? 99

Chapter 2 References 101

3 Global Change Research in the

Federal Government 109

The U.S. Global Change Research Program 112

Priorities and Balance in USGCRP 119

Adaptation Research in the Federal

Government 132

Evaluation Mechanisms 139

Policy Options: Augmenting the Federal

Research Effort on Global Change 144

Chapter 3 References 151

IIx“
4 Coasts 1 5 3

Overview 154

vulnerability of coastal Areas 154

The Challenge for Policy 166

Obstacles to Better Management 176

Encouraging Less-Damaging

Coastal-Development Patterns 170

Policy Options for the Federal Government 194

First Steps 202

Chapter 4 References 204

5 Water 20 9

Overview 210

Background 211

Possible Effects of a Warmer Climate

on Water Resource Systems 212

Current and Potential Stresses on Water

Resource Systems 213

Effects of Climate Stress on Nonconsumptive

Uses of Water 227

Adapting Water Resource Systems to

Climate and Other Changes 232

First Steps 262

Chapter 5 References 266

Appendix 5. l—Water Resource Concerns:

Region by Region and State by State 269

Agriculture 275

Overview 276

U.S. Agriculture Today 277

The Problem of Climate Change 266

Technologies for Adaptation to

Climate Change 297

The Institutional Setting 310

Policy Options 316

First steps 326

Chapter 6 References 329

APPENDIXES

A: List of Tables and Figures 333

B: Acknowledgments 339

INDEX 345

xii I
Synthesis,

Summary

and

Policy

Options 1

w

idespread public attention to the question of whether

or not climate is changing intensified during the hot

summers of the late 1980s. Since then, during the

time the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

was conducting this assessment, the Nation has experienced

major drought in the western and southeastern United States,

powerful hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii, a destructive forest

fire in Northern California, and substantial flooding in the

Midwest. Although none of these events can be clearly linked to

climate change, they represent the types of extreme events that

may occur with greater frequency if climate warms.

Most scientists believe that the Earth’s climate is likely to

warm by several degrees during the next few decades. Although

our understanding of climate change has progressed a great deal

in the past few years, major knowledge gaps remain, and

empirical evidence of human-induced climate change is not

unequivocal. Many factors important to understanding climate,

such as the role of clouds, ocean circulation, and solar cycles and

the interactions between living organisms and the environment,

cannot yet be reliably incorporated into general circulation

models (GCMS), science-based computer models used to predict

potential changes in average global surface temperature. Some

key information that could guide policy response is likely to

remain unknown for another decade or two (69). We cannot

predict rates or magnitudes of changes in local or regional

temperature and precipitation patterns. Predicting changes in the

variability of climate and weather patterns, particularly on small

spatial scales, is also beyond current scientific capabilities,

Existing ecological, social, and economic models are similarly

limited and cannot adequately predict the responses to climate
2 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

changes by natural systems (e.g., forests and

wetlands) or managed systems (e.g., water resource systems and agriculture). Therefore, most

policy decisions made in the near future about

how to respond to the specter of climate change

will be made in light of great uncertainty about

the nature and magnitude of potential effects.

Although climate change has certainly become

a public and scientific concern, what to do about

it is not clear. Issues now being heatedly debated

are the technical feasibility and economic implications of reducing or offsetting emissions of

greenhouse gases. Several studies concluded that

cutting U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide (C02),

the most important anthropogenic greenhouse

gas, below current levels is plausible. OTA’S

1991 report, Changing by Degrees: Steps to

Reduce Greenhouse Gases, concluded that by

adopting a package of low-cost measures, the

United States could significantly slow the growth

of its C02 emissions over the next 25 years-but

could not easily decrease them to below current

levels (172). With aggressive-but potentially

expensive-initiatives, OTA found that the United

States might be able to decrease its C02 emissions

to 35 percent below today’s levels by 2015. Even

in this case, U.S. emissions of C02 are expected

to rise again after 2015 unless there are successful

programs for developing alternatives to fossilenergy supplies (such as solar and nuclear power)-

programs that would lead to substantial increases

in market penetration of one or more of these

energy alternatives by 2015.

Since the 1992 United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development (UNCED) in

Brazil, many countries have signed the Climate

Convention, seeking to freeze greenhouse gas

emissions at 1990 levels in the near future. On

Earth Day 1993, President Clinton announced

that the United States would participate in this

effort. The Climate Convention represents a

landmark agreement and recognition that global

environmental problems must be addressed on a

global scale.

Nonetheless, the bulk of scientific evidence

indicates that simply freezing greenhouse gas

emissions at 1990 levels will not stop global

warming. Stabilizing emissions is different from

stabilizing atmospheric concentrations. Constant

annual emissions will still increase the total

concentration of greenhouse gases and, thus, the

heat-trapping capacity of the atmosphere. The

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(WCC), an international group representing more

than 50 countries, concluded that to stabilize the

concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at today’s levels would require up to an 80

percent reduction in world C02 emission levels

immediately, along with significant reductions

in other greenhouse gases. Even if such reductions could be achieved, the world would warm

about 1 to 4 OF (1 to 2 ‘C) because of long-lived

greenhouse gases emitted over the last century.

Given the virtual certain“ ty that energy use (and

associated C02 emissions) in developing countries will rise as they pursue economic growth

and given the intense debate in the United States

and other industrialized countries about the feasibility of achieving even a freeze in emissions, it

seems certain that global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to rise.

Thus, unless the predictive GCMS are seriously flawed, average global temperatures are

expected to increase several degrees over the

next century, even under the most optimistic

emissions scenarios (see box 2-B). l

If climate change is inevitable, then so is

adaptation to climate change. Society and nature

may have to cope with rising sea levels, more

frequent drought and periods of temperature

extremes, changes in water supplies, disruption of

ecosystems, and changes in many other climatesensitive natural resources (see ch. 2). The term

adaptation, as used here, means any adjustment to

1 All chapters, boxes, figures, snd tables ckd here can be found in volumes 1 and 2 of this report Volume 1 addrasm coastal areas, U@@

resources, and agriculture; volume 2 includes wetlands, preserved lands, and forests.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options! 3

altered conditions; it can be a biological, technical, institutional, regulatory, behavioral, or economic response. It encompasses passive adjustments (e.g., biologically driven changes in plant

communities or gradual changes in human behavior and tastes), deliberate reactive responses

(management responses after climate change

effects are observed), and anticipatory actions,

(planning, engineering, or regulatory responses

taken in preparation for climate change). Throughout this report, we examine the ability of naturalresource-based systems, both unmanaged and

managed, to adapt to climate change and consider

means by which adaptation can be enhanced by

modifying management, advancing research and

technology, disseminating information, and taking legislative actions.

Given the current inability to predict accurately

where, when, and how much change will occur,

decisionmakers must plan for natural and managed systems in light of considerable uncertainty.

It is understandable, under these circumstances,

that postponing responses until more is known

about climate change is very appealing. Nonetheless, uncertainty does not mean that the Nation

cannot position itself better to cope with the broad

range of impacts possible under climate change or

protect itself against potentially costly future

outcomes. In fact, delay in responding may

leave the Nation poorly prepared to deal with

the changes that do occur and may increase the

possibility of impacts that are irreversible or

otherwise very costly. Many options that will

increase the Nation’s ability to cope with the

Uncertainties of climate change will also help in

dealing with existing threats to natural resource

systems, such as those related to climate extremes

(e.g., droughts, floods, and fire) and the fragmentation of natural habitat.

The following sections of this chapter discuss

the OTA assessment, general problems posed by

climate change, criteria for choosing strategic

responses, near-term opportunities for Congressional action, and summaries and first steps for

the six resource systems studied in detail.

THE OTA ASSESSMENT

Three Committees of Congress asked OTA to

help them think about coping with potential

climate change. OTA was asked: How can the

United States set prudent policy, given that we do

not know for certain what the climate will be?

This assessment attempts to answer three key

questions:

What is at risk over what time frames?

Which natural ecological systems and managed natural resource systems are at risk

from climate change? How do the lead times

needed for human interventions in these

systems vary?

How can we best plan for an uncertain

climate? When and how should decisionmakers consider the uncertain effects of a

changing climate as they plan the future

management of natural and managed systems in the United States? What criteria

should be used?

Will we have answers when we need

them? Does the current U.S. Global Change

Research Program (USGCRP) reflect the

short- and long-term needs of decisionmakers? Will it provide information about

rates of climate change, the potential for

‘‘surprise’ effects on different systems,

potential strategies for making systems more

resilient in the face of uncertain climate

change, and adapting to the changes that may

occur?

Society depends on natural and managed systems for both basic needs and amenities. These

include, for example, food, shelter, clothing,

. . drmking water, energy, and recreation. Many

social and economic problems arise when the

availability and diversity of goods and services

decline. Such disruptions can range from mild to

severe, and they include unemployment, famine,

migration of workers, and political instability.

Climate change heightens the uncertainty about

future availability of desired goods and services.
4 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

In the West, center-pivot sprinklers irrigate wheat,

alfalfa, potatoes, and other crops. Increasingly

efficient irrigation techniques maybe critical if

regional climates become drier.

Yet, given the potentially long delays until the

onset of significant changes, reacting to climate

change as it occurs may seem more practical than

undertaking anticipatory measures. Why adopt a

policy today to adapt to a climate change that may

not occur, for which there is significant uncertainty about regional impacts, and for which

benefits of the anticipatory measure may not be

seen for decades? Effort put into adopting the

measure could well be wasted. Furthermore,

future generations may have more sophisticated

technologies and greater wealth that can be used

for adaptation (91).

The Committee on Science, Engineering, and

Public Policy (COSEPUP) (27)2 concluded that it

is theoretically possible to put technology and

practices into place to adjust to the changing

climate as it happens if the change is gradual

enough. However, the rate of climate change is,

admittedly, unknown. IPCC concluded: “it is

uncertain whether these changes-should they

come-would be gradual or sudden” (68). Furthermore, “our imperfect understanding of climate processes . . . could make us vulnerable to

surprises; just as the human-made ozone hole

over Antarctica was entirely unpredicted” (69).

Waiting to react to climate change may be

unsatisfactory if it is possible that climate change

impacts will be very costly. Of greatest concern

may be those systems where there is the possibility of surprise-of facing the potential for high

costs without time to react--or where the climate

change impacts will be irreversible. Such impacts

seem more likely if long-lived structures or

slow-to-adapt natural systems are affected, if

adaptive measures require time to devise or

implement, or if current trends and actions make

adaptation less likely to succeed or more costly in

the future. In these cases, anticipating climate

change by taking steps now to smooth the path of

adaptation may be appropriate.

Ideally, a policy-relevant research program

could help identify appropriate actions as the

current state of knowledge evolves. In response to

the potential risks of climate change and the

uncertainties surrounding the science, the Federal

Government launched a massive, multiagency

research effort in 1989 to monitor, understand,

 of the National Academy of the National 

of stated: inventions and their adoption may occur quickly, we must ask whether the broad spectrum of current capital could be changed faat enough to match a change in climate in 50 to 100 years’ (27). goes on to note that half a 

should be time enough to allow most major technological systems (and some natural systems) to be transformed most capital stock to 

over.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 5

and, ultimately, predict global changes and to

determine the mechanisms influencing these

changes (25, 26). Chapter 3 examines the

USGCRP and suggests ways to effectively broaden the program to both incorporate natural

resource concerns and assessment activities.

Other studies have examined systems at risk

from climate change in various ways (see boxes

l-A, l-B, and 2-F and refs. 27, 67, and 188). To

complement these analyses, OTA focused its

examination of adaptation potential on areas

where:

■ Costs of climate change may be very high.

For example, flood and wind damages from

more-intense storms could lead to death and

extensive property damage.

= Impacts of climate change may be irreversible. For example, species extinction and

loss of valuable ecosystems—in wetlands,

forests, and wilderness areas-may be permanent.

■ The validity of long-term decisions made

today will be affected by climate change.

For example, trees planted with a life expectancy of many decades may not survive to

maturity if climate conditions change. Agricultural and coastal development in climatesensitive areas may add to the likelihood of

future losses to natural disasters.

■ Preparing for catastrophic events is already warranted. Reacting to climate

change may mean reacting to climate extremes-such as floods, droughts, storms,

and fires. Coordinated contingency planning

can help avert high costs and reduce risk of

loss.

■ There is a significant Federal role in the

research, planning, or management of

these systems.

On the basis of these criteria, OTA selected six

systems for further analysis:

1. coastal areas,

2. water resources,

3. agriculture,

4. wetlands,

5. preserves (federally protected natural areas),

and

6. forests.

The first three systems are managed natural-resource-based systems with a high degree of

government involvement and a complex system

of incentives and subsidies in place; these are

grouped together in volume 1 of the report. The

other three systems include less-managed natural

systems and are presented together in volume 2.

Both volumes contain this summary chapter, a

primer on climate change, and a chapter on the

Federal research effort. Box 1-A highlights our

overall methodological approach.

Each of the six systems OTA examined is

stressed to some degree today, and that may

influence how well it can respond to any change

in the future. For example, because populations in

coastal areas are growing, the exposure to costly

natural disasters is increasing. Water scarcity and

water-quality concerns are already common in

many parts of the United States. Current agricultural support programs often distort and constrain

choices about crop and farm management. Wetland loss continues-albeit at a much slower rate

than 20 years ago-despite a stated national goal

of “no net loss” (see vol. 2, ch. 4). Preserved

natural areas serve aesthetic, recreational, and

biodiversity functions, but may not be adequate in

size or distribution to maintain wildlife and plant

species in the face of growing habitat loss and

fragmentation. U.S. forest managers are finding it

increasingly difficult to meet the sometimes

competing demands for recreation, environmental

services, and commercial wood products.

Water is an integral element of all of the

resource systems discussed in this report. Its

abundance, location, and seasonal distribution are

closely linked to climate, and this link has had

much to do with where cities have flourished,

how agriculture has developed, and what flora

and fauna inhabit a region. Water quality and

quantity will remain key to the economy. Future
6 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-A—The OTA Study in Context

Within the past 5 years, three major studies of the impacts of climate change have been released. The

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (166) and the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy

(COSEPUP) (27) issued reports on potential effects of global climate change on the United States; Working

Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focused on potential impacts from climate

change worldwide (67).

The Sensitivity and Adaptability of

Human Activities and Nature

Sensitive;

adaptation Sensitive;

Human activity Low at some adaptation

and nature sensitivity cost problematic

Industry and energy

Health

Farming

Managed forests

and grasslands

Water resources

Tourism and

recreation

Settlement and

coastal structures

Human migration

Political tranquility

Natural landscapes

Marine ecosystems

SOURCE: Redrawn from Committee on Science, Engineering,

and Public Policy, Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse

Warming, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of

Engineering, and Institute for Medicine, Policy Implications of

Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the

Science Base (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,

1992).

COSEPUP divided human activities and natural systems into three classes of sensitivity and

adaptability to climate change: 1) low sensitivity,

2) sensitive but can adapt at a cost and

3) sensitive with problematic adjustment or

adaptation (see table). The report concluded that

industry decisionmaking horizons and building

schedules are shorter than the time frame within

which most climatic changes would emerge, so

most industries could be expected to adapt as

climate shifts. COSEPUP listed human migration

and water resources as “sensitive to climate

change,” but adaptable “at some cost.” Finally, it

suggested that unmanaged natural ecosystems

respond relatively slowly and that their ability to

adapt to climate change is more questionable

and “problematic” than that of managed cropland

or timberland. The EPA report concluded that

natural ecosystems have only limited ability to

adapt if the climate changes rapidly and suggested that “managed systems may show more

resilience.”

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

analysis began with the EPA, COSEPUP, and

IPCC reports and related literature, but it goes

beyond them in several important ways. COSEPUP addressed natural systems primarily in

the general terms of “natural landscape” and

“marine ecosystems.” However, natural systems are much more numerous and complex than this categorization

suggests. We examine some natural systems in the United States at a much finer level of resolution (e.g., wetlands,

forests, and preserved areas) and in different regions of the country.

We also consider systems under varying degrees of management intensity-from Iess-managed wilderness

areas, wetlands, and some coastal systems, to systems managed for multiple uses, such as forests and

rangelands, to intensively managed agricultural and commercial forestry systems. We consider each to be a

system for which we can characterize outputs and’ inputs. We focus on the outputs that society cares about

whether for economic, recreational, aesthetic, or other reasons-in short, things about which policy is made.

While recognizing the value of climate predictions used in previous assessments, we chose to acknowledge

the uncertainties of our changing climate by deliberately avoiding predictions linked to any particular climate

change scenario. Instead, we examine the vulnerabilities of natural resource systems to climate change, attempt

to elucidate how different climate variables drive natural resource systems, and examine the types of planning and

management practices that might help vulnerable systems adapt to a changing climate.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 7

Timing is key to our analyses. In addition to the sensitivity of systems to climate change, the lead time needed

for human interventions in these systems also varies, as does the time framefor systems to respond. Continuation

of the structure, function, and services of many systems in an uncertain future depends on decisions being made

today. In this report, we highlight how today’s decisions about long-lived systems (e.g., forests and water resource

projects) may determine how those systems respond to tomorrow’s unknown climate.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Congress, our assessment examines the institutions and legislative

framework that surround natural and built systems in the United States today. Whether or not a system can adapt

to a changing climate may depend on how adaptable the institutions themselves are. Many systems transcend

agency, geographic, or legislative boundaries; such fragmentation can impede adaptation. OTA identifies these

rigidities and offers new legislative, coordination, planning, and management options to facilitate adaptation.

water availability is essential for continued serv- 1) increased unpredictability resulting from changices and functions from coasts, water resources,

agriculture, preserves, wetlands, and forests. Competition for water, whether for irrigation, recreation, wildlife, or urban use, is likely to heighten in

some regions of the country. Throughout the

report, we highlight this and other intersecting

issues in cross-cutting boxes, indicated by a bar of

icons representing the six systems studied (see

table l-l).

THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

ing climate averages, and 2) increased risk of

surprises or large-scale losses. These, together

with the “background” of increasing population,

greater future demand, and growing competition

for the use of scarce resources, make the need to

improve the Nation’s ability to deal with an

uncertain climate all the more urgent.

Stresses on resources are most acute and visible during extreme events such as floods and

droughts. Our response to such events has often

proven to be expensive and unsatisfactory. DamClimate change alters the baseline against ages from the Mississippi River flooding in 1993

which future actions are gauged. Our lifestyles, are expected to range from $5 billion to $10

water supplies, and food supplies and other things billion, with Federal disaster payments of about

society values from natural resources rely on a $3 billion. Almost $4 billion in Federal payments

dependable, consistent, and sustainable supply.

Our institutions and infrastructure presume that went to farmers suffering crop losses during the

the past is a reasonable surrogate for the future. 1988 drought. Hurricane Hugo cost the Federal

When designing reservoirs, for example, historic Government about $1.6 billion. Hurricane

Andrew topped $2 billion in Federal disaster rainfall patterns are assumed to provide a good

indication of the range of future patterns. A payments, and many complained about the Governfarmer plants knowing that at times, weather ment’s response. 3 Policies that improve the Naconditions will cause a crop to fail, but with the tion’s ability to prepare for and cope more

expectation-based on past climate--that the effectively with climate hazards (e.g., floods,

crop will succeed, in most years. fires, and droughts) would be valuable now and

Climate change poses two potential problems would help prepare the Nation for a less certain

for existing management strategies for resources: future.

3 Hurricane Andrew’s estimated COSt tO property insurers as of February 1993 is at least $15.5 billion (136). Additional losses involved

uninsured property, public utility equipment (e.g., power lines), crop damage, property insured under the National Flood Insurance and the

Small Business Administration programs, lost tax revenue, and the costs of emergency services.
8 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table l-l—List of Boxes in Reporta

Chapter 1 — Summary

Box 1-A — The OTA Study in Context, p.6

Box 1 -B — How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems, p 12

Box 1 -C — Solutions from General to Specific: Addressing the Overarching Problems, p.20

Box 1 -D — Climate Change, South Florida, and the Everglades, p.28

Box 1-E — Water Allocation and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, p.31

Box 1 -F — Changes in Agriculture and the Fate of Prairie Potholes: The Impacts of Drought and Climate Change, p.33

Box 1 -G — Climate Change in Alaska: A Special Case, p.50

Chapter 2 — Primer

Box 2-A — What the Models Tell Us. GCMs and Others, p 68

Box 2-B — Highlights of the IPCC 1990 Scientific Assessment of Climate Change, p.74

Box 2-C — Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries, p.81

Box 2-D — Coping with Increased CO2. Effects on Ecosystem Productivity, p 88

Box 2-E — Responses of Natural Systems to Climate Stress. Adaptation, Migration, and Decline, p 92

60X 2-F — Major Assessments of Climate Change Impacts, p 102

Chapter 3 — Research

60X 3-A — Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change, p.125

Box 3-B — Weaknesses in U.S. Environmental Research Identified by the National Research Council, p 137

Box 3-C — Lessons from NAPAP, p.141

VOLUME 1

Chapter 4 — Coasts

Box 4-A — Saffir-Simpson Hurricane-lntensity Scale, p 162

Box 4-B — Protector Retreat?, p 174

Box 4-C — South Carolina, Hurricane Hugo, and Coastal Development, p.189

Box 4-D — The “Maine Approach”, p 192

Chapter 5 — Water

60X 5-A —

Box 5-B —

Box 5-C —

Box 5-D —

Box 5-E —

60)$ 5-F —

60X 5-G —

Box 5-H —

Box 5-1 —

60X 5-J —

Chapter 6 —

Box 6-A — Major Federal Programs Related to Agriculture and the Environment, p.278

Box 6-B — Primary U.S. Farm Products, p.285

60X 6-C — Previous Studies of Agriculture and Climate Change, p.290

Box &D — Water Transfers in the West: Winners and Losers, p.292

Box 6-E — Irrigated Agriculture and Water Quality: The Kesterson Case, p.294

Box 6-F — Historical Examples of Adaptability in Agriculture, p 298

Box 6-G — Adaptation to Declining Groundwater Levels in the High Plains Aquifer, p.301

Box 6-H — Current Technologies for Adapting to Climate Change, p.303

Box 6-I — The Institutional Setting for Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change, p.311

Box 6-J — Structure of the Agricultural Research and Extension System, p.315

Climate Change, Water Resources, and Limits to Growth?, p.216

Water Quality, Climate Change, and the Rio Grande, p.217

Reauthorizing the Clean Water Act, p.220

Major Doctrines for Surface Water and Groundwater, p 222

Navigating the Mississippi through Wet and Dry Times, p,228

Important Water-Related Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies, p.233

Permanent Transfer: Conserving Water in California’s Imperial Valley, P.237

A Drought-Year Option California’s Drought Water Bank, p.238

Seasonal Storage: The Metropolitan Water District’s Interruptible Water Service and Seasonal Storage

Programs, p.247

The Use of Reclaimed Water in St Petersburg, p.261

Agriculture

■ What Is at Risk? creased evaporation, and sea level rise. The

As described in chapter 2, climate change combination of these factors could cause signifipredicted by the models includes changes in cant impacts on all systems. For example, sea

precipitation patterns, increased temperature, in- level rise could lead to higher storm surges and
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 19

VOLUME 2

Chapter 4 — Wetlands

Box 4-A — Wetland Restoration and Mitigation, Maintainmg Wetland Functions and Values, p 154

Box 4-B — How Wet Is A Wetland?: The Debate Over Which Wetlands to Regulate, p 157

Box 4-C — Wetland Types and Distributionl p,160

Box 4-D — Why Care About Wetlands?, p,162

Box 4-E — Isa Wetland a Place or a Process?, p,166

Box 4-F — Louisiana and Sea Level Rise: A Preview of What’s to Come?, p.173

Box 4-G — How Will Climate Change Affect Wetlands?, p 175

Box 4-H — Will Climate Change Increase Conflicts Over Riparian Wetlands in the Arid West?, p.178

Box 44 — The Wetlands Policy Space, p.189

Chapter 5 — Preserves: Federally Protected Natural Areas

BOX 5-A — Climate Change and Management Philosophies for Natural Area Management, p 221

Box 5-B — The Strategic Dilemma for Protecting Natural Areas Under Climate Change, p.223

Box 5-C — Federally Protected Natural Areas: The Legislative Framework, p.228

BOX 5-D — Implications for Endangered Species Conservation Under a Changing Climate, p 235

Box 5-E — Landscape Fragmentation: Islands of Nature in a Sea of Human Activity, p.241

Box 5-F — Some Innovative Management Models: Toward Ecosystem Management in Natural Areas, p.244

Box 5-G — Competition for Water: The Case of the Stillwater National Wildlife Management Area, p.252

Box 5-H — Water and Natural Areas Under Climate Change, p.255

Box 5- I — The Yellowstone Fires of 1988: Harbinger of Climate Change and Fire Management Conflicts, p.262

Box 5-J — Possible Funding Sources for Conservation Programs, p.265

BOX 5-K — The Sustainable Biosphere Initiative: Articulating an Ecological Research Agenda for Global Change, p 269

Box 5-L — Building Blocks for Integrated Information Systems, p.270

Box 5-M — Restoration Ecology Giving Nature a Helping Hand Under Climate Change, p 276

Chapter 6 — Forests

Box 6-A — Major Forest Types of the United States, p.306

Box 6-B — Forests and Carbon Sequestration, p.310

BOX 6-C — Major Federal Laws Related to Forest Management, p.312

Box 6-D — Southern Bottomland Hardwoods: Converting Wetland Forests to Agriculture, p.316

Box 6-E — The Blue Mountains: Forest Decline and Climate Change, p.318

Box 6-F — Current Weather-Related Stresses on Selected Forests, p.324

Box 6-G — Private Property and Fire Risk, p.329

Box 6-H — Public Grazing Lands: Management Dilemmas, p.334

a Shading indicates boxes that discuss interactions across resource systems

increased erosion of coasts (see vol. 1, ch. 4).

Shifts in precipitation patterns could cause more

floods, droughts, water-supply disruptions, hydropower reductions, and groundwater overdrafts,

especially in the arid West (see vol. 1, ch. 5). The

ideal range for agricultural crops might move

north as temperatures increase, and drought losses

could become more frequent (see vol. 1, ch. 6).

Forests could experience more-frequent fire and

diebacks driven by drought, insects, and disease

(see vol. 2, ch. 6). It could become difficult to

retain unique assemblages of plants and animals

in preserves as the climate to which they are

adapted effectively shifts northward or to higher

elevations (see vol. 2, ch. 5). With sea level rise,

loss of coastal wetlands maybe accelerated, and

regional drying could eliminate some prairie

potholes (see vol. 2, ch. 4).

The loss of soil moisture that might result from

higher evaporation rates at warmer temperatures

is likely to present the greatest threat to natural

systems. Figure 1-1 shows areas of the United

States that may undergo significant changes in

soil moisture based on climate changes projected

by two GCMS. The Goddard Institute for Space

Studies (GISS) scenario suggests that large areas

face moderate drying. The Geophysical Fluid

Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) scenario shows

more severe drying across much of the eastern and

central United States. Figure 1-2 illustrates the
10 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

The summer floods of 1993 in the Midwest

demonstrate the risks of floodplain development

combined with intensive control of river flow.

The satellite photograph on the top shows the

Mississippi River as it appeared in July of 1988 during

the drought; the one on the bottom shows the same

area during the floods of July 1993.

extent to which changes in soil moisture could

affect U.S. lands in natural cover (e.g., forests and

wetlands) or agricultural use. Much of the Nation’s natural resource base may face at least

moderate drying, which is likely to increase stress

on vegetation.

It is impossible to estimate with any confidence

the cost of climate change to society. Estimates of

the costs to the United States resulting from an

average temperature increase of 4 to 5 OF (2 to

3o

C)4 range from 0.3 to 2.0 percent of the gross

national product (GNP) (22, 23)-corresponding

to tens of billions of dollars per year. Box 1-B

highlights a broad range of climate impacts that

could be caused by climate change.

Although it is desirable to anticipate climate

change, the uncertainties involved make the

design of appropriate policies challenging. These

uncertainties include: 1) the extent of global and

regional climate change, 2) its economic and

ecological impacts, and 3) the ability of society

to adapt.

 Uncertainties About Global and

Regional Climate Change

Atmospheric scientists generally agree about

the direction of climate change on a global and

latitudinal scale. Global temperatures will likely

rise, which would cause an increase in global

precipitation and sea levels. Temperature increases are likely to be greater at higher latitudes.

Winter precipitation could increase in middle and

high latitudes; decreased summer precipitation in

midcontinental, midlatitude regions could result

in reduced summer soil moisture (69). At finer

spatial scales, such as at the regional or State

level, uncertainty about climate change increases.

The rate of change is also uncertain. IPCC

estimated that global average temperatures will

increase at over 0.5 OF (0.3o C) per decade. As

average temperatures increase, the entire range of

expected temperatures increases as well; thus,

both the warmest and coolest temperatures experienced will be warmer than before. This does not

preclude late frosts or early freezes if variability

increases. Some analyses show that climate

variability may increase at the regional level-a

series of warm years in a region could be followed

by a series of cool years (195). There is, however,

significant uncertainty about whether the frequency and intensity of extreme events will

change. It is likely that, on average, precipitation

worldwide will increase with climate change (69),

but the models suggest that the interior of

continents will get drier. It is not known whether

droughts or floods will increase or decrease.

 is equilibrium warming 

to a doubling of above “ levels. Although leading to this is 

 2030, due several decades later.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 11

Figure l-l—Potential Sol I-Moisture Changes Under Two GCM Climate Change Scenarios

 Much

 Drier

GISS scenario

drier Much wetter

 Wetter

NOTE: GFDL=Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory; GISS--Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, ‘Ecosysatems at Risk to Potential Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,

June 1993.

Some analyses predict that hurricane intensities

could increase (43), and drought in lower latitudes could be more severe (144).

 Uncertainties About Direct Effects

Even if the regional changes in climate could

be predicted, important uncertainties would remain about the physical and biological effects

they would have. We do not really know how

vegetation, “ animals, and other natural resources

will be affected by climate change. Rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2 will change the

rates at which plants grow, respire, use water, and

set seeds. Numerous laboratory experiments on

intensively managed agricultural systems suggest

that CO2 will boost plant growth and productivity

as long as other nutrients are plentiful (6, 39, 81);

this is called the CO2 fertilization effect (see ch.

2). This effect has not yet been studied in many

natural ecosystems (72, 124). Many studies of

climate effects have used statistical models that

relate natural vegetation or crop productivity to

differences in current regional climates in order to

estimate impacts under climate change scenarios.

These are summarized in chapter 2 and in volume

1, chapter 6. The ability of plants and animals to

Figure 1-2-Soil-Moisture Changes for Agricultural

Lands and Areas of Natural Cover,

by GCM Climate Change Scenario

40

 Much wetter

I GISS —UKMO Wetter

I

Natural cover Agricultural land

NOTE: Bars above the zero axis show the percent of land area

becoming wetter; bars below the axis show the percent of land area

becoming drier. GFDL--Geophysical fluid Dynamics Laboratory; GISSGoddard Institute for Space studies; OSU-Oregon State University;

and UKMO-United Kingdom Meteorological Office.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystems at Risk to Potential Climate

Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, June 1993.
12 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box I-B-How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems1

Natural ecosystems-These may be the systems most vulnerable to climate change. We are least able to

intervene and help with adaptation of natural ecosystems because of limited knowledge about ecological

processes (see chs. 2 and 3). The shift in climate zones may far exceed the ability of vegetation, such as forests,

to adapt through migration (see fig. 1-7). Climate zones may shift hundreds of miles in a century, whereas natural

rates of dispersal and colonization maybe on the order of tens of miles in the same time period (35). In addition,

fire and disease could result in rapid dieback of many existing forests and other terrestrial ecosystems (157).

Helping plants to migrate through such activities as widespread seed dispersal would be very expensive and have

dubious prospects for success (188). These issues are discussed in detail in “Forests” (vol. 2, ch. 6).

Climate change could also lead to a loss of species diversity. Isolated (“island”) species may find

themselves in climate zones that are no longer suitable for their survival (132). The potential for migration of plants

and animals to new suitable habitats is not known, but barriers such as water bodies or development could impede

migration (see fig. 1-6), Species in mountainous terrain could migrate to higher elevations. This creates reduced

habitat areas, which are correlated with reductions in species diversity. For example, a study ofa5‘F (3 ‘C)

warming in the Great Basin National Park in eastern Nevada concluded that it would cause 20 to 50 percent of

species in individual mountain ranges to go extinct (108). The ability for human intervention to maintain species

diversity in the face of climate change is currently limited. Selected species could be transplanted to new habitats,

but this could be very resource intensive and would only be feasible in certain cases; Iittle research has actually

been done on transplantation of multiple-species systems. Migration corridors could be created, but their chances

of success are limited because migration rates are slow and the direction of species migration is unknown. In

addition, the creation of corridors maybe relatively expensive compared with setting aside new protected areas

(154). These issues are discussed further in “Preserves: Federally Protected Natural Areas” (vol. 2, ch. 5).

Climate change can result in the loss of coastal wetlands directly through sea level rise, and indirectly,

through interaction with societal response to sea level rise. Many coastal wetlands will likely be inundated because

the sea will rise faster than wetland sediments accrue (161). Some wetlands will adapt to climate change by

migrating upland with the rising tides. The areas with the greatest risk of wetland loss are along the Gulf and East

Coasts of the United States (see fig. 1 -4). This will result in a net loss of wetlands because vast areas of tidal flats,

such as in the Mississippi Delta, will be inundated, while inland migration will create new wetlands having only a

fraction of the area of today’s wetlands.2 This net loss of wetlands will be even larger where coastal structures,

such as bulkheads or levees, block the inland migration of wetlands (162).

Even if it were feasible to create new coastal wetlands, the costs of this would be so high that large-scale

restoration programs would become unattractive. The average cost of creating wetlands has been estimated at

roughly $20,000 to $45,000 per acre ($50,000 to $100,000 per hectare),3 not including land-acquisition costs.4

This figure, however, can vary from just a few hundred dollars per acre to many hundreds of thousands of

dollars per acre. Though technology is improving (see vol. 2, box 4-A), attempts to recreate wetland structure and

function fully have been limited. Prohibiting the construction of or removing coastal structures would enable more

wetlands to colonize upland areas. It may not be feasible to move some existing coastal structures that impede

wetland migration. For example, it is unlikely that areas of dense development would be relocated.

1 This box is a compendium of information drawn from previous studies, recent research, and OTA’S

assessment. The back chapters of this report discuss a subset of these issues.

2 S. Leatherman, University of Maryland at College Park, personal communication, November 1992.

3 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

4 D. King, Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, University of Maryland, personal communication, November

1992.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 13

Prairie pothole and riparian wetlands in regions that get drier maybe at greater risk than those in regions that

get wetter. For example, in the North central States, increases in temperatures and evaporation rates could cause

many prairie potholes to shrink or disappear, leading to further declines in already diminished continental waterfowl

populations (9). Tundra may shrink as increased temperatures allow the permafrost to thaw and drain (see box

l-G). In addition, wetlands of any type that are already degraded by pollution, water diversions, or fragmentation

may also be particularly vulnerable (1 98, 199). The status and vulnerability of coastal, riparian, depressional, and

tundra wetlands are discussed in “Wetlands” (vol. 2, ch. 4).

Fisheries-The potential effects of climate change on aquatic ecosystems have been studied very Iittle to

date, and could vary significantly. in some cases, marine fish maybe able to migrate to new, more suitable habitats,

depending on several factors, if food sources are available (80). Some freshwater fish in open waters, such as

the Great Lakes, could benefit from a larger thermal niche (98). Fish in small lakes and streams, however, may

suffer from increases in temperature that adversely affect survival, reproduction, or their ability to migrate to cooler

locations (101). Changes in water quality will also affect the survival of aquatic organisms. Climate change may

alter circulation patterns in many lakes, reducing dissolved-oxygen concentrations. Higher temperatures will also

act to reduce dissolved-oxygen concentrations (71). Sea level rise will increase saltwater intrusion of estuaries,

potentially benefiting marine fish at the expense of freshwater species (80). However, changes in estuaries could

have broad impacts on the U.S. fishery. By far, the greatest portion of commercial catches, with the exception of

those from Alaskan fisheries, are composed of estuarine-dependent species (139). Ongoing alterations of critical

habitat (such as those caused by geographic fragmentation and pollution) may be exacerbated by climate change.

Box 2-C (ch. 2) discusses, by region, the condition and value of fisheries today, current problems, and the potential

impacts of climate change.

Agriculture--This system is very sensitive to climate, but climate change impacts maybe offset by intense

management over short time frames. High temperatures and drought could reduce crop yields, although this effect

could be counteracted by higher atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and longer growing seasons in

higher latitudes (129). The potential for agricultural adaptation, particularly at the farm level, is very high (30).

Changes in management practices (e.g., changing planting dates or using irrigation or crop-switching) can reduce

or eliminate many of the potentially negative impacts of climate change. Shifts in climate zones would result in

changes in relative productivity levels, with some areas increasing output, and other areas reducing output due

to increased competition (l). See “Agriculture” (vol. 1, ch. 6) for further discussion.

Coastal resources-Cities, roads, airports, and other coastal resources are vulnerable to flooding from sea

level rise and hurricanes. The population near the coast is growing faster than populations in any other region of

the country, and the construction of buildings and infrastructure to serve this growing population is proceeding

rapidly. As a result, protection against and recovery from hazards peculiar to t he coastal zone, such as hurricanes

and sea level rise, are becoming ever more costly (11). The combination of popularity and risk in coastal areas

has important near-term consequences for the safety of coastal residents, protection of property, maintenance of

local economies, and preservation of remaining natural areas. These points are discussed further in “Coasts” (vol.

1, ch. 4).

Water resources-These resources are vulnerable to several climate change impacts. Changes in

precipitation and higher levels of evapotranspiration can combine to affect surface-water and groundwater

supplies, flood and drought frequency, and hydropower production. Arid basins could experience the largest

relative change in water flow from climate change (67). Numerous studies have been conducted on the relative

vulnerability of the major US. river basins to flood and drought, supply disruptions, hydropower reductions,

groundwater overdrafts, and extreme events (48, 49,88, 188). They conclude that the water resource regions most

vulnerable to some or all of these events are the Great Basin, California, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas Gulf, Rio

Grande, and Lower Colorado (see fig. 1-5). See “Water” (vol. 1, ch. 5) for more information; Appendix 5.1 lists

State-by-State problems.

(Continued on next page)
14 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-B-How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems--(Continued)

Human health-Climate change could affect human health, but there is a great deal of uncertainty about

whether mortality and morbidity would actually increase and about the potential for adaptive measures (such as

the use of air conditioning) to offset any negative impacts. Several studies have concluded that the potential range

of infectious diseases could shift with climate change, but the exact nature of these shifts is uncertain (94). Even

if the range of disease-carrying vectors, such as mosquitoes, changes, enhanced pest-control measures could

nullify the increased threat of disease. Effects of climate change in other countries could displace some

populations. If “environmental refugees” lead to an increase in immigration, there is the potential for increased

importation of communicable diseases into the United States (184). Other studies have shown that climate change

could lead to increased cases of heat-stress mortality (74). Uncertainties about changes in human physiological

and behavioral response make it difficult to draw conclusions about the risks of climate change to human

health.

Energy-Higher temperatures will no doubt increase energy demand for cooling and decrease energy

demand for heating. This would result in an increase in the demand for electricity (primarily for air conditioning)

and for electric-generating capacity (93). This new demand would not be completely offset by reductions in the

use of oil and gas for heating (98). The largest capital costs would be associated with increased power plant

construction, which could cost as much as $170 to $320 billion, about 12 percent more than the increases in

capacity needed to meet population and economic growth through the middle of the next century (93). As with sea

level rise, adapting to increased energy demand could involve significant costs.

Transportation-Some forms of transportation could be positively or negatively affected by climate change.

inland shipping may be the most sensitive to climate change. On the one hand, warmer winters would likely result

in less ice cover and a longer shipping season. For example, ice cover on the Great Lakes could be reduced by

5 to 13 weeks (4), lowering shipping and related costs (78). On the other hand, lower river flow and lake levels

could increase shipping costs by reducing shipping tonnage capacity or blocking shipping (143). Some roads near

the coast may have to be moved or protected from sea level rise. In many instances, adaptation is highly probable

in transportation at some cost to the economy (see vol. 1, box 5-E, “Navigating the Mississippi through Wet and

Dry Times”).

adapt to changes in climate, either through ■ Uncertainties About Society’s

physiological adjustment or through migration, is Ability to Adapt

uncertain. Historically, trees can disperse and

migrate about 60 miles (100 kilometers)5 

per

century, but the projected rates of temperature

change would require migration rates 5 to 10

times faster for forests to remain in suitable

habitats (35, 36). The success with which natural

vegetation can migrate will depend on seed

dispersal, physical barriers to migration (e.g.,

mountains and developed land), competition

between species, and the availability of fertile

soils in areas of suitable climate.

Finally, how society will respond to whatever

climate change occurs and the resulting impacts

are uncertain. Coping with climate change can

take the form of technical, institutional, regulatory, behavioral, and economic adjustments.

Future technologies and levels of income are

unknown, although they will most likely improve

and increase and will aid in adaptation (5). Will

population growth or environmental consensus

limit or expand adaptation options? Will people

5 To convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 15

Box 1-B-How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems--(Continued)

The table below summarizes potential climate change impacts for these various systems.

Potential Climate Change Impacts for Various Systems

Systems Potential impacts

Forests/terrestrial vegetation Migration of vegetation.

Reduction in inhabited range.

Altered ecosystem composition.

Species diversity Loss of diversity.

Migration of species.

Invasion of new species.

Coastal wetlands Inundation of wetlands.

Migration of wetlands.

Aquatic ecosystems Loss of habitat.

Migration to new habitats,

Invasion of new species.

Coastal resources Inundation of coastal development.

Increased risk of flooding.

Water resources Changes in supplies.

Changes in drought and floods.

Changes in water quality and hydropower production.

Agriculture Changes in crop yields.

Shifts in relative productivity and production,

Human health Shifts in range of infectious diseases.

Changes in heat-stress and cold-weather afflictions,

Energy Increase in cooling demand.

Decrease in heating demand.

Changes in hydropower output.

Transportation Fewer disruptions of winter transportation.

Increased risk for summer inland navigation.

Risks to coastal roads.

SOURCE: J.B. Smith and J. Mueller-Vollmer, “Setting Priorities for Adapting to Climate

Change,” contractor paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, March

1992.

react quickly and efficiently to trends deemed CHOOSING ADAPTATION STRATEGIES

outside the range of normal, or will they assume

that conditions will return to-historic no&? Will How should” decisionmakers incorporate the

people overreact to periodic climate extremes uncertainties posed by a changing climate into

that do not actually signal a substantial change in long-term plans for resource systems? What can

the underlying climate? Responses to recent be done to minimize vulnerability to climate

extreme events, such as the Mississippi River change? Uncertainty makes acting now difficult,

flooding in the summer of 1993, may provide an but it also makes preparing for a wide range and

interesting lesson. intensity of climate impacts essential.
16 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate --Volume 1

The Grand Teton National Park, along with other

national parks and preserves, provides habitat for

countless species of birds and wildlife. The parks and

preserves also offer extensive recreational opportunities such as hiking, camping, nature study, and

photography. These are examples of services at risk

from climate change.

Possible responses to the threat of climate

change depend on what one wants to save. Do we

try to maintain systems in their current form (e.g.,

the extent of forests and the varieties of crops), or

do we maintain the services they provide (e.g.,

enough food for the population, scenic views,

beach recreation facilities)? Do we wish to

minimize the economic costs of facing a changing

climate? Do we attempt to forestall only catastrophic events? However these interests are

balanced, two general primary characteristics of

adaptation policies stand out: flexibility and

robustness. By helping to ensure quick and

effective response to changing circumstances

(flexibility) and by being prepared for the worst

(robustness), the potential costs of an uncertain

future climate can be reduced.

Just how much effort should be expended to

avoid future risks will ultimately depend on the

perceived costs of the effort compared with the

likelihood and scale of future damages that will be

avoided. In some cases, the same strategies that

help protect against climate risks might also

provide some immediate and certain benefits:

enhanced services from natural systems, improved productivity in managed systems, better

means for dealing with existing climate variability and weather extremes, or reduced environmental damages from managed systems. The

costs of these low-regrets strategies or activities

may be relatively easy to defend. Other activities,

however, would be most useful only in the event

of severe climate change. The costs of such

activities may be considered in the same light in

which we consider the purchase of insurance--

it may be better to pay a relatively small premium now than to be uninsured against the threat

of severe and more costly ecological and economic damage.

 Enhancing Flexibility

Any policies that improve the chances of

adapting more smoothly and painlessly provide a

buffer against the negative impacts of climate

change. Flexible systems and policies are those

that allow self-adjustments or midcourse corrections as needed without major economic or social

disruption. For example, flexible systems can be

fine-tuned to cope with hot and dry weather as

well as more-intense rainstorms. The system

should work now, under current climate conditions. Flexibility would not preclude potentially

desirable actions or lock policy makers into

expensive, irreversible decisions. For example, in

some cases, building a dam is a less flexible

policy than is water conservation. If new information becomes available that suggests that the dam

is not needed in that location or is the wrong size,

fine-tuning is difficult. Efforts to conserve water

can (within limits) be used to supply quantities of

water without building new, expensive infrastructure with 50- to 100-year lifetimes; the policy is

also reversible in times when water is plentiful

(see vol. 1, boxes 5-G, 5-H, 5-I, and 5-J).

Advancing the knowledge base will enhance

flexibility. In agriculture, the development of new

crops suited to a wide variety of climates,

improved understanding of the performance of

crops under a changing climate, and continuing
Chapter 1--Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 17

education and extension programs to provide

better-informed decisionmakin“ g by farmers will

all help smooth the path of adaptation (see vol. 1,

ch. 6). In general, research that clarifies how

systems respond to climate change will help

identify and expand the range of possible adaptive actions and will speed their successful

implementation.

Removing legislative or administrative constraints that now limit our ability to change would

also promote flexibility. For example, the complicated programs of price supports in agriculture

now penalize farmers who choose to change

planting or management practices significantly.

Given the importance of agriculture in the United

States, large economic costs could be associated

with even brief delays in agricultural adjustment

to a changing climate. Other subsidies, such as

those for irrigation and those implicit in the

support for infrastructure in coastal zones, add to

our inflexibility by encouraging the development

of built systems in areas that maybe increasingly

at risk to natural disasters. Resolving conflicts

over the use of natural resources, through the

creation of organizational structures or market

incentives, should also help with our ability to

implement change.

I Enhancing Robustness

Policies can also minimize the risk of adverse

effects from climate change by making systems

less sensitive to climate. Robust systems are those

that can tolerate a wide range of climate conditions and are, therefore, less vulnerable to climate

change extremes. Actions that increase robustness in a system are those that help protect against

the threat of large-scale losses or climate surprises. The robustness of a system can be increased in several ways. One is to take actions that

make the system itself inherently more tolerant of

a variety of climate conditions. For example,

developing and planting crops that perform reasonably well under a wide range of climates may

be wise no matter how the climate changes.

Adding capacity to dams or other structures can

make them more ‘‘robust, ’ that is, able to

accommodate greater variability in precipitation.

Another way to increase robustness is to put a

variety of mechanisms in place to protect against

possible losses, hoping that some mechanisms

will succeed even if others fail. For example, a

mix of management strategies for forests and

natural areas could be used to protect against

climate change.

Improving the robustness of a system will often

require an insurance strategy something must

be initiated now in order to avoid extremely high

costs under a much warmer climate. The idea is

that paying a small amount now will reduce the

risks of a major loss in the future. For example,

establishing gene banks or learning how to

undertake ecosystem restoration may be an “investment’ that would reduce the risks of catastrophic forest or ecosystem loss in the future.

Efforts that enhance the general health, productivity, or quality of a system can also enhance

robustness by making the system more resilient,

or able to tolerate some climate-related stresses.

Actions promoting robustness include improving

the quality and protection of wetlands, minimizing existing threats to natural areas, and establishing new preserves (see vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

Plannin g and management measures that avert

trends that make adaptation more difficult in the

future are also robust strategies.

It is not immediately obvious that natural

systems, such as forests or wetlands, are less

robust (more vulnerable) in the short term than are

managed systems such as agriculture and watersupply systems. Natural systems do have some

inherent buffering to protect themselves against

existing climate variability. However, what may

put natural systems at greater risk than systems

that are actively managed is continued stress from

climate change over a long time period. Once a

natural system declines, it may take many years to

recover. Of particular concern is the possibility

that losses to natural systems may be irreversible, such as the loss of species. In managed
18 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

systems, it is much more likely that there would

be intervention to reduce the losses because the

economic value at stake is often very high.

I Applying the Criteria

Federal agencies are currently making many

decisions about the management of natural resources that could be significantly affected by

climate change. What the Federal Government

decides now about the management of water

supplies, forests, wetlands, fish, wildlife, and

other issues could limit or foreclose the ability of

these resources and their managers to adapt to the

future effects of climate change, or could help

make us better prepared to deal with an uncertain

climate future.

Given the broad criteria of flexibility and

robustness, we identified a large class of policy

options that could remove inefficiencies, address

existing problems, and help insure against the

uncertainties posed by climate change to resource

systems. Many studies term such options no

regrets or low regrets because they make sense to

pursue now, even assuming no climate change.

The question that arises is: Why are actions that

are supposed to be prudent, anyway, even without

the added impetus of climate change, being

pursued in such a limited way (5)? Actions that

appear reasonable for protecting resources cannot

be considered in a vacuum. In reality, there are

barriers of many sorts-in information, institutions, and process-even to options that appear to

be low regrets. OTA’S policy analysis focused on

these barriers and tried to identify ways to

overcome them.

Another large class of policy options calls for

us to be prepared for the worst. Whether these

options will still be seen as no-regrets once

climate does change may depend on the rapidity

and magnitude of that climate change, and the

future response of decisionmakers. If, in the face

of significant climate change, the no-regrets

options prove inadequate, there could indeed be

regrets that substantially more aggressive measures were not taken earlier. OTA has also looked

at some of the more aggressive measures that

would be appropriate if the likelihood of climate

change is considered high.

The policy options presented in this report to

enhance the flexibility and robustness of the

various resource systems represent a gradation

from ‘‘learn more about the natural resource

system” to “improve the technology or knowhow required for adaptation” to “relax the

institutional constraints that tend to inhibit the

ability or incentive to respond. ” This gradation

depends on whether the ability to respond to

climate change is limited by information, by

available technologies, or by the institutions that

govern the system.

Coastal systems and water resources (discussed in vol. 1, chs. 4 and 5, respectively) face

many institutional factors that may limit adaptation. Theoretically, there is enough water to

supply needs throughout the United States, even

under climate change. We know how to move

water from one place to another and have

technologies to save water or even to make fresh

water from salt water. However, the complex

system of water rights, lack of incentives to

conserve water, and limits on the transferability

of water result in daunting institutional constraints and inflexibility. In coastal systems, the

infrastructure of roads and bridges and subsidized

flood insurance encourage a degree of development in high-risk zones that maybe economically

unwise even under current climate conditions and

sea levels.

In agriculture, market incentives and annual

planting cycles make the system quite responsive,

or flexible, to change. As long as there are

continued efforts in research, technology, and

innovation that expand the base on which adaptation can proceed, coping with climate change

should be relatively easy for agriculture-barring

catastrophic changes (vol. 1, ch. 6). Yet, whether

adaptation is optimal may depend greatly on our

ability to remove certain institutional incentives

that may encourage uneconomic farming of areas
Chapter 1--Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 19

where climatic risks are high. In this regard, farm

subsidies and disaster-assistance programs need

review and, likely, adjustment.

For less-managed systems, our ability to facilitate natural adaptation is limited by inadequate

information or understanding of natural processes

and by the narrow range of available and suitable

technologies for adaptation. In wetlands (vol. 2,

ch. 4), sea level rise and changes in the timing and

amount of precipitation will exacerbate ongoing

habitat loss. Efforts to reduce current loss will

make the system more robust and improve

chances for adaptation to climate change. Actions

to minimize the possibility of irreversible damage

should receive high priority. For forests and

natural preserves (vol. 2, chs. 5 and 6), climate

change may make the continued existence of

unique assemblages of plants and animals questionable. Natural areas have become the repository of biodiversity in the United States. Yet little

is known about maintaining, changing, restoring,

or transplanting natural ecosystems. There is no

systematic effort to document what is currently

preserved and how that can be augmented or

protected under climate change. Enhancing these

areas through strategic acquisitions of land or

land easements and through innovative coordination of management with adjacent landowners

offers great promise as an approach for maximizing protection of biodiversity. Filling in gaps in

our knowledge through research would allow us

to better manage and protect these areas and to

reduce the risk of decline under climate change.

OVERARCHING POLICY THEMES

As we developed and evaluated policy options,

using the criteria described above, for the six

different resource sectors examined in this report,

many sector-specific policy options appeared to

coalesce into several broad themes, or problems.

Four particular themes were found to be shared by

several or all of the sectors:

■ geographic and institutional fragmentation,

w inadequate communication of climate risk,

■

9

the need for contingency planning, and

an ongoing Federal research effort-the

U.S. Global Change Research Progrogram--

that will not fill many key research and

information gaps.

Each chapter addresses these themes within the

context of the appropriate resource sector, but the

common threads are highlighted here. Below, we

describe the overarching themes more fully and

illustrate some possible directions Congress could

take to begin addressing these broader policy

challenges. Box 1-C examines some specific

options from the resource chapters, and relates

them to these common themes.

H

is

a

Fragmentation

A key problem in natural resource management

that the most sensible management units from

resource perspective—watersheds or ecosystems-rarely correspond to the boundaries

within which resources are actually managed.

Furthermore, resources are usually owned and

managed for multiple purposes. Many different

government agencies and private owners may

have some responsibility for the management of

a given resource, with differing incentives motivating its management and use. As a result,

resources may be fragmented geographically and

jurisdictionally.

One aspect of fragmentation is the geographical division of landscapes and ecosystems that

results from uncoordinated development and the

encroachment of human activity. Such activity

has left few ecosystems intact in the lower 48

States (the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is

often cited as the most important remaining

example). Inmost parts of the country, remaining

natural areas have become “islands’ of habitat,

surrounded by developed or altered landscapes

and vulnerable to a variety of human stresses (see

vol. 2, box 5-E). This fragmentation of former

large ecosystems has led to greater stress on the

natural resources within the remaining fragments.

Many natural areas, including the federally pro-
20 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-C-Solutions from General to Specific: Addressing the Overarching Problems

During the course of developing policy options for coping with climate change, OTA heard repeatedly from

many experts that climate change alone is not necessarily the most worrisome threat to natural resources. Rather,

climate change is likely to exacerbate various trends and problems that already plague natural resource

management. Current management policies and practices for coasts, water resources, agriculture, wetlands,

natural areas, and forests are perceived in many quarters as being inadequate in ways that not only hinder

management today, but could impose greater constraints under a changing climate. Four particular problems were

found to be common to several or all of the sectors: 1) institutional and geographical fragmentation;

2) Inadequate communication of information that would improve response to climatic risks; 3) lack of

contingency planning and other measures to prepare for extreme events or weather surprises; and

4) information gaps in various key scientific and policy areas.

Addressing these overarching problems will pose numerous challenges for Congress and Federal agencies.

All four problems have been recognized to varying degrees in the past, but progress toward solving them has been

slow. Attempting to solve any of them could require far-reaching policy changes, but small piecemeal actions could

be undertaken for individual resource sectors by many different government agencies or by congressional

appropriations, legislation, and oversight committees. Big, bold policy changes could accomplish the job more

uniformly or effectively, but reaching agreement on solutions and then garnering sufficient support to implement

them could prove impossible. Incremental changes do not require such widespread support and may accomplish

specific goals, but such policies can also detract from needed larger changes by leaving the impression that no

further action is necessary.

In the resource and research chapters of this report (vols. 1 and 2, chs. 3 through 6), we suggest numerous

policy options that address parts of the four overarching problems in ways that are specific to each resource sector.

In many cases these resource-specific options could be formulated in broader terms to attempt across-the-board

solutions to the overarching problems identified above. Furthermore, many of the sector-specific options are

interconnected, and could be more effective if enacted in a coordinated way. In some cases, any of several

different resource-specific policy options could forma first step toward solving an overarching problem. A few of

these options are described below.

Fragmentation

Options to help reduce institutional fragmentation include:

Promoting the reestablishment and strengthening of Federal-State river basin commissions to improve

coordination among agencies. (Vol. 1, option 5-11—’’Water.”)

Promoting integrated resource management at the watershed level, (Vol. 2, option 4-22-’’Wetlands.”)

Creating a Federal coordinating council for ecosystem management. (Vol. 2, option 5-12–’’Preserves.”)

Amending the Science Policy Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) to strengthen the ability of the Office of Science and

Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology

(FCCSET) to coordinate research and ecosystem management across agencies. (Vols. 1 and 2, option

3-1-’’Research.”)

Although these options seem varied, all four address, in some way, the problem of institutional fragmentation and

the need for greater coordination and integrated management. If enacted individually, these policies could focus

on specific problems in the management of water resources, wetlands, and preserves. However, any of the four

could also serve as part of a larger effort to coordinate the management of all three resources. Reinstated river

basin commissions could form a local base for watershed management that could be broadened to include

attention to wetlands and other natural areas within the watershed. Similarly, a Federal coordinating council for

ecosystem management could use watershed units as one level of coordination and examine the interac-
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 21

tion of water resources with other natural resources in that unit. The problem in trying to expand any of these

individual options to cover the overarching concerns would be in how best to assign authority and enforcement

capabilities for any coordinating agency without interfering with the jurisdiction of the agencies to be coordinated.

Options to help reduce geographic fragmentation include:

Identifying and assigning priorities to the wetlands that are most important to protect and restore. (vol. 2, Option

4-19-- "Wetlands.”)

Directing agencies to modify their criteria for land acquisition to include underrepresented ecosystems and

long-term survivability. (Vol. 2, option 5-9-’’ Preserve”)”)

Using current conservation incentive programs administered by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to

enhance the Federal effort to protect natural areas. (Vol. 2, option 5-16-’’ Preserve”)”)

Protecting highly valued forest sites. (Vol. 2, option 6-4-’’Forests.”)

Providing incentives to reduce fragmentation of private forestland. (Vol. 2, option 6-5-’’Forests.”)

Several of the policy options for wetlands, preserves, and forests either explicitly address the problem of

geographic fragmentation or could be used to do so. The options listed above would promote priority setting for

land acquisition or restoration of valuable natural areas, including wetlands, forests, and other typesof preserves.

Reducing landscape fragmentation could be viewed as a high-priority goal. Furthermore, existing conservation

incentive programs of various types could be required to focus on the lands most valuable for preventing or

ameliorating fragmentation.

Communication of climate risk

Options to communicate risk through modifying subsidies include:

■ Raising premium rates for the National flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policyholders who receive subsidized

flood insurance. (Vol. 1, option 4-1-’’Coasts.”)

■ Reducing the Federal share of public disaster assistance. (Vol. 1, option 4-7-’’ Coast”)”)

■ Reforming pricing in Federal water projects. (Vol. 1, option 5-5--"Water.”)

■ Defining disasters formally, with assistance provided only for unusual losses. (Vol. 1, option 6-3--’’Agriculture.”)

■ Improving participation in the crop-insurance program. (Vol. 1, option 6-5--’’Agriculture.”)

■ Eliminating incentives to destroy wetlands. (Vol. 2, option 4-8-"Wetlands.”)

■ Reducing Federal subsidies, such as Coastal Zone Management funds and flood insurance, in areas that have

not established setback or “planned retreat” policies. (Vol. 2, option 4-16-’ ’Wetland”)”)

One of the major ways the Federal Government affects the responsiveness to climate risk is in the distribution of

public money for disaster assistance and insurance subsidies. Subsidized and regulated prices distort the

perception of changing risks and could slow the response to growing water scarcity and to increases in the

frequency of droughts, floods, and storms. The options listed above suggest that policies to reduce or eliminate

such subsidies could be beneficial in encouraging greater precautions and faster responses to changing climate

risk in nearly every individual resource sector-as well as in reducing Federal spending in an era of constrained

budgets. If enacted together, these options could go a long way toward addressing the overarching problem of

misperception of risk.

Options to communicate risk through tax signals include:

■ Eliminating or reducing tax benefits for coastal development (such as the casualty-loss deduction). (Vol. 1,

option 4-16--"Coasts.”)

■ Reforming tax provisions to promote conservation investments. (Vol. 1, option 5-4--"Water.”)

■ Using current conservation incentive programs administered by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to

enhance the Federal effort to protect natural areas. (Vol. 2, option 5-9--’’ Preserves.”)

(Continued on next page)
22 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-C-Solutions from General to Specific:

Addressing the Overarching Problems--(Continued)

The U.S. Tax Code can provide both incentives and disincentives for financial risks. Tax incentives can be used

to encourage behavior that might reduce risks to humans and the environment, including investments in water

conservation and in protecting natural areas. Tax disincentives could be used to help prevent unproductive

behavior, such as coastal development in high-risk zones or where development leads to the destruction of

wetlands or creates barriers against their movement inland as the sea level rises.

Other options to communicate risk include:

Improving the research and extension process (develop a database on successful practices; expand farmer

involvement; provide support for on-farm experimentation). (Vol. 1, option 6-11—’’Agriculture.”)

Incorporating climate change scenarios into forest plans and assessments. (Vol. 2, option 6-11—’’Forests.”)

Eliminating the even-flow-harvest requirement of the National Forest Management Act (P.L. 94-566), which

falsely implies that future timber supplies will be stable). (Vol. 2, option 6-12–’’Forests.”)

Incorporating sea level rise into National Flood insurance Program mapping. (Vol. 2, option 4-5--’’Coasts.”)

The Government is the source of considerable information that can serve to improve private sector response to

a changing climate. Outreach and extension services will be valuable in communicating changes in the

effectiveness of farm management techniques and crop choices, speeding t he process of adaptation. Inventories,

monitoring, climate data, and resource-status assessments will indicate trends in natural resource conditions and

signal changes in the future supply of products and service from natural resource systems. Better understanding

of these trends will help businesses and individuals to anticipate and adjust more effectively to changing future

conditions. Inappropriate signals about climate risk that create an unrealistic expectation of stable conditions may

encourage unwise financial investments in resource-dependent communities that are at risk of decline. The public

generally is not well-informed about the risks associated with living in coastal areas, and this lack of awareness

has led and will continue to lead to large public and private expenditures. Educating people now about the risk

of a rising sea level could greatly reduce future damages.

Contingency planning

Options to formalize contingency planning include:

■ Creating an interagency drought task force to develop a national drought policy and plan. (Vol. 1, option

5-l&’ ’Water.”)

■ Creating a national flood-assessment board. (Vol. 1, option 5-17--’’Water.”)

■ Establishing criteria for intervention in order to protect or restore forest health through a forest health bill. (Vol.

2, option 6-7—’’Forests.”)

Droughts, forest fires, floods, and hurricanes have all become the focus of public attention in recent years after

events such as the nationwide drought in 1968, the 5-year California drought of 1968-1992, the Mississippi floods

in the summer of 1993, and Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew in 1968 and 1992. In many cases, contingency plans

set up to deal with such disasters were either inadequate or nonexistent. Policy options for water resources and

forests suggest different types of contingency planning that may help address future disasters as the climate

changes. Because the presence of forests and wetlands moderates how water moves through the landscape, both

should be considered in flood planning and development.

Options that add a measure of “insurance” against catastrophic events include:

■ Increasing support for the development of new commercial crops. (Vol. 1, option 6-14--"Agriculture.”)

❑ Conducting research on natural resources to prepare for climate change (restoration ecology, preservation of

biodiversity, effective preserve design). (Vol. 2, option 5-2—’’Preserves.”)

■ Directing agencies to modify their criteria for land acquisition to include underrepresented ecosystems and

long-term survivability. (Vol. 2, option 5-9—’’Preserve”)”)
Chapter 1-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 23

■ Enhancing forest seed banks and genetics research programs. (Vol. 2, option 6-1—’’Forests.”)

Preparing for extreme future climate conditions through the development of technologies or institutions will assist

in recovery and can help reduce the threat of future damage. The development of crops well-suited to harsher

future climate may provide some insurance against a steep decline in our agricultural sector. Contingency

preparations for forests and preserves must consider the potential need for active restoration or protection if natural

processes become excessively disturbed. Seed banks may provide the material to rebuild a forest in the event

of severe decline and loss of species or populations from their natural range.

Information gaps

Options to help decrease these gaps include:

■ Supporting long-term research and monitoring on the impacts of climate change on wetlands. (Vol. 2, option

4-24--’’Wetlands.”)

■ Increasing funding for ecological research in the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). (Vol. 2,

option 5-1--’’Preserves.”)

■ Supporting coordinated research in federally protected natural areas. (Vol. 2, option 5-4--’’Preserves.”)

■ Creating a national program for inventorying and monitoring. (Vol. 2, option 5-5-’’ Preserve”)”)

■ Using the Experimental Forests for research on adaptation to climate change. (Vol. 2, option 6-2—’’Forests.”)

● Using existing monitoring and inventorying efforts to identify causes and effects of forest decline. (Vol. 2,option

6-6--’’Forests.”)

■ Creating an Integrated Assessment program within or outside USGCRP positioned above the agency level,

(Vols. 1 and 2, option 3-8-’’Research.”)

■ Creating an adaptation and mitigation research program either within USGCRP or separate but parallel to it.

(Vols. 1 and 2, option 3-+’’ Research.”)

Many policy options suggest particular research questions or promote the use of specific existing programs to

address some of the information gaps regarding climate change. Coordinating these different research efforts

and ensuring that each considers some of the related concerns of others might yield synergistic results. For

example, while the Experimental Forests should be useful sites for examining how forests may adapt to climate

change, research could be focused more broadly to consider issues that affect natural areas (including questions

of how to maintain biodiversity and how to restore damaged ecosystems) and forested wetlands.

While these research programs in individual areas are forming useful building blocks toward solving the

overarching problem of Iack of knowledge, a broader program of coordinated research across-the-board could also

be attempted. Some of the research listed could be coordinated under the Ecological Systems and Processes

priority group in the USGCRP. However, the USGCRP goals and purview need to be broadened to include

ecosystem research, adaptation and mitigation research, and an iterative integrated assessment in order to be

more useful to policy-making.

tected natural areas, may not be large enough to sheds, for example, for dozens of Federal, State,

withstand future stresses such as climate change.

Managing smaller areas as individual parcels in

an uncoordinated manner and without larger

needs in mind has become part of the problem.

A second aspect of fragmentation is the inefficiency that results from a lack of coordination in

management across government agencies. It is

not uncommon in even relatively small waterand local agencies to share jurisdiction overwater

and other natural resources. For instance, the

Delaware River Basin is divided among four

States (fig. 1-3). Responsibility for water resources alone in this basin is divided among at

least 10 agencies in each of the four States and

among more than 20 Federal agencies. In most

basins, responsibility for groundwater manage-
24 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--VoIume 1

u Figure 1-3-The Delaware River Basin

Albany 

 CONNECTICUT

MARYLAND

 on, DC

DELAWARE

NOTE: As is typical of many watersheds, the boundaries of the Delaware River Basin do not coincide with legislated boundaries. The multiple

jurisdictions make management more difficult.

SOURCE: W.E. Harkness, H.F. Uris, and W.M. Alley, “Drought in the Delaware River Basin, 1984-85,” in: National Water Summary

1985-Hydrological Events and Surface Water Resources, U.S. Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 2300 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Off be, 1986).
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 25

ment is separate from that for surface-water

management (see also vol. 1, box 5-D). Water

quality and water quantity are usually treated

separately. And jurisdiction over navigation,

recreation, flood control, and wetlands may also

be split, although all these aspects of water

resource management are related and may affect

one another. Problems are encountered in managing a single reservoir as if its operation does not

affect how others within a basin are operated, or

in managing to control floods without considering the role of wetlands. The result of this

jurisdictional fragmentation is often seen in

conflicting efforts, high management costs, and

foregone opportunities to provide better overall

service. These inefficiencies may be of increasing

concern if climate changes threaten the supply

and services of natural resources. Box 1-D

describes the complexities of trying to manage a

growing urban center, agricultural areas, and

the Everglades of South Florida (see also vol. 1,

box 5-B).

More effective management for coping with

current and potential future stresses on natural

resources and built systems is possible and

needed. Today’s agency-by-agency, owner-byowner, and system-by-system management

approach leaves much to be desired. Many

improvements can be made by going beyond our

customary fragmented style of management to

consider more comprehensively the services of

watersheds, ecosystems, and landscapes (see vol.

2, box 5-F). Within most sectors or systems

examined in this report, we have identified

options that can begin moving toward more

integrated management and reduced geographical

fragmentation: breaking down institutional barriers among agencies, acquiring and consolidating

natural areas, and providing private owners with

incentives to maintain the environmental services

of a landscape. Regional priorities could be used

to direct activities in regulatory, acquisition, and

incentive programs. We also consider some more

fundamental changes, such as creating major new

programs and reorganizing agency responsibilities, which can be pursued if the political will

exists. However, neither breaking down institutional barriers nor altering private incentives will

be easy. Watershed management, for example,

has been discussed for many years, but established styles of management have changed little

to date. Nevertheless, watershed management

seems to be a concept whose time has come: the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), backed

by the current Administration, has strongly advocated the approach, and watershed management is

being considered in current legislation to reauthorize the Clean Water Act (P.L. 92-500) (see

vol. 1, box 5-c).

More integrated planning and management

along watershed and ecosystem lines is likely to

be one of the best ways for the Nation to promote

the flexibility, robustness, and efficiency that is

desirable in coping with the uncertain impacts of

climate change.

 Communication of Climate Risk

If climate changes as predicted, resource managers and individuals will find it necessary to

adjust to new circumstances. Certain parts of the

country are likely to become much less desirable

Hurricanes and other tropical storms cause millions of

dollars’ worth of damage each year as homes, boats,

and businesses are destroyed by high winds and water.

Some Federal programs and regulations encourage

redevelopment in high-risk areas without requiring

appropriate safety measures.
26 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

places to live and work. Even where climate

changes are less harsh, current management

practices and lifestyles may not continue to be

appropriate. The speed with which resource

managers and individuals can recognize and

respond effectively to new climate conditions

will largely determine the economic and social

costs of climate change. Adaptation to change is

likely to be delayed by the inherent difficulties in

recognizing climate change against the background of normal climate variability. Responsiveness to changing climate risks maybe further

impeded by existing Federal programs designed

to protect individuals from the financial risks of

climatic extremes. It maybe enhanced by providing information about the nature of climate

change risks, the changing resource situation, and

the likely success of particular adjustments in

resource-management techniques. Effective communication of the nature of climate-related risks

can be promoted through formal educational

efforts or through appropriate incentives.

The Government could better communicate

climate risk by reducing the various public

subsidies for developments in areas of high risk.

The public has come to depend heavily on

government disaster assistance and subsidized

insurance programs, which helps reduce exposure

to the financial risks from climate extremes. Such

programs have been valuable in allowing the

productive use of resources in areas of highly

variable climate. Problems may arise, however, if

the financial buffer provided by these Federal

programs unintentionally encourages people to

move into environments where they may be

exposed to greater risk in the future, or reduces

incentives to take adequate precautions against

climate risk. Because development decisions are

not easily reversible, and the consequences of

decisions taken now are, in some cases, likely to

be with us for many decades, it seems prudent to

begin reexaminingg policies that may encourage

development in climate-sensitive areas. Private

citizens should recognize the true costs of extending farms into economically marginal areas,

building structures in areas of high forest-fire risk,

or locating buildings in coastal erosion zones.

We assessed two systems in which a reexamination of current risk protection policies may be

especially important in the face of climate

change: coastal areas and agriculture (see vol. 1,

chs. 4 and 6). Flooding and erosion are of

particular concern in coastal areas, and these

hazards could increase in a warmer climate. We

discuss options in the coastal and agriculture

chapters that could help owners respond more

effectively to climate change and that would

decrease potential future exposure to climate risk.

For example, the National Flood Insurance Program has been only partially successful in reducing the need for taxpayer-funded disaster assistance and in encouraging local mitigation efforts.

In agriculture, Federal Crop Insurance, various

disaster-assistance programs, and irrigation subsidies all tend to distort the manner in which

farmers respond to climate risks. (See box 1-Eon

water allocation in the Sacramento-San Joaquin

River System and box 1-F on agriculture in the

prairie-pothole region.) Improvements can and

should be made in these program to ensure that in

the future, individuals, communities, and the

Federal Government are not exposed to excessive costs.

Equally important may be quickly communicating the detection of any change in key climate

variables and other information that will assist in

the responses to changing climates. Farmers and

foresters, for example, may be reluctant to alter

practices until they are convinced climate has

actually changed. The potential role of the Extension Services in tracking the changing success of

farming and forestry practices and spreading this

information to managers may prove important in

reducing the costs of adaptation.

I Contingency Planning

The goal of contingency plarnning is to minimize losses from natural disasters or accidents by

preparing in advance to take appropriate actions.
Chapter 1--Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 27

Contingency plarming is important where the

threat of significant losses is high in the absence

of preparation and prompt response--as is the

case with floods, forest fires, droughts, and

hurricanes (see vol. 1, chs. 4 and 5 and box 4-C;

vol. 2, box 5-I). Climate change could affect the

intensity or number of extreme climate events,

making preparedness perhaps even more important than it is now. However, adequate contingency plans do not exist for all parts of the country

that are vulnerable to extreme events. For example, only 23 States have drought-management

plans (197). The States that do have them,

however, have generally adapted better to

droughts than those without plans (197). We

identified options that could help mitigate damages, including the ecological harm caused by

natural disasters. Improvements in contingency

planning would be helpful both to minimize

near-term damages and to prepare for potentially

greater damages caused by climate change.

States have a key role in planning for most

extreme events and must continue to do so. States

should be encouraged to develop contingency

plans or to refine them with climate change in

mind. The Federal Government also has a role in

planning for natural disasters, with many agencies involved in some way in this activity (see

cartoon on page 34). However, the Federal

Government could do better at defining the

respective roles of the agencies that have responsibilities for extreme events. It could also promote

stronger coordination among Federal agencies

and among the various levels of government in

establishing requirements for assistance and in

providing such assistance in a more timely,

consistent, and equitable manner.

Contingency planning is also important when

emergency measures are likely to be controversial; it allows potential responses to be considered

in advance when there can be rational debate.

Such controversies are very likely to be associated with any efforts to restore the health of

natural ecosystems that have been severely

harmed by climate-related stresses. This is wellillustrated by difficulties now faced in responding

to “massively destructive forest health problems” in the Blue Mountain forests of Eastern

Oregon (176; see vol. 2, ch. 6 and box 6-E).

Although there is general agreement that major

changes in management are needed in those

forests, the response has been slow, and agreement about how to proceed has been hard to

achieve. Procedures for responding to ecosystem

health emergencies should be established.

9 Research and Information Gaps

The individual resource chapters outline the

important research gaps that need to be addressed

for coasts, water resources, agriculture, wetlands,

preserves, and forests. Overall, we found that

various strategies for coping with climate change

can be identified for managed natural-resourcebased systems (including the coastal zone, water

resources, and agriculture-see vol. 1, chs. 4-6).

Some of these strategies may require continued

support for research on new technologies or

management practices that will enhance the

potential for adaptation. For natural systems,

however (e.g., wetlands, unmanaged forests, and

nature preserves-see vol. 2, chs. 4-6), the

informational gaps in our understanding of these

systems are so large that realistic response

strategies are difficult or impossible to identify

now (see also vol. 2, box 5-K).

Although an estimated $900 million is spent

annually on what can be considered research in

“environmental life sciences” (54) or “environmental biology,”6

there is currently very little

research directed specifically at protecting natural

areas under climate change and helping land

managers modify management strategies to re6 J. GOSZ, Executive Secretary, Subcommittee on Environmental Biology, Committee on Life Scicnccs and Heal@ Fcda COO*-

Council for Science, Engineering, snd ‘RxImcdogy, personal wmmunication, Sept. 14, 1993, Only 11 percent of these expenditures overlaps

with the Federal Global Change Research Program budget.
28 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-D–Climate Change, South Florida, and the Everglades

Lying dose to sea level and in the preferred path of a sizable percentage of Atlantic hurricanes, South Florida

is potentially one of the most vulnerable areas of the United States to climate change. It is also one of the most

distinctive. South Florida’s famed Everglades, a vast subtropical wetland of which about one-seventh is preserved

in Everglades National Park, is seen by many as one of the crown jewels of the U.S. National Park System. Miami,

Palm Beach, and other coastal communities in South Florida makeup one of the most popular seaside vacation

destinations in the world. Despite hurricane and flood hazards, these cities have experienced phenomenal growth

in recent years. In addition, varieties of crops can be grown in the warm, subtropical climate that grow nowhere

else in the United States. And Miami has become a gateway between North and South America, transforming

South Florida into an important international crossroads.

Despite, or perhaps because of, its distinctiveness and popularity, South Florida is under stress and, like a

few other heavily developed parts of the United States, beginning to bump up against Iimits to growth. The critical

factor is water. Although the region receives an annual average of 60 inches (152 centimeters) of rain, annual

evaporation can sometimes exceed this amount, and rainfall variability y from year to year is quite high, resulting

in periodic droughts and floods. In the past century, moreover, South Florida has been transformed from a virtual

wilderness into a complex, interconnected system of developed and undeveloped land. The main elements of this

system-the growing urban sector, agricultural areas, and the Everglades and other remaining natural

areas-must all compete for the limited supply of water, and the competition is increasing with every new resident.

Much of the growth of South Florida has occurred since 1870. Then, fewer than 100 people lived in what are

now Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Now, about 5.2 million people occupy the same area. The vast

unaltered Everglades, which originally extended from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay, were seen by early settlers

as hostile to human welfare and completely without value. Encouraged by a grant from the U.S. Congress, the

State of Florida began draining these “useless” wetlands for agriculture, and by the early 20th century, the natural

character of the Everglades had begun to change. Farmers planted sugar cane and a variety of vegetables in the

drained area south of Lake Okeechobee now known as the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA).

The initial drainage system worked well enough during normal years but was stressed during occasional

abnormal events and failed completely during a major hurricane in 1928. At that time, 2,000 people died in the

EAA when the protective dike around Lake Okeechobee burst. This incident prompted the initiation of a massive

public works project, as attention shifted from drainage of wetlands to flood control. Eventually, an 85-mile

(137-kilometer)1 earthen dike was built around Lake Okeechobee, and the meandering 98-mile Kissimmee River,

which fed the lake from the north, was transformed into a canal 48 miles long and 33 feet (10 meters) deep.

Flooding problems diminished, but the former broad, riverlike system north of Everglades National Park has been

greatly altered into a series of canals and pools. The former sheet-like flow of water to the park, necessary to its

health, has been blocked. Today, the area has more than 1,395 miles of canals and levees and 143 water-control

structures.

Projects to expand the supply of water to growing urban centers proceeded in tandem with flood-control

projects. To accommodate demands for agricultural and urban expansion, diking and draining of wetlands

continued, and as the expansion progressed, more water was diverted for these purposes. Today, additional water

is diverted for sewage dilution, pest control, and frost protection. Some water is used to recharge aquifers that

supply cities east of the Everglades and the populated areas of the Florida Keys. Large quantities of water that

could be recycled or used to recharge urban aquifers are dumped into the Atlantic Ocean (see vol. 1, ch. 5, and

vol. 2, ch. 4, for complete discussions of water and wetland issues).

A major effect of this decades-long restructuring of the natural hydrological system has been to drastically

reduce the supply of water from the Kissimmee River watershed that reaches the much-diminished-in-size

1 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.
Chapter 1-Synthesis Summary, and Policy Options 29

Everglades. The natural system has suffered in several ways as a result: 1) the abundance of species

characteristic of Everglades habitats (e.g., wood storks, white ibis, tri-colored herons, and snowy egrets) has

declined dramatically in the past 50 years, 2) more than a dozen native species have been listed as endangered

or threatened (e.g., the Florida panther, snail kite, Cape Sable seaside sparrow, American alligator, and American

crocodile), 3) nonnative and nuisance species have invaded the area (e.g., Melaleuca quinquinervia and the

Brazilian pepper tree), 4) sizable land subsidence and water-level declines have occurred throughout the region,

5) water quality has been degraded by agricultural runoff containing excessive nutrients, such as phosphorus,

6) saltwater intrusion of coastal aquifers has occurred, 7) vulnerability to fire has increased, and 8) massive algal

blooms have appeared in Florida Bay, accompanied by die-offs of shrimp, lobster, sponge beds, and many fish.

The impacts of development have not been limited to natural areas. As water use in the region has grown,

susceptibility to periodic droughts has increased. A 1981 drought, for example, Ied to mandatory water restrictions

for half the counties of South Florida and water rationing in the EAA. Pollution from cities, as well as from

agricultural areas, has added to water-quality problems. Saltwater intrusion threatens aquifers used for urban

water supplies.

Everglades National Park was created in 1947, the culmination of efforts that began in the 1920s. The

transition of the Everglades from being perceived as “worthless land” to an important preserve worthy of

designation as an International Biosphere Reserve and World Heritage Site took decades, but preservation of this

area and restoration of other degraded wetlands are now considered high priority by a broad spectrum of people

and organizations. Although there is broad agreement that the hydrology of the Everglades should be restored

to a pattern similar to that found in the original system, it will not be easy to balance the needs of the Everglades

for water with the similar needs of other users.

South Florida’s Everglades and coastal areas, dearly already under stress, face an unusually difficult problem

in the light of global climate change. Both are already vulnerable to sea level rise and intense tropical storms (see

vol. 1, ch. 4). (Damage from Hurricane Andrew, for example, was not confined to urban areas-coastal mangrove

forests were heavily damaged, as were trees in many densely forested hammocks.) Climate change could

increase the current vulnerability to these events. Climate change may also result in a hotter and drier climate for

South Florida, although predictions from general circulation models (GCMs) are not consistent on this point.

Whatever occurs, the future is likely to be increasingly stressful for South Florida. Cities are likely to continue to

grow and will almost certainly be protected from sea level rise, but the expense of protecting them could be

immense. The Everglades, once deemed worthless, is now considered a valuable natural resource. As valuable

as it is, however, the Everglades will probably not receive the same attention as cities threatened by rising seas

will. Farmers are likely to resist attempts to hinder or reduce long-established patterns of agriculture in favor of other

uses for water. In short, South Florida is a system increasingly “close to the edge.” The flexibility to satisfy

competing interests for water and land has been reduced by actions taken since the turn of the century, and climate

change may further reduce flexibility.

In recent years, some efforts have been made to offset some of the damage to the Everglades and restore

some of the lost flexibility to the natural system. In 1970, for example, Congress directed that not less than 315,000

acre-feet (389 million cubic meters) of water be delivered annually to Everglades National Park. In 1989, Congress

enacted the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act (P.L. 101-229), one purpose of which was

to enable more natural flow of water through a portion of the park. More recently, the Federal Government sued

the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for not upholding its own water-quality laws, thereby allowing

degradation of the Everglades to continue. As a result, the State has agreed to design and construct treatment

areas in the EAA where drainage could be filtered before it is discharged to the park. The State has also directed

the South Florida Water Management District to implement an Everglades Surface Water Improvement and

Management Plan. Finally, as authorized in the 1992 Water Resources Development Act (P.L. 101-640), the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers will soon begin a long-term project to restore the Kissimmee River to an approximation

(Continued on next page)
30 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

spend to climate change. In 1992, only $8 million or the ecological information that would be

was spent on research focused on adaptation to helpful in providing policy guidance and adaptaclimate change.7

tion options for natural systems. Overall,

The U.S. Global Change Research Program USGCRP is more focused on understanding the

(USGCRP) is a $1.4 billion research program. causes for and rates of climate change8 than on

However, as currently designed, it will not examining the ecological and human impacts of

provide either the practical technologies that change (see ch. 3 for a more complete explanation

might make us more prepared for climate change of USGCRP). The agencies primarily responsible

7 ‘I&Working Group on Mitigation and Adaptation Rcscam h Strategies (disbanded in 1992) of the Commi ttee onl?arth and Eawiromncntal

SUencca of FCCSET identified FedcraI research that focuses on m contributes to adaptation to global change (24).

s us-ig des- to produce a ptictivc~of the Earth systan and focuses on three interrelated streams of activity:

documenting global change (observations), enhancing understanding of key processes (process march), and pIdiCtiDg @Obd and rcgiond

cnvironumtal change (integrated modelnng and prediction). For FY 1994, a fourth activitys- assessrnenq was added.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 31

Box l-E—Water Allocation and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System

The complexity and divisiveness of western water problems-and the potential for climate change to

exacerbate those probleme--is well-illustrated in the continuing battle over allocation of water in California. The

Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, and especially the Delta area where the two rivers come together in

Northern California, is the focal point of this conflict. Before western water development began, about 40 percent

of California’s runoff converged into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta on its way to San Francisco Bay and,

eventually, the Pacific Ocean. However, about half of this water is now diverted to Southern California, the San

Joaquin Valley, and parts of the Bay Area the the massive State Water Project (SWP) and central Valley Project

(CVP). The water delivered through these huge “plumbing” systems has enabled California’s semiarid Central

Valley to become one of the Nation’s prime agricultural areas and has been partly responsible for the phenomenal

population growth of Southern California’s mild coastal areas.

Agriculture is now firmly established in the Central Valley, and about 16 million people--over 70 percent of

the State’s population-now live in Southern California. Water supply is crucial to California: it has been the basis

for most agricultural, industrial, and economic development. However, the transfer of water from Northern to

Southern California has not come without a cost to the river system and the State. Water supply and allocation

issues directly conflict with water-quality and ecosystem concerns, and they pit interests of Southern Californians

against those of Northern Californians. Three issues are of special concern.

Delta fisheries-The Delta and extended Sacramento-San Joaquin River System provide important habitat

for over 40 species of fish. Coho and chinook salmon, steelhead trout, and striped bass all reside in the river system

atone point in their lives and have been especially important to the recreational and commercial fishing industries.

Yet these species of fish have declined 50 percent or more since the early 1960s. Fewer than 500 winter run

salmon have returned to spawn each year in the Upper Sacramento in recent years, compared with the 60,000

per year that returned 20 years ago. Only 432 steelhead returned in 1966 compared with over 17,000 in 1967 (16).

The Delta smelt is dose to extinction. Causes of these dramatic declines include loss of habitat; water pollution;

dam, levee, and diversion-facility obstructions; and drought. When conditions are poor in the Delta-when

flows are low and water temperatures and exports are high-losses of young, ocean-bound salmon can be

very high.

Fishermen, as well as fish, have suffered. Fish losses have cost the local economy over $15 million per year

in recent years. In effect, the benefits to people who receive water diverted from the Delta have come partially at

the expense of both fish and fishing interests. in March 1993, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National

Marine Fisheries Service invoked the Endangered Species Act (P.L. 100-707) to protect winter run chinook salmon

and Delta smelt, setting limits on t he operations of the Central Valley Project and intensifying a dispute between

State and Federal officials on how best to protect the Delta.

Delta farmland and levees--The Delta, once a natural marshland, was developed for farming around the

turn of the century and now contains almost 550,000 acres (223,000 hectares)1 of rich farmland. The marshland

was converted to a mosaic of over 70 islands by building over 1,100 miles (1 ,600 Kilometers)2 of levees. The levee

system is fragile, however. The peat soils of the Delta have been gradually compacting, requiring that levees

constantly be raised or repaired. Many of the levee-surrounded Delta islands are now wel below sea Ievel.

Maintenance of the levee system is important for protecting life, property, and infrastructure from flooding on Delta

islands. Permanently flooded islands would also have major adverse effects on both water quality in the Delta and

freshwater supplies. Since 1960,24 levees have failed, and with each year, the fate of these islands becomes more

uncertain.

1 TO convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

2 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

(Continued on next page)
32 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-E–Water Allocation and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System--(Continued)

Water quality-Water quality in the Delta is of concern because of possible salinity intrusion into the western

Delta from San Francisco Bay, wastewater discharges that contain chemical pollutants, and the inflow of

agricultural drainage water that may contain pesticide residues and other toxic agents (18). Maintaining water

quality and ecological health in the Delta (by, among other things, ensuring that an adequate amount of fresh water

reaches the Delta) is legally required by the State but may conflict with water transfers and local consumptive uses.

This is especially true during drought, when there may not be enough water to fulfill all demands. Drought poses

another problem as well: during low-flow periods, water temperature in system rivers increases, and this has

contributed significantly to the decline of cold-water anadromous fish spades in recent years.

In sum, Californians are making heavy demands on the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System. They

recognize that the means of transferring water from the Delta must be improved to maintain water quality and to

enable more efficient transfer of supplies to the southern part of the State, but the issue has proved to be one of

the most controversial water problems in the West. In 1982, for example, California voters defeated a referendum

to build the so-called Peripheral Canal around the Delta to improve the system’sufficiency. Northern Californians

overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, for fear that the Delta’s environment would not be adequately protected and

because they perceived that populous Southern California was attempting yet another “water grab.” Although

there was more support in Southern California, many in that part of the State feared the project’s high cost.

Studies of the potential impact of climate change in California suggest-but have by no means proven-that

the regional effects of climate change could be reduced mountain snowpack, a shift in runoff patterns (i.e., in timing,

amount, or duration of precipitation), and large decreases in summer soil moisture. Specifically, a possible result

of warming temperatures is that more winter precipitation will fall as rain and a reduced mountain snowpack will

start melting earlier in the spring. As a result, reservoirs would fill faster. Because a portion of reservoir space must

be reserved for flood-control purposes, the additional water would have to be spilled. Although California’s total

water budget might remain the same, less would be available during the summer, when water demand is highest.

The reduced snowpack in effect represents the loss of one or more storage reservoirs. Maintaining adequate

freshwater flow to San Francisco Bay would be more difficult in summer and could increasingly conflict with water

needed for consumptive purposes. Summer temperatures would also likely increase in the Sacramento and other

rivers and represent a threat to fish.

A further complication could be sea level rise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts a

total sea level rise of 26 inches (65 centimeters)3 by 2100. Such a rise would inundate the entire Delta area and

have devastating effects on Delta islands and water quality. A sea level rise of more than 2 feet would transform

the current 100-year high-tide peak at Antioch, a western Delta location, into a 1 in 10 event-making such rare

occurrences more common. Levees would be even more expensive, or even impossible, to maintain. Because

the Delta islands are developed for farming and valued for helping preserve water quality, the initial response to

incremental sea level rise is likely be to try to preserve the islands. In the long run, a phased retreat from the Delta

may have to be considered (142), Choosing between preservation at any price and abandonment would not be

easy.

if the above impacts occur (or worse, if California’s water budget actually decreases), maintaining California’s

water supplies for consumptive purposes and maintaining the health of the Delta will be a great challenge. This

would be especially true during droughts, which, if more common than--and as extreme as-the current

drought in California, could have devastating impacts. A suite of demand-and-supply management and

supply-augmentation responses to the State’s water problems is being considered. No one response will be

sufficient. Conservation and water marketing could significantly ease California’s water problems, but building new

reservoirs and even some desalination plants and other responses may be needed as well.

3 TO convert inches to centimeters, multiply by 2.540.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 33

Box l-F-Changes in Agriculture and the Fate of Prairie Potholes:

The Impacts of Drought and Climate Change

The prairies comprise millionsof acres over a vast geographical area that includes parts of Canada, and the

states of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota Minnesota, and lowa.The region is characterized by a glaciated,

depressed topography with poorly defined drainage that results In numerous small lakes and wetlands known as

prairie potholes.1 Millions of potholes dot the landscape, providing an impermanent water source for the region’s

agricuItural operations and diverse wildlife, including migratory waterfowl. Since the early 1960s, a general shift

in the structure of the agricultural economy has occurred in the prairie region, involving a move toward

more-intensive farming practices (80). The drainage of prairie potholes has been accelerated in order to bring more

land into production and to increase yields on existing cropland. However, drought conditions in recent years have

evoked concerns about the sustainability of the regional agriculture and wildlife and have raised questions about

impacts that may result from climate change.

The drying effects of climate change are certain to affect the prairie-pothde region by altering aquatic

conditions. Agricultural operations and wildlife rely on prairie potholes for water. An increase In temperature, which

would influence aridity in continental interior areas, would reduce available volumes, thereby putting both farming

and waterfowl at risk. In addition to changes in the availability of surface water, water storage in the soil is likely

to decrease (134). Temperature changes may also mean an extended growing season, which could alter the

nesting and feeding habits of wildlife. In total, climate change will affect the region by increasing existing stress

on the prairie-pothole ecosystems and agriculture.

Agriculture operations in the prairie region have long provided the bulk of the Nation’s wheat supply. Wheat

is well-suited to the region’s dryland agriculture, with the majority of precipitation falling during the growing season

and with relatively cod temperatures keeping evapotranspiration rates down. Farming in the region has become

more and more intensive as agriculture has become increasingly mechanized. These developments have had a

considerable effect on the fate of prairie potholes, which have decreased from 20 million to 7 million acres (8 to

3 million hectares)2 leaving only 35 percent of the original pothole acreage intact (179). A poor farm economy in

the 1980s coupled with mechanization caused prairie farmers to push every possible acre into production. North

Dakota’s potholes were being drained at an estimated rate of 20,000 acres per year to support conversion to

agriculture (179). And drainage rates became similarly high in other prairie States, as farmers recognized the

potential value of new farmland.

Now, although 20 percent of all remaining prairie potholes are protected? prairie potholes are among the most

threatened ecosystems in the United States. They provide prime nesting grounds and habitat for a multitude of

waterfowl and other wildlife. Since the 1970s, populations of three common duck species (the mallard, the pintail,

and the blue-winged teal) have declined dramatically. Populations of some other spades of duck less dependent

on potholes in agricultural regions have increased. The mallard, pintail, and blue-winged teal nest in the

drought-prone zone of intensive agriculture (1 19). These migratory waterfowl have lost not only extensive areas

of breeding habitat, but also adjacent vegetated areas once used for food and cover. Here, the detrimental effects

of the loss of wetlands cleared for agricultural use are dramatic; wildlife populations have likely been cut in half

(80).

1 Prairie-pothole wetlands are relatively shallow, water-holding depressions that vary in size, water

permanence, and water chemistry. They are located in the glaciated portion of the North American Great Plains and

are the single most important breeding area for waterfowl on this continent (63). They also support a variety of other

Wildlife.

2 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

3 Protection includes, but IS not limited to: ownership by Federal or State governments, short-and long-term

government easements, and ownership by private conservation groups.

(Continued on next page)
34 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-F-Changes in Agriculture and the Fate of Prairie Potholes:

The Impacts of Drought and Climate Change-(Continued)

Though these changes have been occurring over along period of time, effects were most dramatic during

recent drought conditions in the region. Severe drought marked both the 1988 and the 1989 growing seasons in

North Dakota the heart of the country’s spring wheat production area (143). This dry spell was the second to occur

during the 1980s and the fourth serious drought in the past three decades (143). The lack of precipitation and

subsequent loss of soil moisture resulted in dramatic decreases in agricultural yields and in abandonment of some

cropland. Despite the grain crop losses (some more than 70 percent), net farm income and farmed acreage did

not suffer. This was basically due to government drought assistance, in the form of insurance and direct aid. The

combination of insurance, aid, and the higher grain prices resulting from the drought helped farmers avoid losses

that might ultimately have led to extensive farm failure and abandonment.

Climate change may significantly alter growing conditions in the prairie region. Changes resulting from global

warming may decrease both water depth and the number of ponds holding water in t he spring and summer. This

aspect is likely to further influence the degradation of waterfowl and wildlife habitat and to upset populations.

Waterfowl may respond by migrating to other areas, relying heavily on the semipermanent prairie-pothole

wetlands, remaining on permanent wetlands but not breeding, or failing to renest as they currently do during

drought (160). On the other hand, drier conditions in these shallow, temporary, seasonal wetlands will make

land-use conversion to agriculture much more reasonable in terms of expense and ease. Long-term changes in

agricultural activity in the region, caused by economics and climate change, are sure to affect the fate of prairie

potholes and the waterfowl and wildlife they support, placing them at further risk.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

“LOOKS LIKE A DISASTER RELIEF CHECK, CROP LOSS COMPENSATION, AND A FINE FOR DISTURBING A WETLAND’
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 35

for research and management of public lands (the

Department of the Interior (DOI), the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Science

Foundation and EPA) combined receive less than

30 percent of the total funding for Ecological

Systems and Dynamics (less than 5 percent of the

total USGCRP budget). Given that such research

on ecological and human impacts may take years

or decades to produce results, the slow process

may cost us the ability to respond to global

change in areas that are especially at risk to

irreversible damage. In addition to understanding

climate impacts and effects, it is important to

know how to minimize socioeconomic impacts.

Ultimately, to be useful in planning for an

uncertain climate, USGCRP must include ecosystem research that can feed into management,

socioeconomic analysis, and adaptation research.

An assessment process that incorporates all these

categories and permits inputs from stakeholders

and policy makers is necessary to make USGCRP

truly policy relevant. This is a much broader

definition of “assessment” than USGCRP can

accommodate given its current research program

and structure.

NEAR-TERM CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

In the resource chapters (vol. 1, chs. 4-6, and

vol. 2, chs. 4-6) of this report, a series of “first

steps’ ‘ is outlined to illustrate ways to begin

incorporating climate change considerations into

statutes, policies, and programs relating to various natural resource--coasts, water, agriculture,

wetlands, preserved lands, and forests. The first

steps for the resource chapters are summarized

briefly in the last section of this chapter. Several

of the first steps focus on actions that offer

important and immediate benefits, even without

climate change as an additional factor justifying

them. Several targets of opportunity in the nearterm congressional agenda, in the announced and

potential initiatives of the new Administration,

and in the programs of the various agencies can be

capitalized upon now.

Likewise, the USGRP offers annual opportunities for changes. Chapter 3 discusses several

directions the program could take; many of these

options are included below as possible near-term

congressional actions. The process of policy

development in government is not so orderly that

one can lay out and follow a detailed plan of

logical first steps, followed by logical second

steps, and so on. Regular congressional reauthorization cycles for major natural resource programs, the annual budget cycle, election cycles,

the fragmentation of responsibilities among congressional committees, and still other policymaking realities provide the context in which

decisions about climate change will be made.

Seen in this light, the choice of frost steps is

significantly influenced by an assessment of

where the opportunities lie.

1 Annual Appropriations

Even if Congress did nothing else, each year it

would enact legislation appropriating money for

carrying out governmental programs. Thus, an

immediate and recurrent annual opportunity to

address many of the issues considered in this

report is through the appropriation process. Most

simply and directly, to narrow the breadth of

uncertainties that exist today, Congress can ensure adequate levels of funding for existing

climate-change-related research programs.

Through the appropriation process, Congress can

also encourage natural resource management

agencies to carry out their monitoring and research programs in ways that meet their intended

objectives while simultaneously producing data

that could be useful to their own or other

agencies’ climate change research efforts.

The annual appropriation process is also the

means by which Congress makes major long-term

investments-for example, in land acquired for

National Parks and wildlife refuges and in dams

and other water resource projects. Until now,

climate change considerations have not been a

factor in deciding whether any of these invest-
36 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

ments were prudent. One could justify inclusion

of such considerations now because climate

change has the potential to lessen the value of

such investments. Thus, Congress could require that the land-acquisition, water-resourcedevelopment, and other similar proposals

brought before it be accompanied by explicit

evaluations of how climate change may affect

the long-term viability of the investment. Alternatively, in the case of lands proposed to be

acquired for conservation purposes, Congress

could direct that the criteria by which agencies

rank their acquisition priorities include some

consideration of potential climate change impacts

on those lands or their resources. Building up the

Nation’s reserve of protected land would help

stem some climate change impacts by reducing

fragmentation and, possibly, reducing other

threats to natural area resources. Increased protection and reduced fragmentation of these areas

could help build more resiliency into some

natural systems (see vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

Congress has increasingly linked policy direction to agency funding during the appropriation

process. Congress could include requirements

in its various appropriation bills that each of

the agencies managing natural resources potentially affected by climate change provide

Congress with its own evaluation of the agencies} preparedness to cope with a range of

climate futures. The appropriation process may

also be especially well-suited to encouraging

agencies that implement climate-sensitive programs (e.g., agricultural disaster assistance, crop

subsidies, and flood insurance) to develop longterm budget projections for those programs based

on several future climate scenarios. In this way, a

budget-conscious Congress can better inform

itself early on about the potential costs of climate

change for those programs.

# Reauthorization Cycle

In addition to the annual appropriation cycle,

congressional action is heavily influenced by the

reauthorization cycles of major Federal programs.

Congressional attention is not focused on all

issues at once. Rather, at any given time, its

attention is disproportionately focused, through

its committees, on the major Federal programs for

which current authorization is about to expire.

The process of extending that authorization provides an opportunity to evaluate the workings of

a program closely and to provide legislative direction for that program for a period of many years.

Thus, at least with respect to changes in existing

Federal natural resource programs, the best opportunities to implement the first steps recommended here are in the context of laws and

programs that are about to be reauthorized.

Among these, the Clean Water Act is a highpriority target of opportunity (see vol. 1, box 5-C).

Comprehensive revisions of that law have been

proposed, and the act’s wetland provisions are

undergoing particular scrutiny. The reauthorization of the Clean Water Act provides a key

opportunity to address one of the more important

needs identified in this report-the need to

achieve more effective integration of resourcemanagement efforts across political jurisdictions.

Comprehensive watershed planning (see vol. 1,

ch. 5), which integrates wetland protection and

restoration goals (see vol. 2, box 4-A), water-useefficiency goals, strategies for controlling pointsource and non-point-source pollution, and both

water-quantity and water-quality concerns generally, could create the institutional capability and

flexibility to anticipate and plan for climate

change. Such planning could be especially valuable for finding creative ways to resolve current

conflicts in which landowner and development

interests chafe at restrictions on use of wetlands,

while environmental interests decry the continued

loss of wetlands (see vol. 2, ch. 4 and box 4-B).

Another major target of opportunity is the

upcoming reauthorization of farm programs in the

1995 Farm Bill. The next reauthorization cycle

could provide a forum for considering how to

enhance farmers’ flexibility and effectiveness in

responding to a changing climate and how climate
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 37

change may affect Federal expenditures on disaster assistance and farm commodity programs (see

vol. 1, ch. 6).

I New Targets of Opportunity

In addition to the reauthorization of existing

laws, Congress regularly considers altogether

new legislation creating programs for existing or

new agencies of Government. A program of potentially great significance on the horizon is

Interior Secretary Babbitt’s proposal to create a

National Biological Survey (see vol. 2, box 5-L).

Legislation to establish the Survey has been

introduced in both the House and Senate, and a

National Research Council committee has been

asked to offer advice on the formation and role of

the Survey. The nature, mandate, resources, and

overall purposes of the National Biological Survey, however, are still very much in the process of

development. The bills introduced in Congress

thus far to establish the Survey give only a very

general description of its functions. Thus, there

exists an opportunity to shape the content and

direction of this new institution in ways that

wouId be useful to the management of natural

resource systems in a changing climate.

The rationale frequently offered by Secretary

Babbitt for creating a National Biological Survey

is its potential, by cataloging the biological

resources of the Nation and monitoring their

status and trends, to avert future ‘‘train wrecks,’

that is, the disruptive and wrenching conflicts

between conservation and development goals. A

‘‘train wreck’ of another sort could take the form

of severe adverse impacts on our natural resources

from climate change for which we were unprepared. A National Biological Survey could help

detect, evaluate, and prepare for that climate

change. Thus, an important opportunity exists to

structure the mission and capabilities of the

Survey so that it can contribute to the early

detection of indicators of climate change, a better

understanding of the ability of organisms and

natural communities to respond to climate changes,

and the design and management of a system of

preserves best able to achieve the purposes for

which they were established. Careful congressional attention now to these details in the design

of a National Biological Survey could yield major

returns in the future (see vol. 2, ch. 5).

I Existing Statutory Language

Of the many Federal statutes pretaining to the

management of the natural resource systems

discussed in this report, only one-the Coastal

Zone Management Act (CZMA; P.L. 92-583)--

explicitly addresses climate change and its potential consequences. The 1990 amendments to that

law required that possible sea level rise resulting

from climate change be anticipated and addressed

in State coastal zone management plans (see vol.

1, ch. 4). Congress could extend this legislative

precedent to other statutory arenas; here, we

attempt to identify which statutes may be most

appropriate for this.

None of the statutes governing the various

natural resource systems discussed throughout

the full report precludes the agencies responsible

for their management from fully considering

climate change. Existing grants of authority are

sufficiently general and open-ended to allow an

agency, on its own initiative, to examine the

implications of climate change for the natural

resources under its jurisdiction and to tailor its

management of those resources accordingly.

The question, therefore, is whether Congress

wishes to supplement the existing legislative

framework with explicit directives pertaining to

climate change.

Several categories of legislation maybe especially appropriate for considering possible climatechange-related amendments. First among these

are statutes, such as CZMA, that require longrange planning for the management of natural

resources. For example, the Rangeland and

Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974

(RPA; P.L. 93-378) requires the preparation of a

forest ‘resource planning assessment’ that looks
38 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

50 years into the future. Similarly, the Clean

Water Act requires preparation of area-wide

waste treatment plans that look two decades into

the future, a planning horizon also found in the

Pacfic Northwest Electric: Power Planning and

Conservation Act (P.L. 96-501). In general, the

longer the time frame over which management is

to be planned, the greater the likelihood that

climate change may affect the resources being

managed. Thus, mechanisms to ensure that climate change is taken into) account when longrange plans are being developed and to ensure that

plans can be revised as new information about the

direction and magnitude of climate change becomes available are clearly desirable.

A second statutory area where it is especially

important to ensure that potential climate change

is considered is long-term public or private

investments affecting natural resources. Examples include public land acquisition for parks,

wildlife refuges, and the like (see vol. 2, box 5-C).

Historically, such public land acquisitions have

been viewed as permanent investments, with the

intention of keeping the areas acquired in public

ownership in perpetuity. The expectation implicitly accompanying these investments has been

that the areas acquired would, with appropriate

management, continue to provide the environmental and recreational benefits for which they

were acquired indefinitely into the future. Climate change introduces a new uncertainty about

the validity of this expectation. At the very least,

it suggests the need for a more careful examination of whether particular acquisitions are, in fact,

likely to continue to provide the environmental

benefits that they provide today.

Somewhat similar are public or private investments in dams and other water-resourcedevelopment projects. Public projects are governed by the Water Resources Planning Act (P.L.

89-80) and private ones are licensed pursuant to

the Federal Power Act (P.L. 102486). The

implicit assumption underlying both has always

been that hydrological models based on past

climate will accurately predict future conditions

as well. The possibility of climate change casts

doubt on the continuing validity of that assumption and may warrant statutory revisions explicitly requiring water resource planning agencies

and Federal regulators to factor climate change

into their decisionmaking.

A third statutory arena relevant here includes

those laws that require an evaluation of the

expected environmental impacts of planned

actions. Foremost among these laws is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; P.L.

91-190); similar, though less far-reaching, laws

include the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act

(P.L. 85-624) and the Endangered Species Act

(P.L. 100-7O7). Under these and similar laws,

expectations of the environmental impacts of

planned actions may vary, depending on whether

a constant or changing climate is anticipated.

Legislative direction could provide useful guidance to agencies with respect to their duties to

consider climate change possibilities in implementing their responsibilities (see, for example,

vol. 2, box 5-D).

A fourth set of laws that warrant discussion

consists of those that authorize research programs. The Clean Water Act and the Rangeland

and Renewable Resources Planning Act are

examples. As this report makes abundantly clear,

there are many uncertainties about climate

change, including its magnitude, its direction, and

its impact on natural resource systems. Natural

resource management will require research aimed

at resolving many of today’s uncertainties. Reflecting that need in the legislative description of

the various research missions may serve o

underscore the importance of this area of inquiry.

Each resource chapter highlights important research options to consider.

Finally, the Science Policy Act of 1976 (P.L.

94-282), which established the Office of Science

and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Federal

Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering,

and Technology (FCCSET), could be amended to

strengthen the ability of these offices to coordi-
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 39

nate science and ecosystem management across

agencies. 9 These offices have the authority to

develop and implement coherent, governmentwide science policy and have been the mechanism

for coordinating several multi-agency programs.

However, OSTP has not always been an active or

influential player in the executive branch, and

FCCSET lacks the authority to set priorities,

direct policy, and fully participate in the budget

process (17, 51). FCCSET acts largely as a

fulcrum for coordination. Agency participation in

FCCSET projects is voluntary, and FCCSET has

no authority over how participating agencies

spend their funds. Congress could amend

P.L. 94-282 to change this. Similarly, the U.S.

Global Change Research Act of 1990 (P.L.

101-606) could be amended to require periodic

integrated assessment reports to be presented to

Congress and to specify key participants in the

assessment process.

SUMMARIES AND FIRST STEPS FOR

EACH RESOURCE CHAPTER

 The Coastal Zone

The coastal zone is a complicated area that

includes both human-made and relatively ‘undisturbed” features, ranging from densely settled

urban areas to cypress swamps (see vol. 1, ch. 4).

Populations in coastal areas are growing faster

than in any other region in the United States, and

the construction of buildings and infrastructure to

serve this growing population is proceeding

rapidly. Consequently, protection against and

recovery from hazards peculiar to the coastal

zone, such as hurricanes and sea level rise, are

becoming ever more costly (163). The combination of popularity and risk in coastal areas has

important near-term consequences for the safety

of coastal residents, the protection of property, the

maintenance of local economies, and the preservation of remaining natural areas (see fig. 1-4).

The expected climate change impacts are likely

to exacerbate problems that already plague the

coastal zone (66). Sea level rise will substantially

increase flooding and erosion in areas already

vulnerable. Coastal storms-whether or not they

increase in intensity or frequency under a changing climate-will have increasingly greater effects as sea level rises.

The coastal areas most vulnerable to the effects

of climate change are those with low relief and

easily eroded shorelines-such as those in the

Southeast and Gulf Coasts-and those where the

coastline is already subsiding, such as in

Louisiana (52). Structures close to the ocean in

low-lying areas are also vulnerable.

Barrier islands provide protection for coastal

ecosystems and help stem erosion. In some cases, such

as this barrier island near Tampa, Florida, these

islands have been heavily developed, exposing many

communities to the risks of serious damage from

storms and high seas.

9 coherent approaches for applying and technology to critical and 

in problems and for promoting coordination of the scientific and technological responsibilities and programs of the Federal

-rots agencies the resolution of such problems,” and was established to “provide more effective planning and

administration of Federal engineering, and technological programs” 94-282, the Policy Act of 1976).
40 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure f-4-An Assessment of Coastal Hazards: Texas and Louisiana

Louisiana Population density

per square kilometer

Mississippi , 2000 or more

Texas — --

 500-1999

New Orleans `n 100-499

O Less than 100

Relief

Corpus Chrissti Less than 3 m

 3-9 m

 10-19 m

Brownsville 20 m or more

— Overall hazard assessment Overall hazard

assessment

— Relief High risk — Population density Moderate to high

 Moderate risk

 Moderate to low

NOTE: To convert square kilometers to square miles, multlply by 0.624. To convert meters to feet, multlply by 3.280.

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), "Coastal Hazards,” In: National Atlas of the United States of America

(Reston, VA: USGS, 1985). - ‘

Although development pressures in coastal

areas are driven by many social and economic

trends, government policies can influence the

appropriateness, rate, quality, and location of

development. The current system of allocating

the costs of preventing or repairing climaterelated damage in the coastal zone among Federal, State, and local governments and private

entities encourages certain types of+ development, or at least does not discourage them (11). . Climate change will likely add to the risks and

costs of living in the coastal zone. It is essential

that all stakeholders, such as property owners,

understand them and that coastal development

and preservation are guided by this understanding. The sooner policies are in place that encourage an adequate appreciation of risk, that offer

sufficient incentives to take adequate precautions,

and that attempt to overcome the organizational

fragmentation that makes a unified approach to

coastal climate change issues impossible, the

easier and less costly adaptation to a changing

climate is likely to be.

The Federal Government has an interest in

promoting sound planning and public safety in an

effective and efficient manner. Federal coastal

zone policies can be improved in many ways to

better guide the decisions of those living in

coastal areas, and a suite of options for doing so

is presented in volume 1, chapter 4. We focus on

five general categories in that chapter: revamping

the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),

improving diaaster-assistance policies, revising

the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (P.L. 97-348)

and the Coastal Zone Management Act, changing

beach-renourishment guidelines, and altering the

U.S. Tax Code.

To help focus on where to start with responses

to climate change in the coastal zone, some first

steps that could be taken are listed below.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 41

■ Revamp the National Flood Insurance

Program. The National Flood Insurance Program could be revised to provide stronger

incentives to reduce the potential costs

associated with high-risk development in

coastal areas. Congress has been considering

revising the NFIP for several years, and bills

to do this have been introduced in both the

House and Senate. H.R. 62, the “National

Flood Insurance Compliance, Mitigation,

and Erosion Management Act of 1993, ”

contains provisions that partially address

some of the NFIP improvements that maybe

desirable. Most pressing is the need to

adequately address erosion along the coast.

Erosion losses will increase with rising sea

levels. The Federal Emergency Management

Agency does not now have the authority to

map erosion risks or to reflect such risks in

insurance premiums, and as a consequence,

information and incentives to avoid development in eroding areas are inadequate. Also,

it seems especially desirable to increase

insurance premiums after multiple claims are

made on properties in high-risk areas subject

to repeated flooding.

■ Improve disaster assistance. Several bills

have also been introduced in the 103d

Congress to revise disaster-assistance policies and regulations. More stringent disaster mitigation by States and localities

could be required, which could hold down

future costs to the Federal Government.

This could be accomplished by more strongly

tying disaster assistance to adoption of

mitigation measures. H.R. 935, the “Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurricane

Hazards Insurance Act of 1993, ” for example, would establish minimum criteria for

reducing losses, recommends such measures

as fiscal incentives to reduce losses, provides

for low-interest loans or grants to retrofit

facilities vulnerable to hurricanes, and provides guidelines for establishing actuarial

premium rates for disaster insurance. S. 995,

the “Federal Disaster Preparedness and Response Act of 1993,’ would establish, among

other things, a grant program and accompanying performance standards to help States

prepare for, respond to, and recover from

major disasters.

■ Strengthen coastal zone management.

The Coastal Zone Management Act will

be up for reauthorization in 1995, and

this provides an opportunity to require

stronger State controls on risky development. Such controls could include, for

example, an erosion-setback program

(already adopted by several States), rerestrictions on construction of immovable

buildings, a relocation-assistance program,

restrictions on rebuilding damaged or destroyed structures in high-risk locations, and

adoption of minimum coastal-construction

standards. All of these controls would add

some degree of protection against sea level

rise and flood or storm damage. Another

possibility for reducing risks of living on the

coasts would be to encourage States to adopt

coastal-hazards-management programs.

These could be overseen jointly by the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency.

■ Promote public education. The public generally is not well-informed about the risks

associated with living in coastal areas, and

this lack of awareness has led and will

continue to lead to large public and private

expenditures. H.R. 935 provides one possibility for expanding public education. The

act authorizes education programs and

provides funds to States to implement

them through a self-sustaining mitigation

fund. The private sector, particularly the

private insurance industry, could also play an

important role in increasing awareness of

coastal hazards.

■ Require increased State and local contributions to beach-nourishment operations.
42 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Most benefits of the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineer’s beach norishment and shorelineprotection projects are realized at the local or

regional level, yet these projects are often

heavily subsidized. In most instances, the

Federal share is 65 percent. Greater State

and local contributions could be required,

both for initial construction and for maintenance, and Federal funding could be

made conditional on adoption of stronger

mitigation measures. These adjustments

would tend to increase the interest of local

governments in acting to limit community

exposure to coastal hazards.

1 Water Resources

Many factors are straining the Nation’s water

resources and leading to increased competition

among a wide variety of different uses and users

of water (see vol. 1, ch. 5), Human demands for

water are increasingly in conflict with the needs

of natural ecosystems, and this has led to significant water-quality and water-quantity problems

(see vol. 1, box 5-B). In addition, water infrastructure in many urban areas is aging.

Although it is unclear exactly how climate

change will affect water resources, climate

change has emerged as another important factor

to consider in water resource planning. Changes

in water availability as a result of climate

change could further affect already overburdened systems, and changes could occur in the

frequency, duration, and intensity of floods

and droughts (105). The areas that are most

vulnerable to climate change are, not surprisingly,

places that are already experiencing stressed

water resources (see fig. 1-5), such as many parts

of the Southwest and South Florida; the central

part of the country, which most models predict

will become hotter and drier; and areas where

competition for water is expected to increase.

The country faces a huge challenge in adapting

its water resource systems to the many current and

potential stresses. The numerous impediments to

this adaptation include the fact that traditional

engineering solutions for developing additional

water supplies-such as dam construction-have

become prohibitively expensive and politically

less acceptable because the best sites have already

been developed. Federal agencies’ responsibilities for water often overlap or conflict, and

coordination among different levels of government on water issues is often inadequate (166)

(see vol. 1, box 5-F). Many institutional arrangements for the management and allocation of water

resources are rigid and inefficient, making them

ill-equipped to cope well with water scarcity. And

there are very few incentives to conserve water.

Water resource planning is a complex political,

economic, sociological, scientific, and technological endeavor, so adaptation to change will not be

straightforward. In encouraging adaptation to

changes in water resources caused by climate

change, the Federal Governrnent, in cooperation

with State and local agencies, should focus on

encouraging five types of activity: improving

demand management (e.g., through pricing reform and conservation); improving supply management (e.g., through improving coordination,

jointly managing ground- and surface-water supplies, and improving the management of reservoirs and reservoir systems); facilitating water

marketing and related types of water transfers;

improving planning for floods and droughts; and

promoting the use of new analytical tools that

enable more efficient operations.

The following first steps toward improving

water resources planning and management—

selected from a longer suite of options presented

in volume 1, chapter 5-are intended to both

relieve existing stresses and make sense for

climate change.

■ Improve extreme-events management.

Despite all efforts to date, both floods and

droughts continue to cause significant losses

to human and natural systems (143, 200).

Greater coordination of the many agencies with flood- or drought-related re-
Chapter1-- Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 43

Figure 1-5-Water Withdrawals and Consumption in the Coterminus United States, 1985

NOTE: To convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: Adapted from W. Solley, R. Pierce, and H. Perlman, Estimated Use of Water the United States in 1990, USGS Survey Circular 1081

(Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 1993),

■

sponsibilities is needed. Congress could

direct the executive branch to create highlevel coordinating bodies, such as an interagency drought task force and a national

flood-assessment board. Such bodies could

be given the responsibility to develop a

national drought policy and to establish

national goals for floodplain management.

The “National Flood Insurance Compliance, Mitigation, and Erosion Management

Act of 1993” (H.R. 62) C allS for establish- .

ment of a flood-insurance task force. This

bill could also be broadened to create a more

comprehensive flood-assessment board.

Make it easier to manage reservoirs on a

basin-wide level. Operating reservoirs within

the same basin as a single system rather

than individually (as is often the case)

could greatly improve the efficiency and

flexibility of water-quantity management.

New legislation, perhaps as part of the next

omnibus water bill, could grant the Army

Corps of Engineers and the Department of

the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation greater

flexibility to manage their reservoirs basinwide and thus encourage development of a

more integrated approach to water-quality,

wetland, flood, and drought management.

Support water marketing. As long as

adequate attention is given to protecting

all affected parties, water markets could

provide an efficient and flexible way to

adapt to various stresses, including a

changing climate. It would be very useful

for Congress to clarify reclamation law on

trades and transfers and define the Federal
44 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Government’s interest in facilitating the

creation of markets (193). Congress could

urge the Department of the Interior to

provide stronger leadership to assist with

water transfers, and water marketing could

be thoroughly evaluated as part of the

Western Water Policy Review, authorized in

late 1992.

■ Promote the use of new analytical tools.

Further development dissemination, and

use of new modeling and forecasting tools

could greatly enhance water resource

management. Some current analytical efforts have not been adequately funded, and

the most advanced tools now available are

not yet being used by many States or water

utilities. Small investments in promoting

dissemination and use of these tools today

could save substantial sums later. Section 22

of the Water Resources Development Act of

1974 (P.L. 93-251) authorizes funding for

training and technical assistance to States

and could be used to promote the adoption of

the new tools. Congress could also consider

providing funds to develop or refine tools

that incorporate climate uncertainty into

traditional hydrologic analyses.

■ Promote demand management. The upcoming reauthorization of the Clean Water

Act is one potential target of opportunity

for improving water-use efficiency (see

vol. 1, box 5-C). Congress could consider

making conservation projects eligible for the

State revolving-fund loans created under the

act to fund wastewater treatment plants. The

Federal Government could set an example

by adopting efficient water-use practices in

its own facilities. The Energy Policy Act of

1992 (P.L. 102-486) requires that Federal

facilities adopt conservation practices to the

extent practicable, but it concentrates primarily on energy conservation. A technicaladjustment bill to the Energy Policy Act

could be considered in the 103d Congress

and would provide a way to clarify and

underline congressional intent toward water

conservation in Federal facilities.

■ Expand the scope of the Western Water

Policy Review. With the enactment of Title

30 of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 (P.L.

102-575), Congress authorized the Resident

to oversee a major water-policy study. Title

30 directs the President to undertake a

comprehensive review of Federal activities

that affect the allocation and use of water

resources in the 19 western States and to

report findings to appropriate congressional

committees by the end of October 1995

(190). Climate change is not mentioned as

a factor motivating the Western Water

Policy Review, but the study could provide an opportunity to assess more fully

how climate change may affect water

resources and to evaluate policy options

that might help with adaptation to a

warmer climate. Congress could expand

the scope of the Review beyond the West, or

it could authorize a similar follow-on study

of eastern water issues. The Review could

also provide an opportunity to explicitly

consider land-use practices and water resource issues jointly. The relationship between the two is close, and there appear to be

significant opportunities to improve both

water-quantity and water-quality management by improving land-use practices.

9 Agriculture

Agriculture in the United States is an intensively managed, market-based natural resource.

Throughout the world, agriculture has adapted

continuously to the risks associated with normal

climate variability, just as it has adapted to

changes in economic conditions. The American

agricultural sector will undoubtedly make further

adaptations in response to climate changes, with

market forces rewarding and encouraging the

rapid spread of successful adaptation (30, 41,
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 45

148). Just what these adaptations will be and what

public actions could be taken to encourage them

are addressed in detail in volume 1, chapter 6, of

this report.

The possible effects of climate change on

agriculture are difficult to predict. Agricultural

productivity is likely to be affected worldwide,

which would lead to alterations in the regional

distribution and intensity of farming (1, 188). The

range over which major U.S. crops are planted

could eventually shift hundreds of miles to the

north (13, 150) (see vol. 1, box 6-C). For

American farmers, already facing increasingly

competitive and growing world markets, any

relative decline in productivity compared with the

rest of the world would mean lost markets (40). A

significant warming and drying of the world’s

climate might lead to an overall decline in

agricultural yields (75, 150). Consumers would

bear much of the cost through higher food prices

or scarcities. Some individual farmers might still

benefit through locally improved yields or higher

prices; others might suffer because of relatively

severe local climate changes. Rapid geographical

shifts in the agricultural land base could disrupt

rural communities and their associated infrastructures.

If the United States wants to ensure its competitive position in the world market and meet the

growing demands for food without higher prices,

public efforts to support the continued growth in

agricultural yields remains necessary. Climate

change adds to the importance of efforts to

improve the knowledge and skills of farmers, to

remove impediments to farmer adaptability and

innovation, and to expand the array of options

available to farmers (157). Efforts to expand the

diversity of crops and the array of farm technologies insure against a future in which existing crop

varieties or farming systems fail (137) (see vol. 1,

box 6-H). Efforts to enhance the adaptability of

farmers--to speed the rate at which appropriate

farming systems can be adopted-lower the

potentially high costs of adjustment to climate

change.

This soybean field shows the devastating effects of

droughts. The farmer indicates how tall soybean

plants would normally be. Warmer climates could lead

to an increase in both nurnber and severity of droughts.

Impediments to adjusting to climate change are

numerous (see vol. 1, box 6-I). Water shortages

will probably limit the potential for compensating

adjustments in certain regions. The uncertainty of

climate change makes effective response difficult, as do limitations on the availability of

suitable crops and agricultural practices. The

decline in the Federal Government’s interest in

agricultural research and extension is also a

problem (138, 174); more-vibrant research and

extension programs could enhance adaptability.

Certain agricultural programs may increase the

costs associated with a changing climate (90).

Because the commodity programs link support

payment to maintaining production of a particular

crop, they could inadvertently discourage adjustments in farming. Disaster-assistance programs

may become increasingly costly under a harsher

climate, and, if not well designed, may tend to

discourage farmers from taking appropriate cautionary actions to reduce exposure to climate

risks. Restriction on the marketing of conserved

water may limit the incentive for efficient use of

scarce water resources.
46 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume

The most pressing tasks concerning agriculture and climate change that the Federal

Government should undertake are: improving technology and information transfer to

farmers in order to speed adaptation and

innovation in farm practice; removing the

impediments to adaptation created unnecessarily by features of commodity support and

disaster-assistance programs; and supporting

research and technology that will ensure that

the agricultural sector can deal successfully

with the various challenges of the next century.

The Government could organize its approach

around the following first steps, which should

increase the ability of the farm sector to adjust

successfully to a changing climate.

■ Revise the commodity support programs.

Congress addresses farm issues every 5

years in omnibus farm bills, with the next

one likely to be debated for passage in 1995.

The annual budget-reconciliation process

and agricultural appropriations bills offer

intermediate opportunities for revisions in

commodity support programs. commodity

support payments are linked to the continued

production of a single crop. If a farmer

significantly changes crops, support payments will be reduced. This link discourages

the responsiveness of farmers to changing

market and climate conditions. The cumulative economic costs of even temporary

delays in adjusting to climate change might

prove to be large. Congress should consider

breaking the link between farm support and

the production of a single crop. A further

increase in flex acreage (an amount of land

that can be shifted to new crops with little

penalty) or other more substantial revisions

in the commodity support programs that

would allow greater flexibility in crop

choice (42) could be considered in the 1995

reauth orization of the Farm Bill. These

changes would increase the ability of farmers to adapt to climate change.

1

■ Encourage research and development in

computerized farm-management systems.

The competitiveness of the farm sector will

increasingly depend on advances that improve the efficiency of U.S. farmers-rather

than on further increasesin intensity of input

use. Computerized farm-management systems include land-based or remote sensors,

robotics and controls, image analysis,

geographical information systems, and

telecommunications linkages packaged into

decision-support systems or embodied in

intelligent farm equipment. Such systems

will be increasingly important to the farmer’s

ability to increase yields, control costs, and

respond to environmental concerns. The

U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service already provides

leadership in this area and has proposed an

‘‘Integrated Farm Management Systems Research’ program that would provide for the

development and broader use of technologies that have the potential to greatly enhance the efficiency of farming and to

increase the flexibility with which farmers

can respond to climate conditions.

Use the 1995 Farm Bill to modify disasterassistance programs. Since the late 1970s,

Congress has been considering how to best

structure the crop-insurance and disasterpayment programs (20, 21). After a flurry of

proposals and studies before the passage of

the 1990 Farm Bill, the programs were left

essentially unchanged. Major revisions are

likely to be considered in the 1995 Farm Bill.

The best option for revising these programs

remain unclear. For the purpose of preparing

for climate change, any program that

provides a greater incentive for farmers

or local communities to reduce their

exposure to risk should lessen the potential for large-scale future losses and encourage adaptation to changing climate

risks. Features of a restructured system

might include: defining disasters formallv.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 47

with assistance provided only for statistically unusual losses; eliminating either crop

insurance or disaster payments (or merging

the two programs) so that one does not

undercut the incentives to participate in

the other; limiting the number of times a

farmer could collect disaster payments; and

requiring farmers or farm communities to

contribute to a disaster-payment fund, thus

providing a greater incentive to reduce

exposure to risks.

I Wetlands

More than half of the Nation’s wetlands have

been destroyed by activities ranging from agriculture to flood-control projects to urban development. Roughly 5 percent of the lower 48 States is

currently covered by wetlands (see vol. 2, ch. 4).

They provide diverse products of considerable

commercial value, playing a key role in the

production of goods such as finfish, shellfish, fur,

waterfowl, timber, blueberries, cranberries, wild

rice, and peat. Wetlands also nurture biological

productivity, slow surface-water flows, and transform nutrients and toxic chemicals. Wetlands are

key to the harvest of 75 percent of the Nation’s

fish and shellfish and harbor about one-third

of the Nation’s threatened and endangered species (83).

As a result, in 1989, the Federal Government

embraced the policy goal of no net loss of

wetlands-any destruction of wetlands should be

offset by an equivalent restoration or creation of

wetlands (28, 184). Steps to achieve this goal,

however, have not been fully implemented. Part

of the problem is that no single Federal statute is

directed at protecting, restoring, and acquiring

wetlands, and there is no coordinated effort to

monitor and evaluate wetlands. Different authorities with different goals are scattered across

many Federal and State agencies, and the criteria

they use for decisionmak“ing are somewhat inconsistent. Federal policies have sometimes failed to

discourage--and sometimes have encouraged—

wetland destruction (179). Few programs for

wetland acquisition and restoration address

the possibility of climate-induced alteration of

wetlands.

Climate change is likely to accelerate the loss

of wetlands, especially of the following highly

vulnerable types: coastal wetlands, depressional wetlands in arid areas (i.e., inland

freshwater marshes and prairie potholes),

riparian wetlands in the arid West and Southwest, and tundra wetlands. Coastal wetlands

may be drowned by a rising sea or altered by

changing salinity (123, 194, 198). Depressional

wetlands are susceptible to the lowered water

tables that will likely result from the higher

temperatures, increased evaporation, and decreased summertime precipitation predicted for

these already dry areas. Riparian wetlands in the

arid West, which rely on water flowing through

rivers and streams, could also be threatened by

drier conditions. Tundra areas in Alaska may

shrink as increased temperatures allow the permafrost to thaw and drain.

Whether or not a no-net-loss goal can be

achieved as the effects of climate change become

more pronounced, the goal remains a useful focal

point for policy makers (114). Wetlands are a

diminishing resource, and the Federal Government could play a lead role in ensuring that

wetlands survive climate change by adopting

the following objectives: protect existing wetlands, restore degraded or converted wetlands,

facilitate migration (e.g., the upslope movement of coastal wetlands as sea level rises), and

improve coordinated management and monitoring.

Given the available policy levers (regulation

and acquisition, incentives and disincentives, and

research), limited money to fund programs, and

the level of scientific understanding of the impacts of climate change on wetlands, we identified the following strategies as first steps to use in

responding to climate change and the threats it

poses to wetlands. Additional options are assessed in volume 2, chapter 4.
48 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Prairie potholes, like these in North Dakota, serve

valuable storm-water-retention functions and provide

breeding and stopover habitat for migratory

waterfowl. Agricultural development, encouraged in

part by Federal subsidies, has eliminated many of

these wetlands. Climate change rnay pose further risks

if moisture declines or if farming intensifies with a

warming in these northern lands.

■ Revise the Clean Water Act. The act is up

now for reauthorization, and it could be

revised to improve wetland protection (169).

This could be done through minor revisions or through transforming the act into

a broad wetland-protection and watershedmanagement act. For example, the mitigation requirements could be clarified to ensure that lands set aside for protection or

restoration more than compensate for wetlands that are destroyed. Congress could

establish uniform standards for mitigation

activities and require that restoration projects be monitored and evaluated for success

in meeting these standards. At a broader

level, Congress could devise a mechanism

for coordinated management of water quality and wetland resources at a regional or

watershed level. For example, regulations

covering non-point-source water pollution

might be linked to wetland protection, allowing wetland restoration or protection in

exchange for relaxation in pollution-control

requirements (127).

■

■

■

Develop and implement a priority plan to

coordinate wetland protection across agencies. Direct Federal agencies to develop and

implement uniform regional plans guiding

wetland protection, acquisition, mitigation,

and restoration and to coordinate the designation of wetlands deemed high priority for

protection or restoration. These priority plans

could be built on existing plans under

various agencies (e.g., the Army Corps of

Engineers, the Environmental Protection

Agency, DOI’S Fish and Wildlife Service,

and the U.S. Department of Agriculture) that

now set priorities for wetland management

and acquisition. With better coordination

and guidance and a watershed-management

focus, existing programs could accomplish

wetland protection more efficiently.

Ensure that all Federal policies and incentives are consistent with wetland protection. Congress could ensure that all Federal

policies and incentives are consistent with

wetland protection, reviewing Federal programs to find and eliminate those that offer

incentives to destroy wetlands and to perhaps bolster programs that encourage wetland protection. For example, the Coastal

Barrier Resources Act (P.L. 97-348, as

amended) might be extended to include

coastal wetlands; funding for the Wetlands

Reserve Program might be restored to at

least authorized levels and targeted to wetlands in high-priority areas. The Fish and

Wildlife Service could be required to complete and issue the report on the impact of

Federal programs on wetlands that was

mandated in the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-645).

Conduct research, development, monitoring, and evaluation in key areas. A new

National Biological Survey at the Department of the Interior could incorporate wetland monitoring as part of its mission (see

vol. 2, ch. 5). Relevant agencies should be

encouraged to include wetland research in
Chapter 1 Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 49

their component of the U.S. Global Change

Research Program (USGCRP).

 Federally Protected Natural Areas

Over 240 million acres of land have been set

aside by the Federal Government to protect some

part of nature for generations to come. These

lands represent and protect the best of the

Nation’s natural heritage and have become a

source of national pride. Chapter 5 of volume 2

focuses on National Parks, Wilderness Areas, and

National Wildlife Refuges, which comprise the

bulk of the Federal lands held primarily for nature

conservation.

Because a variety of human activities has

altered or degraded the habitat for many species,

federally protected natural areas have become

repositories for the Nation’s rarest species and

sites for conserving biological diversity (181,

185). Protected natural areas are also subject to

increased stress from activities that occur both

within and outside their boundaries. Natural areas

are being effectively dissected into smaller and

smaller parts in some places--especially in the

East-leaving them more vulnerable to other

stresses that could degrade habitat quality and

ecosystem health (103).

Under climate change, the climate “map’

that has helped to shape natural areas will shift

while the boundaries that define the management and degree of protection for natural

areas will remain fixed (see fig. 1-6). As a

result the biological makeup of the protected

natural areas will change. Some may become

incapable of providing the benefits or serving the

functions for which they were originally established, such as maintaining their unique or

distinctive character, providing protection for rare

species and other biological resources, and maintaining the quality or availability of other services, such as nature study or certain kinds of

recreation (see vol. 2, box 5-B).

Figure l-S-Preserves and Climate Change

— 1

Southern range limit I

New southern

range limit

❑ \

/

/

- - .

Old southern range limit

NOTE: As climate changes, the preferred range of many species may

shift, Ieaving preserves dramatically changed.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

Certain general characteristics of protected

natural areas may make them more vulnerable to

climate change, such as being small, isolated,

fragmented, or already under considerable stress,

and containing sensitive species or ecosystems,

such as coastal, alpine, or Arctic ecosystems or

midcontinent wetlands (67, 133, 188). If climate

change leads to accelerated habitat loss or proceeds so quickly that some species cannot adapt

quickly enough, species loss may accelerate, and

overall biodiversity will decline (29, 196).

Even if species can move fast enough, adaptation by migration may be difficult because in

many places, the landscape has been sectioned off

into small pieces. Some natural areas are islands

in the middle of extensively developed areas.

Geographic fragmentation may limit the ability of
50 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-G-Climate Change in Alaska: A Special Case

Nowhere in the United States does there remain such a vast expanse of land so undisturbed by human activity

as in Alaska. Because of its distinctive character, pristine conditions, and abundant natural resources, Alaska has

become a national treasure. Nearly 66 percent of Alaska’s land base is protected in wilderness areas, National

Wildlife Refuges, National Forests, or public Iands administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Alaska

contains some 170 million acres (69 million hectares)1 of wetlands (over 60 percent of the Nation’s total) and 330

million acres of boreal forest. Alaskan plants and animals withstand some of the harshest environmental conditions

in the world and many are unique to polar climates. Although human activities are to some extent adversely

affecting this remote environment, it remains the most wild place in the United States and is rightly referred to as

our “last frontier.”

The unique characteristics of Alaska-the natural resources, the wildlife, and the pristine, harsh

environment-affect nearly every aspect of life, including the culture and industry of those who live here. For

example, traditions of the indigenous communities are deeply rooted in t he distinctive wildlife and vegetation of

Alaska. Many indigenous communities, such as the Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska’s North Slope, still rely on wildlife

and natural vegetation for subsistence. The bowhead whale is central to their culture. The whales are a major food

source and the hunts are a community tradition. Caribou and fish are other staples for Inupiats. Athapaskan

Indians, who reside mostly in the boreal forest of interior Alaska, rely heavily on the plant life there for food, housing

materials, and heating fuels (120). Fish such as salmon and whitefish are primary elements of Athapaskan

subsistence, and caribou and moose are important sources of food anddothing(120).

Alaska’s economy is also deeply rooted in its abundant natural resources, with oil and gas, fishing, and

tourism providing the base for the economy. Nearly 65 percent of the State’s revenue comes from oil and gas

exploration or development. Two of the largest oil fields in North America (Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk fields) are

located near Alaska’s North Slope and provide the economic base for much of that region. Alaskan waters are

also sites of some of the world’s most productive fisheries. The Bering Sea has the biggest fishery in the United

States; it is among the biggest in the world. In 1990, Alaska’s fish harvest (mostly salmon, king crab, halibut, shrimp,

and scallops) surpassed any other State’s, with more than 5.4 billion pounds (2.4 billion kilograms)2 of seafood

harvested-half of all seafood harvested in the Nation. The seafood industry is also Alaska’s largest private-sector

employer, employing 23 percent of the State’s work force. In addition, Alaska’s vast expanse of rugged land and

abundant wildlife have made tourism a growing and important industry there. Visitors to Alaska spent almost

$1 billion in 1989, the third largest source of income in the State. With 13,500 workers in tourist-related industries,

tourism is second only to fisheries as a source of employment?

Because climate changes resulting from rising atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) are expected to be

especially pronounced in Alaska and other high-latitude regions, Alaska may provide an “early warning” of initial

climate effects. In very general terms, Alaska can expect to see increased average temperatures, increased

precipitation, and melting of sea ice. The rate and ultimate severity of the climate changes is at present unknown

(67). In addition, little is known about the sensitivities of wildlife, vegetation, ecosystems, indigenous cultures, or

the economy to any potential climate changes.

Warmer temperatures in polar regions are expected to lead to some melting of sea ice. A recent study of

climate change effects on the Canadian Beaufort Sea determined that, based on a doubling of atmospheric CO2

the open-water season could increase from an average of 2 months to 5 months, the extent of open water could

increase from about 100 miles (160 kilometers)4 to 300-500 miles, and maximum ice thickness could decrease

1 TO convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

2 TO convert pounds to kilograms, multiply by 0.454.

s P. carlson, Alaska Division of Toursim, personal communication, *ptem~ 1993.

4 TO convert miles to Idlonwters, multiply by 1.609.
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options | 51

by 50-75 percent (102). Shoreline erosion could increase significantly with a longer open-water season. Overall

biological productivity is also expected to increase in parts of the Bering Sea with an increase in temperature and

change in ice cover. Because of the drying effects of warmer temperatures, there could be an increase in the

frequency and extent of fires. Over the past three decades, fires in Alaska have increased due to warmer and drier

conditions. More fires under climate change could expand the extent of early successional vegetation favored by

moose, beavers, Arctic hares, sharptailed grouse, and other wildlife species. However, fire may adversely affect

the lichen supply in spruce forests--an important food for caribou in winter.

The most profound consequence of warming in Alaska and other polar regions maybe the exacerbation of

global climate change through the release of carbon from the permafrost of the Alaskan tundra and boreal forests.

Worldwide, tundra and boreal forests contain nearly a third of the world’s soil carbon. Thawing of the permafrost,

and the resulting decomposition of organic material, could release huge quantities of methane (CH4

) and C02 into

the atmosphere and contribute to accelerated warming (67).5 Climate warming may also be exacerbated by

melting of the vast expanse of ice and snow that now reflects away considerable incoming heat. Little can be done

to stem the thaw and resulting secondary climate impacts, except to slow warming by reducing human-made

greenhouse gas emissions.

Potential Losers

Indigenous cultures--Alaska’s indigenous, subsistence communities could be at risk under climate change.

Thawing of the permafrost is likely to affect supported structures such as pipelines and bridges, and roads may

be threatened if thawing weakens the soil. Many indigenous peoples use the permafrost for food-storage cellars,

so warming may threaten their ability to preserve food during summer months. Hunting the bowhead whale, an

ancient and sacred tradition for many indigenous communities on the North Slope, is linked to the extent of sea

ice. Melting of the sea ice will likely change the whale’s migration and affect access to the whales by indigenous

hunters.

Plants and animals--early half of the world’s peatlands (tundra) are in North America, with nearly a third

of these in Alaska. Evena2‘F (1 oC) warming could lead to forests replacing alpine tundra on many mountains

and islands (122). Some tundra species unable to adapt to climate change might decline. Caribou populations

depend on lichens for food. The distribution of lichens is sensitive to the amount and extent of snow cover, which

will change under a warming climate. Furthermore, because caribou calving is linked to vegetation produced during

early snow melt, changes in the timing of the melt could disrupt calving.

Some 25 species of marine mammals regularly use Alaskan waters. The marine mammals most likely to be

adversely affected by climate change are pinnipeds (seals and walruses) that winter primarily in t he Bering Sea

have regular contact with ice, and are closely associated with the continental shelf or shelf edge. These include

spotted and ribbon seals, which may suffer from increased competition with other species and reduced habitat,

and Pacific walruses and bearded seals, which are ice-associated bottom feeders and are therefore tied to the

seasonally ice-covered continental shelves. Both the beluga and bowhead whales are associated with sea ice,

but they may not be significantly affected by melting because they do not depend on ice cover to protect and

nurture their newborn.

Perhaps the biggest unknown impact of climate change is how it will affect fish populations and the fishing

industry. Variations in stock size and species abundance appear to be correlated wit h periodic variability of ocean

temperature, but are not completely understood. For example, huge fluctuations in groundfish stocks occur now.6

Many scientists believe that overfishing will remain the primary concern for Alaskan fisheries (122). However,

5 Recent measurements Indicate that the tundra of the North Slope of Alaska has in fact Changed from a

“sink” to a “source” of C02 with the warming trend seen in Alaska over the past few decades (125).

6 V. Alexander, Dean, School of Fisheries and Ocean Science, University of Alaska at Fairbanks, personal

communication, May 27, 1993.

(Continued on next page)
52 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 1-G--Climate Change in Alaska: A Special Case-(Continued)

considering the importance of fishing to the Alaskan economy, the potential for loss under climate change is

significant

Potential Winners

0il and gas industry-Reduction of the sea ice could allow the use of less expensive offshore structures

and would reduce the costs of marine transportation. Some speculate that the opening up of the Northwest

Passage would offer a shortcut for shipping from Europe to the Pacific Rim, but Alaskan ports probably would not

participate significantly in this traffic.

Plants and animals-in general, plant life is likely to benefit from an increase in temperature, though the

composition of forests and other vegetated areas will likely change. Some boreal forest species, such as white

spruce and birch, are Iikely to expand northward. Others, such as red and yellow cedar, may be less able to migrate

because of the rugged terrain, low genetic variability, and slow dispersing ability. Some migration is already

happening--white spruce ranges have been expanding over the past 40 years. Expansion of white spruce into

boreal forests may eventually be important for timber harvests.

Most wildlife species, including polar bears, moose, muskoxen, mountain sheep, most marine mammals, and

many birds (e.g., grouse, raptors, owls, and migratory birds), will likely benefit from increased temperatures and

increased productivity in vegetation. These benefits might be stemmed by losses of tundra wetlands, increases

in disease spread, or changes in species assemblages that would result in changed predation patterns. Most birds

will likely benefit from having more forage, more insects, and a longer season during which to rear their young.

Omnivores such as bears should respond favorable to a changing climate because of the longer availability of

green vegetation in the spring. Other forbearers and carnivores should increase in response to larger prey

populations unless they are controlled by hunting, trapping, or other human activities.

Tourism-Higher temperatures are likely to benefit the tourism industry, although vigorous advertising by

the State has almost certainly had more impact on the industry in recent years than has its climate. Increased

wildlife populations will probably attract more hunters, hikers, and campers. However, increased tourism could also

mean more impacts on the environment that is so important to indigenous, subsistence communities.

species to find new habitat-they may have no factors that make natural areas valuable: characplace to go (34).

Natural areas in the West are currently much

larger and much less fragmented than they are in

the East. However, the institutions that manage

these lands are designed to manage only their own

parcels-in isolation—and are not encouraged to

consider the often more extensive natural ecological system. This compartmental approach to

management, or institutional fragmentation, may

prevent effective solutions to problems that transcend individual management parcels, such as

those posed by climate change (64, 92).

The main challenge for policy is to maintain

the high value of the system of natural areas while

realizing that climate change may affect the very

ter, species protection, and environmental services. The ideal response to this challenge might be

some combination of three general management

approaches: 1) maintain species where they are

today, 2) help species migrate through more

intensive management, and 3) acquire lands that

will be valuable under a changed climate. However, the lack of adequate knowledge and information precludes the full implementation of

either approach now.

It is difficult to predict how climate change will

affect natural areas and how they will respond.

This lack of knowledge limits the ability to help

natural areas adapt. We do not know which

species are most sensitive to climate change,
—

Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 53

which could be saved, or how to recreate habitats

or entire ecosystems elsewhere. The limited

success with restoring populations of endangered

species illustrates how little is known about

restoring species and their natural habitat. In

addition, we do not know what lands will be most

valuable as preserves under climate change. We

do not even know all of the species and kinds of

ecosystems currently under formal protection in

preserves today.

The most useful approaches that the Federal

Government could take to facilitate adaptations to climate change in natural areas fall

into two categories: information gathering

(including research, inventory, and monitoring options) (115, 171), and managing natural

areas now to minimize the impediments to

adaptation and to increase their resiliency. The

second category includes taking direct Federal

action to influence the management of natural

areas, establishing incentives to private landowners to encourage conservation under uncertainty,

and promoting larger-scale management through

more partnerships among agencies, communities,

and governments. A variety of options that

address these needs are assessed in volume 2,

chapter 5.

Because money to implement every policy

option and the scientific understanding of how

climate change will affect natural areas are

limited, we have identifed some strategies that

represent inexpensive or useful frost steps for

facilitating adaptation to climate change in natural areas. These options meet at least one of

several criteria: they will take a long time to

complete; they address “front-line,” or urgent,

issues that need attention before informed policy

decisions can be made; they can be approached

through mechanisms that are already in place or

through efforts already under way; and/or they

have benefits in addition to those that help

prepare for climate change. In some cases, a

near-term legislative action will provide a target

of opportunity to pursue these options.

■ Use the National Biological Survey (NBS)

to assess ecological inventory and monitoring needs. Future strategies to protect

natural areas and their resources will require

a national picture of current biological resources and the extent of the protection

of-or the threat to-these resources. A

national inventory and monitoring program

would be particularly beneficial in supporting efforts to protect endangered species and

biodiversity. DOI’S proposed new National

Biological Survey presents an opportunity to

implement some of these activities (131,

132, 188). Congress could ask NBS to

initiate a nationwide inventory and monitoring program, synthesize ecological and biological information for managers and planners, establish a mechanism for facilitating

regional-level research and management,

and develop a priority plan for expanding

protection of natural areas.

■ Support basic research on key gaps in our

understanding of ecosystems. This research would include work on species sensitivity to climate change, restoration and

translocation ecology, the design and effectiveness of migratory corridors or protective

buffer zones, the development of ecological

models, and the effect of elevated CO2

concentrations on plants and animals. Basic

research in these areas is needed now to

determin e how species might respond to

climate change and how best to provide for

their protection in the future.

■ Conduct a review of ecological research

within USGCRP and across Federal agencies. Such a review would evaluate how

much ecosystem research relevant to climate change and other long-term ecological

problems (e.g., loss of biodiversity) is being

done, and would identify important gaps. A

review of all research on ‘natural resources’

has not yet been conducted across the

Federal agencies. Existing analyses suggest

that a great deal of money is spent on
54 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

research relevant to the environment, but

how much is useful to understanding longterm ecological problems is not known.

Further, there is currently no mechanism for

consolidating results from disparate research

efforts into “general patterns and principles

that advance the science and are useful for

environmental decisionmaking. Without

such synthesis studies, it will be impossible

for ecology to become the predictive science

required by current and future environmental problems’ (97). An effort to characterize and synthesize ongoing research could

help bridge the gap between basic research

and natural resource planning. Such a review could be conducted by the Office of

Science and Technology Policy, the National Academy of Sciences, or an independent commission.

■ Provide funding for the Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-366).

This law establishes a Federal cost-share

program for “nongame” species conservation. It has already been enacted, but has

never been funded. Many States have prepared initial plans that could qualify for

Federal matching funds, making it a target

of opportunity to promote natural area

conservation at the State level. With some

amendments to promote multispecies, or

“ecosystem,” protection at the State level

and adequate funding., the Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Act could be used to encourage natural area protection and conservation

on State and private lands.

■ Use acquisition strategies to enhance protection. Federal land-management agencies

should be directed to consider whether all

future land acquisitions and exchanges:

1) augment underrepresented ecosystems in

the Federal natural area holdings, 2) buffer

or connect other preserved land parcels, and

3) provide habitat or services likely to persist

over the long term despite anticipated stresses.

Setting aside a given amount of land within

the modern fragmented landscape does not

alone ensure that the ecological features for

which it is valued will be preserved. To best

conserve species, natural areas should include an array of ecosystems and transition

zones between them to allow for the many

complex interactions that rely on links

between different parts of the landscape. By

asking agencies to incorporate such concerns into future acquisitions, Congress could

minimize future geographic fragmentation

and use limited monies to maximize the

range of protected ecosystems.

9 Forests

Forests cover roughly one-third of the U.S.

land area, shaping much of the natural environment and providing the basis for a substantial

forest-products industry. These forests are enormously variable, ranging from the sparse scrub of

the arid interior West to the lush forests of the

coastal Pacific Northwest and the South. The

Nation’s forests provide essential fish and wildlife habitat, livestock forage, watershed protection, attractive vistas, and an array ofrecreational

opportunities. Timber is one of the Nation’s most

important agricultural crops.

Climate change may pose a significant

threat to forests, particularly forests that are

not actively managed for timber production.

Within a century, climate change might shift the

ideal range for some North American forest

species more than 300 miles to the north (see fig.

1-7). Such a shift would almost certainly exceed

the ability of natural forests to migrate (35, 36,

146). Forests stranded outside their ideal climatic

range could suffer from declining growth and

increased mortality from climate-related stresses

such as insects, disease, and fires (2, 58, 100,

157). Some forests may collapse, and species and

unique populations may be lost from isolated

ranges if climate change is too rapid.

The most vulnerable forest resources are those

in regions subject to increased moisture stress, as
Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 55

Figure 1-7-Current and Projected Range of Beech

Under Climate Change

m Current range

 Potential

future range

o 500 Overlap

NOTE: Based on climate projections from the Goddard Institute for

Space Studies GCM under the assumption of a doubling of atmospheric

CO2. To convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, adapted from M.B.

Davies and C. Zabinski, “Changes in Geographical Range Resulting

from Greenhouse Warming: Effects on Biodiversity in Forests,” in:

Global Warming and Biological Diversity, R.L. Peters and T.E. Lovejoy

(eds.) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

in the dry continental interiors (14, 15, 159, 191).

Forests in coastal regions may be at risk from

rising sea levels, with the threat of flooding and

saltwater intrusion, or from increases in damaging

wind storms (61, 106). Forests with small or

highly fragmented ranges may be lost, such as

those at the upper elevations of mountains with

nowhere to migrate (89). Forests in locations

already subject to droughts, fire, and wind damage will be at high risk if the frequency or

intensity of these stressors is increased (157).

The extent to which intervention to facilitate

adaptation may be practical or desirable is limited. Even timber-industry forests are not intensively managed by the standards of annual

agricultural crops. On large areas of public forest

lands, even a minimal management response

might be viewed as incompatible with the goals

for which the forest is held. The challenge is to

find unobtrusive and cost-effective means to help

ensure that the health and primary services of the

Nation’s forest resource will not be lost if climate

change proves to be as serious a threat to forests

as some believe it will be.

The Federal Government can prepare itself

to respond to the threats that climate change

poses to forests in several ways: 1) by better

understanding which forests are at risk (e.g.,

by supporting research on species sensitivity to

climate and monitoring changes in forests);

2) by acting to avoid the potential loss of forest

species (e.g., by promoting and improving

forest seed banks, mass propagation techniques, and forest-restoration techniques);

3) by being ready to react promptly to the

threat of large-scale forest mortality (e.g., by

preventing fires, managing pests, or thinning

to promote drought tolerance—in forests

where such activities are determined to be

appropriate); 4) by redirecting incentive programs to encourage improvement in the health

of private forests; and 5) by increasing the

adaptability of the forest industry and forestdependent communities to climate change

through forest-product research and incentives for diversification.

Given the existing policy levers, the limited

money to fund programs, and the poor level of

scientific understanding of impacts of climate

change on forests, the following subset of policies, discussed in volume 1, chapter 6, are first

steps that Congress could take. Each would help

the Nation begin to position itself to respond to

the effects of climate change on both timber and

nontimber forests. These options are justified

now either because of existing problems (such as

fire, pests, and drought) that will be exacerbated

by climate change, or because of the time required

to complete the process.

 Establish an expanded forest seed-bank

program. A rapid climate change could
56 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

threaten the genetic diversity of U.S. forests.

A national effort in the conservation of

forest seeds would provide an opportunity to

respond to the potential for loss of genetic

diversity in the forest resource under climate

change. An appropriate goal for such a

program would be to maintain sufficient

seed variety, or other genetic material, so

that much of the original diversity of the

Nation’s forests could eventually be restored

(86, 87). (Current forest seed-collection

activities are uncoordinated and focused on

only a small number of species (113).) To

accomplish this goal., Congress could authorize and fund a National Forest Genetic

Resources Program within the Forest Service, providing funds for the construction and

operation of seed-storage facilities, for the

establishment of associated plantations to be

used for continuing seed production, and for

a forest genetics research program that

would address climate tolerance of trees and

means for large-scale propagation. Such a

program could be partially supported

through fees for private access to the seed

collection.

B Develop strategic plans for responding to

major forest declines. Increased risk of

fires and insect damage may result under a

warmer climate. The relative value of prevention activities to reduce risk is likely to

be increased. The need for aggressive intervention to protect forest resources may also

be increased. Because of the need for prompt

action and because of the contentiousness

that often accompanies forest management,

policy rules for pest-control activities and

silvicultural management to reduce forest

health risks are best established before they

are needed. Congress could enact a foresthealth bill that would establish criteria that

would allow prompt action to protect against

threats of catastrophic mortality or restore

forests after large-scale mortality and decline. Such a bill might allow for the

declaration of temporary forest-health emergencies, under which accelerated actions to

protect or restore forest health would be

authorized-as long as these actions were

consistent with established standards for

protection of all forest values. A policyreview group made up of academics, representatives of interest groups, and Federal

forestry personnel could develop criteria for

undertaking actions to stem forest decline.

■ Prepare for a forest-management response

to climate change. A changing climate may

eventually require innovations in forestmanagement and planting practices. Experimental efforts will be important in establishing a scientific basis for any necessary

changes to future management practices that

might later be applied to public multiple-use

forests. Congress could support a program of

research on the Forest Service’s Experimental Forests, or other research facilities, to

address adaptation to climate change. The

Experimental Forests are already designated as outdoor laboratories for evaluating

forestry practices. The research could be

directed toward finding practical and

environmentally appropriate techniques for

managing the public forests that will help

buffer them or help them adapt to a changing climate.

■ Improve incentives for private management of forest lands. The Federal Government controls only about one-quarter of the

Nation’s forestland. In the East especially,

where Federal holdings are limited, efforts to

support the protection of private forestland

may take on increased importance. The

Federal Government may use incentives,

disincentives, and cooperative approaches to

promote the health and productivity of this

forestland. Existing subsidy programs under

the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of

1978 (P.L. 95-313), as amended by the 1990

Farm Bill, provide cost-sharing assistance to

owners of small, private forests. Traditional
Chapter 1--Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 57

forest-support programs (e.g., the Forestry Incentives Program) target funds on

the basis of potential gains in timber

supply. These programs could be modified so that funds could be targeted to

areas at high risk of insect and fire

damage and to ecologically valuable forestland, which would encourage activities

that maintain the health of the private

forestland and discourage the further

fragmentation of forestland. Expanding

the role of the Forest Stewardship and Forest

Legacy Programs might help to accomplish

these goals. The funding priorities of the

Forest Stewardship Program could be clarified, thus ensuring that most funds are

targeted to the areas identified above.

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coastal wetland vulnerabilities to climate change, prepared for

U.S. CMce of lkchnology Assessment May 1992.

193. W@ R., “The Management of Water Resources in the

Western U.S. and Potential Climate Change,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of ‘Ikdmology Assessment

October 1992.

194. Warreq R. S., Coastal Wetland Vuherabilities to Climate

Change, contractor paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, July 1992.

195. w@dng’tomw., “Reliability of the Models: Their Match with

Observations,” h. Climate Change and Energy Policy, L.

Rosen and R. Glasses (eds.) (New York: American Institute of

Physics, 1992).

1%. Webb, T, “Past Changes in Vegetation and Climate: kssons

for the Future,” im Global Warming and Biological Diversiq,

R. Peters and T. Lovejoy (eds.) (New Have.rL CT: Yale

Univemity Press, 1992), pp. 59-75.

197. Wilhite, D., “Drought Management and Climate Chang%”

contractor report prepared for the Office of ‘IkcImology

Assemzne@ December 1992.

198, Willard D.E., et al., “Wetland Vulnerabilities to Climate

Change,” contractor paper prepared for the Office of ‘Ikehnology Assessment, August 1992.

199. Willar& DJ3., and LD. Kosmox4 A Watershed-Ecosystem

Approach to Lund and Water Use Plawu”ng and Management,

contractor report prepared for the Office of Tkdnology

Ai%WSSUMl~ Aug. 28, 1992.

200. Wingerd, D., and M. Tseng, “Flood and Drought Functions of

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” irx National Water

summary 19884My&ologic Events and Floods and

Droughts, U.S. Geological Sumey Water-Supply Paper 2375

(_W%shingtq DC: U.S. Governrmmt Printing Office, 1991).

201. World Resources Institute (WR.I), ‘IIM World Conserv ation

Union (IUCN), and United Nations Environment Programme

m), GIobal Biodiversity Strategy: Policy-Makers’ Guide

(Baltimore, MD: WRI Publications, 1992).

202. Wrigh4 G.IL, Wildlife Research and Management in the

NationaZ Parks (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press,

1992).
A Primer on

Climate Change

and Natural

Resources 2

This chapter summarizes the current state of knowledge

about climate change and describes the interaction of

climate variables with natural systems. Background

information key to understanding the impacts described

in each of the resource chapters (coasts, water, agriculture,

wetlands, preserves, and forests) is included here. This chapter

illustrates the range of effects climate change could cause across

systems and at different spatial and temporal scales.

Human activities have increased the rate at which greenhouse

gases--carbon dioxide (CO)2 methane (CH4, nitrous oxide

(N2O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs--are building up in the

atmosphere. This increase is likely to lead to changes in climate

that could have significant effects on natural systems. The

first-order effects of a buildup of greenhouse gases-increasing

average temperature, rising sea level, and changes in precipitation and evapotranspiration--can be estimated with some

confidence at the global scale. Global average temperature may

increase about 2 OF (1 ‘C) by 2030 and sea level is predicted to

rise by about 8 inches (20 centimeters)l in the same period;

precipitation and evapotranspiration globally will also increase.

As scientists consider smaller spatial scales, their certainty

about these effects decreases. Some midcontinent regions are

likely to become warmer and drier rather than warmer and wetter,

for example, but not enough is known yet about climate change

on a regional scale to be confident about the direction and

magnitude of changes. A decade or more of research will be

needed before such precision is available. Second- and thirdorder effects, such as changes in individual plants and animals or

whole ecosystems, are utimately the impacts that humans care

 To convert inches to centimeters (cm), multiply by 2.540,To

165
66 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

about. These changes in the natural and managed

systems that societies depend on have socioeconomic consequences and result in costs or benefits.

Plants and animals are more immediately

affected by extreme events, such as droughts,

floods, or storms, than they are by changes in the

long-term averages of climate variables. However, individuals may not be able to tolerate

sustained changes in average temperature and

precipitation. Such conditions might, for example, lead to increased vulnerability to pests,

disease, and fires. Repeated stress will adversely

affect not only individuals but also populations

and species, potentially resulting in altered ecosystem ranges and composition.

As the climate changes and average temperature increases, the extremes experienced by

ecosystems will change as well. The hottest

temperatures may be hotter than previously experienced; the coldest temperatures may not be as

cold as they are now. Ultimately, temperature

shifts may alter the geographic range of species

and ecosystems. Climate change may also benefit

some plants and animals. Certain plants, for

example, may derive benefits from the rising

concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, which

can act like a fertilizer. Higher temperatures could

enable some plants and animals to increase their

geographic ranges.

Ecosystems are always changing and would

continue to do so without climate change. However, projected rates of change in temperature

exceed the estimated rates for the past 15,000

years, which averaged about 2o

F(1oC) per 1,000

years; under a changing climate, temperatures

could rise 3 to 8 OF (1.5 to 4.5 o

C) over the next

century. These changes may be too rapid to allow

forest ecosystems to migrate with the changing

climate. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are

changing 30 to 100 times faster than shown in

ice-core records, which go back millennia. Natural ecosystems are more vulnerable to climate

change than are managed ones, such as farms and

plantation forests, because active measures--

Many animals, such as this Rocky Mountain coyote,

require large expanses of remote and undisturbed

habitat to sustain populations. Human disturbance or

fragmentation of habitat leads to declines in prey

populations and vegetation cover. Affected species

can migrate, decline, or alter their food sources.

irrigation, replanting, and fertilizing, for example

are much more difficult to undertake in natural

areas.

Many natural systems are already degraded by

pollution and geographic fragmentation. Additional human-caused stress may lead to undesirable changes in the values and functions of natural

systems from which humans now benefit. ‘Uner

stress, natural systems of plants and animals tend

to breakup and reformulate in new systems with

different species or mixes of species” (21). The

total change in an ecosystem depends not only on

its sensitivity to climate change, but also on the

system’s absolute sensitivity to a variety of other

changes that influence soil and water chemistry or

habitat fragmentation (21).

HOW DO WE KNOW CLIMATE

IS CHANGING?

The Earth’s average temperature has increased

0.8 OF (0.45 ‘C) over the past 100 years, with an

uncertainty range of +/-0.27 oF (+/-0.15 oC). The

broad range reflects many inaccuracies introduced in the 100-year land-based temperature

record by recording temperatures in cities (which
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 67

tend to be warmer than rural areas), 2 using

different instruments over time, and inadequate

and changing spatial coverage.

Because the climate system is so inherently

variable, it takes a long time to detect trends.

Besides greenhouse gases, urban ozone, decreases in stratospheric ozone, increases in acidic

air pollution, volcanic aerosols, and the solar

cycle are all likely to have influenced the observed global temperature record. For example,

the sum of all known greenhouse gases emitted to

the atmosphere to date should have increased the

heat-trapping capacity of the atmosphere by 2.1

watts per square meter (W/m*). However, over the

past few decades, other forces could have counteracted as much as 50 percent of the effect by

cooling the earth. Urban air pollution (e.g., soot

and acid aerosols) could have offset the warming

by up to 24 percent, ozone depletion by CFCS, 10

percent, and increased cloudiness by 20 percent.

Although these cooling effects temporarily mute

the greenhouse effect, they do not negate it, so net

warming is expected. Simultaneously, solar irradiance (the output of the sun) may have enhanced

the greenhouse effect by 14 percent.

Other naturally occurring events can confound

the temperature record, too, such as the 3- to

7-year occurrences of El Niño. Volcanic eruptions (such as El Chichon in 1982 and Mount

Pinatubo in 1991) can more than offset the entire

greenhouse effect temporarily (for 2 to 4 years).3

Recent satellite temperature measurements taken

over a 12-year period show no warming trend

(84). This satellite record cannot be used to refute

global Warming for three reasons: 1) the record of

measurements is over too short a period; 2) two

major volcanic eruptions occurred during that

period (Chichon and Pinatubo), followed by a

several-year cooling due to the particles they

injected into the atmosphere; and 3) the satellite

Figure 2-l—Long-Term Global

Temperature Record

15.5 -

Q

 15.0-

 14.5-

 As observed

--- Adjusted

I 1 I I

1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980

NOTE: Global average temperature from raw observations (solid line)

vs. data adjusted for known biases (dashed line). Lack of data quality

and contlnuity has Ied to an undesirable Ievel of uncertainty about these

records. To convert oC to oF, multiply by 1.8 and add 32.

SOURCE: T.R. Karl, ‘Missing Pieces of the Puzzle,” in: Research and

Exploration, Spring 1993, pp. 235-49.

does not measure the near-surface temperature of

the earth; rather, it integrates a 6,500-yard (6,000-

meter) swath of the atmosphere (48).

Despite all the confounding factors, the longterm temperature record shows warming that is

consistent with that calculated by the general

circulation models (GCMS) (44) (see fig. 2-1 and

box 2-A). The observed 0.8 OF rise is within—

but at the low range of--the 0.7 to 2.0 OF (0.4 to

1.1 o

C) that models predict. The warmin g is not

“statistically significant’ ‘-that is, it is not outside the range of normal variability. The unequivocal detection of a climate change signal from

such complicated records requires at least another

decade of measurements (44). The nine warmest

years since 1891 were all in the 1980s and early

1990s (6). Several ancillary pieces of evidence

consistent with warming, such as a decrease in

Northern Hemisphere snow cover, a simultaneous

 due to “the heat island effect’ is likely to than 0.1 (0.05 ‘C), or less than 10 percent of the 

(43).

 For example, injected 25 million tons (23 billion kg) of sulfur dioxide 15 miles (25 km) into stratosphere; the cooling caused

by reflectivity of those particles should offset the warming from greenhouse gases for 2 years until the particles settle out of the 
68 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-A–What the Models Tell Us: GCMs and Others

To describe how the climate system operates and to predict how changes in the composition of the

atmosphere will affect climate, scientists have developed models known as general circulation models (GCMs).

GCMs are composed of mathematical equations that describe the physical climate processes and interrelationships, including seasonal changes in sunlight, global air currents, evaporation and condensation of water vapor,

and absorption of heat by t he oceans. The models incorporate basic physical principles (such as the conservation

of energy and mass) and empirical evidence from observations of how the climate system seems cooperate (such

as statistical equations describing t he humidity and temperature at which clouds generally form). The four major

GCMs have generated somewhat different predictions about how climate might change largely because they use

different empirical evidence and starting assumptions and incorporate different sets of climate variables. Even

models that agree on global averages may predict different regional distrbutions because they have different ways

of accounting for small-scale climate processes.

The differences in climate change predictions from the various major climate models have drawn

considerable attention. So, too, has the fact that observed changes in global average temperature have been lower

than initial estimates. Many models have predicted that based on the increases of human-generated greenhouse

gas emissions (particularity carbon dioxide (CO2

) emitted during fossil fuel combustion) over the past century,

global temperatures should already have increased by 0.5 to 2.0 ‘F (0.3 to 1.0 oC). Measurements of warming to

date suggest that global average surface-air temperatures have increased approximately 0.5 to 1.0‘F (0.3 to

0.6 oC)--on the low end of the predicted range (45).1

That global warming appears to be proceeding more slowly than predicted maybe due to difficulties in

distinguishing short-term climate patterns from long-term trends, as well as to the complex and incompletely

characterized interactions, of oceans, clouds, and air pollution with weather and climate (44, 92). Natural variations

in weather (e.g., rainfall and temperature) occur over years or decades, which may mask longer-term (century and

millennium) climate patterns for many years (63). In addition, oceans have an enormous capacity to absorb heat

which may delay atmospheric warming for some time (81, 66). Clouds also play an important but uncertain role

in moderating planetary climate. Depending on their composition and location, clouds may either cool the planet

by reflecting incoming solar radiation or warm it by contributing to the greenhouse effect so it is not clear whether,

in the aggregate, they contribute to or somewhat offset global warming (1, 66). Finally, global warming may be

offset somewhat in the Northern Hemisphere because some human-generated pollution (particularly sulfur

aerosols) may actually exert a cooling effect: when converted to sulfate particles in the atmosphere, they reflect

incoming solar radiation (44, 66).

Generalities and uncertainties

GCMs paint the following general picture of global climate change. Average global air temperatures will

increase. With increased temperatures will come an increase in average global precipitation because warmer air

causes faster evaporation, speeding up the rate at which water vapor becomes available for aloud formation and

precipitation. Increased temperatures will cause the water in oceans to expand (water expands as it warms above

39 OF (4 oC)), and as ocean volume increases, sea levels will rise. Sea level rise may be moderated if increased

1 Global-average temperature statistics are compiled from historical temperature measurements from

weather stations around the world. Accurate interpretation of historical temperature data Is complkated and

controversial because changes in measurement technicpes and Iocatlons over the past century make the data

dlfflcult to compare. Data analysis is further oomptioated by the urban “heat island effect’’-local warming in areas

with many buildlngs and paved surfaces that tend to trap heat-which has ralsedtemperatures at some monitoring

stations, reflecting changes in local dhnate apart from any potential global changes. The estimated temperature

change reported here wasaconsensusflgure developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on CllmateChange (IPCC)

that attempts to amount for both the changes In measurement and the confounding effeots of data from urban areas.
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources | 69

temperature and water-holding capacity of

the air lead to more snow at the poles, which

may cause arctic ice sheets to grow thicker

in the near future; on the other hand, warmer

temperatures could cause parts of the

Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets to melt,

causing even more sea level rise. Beyond

these generalities, significant uncertainties

remain about regional impacts, rates of

change, and feedbacks. Regional predictions are quite murky, and they are the ones

that are most important to individual resources and human societies. A variety of

factors, including local or mesoscale effects

of hills, and vegetation boundaries, are

important in determining regional climate.

GCMs cannot at present incorporate features this small (see the figure in this box)

because spacing between grid points is

between 150 and 800 miles (250 and 1,000

kilometers) 2 (94). Because models differ in

how they treat these physical features and

because the current generation of models is

only beginning to incorporate the modeling

of ocean currents and aloud cover, it is not

surprising that the major GCMs differ markedly in predicting regional changes in precipitation, soil moisture, and other hydrologic variables. For example, certain models

predict that precipitation will increase in

some regions white others suggest that it will

decrease (83). The range (and therefore

uncertainty) in model output for soil moisture

and runoff is even greater than it is for

precipitation (49).

Most climate modelers agree that preNOTE: Models cannot yet incorporate regional features

adequately because grid sizes are too large. The smaller the

grid size, the more complex and time-consuming each model

run becomes. The top figure shows how a 480-km grid can

obscure important geologic features. The bottom figure shows

what the topography of the United States looks like with a

120-km model grid. The degree of resolution in the bottom

figure is typical of present global weather prediction models.

SOURCE: National Center for Atmospheric Research.

cipitation is most likely to increase at high latitudes and that the water-holding capacity of the atmosphere

(cloudiness) will be largest in low to midlatitudes (30). In the midcontinent areas, especially in summer,

evapotranspiration may outstrip precipitation, and thus soil moisture and runoff would decrease. The potential for

more-intense or longer-lasting droughts would therefore increase. Some scientists (78) suggest that GCMs

(because of their lack of realistic land-surface models) understate the potential for the intensification of

summertime drought in low to midlatitudes. If current trends in greenhouse gas emissions continue, they predict

the frequency of severe drought in the United States would be expected to increase dramatically, with effects

becoming apparent sometime on the 1990s (78).

A second likely regional consequence of global warming is that it will lead to changes in the type and timing

of runoff. Snowmelt is an important, source of runoff in most mountainous areas. Warmer temperatures in such

2 To convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609. (Continued on next page)
70 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-A–What the Models Tell Us: GCMs and Others-(Continued)

areas would cause a larger proportion of winter precipitation that now falls as snow to fall as rain. Thus, the

proportion of winter precipitation stored in mountain snowpack would decrease. Winter runoff would increase, and

spring runoff would correspondingly decrease. During times when flooding could be a problem, seasonal changes

of this sort could have a significant impact on water supplies because adequate room in reservoirs would have

to be maintained (53), and thus some early runoff would probably have to be released.3

Uncertainty surrounds predictions of the rate at which climate change may proceed. Most assessments of

climate change have assumed that it will proceed gradually and continuously until the climate reaches some new

equilibrium (21). These assessments attempt to characterize what the climate might eventually be like when the

equivalent of doubled C02 has been reached; relatively few studies have examined the intermediate, or transient

climate stages. However, a few suggest that the change may not linear and gradual. For example,the capacity

of the oceans to absorb heat may delay warming for sometime, but there maybe some threshold after which ocean

heat absorption slows and a relatively rapid warming of air temperatures follows (81)-or proceeds in steps in a

series of punctuated equilibria (relatively rapid change for a short time followed by a period of relative stability),

so transient climate stages might be important (15).

Uncertainties also arise from lack of knowledge about potential climate feedbacks--that is, processes that

occur in response to global warming that either augment or diminish the effect in complex and interacting ways.

For example, at warmer temperatures, the atmosphere can hold more water vapor, which is a powerful greenhouse

gas, and this will magnify warming. On the other hand, some portion of the additional water vapor could form into

clouds, which can, depending on their size, shape, and distance from the Earth’s surface, reflect solar radiation

and either amplify or offset some of the warming. The role of ice and snow in climate systems has not yet been

quantified, and it is not clear whether it will prove to be an additional feedback. Warming in the polar regions will

likely melt some portion of the polar ice caps, reducing the extent of land and ocean covered by them. Ice and

snow are more reflective than either land or water; reducing the amount of ice and snow will allow both land and

sea to absorb more heat= In addition, sea ice tends to insulate the ocean; when the ice is not present the ocean

may release heat to the atmosphere more readily. Both processes could add to the warming cycle, so that as the

atmosphere becomes warmer, it triggers various additional processes that will make it warmer still (66).

Other feedbacks may, however, counteract warming. For example, some scientists point out that vegetation

may grow better in an atmosphere with higher concentrations of C02 Increased plant growth could allow plants

to take up more carbon from the atmosphere, potentially acting as a brake to greenhouse warming (61).

Despite the uncertainties attached to climate change predictions, there are many areas of agreement on the

global, and even some regional, outlines of change. The effects on ecosystems and natural resources are more

uncertain. Even if models could now generate accurate regional and local climate predictions, scientists do not

yet have the theoretical knowledge to predict with confidence how ecosystems will react to the predicted climate

changes—and how ecosystem response will translate into impacts on natural resources and on the people who

depend on them. And they are further still from being able to forecast how or whether systems could adapt

3 The California mpartrnent of Water Resources has estimated, for exam~e, that if avera9e temwrature8

warm by5‘F (3 ‘C), winter snowmelt runoff would increase, but the average April-Juty runoff would be reduced by

about 30percent (M. Roos, Chief Hydrologi+ California Department of Water Resources, personal communication,

1992).

SOURCES: Intergovernmental Panei on Climate Change (lPCC), Wxld Meteorological Organization, and United Natbne

Environment Program, C//mate Change: The /PCC Sc#enfiflc Asseesrnent report prepared for IPCC by Wrking Group 1, J.T

Houghton, G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums (ads) (Oambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change, Wdcf Meteorological Organization, and United Natbns Environment Program, Umate Change 1992: 7he

Sq@ementary %porf to the /PCC Sdentifk Assessment, report prepared for IPCC by Working Group i, J.T. Haughton, B.A.

Callander, and S.K. Vamey (eda.) (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Prees, 1992); U.S. Congress, Offbe of Te&nobgy

Aaeeesment (OTA), Char@gby Degrees: SYeps to Redme Greenhouse Gases, OTA-O-42 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, February 1991 ).
.. . .

Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 71

decrease in Arctic sea ice, continued melting of

alpine glaciers, and a rise of sea level (48), have

also been corroborated.

WHAT CAUSES CLIMATE CHANGE?4

The Earth’s atmosphere is a natural greenhouse. Sunlight passes through the atmosphere

and strikes the Earth, and as the planet warms and

radiates heat, a large share of the heat is trapped

by gases in the atmosphere, primarily C02 and

water vapor. Although these gases make up only

0.25 percent of the atmosphere by volume, they

are responsible for increasing the average temperature of the Earth from O OF (the temperature it

would be without these natural greenhouse gases)

to 59 oF. The evolution of such an atmosphere

offered the appropriate conditions for the development of life on Earth. Humans have added more

CO2 and other greenhouse gases (CH4, N20, and

CFCS) to the atmosphere over the past 100 years.

These gases effectively trap the heat that would

normally be radiated from the earth into space.

Instead, heat is reflected back to the Earth, and

both the surface and the lower atmosphere get

warmer-causing global warming. This greenhouse effect is illustrated in fig. 2-2.

An international panel of scientists was established in 1988 to assess potential climate change

and its impacts. This Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) includes more than 50

countries, and operates under the aegis of the

World Meteorological Organization and the United

Nations Environment Program. IPCC issued a

report in 1990 and an update in 1992 (44, 45) that

represent the best scientific assessment to date

about climate change and its causes. IPCC

scientists agree on the basic atmospheric mechanisms that make the planet a greenhouse. They

also concur that human activities, such as burning

fossil fuel, deforestation, and agriculture, have

increased the rate at which greenhouse gases are

emitted to the atmosphere, and that the concentrations of those gases in the atmosphere are

increasing.

WHAT CHANGES IN CLIMATE

ARE PREDICTED?5

S Carbon Dioxide and Other

Greenhouse Gases

In contrast to measurements of temperature and

precipitation, which do not reveal clear trends,

measurements of greenhouse gases show significant, steady increases over the past century.6 For

example, the concentration of atmospheric CO2

,

the most important greenhouse gas (other than

water vapor), has been systematically monitored

since 1958 at the Mauna Loa Observatory in

Hawaii. 7 It has been increasing steadily for the

past 35 years. Data from air bubbles in ice cores

show that preindustrial atmospheric C02 concentrations were 280 parts per million (ppm); in

1990, the concentration had increased by more

than 25 percent to an annual average of 353 ppm

and is increasing at 0.5 percent per year (see fig.

2-3, lower data points). Seventy to 90 percent of

the CO2 added to the atmosphere today (about 8

4 This section briefly summarizes the mechanisms and the greenhouse gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect. For a more detailed

treatment of climate change, see chapter 2 of OTA’S previous report on climate change, Chunging by Degree$ (88). That repxt also examines

how the United States and other countries could reduce emissions that contribute to climate change.

5 The predictions given throughout this section are based on an equivalent doubling by 2025 to 2050 of greenhouse gas concentmtions from

preindustrial levels. In additio% the predictions refer to a future equilibrium climat~ is, one in which the climate has finished changing

and the climate system has arrived at a new balanc=ather than the rransient climate, or intermediate stage, that occurs as climate change

is underway. Scientists debate whether the climate will reach anew equilibrium or whether we are instead entering an era of continuous change.

Equilibrium may not be reached for centuries. (J. Mahlmaq Director, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, Princeton University, July 28,

1993, at a briefing sponsored by the World Resources Institute and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric A&mm“ “stration.)

6 For a more detailed discussion of the emissions and effects of greenhouse gases, see reference 88.

7 C02 is responsible for about 70 percent of the radiative forcing (heat tmpping) caused by greenhouse gases in the 1980s.
72 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure 2-2—The Greenhouse Effect

Greenhouse

gases

45

Atmospheric

\ \ processes

1

88

Greenhouse

effect

EARTH

NOTE: Radiation flows are expressed here as a percent of total incoming or outgoing energy. Incomlng solar radiation is partially reflected back into

space (30 percent) and partially absorbed by the atmosphere, ice, oceans, land, and biomass of the Earth (70 percent).The Earth then emits radiant

energy back into space. The “greenhouse effect” refers to the trapping of some of the radiant ● nqy the Earth emits by atmosphere gains, both

natural and anthropogenic. As a result of this effect, the Earth’s surface and lower atmosphere warm.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Changing by Degrees: Steps to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, OTA-O-482

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1991).

to 9 billion tons, or 7 or 8 trillion kilograms, of

carbon each year) is due to the burning of fossil

fuels--coal, oil, and natural gas; the remainder is

attributed to deforestation. IPCC notes that under

a “business-as-usual” scenario, the concentration of C02 could rise as high as 800 ppm-nearly

triple the preindustrial level—by the end of the

next century (44). If world emissions were frozen

at 1990 levels, CO2 concentrations would still rise

to 400 ppm by about 2070 (see fig. 2-4),8 and

temperatures would continue to rise about 0.4 OF

(0.2 ‘C) per decade for many decades.

Increases in the atmospheric concentrations of

the greenhouse gases CH4, N2O, and CFCS have

also been documented and can be linked to

anthropogenic emissions. As the upper line in

figure 2-3 shows, these gases effectively augment

the greenhouse effect caused by CO2. Sources of

CH4 emissions include rice paddies, domestic

animals (cattle and sheep), natural gas production

and delivery, coal production, and landfills (44).

CH4 concentrations increased about 1 percent per

year between 1978 and 1987 (from 150 to 168

parts per billion (ppb)). Recently, this increase

has slowed to 0.5 percent per year; the cause of

this slowdown is unknown (45).

Atmospheric concentrations of N20 began a

rapid ascent in the 1940s and increased at 0.2 to

0.3 percent per year during the mid-1980s, with

current concentrations at about 310 ppb. Ice-core

 Given that developing countries use the energy of the developed world and their usage 6 to 

per year, this later scenario is unrealistic (88).
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 73

Figure 2-3-Measured and Equivalent CO2

Concentrations in the Atmosphere

Figure 2-4-Expected CO2 Concentrations

in the Atmosphere According to Various

Emissions Scenarios

300 - ~ ● +*-

275 1 I

1890 00 10 20 30 40 50 80 70 80 1990

NOTE: The lower points represent atmospheric concentrations of C02

from Antarctic ice-core data (1890 to 1950, shown as diamonds) and

from recent Mauna Loa observations (1 958 to 1990, shown as stacked

squares). “Equivalent C02 levels” are shown by the connected circles;

this is the additional effect caused by various trace gases (methane,

nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons) expressed In CO2 equivalents.

SOURCE: R.C, Balling, ‘The Global Temperature Data,” In: Research

& Exploration, vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 203.

data show preindustrial concentrations of 285

ppb, which had been relatively stable for 2,000

years. Anthropogenic sources appear to be responsible for about 30 percent of N20 emissions9

—prirnarily from nylon production, nitric

acid production, and the use of nitrogenous

fertilizers. 10

CFCS are humanmade chemicals used primarily for refrigeration and insulation. A worldwide

treaty (the Montreal Protocol signed in 1987 and

augmented by several subsequent amendments)

will eliminate use of these chemicals by the end

of the century. The concentration of CFCS in the

atmosphere had been increasing at 4 percent per

year in the 1980s. These chemicals cause ozone

depletion worldwide and the Antarctic ozone

hole. Given world action to phase out CFCS, the

A = IPCC “business as usual”

B = frozen emissions after 1990

550 C = no emissions after 1990 /

 400-

350-

---------------

1 i I r 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

SOURCE: M. Heimann, "Modeling the Global Carbon Cycle,” paper

presented at the First Demetra Meeting on Climate Variability and

Global Change, Chiandiano Therme, Italy, Oct. 28-NOV. 3, 1991.

ozone hole is expected to close in 70 years. CFCS

are greenhouse gases and trap heat, but because

they also destroy ozone (another greenhouse gas),

the net warming

zero (45).

 Temperature

IPCC predicted

from CFCS is approximately

that global average temperature would increase at a rate of 0.5 ‘F (0.3 ‘C) per

decade, amounting to a 5.4 OF (3.0 ‘C) increase by

2100. BOX 2-B summarizes the IPCC findings.

Although the global average temperature has

increased about 0.80 OF (0.45 ‘C) over the past

100 years, a warming of 1.4 to 4.0 OF (0.8 to 2.2 o

C) is expected as an eventual result of the

greenhouse gas concentration increases of the

past century (this estimate does not include any

warming from future emissions).

9 J. Director, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, Princeton University, personal communication Aug. 27, 1993.

 of Of (45).
74 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-B–Highlights of the IPCC Scientific Assessment of Climate Change

IPCC is certain that:

■ There is a natural greenhouse effect that already keeps the Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.

• Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the

greenhouse gases.

IPCC calculates with confidence that:

Atmospheric concentrations of the long-lived gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons)

adjust slowly to changes in emissions. Continued emissions of these gases at present rates, would cause

increased concentrations for centuries ahead.

The long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in emissions from human activities of over 60 percent

to stabilize their concentrations at today’s levels; methane would require a 15 to 20 percent reduction.

The longer emissions continue to increase at present day rates, the greater reductions would have to be for

concentrations of greenhouse gases to stabilize at a given level.

Based on current model results, IPCC predicts that:

• Under the IPCC “business-as-usual” scenario,1 the global mean temperature will increase about 0.5°F(0.3°C)

per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.4 to 0.9 °F per decade), reaching about 2°F (1 ‘C) above the present

value by 2025 and 5 OF (3 ‘C) before the end of the 21st century.

• Land surfaces will warm more rapidly than the ocean, and high northern Iatitudes will warm more than the global

mean in winter.

■ Global mean sea level will rise about 2 inches (6 cm) per decade over the next century, rising about 8 inches

(20 cm) by 2030 and 25 inches (65 cm) by the end of the 21st century.

All predictions are subject to many uncertainties with regard to the timing, magnitude, and regional

patterns of climate change, due to incomplete understanding of:

■ sources and sinks of greenhouse gases,

■ clouds,

■ oceans, and

■ polar ice sheets.

The IPCC judgment is that:

■ Global sea level has increased 4 to 8 inches (10 to 20 cm) over the past 100 years.

■ Global mean surface air temperature has increased by about 0.80 OF (0.45°C) (with an uncertainty range of 0.5

to 1.0 °F (0.3 to 0.6 ‘C) over the past 100 years), with the five globally averaged warmest years occurring in the

1980s.

■ The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models, but it is also of the same

magnitude as natural climate variability. Thus, the observed temperature increase could be largely due to natural

variability y; alternatively, this variability and other human factors (such as aerosol air pollution) could have offset

a still larger human-induced greenhouse warming. The unequivocal detection of the enhanced greenhouse

effect from observations is not Iikely for a decade or more.

1 ~is ~nario aSSJmeS that few steps are taken to reciuce greenhouse gas emissions. The atmospheric

concentration of C02would double (over preindustrial levels) by about 2060, but the effective C02concentratlon (the

cumulative effect of all trace gases) would double by about 2030.

SOURCES: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC), Climate Change: 77re tkientif~ Assessment M&id Meteorological

Organization and U.N. Environmental Program (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Preaa, 1990); Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (lPCC), 1992 /PCC Supp/ernent W Meteorological Organization and United Nationa Environment Program

(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Preee, 1992).
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 75

Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere will have effectively doubledll relative to

their preindustrial values by 2030 (44, 45).

Changes in global temperature will affect global

patterns of air circulation and wind, possibly

changing the frequency or pattern of convective

storms. Some research suggests that a warmer sea

surface may lead to a longer cyclone season with

more-intense storms. To date, however, evidence

on whether storm frequencies will change is

inconclusive (81).

On the regional level, average temperatures are

expected to increase more in the higher latitudes

(in the Arctic and Antarctic), particularly in late

fall and winter. In the northeastern part of North

America under a doubled CO2 climate, for

example, warming could reach 14OF(8‘C) during

the winter (44), and average annual temperatures

could increase as much as 18 OF (10 ‘C) in some

high-latitude areas (81). In addition, summer

warming in the middle latitudes, including much

of the United States, could be greater than the

global average, potentially reaching 7 to 9 oF (4 to

5 ‘C) in the Great Lakes area (45). In the tropics,

however, temperature increases are likely to be

less than the global average, and will vary less

from season to season. Figure 2-5 (top) shows

changes in the average annual, winter, and

summer temperature ranges predicted for different regions of the United States used for studies

performed for the Environrnental Protection Agency

(EPA) (94). Regional temperature predictions

such as these are accompanied by only a medium

level of confidence, but the predictions are likely

to improve within the next decade (8 1).

1 Precipitation

Worldwide, average precipitation is expected

to increase by 7 to 15 percent under a doubled

C02 atmosphere. Regional changes will be much

more variable, with estimated increases of 20 to

40 percent in some locations (e.g., coasts), and

decreases of up to 20 percent in other areas (78,

94). The seasonal distribution and form of precipitation are likely to change. In regions where

precipitation increases, a significant share of the

increase may come during the winter; in some

locations, more winter precipitation will come in

the form of rain than snow (81). Although

researchers are fairly confident about the predicted rise in average global precipitation, they

are much less confident about regional precipitation because of the many uncertainties surrounding small-scale climatic processes. Figure 2-5

(bottom) shows EPA’s predicted average annual,

winter, and summer precipitation patterns for

different regions of the United States (94).

Natural climate variability is great relative to

the expected changes in climate variables. Hence,

separating the signal of climate change from the

noise of natural variability is difficult. One

statistical analysis of climate data from the

southeastern United States indicates that if average rainfall increased 10 percent, there would be

only a 7 percent chance of detecting that trend

after 25 years; even a 20 percent increase in

rainfall could only be detected with a 65 percent

probability after 50 years (63). More concretely,

it is difficult to know whether the recent 6-year

drought in the western United States is a rare but

possible outcome of natural climate variability,

an early indication of climate change, or a return

to the average climate after a long particularly wet

spell. Longer climate records are needed to

distinguish among these various possibilities. It is

unlikely that researchers will be able to resolve

the uncertainties to develop better predictions for

another decade or two (81).

11 TIM quiv~mt doubling of C02 refers to the point at which the combined total of COZ and other -OUSC @.Us, such U m,, b~t

up in the atmosphcrchavc “aradhtive cffcctequivalcnt to doubling the preindustrial value of carbon dioxide from about 2SOppm to 560ppm”

(81). Thcfull warming associated with that amount of greenhouse &3scs XIlliY be delayed by ocean wurnin& “~ large heat cupacity of the

oceans will delay lwlizul “on of IMl equilibrium _ by perbaps many decades. ‘his implies that any spechlc time when wc reach an

equivalent C02 doubling . . . the actual global temperature increase may be considerably less [than 2 to 5 T]. However, thia ‘umdized

warming’ will eventually occur when the climate system’s thermal response catches up to the greenhouse-gas forcing.’
76 I Preparing for an Uncertain CIimate--Volume 1

1“

I

0
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 77

Figure 2-6-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under

the GISS Climate Change Scenario

Much wetter (> 0.05)

Wetter (0.025 to 0.05)

No change (-0.025 to 0.0

Drier (-0.025 to -0.05)

Much drier (< -0.05)

NOTE: Numbers represent the degree of drying or wetting, calculated as the change in the ratio of actual

evapotranspiration (AET) to potential evapotranspiration (PET). This ratio is an index of plant-moisture stress,

indicating moisture availability relative to moisture demand. GISS-Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystems at Risk to Potential Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the office

of Technology Assessment, June 1993.

 Moisture

Despite overall increases in precipitation, soil

moisture is predicted to decrease in many midcontinental regions. Soil moisture, which is

generally more important for vegetation than is

total precipitation, may decrease for two reasons.

First, the rate at which moisture evaporates from

the soil surface and from plants (evapotranspiration) would increase as temperatures rise. The

increased evaporation rates may cause soil to lose

moisture at a faster rate than is supplied by the

increased precipitation, particularly during the

summer. Second, the manner in which added

precipitation arrives can affect soil moisture by

changing runoff patterns. There are limits to how

much soils can absorb at once.12 For example,

sandy soils allow for relatively quick percolation

of water through the soil column and into surfaceand groundwater systems. However, the percolation rates of clay soils are slow. If increased

precipitation comes in a few large storms rather

than being evenly distributed over the year, more

of it may run off rather than remain in the soil.

Thus, increases in average annual precipitation

will not necessarily lead to increases in soil

moisture and could be accompanied by drier

conditions.

Figures 2-6 and 2-7 identify areas of the United

States that may face significant changes in soil

moisture based on the climate changes projected

 of to water considerably according to soil composition (the Of 

and organic-matter content. In sandy soils with little organic such those in central have a low for 

storage. Soils with more clay and a higher organic characteristic of the Midwest, can generally retain more water (13).
78 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Figure 2-7—Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under

the GFDL Climate Change Scenario

 Much wetter (> .05)

m Wetter (0.025 to 0.05)

 No change (-0.025 to 0.025)

 Drier (-0.025 to -O.O5)

 Much drier (< -0.05) . . . . . 

NOTE: Numbers represent the degree of drying or wetting, calculatad as the change in the ratio of actual

evapotranspiration (AET) to potential evapotranspiration (PET). GFDL-Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, "Ecosystams at Risk to Potential Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office

of Technology Assessment, June 1993.

by two GCMS. An index. of soil moisture was

calculated as the ratio of available moisture to

potential moisture demand (calculated as the ratio

of actual evapotranspiration to potential evapotranspiration) .13 White areas in the maps indicate

regions of no significant change in the moisture

index, dark shading indicates areas of drying, and

lighter shading shows areas that become relatively wetter. The Goddard Institute of Space

Studies (GISS) scenario (fig. 2-6) produces a

mixed result, with large areas of moderate drying

intermixed with patches of wetting in the Southeast and northern Rocky Mountain States. The

Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL)

scenario (fig. 2-7) provides the most extreme

outcome for North America, with significant

drying across the eastern and central United

States and along the Pacific Coast.

 Sea Level

IPCC predicts that global average sea levels

will rise by around 2 inches (6 cm) per decade for

the next century, in contrast to the historic rate of

0.4 inches (1 cm) per decade that occurred since

the end of the 19th century. By 2030, IPCC

predicts that sea levels will have risen by around

8 inches (20 cm), with a total rise of 26 inches (65

cm) expected by the end of the century (44).

Sea level rise will result from the expansion

that occurs as water warms. Oceans will also be

 for of by P. N. (34). is the 10SS of from 

resulting from both evaporation and plant transpiration. Potential is the of water that would be lost if there were

never a shortage of soil moisture. is the actual amount of released to the atmosphere (reflecting precipitation

and limited availability of soil moisture).
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 79

affected by the melting of ice in polar regions. The

area of sea ice and seasonal snow cover will also

diminish (42). It is likely that ice on the margins

will melt more quickly in warmer waters. This

result could change the mix of fresh and saline

waters in high-latitude seas, and could further

change ocean circulation patterns.

Sea level may increase more along some coasts

and less along others because sea level rise

depends not only on whether the oceans are rising

but also on whether adjacent land masses are

rising or sinking. Some coasts are sinking as soils

are compressed; others are rising due to tectonic

forces or as they gradually rebound from the

weight of glacial ice that burdened them during

the last ice age. 14 Mississippi River Delta in

the Gulf of Mexico is subsiding, leading to

relatively rapid rates of land loss, while much of

the West and the Alaskan coasts are experiencing

tectonic uplift and glacial rebound. Thus, the

relative sea level rise and the associated land loss

is predicted to be greater along the Gulf Coast (as

well as in parts of Florida’s Atlantic Coast and the

South Atlantic States) than along the Pacific

Coast. The interaction of sea level rise, altered

waves and currents, and storms could lead to

greatly increased erosion on sandy coasts and

barrier islands (77; see vol. 1, ch. 4).

HOW WILL CLIMATE CHANGE AFFECT

NATURAL RESOURCES?

Climate interacts with ecosystems at every

level, from the individual to the landscape,

throughout the energy and nutrient cycles, and on

time scales ranging from seconds to centuries.

The effect of climate can be direct, through the

action of temperature, evapotranspiration, and

sunlight, and indirect, through variables such as

wind, cloud cover, ocean currents, and the chemical composition of the atmosphere. For example,

photosynthesis rates are affected by the amount of

sunlight striking a plant’s leaves, which is determined by cloud cover, which in turn is determined

by such climatic factors as temperature, evaporation, and wind. Similarly, global temperature

affects the amount of precipitation and runoff,

which in turn affects the transport of nutrients on

land and through wetlands; ocean currents, which

are also strongly affected by global temperatures,

carry nutrients through marine systems. Indeed,

over the long term, climate both shapes the

physical landscape and determines where various

ecosystems can exist (see fig. 2-8). Climate

change of the predicted magnitude is not unprecedented, but scientists who warn of the potential

harms of human-induced climate change point

out that past global warming and cooling occurred

over centuries and millennia rather than decades

(see fig. 2-9).15

I Direct Climate Impacts

Climate is often defined as the long-term

‘‘average weather. ’ Likewise, predictions for

climate change characterize changes in the Earth’s

average annual temperature. However, individual

plants and animals respond to events on small

temporal and spatial scales. Variability is usually

more important than annual totals or averages.

The seasonal distribution of precipitation and

temperature, the form precipitation takes (whether

rain or snow), extreme events such as droughts or

floods, climate-generated fire cycles, late spring

frosts, and early fall freezes are all significant

factors in determiningg the survival and productiv14 hd h de]~ a,rw often subsides. Sediment from upland areas loosely packs layers at the river delta where the river mtits the oas sediment accumulates over time, it gradually grows heavier and compresses the underlying layers, so the delta land mass sinks relative to

the ocean. Coastal land may also subside in areas where offshore oil and gas extraction or pumping of water from coastal aquifers, has hollowed

out underground spaces that are gradually compacted by the masses of land and water above. Much of the northern part of the North American

continent is still slowly rising as it rebounds from the weight of glaciers that covered it during the last ice age and is situated on a tectonic plate

that is being lifted as the adjacent plate slides beneath iq both processes may cause sea levels on the western and Alaskan coasts to appear lower

relative to the coastal land mass,

15 Athou@ ~nt ice-cover a.ndysis suggests that climate may have shifted sevem.1 degrees in a decade or less over regions of GH*d.
80 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Figure 2-8--Approximate Distribution of the

Major Biotic Regions

30

-lo

Deciduous forest

 forest

1

100 200 300 400

Mean annual precipitation (cm)

NOTE: Based on mean annual temperature and mean annual precipi

tation. To convert oC to oF, multiply by 1.8 and add 32; to convertl

centimeters to inches, multiply by 0.394.

SOURCE: Adapted from A.L. Hammond, “Ecosystem Analysis: Biome

Approach to Environmental Science,” Science, vol. 175, 1972, pp.

46-48.

ity of individual organisms. One or several

extreme events (such as a hurricane or drought)

may shape ecosystem boundaries more than many

years of “average” weather. Eventually, however, when the ‘‘average’ has shifted well

beyond “normal,” ecosystems may have trouble

persisting.l6

The Role of Temperature

Temperature and its distribution are important

determinant s of plant productivity and survival.

Temperature range exerts three classes of effects

on plants: 1) low temperatures can damage plant

tissues, causing die-offs during unusual extreme

events and controlling the northward or altitudinal migration of plants; 2) in intermediate ranges,

temperature governs the rates of photosynthesis,

Figure 2-9-Long-Term Temperature and C02

Records from Antarctic Ice Cores and

Recent Atmospheric Measurements

,1990 

date (AD) :

:

1956 

I I

160 120 4 0 0

Thousands of years ago

NOTE: Data show that C02 is increasing in the atmosphere much

faster than it has at any time over the past 160,000 years. The observed

increase in temperature is not yet outside the range of natural variability.

To convert oC to oF, multiply by 1.8 and add 32.

SOURCE: C. Lorius, J. Jouzel, D, Raynaud, J. Hansen, and H. Le

Trout, “The ice-Core Record: Climate Sensitivity and Future Greenhouse Warming,” Nature vol. 347, 1990, pp. 139-145.

respiration, the growth and development of seeds,

and other processes; and 3) high temperatures

may stress plants to the limits of their ability to

withstand heat and moisture loss, thus controlling

plant distribution and migration (19). Seasonal

distribution, diurnal cycles (i.e., the variation

from night to day),17 and the occurrence and

timing of extremes (e.g., late spring frosts, early

winter storms, and peaksummer high and winter

low temperatures) are all aspects of the effects of

 (with standard deviation) will make waves of 

future.

 on prove because day is a major factor productivity.
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources | 81

Box 2-C—Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries

Background

The U.S. commercial, recreational, and sport fishing industries, worth an estimated $14 billion in 1988 (73),

rely on the health of nearshore and coastal areas (such as tidal marshes, coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangrove

forests, estuaries, and banks). Two-thirds of the world’s fish catch, and many other marine spades, depend on

coastal wetlands and estuaries for their survival (42). By far the greatest portion of U.S. commercial fisheries

catches, with the exceptlon of those from Alaskan fisheries, are composed of estuarine-dependent spades.

Ongoing alterations of critical habitat (such as geographic fragmentation and pollution) maybe exacerbated by

climate change.

Much is yet to be learned about the marine environment and the long-term effects that humans have on it

Understanding the breadth of environmental stresses that affect fish and coastal systems will be essential to

forecasting how climate change may affect these valuable areas. During the 1970s and 1980s, populations of

many commercially important estuarine-dependent fish plummeted. Human activities In the coastal zone are

thought to have been responsible for many of the dramatic declines in fish populations. Overfishing has been

implicated as a primary cause of the declines of some fish stocks, with some 42 percent of species in American

waters considered to be overfished (52). The Atlantic cod fishery of the Grand Banks area has all but collapsed,

triggering industry-related layoffs (primarily in Canada) of more than 30,000 people (75). Migratory species such

as salmon, shad, herring, and striped bass have decreased due to a combination of habitat degradation and

overfishing. The Chesapeake Bay’s oyster harvest has declined 98 percent from the levels of 100 years ago due

to disease, over-exploitation, predators, and habitat degradation (18). Neatly half of the Chesapeake’s wetlands

and seagrass meadows, which serve as primary nursery habitat for many migratory species, have been destroyed.

Such destruction will adversely affect future fish populations.

The fishing industry from Southern California to Alaska is experiencing similar troubles as a result of

overfishing, the damming of spawning rivers, water-quality degradation from logging, and other anthropogenic

(COntfnued m mWtj?@e)

temperature on plants. Length of the growing and indirect influences on animals. Higher-thanseason is also very important, particularly for

agricultural crops. Seed production generally

requires a certain number of days with a temperature above freezing, often expressed in terms of

degree-days. At northern latitudes, the growing

season may not be long enough for some species

to set seeds. Longer growing seasons in a warmer

climate could boost productivity of trees and

other plants, especially those that could tolerate

erratic spring and fall weather (e.g., early or late

hosts). Seeds of many tree species, including

conifers, need to be chilled for particular periods

before they will germinate (17,21), so a shortened

Cool season could be detrimental to such species.

In addition to the numerous effects of temperature on vegetation, temperature exerts other direct

usual temperatures can adversely affect the reproductive success of many birds, mammals, and

insects (26). Increased water temperature limits

the availability of oxygen in the water and, in turn,

reduces the amount of oxygen available to fish

and other aquatic organisms (87). For many fish

species, ambient water temperature is critical for

survival (see box 2-C). In addition, temperature

increases can actually reduce the number of

species in a given ecological community (87),

though total biomass may increase.

Warmer temperatures could allow some insects, including various agricultural pests, to

survive winters farther north than they now do.

For example, the potato leafhopper, which is a

pest on soybeans and other crops, now overwin-
82 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-C-Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries-(Continued)

Arctic

.

.

activities. In Alaska, where the seafood industry employs 23 percent of the State’s work

force, this could prove to be a major problem.

More than half of the Nation’s seafood harvest

comes from Alaskan waters.

scientists have hypothesized that climate

warming is likely to alter the distribution and

reproductive success of coastal species (77).

Many marine species are sensitive to narrow

temperature variations. Water temperature

controls the respiration and reproduction rates

of fish. Changes in temperature can also

affect the geographical distribution of species

range because some species will thrive in

warm waters, while others function effectively

only in cooler waters. Changes in stream

flows will also be important because they can

alter the salinity of coastal bays and estuaries.

The interactions of temperature and salinity

determine the “tolerance zone” for most fish

species. Anadromous fishes-which swim

upstream to spawn, such as salmon—also

depend heavily on stream flow and water

quality (33). If these are altered by climate change, there maybe serious effects on reproductive success. In ail

these cases, climate change would be expected to alter the dose associations between species distributions and

reproductive success, and the success of the fishery as a whole. Although it is difficult to estimate the magnitude

of these changes, impacts could upset the stability of the commercial fishing industry on which many coastal

residents rely.

Coastal areas have also been affected by human activities that contribute toxic pollutants and polluted runoff to marine waters. Runoff from developed and agricultural areas and overflow from storm-water systems

adversely impact these areas. Nutrients cause algal blooms, which deplete oxygen available for fish and other

organisms. Stressed species may become more susceptible to disease and predators. Shoreline construction and

dams have also contributed to fishery population declines. Destruction of estuarine and coastal zones limits

nursery and breeding areas, and dams prohibit fish from reaching upriver spawning grounds {see vol. 1, ch. 4,

and vol. 2, ch. 4).

Regulatory attention has generally not addressed coastal zone management in light of the potential impacts

of climate change. Harvest regulations, which are either inadequate or insuffiaently enforced, seem unable to keep

pace with the decline in fish populations (52). In short too many fishermen are taking too many fish from

overburdened ecosystems. Traditional fishery management is concerned primarily with a few major resources and

tends topayfarless attention to the other ecosystem elements that fish depend on (77). Increasing concerns about

ecosystem management (see vol. 2, ch. 5) and the upcoming reauthorizat”km of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation

and Management Act (P.L 94-265, as amended) and the Clean Water Act (P.L 92-500, as amended) offer

opportunities to work toward improving fisheries and their habitat. Below, we highlight the regional importance of

marine fisheries and identify particular problems (77).
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources 183

Regional Characteristics of the U.S. Coastal Marine Fisheries

Acadian-Boreal (Newfoundland and southern Greenland to Cape Cod, MA)

■ Cultural: Indigenous coastal people-New England clam diggers.

■ Flshh?g:

—7 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries

+wtimated value, $250 million in 1990

-multispedes trawf fishery

-32 percent of species estuarinedependent

-important species include hard dam, soft dam, American bbster, sea scallops, northern shrimp, Atlantic cod,

butterfish, cusk, flounder, haddock red and white hake (silver hake)

—Atlantic cod most commercially important fish in 1989 (valued at $45 million)

m Common problems:

-only remaining self-supporting U.S. salmon runs are in Maine

-lobsters are overharvested

-northern shrimp are at maximum harvest and subject to environmental variability y, especially when waters

are warmer

Virginian-Mid Atlantic (Cape Cod, MA, to Cape Hatteras, NC)

■ Cdturd: Indigenous coastal people--Chesapeake Bay watermen.

■ Flshhlg:

-estimated value, $500 million in 1990

—11 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries

-most important species are blue crab and surf and ocean quahog

-Chesapeake Bay fish: 87 percent are estuarinedependent

E Common problems:

-region is the most urbanized and densely populated in the United States

-disease, overharvesting, predation, and pollution are rampant-responsible for reductions in harvestable

shellfish, forcing many watermen out of business

-second to the Gulf of Mexico in the number of point sources of pollution

-striped bass began a precipitous decline in 1973

Carolinian-South Atlantic (Cape Hatteras, NC, to Cape Canaveral, FL)

■ FMhg:

43 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries

-estimated valued, $189 million in 1990

—94 percent of species estuarinedependent

-over half of this harvest from estuarinedependent species

-most important species indude Atlantic menhaden, bfue crabs, and penaeid shrimp

● Common problems:

-application of pesticides and fertilizers to extensive commercially harvested forested wedands

-degradation of shellfish habitat due to agricultural runoff and septic system overfbw

FloridIan-West Indian (Cape Canaveral to Key West, FL, and VWt Indies)

m Fhhhg:

-values for individual species are not observed

-important species include the Queen conch, spiny lobster, Nassau grouper, and more than 100 reef fishes

(ConthOd on next page)
84 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-C-Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries-(Continued)

■ Common problems:

-growing human populations, greater demands, and technological improvements in catch

—virtually all assessed reef-fish stocks are overharvested

-major tropical storms, including hurricanes, generally affect the area

Louisiana-Gulf of Mexico (Northern Gulf of Mexico from Central West Florida to South Texas)

■ Fishing:

—17 percent of the Nation’s commercial fishery (with Vera Cruzian)

—estimated value, $648 million in 1989

-leading seafood producer among regions

■ Common problems:

-subject to devastating floods, tornadoes, hurricanes and tropical storms, erosion, land subsidence, saltwater

encroachment, and sedimentation

-second-fastest growing population rate of all regions

-more point sources of pollution than any other region

—application of pesticides to agricultural lands is the highest among all regions

Vera Cruzian-West Indian (South Texas to Yucatan Peninsula)

■ Fishing:

—fourth leading U.S. port in fisheries value

-major commercial species are similar to those of the Gulf region

■ Common problems:

-hurricanes and intense thunderstorms

California-Subtropical Eastern Pacific (Southern California (Los Angeles basin) southward to Mexico and

Central America)

■ Fishing:

--major commercial species include Pacific sardine, northern anchovies, and Jack mackerel

■ Common problems:

-most wetlands already lost; restoration doubtful

-low-lying coastal areas subject to sea level rise

Oregonian-Temperate Eastern Pacific (California north of Los Angeles to British Columbia)

■ Fishing:

-estimated value, $337 million in 1989

-one-fifth of catch estuarine-dependent species, especially Pacific salmon (Chinook, coho, sockeye, pink and

chum)

-commercial landings of salmon valued at $140 million

--other important species include northern anchovies, Pacific sardine, Jack mackerel, and groundfish

(flatfishes, rockfish, including Pacific whiting, sable fish, Dover sole, widow rockfish, and others)

■ Common problems:

--conflicts among fishermen, the Fisheries Council, various States, Canada, and foreign fisheries regarding

the allocation of resources

-worsening freshwater (spawning) habitat has been the main cause of the salmon decline, and wild coho

stocks of the lower Columbia River were recently declared extinct

Sitkan-North Pacific (British Columbia to base of Alaska Peninsula)

■ Fishing:

—56 percent of the Nation’s commercial landings of fish (with other Alaskan fisheries)
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources | 85

—estimated value, $1.5 billion in 1990

—5.4 billion pounds (2.5 billion kg) landed in 1990 (with other Alaskan fisheries)

—76 percent of species estuarine-dependent

-most important species include Pacific salmon, Pacific herring, Pacific halibut Gulf groundfish (Pacific

cod, stablefish), king crab, and tanner crabs

■ Common problems:

-some rookeries threatened by fishery operations

—Exxon Valdez oil spill severely contaminated coastal areas

Arctic-Boreal/Arctic (Southeast Bering Sea to Chukchl and Beaufort Seas and Canadian archipelago)

Cultural: Coastal indigenous people-Eskimo, Aleute

Fishing:

-most important species include Pacific salmon, Alaska pollock, Pacific herring

—Pacific salmon fisheries rank as the State’s largest nongovernmental employer

-provides an integral part of Alaska’s native culture and heritage

Common problems:

-some stocks (chinook and coho) maybe harmed by foreign high-seas catches, and some salmon maybe

regionally overfished

-destruction of spawning and rearing habitat

-human population in this area is expected to increase by 380 percent between 1960 and 2010

Aleutian-North Pacific (Alaska Peninsula base to Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and including southwest

Bering Sea)

■ Fishing:

-estimated value of groundfish, $352 million in 1990

--dominant groundfish groups are walleye pollock, flatfishes (Yellow sole, rock sole, other), Pacific cod, Atka

mackerel, and shrimp

—Alaska king crab value, $88 million in 1990

■ Common problems:

–The U.S. fishery for shrimp in Alaska is at a low level, and potential yields are not well-understood (91)

insular-lndo Pacific (Tropical Indian and Pacific Oceans; not shown in figure)

■ Cultural: Coastal indigenous people-Papuan, Micronesia, and Hawaiian

■ Fishing:

—7 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries taken in the Pacific United States and Hawaii

-major species include invertebrates species (spiny and slipper lobsters; gold, bamboo and pink

corals), bottom fish (snappers, jacks, groupers, Pacific armorhead), tropical tunas (yellowfin and

skipjack), and albacore

■ Common problems:

-coastal pollution

destructive fishery technologies (explosives, poison, etc.)

-overfishing by foreign fleets

-ambiguous application of Federal environmental laws

SOURCES: M.R. Chambers, “U.S. Coastal Habitat Degradation and Fishery Declines,” In: Tmnsactbnsoftheh rth Amedcan WkWatni

Naturaf l?esourws Conference (Washington, DC: The Wildlife Management Institute, in press); U.S. Department of Commeme, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), OurLMng Oceans, The f?rstAnnualReporf

on the Status of the U.S. Living Marine Resourcss, NOAA Technid Memo, NMFS-FWW-1, 1991; C.G. Ray, G. McCormick-Ray, and F.M.

Pottw, G&&l Climate Change and the Coastal Zone: Evaluation oflmpacts on Marfne Eishedas and Bbdhferslty of the U.S., contractor

report prepared for the Office of TAndogy Aseesement, 1993.
86 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

ters in only a small area of the southern United

States along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

Warmer winter temperatures could greatly expand the overwintering range, allowing for much

larger populations to develop in the spring, and

potentially leading to increased plant damage

(94).

The Role of Precipitation and Soil Moisture

Precipitation-or more precisely, soil moisture

(the result of a combination of precipitation,

infiltration, runoff, and evaporation--directly

affects plant growth through its role in photosynthesis. Although average annual precipitation is

often used to characterize climate zones, the

seasonal distribution is more significant than the

annual total. Adequate moisture during the growing season is critical. Seeds need moisture to

germinate, and young plants-both annuals and

perennial s-are often quite sensitive to drought.

Vegetation may respond by defoliating, which

reduces water and nutrient demand, helping

plants survive dry periods. Precipitation during

the growing season controls wood growth as well

as the size and maturation time of seeds (21, 42).

Decreases in soil moisture can slow growth,

interfere with reproduction, and cause plants to

die early. Increases in soil moisture are less likely

to cause harm unless the soil in normally dry areas

becomes saturated with water for extended periods. Standing water can drown the roots of plants

not adapted to wetlands by interfering with

normal respiration; extended saturation of roots

may kill the entire plant.

Direct effects of moisture on many land animals may often be less important than the indirect

effects-that is, moisture affects plant growth,

which then affects the availability of food and

habitat (86). However, moisture does play a

critical, direct role in the natural history of

invertebrate species (e.g., snails) and is essential

to the survival and reproduction of amphibians

(105). Fish and other aquatic organisms that

inhabit rivers and streams can be threatened by

either too little water during drought periods or

too much runoff flowing into streams. During

periods of high precipitation, water may become

turbid, interfering with the health and functioning

of the aquatic ecosystem. Moisture is also important to many microorganisms and fungi, including

many that contribute to human disease or are

considered forest or agricultural pests (described

in more detail below and in vol. 1, ch. 6, and vol.

2, ch. 6).
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 87

sunlight

The amount of available sunlight, or solar

irradiance, that strikes vegetation is an important

variable in photosynthesis and productivity. Individual plants or species that make up the canopy,

those near the edges, or those growing in clearings receive more light, whereas those in the

understory are better adapted to lower light levels.

Solar irradiance varies regularly from season to

season and from latitude to latitude. Cloud cover

also affects the quality and quantity of solar

irradiance and its distribution over time, allowing

less sunlight to reach the surface on cloudy days.

If climate change is accompanied by increased

cloudiness, as some models predict, overall plant

productivity could decline. Water stress and high

temperatures may also affect plant response;

however, plant response to changes in solar

irradiance is complex and difficult to predict (19).

In addition to the total amount of solar irradiance, the number of hours of sunlight per day (day

length, or photoperiod) plays a role in plant

fictions such as flowering and the setting of

fruit, and influences the rising of sap in deciduous

trees, such as sugar maple, in spring. Light quality

may also affect productivity. For example, cotton

depends on very regular day lengths, which only

occur in southern latitudes. Plant species that

might migrate northward as the climate warms

may not be able to reproduce as effectively

because day length is longer at northern latitudes

during the summer and drastically reduced during

the winter (41). On the other hand, adaptation to

a shorter photoperiod may limit northward movement.

Increased C 02

Rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2 may

affect the rates at which plants grow, respire, use

water, and set seeds. This is known as the CO2

fertilization effect (see box 2-D). Numerous

laboratory experiments and intensively managed

agricultural systems that have been studied suggest that CO2 has the potential to boost plant

growth and productivity by speeding the rate of

photosynthesis, relieving nutrient stress (by improving efficiency of nutrient uptake and use),

increasing water-use efficiency, decreasing respiration (which is a major source of water loss),

slowing the rate at which leaves die, and speeding

the development of seeds (27,42, 66,68,69, 93).

Theoretically, the fertilization effect could

compensate for the water stress faced by plants in

areas that become warmer and drier due to climate

change, and might actually increase the total

global biomass (41). On the other hand, various

studies have suggested that in some settings, there

may be limits to and even detrimental effects from

increased CO2. For example, changes in the

amount of carbon in plant leaves affect nutritional

quality (65), which could mean that foraging

animals would have to eat more leaves to gain the

same amount of nutrition. Increased CO2 may

also cause starch to accumulate in plant leaves to

such high concentrations that it could actually

harm the plant by interfering with photosynthesis

(50), though there is no field data to support this.

Numerous complex factors interact to determine the extent to which fertilization actually

occurs in natural ecosystems, and many uncertainties about the overall impacts remain. Plant

responses to CO2 vary according to species and

stage of development, as well as to water and

nutrient availability (42). Some plant species

already use CO2 efficiently and will not receive

much of a boost, whereas other species are now

limited by their inefficient use of CO2 and could

profit from higher atmospheric concentrations.

Plants may experience the greatest productivity

boosts from increased CO2 when other nutrients

are plentiful (7). Thus, for example, field studies

have demonstrated that higher CO2 concentrations boost productivity in Chesapeake Bay salt

marshes, where water entering the bay is rich in

nutrients (2, 27, 28, 107), but CO2 fertilization

does not appear to be significant or permanent in

nutrient-limited tundra and other arctic ecosystems (32, 68). Few other ecosystem types have yet

been tested in the field. Intensively managed

agricultural systems, in which nutrient deficien-
88 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-D-Coping with Increased CO2

: Effects on Ecosystem Productivity

Climate, particularly the combination of temperature and moisture, Iargely determines where plants grow (14),

and vegetation, in turn, is key to the distribution of animal species. Generally, climate belts vary within the United

States from humid and damp in the Southeast and Northeast to moderately dry in the central regions, to arid in

much of the West except for a humid belt along the Pacific Coast from northern California to Washington.

Temperature and precipitation maps of the United States reveal bands across the Nation from north to south for

temperature, and east to west for precipitation. Vegetation growth, in type and lushness, varies with temperature

and altitude, but in all cases, solar irradiance is critical to the productivity of living things.

The sun provides the energy that fuels ecosystems; this energy is transformed through the processes of

photosynthesis and photorespiration. During photosynthesis, plants use water and the energy from sunlight to

convert carbon dioxide (CO2

) and other nutrients into organic matter and oxygen. This process is dependent on

the concentration of C02 In the air (i.e., ambient CO2

, and, therefore, changes in normal COz levels may affect

photosynthesis and, likewise, plant growth. External environmental factors, such as temperature and the

availability of nutrients, may modify photosynthesis as well. The output of organic matter by an ecosystem is

characterized as its biological or primary, productivity. Linked to primary productivity is nutrient cycling-the

absorption by plants of vital nutrients (e.g., carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorous) and their subsequent conversion

into usable forms.1 The combination of energy and nutrient cycling in vegetative systems determines the nature

of the assemblage of plants and animals in a given area. Certain types of plants, growing in certain conditions,

have higher primary productivities than others. Ecosystems that are highly productive often support both large

numbers of other organisms and many diverse species—that is, they are characterized by high secondary

productivity and high biodiversity.2 Productivity is also key to carrying capacity—the number of organisms that a

particular area can support. Carrying capacity can vary from year to year based on many factors, including climate,

1 Carbon isdertvedfrom C02through photorespkation; nitrogen andphosphorousare taken upfromthesoil

and oonverted to usable forms during the same process.

2 Although deflrtitlons vary, biodiversity generally refers to the “variety and tility m(j II* omtim

and the eodogkal complexes in whloh they oocar” (89).

cies can be remedied by adding fertilizers, maybe fires, which play an important and visible role in

more likely to receive a productivity boost from

additional CO2 than are natural ecosystems.

Many complex interactions determine to what

extent, if any, the CO2 fertilization effect documented in laboratory studies will occur in natural

ecosystems. The responses will likely vary so

much fromn ecosystem to ecosystem and location

to location that there cannot be a simple answer to

the question of whether it will present a net

benefit or a net harm.

■ Indirect Climate Impacts

Through Stressors

Climate will also have numerous secondary

impacts. Increases in herbivores, disease, and

mediating the near-term effects of climate change

on communities and ecosystems, could result. For

example, although few trees in a forest may die

outright due to heat or drought, it is likely that

many trees will sicken and become more susceptible to insects and disease. At the same time, trees

in decline will provide more fuel for fires (83).

The extent to which an area is stressed by

anthropogenic activities, such as land clearing

and pollution, will also influence the effects of

climate change.

Insects anti Disease

Climate may affect the proliferation of insects

and disease in numerous ways. Higher tempera-
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources | 89

and refers to the indivdual species or mix of species in a particular ecosystem. overall, however, ecosystem health

and productivity is dependent on the availability of sunlight water, nutrients, and C02.

Considerable experimental evidence has shown that an increase in the atmospheric concentration of COz

has the potential to increase plant growth and ecosystem productivity (28). This expected effect of Increased plant

productivity in the presence of elevated CO2 concentrations is known as the “CO2 fertilization effect,” and it is

expected to be particularly pronounced in the presence of plentiful supplies of light, water, and nutrients. Over the

long run, this effect may help alleviate the rate of global warming by drawing excess C02 from the atmosphere

(8), although researchers are uncertain about the extent to which this will occur (vol. 2, see box 8-B).

Plants vary in their response to CO2 in part because of differing photosynthetic mechanisms—mostspecies

follow the C3 pathway and some, the C4 pathway. C3 species (e.g., wheat, rice, soybeans, and all woody plants)

are not yet fully saturated with CO2 and may greatly increase their productivity, whereas C4 species (e.g., corn,

sorghum, sugar cane, and tropical grasses) are almost saturated with C02and their productivity may not be much

affected. Added productivity of C4 species from doubled C02 may be in the O to 20 percent range, and in the 20

to 80 percent range for C3 species. The differential effects of C02 could alter the dynamics of competition among

species, with C3 plants potentially prospering at the expense of C4 species. In agriculture, this competition among

plants may prove important. Because 14 of the world’s most troublesome weed species are C, plants that occur

amidst C3 crops, enhanced C02 concentrations may make such weeds less competitive (73). However, many of

the major weeds of corn (a C, crop) in the United States are C3 plants; climate change may favor the growth of

these weeds. Similarly, natural grassland ecosystems where C4 grasses now dominate maybe invaded by weedy

plants. Competitive success, however, does not depend solely on response to CO2

. Competition among species

in natural ecosystems will continue to depend on the ability of species to tolerate soil, light, temperature, and

moisture conditions. Because of the complex effects of competition among species it is by no means clear how

the overall productivity of natural ecosystems will increase under elevated C02 (8).

SOURCES: B.G. Drake, “The Impact of Rising C02 on Eoosystem Production,” Water, A/r, andSo//Po#ut&n, VOI. S4, 1992, pp.2544; P.M.

Karalv% J.(3. Kingdver, and R.B. Huey (ecis.), Slot/c /rrteractlons and G/06a/Change (Sundedand, MA: Slnauer Armoo&tsa, Inc., 1993).

tures could accelerate the growth rate of insects. Once stressed by heat or drought, vegetation

If the number of warm days per year increases, the

number of insect generations per year may

increase. Also, the range of many insects is

determined by cold winter temperatures. As

described in the section above on temperature

impacts, milder winters could allow insects such

as leafhoppers (agricultural pests) to spread north

of their present range. Hot, dry conditions encourage the growth of numerous fungi in forests (such

as Armillaria mellea, a fungus that causes root

disease), which can cause widespread damage in

many types of forests. Warm, humid conditions,

which favor soil and leaf-litter organisms as well

as decomposition, may encourage the growth of

other fungi and insect pests, such as aphids, which

can also be quite damaging.

may become more susceptible to pests (58).

Changes in CO2 concentration may affect the

composition of leaves, potentially making them

less nutritious, so insects might have to consume

more to obtain the same amount of nutrients (8).

Thus, damage from insects and disease might

increase, and in some cases, the effects of climate

change may become noticeable over the short

term. Over the long term, damage from insects

and disease may cause less-adaptable species to

decline, potentially opening the way for exotic

species to migrate into communities (21, 83).

Exfreme Events

Periodic but unpredictable events such as

extended drought, storms, and fire are among the

primary natural factors that shape ecosystems.
90 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Severe storms accompanied by high winds and

rain, hail, or ice may cause significant wind

damage in forests, toppling older trees and

leaving a trail of debris, but also clearing space for

new vegetation to take root (see vol. 2, ch. 6).

Storm damage may reduce habitat for birds and

wildlife that prefer a dense forest canopy and little

undergrowth, but could increase food and habitat

for animals that thrive in mixed forests with

cleared areas, such as deer. In coastal areas,

tropical storms and their accompanying high

winds and waves play an enormous role in coastal

processes (see vol. 1, ch. 4).

The occurrence of fire is critical in determining

vegetation types, successional history, and wildlife species in forests in more arid areas, such as

prairie and chaparral, and in wetlands. Fire is

important in maintaining prairie, but the control

of fire has virtually eliminated most naturally

occurring prairie areas. In some wetlands, including the Okefenokee Swamp and others along the

Atlantic coastal plain, fire has played an important role in clearing shrubby growth and maintaining wetland vegetation. Under normal conditions,

fire clears out forest undergrowth, damaging

some trees but allowing new ones to take root,

thus creating a more open stand of trees (see vol.

2, box 5-I).

Fire has been recognized for playing an important role in vegetation succession. In areas where

fires have been suppressed and fuels have accumulated, however, fires may become so hot that

they cause severe damage, and forests may

regenerate slowly or not at all. For example,

chaparral ecosystems in the foothills of California

rely on fire to spur the growth of the shrubby

plants that dominate the area; however, in areas

where fire has been suppressed, a fire that does

occur will be more damaging, and the regeneration of chaparral species maybe affected. Natural

fire regimes are influenced by the frequency of

lightning (which may or may not increase as the

climate changes), the presence of hot, dry winds

to carry a fire once ignited, and an abundance of

dry fuel provided by the buildup of undergrowth

or vegetation that has died from drought or

disease, as well as by dry, living vegetation (22).

Fires may increase under changed conditions, but

the ability of species to regenerate in areas with

less moisture, because of climate change, maybe

reduced. Thus, recovery may not occur.

Anthropogenlc Forces

Climate change may serve to make species or

ecosystems more susceptible to stresses from

human disturbance. Human activities have become so widespread that they are now a pervasive

influence on much of the environment. Agriculture, timber harvesting, road building, and urban

development have fragmented the landscape,

carving natural areas into ever smaller and

less-connected patches (see vol. 2, box 5-E). This

fragmented landscape may offer few opportunities for organisms to adapt to a changing climate.

Fragmentation often isolates small populations of

plants and animals, which may limit genetic

diversity and make them less able to adapt to

change over time. These small, isolated populations may also be prevented from moving to new

and more favorable areas by barriers such as

roads, buildings, or large cultivated fields. In

addition, humans may respond to changes in

climate by adopting land uses (such as more

extensive cultivation) that further fragment the

landscape, exacerbating the stresses on flora and

fauna.

Human activities may also result in the introduction of weedy and nonindigenous species that

flourish in the disturbed areas and that may

eventually outcompete other species, leading to

local extinctions and reducing the diversity of

ecosystems. In areas where weedy or nonindigenous species already pose a threat to a particular species or ecosystem, the added stress of

climate change may further tip the balance in

favor of weedy species that thrive in disturbed

conditions. Similarly, air pollution in urban areas,

and in much of the Northeast, already threatens

the health of many plant species. Climate change

could further weaken individuals that are already
Chapter 2—A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 91

stressed by pollution, and could make them more

susceptible to insects or diseases.

Although climate change might not be the

proximate cause of ecosystem harm, it could

increase the potential for damage. In sum, climate

change may exacerbate many other stresses, both

natural and anthropogenic.

 Direct Climate Impacts on Ecosystems

As temperature and moisture regimes change,

climatic zones could shift several hundred miles

toward the poles, requiring plants and animals

either to migrate or adapt to a new climate regime.

The rate of change will determine the degree of

impacts: some species might be able to keep up

with change, others could become extinct--either

locally or globally (see box 2-E). The ability of a

species to adapt will be critical to its survival. By

the same token, the decline and disappearance of

species that are unable to adapt will decrease the

biodiversity of ecological communities. Such a

reduction may leave the remaining species more

vulnerable to catastrophic events. Ecosystems,

the assemblages of plants and animals, are

unlikely to move as units, but will instead develop

new structures as species abundance and distribution are altered (42).

The general distribution of ecosystems is

related to climatic conditions. The Holdridge life

zones shown in figure 2-10 characterize regions

of North America according to the general

vegetative ecosystem suited to current climate

conditions. Under climate change scenarios projected by four GCMS, this distribution of vegetation zones will shift significantly (34). There is

general agreement among scenarios about the

direction of change: the extent of tundra and

cold-desert climate zones will decrease, and the

area of potential forest and grasslands will

increase. Despite this general agreement, there

are qualitative differences, with dry forest types

increasing under some climate scenarios, and

moister forests increasing under others. Overall,

as much 80 percent of the land in the United States

Alpine areas are awash in color when spring and

surmmer flowers bloom.

may shift to a new vegetation zone (see fig. 2-11).

Associated with such shifts in climatic zones

could be large-scale disturbances to existing

ecosystems.

Adjustment of Species

Natural adjustments to climate change could

begin with the failure of some species to reproduce because flowering, fruiting, and seed

germination-and in some animals, reproductive

physiology or mating behavior-could be affected. All of those processes are particularly

sensitive to climate. Reproductive failure might

allow new species to invade, or give a competitive

advantage to other species already present. Thus,

a gradual adjustment could occur, although in
92 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-E—Responses of Natural Systems to Climate Stress:

Adaptation, Migration, and Decline

Responses of individuals and communities to climate stress fall into three basic categories: adaptation,

migration, and decline and die-back. The extent to which individuals and communities respond may depend on

the rate and magnitude of climate change.

Adaptation

It is difficult to predict which species, populations, communities, ecosystems, and landscapes will prove most

able to cope with climate change because of the many variables and uncertainties that exist. However, biological

diversity affords populations the ability to adapt to changes in the environment by serving as a natural protection

against shocks and stress. “The rule that there is security in diversity is an axiom of ecology as well as finance. . . .

Biological diversity is a natural protection against surprises and shocks, climatic and otherwise. Among diverse

species will be some adapted to prosper in a new landscape in new circumstances” (21).

In species with diverse gene pools, the chances will be greater that some individuals will possess a

combination of genes that is useful in new environments, such as genes that determine drought resistance and

tolerance to extreme temperatures or salinity. These individuals will be the most likely to survive and pass along

adaptive characteristics to their offspring. At the community level, diversity may also increase the chances for

survival. For example, a forest stand composed of a single species or of trees that are all the same age may be

less able to withstand climate change than a forest composed of several species within a range of ages.

Biodiversity is generally considered an important trait at the ecosystem level, too, because it increases the charms

that the overall structure and function of an ecosystem will persist or adapt to changing conditions, even if some

species that were formerly part of the ecosystem no longer remain (21).

Some species may prosper under climate change conditions, others maybe able to adapt relatively quickly,

and still others may prove unable to adapt at all and may face extinction. As a result, ecosystems may change

as different plant species become dominant and different animal species become associated with altered habitats

(21). Species in varied landscapes may be able to find microclimates within their current ranges that are suitable,

and some species may even thrive and expand their ranges. Species already adapted to disturbed environments

(e.g., weedy species) may be particularly resilient to changes in climate. On the other hand, species with extremely

specific and/or narrow habitats may be more at risk to changes in climate. In addition, species on the fringe of

habitats, in transitional zones, may also experience greater stress from the impacts of climate change because

these species may not be well-established. On the whole, some species maybe restricted by a variety of biological

and physical limitations, but others will be able to adapt to the conditions brought on by climate change.

Certain wildlife species may be able to alter their diet in favor of other, exotic but newly available plant species.

White-tailed deer, mule deer, moose, elk and other species benefit from human activities that disturb ecosystems

and alter habitat (22). if, for example, climate change contributes to the conversion of a dense, forested habitat

to a more open area, species such as these would likely benefit. Similarly, some birds, such as robins, starlings,

and gulls, may adapt easily to alterations in habitat caused by climate change (22). These species tend to feed

on a variety of different organisms and are territorial and aggressive in nature. They are very good at vying for

resources with less competitive and smaller birds.

Migration

Some communities and ecosystems might have to migrate to survive the environmental conditions that could

result from climate change. Most species of vegetation and wildlife have the ability to migrate to some extent.

However, adverse conditions, such as landscape fragmentation, may limit this ability (see vol. 2, ch. 5). In addition,

the ability of a species to migrate depends not only on environmental conditions but on dispersal rate. Animals

can generally disperse much more quickly than plants (22). However, because wildlife is dependent on vegetation
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources! 93

for survival, many species are forced to migrate only as fast as vegetation does (94). Therefore, the health and

survival of many species will be dependent on the response of vegetation to climate change.

Dispersal rates for vegetation are considerably slower than the projected rate of climate change, and,

therefore, some species will not be able to migrate as fast as their corresponding climatic regimes. For example,

most North American tree species can migrate at 12 to 25 miles (20 to 40 kilometers) per century, but climate

regimes are expected to migrate at much faster rates, in some cases by at least an order of magnitude (106). In

particular parts of the United States, climatic regimes may shift hundreds of miles by as early as the middle to the

end of the next century (43, 74). Because some species will be unable to keep up with the pace of climate change,

their range may be reduced, or they may become extinct.

Coastal and estuarine wetland vegetation will likely attempt to migrate inland as the sea level rises. Their

success in migrating will depend on the steepness of the coast and obstructions to migration that might exist, such

as rocky areas and human-built structures. Wetlands fringing the playa lakes of the Southwest may retreat along

with the water levels if increased evaporation, in a hotter and drier climate, causes water levels to drop. Alpine

tundra will likely migrate toward higher altitudes as lower areas become warmer and drier.

In all of these cases, wildlife and other organisms that are dependent on these ecosystems for survival may

attempt to migrate as well. The least Bell’s vireo, an endangered species completely dependent on riparian

vegetation for survival, may lose a great deal of habitat if inland drying occurs (22). The jack-pine forest in northern

Michigan, which provides critical habitat for the endangered Kirtland’s warbler, could die off and be replaced by

a sugar maple forest in as few as 30 years under climate change conditions (11).

In each case, the ability to migrate will be limited by adjacent land-use patterns and the availability of areas

to which organisms can migrate. “Barriers,” such as roads, cities, and agriculture, degrade habitat quality and limit

the ability of vegetation and wildlife to move or spread. Roads may pose a formidable physical barrier to animal

migration, and even plants may have difficulty “moving” across roads if their seeds are too heavy to be dispersed

easily and over large distances by wind. Vast expanses of suburban developments now occupy sites that formerly

could have offered either suitable destinations or pathways for migration of plants and animals from one locale

to another. Many animals will not cross seemingly small obstructions, such as railroad clearings or roads, to get

to nearby suitable habitat (22). Agricultural land and other highly managed areas prevent species from naturally

establishing themselves. In general, the ability of plants and animals to migrate in response to climate change is

largely affected by anthropocentric influences and factors. Nevertheless, many species will be sufficiently

resourceful to migrate successfully, and some may even thrive and expand their ranges.

Decline and die-back

If climate change is rapid or severe, some species, ecosystems, and landscapes may not be able to adapt

Changes in climate may cause severe loss of function or value in certain species, ecosystems, and landscapes,

or may result in the disappearance of certain species or entire ecosystems. Just as human land-use patterns may

limit migration, they may also ultimately limit the chances for some species or ecosystems to survive. Some species

are well-suited to a very narrow set of environmental conditions, but lack characteristics that would allow them to

move or adapt easily to new environments. When human activities reduce or eliminate their normal habitats, these

species are likely to show signs of stress leading to decline or die-back.

In forest systems, decline and die-back occur when a large proportion of a tree population exhibits visible

symptoms of stress, unusual and consistent growth decreases, or death over a large area. Such distinguishing

characteristics can be irregular in distribution, and discontinuous but recurrent in time. In all cases, however,

decline and die-back are the result of complex interactions of multiple stress factors (83). Some common abiotic

factors include drought and low- and high-temperature stress. Biotic agents include defoliating insects,

root-infecting fungi, and borers and bark beetles. Typicalty, declines are initiated by an abiotic stress, with mortality

ultimately caused by a biotic stress agent.

(Continued on next page)
94 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-E—Responses of Natural Systems to Climate Stress:

Adaptation, Migration, and Decline-(Continued)

More often than not, the decline and die-back scenario is a direct or indirect response to a change in some

climatic variable. Changes in precipitation and temperature patterns have been shown to have an interactive and

sequential influence on the health of forest systems. Drought conditions tend to enhance the possibility of insect

attack. For example, sugar maple in northern forests is extremely sensitive to extreme changes in temperature.

Moist, warm weather is particularly conducive to the spread of Eutypella canker, a serious stem disease, whereas

drought periods favor the spread of Armillaria root decay; wind damage and sudden temperature drops significantly

favor certain cankerous fungi, and the Iack of snow cover can result in deep root freezing (83). Nevertheless, these

phenomena have sufficient common characteristics in various forest tree species to allow for some generalization;

changes in climate will almost certainly exacerbate existing stresses, further influencing forest decline and

die-back.

Some ecosystems will be influenced by changes in sea level rise. For example, coastal wetlands have been

able to keep pace with a sea level rise of approximately 0.04 inches (1 mm) per year for the past 3,000 years, which

is the rate at which many marshes are able to accumulate material. However, climate change is sure to increase

the rate at which sea level rises, which may ultimately drown these wetlands (98). Likewise, alpine and arctic

ecosystems may shrink and, in some sites, disappear if the amount and speed of climate change exceed the rate

at which these systems can migrate upslope. On the whole, the rate at which climate change occurs will have a

direct effect on the rate at which ecosystems experience declines in population and die-back responses.

SOURCES: P.M. Kareiv% J.G. Kingsolver, and R,B. Huey (cds.), Biot/c /rrteract&s and G/o&d Change (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer

Associates, Inc., 1993), 559 pages; R.L. Peters and J.D.S. Darling, “The Greenhouse Effect and Nature Reserves,” i%bscfence, December

19S5, pp. 707-17; C. Zabinsti and M.B. Davis, “HardTimes Ahead for Great Lake Forests: A Climate Threshold Model Predkts Responses

to C02-induced Climate Change, “ in: The Pot6ntial Effects of Global Climate Changa on The United States, Appendix O: Fwasfs

EPA-230-95-S9-054, J.B. Smith and D. Tirpak (eds.) (Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, June 19S9).

some areas, or for some species, slow processes of widely dispersing species (e.g., weeds) increase

seed dispersal, soil development, and achievement of sexual maturity may curtail adaptation.

Pollen records suggest that temperate forests can

migrate at approximately 62 miles per century,

but the correlated growing-season conditions may

shift by 200 miles for every 4 OF (2 ‘C) of

warming, so even in the lower range of climate

change predictions, some tree species might not

be able to keep up. Modeling results suggest that

if a forest includes some species that are better

adapted to a new climate, those species may

become dominant, but if none of the species are

better adapted, the whole forest might decline.

However, climate change is unlikely to decimate

vegetation and make land barren, except in

limited areas that are now arid and that may

become even drier. Rather, ecological communities are likely to change as rapidly moving and

in number, while slower-moving species decline

and disappear (21).

The adjustment process will not occur uniformly across species, communities, and ecosystems. Plants or animals attempting to migrate to

new areas may face competition from those that

still remain. Some migrators may be able to

compete effectively, and others may not. For

example, wetland vegetation may attempt to take

root further inland as sea level rise inundates

coastal marshes, but existing inland plants that

survive may temporarily block the path. Migration may also be blocked by areas rendered

unsuitable as a result of human use. Some wetland

species may be more capable than others of

establishing themselves among the inland vegetation. Thus, many species, as well as ecosystem

processes and interactions, may be reshuffled,
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 95

Figure 2-10-The Distribution of Holdridge Life Zones Under Current Climate Conditions

 Dry forest

 Cool desert

 Warm temperate forest

 Semiarid

 Hot desert

 Cool temperate forest

 Subtropfcal rnoist forest

Tundra

 Boreal forest

 Steppe + shrublands

 Polar desert/ice + cold parklands

SOURCE: Office of Technogy Assessment, 1993, adapted from L.R. Holdridge, Life Zone Ecology(San Jose, Costa Rica: Tropical Science Center,

1987), and W.R. Emanuel, H.H. Shugart, and M.P. Stevenson, “Climatic Change and the Broad Scale Distribution of Terrestrial Ecosystem

Complexes, r

’ Climatic Change, vol. 15,1985, pp. 75-82.

especially at the boundaries of current ecological

zones, where ecosystems are the least mature and

the most stressed (21). However, plants that are

capable of migrating or adapting may not necessarily be the most desirable. Climate change

could lead to an increase in less-valued species

and a change in ecosystem composition.

Development of Asynchrony

The migration of vegetative species could put

many organisms ‘‘out of sync’ with their environments and disrupt many symbiotic relationships. As plants migrate inland and upland,

pollinators and other vectors that assist in the

reproductive process may not move at the same

rate. If insects and birds are left behind, plants will

face significant losses in populations, and some

may become extinct. This may be especially true

for organisms with very specific ranges, whether

they be limited by topography, precipitation, or

temperature. In addition, insects and birds may

arrive at their migratory destinations prematurely,

before feeding and nesting conditions are optimal, or too late, after resources have been

exhausted. Organisms will be exposed to different and varying conditions, such as photoperiod,

intensity of sunlight, and temperature, unlike

what they are currently acclimated to, which may

affect reproductive capabilities as well. In addition, some plant species may alter nutrient cycles

and other processes in order to adapt to new soil

and moisture conditions. This could not only

adversely affect the health of plants, but could

reduce their nutritional value, thereby affecting

the health of the wildlife that depends on them for

sustenance. Marine species will face similar
96 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 2

Figure 2-n-Percent of U.S. Land Area Shifting

Holdridge Life Zones After CO2 Doubling

UKMO OSU GFDL GISS

NOTE: UKMO-United Kingdom Meteorological Office, OSU-Oregon

State University, GFDL=Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, and

GISS=Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystemsa at Risk to Potential Climate

Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, June 1993.

Many species of birds, like this Clark’s nutcracker,

are dependent on specific habitats that provide

sustenance and cover. Fragmentation of these areas

could have a dramatic impact on populations unable

to locate mating, nesting, feeding, and over-wintering

habitat.

difficulties because most fish require specific

conditions for reproductive activities to occur at

optimum rates. Anadromous fish (those that swim

into freshwater streams from the sea to spawn)

may be most affected as salinity in intertidal

waterways is altered due to sea level rise. On the

whole, the migration of vegetation in response to

altered climate and the subsequent response of

insects, birds, and other organisms could have

significant impacts on ecosystem structure, function, and value.

 Interactions Among Climate, Ecosystems,

and the Physical Environment

Climate change will affect living organisms

both directly and indirectly, as described above,

but it will also affect the processes of the physical

environment in which they exist-soils and

nutrient cycling, the hydrologic cycle, and photorespiration. Effects on the physical environment and living organisms will interact and cause

further modifications to the environment and the

organisms. Because the various biological and

physical processes are intricately interconnected,

with many feedbacks among them, it is difficult

to predict what the overall effect of climate

change will be. The following sections suggest

the range of interactions between climate and the

biological and physical processes it affects.

Interaction of Water Resources and Ecosystems

Water influences ecosystem function, but ecosystems, in turn, influence the flow of water

through the hydrologic cycle (see fig. 2-12 and

vol. 1, ch. 5). Water falls to the Earth’s surface in

the form of precipitation. Some water stays on the

surface and evaporates relatively quickly. Some

percolates into the soil and is taken up by

vegetation, from which it is eventually transpired

through the processes of photosynthesis and

respiration. The remaining precipitation moves

from upland to low-lying areas-on the surface,

as shallow groundwater flow toward rivers or

streams, or by infiltrating more deeply into and

through aquifers, eventually emptying into rivers,
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 97

Figure 2-12—The Hydrologic Cycle Shows How Water Moves Through the Environment

Evaporation and transpiration’ 

from surface water bodies,

land surface and vegetation 

Evaporation from

Consumptive use oceans

 ‘-- Streamflow

NOTE: BGD billions of gallons per day, To convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: Office of TechnoIogy Assessment, 1992.

lakes, and oceans, from which it eventually

evaporates-and the cycle begins again.

The extent to which water evaporates, discharges to surface water, seeps into the ground, or

remains on the surface depends on the amount and

form of precipitation, the temperature, the topography, the nature of soils (whether sandy or

clayey, and the content of organic matter), and the

types of vegetation. Vegetation moderates the

cycle in several important ways: it adds to the

organic matter of soils, increasing their water

retention; roots and stems may physically anchor

soils and slow the passage of water and channel

water below ground, further reducing runoff; and

canopies of leaves reduce droplet impact on the

soil and affect the rate of evapotranspiration.

Because of these interactions, changes in vegetation may cause changes in the hydrologic cycle.

For example, a semiarid grassland that is stripped

of vegetation through overgrazing (by either wild

or domestic herbivores) may lose some of its

ability to retain water as plants no longer slow

runoff or take up water to release it slowly later.

The interaction of changes in the ecosystem and

the hydrological system may eventually lead to

desertification.

Climate interacts with the hydrologic cycle on

different scales. Global average temperatures

affect how much moisture can be carried in the

air, how quickly clouds form, how readily clouds

yield precipitation, and how much precipitation

occurs and in what form (e.g., rain or snow), as

well as the large-scale wind patterns that carry

clouds from one region to the next. On a regional

or local scale, temperature affects the rate at

which water evaporates from the surface or
98 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

transpires from plants. Temperature further affects the rate of evapotranspiration by influencing

the form in which precipitation falls. Rain typically runs off soon tier it falls. Snow may remain

on the surface for a considerable amount of time,

with the delayed runoff supplying downstream

and adjacent areas with water during the spring.

Thus, global and regional changes in temperature

and precipitation can affect the hydrologic cycle

and the related ecosystem interactions in numerous ways.

The predicted changes in global climate will

essentially increase the rate at which the hydrologic cycle occurs, although different hydrologic

models yield rather different scenarios of what the

regional results will be (79). As outlined above

and in volume 1, chapter 5, total global precipitation is expected to increase 7 to 15 percent, but

warmer temperatures will allow for greater and

more rapid evapotranspiration, which could lead

to drier conditions in some areas (particularly in

midcontinent, midlatitude regions). Hydrologic

studies suggest that river watersheds can be quite

sensitive to even small climatic changes, particularly in arid and semiarid areas, where annual

runoff tends to be highly variable. In river basins

where snowmelt is important, both the annual

total runoff and its seasonal distribution can be

affected by changes in temperature and precipitation. Overall, climate change is expected to lead

to significant changes in both high-flow and

low-flow runoff extremes (42).

Soils, Nutrients, and Vegetation

Soil development and nutrient cycling rely on

a dynamic interaction among rock, plants, fungi

and microorganisms, and atmosphere. The development of soils depends in part on the rock that

contributes sediments as it erodes and weathers,

on the kinds of plants that grow on the soil,

generating detritus of varying composition, and

on the microorganisms associated with the plants

that decompose the detritus into nutrients and

organic matter. Nutrients, including carbon and

nitrogen, are cycled in various forms through

plants, soil, and the atmosphere. The type of soil

that has developed may limit the kinds of plants

that can easily take root and survive (which then

provide habitat for particular animal species that

affect nutrient turnover from plants). The presence of vegetation further affects the soil by

anchoring it, thus preventing erosion.

Both temperature and moisture affect the type

of vegetation that grows, the amount of detritus

produced, and the rate at which litter decomposes

and releases nutrients that can then be used by

other plants, animals, and microorganisms. With

intermediate levels of moisture, increased temperatures accelerate decomposition. This may free

more nutrients in the short term, potentially

boosting productivity. However, faster decomposition could also release more carbon (in the form

of CO2

) from the soil, particularly in the northern

United States, where soils store a large share of

the global carbon, thus amplifying the greenhouse

effect. Furthermore, as described in the earlier

section on C02

, increased concentrations of

atmospheric C02 will likely lead to changes in the

composition and structure of plant leaves. The

ratio of carbon to nitrogen may increase, which

may actually slow the rate at which these leaves

decompose and release minerals (see box 2-D).

Changes in precipitation and runoff will also

affect whether nutrients are maintained or lost

more quickly from soils. More-frequent or moresevere storms could cause more erosion and soil

loss in areas where land use is intensive or where

vegetation has declined because of altered climate

conditions (19, 42, 64).

The overall effects of climate change on soils

are difficult to calculate because of the many

complex and interacting processes that contribute

to soil development. Regardless of the long-term

change in soils, in the shorter term, soils may play

an important role in vegetation changes. As

temperatures Warm the suitable ranges or climate

conditions for many plant species may expand

northward. However, soils at the northern edge of

the United States and into central Canada tend to

be thinner and less fertile than those in the
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 99

Midwest, which may make adaptation difficult

for some species. In agricultural systems, any lack

of nutrients in the soils can be compensated for by

adding fertilizers, although there may be environmental costs associated with this (see vol. 1,

ch. 6).

Sea Level, Oceans, and Coastal Ecosystems

The many interconnected physical changes in

oceans and coasts will affect marine ecosystems

in numerous ways (see box 2-C). Wave patterns

in certain areas could be altered as a result of

changes in regional climate, which could affect

the stability of coastal areas.

Coral-building organisms thrive at a rather

narrow range of water temperatures and depths.

Although these organisms build reefs at a rate of

up to 0.6 inches (1.5 cm) per year, fast enough to

keep up with predicted sea level rise, other factors

such as storms and warmer water temperatures

could interfere with their growth and, in some

cases, could kill the organisms, Loss of coral reefs

would change the wave and water patterns near

the coast and could allow for increased coastal

erosion. Likewise, mangrove trees along many

tropical coasts play an important role in shore

stabilization. Sea level rise could inundate some

mangrove swamps. As these trees die, the coast

would be left vulnerable to erosion. In addition,

the potential elimination of salt marshes and

seagrass beds could have serious effects on

marine organisms. However, wetlands may migrate landward at a rate dictated by the landward

slope and sea level rise. In any case, the physical

and biological changes along oceans and coasts

could interact to amplify the effects of climate

change (see vol. 1, ch. 4).

WHICH NATURAL RESOURCES ARE MOST

VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE?

Although regional predictions of the natural

resources most at risk from climate change cannot

be made based on existing knowledge, certain

characteristics may put some parts of a natural

resource system at greater risk than others. For

example, ecosystems with limited options for

adaptability-such as alpine ecosystems, oldgrowth forests, fragmented habitats, and areas

already under stress-may be particularly vulnerable to changes in climate (42) (see vol. 2, ch. 5).

How ecosystems will fare under climate change

also depends on other factors that influence soil

and water chemistry, including land use, air

pollution, and water use (21). A1though systems

at the edges of their ranges and those already

stressed may be at the greatest risk from climate

change, some systems that now appear healthy

could also suffer.

Natural ecosystems may be more vulnerable to

climate change than managed ones. Furthermore,

natural or less managed ecosystems may be

affected not only by changes in climate, but by

further stresses resulting from human responses

to those changes, such as increased irrigation,

diversion of water from streams, and expanded

tillage or grazing (see vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5). On the

other hand, poor management responses in forestry and agriculture, such as planting species that

are not well-adapted or maintainingg stands at high

densities, could make some managed areas vulnerable as well (see vol. 1, ch. 6, and vol. 2, ch. 6).

Vulnerability to climate change will certainly

vary widely, and predictions about how systems

will respond to climate change are difficult to

make.

Changes in soil moisture may be among the

best indicators that a natural resource system is

becoming stressed. Figures 2-6 and 2-7 illustrate

areas of the United States that may face changes

in soil moisture under the climate change scenarios projected by GCMS. The extent to which

these changes in soil moisture will affect areas of

significant natural cover (34) is presented in

figure 2-13. The figure shows the percent of area

in each land class that is becoming effectively

wetter (measured above the zero axis) or drier

(below the zero axis). The GFDL scenario produces dramatic effects, with the majority of all

existing ecosystems except tundra and deserts
100 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Natural disturbances, such as the Yellowstone fires,

create openings in forested areas where grasses and

wildflowers can flourish. This provides new food

sources for elk and other wildlife, Fires also promote

recycling of nutrients, which enriches the soil.

moving toward drier climatic regimes. Almost 80

percent of agricultural lands of the United States

face drying under the GFDL, scenario. The GISS

scenario produces a mix of wetting and drying in

areas of natural cover, with the exception of some

noticeable drying in the wetlands. Agricultural

lands (the midwestern corn belt and California)

are more effected, with over 40 percent of the

agricultural lands showing some drying under the

GISS scenario.

Natural resource systems could change in any

number of ways in response to a changing

climate, but not all changes damage things that

humans value. For example, a gradual shift in the

boundaries of a wetland would probably not be

considered a damage unless this results in a

reduction of the habitat, flood control, water

filtering, or recreational services offered by that

wetland. Similarly, an increase in tree mortality

may be of no concern in a forest valued as wildlife

habitat rather than as a source of timber supply.

The degree of human intervention may also

influence the vulnerability of natural resource

systems to climate change. Depending on how

natural systems are valued, they may be managed

along a spectrum from active to passive management regimes. Because intensively managed systems are considered valuable, and because people

are already exerting effort and expense to keep

them productive, use of additional measures to

respond to a changing climate is likely. On the

other hand, wilderness areas are essentially

unmanaged--but highly valued precisely because

of ‘this lack of management. Active intervention

to protect these areas seems unlikely (see vol. 2,

ch. 5), but there may be little loss of value from

any but the most extreme effects of climate

change on these natural areas. Thus, climate

impacts on natural resource systems and the need

for taking precautionary actions in preparation for

climate changes cannot be evaluated without also

considering how people value and manage these

resources. These are the issues considered in

subsequent chapters that investigate the effects of

and possible responses to climate change in

individual natural resource sectors: coastal systems, water resources, agriculture, wetlands, preserves, and forests.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change, the National Academy of Sciences, and

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have

all conducted assessments of the potential impacts of climate change (see box 2-F). Their

reviews describe numerous impacts of climate

change on U.S. natural resource systems, which

laid the foundation for this report. Subsequent

chapters will summarize some of the predictions

made by these reports for individual natural

resources, then explore in greater detail the
40

20

60

80

Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 101

Figure 2-13-Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GFDL and GISS Climate Change Scenarios,

by Land-Use and Cover Type

GFDL

GFDLn GFDL

Drier

 Much drier

GFDL

GISS

GFDL

Much wetter

Wetter

GFDL

Tundra Coniferous Deciduous Grass-shrub Desert Wetland Agricultural

forest forest

NOTE: Bars above the zero axis represent the percent of Iand-use area predicted to become wetter bare below the axis chow the percent of land

area becoming drier. Drying or wetting is calculated from the change In the ratio of actual evapotranspiration (AET) to potential evapotranspiration

(PET). No change is reported If the index changed (up or down) by lees than 0.025; wetter= 0.25 to 0.05; much wetter= > .05; drier= -0.25 to -.05;

much drier. <-0.05. GFDL-Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, GISS=Goddard Instltute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystems at Risk to Potential Climate Change,”contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, June

1993.

vulnerability and adaptability of the various

resources and the potential management strategies and policies that might assist adaptation.

CHAPTER 2 REFERENCES

1. B.A., “The Effect of U in the Representation of Cloud Processes in Climate Models on Climate Change

 of Scientific Uncertainties the

Accuracy of Global Climate Change Predictions: A Survey of

Recent Literature, and South U.S.

 of (DOE) Internal National Environmental Assessment and 

 and Environmental Policy

Section (Argonne, IL: DOE, October 1991).

 W.J., Drake, Photosynthetic Capacity

of After 4 of Exposure to Elevated 

Plant, Cell, vol. 14, No. 9, 1991, pp. 1003-6.

3. “Impact of Global Warming on Great 

Cycles,” The Change on

the United States, Appendix A: Water Resources, EI?A-23@OS89-050, Smith D. DC: U.S. . Protection Agency, 1989).

4. J.H., Climate Still Nature, vol. 350,

1991, pp. 649-52.

5. J.H., “A Second at Impacts of 

“ Scientist, vol. 79, 1991, pp. 

6. Jr., Research

& vol. 9, No. Spring 1993, pp. 201-07.

7. F.A., Response of Natural Ecosystem to 

 C02 Annual Review

 21, 1990, pp. 167-%. .

8. PA., ED. “Plant in a 

Wor14° 226, January 1992, pp.

68-744

9. and Climate A 

 Orion Nature Quarterly, Spring

1989, pp. 22-27.
102 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 2-F–Major Assessments of Climate Change Impacts

Three major assessments by national and international organizations have addressed the potential impacts

of climate change: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 1989 report, The Potential Effects of

Climate Change (94), the three-volume climate change series issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change in 1990 (42, 43, 44, and the 1992 supplement (45)), and a 1991 report by the National Academy of

Sciences, Policy /mplications of Greenhouse Warming (22), and its 1992 supplement. These reports focus on

different aspects of climate change. Taken together, they lay the foundations for OTA’s assessment of the

adaptability and vulnerability of systems to climate change, and their findings are cited throughout this chapter.1

The EPA Report—In 1987, Congress requested that EPA study “the potential health and environmental

effects of climate change including, but not. . . limited to, the potential impacts on agriculture, forests, wetlands,

human health, rivers, lakes, estuaries, as well as societal impacts.” To respond, EPA conducted a massive 2-year

effort, hiring more than a hundred contractors to model potential effects on each system, and contracting out

several regional case studies to integrate how all impacts might interact in different regions. The results were

synthesized in a 400-page report accompanied by 11 appendixes of contractor papers.

EPA used regional predictions of temperature and precipitation generated by four major general circulation

models GCMs to examine the sensitivities of managed and unmanaged systems and to evaluate regional effects.

The climate predictions were distributed to contractors, who then incorporated the results into their own models

for crop growth, forest productivity, farm-level decisionmaking, etc., to predict the potential effects on particular

systems and in particular regions.

EPA found that unmanaged systems such as coastal wetlands, parks, and forests “maybe unable to adapt

quickly to rapid warming.” Effects could include a reduced range for many tree species, changes in forest

composition, a decline in cold-water fish and shellfish (although some warm-water species could benefit), an

increase in species extinction, loss of coastal wetlands, and an increase in salinization of estuaries. Such impacts

could begin in 30 to 80 years. Climate changes may heighten the effects of other stresses (such as pollution,

increased radiation accompanying stratospheric ozone depletion, pests and pathogens, and fire). For example,

climate-induced stress may make large regions of forests more susceptible to other stresses, such as fire, pests,

disease outbreaks, wind damage, and air pollution. Changes in forest species and productivity could lead to

secondary effects such as increased soil runoff and erosion, reduced aquifer recharge, reduced biodiversity, and

changes in wildlife habitat and recreational opportunities. Species extinctions could increase (and biological

diversity could decline), especially in areas where roads, agriculture, and urban development block or restrict

migration pathways or habitat, and in areas that harbor heat-or drought-sensitive species. Some forested land

could become grassland. As communities and ecosystems are displaced by climate change, it may be necessary

to expand scientific knowledge on the practice of ecosystem restoration, so that communities can be rebuilt in

degraded sites or relocated to new areas where they have not existed in the past (94) (see also vol. 2, boxes 4-A

and 5-M).

Overall, EPA found that managed systems such as water resources and agriculture are more capable than

natural systems of withstanding climate change. However, problems may still arise as humans attempt to adapt

to the changes to these systems brought about by climate change. Agricultural yields might be reduced, but

productivity could shift northward so that overall production could probably meet domestic needs, with some

possible reductions in exports. Farmers might have to change their practices, such as beginning or increasing

irrigation, which might increase conflicts over water use. If climate change leads to reduced stream flows, water

quality may suffer because less water will be available for diluting or flushing pollutants and dissipating heat; these

1 Ail three reports were based on the assumption that there would be no @Or*a~OSin C!i~te Wd*ilty.
Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources | 103

Changes could affect fish and wildlife populations. The effects on agriculture might vary considerably over regions,

with declines, for example, in crop acreage in t he Great Plains potentially offset by increased acreage in the Great

Lakes States.

Quality of life may not suffer much in areas where, for example, forests shift from one species to another, and

where the shifts are gradual; however, in areas where forests die altogether (such as may occur in some parts

of California), people would face severe environmental and land-use effects. Recreation relies on relatively healthy

forests; rapid changes that caused stressed or declining forests would Iikely reduce recreational opportunities and

demand.

The IPCC Report—The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an international group of

hundreds of scientists from more than 50 countries established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization

and the United Nations Environment Program. The IPCC setup three working groups: Working Group I to assess

the scientific basis for how human activities affect the climate; Working Group II to study the potential impacts of

climate change worldwide; and Working Group Ill to formulate possible policy responses. The results were

Published in the three-volume Climate Change report in 1990 (The IPCC Scientific Assessmemt, The IPCC Impacts

Assessment and The /PCC Response Strategies). The working groups continue to meet, and issue occasional

updates to the 1990 reports.

The scientific assessment predicted that under a ’’business-as-usual” scenario (characterized by continued

reliance on coal-intensive energy sources and only modest efficiency increases), the global average temperature

would increase at a rate of 0.5°F (0.3 °C) per decade, with a likely increaseof2‘F (1 °C) over current levels by

2025 and 5.4 °F (3 °C) before the end of the next century. The impact assessment used this business-as-usual

prediction for increasing temperature (with accompanying estimates that equivalent atmospheric CO2

concentrations would double by 2025 to 2050 and sea level would rise about 1 foot (0.3 meter) by 2030) to predict

potential impacts on systems including natural terrestrial ecosystems, agriculture, and forestry.

IPCC suggested that climate change could shift climatic zones several hundred miles toward the poles over

the next 50 years, requiring natural terrestrial ecosystems to either migrate or adapt to a new climate regime. The

rate of change will determine the degree of impacts: some species might be able to keep up with change, but some

could become extinct, thus reducing global biodiversity. Ecosystems are unlikely to move as units, but will develop

new structures as species abundance and distribution are altered. Most at risk are systems with limited options

for adaptability (montane, alpine, and polar areas, island and coastal communities, remnant vegetation, heritage

sites or reserves, and areas already under stress). Sea level rise and ocean warming will affect fisheries, potentially

reducing habitat for several commercially important species. Coastal wetlands may be inundated by rising seas

and forced to migrate inward, though in many areas, this may not be possible. Inland wetland areas may come

under increased pressure for agricultural use. As for managed systems, forests may become more susceptible

to parasites, and losses from fires will increase. It is urclear whether global agricultural productivity would increase

or decrease overall, but many regions are likely to experience shifts or losses in production (for example, a decline

in cereal and horticultural production in the southern United States), which will alter trade patterns. Impacts will

differ considerably from region to region, as will the socioeconomic effects. Water availability will likely increase

in some areas and decrease in others, but regional details are not yet known. There may also be a change in

drought risk which could seriously affect agriculture at both the regional and global levels.

The NAS Report—The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) convened three different scientific panels to

conduct preliminary analyses of climate change effects, mitigation strategies, and adaptation strategies. Each

panel drafted a report that described their analyses and conclusions. A fourth “synthesis” panel drew on the work

of the other three panels to formulate a policy report which was published in April 1991.

2 The Cumulative warming effect of all greenhouse gases is equivalent to a doubled C02 concentration.

(Continued on next page)
104 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Volume 1

Box 2-F-Major Assessments of Climate Change Impacts-(Continued)

The NAS panels assumed greenhouse warming In the range of 2 to 9°F(1 to 5°C), but did not give a specific

time frame of reference. Based on this scenario, NAS classified natural resource systems and human activities

into one of three categories: low sensitivity to climate change within the given range; sensitive but adaptable at

a cost; and sensitive with questionable ability to adjust or adapt. NAS concluded that built systems generally fit

into the first or second categories, and managed crop or timber lands fit into the second.

Water resources are quite sensitive to climate because runoff is the “small difference between the larger

quantities of precipitation and evaporation,” and runoff fluctuates relatively more” than either precipitation or

evaporation. Changes in runoff will have adverse impacts only when water supply no longer matches water

demand for use and consumption. In the United States, water supply and demand are now closely matched in the

Great Basin, Missouri, and California water regions, so these areas maybe particularly vulnerable to decreases

in precipitation (and conversely, they would reap large benefits should precipitation increase). Activities such as

irrigation are also vulnerable to decreased precipitation because irrigation is most common in areas where

precipitation is already light and evaporation is high. Unless climate changes quickly relative to demographic

changes that affect water demand, however, the NAS report concludes, “the overall impact of climate change is

unlikely to be substantially more serious than that of the vagaries of the current climate” {21).

In contast, NAS suggested that unmanaged ecosystems—the “natural landscape” and marine ecosystemsrespond relatively slowly to climate change and that their ability to adapt is questionable and “problematic.”

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June 1989).
Global Change

Research

in the

Federal

Government 3

0 n October 13, 1992, the United States ratified the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The convention was one of the key accomplishments of

the United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Its

declared goal is ‘‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations

at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, ’ and it calls for parties to return

“individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases

not controlled by the Montreal Protocol” (46). Most of the 166

countries that signed the convention have pledged to do so by

2000 (on April 21, 1993, President Clinton made a commitment

to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by that

year). The convention also requires all participating countries to

prepare action plans detailing their strategy to mitigate climate

change. The Biodiversity Convention, signed by most developing and industrialized countries at UNCED, calls for the

development of strategies for global biodiversity conservation,

and Agenda 21, the comprehensive action agenda to promote

sustainable development adopted at UNCED, also calls for

policies to minimize environmental degradation.

All these concerns about climate change, biodiversity, and

sustainable development reflect a policy agenda that is inextricably linked to scientific research. “The relationships between

scientific and technological advancement and government support are complex, and the stakes in these decisions are high, not

just for scientists and engineers, but for society as a whole.

Consequently, a better understanding of the process of articulating goals, both within and outside science, is vital” (3).

I 109
110 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume

The Federal Government launched a multiagency research effort in 1989 in response to the

uncertainties and potential risks of climate

change. Its purpose is to observe, understand, and

predict global change (9). When the U.S. Global

Change Research Program (USGCRP) was created as a Presidential Initiative in 1989, it did not

have an explicit plan to link research to policy.

Before codifying the program, Congress directed

it to provide information useful to policy makers;

however, Congress did not identify or mandate

any mechanism to ensure this. When the program

was first implemented, key questions of the

scientists and policy makers were: Are humans

significantly changing the climate, and can climate change be predicted? The program was

intended to replace a crisis-driven, one-problemat-a-time approach to environmental problems

with a more systemic, proactive approach that

recognizes that different environmental problems

are linked by the very nature of the Earth system.1

Although the program is scientifically well-

-grounded, it has become overwhelmingly a physical science program focused on basic Earth

system processes that largely ignores the behavioral, economic, and ecological aspects of environmental problems. For example, understanding

the role clouds play in climate change and the role

of the ocean-land-atmosphere interface is now its

highest priority.

Understanding the size and scope of USGCRP

can be difficult, and the coordination challenges

of such a large interagency program are formidable. Agency personnel committed to the program

have made a commendable effort to ensure that

the program functions smoothly. However,

USGCRP is not a managed entity with one

budget, nor does it have an authoritative body

making decisions on projects. It is, rather, a

1

loosely coordinated collection of several programs and budgets. Even this level of coordination is undermined at the legislative level, where

the program, collected into a compilation of

budgets by the Federal Coordinating Council for

Science, Engineering, and Technology

(FCCSET), is splintered into several parts and

never considered as a whole during the authorization, appropriation, and oversight processes.

The primary questions of policy makers have

changed since 1989 in the wake of the world

climate treaty and the publication of several key

reports: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) reports, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports on the potential

effects of climate change and policy options, and

the Committee on Science, Engineering and

Public Policy (COSEPUP) report.2 It is now

generally accepted that unequivocal detection of

the greenhouse effect requires another decade of

measurements, and that rates of climate change

and regional details about climate changes will

not be available for at least that long (see ch. 2).

Thus, questions being asked today have moved

beyond the basic science issues of “observing,

understanding and predicting’ climate change to

a second set of concerns: What can be done to

mitigate or adapt to climate change? What are the

climate effects of most concern? How can we

manage natural and human systems wisely given

an uncertain climate? Consequently, USGCRP’S

mission statement and priorities are now too

narrow to address questions such as how to

minimize negative impacts of climate change.

The congressional committees requesting this

study recognized that decisionmaking must continue in the face of uncertainty. They expressed

the following concerns to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA):

1 The Earth system is the sum of all interactions among living organisms and their biotic and abiotic environments.

2 IPCC*S Scien@c~5Hmnt (28), Impacts Assessment (26), Response Strategies (27), and Supplementary Report to the rCC s~emyc

Assessntent (29); EPA’s Policy OptionsforStabilizing Global Climate (52) and The Potenn”alE#ects of Global Climate Change on the United

States (51); and COSEPUP’s Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, National Academy of science9, National Academy of

W-* and Institute of Medicine, Policy Implications of Greenhouse W~”ng: Mitigation, A&ptation, and the Science Base (10).
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government! 111

m

9

■

“We think it is prudent to begin--today—

investigating how our research and develop

ment programs should incorporate concerns

about climatic uncertainty. ”3

“Do current U.S. R&D Programs focus on

the right questions to provide information

about effects on different systems, potential

strategies for making systems more resilient

in the face of climate change and adapting to

such changes that may occur?’

“What information can more research provide over various time frames to guide

decisions about reducing greenhouse gas

emissions, ameliorating effects of global

climate change, and building resiliency into

systems?’

Conducting research to answer some of these

questions has been a low priority. Although the

results of the program, as currently structured,

will provide valuable information for predicting

climate change, they will not necessarily contribute to the information needed by public and

private decisionmakers to respond to global

change. Three areas are particularly lacking:

ecosystem-scale research, adaptation research

(ecological, human, and economic), and integrated assessments (evaluation of all focused

and contributing research results and their implication for public policy). Research can begin now

on topics more closely related to policy decisions

despite incomplete answers from the physical

sciences. More research is needed on the impacts

of climate change on natural and managed ecosystems and the resulting implications for land

and water resource management, on how people

adapt, and on why people resist change. Key

projects for a USGCRP committed to policyrelevant research should also include gathering

information about the relative importance of

population size and expectations of quality-of-life

improvements, the demand for goods and services

(including clean water, agriculture and forestry

products, and access to natural areas), and economic and institutional barriers to the dissemination and adoption of technological innovation.

Some of the research in these areas will take

decades and, if started now, may leave us much

better prepared to respond to global change in the

future.

Implicit in the current structure of USGCRP is

that the initiation of a comprehensive adaptation

research program must wait until predictions of

climate change are reliable. However, there are

several important reasons not to wait to initiate

adaptation research. First, according to IPCC

estimates, few reliable predictions of climate

change on a regional scale will be available before

the next 15 to 20 years. Although such regional

information might help focus research on managed and natural systems in areas expected to

experience the most change, research on ecosystems is a multidecade task (see vol. 2, chs. 4-6)

and should begin now. Second, even though the

effects of climate change on a regional level

cannot currently be modeled accurately, general

effects can be predicted, such as sea level rise.

Adaptation research that addresses sea level rise

and other effects of climate change need not wait

for reliable predictions. Third, much adaptation

research makes sense regardless of climate

change. For example, restoration of wetlands

addresses adaptation to climate change, but it also

addresses the current depletion of wetlands due to

other causes. Adaptation research can use historical records of societal, economic, and environmental impacts of environmental change combined with reasonable hypothetical scenarios for

future environmental change (31).

Because policy makers and scientists have

different educational and professional backgrounds,

scientific research findings need to be translated

3 House Committee on Science, Space, and ltchnology, letter to Ow Sept. 27, 1991.

4 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, letter to OT~ Oct. 4, 1991,

5 Senate (!omrnittee on Commeree, Seienee, and Tnmspmta tioq letter to Ow Oct. 8, 1!391.
112 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

into terms relevant to policy making and decisionmakin“ g. Regardless of the “completeness”

of climate research, policy makers are making

decisions now that affect global change and

whether the Nation will mitigate and/or adapt to

it. They also decide where to allocate scarce

resources for research.

A recent National Research Council report,

Research to Protect, Restore, and Manage the

Environment (37), stated: “No matter how good

the science, environmental problems cannot be

solved without integrating the science with environmental policy. To accomplish that, integrative

study is needed to bridge the multidisciplinary

gaps and deal with the conflicting goals held by

varied constituencies. Research is necessary but

not sufficient to solve problems. ” One way to

improve the relevance of” research results for

policy makers is through the use of integrated

assessments. Integrated assessments are a mechanism for synthesizing all the research relevant to

an identified problem and for presenting research

results in policy-relevant language. Such assessments, if conducted by multidisciplinary teams on

a regular basis, could help bring together and

evaluate research results produced by USGCRP,

which is now composed largely of isolated

programs and projects.

Although assessments were not included in the

original USGCRP program, they are included in

a rudimentary form in the FY 1994 budget (8).

However, there has been no fundamental change

in the mission of USGCRP, which remains

predominately focused on understanding climate

change. As a result, different people draw different conclusions about what changes in research

focus to expect from USGCRP. In addition, the

quality of assessments is determined solely by the

information fed into them and the backgrounds of

those constructing the assessment homework. If

ecological, economic, and sociological research

continues to be neglected. the planned assessments will not be useful to policy makers (24).

John Gibbons, assistant to the President for

science and technology, testified recently that

USGCRP needs to expand the scope of its

research to include the impacts of climate change

on natural and human environments and strategies for mitigating and adapting to climate

change. He also recognized the need to improve

the integration of research with policy making

(20).

This chapter will examine the broad issues

surrounding the Federal research effort to understand climate change-particularly within the

context of the natural and managed systems

discussed in chapters 4 through 6 of volumes 1

and 2. The options presented here, if implemented, could help commit the Federal Government to addressing areas of imbalance in

USGCRP, the need for adaptation research, and

the issues surrounding a national research program with an explicit science-policy interface.

These program changes could benefit policy

makers and decisionmakers by ensuring that

USGCRP and other federally funded global

change research supply the integrated information they need to make choices in the face of

uncertainty about global change and its impacts.

THE U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE

RESEARCH PROGRAM

1 Inception and Structure

Recognition that human activity could significantly alter the global environment grew during

the 1970s and 1980s. Concerns focused particularly on the threat of climate change from

increased emissions of greenhouse gases and the

depletion of the ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCS). In response to the potential risks of

climate change and the uncertainties surrounding

the science, the Federal Government launched a

massive, multiagency research effort in 1989 “to

observe, understand, and, ultimately, predict global

changes and to determine the mechanisms influencing these changes” (9). In 1989, USGCRP

was developed by the Committee on Earth

Sciences (now the Committee on Earth and
Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 113

Figure 3-1A--Organlzatlonal Chart for the Federal Coordinating Council for

Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET)

John H. Gibbons

FCCSET membership Chair

DOS DOEd HUD

DOD DOL OMB I I

DOI DOT NASA FCCSET Secretariat

USDA VA EPA Charles Dickens, Executive Secretary DOC GSA NSC Elizabeth Rodriguez, Senior Policy Analyst DOE HHS NSF Alicia Dustira, Senior Policy Analyst

CEES CISET

Committee on Earth and Committee on International Science,

Environmental Sciences Engineering and Technology

Frederick M. Bernthal (NSF), Chair Chair vacant

CFAFR

Committee on Food, Agriculture and

Forestry Research

Chair vacant

CPMES

Committee on Physical, Mathematical

and Engineering Sciences

Frederick M. Bernthal (NSF), Acting Chair

CEHR

Committee on Education and

Human Resources

Luther Williams (NSF), Acting Chair

CLSH

Committee on

Life Sciences and Health

David Galas (DOE), Acting Chair

r

CTI

Committee on Technology and Industry

Chair vacant

NOTE: For definition of terms, eee figure 3-1 B, next page.

Environmental Sciences, CEES), an interagency

group under FCCSET in the President’s Office of

Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (see fig.

3-l). USGCRP became the first Presidential

Initiative indicating that it was to be a highpriority program with strong administrative backing. In 1990, Congress passed the U.S. Global

Change Research Act (P.L. 101-606), which

(Continued)

codified USGCRP. In 1992, USGCRP became a

National Research Program.7 Between FY 1989

and FY 1993, the Government spent $3.7 billion

on this effort. A new administration that asserts its

commitment to taking action on climate change

issues and a Congress with a large number of new

members coincide with this 5-year benchmark

and could change the direction and scope of the

Initiatives exist: cc computing and communication advanced materials biotechnology 

mathematics and science education. . to coordinate interagency in these 

 developed this for continuing Initiatives that have reached
114 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure 3-lB-Organizational Chart for the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES)

Frederick M. Bernthal (NSF) Lennard Fisk (NASA)

Chair Vice-Chair

DOD HHS N!3F 1 I

DOI HUD CEQ

USDA OMB SI CEES Secretariat

DOC OSTP NRC Penelope Firth, Executive Secretary

DOE NASA TVA Sylvia Edgerton, Senior Science Associate

NIEHS FEMA ICA Betty Wong, Professional Assistant

SGCR

Subcommittee on

Global Change Research

Robert Corell (NSF), Chair

—————r—’

SET I

Subcommittee on

Environmental Technology

Joseph Bordogna (NSF), Interim Chair

SERNRE

Subcommittee on

Economic Research on Natural

Resources and the Environment

Joseph Stiglitz (CEA), Chair

SNDR

Subcommittee on

Natural Disaster Reduction

Robert Hamilton (USGS), Chair

I

1

SUSCOS

Subcommittee on

U.S. Coastal Ocean Science

Donald Scavia (NOAA), Acting Chair

1

I

A.tmospheric Research

Richard Greenfield (NSF”), Acting Chair

I

SWR

Subcommittee on

Water Resources

Stephen Ragone (USGS), Chair

1

SFOFC

Subcommittee on Federal

Oceanographic Fleet Coordination

R. Adm. Peterson (NOAA), Chair

I I I

I PEGI I

Working Group for Private Enterprise/

Government Interactions

William Busch (NOAA), Chair

NOTE: DOS-Department of State; DOD-Department of Defense; DOI-Department of the Interior; USDA-U.S. Department of Agriculture;

DOC-Department of Commerce; DOE-Department of Energy; DOEd-Department of Education; DOL-Department of Labor; DOT-Department of

Transportation; VA. Department of Veterans Affairs; GSA-General Services Administation; HHS-Department of Health and Human Services;

HUD-Department of Housing and Urban Development; OMB-Office of Management and Budget; NAS-National Aeronautics and Space

Administration; EPA-Environmental Protection Agency; NSC-National Security Council; NSF-National Science Foundation; NIEHS-National

Institute of Environmental and Health Sciences; OSTP-Office of Science Technology Policy; FEMA-Federal Emergency Management Agency;

CEQ=Council on Environmental Quality; S1-Smithsonian Institution; NRC-National Research Council; TVA-Tennessee Valley Authority;

ICA-lntelligenoe Community Affairs, CEA-Council of Economic Advisors; USGS-U.S. Geological Survey; NOAA-National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet.’ The FY 1994 U.S. Global Change Research Program

(Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).
Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 115

program for FY 1994. There is no official

termination date for the program; however, program plans indicate that it will last at least 40

years (11).

Three ‘ ‘activity streams, ” or program elements, defined the USGCRP mission between its

inception and FY 1994:

■

■

■

Documentation and analysis of Earth system changes, which include observation—

using both ground- and space-based observation systems-and data management;

Process Research to enhance the understanding of the physical, geological, chemical, biological, and social processes that

influence Earth system behavior; and

Integrated Modeling and Prediction of

Earth system processes.

Each of these priorities is represented by a

working group under the Subcommittee on Global

Change Research under CEES. The chair of the

subcommittee along with the chair of each of the

working groups make up the principal body

responsible for the planning, development, coordination, and review of USGCRP (7). In FY 1994,

a new activity stream, Assessment, was added.

USGCRP was originally envisioned as a complete global change research program, covering

research on natural climate change, humaninduced climate change, impacts of climate and

land-use change on the Earth system, and impacts

of human activity on ecosystem health. The

program has evolved in parallel with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and

has drawn heavily from the panel’s work.8

Consequently, the main focus of global change

research under USGCRP has become climate

change. Important global changes other than

human-induced climate change, such as loss of

biodiversity, changes in land use, and increases in

industrial pollution, were determined to be beyond the scope of USGCRP and are addressed

only to the extent that they interact with the

climate system. This is reflected in the research

priorities of the program’s science elements.

To guide research, CEES identified and prioritized seven scientific research elements, or science elements.9 In order of priority, the science

elements are Climate and Hydrologic Systems,

Biogeochemical Dynamics, Ecological Systems

and Dynamics, Earth System History, Human

Interactions, Solid Earth Processes, and Solar

Influences (7). More-specific areas of research

are prioritized under each of these seven research

elements (see fig. 3-2). Several criteria, although

not applied systematically, are used to evaluate

projects under each research element, including:

relevance and contribution to the overall goal of

the program, scientific merit, ease or readiness of

implementation, links to other agencies and

international partners, cost, and agency approval.

1 New Developments

In 1992, CEES began developing a management plan for the program that would include the

addition of Assessment as a fourth activity stream

along with Documentation, Process Research,

and Integrated Modeling and Prediction (see fig.

3-3). The primary function of the Assessment

working group is to ‘‘. . document the state of

scientific knowledge and address the implications

of the science of global change for national and

intemational policy-making activities over abroad

spectrum of global and regional environmental

issues” (8). The group will also help coordinate

the scientific assessments of global change with

6 KC is an intergovernmental body sponsored jointly by the World Meteorological Organiza tion and the United Nation’s Environmental

Programrne. The group was set up in 1988 to assess the scientific understanding of natural and human-induced climate change, its impacts,

and potential response strategies. IPCC is scheduled to produce anothex full assessment in 1995,

s CEIUl (formerly C’ES) works closely with and has drawn heavily on the ongoing activities of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),

the World Climate Resewuh Pmgrarn (WCRP) of the World Meteorological Organization the International Council of Scienti~c Unions

(lCSU), the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP), and IPCC in designing the structure of USGCRP and in identifying the

pro~’s key scientific issues and research priorities.
Figure 3-2-Priority Framework for USGCRP

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

. Support broad U.S. and international scientific effort

. Identify natural and human-induced changes. Focus on interactions and interdisciplinary science. Share financial burden, use the best resources, and encourage

full participation

INTEGRATING PRIORITIES

. Documentation of Earth system change

● Observational programs

Data-management systems

. Focused studies on controlling processes and

improved understanding

. Integrated conceptual and predictive models

Climate and

hydrologic systems

Role of cloudsOcean circulation

and heat flux

Land/atm/ocean

water and energyfluxes

Coupled climate

system and

quantitative links

Ocean/atm/cryosphere interactions

Biogeochemical dynamics

Bio/atm/ocean fluxes

of trace species

Atm processing of

trace species

Surface/deep water

biogeochemistry

Terrestrial biosphere

nutrient and

carbon cycling

Terrestrial inputs to

marine ecosystems

I SCIENCE PRIORITIES

Ecological systems and dynamics

Long-term measurements of structure/

function

Response to climate

and other stresses

Interactions between

physical andbiological process

Models of interaction

feedback, and

response

Productivity/resource

models

Earth system history

PaleoclimatePaleoecologyAtmospheric

composition

Ocean circulation

and composition

Ocean productivitySea level changesPaleohydrology

Human

interactions

Database

development

Models linking:. population growth

and distribution

. energy demands. change in land use- industrial production

Solid Earth

processes

Coastal erosion

Volcanic processesPermafrost and

marine gashydrates

Ocean/seafloor heat

and energy fluxes

Surficial processes

Crustal motions and

sea level

Solar

Influences

EUV/UV monitoringAtm/solar energy

coupling

Irradiance (measure/

model)

Climate/solar record

Proxy measurements

and long-term

database
Chapter --GIobal Change Research in the Federal Government I 117

related assessments on environmental impacts,

technologies for adaptation and mitigation, risk

assessment, and policy-response strategies (12).

Although the FY 1994 budget proposal reflects

these changes, it is unclear how much money

agencies will allocate for assessment and how the

assessments will be structured. The FY 1994

budget does not show Assessment separately but,

rather, embeds it within the other three activity

streams. Comprehensive assessments cannot be

carried out without expanding the ecological and

socioeconomic aspects of the program and incorporating impacts research into it. The FY 1994

budget does not reflect any significant expansion

in these areas.

Nonetheless, the Admini “ “stration has expressed

interest in significantly broadening the program

to include studies of environmental and socioeconomic impacts and of mitigation and adaptation

strategies. “The development of a successful

assessment activity in the USGCRP will, I believe, go far toward demonstrating the ClintonGore administration’s commitment not only to

research but to effective action to manage this

Nation’s national and international environmental

policy” (19). If this research materializes, it could

then be integrated with research on Earth system

processes to conduct integrated assessments. The

expanded program should be reflected in the

FY 1995 USGCRP budget.

To ensure progress in each of the activity

streams, timetables and milestones have been

included in each agency’s USGCRP research

program, although they have not appeared in any

published document. These milestones, specified

for both the near term (5 to 10 years) and the long

term (10 to 30 years), “will guide program and

budget development and serve as a critical

element in evaluating program accomplishments

and progress’ (11). The Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) could hold research programs

to these targets only if the milestones are clearly

stated and easily measured and, therefore, enforceable. Representative George Brown, chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and

Figure 3-3-Functional Architecture of USGCRP

Documentation

Global observations

Data management I

Integrated

odeling

Process

mo cling research

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES),

Our Changing Planet: The FY 1993 U.S. Global Change Research

Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992).

Technology, has suggested building performance

guidelines into authorizing legislation as well as

mandates that would redirect or terminate programs that do not make sufficient progress toward

stated goals (2).

 The Interface Between Policy and Science

Research programs intended to be relevant to

management and policy making often fail because of fundamental tensions among researchers, resource managers, and decisionmakers. These

tensions are created because of conflicts in the

time horizons of each group, differences between

priority- or goal-setting processes, and differences in the agendas of extramural research

organimations (e.g., universities, industries, and

independent laboratories), mission-oriented agencies, and Congress.

The timetable for governmental decisions is

driven primarily by the annual budget cycle and

an election cycle that ranges between 2 and 6

years. Not surprisingly, policy makers funding

global change research often have a shorter time

horizon for “answers” than do researchers. This

disparity leads to tension between Government

officials, who are required to formulate annual
118 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

budgets and make immediate decisions, and the

scientific community, whose long-term research

is dependent on continuous and reliable funding.

When the questions of policy makers are not

answered in one or even a few years, it may

become more difficult to sell a program as

relevant to policy needs. Mission-oriented agencies are repeatedly deflected by the ‘crisis-of-themonth’ syndrome, which siphons resources away

from long-term programs (37). The result maybe

annual budget fluctuations and/or rapidly shifting

priorities-both of which are detrimental to the

development of a sound scientific program. A

balance between continuity in priorities and

finding and flexibility in project direction is

essential (3).

Tension arises between extramural research

organizations and the Federal Government because of different research agendas. Universities

and independent laboratories judge their scientists to a large extent on their ability to raise funds

for research. Adherence to management- and

policy-relevant goals is not seen as important

unless it leads to more Federal funding.

Many scientists believe that the science must

be “complete” before policy conclusions can be

made safely. Policy makers, on the other hand,

cannot afford the luxury of complete information.

Decisions about reauthorizing environmental legislation and natural resource planning and management will continue to be made based on the

best available information, “[I]f policy is to be

effectual, then we must make policy while we

continue to investigate the physical and societal

effects of global warming. But this means that

policy will also enter the feedback loop, influencing societal responses and physical effects” (30).

Science need not proceed in a sequential fashion.

Research on the climate system need not be

“complete” before research on the ecological

effects of climate change is undertaken nor does

research on the ecological effects of climate

change need to be ‘complete’ before research on

the societal impacts of and potential responses to

climate change is initiated (45). If USGCRP is to

address policy-relevant questions, a parallel ap

preach to climate effects and response research is

necessary.

In a narrow sense, USGCRP is policy-relevant

if the most important policy concern is to gain a

better understanding of Earth system processes in

order to predict climate change. However, the

major international assessments conducted by

IPCC demonstrate that the key questions policy

makers need to address move far beyond the

narrow definition of ‘‘observe, document, and

predict” global change, into the realm of issues

related to adaptation and mitigation. As a result of

focusing research funds on climate prediction,

USGCRP is not addressing other key science

issues or broad policy questions for the near term.

For example, what plants and animals are sensitive to climate changes? How might biota and

vegetation respond to changes in climate? What

are the implications for forestry, agriculture, and

natural areas? What mitigation strategies would

slow climate change the most? How much would

they cost? To whom? How might society respond

to changes in climate and global ecosystems?

What technologies should be developed? How

will the effects of climate change interact with

other global environmental changes? How important is climate change in the scheme of long-term

environmental threats? How can natural resources

be managed to minimize economic and ecological

loss? These issues were largely excluded from

USGCRP to keep it primarily driven by the earth

sciences. Even if accurate regional climate predictions could be given today, land managers,

planners, decisionmakers, and policy makers

would not have all the information they need to

guide their response (33). As originally envisioned in 1990, these issues were to be addressed

under the CEES Working Group on Mitigation

and Adaptation Research Strategies (MARS),

which was abolished in 1992.

If USGCRP begins to address this broader set

of questions, it will be moving closer to policyrelevant research. Some fear that a program

driven by policy concerns will undermine or
Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1119

Table 3-l—List of Departments and Agencies or Bureaus Involved in USGCRP Research

DOC

DOD

DOE

DOI

EPA

HHS

Department of Commerce

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Defense

CRREL Cold Regions Research and Engineering

Laboratory

ONR Office of Naval Research

Department of Energy

OHER Office of Health and Environmental

Research

Department of Interior

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs

BLM Bureau of Land Management

BOM Bureau of Mines

BOR Bureau of Reclamation

FWS Fish and Wildlife Service

NPS National Park Service

OS Office of the Secretary

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

Environmental Protection Agency

ORD Office of Research and Development

Department of Health and Human Services

NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health

Services

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

OSSA Office of Space Science and Applications

NSF National Science Foundation

BIO Directorate for Biological Sciences

GEO Directorate for Geosciences

SBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and

Economic Sciences

SI Smithsonian Institution

IC International Center

NASM National Air and Space Museum

NMNH National Museum of Natural History

NZP National Zoological Park

SAO Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory

SERC Smithsonian Environmental Research

Center

STRI Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

RBO River Basin Operations

USDA Department of Agriculture

ARS Agricultural Research Service

CSRS Cooperative State Research Service

ERS Economic Research Service

FS Forest Service

SCS Soil Conservation Service

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1993 U.S. Global

Change Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992).

change the direction of science. Others maintain

that the second set of policy-related questions can

be addressed adequately by research driven by the

earth sciences. Maintaining the long-term policy relevance of scientific research under

USGCRP will require a formal and iterative

assessment link that simultaneously transfers

scientific research results in policy-relevant

language to decisionmakers and policy concerns to the research community.

PRIORITIES AND BALANCE IN USGCRP

I Budget

CEES designed USGCRP as a cohesive, integrated research program that would encompass

the unique attributes of 11 Federal agencies,

including 31 bureaus, but it did not assign a

central management body (see table 3-l). The

priority scheme set up by the three activity

streams and the seven science elements is intended to guide budget decisions, and, to date,

funding levels have followed these priority areas.

Since the program formally began in FY 1990,

the USGCRP budget has grown from $660 million in its first year to $1.33 billion in FY 1993 (7,

9). The proposed budget for FY 1994 is $1.47 billion (8). The budget can be analyzed in terms of

distribution across agencies, activity streams, and

science elements (see figs. 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6). In

FY 1993, projects funded by the National Aeronautics and Space Admini “ stration (NASA) comprised 69 percent of the program’s budget ($921

million) while projects funded by the Department

of the Interior (DOI), which contains most of the

land-management agencies, comprised 3 percent

of the program’s budget ($38 million). For FY

1994, the requested budget for DOI’S global
120 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

1,200

1,000

800

E

~ 600

E

w

400

200

0

Figure 3-4--U.S. Global Change Research Program Budget by Agency

- “1993

D -1994 1013

921

169

67 70

89 98

46 48

NOAA DOD DOE DOI EPA HHS NASA NSF Smith- TVA USDA

sonian

NOTE: For definition of terms, see table 3-1. FY 1994 values are the requested, not the appropriated, amounts.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1994 U.S. Global

Change Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).

change research program decreased to 2.3 percent

of the total.

Of the activity streams, Documentation, including observation and data management, received 45 percent of the budget ($595 million) in

FY 1993. Earth Process Research for understanding climate change received 46 percent of

the budget ($610 million), and Integrated Modeling and Prediction received 9 percent of the

budget ($121 rnillion).l0

Although USGCRP programs include projects

on almost every aspect of climate change, the

bulk of the funds is focused on answering

scientific questions related to understanding the

physics and chemistry underlying climate systems. Research on Climate and Hydrologic Systems and Biogeochemical Dynamics constituted

about 71 percent of the program’s FY 1993

budget ($937 million). Ecological Systems and

Dynamics received 17 percent of the budget

($224 million). The remaining 12 percent of the

budget ($165 million) was divided among the

remaining four research elements: Earth System

History, Human Interactions, Solid Earth Processes, and Solar Influences (8).

Projects are categorize as focused --directly

relating to global change--or contributing—

justified on a basis other than global change but

having the potential to contribute to the global

change knowledge base (see fig. 3-7).11 Even

when both focused and contributing research are

considered, 70 percent of all funds is targeted for

10 wt ofthc *for modeling and prediction go toward ncmmodoling process research. The major modeling groups Mve mceivcd ~y

a small portion of thc8c funds,

11 U* ~fi~y nom budget fi~S refer to the focused budget.
Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 121

Figure 3-5-USGCRP Focused Budget

by Activity Stream

800 ,

600-

m

.—s

=.- 400 -

E

652

595 n

—

680

610 m

m 1993

m 1994

Documentation Process Modeling and

research prediction

NOTE: Total budget does not include one-time appropriation of

$5 million for the State Department In FY 1993 because the distribution

of funding among proposed projects is still being determined. The

budget for the FY 1994 Assessment activity stream is embedded in the

other three activity streams. FY 1994 values are the requested, not the

appropriated, amounts.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES),

Our Changing Planet: The FY 1994 U.S. Global Change Research

Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).

projects in the first two priority research areas.

There are no standardized criteria for classifying

contributing research, and each agency uses its

own system. Consequently, it is difficult to know

precisely the extent of contributing research or to

get a comprehensive picture of relevant research.

Both focused and contributing programs are

considered in a procedure called the ‘‘budget

crosscut. ’ USGCRP is one of only a few Federal

programs that uses a budget crosscut as a coordinating mechanism. This approach has been reasonably successful in facilitating cooperation and

securing new funding for global change research.

The USGCRP budget-crosscut process works as

follows.

Each program within an agency submits new

projects to the appropriate subworking group of

CEES. This subworking group determines whether

to recommend to the agency that the project be

included in USGCRP (projects can be added later

in the budget process, but this is the most likely

step at which new projects are added).

Each agency that participates in USGCRP then

develops its own GCRP budget, with some

coordination between agencies for joint projects.

These budgets are then submitted to CEES, which

may continue to negotiate with the agencies.

CEES submits one budget proposal incorporating

programs from all participating agencies to the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB). When

the proposal reaches OMB, it is initially reviewed

at one meeting by all of the budget examiners for

the various agencies involved in USGCRP. Although one examiner takes the lead for USGCRP,

the participation of the other examiners is critical

because each must understand the purpose of the

USGCRP projects that fall within his or her

agency’s budget. The USGCRP budget is returned to each agency when that agency’s whole

budget is returned. At that point, deliberations

between OMB and the agencies proceed as

normal. As agencies work to meet OMBestablished budget targets, they look at modifying

all projects—they can accept or reject OMB’S

recommendations and reprogram their global

change budgets. 12 The final USGCRP budget is

presented to Congress along with the annual

Presidential Budget Request.13 When the program first started, approximately 70 percent of the

proposed budget consisted of research funds from

already existing projects.

The USGCRP budget falls within the jurisdiction of several congressional authorization and

appropriations committees and subcommittees

(see table 3-2). With all of these committees

reviewing components of the USGCRP budget, it

12-& f~t fw yws of the pro= USCWIW required agencies to “fence off,” or cornmi~ their global change Hearch budget

requests to the progm.rn. They could not repmgnun this money later if OMB cut ovemll agency funding further down the line.

13 ntittwo budget rcqumts were long, detailed documents accornpaniedbyexecutive summaries, but since FY 1992, only the summaries

have been published. USOC!RP staff determined that the information in the detailed budgets changes slowly @ themforc, needs to be

published Ody CVUy 5 yt?.SIX
122 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

700

600

500

u) 400

c

g

=

E

V3 300

200

100

0

Figure 3-6--USGCRP Budget by Science Element

664

376

596n

249

224 m

CHS BD ES&D

S5_

ESH &LE_LA% HI SEP SI

NOTE: CHS-Climate and Hydrologic Systems; BD=Biogeochemical Dynamics; ES&D= Ecologcal Systems and

Dynamics; ESH=Earth System History; H-Human lnteractions; SEP=Solid Earth Processes; SI=Solar Influences.

FY 1994 values are the requested, not the appropriated, amounts.

SOURCE: committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1994 U.S. Global

Change Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).

is much more difficult for Congress to consider

the USGCRP budget as a whole than it is for the

executive branch to do so. Several members of

Congress have complained about the fragmentation of congressional attention to the USGCRP

budget, but no alternatives have been proposed. It

might be useful for Congress to consider using an

ad hoc appropriations subcommittee consisting of

members from the committees with primary

jurisdiction over elements of USGCRP to review

the program’s budget as a comprehensive unit. If

two or three agencies are cooperating on a single

project, but one agency does not receive funding

for it, the entire project could beat risk.14 Large,

interagency programs such as USGCRP will

require innovative methods of funding if they are

to succeed.

9 Satellite vs. Nonsatellite Measurements

NASA’S Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE)

program accounts for over 60 percent of

USGCRP focused funding (crossing several of

the priority research areas). The core of the MTPE

program is the development and maintenance of

the Earth Observing System (EOS), an ambitious

satellite program originally designed to provide

Id ~r CX~ple, at O’IA’S workshop “EOS and USGCRP: k We Ad@ d AKISWU@ thc R@ ~stio~?” @b. ~-~, 1993),

participants cited programs such as the World OcesnCirculation Experiment (WOCE), Tropical Oceans Global Atmosphm (TOGA), and the

JOiXlt Global occan~ux Study (1~00~)(50). All three arc interagency research p~ where the success of the entire program depends on

contributions ffom NASA, the National oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National !lcieme Foundation. However, in a recent

budget cycle, NASA received more than it asked for these programs while NOAA and NSF received no money. Rather than let the programs

die, NASA filled the financial gap left by inadequate funding for NOAA and NSF.
1,000

800

600

Wc

g

=.—

E

(@

400

200

0

Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 123

Figure 3-7--FY 1993 USGCRP Budget of Focused and

Contributing Programs by Agency

—

NOAA

_ Focused

m Contributing

279

d

139

116

DOD DOE DOI

136

48

HHS

921

274

177

--__._D 15 9

— Smith- TVA USDA

sonian

NOTE: For definitlon of terms, see table 3-1.

SOURCES: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1993 U.S. Global

Change Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992); Office of Technology Assessement, 1993.

data over a 15-year period related to the study of

precipitation; ocean circulation; sources and sinks

of greenhouse gases; changes in land use, land

cover, hydrology, and ecology; changes in glaciers and ice sheets; ozone; and volcanic activity.

Because of EOS’S central role in NASA’s

USGCRP effort and the great expense of putting

satellites in space, the USGCRP budget as a

whole is heavily weighted toward satellite-based

measurements. 15

EOS has suffered extensive restructuring over

the past few years, which may jeopardize the

quality of information gained from remaining

EOS instruments. Some instruments that were

supposed to have improved the understanding and

observation of possible climate change impacts

Artist’s conception of NASA’s Earth Observing System

(EOS). EOS (AM-1 Platform) is scheduled to be

launched in 1998.
124 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 3-2-Congressional Authorization Committees and Appropriations Subcommittees

with Significant Legislative Authority over Agencies with a USGCRP Component

House and Senate Authorization Committees

House

Agriculture

Armed Services

Energy and Commerce

Natural Resources

Sciences, Space, and Technology

Public Works and Transportation

Merchant Marine and Fisheries

Senate

Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forest~

Armed Services

Commerce, Science, and Transpodation

Energy and Natural Resources

Labor and Human Resources

Environmental and Public Works

Rules and Administration

House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees

Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education

Housing and Urban Development and Independent

Agencies

Energy and Water Development

Interior and Related Agencies

Agriculture and Rural Developmentb

Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary

Jurisdictiona

USDA

DOD, DOE

DOE, HHS

DOE, USDA/FS, SI

NASA, NSF, DOE, EPA, NOAA, S1

NOAA, SI

USDA, NOAA, SI

USDA

DOD, DOE

NSF, NASA, NOAA

DOE, DOI

DOE, DOI, HHS

EPA, SI

SI

HHS

NASA, NSF, EPA

DOE

DOE, USDA, DOl, SI

USDA

NOAA

Defense DOD

a For definition of terms, see table 3-1.

b The corresponding subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations have the same name with

one exception: the Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies and the House

Subcommittee on Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies.

SOURCES: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a

Decade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1991); Office of Technology Assessment,

1993.

have been dropped or postponed. For example,

the High Resolution Imaging Spectrometer (HIRIS),

an instrument potentially capable of resolving

some of the more subtle aspects of ecological

change that cannot be detected by satellites today,

was originally scheduled to be part of EOS, but

was dropped during program restructuring (54).

EOS began as a $30 billion program, but was

scaled back to an $8 billion program (see box

3-A).

16

Most participants at OTA’S workshop “EOS

and GCRP: Are We Asking and Answering the

Right Questions?” agreed that had EOS been

designed initially to be an $8 billion program, it

likely would be different from the program we

have today. All acknowledged that much good

data will be collected and good science will be

done through EOS, but that it will provide neither

the continuous, multidecade data set necessary

for ecosystem studies nor a true global monitoring
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government | 125

Box 3-A–Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change

Remote sensing is the observation of the Earth from a distance. The ability to view and monitor large areas

of the Earth has become valuable in understanding regional and global-scale phenomena such as weather

systems, deforestation rates, and, most recentty, climate change. Remote sensing can help reduce the

uncertainties associated with climate change in two ways: 1) by improving climate predictions through better

understanding of atmospheric and climate processes and 2) by improving scientists’ ability to detect and predict

the effects of climate change on the biosphere. Both uses of remote sensing would be important for coping with

climate change. However, most biosphere-related climate research to date has focused on the former, whereas

relatively little has focused on the latter. This box examines the uses and limitations of remote-sensing

technologies for observing, detecting, and understanding changes in the biosphere resulting from climate change,

land-use change, or other factors.

Development of remote-sensing technology

Airborne sensors-The oldest form of remote sensing-invented about 100 years ago—consists of

photographs taken from balloons. The development of the airplane made aerial photography the primary way to

monitor and study the Earth’s surface from a distance. Scientists also discovered that images created from other

parts of the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., the infrared region) could provide additional information about surface

characteristics, such as mineral composition, soil moisture, and crop condition.

The U.S. Forest Service has been using aerial photography since the 1930s to measure the area of forests,

monitor forest health, and plan timber harvests. Aerial photography is also an important tool in the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service’s National Wetland Inventory Program. The technique is best suited for observing relatively small

areas and for studies requiring a high level of spatial detail. Riparian wetlands and wetlands less than 5 acres

(2 hectares)f in area, for example, cannot be accurately characterized by satellite-based observations (18).

Therefore, aerial photography is an essential tool for comprehensive wetland monitoring.

However, using aerial photography to get consistent coverage overlarge areas for regional analysis is very

difficult and costly. The aerial photography technology used frequently by the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) for ecological studies can cost about $10,000 per flight. Difficulties also lie in determining

exactly where the plane is in space so that the area being photographed can be precisely identified. Also, taking

photographs at different times from exactly the same vantage point is difficult. Although aerial photography may

be preferable for ecological applications requiring high levels of detail (e.g., wetland inventory and forest

monitoring), it is not practical for routine, regular measurements or for studies of targe-scale ecological

phenomena.

Remote sensing from satellites-By the late 1960s, advances in technology made transmitting electronic

images to Earth from satellite-based instruments practical. Polar-orbiting satellites (orbits pass over both the North

and South Poles) allow imaging of the entire globe. These Earth observation satellites are equipped with various

sensors that detect natural radiance (electromagnetic waves emitted by surface features) and reflectance (those

reflected from Earth’s surface).2 The intensity and wavelength of the signal detected become a type of signature

for certain surface features. By combining these signals, various vegetation types and other characteristics can

be identified.

1 TO convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

2 Sunlights absorbed by Earth’s atmosphere, scattered and reflected Off Earth’s Surface, orabsor~ @1*

surface. Surface features that absorb some waves can re-emit electromagnetic signals-often at longer

wavelengths. In generat, reflected (or scattered) signals give information about the structure of the surface features,

and radiated signals give information about its chemical composition.

(Continuedon nexfpa~)
126 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 3-A–Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change—Continued)

Satellites include several instruments that monitor Earth with “passive sensors” designed to detect a narrow

range, or window, of various parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. These windows are called spectral bands. By

detecting different parts of the spectrum, a variety of signatures is obtained. Being able to detect narrower bands

improves the ability to categorize detected signatures by wavelength. More narrow bands over a wider range of

the spectrum enables detection of more signatures, which improves the ability to discern closely spaced objects

and identify surface features. Identification of a wetland, for example, generally requires analysis of three or more

infrared spectral bands (18): one discriminates amounts of vegetation, water, and soil moisture; another helps

determine water quality; and another helps to classify different vegetation types. However, detailed geographic

and spectral resolution is more expensive, requires higherdata-collection rates, and limits spatial coverage (49).

Passive optical sensors detect only surface features. They cannot be used for Earth observation through clouds,

accurate measurement of soil moisture through dense vegetation cover, or detection of submerged vegetation.

Radar instruments have “active” sensors that provide their own illumination via microwave pulses and then

measure the reflected energy. Unlike optical sensors, radar data can be acquired through clouds and at night.

Radar signals are especially sensitive to water and may improve the way soil and vegetation moisture are

measured (53, 54). In addition, radar can probe to greater depths and may provide better information about surface

roughness, canopy height, and, perhaps, vegetation beneath a dense canopy than can optical sensors (53,54).

Several countries besides the United States, including France, Japan, India and Russia have launched

satellites for environmental studies and Earth observation. Discussed below are satellites whose data are most

widely used by U.S. scientists for detecting change in the biosphere and for large-scale ecosystem studies.

Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR)-This scanning radiometer, aboard NOM’s Polar

Orbiting Environmental Satellite (POES), uses five detectors to create surface images in five spectral bands (49).

AVHRR data allow multispectral analysis of vegetation, clouds, lakes, coasts, snow, and ice and have been used

to monitor crop conditions, classify global vegetation, and demonstrate the scale of deforestation in the tropics (44).

AVHRR provides daily coverage of the Earth, allowing frequent monitoring of a large region and the creation of

virtually aloud-free images at a fraction of the cost and computing time required for aerial photography or other

satellite technologies (43).3 Although PMHRR data have much lower spatial resolution than do data from aerial

photography—about 0.7 miles (1.1 kilometers)4 per pixel, or data point—0.6-mile to 16-mile resolutions are

adequate for “assessing many global or regional trends in land cover, vegetation damage, deforestation, and other

environmental conditions” (44).

Landsat-in 1972, NASA launched the first of a series of Landsat satellites for civilian Earth observation and

monitoring. Now, a 20-year continuous data set has been acquired for some selected areas (primarily in the United

States and the former Soviet Union), making Landsat data the primary source of data for detecting long-term

ecological trends. This long-term record is just now beginning to provide valuable information about trends and

changes in wetland area, vegetation types, forest growth, deforestation rates, and urban expansion.

Consistency in measurement is very important for maintaining accurate and useful long-term records.

Landsat missions have been designed so that data from different missions can be compared while allowing

moderate advances in technology. Sustaining Landsat missions and maintaining a continuous data set over 20

years has not been easy. Over this time, operation of Landsat has changed from public to private and back to public

3 The EROS Data Center makes global data sets that are almost aloud-free by hwjng Over WPrO~mate&

10 days.

4 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.~g.
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 127
128 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

.
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government | 129

changing ecosystems and the consequences of various impacts on the biosphere. Most importantly, satellite data

have allowed the biosphere to be studied from a new perspective and at much larger scales than ever before,

opening up a whole new area of ecological study. The most direct application of satellite data is the detection and

study of land-use change. Because satellite data can be used to discern broad classes of vegetation (e.g.,

grasslands, crops, evergreen forests, and deciduouos forests), it has been an important toll in studying the extent

of deforestation in the tropics and the extent of desertification in Africa.

Leaf area, which can be calculated from remote-sensing data, has been used for identifying more specific

types of vegetation cover of large vegetated areas. A leaf Area Index (LAl) is being used to identify the extent

of specific crops (such as wheat) and their stress levels throughout the growing season. It is also being used to

monitor the condition of rangelands, pastures, and other mostly homogeneous land cover. This technique is less

useful for natural vegetation where suboptimal growing conditions and a mix of species make the links among LAI,

vegetation type, and health weak.

Remote sensing has also been used to monitor soil-moisture conditions in areas where-and during seasons

when—vegetation cover is sparse, but it cannot measure ground soil moisture in heavily vegetated areas. Thus,

satellite images miss most forested wetlands. Coastal erosion and some processes of large, shallow, open

wetlands (such as those in the Mississippi River Delta) can easily be studied and monitored over time with

remote-sensing data. For adequate delineation of wetlands, many wetland scientists believe that color infrared

data at a I6-foot (5-meter)g resolution viewed in stereo is required (18). Landsat 7 may be able to get this kind

of resolution for wetland delineation, but wetland scientists studying the larger-scale processes of coastal wetlands

would rather have a coastal contour map at l-foot contour intervals than improved satellite remote-sensing

technology (50).

Remote-sensing data have been used for mapping forest evapotranspiration and photosynthesis—key

processes that control the exchange of energy and mass in terrestrial vegetation. Climate change will likely perturb

patterns of evapotranspiration and photosynthesis. Regional maps of these processes will help researchers detect

and understand such change.

Remote sensing for land-management and planning—Remote-sensing data are being used in

conjunction with data from other sources as a tool for land management and planning. For example, the Fish and

Wildlife Service launched the Gap Analysis Project (GAP) in 1991 to identify areas of potentially high biodiversity

and their protection status to guide future land acquisitions and habitat-protection efforts. Remote sensing (mostly

Landsat data) is the primary tool used to identify vegetation types (see vol. 2, box 5-J).

In addition, Geographic Information Systems (GISS) have been developed and used throughout Government

agencies for regional analyses and planning. Vegetation and land-cover information from remotely sensed data

is combined with digitized geologic, geographic, hydrologic, and topographic data in one computer system, so that

one overlay containing all this information can be studied and used to test potential land-use decisions (such as

altering the hydrology). Such analyses can lead to a better understanding of the Earth’s surface and subsurface

processes and more sound regional land-use planning near environmentally sensitive areas (see vol. 2, box5-J).

Ducks Unlimited uses remotely sensed data from satellites in combination with aerial photography from the

Fish and Wildlife Service’s National Wetlands Inventory project for wetland monitoring. For their purposes,

combining National Wetlands Inventory digital data with satellite data for evaluating wetland functions is more

valuable than using either product alone (18).

Current satellite data are useful for studying ecological processes on a very large scale, but are relatively

inadequate for detecting more subtle ecological changes, such as those at ecotones, at the edges of ecosystems,

or within an individual plant community. “Satellite data cannot match the extent, classification detail, or reliability”

of data from aerial photography and other manual techniques used in the National Wetlands Inventory Project (18).

9 TO convert feet to meters, multlply @ 0.W5.

(Continued on next page)
130 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 3-A-Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change—Continued)

Limitations to broader applications of remote sensing

The principal drawbacks of satellite data for detecting impacts of climate change are their limited spatial and

spectral resolution. Remote sensing can be used to determine broad classes of vegetation, but it cannot identify

species or communities. With satellite-based information, it is nearly impossible to study the more subtle aspects

of regional ecological change. These include vegetation health in natural areas and mixed forests, ecological

change at ecosystem boundaries, migration of a single species or even a species community, drought conditions

and soil-moisture trends in heavily vegetated areas, and exact rates of wetland loss. Furthermore, few ecologists

are skilled at studying ecosystems at large, cnarse-resolution scales.

Technology is available to expand applications of sateillte remote sensing for studying impacts of climate

change, but high costs, launching requirements, and scientific priorities have delayed its development. Even

current satellite data have not been used to their full potential for studying potential impacts of climate change.

For example, large-scale studies of the biosphere are limited by the availability of data sets. The only global

vegetation data set available is the Global Vegetation index (GVI), generated from AVHRR data. Even a

Landsat MSS Image

September 15, 1973

Landsat MSS Image

May 22, 1983

Landsat MSS Image

August 31, 1988

Landsat data have been used to identify and monitor crops, classify forest stands, and assess damages from

natural disasters. These Landsat images of Mount St. Helens show the area in 1973 before the volcano

erupted and in 1983 and 1988, after the volcano erupted.
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government | 131

consistent, calibrated, single-source map of U.S. land cover and land use does not exist. More detailed coverage

of large areas on the global or continental scale is limited by high costs and data volume. In fact, many university

researchers have started to study AVHRR data despite its limited resolution and spectral information because of

the high costs of Landsat data.

Another factor that limits wider use of remotely sensed data stems from differences among scientific

disciplines. Many ecologists, for example, are not trained to use satellite data (41), and those who use

remote-sensing technologies are typically not mainstream ecologists. There has never been a remote-sensing

instrument designed specifically for ecological studies (41). Furthermore, few remote-sensing scientists have

backgrounds in ecology or biology (41). Ecologists must essentially take what they can get from remote-sensing

data that may not be optimal for their field. Opportunities for interdisciplinary studies at universities and the

relatively recent surge of interest in ecosystem research (spurred by climate change, deforestation, and global

pollution) may help to bridge the gap.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1993.

network. Both these shortcomings are important a 20-year data set, despite several changes in

to consider in future discussions about the science

base of USGCRP. Many correlative measurements made with airborne platforms or groundbased instruments (that would verify and calibrate

the satellite measurements and provide continuous coverage when satellites are not operating)

were originally planned to be part of USGCRP

but were not funded. Costs for such efforts could

be a small percentage of the USGCRP budget—in

the tens of millions of dollars each year.17

The Landsat satellite monitoring program is of

significant ecological interest because it is the

primary source of data for detecting long-term

ecological trends (18).18 Landsat satellites contain instruments that analyze multispectral data to

obtain images of the Earth (see box 3-A). New

technologies have allowed resolution to improve

from about 100 feet (30 meters)lg to a few feet.

Landsat data allow changes to be detected in

vegetation type and cover, hydrologic patterns,

extent of wetlands, land use, and soil moisture. It

is the only satellite monitoring program that has

ownership and new technology over the years that

nearly resulted in its termination. The data are just

now becoming relevant for ecological studies of

changes in vegetation cover due to natural processes. Multidecade data sets are vital to global

change research; however, consistency is extremely difficult because the average life of a

satellite is only 5 years. A central element of an

extended set of missions must be ensuring the

compatibility of future satellite data with current

data while accommodating new technologies. In

addition, subsequent satellites must survive fiscal

fluctuations.

■ Balance Among NASA and

Other USGCRP Agencies

The question of balance between satellite and

nonsatellite measurements is directly connected

to the question of balance among participating

USGCRP agencies. Currently, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA), and the Department of Energy (DOE)

17 OW)S Worbhop “EC)s and usOCRP: Are We Asking and Answering tbe Right Questions?” WAh@Om w, Feb. 25-26, 1993.

18 ~~~ ~iv= appm~~ly 2.5 Percmt of its budget from NASA and 75 percent fmm DOD, It is apart of NASA’s Mssion to P-t

~ but it is separate from EOS.

19 ~ Convw fmt to meters, multiply by 0.305.
132 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

This Landsat photo of Yellowstone National Park

demonstrates the different hand-use patterns in the

vicinity of the park. A clear line, formed by different

land-use patterns, delineate the park boundary. The

area spans three States and is managed by Federal,

State, private, and tribal landowners. The Federal

portion of the area comprises two National Parks, nine

National Forests, and land owned by the Fish and

Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management.

(See vol. 2, ch. 5, box 5-F.)

control 80 percent of the focused research budget

for USGCRP. Even when contributing programs

are considered (e.g., those that are ongoing for

other reasons), NASA, DOE, and NOAA control

60 percent of the USGCRP budget (see figs. 3-4

to 3-7). The lack of participation by agencies

other than NASA has led to gaps in the overall

program. For example, DOI, which manages

approximate ly 500 million acres (200 million

hectares) 20of public land that could be affectedly

climate change, requested a decrease in

USGCRP funding for both FY 1993 and FY 1994.

This can be attributed partly to management

agencies focusing their resources on what they

perceive as more immediate management concerns.

Another dimension of the imbalance in agency

participation is the historical attraction that Congress and the executive branch have had for

space-based research. Federal agencies may correctly perceive that it is easier to get financial

support for large, space-based projects than for

lower-profile research such as monitoring (36,

55).

NASA’S contribution dwarfs contributions from

other agencies, but it is unclear how to bring more

balance to the program to help fill the gaps and

make the necessary links to other global change

issues. Because USGCRP does not have a program budget, it would be difficult to redistribute

funds across agencies; however, there might be

Opportunities to modify projects within agencies

to help meet the needs of global change research.

ADAPTATION RESEARCH IN THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Mitigation and Adaptation Research Strategies program was created about the same time as

USGCRP and operated as an independent working group under CEES. MARS was conceived to

develop “a coordinated Federal research strategy

for mitigation of, and adaptation to, global change

and with assessment of economic, social and

environmental effects of the proposed responses.

The program addressed four functions: mitigation, adaptation, economics, and social dynamics

(5). MARS objectives under its adaptation program were to:

1. determine the sensitivity and adaptive

capacity of human and other natural systems to global change, and the social,

cultural, economic, and other constraints or

impediments to implementation of adaptive

measures and methods to reduce those

constraints;

2. determine the mechanisms and timing required for current evaluation procedures

and practices to be modified to meet soci-

~ ~ COIIVUI ~to hectares, multiply by 0.405.
Chapter 3--GIobal Change Research in the Federal Government I 133

ety’s needs to accommodate global change,

given the uncertainties about the timing and

magnitude of global change and its effects;

and

3. identify, develop, demonstrate, and evaluate technologies and strategies to adapt to

global change.

These objectives were to be directed toward

water resources; natural systems; food, forestry,

and fiber; and human systems. In a sense, MARS

was charged with conducting all the research

components missing from USGCRP.

However, MARS did not receive the administrative backing that USGCRP did and never

developed an interagency research program on

mitigation and adaptation research. By 1992,

MARS, as a formal entity, ceased to exist. Under

the CEES Subcommittee on Global Change, an

informal, and later formal, Subcommittee on the

Environment and Technology formed in 1992,

which continues to address mitigation and adaptation issues, but in a much broader context.

Although this subcommittee has no budgetary

power, it is holding the door open for agencies

with more interest in applied climate change

research than in basic research, such as the

Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),

the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department

of the Interior, to redirect their funds to this end.

Although MARS provided a forum for agencies to discuss global change programs of mutual

interest, it was unable to exercise any influence

over project selection and funding. Consequently,

MARS served primarily to identify existing

agency programs and projects that addressed

mitigation, adaptation, social dynamics, and economic issues either as a main focus or as a

contributing element.

1 Research “Focused” on Adaptation

MARS classified only a handful of projects as

focused on adaptation research, and funding for

Three-level, open-top chambers, such as these at

Finley Farm, North Carolina, can be used to study the

effects of increased carbon dioxide, ozone, and

drought stress on trees and plants.

these projects totaled $8.18 million in FY 1992

(5) (see table 3-3A). These projects are not

included in USGCRP per se because they do not

conform to the USGCRP mission of ‘‘observe,

understand, and predict. ”

Of the $8.18 million considered focused on

adaptation research, NOAA spent $4.1 million, or

close to 50 percent, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and EPA each spent $1.2 million, or

15 percent, each, and USDA spent $0.35 million,

or 4 percent, of the total spent on adaptation

research. DOI, the department that houses landmanagement agencies responsible for 500 million

acres of public land, was conspicuously absent

from the MARS list of agencies undertaking

focused adaptation research.

Examples of focused adaptation research include: a $200,000 NSF program on the effects of

climate change on coastal zones; a $1.1 million

USDA program that seeks to simulate the effects

of changing climate and management practices on

organic matter, crop yields, and rangeland productivity; a $20,000 TVA program on regional

climate scenarios; a $30,000 TVA program addressing the sensitivity of the TVA reservoir and

power supply systems to extreme meteorology; a

$250,000 Department of Defense (DOD) program

that assesses the impacts of potential climate
134 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 3-3A-FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Research by Agency and Function

($ millions)

Totals Mitigation Adaptation Economics

Agencya

1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992

DOC 3.3 5.1 0.1 1.0 3.2 4.1

DOD 1.1 1.1

DOE 1,7 2.2 1.7 2.2

DOS <0,1 0.1 <0. 1 0.1

DOT 0.2 0.2

NSF 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2

USDA 3.5 2.1 0.4 1.0

EPA 3.3 3.3 2.4 2.1 1.0 1.2

Totals 9.5 16.5 4.1 7.3 5.4 8.2 1.0

a DOS= Department of State; DOT= Department of Transportation. For definition of other terms, see table 3-1.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Mitigation and Adaptation Research Strategies

Working Group, MARS Working Paper /: Description of Proposed Coordinated Program (Washington, DC: CEES,

1992).

Table 3-3B--FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Adaptation Research by Agency and Element

($ millions)

Natural Human Food, Forestry, Water

Totals — Systems Systems and Fiber Systems

Agencya1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992

DOC 3.2 4.1 0.7 1.1 0.4 1.0 2.2 2.0

DOD 1.1 1.1

DOS < 0.1 0.1 < 0.1 0.1

DOT 0.2 0.2

NSF 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2

USDA 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

EPA 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3

Totals 5.4 8.2 1.0 1.6 1.8 2.8 0.2 0.3 2.4 3.4

a DOS= Department of State; DOT= Department of Transportation. For definition of other terms, see table 3-1.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Mitigation and Adaptation Research Strategies

Working Group, MARS Working Paper/: Description of Proposed Coordinated Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992).

change on water resource management; and a

$50,000 DOE pro-on regional impacts that

seeks to develop a model designed to capture the

essential climate-sensitive relationships within

and between resource sectors (6).

Research that MARS classified as focused on

economics received $1.0 million in FY 1992; no

research was classified as focused on social

dynamics.

I Research “Contributing” to Adaptation

MARS identified research on the effects of

climate change on natural and engineered systems

and research on the potential impact on society of

these changes as contributing to adaptation research. With the exception of NASA’s component, the majority of USGCRP research under the

science elements Ecological Systems and Dynamics and Human Interactions can be considered impacts research-that is, how climate

change effects plants, animals, and people. Ecological Systems and Dynamics research made up

$224 million, or 17 percent, of the FY 1993

USGCRP budget, and Human Interactions research made up $22 million, or less than 2 percent

of the USGCRP budget. NASA spent 66 percent
Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1135

Table 3-4A-Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for the

Third Science Element, Ecological Systems and Dynamics (ESD), Compared with

Percent of Each Agency’s GCRP Budget for ESDa

Percent of USGCRP ESD Percent of USGCRP ESD budget

budget allocated allocated or requested as percent

or requested b of each agency’s GCRP budget

Agency FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1993 FY 1994

DOC/NOAA 1 1 5 4

DOD

DOE

DOI

EPA

HHS

NASAC

NSF

Smithsonian

TVA

<1

2

4

4

0

66

10

2

0

<1

2

3

4

0

66

12

2

0

15

4

21

36

0

16

17

62

0

15

4

24

39

0

16

18

62

0

USDA 11 10 53 52

a ESD received $224.3 million in FY 1993; for FY 1994, the budget request is for $249.3 million

(approximately 17 percent of the total USGCRP budget).

b FY 1993 figures represent appropriated funds; FY 1994 figures represent requested funds.

c Part of the reason the NASA figures are so high is that the capital costs of their projects are greater

relative to other projects. Although these comparisons are instructive, they do not reflect information on the

cost and yield of research.

Table 3-45-Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for the

Fifth Science Element, Human Interactions (Hi), Compared with Percent of

Each Agency’s GCRP Budget for Hla

Percent of USGCRP HI Percent of USGCRP HI budget

budget allocated allocated or requested as percent

or requested of each agency’s GCRP budget

Agency FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1993 FY 1994

DOC/NOAA 3 3 1 1

DOD

DOE

DOI

EPA

HHS

NASA

NSF

Smithsonian

TVA

o

11

13

15

5

0

42

3

0

0

10

6

11

6

0

53

3

0

0

3

7

13

100

0

8

10

0

0

3

4

10

100

0

8

10

0

USDA 8 9 3 4

a HI received $22.2 million in FY 1993; for FY 1994, the budget request is for $24.4 million (approximately

1.6 percent of the total USGCRP budget).

b FY 1993 figures represent appropriated funds; FY 1994 figures represent requested funds.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

of the total USGCRP Ecological Systems and climate change on ecological systems. In contrast,

Dynamics budget; however, Ecological Systems USDA spends only 11 percent of the USGCRP

and Dynamics research represents only 16 per- Ecological Systems and Dynamics budget, which

cent of the agency’s global change research represents 53 percent of their global change

budget (see table 3-4A). In addition, NASA’s research budget. DOI spends 3.5 percent of the

research in this area focuses primarily on ecologi- USGCRP Ecological Systems and Dynamics

malfunctions and characterizations, not effects of budget, which represents 21 percent of their
136 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

global change research budget (see table 3-4A).

The agencies that one would expect to conduct the

bulk of research on ecological systems and the

effects of climate change on ecosystems--EPA

and the land-management agencies of DOI and

USDA-play only a minor role. The reasons are

varied and complex, but include the higher capital

costs of NASA projects and the reluctance of

some agencies to actively support and participate

in the program. Consequently, these agencies’

contributions to USGCRP comprise projects that

are in place for reasons other than climate change

research, such as characterizingg ground- and

surface-water flows, maintaining weather data,

and monitoring ecosystem change.

Definitions of what encompasses Ecological

Systems and Dynamics research become very

important in the face of such disparate budget

allocations among agencies. If the definition is

not consistent across agencies, or if it is too broad,

large gaps could potentially exist. For example, it

is unclear how much large ecosystem research is

being conducted-such as research on the use of

corridors for the migration of plants and animals

in response to global change or techniques for

ecosystem transplantation. Are we clarifying

rates at which various species in an ecosystem can

migrate? Do we understand how to maintain

ecosystems in place? Will pest ranges increase?

Will fire hazards increase? Are our crop and tree

varieties genetically diverse enough to cope with

the range of potential changes? What agencies are

addressing these questions, and is research adequate to find the answers to these questions? What

questions under this research category does

NASA attempt to answer compared with what

questions USDA attempts to answer? NASA’s

contribution to the understanding of ecological

systems comes largely from space-based measurements and observations, whereas the landmanagement agencies’ contribution comes more

from field research. Box 3-B highlights weaknesses in environmental research identified by the

National Research Council (NRC).

Of the $22 million

tions, NSF spends 42

7.5 percent of their

budget. Except for the

spent on Human Interacpercent, which represents

global change research

Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS), which spends $5.41

million, or 100 percent, of its USGCRP budget on

Human Interactions, the percent of agency

USGCRP budgets allocated to Human Interactions ranges from O to 10 percent (see tables 3-3B

and 3-4B). Although it is difficult to obtain

reliable numbers, because social science research

has many labels, it is doubtful that any Federal

agency devotes as much as 1 percent of its total

research budget to environmental social science

(37).

Specific projects classified as contributing to

adaptation include: a $4.7 million program at

DOI’s National Park Service (NPS) to improve

the scientific basis of adaptive management of the

types of ecosystem responses likely to be associated with climate and other global environmental

changes; a $1.3 million program at DOI’S Bureau

of Reclamation (BOR) to study the changes in

hydrologic processes under scenarios of global

climate change and to determine the potential

impacts on snowpack, snowmelt, and runoff in

the 17 Western States; a $1.5 million program at

DOI’S U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to evaluate the sensitivity of water resources to climate

variability and change across the United States;

and a $150,000 DOE program to evaluate the

existing social science knowledge base concerning energy and the analysis of the role of

institutions in making decisions affecting climate

change (6).

Very little of the effects research described

above could also be considered research on the

impacts of global change on human systems.

USGCRP’S new Economics Initiative does consider the impact of climate change on the economy, and several agencies support research in this

area, including NSF, NOAA, and USDA (in its

Economics Research Service). However, the eco-
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government | 137

Box 3-B–Weaknesses in U.S. Environmental Research Identified

by the National Research Council

The research establishment ispooriystructured todealwith complex, interdisciplinary research oniarge spatial

scales and long-term temporal scales. These traits characterize the primary needs of an effective environmental

research program.

There is no comprehensive national environmental research plan to coordinate the efforts of the more than 20

agencies involved in environmental programs. Moreover, no agency has the mission to develop such a plan, nor

is any existing agency able to coordinate and oversee a national environmental research plan if one were

developed.

The Iackofanintegrated national research plan weakens the ability of the United States to work creatively with

governments of other nations to solve regional and global problems.

The Nation’s environmental efforts have no dear leadership. As suggested by the lack of a cabinet-level

environmental agency, the United States has lacked strong commitment to environmental research at the

highest levels of government. Environmental matters have been regarded as iess important than defense,

health, transportation, and other government functions.

Although individual agenaes and associations of agencies analyze data to provide a base for dedsions on

strategies and actions to address specific environmental problems, no comprehensive ‘think tank” exists for

assessing data to support understanding of the environment as a whole and the modeling of trends whose

understanding might help to set priorities for research and action.

Bridges between policy, management, and science are weak, There is no organized system whereby

assessments of environmental problems can be communicated to decisionmakers and policy-setters.

Long-term monitoring and assessment of environmental trends and of the consequences of environmental rules

and regulations are seriously inadequate. The UrWd States has a poor utierstanding of its biological resources

and how they are being affected by human activities. Although biological surveys have a long history at the State

and Federal level in the United States, it is only very recently that we appear to be approaching a consensus

on the need for a comprehensive, national biological survey.

There Is insuffident attention to the collection and management of the vast amwnt of data being developed by

the 20 agencies involved in environmental research. Coiiection and management ofenvironmentai iife-sdence

data are iess weii organized than those of environmental physicai-sdence data.

Education and training in the Nation’s universities are stiii strongiy disciplinary, whereas soiution of

environmental problems requires broadly trained people and multidisdpiinary approaches. Opportunities for

broadiy based interdisdplinary graduate degrees are few, and facuity are not rewarded as strongty for

interdisciplinary activities as they are for disciplinary activities Thus, there is a risk that envinmmentai scientists

appropriately trained to address pressing needs will be lacking.

Bioiogkal-sdence and social-science components of environmental research are poorty supported, compared

with the (stiii inadequate) support given to the physicai sciences.

Research on engineering soiutions to envkonmentai problems is senousty underfunded. That reduces our ability

to protect ecosystems and restore damaged ones to productivity and jeopardizes the Nation’s ability to achieve

mapr ecunomic benefits that are certain to derive from increasing wotldwide use of technologies for these purposes.

With respect to environmental affairs, government operates in a strongiy adversarial relationship with both

industry and the general pubiic, to the detriment of integrated planning and maintenance of an atmosphere of

mutuai trust that is essentiai for effective government functioning.

With important exceptions in the National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, and the US. Geoiogicai Survey, most environmental research and development is narrow,

supporting either a regulatory or a management function. That appears to be particularity true in the

environmental iife sciences.

SOURCE: National Researoh Council, ReseardI to IWect, ffeetore, and Ma-the Envhrunent Committea on Environmental

Reeaarch, Commission on LHe Sdences (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993).
138 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

nomics component of USGCRP is not wellintegrated with the rest of the program.21

CEES is aware of the absence of research on the

impacts of climate change and has slightly

expanded Earth Process Research, the second

integrating priority, to include research to determine the impacts associated with predicted global

changes (12). However, explicit recognition of

the need for research on impacts of climate

change is not yet reflected in the program

structure.

9 A New Adaptation Program

For reasons discussed above, it is necessary to

pursue research on impacts of global change and

potential response and adaptation strategies without waiting for USGCRP to complete climate

research. The issues addressed by MARS continue to be discussed because MARS sought to

answer near-term policy questions and questions

that naturally accompany climate change research: If the climate is changing, how will

forests, agriculture, and natural areas be affected

and what should we do? MARS may not have had

the administrative, congressional, and program

support it needed to pursue its mission a few years

ago, but now MARS-related questions are being

asked with more persistence, and it might be time

to consider reinstating another MARS-type program.

22 The following discussion addresses how

such a program might be structured. We suggest

some possible ways to incorporate adaptation into

USGCRP below and in option 3-5.

A framework for developing research priorities

for an adaptation research program (ARP) should

be developed through a combination of an interagency committee and an external advisory panel.

The interagency committee should consist of

members from several scientific disciplines and

the policy- and decisionmaking communities.

Committee and advisory panel members should

be committed to the goal of creating a managementand policy-relevant research program.

The committee and advisory panel could address the following questions:

1.

2.

3.

What areas of science are important to

pursue in order to support adaptation research? What existing federally supported

research, which is not currently classified as

global change research, could be augmented

to support an adaptation-focused research

program?

What areas of research would most effectively reduce the physical, biological, socialbehavioral, and economic uncertainties faced

by decisionmakers in choosing among policy options affecting global change?23

How can ARP be organized so that it is

useful to public and private decisionmakers?

Answers to these questions require cooperation

and coordination in the ecological and social

sciences communities, coordination among the

land-management agencies, and a clear delineation of the role of adaptation research in agency

policy and management. As concluded by the

Committee on Human Dimensions of Global

Change, there is “an almost complete mismatch

between the roster of Federal agencies that

support research on global change and the roster

of agencies with strong capabilities in social

science” (35). There is a similar mismatch

between the roster of Federal agencies with

environmental responsibilities and the roster of

agencies with strong capabilities in social science

(37).

21 OW’S workshop ‘‘EOS ~ us~~: ~ We Ask@ and hsw~ th R@ QUeStiOM?” W@d@OIL ~, Feb. 2S-26, 1993.

22 Conw=5 spflc~y ~k~ on t. ~j~5 ~~on issues howev~, ifco~ss C&WSeS to ~Q@ m adaptationprogrmq it should

also decide whether related mitigation issue:] should be addressed along withan adaptation pmgrarq as a separate prograq or within USGCRP.

23 ~s question WaS develop in the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program’s (N~~’S) lg~ ~dvfi for H

Group I (39). Unfortunately, that task group was disbanded the next year.
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 139

The Ecological Society of America’s Sustainable Biosphere Initiative (SBI) has made a start in

fostering cooperation among the ecological and

social sciences. SBI has clearly laid out scientific

priorities in the ecological sciences. Coordination

among the land-management agencies is also

beginning with groups such as the Terrestrial

Research Interest Group, an ad hoc coordinating

committee of Federal agencies and other organizations conducting terrestrial research (see box

5-J). An adaptation program could continue to

encourage such efforts.

Budget Mechanisms for ARP

Because the scope of any ARP would reach

across agencies, a new agency or executive body,

or a new office in an existing agency, could be

created to house it or, as with USGCRP, a budget

crosscut could be used. Because several agencies

have significant expertise and infrastructure to

pursue research on adaptation to global change

and because of budget constraints, Congress

might find it difficult to create a separate body for

ARP. If an existing agency housed ARP, it could

undermin e the ARP mission by creating tension

among agencies about interagency authority.

Because budget crosscuts have worked weIl in the

past, at least until the point when they are

submitted to Congress, the use of a budget

crosscut for ARP might be desirable.

FCCSET currently coordinates the budget

crosscut of USGCRP and could coordinate the

budget crosscut for ARP. However, because

FCCSET supports science, engineering, and technology initiatives but does not initiate managementand policy-relevant deliberations within these

programs, it may not be the best organization for

ARP budget coordination. If an office within the

White House coordinated ARP’s budget, the

program could more easily maintain its emphasis

on policy-relevant research; however, it might be

more subject to political pressure.

ARP Withln USGCRP

If Congress does not wish to create anew ARP,

but chooses instead to augment the existing

USGCRP three points should be considered.

First, the priorities of USGCRP would need to be

changed. In addition to observation, understanding, and prediction, “planning’ for climate

change and other global changes, including adaptation, would have to be incorporated into the

USGCRP goals. The seven scientific elements in

the priority structure of USGCRP might need to

be rewritten, with the help of advisory panels,

agency personnel, and, perhaps, the National

Research Council. More funds would need to be

allocated to the research topics under the present

Ecological Systems and Dynamics and Human

Dimensions elements. Adaptation would have to

be incorporated into the existing elements, or a

new adaptation element would have to be added.

Second, as would be the case with a separate

program for adaptation, the land-management

agencies must be encouraged to Unify their

research programs that address ecological and

human-system response to and management of

global change. Congress must commit more

resources to the Ecological Systems and Dynamics and Human Interactions research areas, especially within the land-management agencies.

Finally, projects currently supported under

USGCRP would need to be reviewed for their

usefulness to adaptation research. For example,

the Earth Observing System (EOS) currently

concentrates on climate monitoring and ecological monitoring, primarily for the sake of determining land-atmosphere interfaces for global

climate models. Could EOS be modified to

provide information on processes that are important for adaptation?

EVALUATION MECHANISMS

To date, there has been no formal evaluation of

the overall scope, goals, and priorities of

USGCRP and of whether its activities collectively are addressing the needs of policy makers.
140 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Several evaluation mechanisms could be used to

address the dichotomy between science and

policy in USGCRP, including internal and external reviews, integrated assessments, and coordinated congressional oversight. Appropriate communication links among scientific disciplines,

Federal agencies, State agencies, policy makers,

decisionmakers, and all levels of USGCRP are

vital for its success.

D Reviews

Most formal reviews of USGCRP elements

have centered on the instruments and methods

used in research about specific scientific priorities

or have focused on individual projects within the

program. For example, teams reviewing the EOS

program have addressed specific instruments that

EOS should use, and the National Academy of

Sciences (NAS) has carried out reviews and

midcourse evaluations of specific agency programs and projects.

Reviews should be used as a mechanism for

maintaining flexibility in the program and to

redirect its activities, if necessary. Reviews

should: be timely and efficient; include people

who do not have an immediate stake in USGCRP,

but do have significant knowledge about its

current structure, content, and history; be conducted periodically to reflect the nature of the

questions being asked; and identify programs that

can be eliminated as well as recommend new

ones. Perhaps most importantly, reviews that call

for a redirection in the overall program should

consider that research on global change issues

requires a financial and institutional commitment

that transcends political and budgetary cycles.

Reviews should not be used to respond to the

political crisis of the day or as a mechanism to

undermine effective programs with long time

horizons.

H Integrated Assessments

Reviews generally look at individual parts of a

program or the program as a whole and determine

how they are functioning; they do not try to

integrate the program’s different research results.

Integrated assessments are a mechanism for

synthesizing all the research relevant to an

identified problem and for presenting research

results in a policy context to decisionmakers (13,

42). 24 Just as important, integrated assessments

help guide research and identify key assumptions,

uncertainties, gaps, and areas of agreement. The

Federal Government tried to incorporate an assessment process into the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) in the

1980s with only limited success (see box 3-C). A

challenge for the global change research community will be to devise assessments that minimum

disruption of ongoing programs but still allow for

redirection of program elements in light of new

discoveries, advances in technology, and changing long-term needs of policy makers.

Scientific information is critical, but not sufficient, in determining how the United States

should respond to the risks of global change. If

USGCRP is to be driven by social relevance as

well as by scientific curiosity, its research priorities should include sociocultural factors as well as

physical factors (23). Integrated assessments

could help determine the importance of the

problems presented by global change relative to

other policy problems, outline alternative policies

to respond to global change, and explain the pros

and cons of various responses and implementation strategies.

For example, preliminary results of an integrated assessment computer model to prioritize

policy-relevant research, by Carnegie Mellon

University, suggest that: economic and ecological

impacts are unambiguously the most important

~ ]nregrat~ a~~e~~~nt (idso knmvn as comprehensive and end-to-end a.wew?wu) is an evolving COncept. AII titemd WSCSsmnt of

global change would generally include at least the following activities: assessments of the physical scienee component of a projec~ assessments

of the potential impacts of change o~ the environment, human heal@ and the eeonomy; assessments of the effectiveness and economic impact

of possible societal responses to change; and assessments of the political feasibility of possible responses (31),
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1141

Box 3-C-Lessons from NAPAP

In 1980, Congress passed the Acid Precipitation Act (Title Vll of the Energy Security Act, P.L. 96-294) and

thereby established an interagency task force to plan and oversee a 10-year National Acid Precipitation

Assessment Plan (NAPAP). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Department of

Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency jointly chaired the task force, which included representatives

from the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Commerce,

the Department of Energy, the Department of State, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the

Council on Environmental Quality, the National Science Foundation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority along

with representatives of the Argonne, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories and

four Presidential appointees. The purpose of NAPAP was to increase our understanding of t he causes and effects

of acid precipitation through research, monitoring, and assessment activities that emphasized the timely

development of science for use in decisionmaking (39).

NAPAP (with an annual budget that ranged from about$17 million at the beginning of the program to just

over $300 million at its end) was one of the most ambitious interagency programs ever focused on a particular

problem (47). It was designed to be a major research effort that provided policy-relevant information in a timely

manner. It succeeded in its research efforts, but it did not provide policy-relevant information in a timely manner.

Because the nature of problems facing the country is increasingly interdisciplinary and global in scope, it is

reasonable to assume that the government will mandate more programs that try to twidge the gap between sdence

and public policy. To reap the greatest benefits from t hese programs, it will be necessary to incorporate the lessons

of NAPAP into program structure. This box focuses on the Task Group on Assessments and Policy Analysis and

the overall lessons learned from such a large, interagency program.

When founded, NAPAP consisted of 10 task groups, each with a single agency serving as the coordination

contact: Natural Sources of Acid Precipitation, Human Sources of Acid Precipitation, Atmospheric Processes,

Deposition Monitoring, Aquatic Effects, Terrestrial Effects, Effects on Materials and Cultural Resources, Control

Technologies, Assessments and Policy Analysis, and International Activities. In 1985, the assessments and policy

analysis task group was disbanded-a decision that undermined the value of the program for decisionmakers.

Congress established NAPAP in large part to determine whether acid rain was a problem. However, in the

context of research NAPAP did not approach acid rain as a unified issue. Rather, it examined the subject at

multidisciplinary and subdisciplinary levels with Iittte emphasis on synthesizing findings. As stated in one critique

(24):

The program reported findings in excruciating disciplinary detail, an approach which was not especially

helpful to non-specialist decision makers. The disciplinary pluralism of NAPAP also allowed policy

advocates to pick and choose among NAPAP’s reported findings, emphasizing facts or uncertainties

supporting a particular position and deemphasizing others. NAPAP lacked an extradisciplinary

perspective that would have allowed it to characterize acid rain as a problem, non-problem, or

something in between.

Assessment and policy analysis research develops and uses quantitative methods to organize and

communicate scientific and other information in ways that allow comparison of policy choices. These methods

include decision analysis, benefit-cost analysis, risk analysis, and technology assessments. The NAPAP Task

Group on Assessments and Policy Analysis attempted to begin early in the program to develop integrated

assessment methodologies and to perform multiple assessments throughout the program to ensure policy

relevance. A 1985 report was to include an assessment of the current damages attributed to aad deposition, an

uncertainty analysis of key scientific areas, and the implications of uncertainty for policy choices. The task grwp

also tried to develop a framework for the methodology for subsequent integrated assessments in 1987 and 1989

(25).

(Continued on next page)
142 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat&Volume 1

Box 3-C-Lessons from NAPAP-(Continued)

However, in 1985, NAPAP’s management changed and, consequently, the focus of the program changed.

The assessments task group was disbanded, and responsibility for assessments was transferred to NAPAP’s

director of research. It was uncertain whether NAPAP would produce even one assessment: NAPAP ceased

funding integrated assessment modeling because the Interagency Scientific Committee decided to spend their

limited funding on other research. The new director repeatedly delayed the 1985 assessment, but it was finally

released-with much controversy-in 1987. The 1987 and 1989 integrated assessments were never produced.

Finally, during the last few years of the program, NAPAP produce its second integrated assessment; however, the

1990 publication of the report came too late to be of maxinwm use to policy makers in fornndating the amendments

to the Clean Air Act (47).

Because NAPAP failed to carry out the full range of assessments it originality pianned, key components for

the 1990 integrated assessment were either not pursued or were underfunded, and the assessment was

incomplete (39). For example, although NAPAP was initially supposed to evaluate the economic effects of acid

deposition on crops, forests, fisheries, and recreational andaestheticresources andtodeterminethe impkations

of alternative policies, funds were significantly reduced for research in these areas (47).

l%eoversight Review Board (ORB) of NAPAP, in its 1991 report tothe JohtChairs Council of the Interagency

T&sk Force on Acidic Deposition, strongly emphasized that an assessment function be given primacy throughout

an interagency program (39). ORB’s key recommendation on lessons learned about the interface between science

and policy was to give assessment priority over research (24) because “science and research findings perse have

little to offer directiy to the public policy process, [andl their usefulness depends on assessme~ defined as the

interpretation of findings relevant to decisions” (39). ORB also outlined eight other suggestions that any program

with such a close interface between science and policy should follow:

1. Match institutional remedies to problems.

2. Obtain and maintain political commitment.

3. Take steps to ensure continuity.

4. Configure organization and authority to match responsibility.

5. Give assessment primacy.

6. Provide for independent external programmatic oversight.

7. Understand the role of science and how to use it.

8. Take special care with communication.

9. Prepare early for ending the program.

The insights gained from the experiences of NAPAP were not considered when designing the U.S. Global

Change Research Program (USGCRP)-a much larger program on both a temporal and spatial scale than

NAPAP. Some argue that USGCRP is following the same path as NAPAP+ research will come from

USGCRP, but the results will not be used to inform poiicy, and decisions concerning global change will be made

with little more knowledge than is available today (42). The logical questions to ask are: Why didn’t Congress use

the experiences of NAPAP in formulating legislation for USGCRP, and how should incorporation of lessons from

NAPAP be integrated into USGCRP and future interagency programs?

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1993.

sources of uncertainty and that reducing the according to the policy objectives chosen and the

uncertainty is more important than resolving the time horizon; although they must not be ignored,

differences among climate models; the priority uncertainties about climate variables appear, in

placed on research in different fields will vary many cases, to be less important than certain
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 143

social, economic, and ecological factors; and

models that measure all impacts in monetary

terms are unlikely to be able to explore many of

the most important aspects of the climate problem (15).

Regardless of the scope of an integrated

assessment, its primary functions should be: to

identify key questions to be answered, to survey

the state of current scientific judgments about

what we know and do not know about global

change and its impacts, to idenify and prioritize

what the key uncertainties are in relation to policy

needs, to list key assumptions and judgments, to

idenify where new research is needed to aid the

policy process most effectively, including research on key uncertainties in understanding the

climate system and fostering mitigation and

adaptation research, and to establish the requirements for peer and public review (24, 42).

Assessments need not be conducted sequentially (e.g., results of earth science research or

economic research need not be complete before

an assessment can begin), but should begin at the

beginning of a program and continue throughout

the life of the program (l). The ideal assessment

would pay particular attention to bridging gaps

and maintainingg essential links among various

research projects and disciplines and would

determine the value of new information.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

Carnegie Mellon University, the Electric Power

Research Institute, and Battelle Pacific Northwest

Laboratory have programs for developing computer models for integrated assessments. For

example, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory is developing an Integrated Climate Change

Assessment Model (ICCAM)25 that will incorporate information from models on human activities, atmospheric composition, climate and sea

level, and terrestrial ecosystems (17). ICCAM is

intended to be an integrated collection of these

models in a reduced, or simplified, form, with the

goal of giving practical answers to practical

questions. The models are limited by the complexity and uncertainty of each system, and some

fear that the results from these integrated assessments could be difficult to understand. However,

these models can at least help to structure thought,

direct inquiries, identify which uncertainties are

important and which are not, and suggest courses

of action (40).

Assessments could be performed by independent, nongovernment committees, Federal interagency task forces consisting of agency personnel

who are participating in the program, a mix of the

two groups, or by the National Academy of

Sciences (42). Nongovernment committees would

offer the fresh perspective of independent evaluators who are less weighed down by political

agendas; however, they might have little control

over the agencies they are trying to influence.

Interagency committees would have the advantage of using Government researchers who are

well-informed about the program and who could

not easily ignore assessment findings.

To date, integrated assessments have received

little administrative support and almost no funding from any ongoing program. Some agency

personnel have expressed interest in integrated

assessments, but few have committed any resources to it (EPA and DOE have funded some

assessment research). The little funding that

integrated assessments have received has come

largely from NSF and the Electric Power Research Institute. A small percentage of the total

USGCRP budget—perhaps 1 to 5 percent-could

be set aside for integrated assessment (15, 50).

The Carnegie Commission also recommends that

a larger percentage of environmental research and

development dollars go toward assessment and

policy research (4).

~ Ba~ellc PNIC Norr.hwHt hbomto~ is working in conjunction with the University Corporation for Atmospheric ReseafeL the Elm~c

Power Research Institute, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
144 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

I Congressional Oversight

Congress has held several hearings on global

climate change that have focused predominantly

on what we know, what we do not know, the

accuracy of current data, reconciling the existence

of conflicting data, the implication of climate

change for natural resources and the economy,

and the potential costs of actions designed to

mitigate climate change. However, these hearings

have not successfully addressed USGCRP as a

program. Some hearings have focused on the

current research of program participants, which is

a first step in determiningg the necessity of the

research, but few have focused on whether

USGCRP research was supplying information

needed to develop policy responses to global

change. The direction of the program and its

emphasis on the first two science elements have

not been altered.

In addition, the different committees with

jurisdiction over USGCRP have not been equally

active in their oversight activities. As a result,

certain portions of the program are regularly

reviewed while others are never reviewed.

New approaches to traditional authorization

and appropriation procedures for large interagency programs such as the USGCRP need to be

considered. The current authorization and appropriation process guarantees that USGCRP will be

examined by Congress only in pieces (38). An

annual, ad hoc appropriation subcommittee might

be created to specifically address the USGCRP

budget as a whole. This committee should consist

of members from appropriation subcommittees

with jurisdiction over elements of USGCRP (see

table 3-2).

For congressional oversight to be effective in

influencing USGCRP, a long-term systematic

approach to communication and oversight must

be developed. Congressional feedback, expectations, and prospective actions must be communicated quickly to the program. Oversight should be

extended to include regular meetings among

policy makers who have jurisdiction over

USGCRP and USGCRP participants; an interdisciplinary, multiagency group working with

USGCRP; and outside reviewers. Results from

these meetings should be freely and widely

disseminated. Oversight hearings should be coordinated with all committees who have jurisdiction

over USGCRP (see table 3-l).

POLICY OPTIONS: AUGMENTING

THE FEDERAL RESEARCH EFFORT

ON GLOBAL CHANGE

To policy makers, climate change does not

become a problem the moment that the change in

the Earth’s mean average temperature becomes

statistically significant. For them, it becomes a

problem when a community feels the pinch of an

unwanted event-drought or flood or decline of

timberland, for example. Knowing how best to

ameliorate or cope with any costs that climate

change might induce is important to policy

makers. Knowing how mitigation efforts to re

duce greenhouse gases will affect our ability to

adapt is important. Knowing what information is

knowable and unknowable over various time

scales is important to policy makers. This kind of

information does not automatically emerge from

a basic research program. To be useful to the

governing bodies of the world, the science facts

gained by USGCRP must somehow be translated

into potential costs or benefits incurred by climate

change and must guide strategies to prepare for or

react to change. Currently, there is no formal

mechanism in USGCRP for making the link

between policy and science.

Given the complicated and long-term nature of

climate change, the research needed to understand

it, and the shorter-term needs of policy makers,

a research program for global change should

ideally:

■ identify the key science and policy questions

for the near term and the long term;

■ orchestrate a research program that involves

the physical, biological, and social scientists;
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 145

integrate the research results across disciplines (i.e., assess the state of understanding)

periodically; and

communicate results back to the researchers

and policy makers effectively.

Identifying the outcomes that matter to policy

makers should be the first step in refining global

change research programs, with scientists helping

the policy makers to ask pertinent questions (14).

Next, scientific priorities should be compared

with the policy questions. Where there are serious

mismatches between scientific and political priorities, programs should be reevaluated-not to

direct a basic science agenda, but to ensure that

key information needed for policy decisions from

many disciplines is available alongside the fundamental chemistry and modeling. The particular

disciplines, research methods, and instruments

that would be used to gather and analyze data

should flow from these priorities and should be

science-driven. Ideally, information needs of

decisionmakers will influence questions asked by

scientific researchers, and vice-versa. For example, the communication between scientists and

policy makers may cause a change in key policy

questions, which in turn may redirect the research

program; “policy makers need to understand the

limitations of what science can determine, and

scientists must understand what the policy community really needs’ (42). This has proved

difficult in past research efforts, such as NAPAP’s

(See box 3-C).

The following policy options generally fall

under three categories:

■ Effectively broaden USGCRP by incorporating results of Federal research relevant

to but not currently under its purview.

USGCRP as currently constructed and implemented cannot do this. It could require

congressional or executive branch codification. There are several policy options directed both at broadening USGCRP and at

ensuring that USGCRP and other programs

relevant to global change are connected (the

Figure 3-8-Alternative Organizational Schemes

for Global Change Research

Environmental

technology

F(F

8

n

Assessment

(OSTP/FCCSET)

1

Mitigation

$’ f ‘$4.

mm*

Earth systems

science and

prediction

\

b

/

Assessment

Evaluation of

[ ~~i~:’‘g

policy decisions:

L 1

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

diagrams in fig. 3-8 show some possible

organizational schemes for building in some

of the missing components). The National
I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume

Research Council has recommended the

creation of a National Environmental Council in the Executive Office of the President

(37), and the National Commission on the

Environment (NCE) recommended the development of a National Environmental Strategy (34); either or both of these could

complement the options described below.

Increase funding or redirect funding to

areas where research is inadequate. A

modest redirection of 1 to 5 percent of

current funding ($15 to $70 million) could

begin filling in the large gaps between the

current climate change program and a policyrelevant global change program (15, 50).

Because the bulk of this OTA report focuses

on natural-resource-based systems and the

Nation’s potential to adapt to climate

change, we discuss coordinating existing

ecosystem research and initiating new efforts

that are critical to planning for and/or managing natural resources under climate change.

However, building strong socioeconomic

components of USGCRP is equally important.

Make the program more relevant to policy

making by incorporating an assessment

function. Assessment and regular reevaluation of USGCRP could be instrumental in

identifying the current information base on

climate change, gaps in knowledge, and

short- and long-term policy questions.

U Effectively Broaden USGCRP

As currently structured, USGCRP is a collection of programs from several agencies with no

central management. Although research should

remain decentralized, coordination should be

centralized and top-down. The Subcommittee on

Global Change Research under the Committee on

Earth and Environmental Sciences is currently

responsible for coordinating activities under the

Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology. FCCSET acts largely as

1

a fulcrum for coordination, but agency participation in FCCSET projects is voluntary, and

FCCSET has no authority over how participating

agencies spend their funds. A previous OTA

report (48) looked broadly at the health of U.S.

research and development and concluded:

In the Executive Branch, Congress should insist,

at a minimum, on iterative planning that results

in: a) making tradeoffs among research goals; and

b) applying (after scientific merit and program

relevance) other criteria to research decisionmaking that reflects planning for the future. . . OSTP

[Office of Science and Techhnology Policy] could

initiate broader priority-setting.

Option 3-1: Amend the Science Policy Act of

1976 (PL. 94-282), which established the Office

of Science and Technology Policy and the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology, to strengthen the ability of

these offices to coordinate science and ecosystem

management across agencies. OSTP was established to “define coherent approaches for applying science and technology to critical and emerging national and international problems and for

promoting coordination of the scientific and

technological responsibilities and programs of

the Federal departments and agencies in the

resolution of such problems,” and FCCSET was

established to “provide more effective planning

and administration of Federal scientific, engineering, and technological programs” (P.L. 94-

282). These offices have the authority to develop

and implement coherent, Government-wide science policy and have been the mechanism for

coordinating several multiagency programs. However, OSTP has not always been an active or

influential player in the executive branch, and

FCCSET lacks the authority to set priorities,

direct policy, and fully participate in the budget

process (2, 21). The directions for environmental

research must be set-and responsibilities among

various Federal agencies must be coordinated-at

the executive level because environmental research is of the highest national importance.
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1147

About 20 Federal agencies have major responsibilities related to the environment. In all instances

(except for EPA), concern for the environment is

not the primary role of the agency conducting the

environmental research (37). For example, DOE

supports much environmental research, but the

department’s primary responsibility is energy,

not the environment.

OSTP could be given budgetary authority,

perhaps in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, to guide agency programs

that contribute to science and technology. This

could mean reinstating “fencing,” or requiring

agencies to commit funds to USGCRP projects

(see footnote 12). These funds could not then be

redirected to meet OMB targets for other areas

within each agency.

A further step would be to create a National

Science and Technology Council to replace

FCCSET as proposed by Vice President Gore in

his National Performance Review (21). Under

this plan, agencies would clear their budgets with

the science council as well as with OMB.

Option 3-2: Establish a committee within

FCCSET to standardize the criteria for classifying focused and contributing research to

USGCRP and to classify all government research

accordingly. Much research that could qualify as

‘‘contributing’ to USGCRP may be ongoing

under another title (such as ‘‘Environmental

Biology;’ see option 3-6 below). Likewise, more

“focused work” might occur in the agencies if

the USGCRP scope is broadened. A defined set of

criteria for classifying research would be of great

value in identifying Federal research that is truly

pertinent to the global change problem and in

identifying critical gaps in research.

option 3-3: Reassess program priorities. Reassess the order of priority given to the seven

science elements. Although the current structure

is producing good science, research results will

not be sufficient to provide the information

necessary to answer policy questions concerning

the impacts of climate change on the Nation’s

resources. To answer these questions, more emphasis needs to be directed toward the science

elements that address the ecological, socio economic, adaptation, mitigation, and human aspects

of global change. Some of this can be done easily

within the current construct of USGCRP; some

may require additional programs outside the

USGCRP research structure.

Option 3-4: Make research on the human

dimensions of global change a primary element of

the program. A human-dimensions program would

look at the interface between human actions and

the natural environment. Humans alter the environment through population growth, economic

growth, technological change, political and economic institutions, and attitudes and beliefs.

Human response to a changing environment will

depend on individual perceptions, markets, sociocultural systems, organized responses at a

subnational level, national policies, international

cooperation, and global social change (35). These

elements of a human-environment interface will

directly influence adaptation responses to climate

change.

Option 3-5: Create an adaptation and mitigation research program (ARP) either within

USGCRP or separate but parallel to it. This

program should either have the authority to

influence project selection throughout USGCRP

or feed into a formal assessment process that

influences program direction. Congress must

decide whether an ARP should function as a

program separate from, but parallel, to USGCRP

or whether ARP should operate within USGCRP.

If ARP is created as a separate program, it should

have formal ties to USGCRP. If USGCRP subsumes adaptation, the USGCRP mission would

have to change to make adaptation equal in

importance to the other three activity streams.

The mission of such a program must explicitly

state its management and policy orientation.

ARP’s mission might be:

. . . to pursue research that will support public and

private decisionmaking on issues related to global

change if climate change occurs. At a minimum,
148 I Preparing for an

research will include

private management

systems and of how to

Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

studies of the public and

of natural and managed

develop strategies to adapt

to the effects of climate change. Annually, the

program will assess the state-of-the-science, develop Government policy and management options for responding to the potential for global

change (including programs that supply information to private decisionmakers), and incorporate

these findings into new research directions. The

assessment, policy options, and new directions

for research will be reported to Congress in an

annual report presented along with the President’s

Budget Request.

The program must include a formal mechanism

for bridging the gap between science and policy;

specifically, integrated assessments need to be at

the center of any ARP structure. Congress should

consider mandating this in any enabling legislation in order to ensure that assessments are given

top priority.

Congress should consider several “rules of

thumb” in structuring the program:

Management agencies should act as the lead

agencies.

Goals for research must have problemoriented task descriptions and milestones

that are specific and easily measurable.

Congress should consider retaining the “power

of advice and consent’ in the appointments

of the director and assistant directors of the

program.

Other mechanisms for ensuring policy relevance

could include requiring the program to make

periodic reports to Congress, and giving Congress

oversight and investigation authority.

If Congress chose to augment USGCRP, it

must recognize that the program has little ability

at present to target its programs to help public and

private decisionmakm- g. Given the structure of

USGCRP, management- and policy-relevant research would be hard to’ initiate because the

process of setting priorities in USGCRP is

do . minated by key agency personnel in conjunction with members of the national and international scientific community.

1 Incorporate More Ecosystem

Research and Natural Resource Planning

Into USGCRP

Although an estimated $900 to $943 million is

spent on what can be considered research in

environmental life sciences (22) or environmental

biology, 26 there is currently very little ecological

research directed specifically at protecting natural

areas under climate change and helping land

managers modify management strategies to respond to climate change.27 Of the $943 million

that FCCSET estimates is spent on environmental

biology, only 11 percent was also reported as

USGCRP program money.28 A former working

group under FCCSET found that in 1992, only

$8 million was spent on research focused on

adaptation.29 This number represents less than

0.8 percent of the USGCRP budget and less than

0.9 percent of the amount spent on environmental

biology research. A review of ecological experiments from 1980 to 1987 found that 50 percent of

all studies were done on very small scales--on

plots less than 3 feet in diameter; only 7 percent

lasted longer than 5 years. Large-scale and

long-term experiments are essential to respond to

26 J. GOSZ, EXeCUtiVC Secretary, Subcommittee on Environmental Biology, Cornrnittee on Life Sciencesand Healt@ Federal Codinahg

Council for Science, En@e@ng, and lkchnology, personsl COrnrrnm .Catiom Sept. 14, 1993.

~ XCSET defines envirmmentafbidogy as all areas of biology d@ing with the ~dy of @_ ~d their~“OILl with their biotic

and abiotic environment (J. GOSL personal communication, Sept. 14, 1993). Gramp et al. (22) define environmentdf~e sciences as processes

and interactions of living resources such as environmenttal biolog, inchd.@ ecology, forestry, biolo~, and marine biology.

2S 6sL op. cit., footnote 26.

29 ~ Work@ ~~p on ~ti@ion~ ~p~onsmtegies (dis~~ ~ 1992) Of ~ ~~a~ on~~ EXla~ sci~

of FCCSET identified Fedend research that focuses on or contributes to adaptation to global change (6).
Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 149

the challenges of global research (37). Yet,

research on large-scale ecosystem management,

structure, and function is necessary to protect

natural areas in the future, and it is not clear that

it is occurring under the auspices of “environmental biology” or USGCRP.

USGCRP as currently designed will not provide either the practical technologies that might

allow us to be more prepared for climate change

or the ecological information that would be

helpful in providing policy guidance and adaptation options for natural systems.

Option 3-6: Conduct a review of ecological

research within USGCRP and across Federal

agencies; evaluate how much long-term ecosystemlevel research relevant to climate change, biodiversity, and other long-term problems is under

way; and identify important gaps in ecological

research. A review of all research on “natural

resources’ has not yet been conducted across the

Federal agencies. Existing analyses suggest a

great deal of money is spent on research relevant

to the environment, but how much is useful to

understanding long-term ecological problems (such

as biodiversity and climate change) is not known.

There is currently no mechanism for consolidating results from disparate research efforts into

“general patterns and principles that advance the

science and are useful for environmental decisionmakmi g. Without such synthesis studies, it

will be impossible for ecology to become the

predictive science required by current and future

environmental problems” (32).

In volume 2, chapter 5, of this report, we

highlight key gaps in our understanding of

ecosystems, such as: past climate changes and

corresponding species responses, restoration and

translocation ecology, the effectiveness of corridors and buffer zones, the development of ecological models, and the effect of elevated C02 on

assemblages of plants and animals.

Basic research in these areas is needed now to

determin e how species might respond to climate

change and how best to provide for their protection in the future. Agencies could attempt to

redirect existing funds within USGCRP or procure new funds for addressing these basic ecological research needs under the Ecological Systems and Dynamics research area. Alternatively,

NSF, whose mission is to support basic scientific

research, could take the lead in supporting these

research areas outside the auspices of USGCRP.

The new National Biological Survey (see ch. 1

and vol. 2, ch. 5) could also be an appropriate

vehicle to use in addressing some of the research

that directly relates to land-management issues.

An effort to characterize and synthesize ongoing research could help bridge the gap between

basic research and natural resource planning.

Such a review could be conducted by OSTP,

NAS, or an independent commission.

Option 3-7: Make research on monitoring and

managing natural resources a key component of

a broadened global change research program.

One of the most prudent approaches to natural

area conservation under climate change is more

coordinated management on the ecosystem or

regional scale. This approach would also help

address threats to biodiversity and maximize

possibilities for species survival under climate

change. The land-management agencies should

receive increased funding--or existing funds

should be redirected-for research that would

directly address concerns of managing natural

resources under climate change. In particular, as

the National Research Council recommends (37),

‘‘environmental research should advance the

social goals of protecting the environment for

present and future generations, restoring damaged environments so that they are productive

once more, and managing our natural, economic,

cultural, and human resources in ways that

encourage the sustainable use of the environmerit. ’

Inventory and monitoring programs are usually

the last to get funds and the first to be cut in a

budget crisis (36, 55); existing institutions are

poorly designed to support and strengthen them

(37). Many monitoring programs that have been

established in protected natural areas have been
150 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

discontinued because of personnel changes, policy alterations, or budget cuts (55).30 Baseline

information is needed on the status and trends of

vegetation cover, plant distributions, animal distributions, soils, and water resources to detect and

monitor climate-induced changes. All Federal

agencies conduct some type of inventory as a

matter of policy, but these efforts vary widely in

completeness and quality, are not consistently

implemented and funded, and are not coordinated

at the national or even agency level.

A concerted effort to connect, in a timely

manner, the information contained in inventories

to the resource-management and land-useplanning process is vital. If these connections are

not adequately addressed, the gap between research and management could increase, which

would be detrimental to DOI’S new National

Biological Survey.

H Incorporate Assessment and Oversight

Option 3-8: Amend the U.S. Global Change

Research Act of 1990 (PL. 101-606) to require

periodic integrated assessment reports to be

presented to Congress and specify key participants in the assessment process. If such a

program is incorporated into USGCRP, it should

be positioned above the agency level. However,

because all of the elements necessary for an

integrated assessment are not found in USGCRP,

an assessment program would have to incorporate

information from outside the program and include

research that is not formally contained within

USGCRP but that contributes to it. An assessment

program should fund external and internal assessment efforts. Because integrated assessments that

use computer models to knit together all aspects

pertinent to global change are not welldeveloped, they should be used only as a guide to

steer program elements. To ensure policy relevance, an assessment program must be given the

authority to influence program priorities and

project selection. Assessment teams must be

interdisciplinary. Documenting the state of scientific knowledge is listed as the primary function

of the newly created Assessment Working Group;

however, the results of such a survey are highly

dependent on the questions being asked-what is

regarded as unknown or uncertain depends on

what one wants to know and the perspective and

background of the person or team carrying out the

assessment (24). To ensure commitment and

accountability to the assessment process, the

director of an

appointed with

gress.

Option 3-9:

involvement in

assessment program could be

the advice and consent of ConCreate innovative congressional

USGCRP. USGCRP does not

function as an individual agency, and Congress

cannot expect to interact with the program in the

same manner it does with agencies. Congress

needs to create a forum where USGCRP can be

addressed as a whole before being broken down

into individual components that fit neatly into

authorization and appropriation jurisdictions. For

example, the Environmental and Energy Study

Institute could conduct an annual seminar for its

congressional members on the USGCRP budget,

or Congress could establish an ad hoc appropriation committee consisting of members from each

committee and appropriations subcommittee with

jurisdiction over USGCRP to consider the program’s budget as a whole.

Congress should conduct oversight of the

program as a whole. Because USGCRP is an

interagency program, it cannot be evaluated

effectively by Congress on an agency-by-agency

basis or through the activities of individual

committees working independently. Committees

with jurisdiction over USGCRP should coordinate oversight of the program.

30 w -Ie, in FY 1993, tie Bure.au of Land Management (M.&f) eliminated 6 of its 16 acid rain stations to release hut $30,0(K) for

other BLM activities. Several of the six stations had been in operation for 10 years and had beta maintaining data sets to monitor the health

of forests and the effects of acid rain, Continuation of this long-term record was lost as a result of these cuts.
Chapter

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3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 151

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Coasts 4

Status

= Population is increasing in coastal areas faster than in any other

region of the country.

- More people and property are becoming exposed to coastal

hazards daily.

■ The costs of mitigating and recovering from disasters is

steadily increasing.

Climate Change Problem

= Sea level rise.

■ Possibility of more frequent and/or more intense coastal storms.

■ Temperature and precipitation impacts.

What Is Most Vulnerable?

■ Low-relief, easily eroded shorelines (e.g., Southeast and Gulf

coasts).

, Subsiding areas (e.g., Mississippi River Delta).

■ Structures immediately adjacent to the ocean.

Impediments to Better Management

■ Popularity of coastal areas.

■ Insufficient incentives to take adequate precautions.

s Perceived or actual cost.

■ Private property concerns.

m Institutional fragmentation.

Types of Responses

, Revamp the National Flood Insurance Program

■ Improve disaster-assistance policies.

- Revise the Coastal Barrier Resources Act and the Coastal Zone

Management Act.

■ Change beach-nourishment guidelines.

■ Alter the U.S. Tax Code.

I 153
154 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

OVERVIEW

The subject of this chapter—the coastal zoneis somewhat distinct from that of the other

chapters in this report because it focuses on a

readily identifiable geographic area and on the

built components of this area rather than on a

specific natural resource. The coastal zone can be

broadly characterized both as a popular place to

live, work, and play and as an area where some

unique, climate-related risks to people, property,

and ecosystems occur. Population near the coast

is growing faster than in any other region of the

country, and the construction of buildings and

infrastructure to serve this growing population is

proceeding rapidly. As a result, protection against

and recovery from hazards peculiar to the coastal

zone, such as hurricanes and sea level rise, are

becoming ever more costly. The combination of

popularity and risk in coastal areas has important

near-term consequences for the safety of coastal

residents, protection of property, maintenance of

local economies, and preservation of remaining

natural areas.

Longer-term climate change impacts are likely

to exacerbate existing problems associated with

living in the coastal zone. Sea level rise is a

potential climate change impact unique to coastal

areas and one that could lead to increased

flooding and erosion in areas already vulnerable

to the dynamic forces of wind, waves, currents,

and tides. Climate change could also lead to more

frequent and/or severe hurricanes and other coastal

storms. Scientists are less confident about this

possibility than they are about sea level rise, but

even if coastal storms are unaffected by climate

change, their impact on the coast will increase as

the sea rises.

Climate change in coastal areas would clearly

be costly for Federal, State, and local governments. These costs are associated both with the

inherent risks of living in the coastal zone and

with how these risks are allocated among various

public and private entities. The present system of

risk allocation in the coastal zone does not

promote an adequate appreciation of the current

and potential hazards associated with living in

this area. As a result, certain types of risky

development are encouraged (or at least not

discouraged) that could lead to greatly increased

Federal outlays in the future. One need only look

at the costs to the Federal Government for disaster

assistance after Hurricanes Hugo (about $1.6

billion), Andrew (about $2.1 billion), and Iniki

(about $400 million) to appreciate the potential

magnitude of the outlays involved. Moreover, in

each of these cases, total costs were considerably

greater. Climate change will likely add to the risks

and costs of living in the coastal zone, so it is

essential that these risks be well-understood by all

stakeholders and that coastal development and

preservation are guided by this understanding.

The sooner policies that encourage an adequate

appreciation of risk are in place, the easier and

less costly adaptation to a changing climate is

likely to be.

Risk management is a Federal, as well as a

State and local, responsibility. The Federal Government has an interest in promoting sound

planning and public safety in an effective and

efficient manner. Federal coastal zone policies

can be improved in several ways to better guide

the decisions of those living in coastal areas.

Considered in this chapter are policies to improve

the National Flood Insurance Program, disaster

assistance, beach nourishment and shoreline protection, coastal zone and barrier-island management, and the U.S. Tax Code. In other

chapters, we consider related water, wetlands, and

preserves issues (ch. 5 and vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

VULNERABILITY OF COASTAL AREAS

Climate-related risks, from blizzards to tornadoes, are inherent to many parts of the United

States. However, the coastal zone--that narrow

boundary zone where ocean and dry land meet

and most directly influence one another-is a

dynamic area of larger-than-average risk. Hurricanes and other violent coastal storms cause

hundreds of millions of dollars in damage every
Chapter 4-Coasts I 155

year and are responsible for numerous deaths. For

example, the two most destructive natural disasters of 1992, Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki did

considerable damage in the coastal zone, and

these two catastrophes accounted for almost 80

percent of the more than $21 billion of insuranceindustry claims for the 10 most costly catastrophes in 1992.

Less dramatic than the destruction of homes

and other structures by storms-but ultimately

very costly-is coastal erosion. A significant

proportion of the U.S. coastline is eroding.

Although rates of erosion are highest during

major storms, long-term erosion caused by the

unremitting action of normal waves, wind, and

tides adds much to the risks and costs of living in

coastal areas. Structures in or near eroding areas

are increasingly at risk as erosion progresses.

Furthermore, erosion can be exacerbated by

human activities, including the deepening of ports

and harbors, maintenance of tidal inlets, damming

of major rivers, and pumping of coastal groundwater and petroleum.

The remaining undeveloped parts of the coastal

zone (e.g., wetlands and many barrier islands) are

also at risk. They are vulnerable both to the effects

of climate change and to human encroachment

and thus may need special attention if society

wishes to preserve them.

The coastal zone may be the region of the

country most vulnerable to climate change. Like

other areas, it would be affected by higher temperatures and changes in precipitation In addition,

coastal regions would have to contend with the

changing sea level and could be subject to morefrequent and/or more-intense hurricanes and other

coastal storms. Such expressions of climate

change would cause, among other things, increased coastal flooding and erosion, higher storm

surges, increased wind damage, and increased

saltwater intrusion into freshwater aquifers.

1 Demographic Trends

Increases in population and development in

coastal areas have been dramatic in recent decades. Between 1%0 and 1990, the population of

coastal counties grew from 80 million to roughly

112 million people. People living in coastal

counties in 1990, about 44 percent of the total

U.S. population, occupied an area that comprises

just 11 percent of the United States outside

Alaska. ] Population density in coastal counties,

roughly 350 people per square mile (135 people

per square kilometer),? is more than four times the

national average. Projections suggest that by the

year 2010, coastal populations will grow to 127

million (15). Seventeen of the 20 States expected

to grow by the greatest amount by 2010 are

coastal. Florida alone is expected to add 11

million people to its population, a 230 percent

change from 1960 (15).

With population growth has come development and a corresponding increase in the exposure of property to natural disasters. For example,

the property-casualty insurance industry has estimated that its insured property exposure in

residential and commercial coastal counties in the

18 Gulf and Atlantic Coast States increased from

$1.13 to $1.86 trillion between 1980 and 1988

(l). This change is a result of increasing property

values as well as of greater numbers of properties

insured. 3 Insurance-industry liabilities in some

States have grown much faster during this period

than the coastal-State average-by 83 percent in

South Carolina, a victim of Hurricane Hugo in

1989, for example (l). Many insurance compa1 The coastal zone baa been defined in a variety of ways-for example, as the area encompassed by counties adjacent to the oce.aIL tbeama

below a specified elevatiom or the area within an arbitrary number of miles fmm the coast. About 53 percmt of the U.S. population lives in

counties entirely or substantially within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of tk coast (89).

2 ~ COmW -mjIa to square kilometers, multiply by 2.590.

3 lbcsc f- do not include smounts for the Pacific Coas~ near-coad cities, such as Houston and Philadelphia that could bc (and have

been) affected by coastal storms, or any uninsured property or self-insured government Proper&,
156 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume

.“

The concentration of people in coastal areas is steadily

increasing. Densely populated Miami Beach, shown

here, was spared the major losses suffered only a few

miles to the south when Hurricane Andrew struck in

1992. The city may not always be so fortunate.

nies decided to pull out of Florida after Hurricane

Andrew, and others are increasing premium rates

significantly, perhaps an indication of future

trends.

I Sea Level Rise

Continuing sea level rise and associated longterm shoreline erosion could be a substantial

problem for some U.S. coastal regions (see, for

example, fig 4-l). Global sea level has risen by

some 4 to 8 inches (10 to 20 centimeters)4 in the

past 100 years, largely as a result of melting of

land-based ice sheets and glaciers (64).5 Along

the U.S. Gulf Coast, relative sea level rise6 has

been closer to 12 inches (67). According to the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(WCC), sea level could rise another 10 inches or

so in the next 50 years. Estimates of future sea

level rise due to global warming vary greatly, but

the change is likely to be between 12 and 43

1

inches by the year 2100, with a “best estimate”

of 26 inches above levels that would otherwise

exist (40). Future sea level rise in this range could

expand areas where coastal flooding and inundation occur, and coastal erosion could increase.

A 20-inch rise could inundate more than 5,000

square miles (mi2, or about 13,000 square kilometers) 7 of dry land and an additional 4,000 mi2 of

wetlands in the United States if no actions are

taken to protect threatened areas (63, 82). The

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

suggests that the number of households subject to

flooding would increase from about 2.7 million

now to almost 6 million by 2100 as a result of a

combination of a 12-inch sea level rise and

coastal area population growth (21).

Sea level rise would especially be a problem

along the low-lying barrier-island system of the

Atlantic Coast from New York south to Florida

and along the Gulf of Mexico Coast, where small,

vertical rises in sea level would cause large,

horizontal movements in the shoreline and where

the full effects of storm surges, winds, waves, and

tides are felt (fig. 4-2). High-risk shorelines are

characterized by low-relief, easily eroded surfaces, retreating shorelines, evidence of subsidence, and high wave and tide energies. A coastal

vulnerability index based on these factors has

been used to identify areas most vulnerable to

future sea level rise (35).

The most vulnerable shorelines in the conterminous United States are in the Gulf of Mexico,

and include virtually all of the Louisiana shoreline and parts of the Texas coast. These areas have

anomalously high relative sea level rise, and

erosion there is coupled with low elevation and

mobile sediments. Forty percent of the entire Gulf

Coast is retreating at rates greater than 80 inches

4 ~ @nvert inches to ~“ eten, multiply by 2.54,

s Other factors include thermal expansion of the oceans, the slow rebound of land after melting of glaciers (@acid isostatic adjustrmmt),

and local tectonic activity.

6 AS tie sea rises, adjacent land may be independently increasing or decreasing in elevation due to tectonic activity, compacting of

sediments, or subsurface pumping of petroleum or water, for example. Relative sea level rise reflects the net effect of all these factors.

7 lb convert square miles to quare kilometers, multiply by 2.590.
Chapter 4--Coasts I 157

per year. The highest rate of relative sea level rise

in the United States occurs in Louisiana, where

the average rate during the past 50 years has been

more than 0.3 inches per year (35). About half of

all land estimated to be inundated from sea level

rise is in Louisiana. The Mississippi River Delta

is especially at risk. In the absence of adequate

protective measures, coastal cities such as Galveston, Texas, would frequently suffer intolerable

flooding (16, 81, 83).

The highest-risk shorelines along the Atlantic

Coast include the outer coast of the Delmarva

Peninsula, northern Cape Hatteras, Long Island,

and segments of New Jersey, Georgia, and South

Carolina. Heavy damage from periodic flooding

and some loss of land due to inundation can be

expected in such coastal cities as Atlantic City,

New Jersey; Ocean City, Maryland; Charleston,

South Carolina; and Miami Beach, Florida, if the

sea level rises as predicted and no steps are taken

1

I

Pennsylvania

.,

Virginia “&Yw

Potomac River ,

\

I

,,

I Chesapeake Bay Poplar Island

SOURCE: S. Weatherman, University of Maryland, College Park

to protect against it (48). About 25 percent of the

Atlantic Coast is eroding; 8 percent is accreting.

Most of the tectonically active West Coast of

the United States is steeper than the Atlantic and

Gulf Coasts. Thus, western coastal areas are

generally less Vulnerable to sea level rise. How-
158 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure 4-2-Schematics of a Developed and an Undeveloped Barrier Island

\ - . ‘-.

Tides

NOTE: General Iocations of Iand-use and Iand-cover types are shown In relation to dominant shoreline process.

SOURCE: R. Dolan, University of Virginla, Charlottesville.
— ——— —

ever, areas such as the low-lying San JoaquinSacramento Delta (adjacent to San Francisco

Bay—see box 5-A), the barrier beaches of Washington and Oregon, and parts of the Puget Sound

lowlands are all quite vulnerable to sea level rise

(35). The Pacific Coast generally is less vulnerable to erosion, too, because erosion-resistant

rocks prevail over unconsolidated sediments.

Only about 6 percent is eroding.

Several studies have attempted to estimate the

possible costs of protecting U.S. coastlines from

a rising sea. On the basis of results of studies

commissioned by the Environmental Protection

Agency, the cumulative costs of coastal defensive

measures in populated areas have been estimated

to be from $100 to $350 billion for a 40-inch rise

in sea level by 2100 (83).8 More recently, the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has used similar

data to make the same calculation but with

different assumptions (e.g., about the protection

measures that would most likely be used). The

Corps estimates maximum costs at less than

$120 billion (in 1992 dollars) (86).

The large spread between the estimates suggests that attaching great significance to any

dollar figure for protecting the coast against sea

level rise should be done cautiously. Of necessity,

all such studies are based on a large number of

assumptions about an uncertain future—

especially the degree to which sea level is likely

to rise in the next 100 years-and on extrapolations from a few well-studied areas to all vulnerable coastlines. Defensive and mitigative strategies, however, are site-specific and cannot easily

be generalized nationwide (60). Also, the current

IPCC “best estimate” for sea level rise by 2100

is 26 inches, which, if realized, could mean that

protection costs would be much lower than those

reported above. Furthermore, the above cost

estimates, accumulated over more than 100 years,

have not been discounted to present worth. Using

the Corps’ high estimate of $120 billion and a

Chapter 4-Coasts I 159

discount rate of 3 percent, the present worth of

investment during this period would be $25

billion, or, equivalently, an average annual cost of

$700 million. The costs of protecting against a

rising sea may be manageable, but they will not

be trivial.

Substantial damage to the natural environment

could also result from sea level rise, including

inundation of large areas of coastal wetlands

(63, 81) and loss of biodiversity (73) (see vol. 2,

chs. 4 and 5). The value of lost land (wetlands and

undeveloped dry land) as a result of sea level rise

has been estimated to be from $50 to $250 billion

by 2100 (83). Losses of wetlands will be largest

where human development, such as construction

of bulkheads and houses, impedes the natural

landward migration of wetlands in response to sea

level rise (82). (For more on wetlands, see vol. 2,

ch. 4.) Also, some human activities outside the

coastal zone, such as construction of upland dams

(which trap sediments that would otherwise

replenish beaches), can thwart natural processes

that could otherwise mitigate the potential erosion and flooding caused by an accelerated sea

level rise (40).

~ Hurricanes and Coastal Storms

Hurricanes and severe coastal storms are among

the most destructive and costly of natural phenomena. Flooding, erosion, and wind damage

caused by such storms result in many lost lives

and hundreds of millions of dollars of property

damage every year.

The East and Gulf Coasts of the United States

are especially vulnerable to hurricanes. Since

1871, roughly 250 hurricanes of varying intensity

have struck parts of the coast between Texas and

Maine. Virtually no segment of this coast has

been spared (fig. 4-3A) (28). The destructive

potential of a hurricane is a function of both its

intensity (see box 4-A) and the density of

development in the area affected. As developB The authors of reference 83 consider their estimates conservative because they do not take into account impacts not readily quantified or

the costs of protecting future development.
160 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Figure 4-3A--lntensity of Historic Hurricanes

n

NOTE: Estimate of the Saffir-Simpson intensity at landfall of tho 247coastal crossings by hurricanes that affected the Gulf or East Coast in the

ll9-year period between 1871 and 1990. Total hurricanes striking each segment of coast plus the number of hurricanes of each intensity are

shown. For example, 23 hurricanes struck the southern tip of Florida during this period. Only one was a category 5 hurricane at landfall. Figure

4-3B shows that the present-day damage-producing potential of each of these 23 hurricanes was greater than $lO million but less than $lO billion

(i.e., fell into categories 2, 3, or 4).
Chapter 4-Coasts I 161

Figure 4-3B--Damage-Producing Potential of Historic Hurricanes

n-k

/1I

u

A-Ji5-l :.ONiN001001

%

VY’ 3Q Catastrophe Damage potential

t

index ($ millions)

#

- *

~

@

‘%

*@v 2 

3 100-1,000

1

10- 100

1-10

=

4 1,000 -10,000 ~o*\ 5 10,000 - 100,000

NOTE: Estimate of the catastrophe index, which shows the present-daydamage-producing potential of the 247 land-falling hurricanes that occurred

somatime in the past 119 years. Numbers of hurricanes In each damage category are shown. For example, 10 hurricanes that have struck the

southern tip of Florida were strong enough to cause between $1 and $10 billion in damages if they occurred today (category A). Hurricane Andris not Included in the data, but It would be the first to fall into category 5.

SOURCE: D. Friedman, Natural Hazards Research Program, Travelers Insurance Co., "estimation of Damage-Producing Potentials of Future

Natural Disasters in the United States Caused by Earthquakes and Storm%” paper presented at the International Conference on the Impact of Natural

Disasters, Los Angeles, CA, 1991.
162 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat%Volume 1

Box 4-A-Saffir-Simpson Hurricane-Intensity Scale

Category O

1. Winds less than 74 mph (119 kti).1

2. Storm surge less than 4.0 feet (1.2 meters).2

Abroad coastal area may experience some darnage to shrubbery, signs, and small structures and possibly

some beach erosion, but the overall scope and impact of damage would not likely require relief action by the

Federal Government.

Category 1

1. Winds 74 to 95 mph; some damage to

shrubbery, trees, and foliage; no real damage

to building structures; some damage to poorly

constructed signs, etc.

2. Storm surge 4 to 5 feet above normal;

low-lying coastal roads inundated; minor pier

damage; some small craft in exposed anchorages break moorings.

Category 2

1. Winds 96 to 110 mph; considerable

damage to shrubbery and tree foliage; some

trees blown down; no rnajordamage to building

structures.

2. Storm surge 6 to 8 feet above normal;

coastal roads and low-lying escape routes

inland cut by rising water 2 to 4 hours before

arrival of the hurricane’s center; considerable

pier damage; marinas flooded; small craft in

unprotected anchorages break moorings; evacuation of some shoreline residences and lowIying island areas required.

Category 3

1. Winds 111 to 130 mph; damage to

shrubbery and trees; foliage off trees; large

Safflr-Simpson Hurricane-intensity Scale

>156

Wind speeds in mph

L

m I 131-155

; 30-

g

0 20-

%

if

~ lo- 111-130 —

74-95 96-110

n

1 2 3 4 5

Saffir-Simpson intensity

NOTE: To convert miles per hour to kilometers par hour, multiply by

1 .s09.

SOURCE: Adapted from P. Hsbatl J. Jarrell, and M. Mayfiekf, 7?M

Deadiest, Costhst, andMostintense UnitedStates Hurdcanesoflhie

Century (and Other Frequently Requested Hurdcane Fwts) (Coral

Gables, FL: National Hurricane Center, 19S2).

trees blown down; some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings.

2. Storm surge 9 to 12 feet above normal; serious flooding at coast with many smaller structures near coast

destroyed; larger structures damaged by battering offloading debris; low-lying escape routes inland cut3 to 5 hours

before center arrives; terrain continuously lower than 5 feet maybe flooded inland 8 miles or more; evacuation

of low-lying residerws within several blocks of the shoreline may be required,

Category 4

1. Winds 131 to 155 mph; shrubs and trees down; all signs down; extensive roofing-material darnage; extensive

window and door damage; complete failure of roof structures on many small residences.

1 TO convert miles per hour to kilometers per hour, multiply by 1.609. Speeds given here are at aandafd

anemometer elevations. An anemometer is a device for measuring wlndspeed.

2 TO convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.
Chapter 4-Coasts 1163

2. Storm surge 13 to 18 feet above normal; terrain continuously lower than 10 feet may be flooded inland as

far as 6 miles; major darnage to lower floors of structures near the shore due to flooding and battering action;

low-lying escape routes inland cut 3 to 5 hours before center arrives; major erosion of beach areas; massive

evacuation of all residences within 1,500 feet of the shorelins and of shgie-story residences on low ground within

2 miles of the shoreline maybe required.

category 5

1. Winds greater than 155 mph; shrubs and trees down; roofing damage considerable; all signs down; severe

and extensive whdow and door damage; complete failure of roof structures on many residences and industrial

buiidings; extensive glass failure; small buildings overturned and blown away.

2. Storm surge heights greater than 18feet above normal; major damage to Iowerfloors of all structures located

less than 15 feet above sea ievel and within 1,500 feet of the shoreline; low-lying escape routes inland cut 3 to

5 hours before center arrives; massive evacuation of residential areas situated on Iowground within 5 to 10 miles

of the shoretine may be required.

SOURCE: P, Hew J. Jarell, and M. Maytbld, The Deadliest COW@ mdhbst /nhmse L4WdStutmHurdcana of7h& Csntury@d

OthurFreqwnt/y Reqmsted Hurricane Facts) (Coral Gables, FL National Hurdcane Center, 19S2).

ment has expanded, exposure to coastal risks has Lauderdale, Florida; and $34 billion in Hampton,

increased dramatically. Table 4-1 compares dam- Virginia (see table 4-2).

ages from 49 hurricanes between 1949 and 1986 Hurricane Andrew was a category 4 hurricane with damages those same hurricanes would have when it struck South Florida in August 1992. The caused if they had occurred in 1987. Figure 4-3B third most intense storm to strike the United shows the current damage-producing potential of States this century,9 Andrew’s total damages

the 247 hurricanes that struck the United States

between 1871 and 1990. The different values,

were more than 4 times greater than total damages

from Hurricane Hugo, the former damage record

after adjusting for inflation, are due to increases holder. Andrew’s estimated cost to property

in the size of the market (i.e., the amount of insurers as of February 1993 was at least $15.5

development) and the percentage of the market billion (72). However, this figure does not

insured (27). For example, Hurricane Betsy, a include losses involving uninsured property, such

category 3 storm, caused about $3.1 billion of as damage to Government military facilities or

insured losses in 1965 (adjusted to 1987 dollars). other public property; utility equipment, such as

Had it struck in 1987, the insured losses would power lines; economic losses, such as crop

have been $6.3 billion. damage and lost tax revenue; and aircraft. It also

does not include the cost of emergency services or

Applied Insurance Research, Inc., in Boston, property insured under the National Flood Insurhas developed estimates of total losses for major ance or Small Business Administration programs

U.S. cities of a major hurricane strike. They (72). The total losses from Andrew are likely to

estimate, for example, that a category 5 hurricane be greater than $30 billion. Moreover, if Andrew

could generate $43 billion (in 1993 dollars) in had struck 15 miles further north, in central

losses in Galveston, Texas; $52 billion in Fort Miami, damages could have been twice as much.

9 TIE two StOIIM that hit land in the United StateS this century that were of greater intensity were Hurricane He,wtia sti*

Mississippi coast in 1%9, killing 256 people, and the Labor Day hurricane that struck the Florida Keys in 1935, killing at least 600 (3). Hugo

ranks llth in intensity.
164 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 4-l—Estimates of Insurance-Industry Potential Losses in 1987 Resulting

from a Recurrence of Past Hurricanes

Scenario 3

Damages adjusted

for inflation,

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 market size, and

Damages in year-of- Damages expressed insured share in

occurrence dollars in 1987 dollars 1987 dollars

Year Hurricane ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)

1986

1986

1985

1985

1985

1985

1985

1985

1984

1983

1982

1980

1979

1979

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1971

1971

1971

1970

1969

1986

1967

1966

1965

1964

1964

1964

1964

1961

1961

1960

Charley

Bonnie

Kate

Juan

Gloria

Elena

Danny

Bob

Diana

Alicia

Iwa

Allen

Frederic

David

Babe

Belle

Eloise

Carmen

Deliaa

Agnes,b

Ginger

Edith

Ferna

Doriaa

Celia

Camille

Gladys

Beulah

Alma

Betsy

Isbell

HiIda

Dora

Cleo

Esther

Carla

Donna

7

21

78

44

419

543

37

13

36

675

137

58

753

122

2

23

119

12

3

8

2

5

1

14

310

165

3

34

5

715

2

23

12

67

4

100

91

7

22

81

46

39

14

40

790

170

82

1,151

187

4

45

259

28

8

22

6

14

4

40

1,007

554

10

136

22

3,096

9

104

54

303

20

473

7

22

84

47

582

40

14

41

893

192

106

1,243

217

4

53

352

36

11

36

8

20

6

57

1,602

822

23

59

6,300

23

137

815

54

1,263

1,313

a Tropical storm (maximum winds less than hurricane force).

b Wind damage only.

Note: Based on assumptions about changes in the cost of repair, size, and insured share of the affected

property market since 1960.

Scenario l—Occurrence of past hurrianes under original conditions.

Scenario 2—Recurrence of past hurricanes with original market conditions, but using current value and

cost-of-repair factor (inflation-adjusted only).

Scenario 3--Recurrence of past hurricanes and their effect on current industry-insured properties, values,

and costs of repair (combined market size, insured share, and inflation adjustment).

SOURCE: D. Friedman, Estimation of the Loss of Producing Potential of the Wind and Hail Perils to

Insured Properties in the United States (London, England: Insurance and Reinsurance Research Group,

Ltd., 1987).
———.

.—

Hurricane Andrew seen from space as it reached

southeastern Florida on August 4, 1992. Andrew was

one of the most destructive hurricanes in U.S. history.

Estimated total losses of $30 billion would have been

even higher had the eye of the hurricane struck heavily

populated Miami a few miles to the north.

Neither Andrew nor Hugo hit major population

centers.

On average, between 16 and 17 hurricanes per

decade have occurred in the United States since

1900. About seven of these per decade have been

major (37).10 Much of the urban growth along the

East and Gulf Coasts has occurred since 1%0,

during which period hurricane and coastal-storm

activity has been somewhat less than average (14

per decade between 1960 and 1990, of which

about 5 per decade were major) (37). About 80

percent of people now living in hurricane-prone

areas have never experienced a direct hit by a

major storm (34). Prophetically, the National

Committee on Property Insurance suggested in

1988 that the people of South Florida, who had

not experienced a major hurricane since 1950,

were living on borrowed time (58). Also, much

coastal development since 1960 has been in the

most vulnerable locations, including barrier isChapter 4-Coasts I 165

Table 4-2—Estimated Cost of a Major Hurricane

Striking Densely Populated Areas

(or Major Cities)

Saffir- Estimated

Simpson total loss

category a

Landfall location ($ billions)b

5 Galveston, TX 43

5 New Orleans, LA 26

5 Miaml, FL 53

5 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 52

5 Hampton, VA 34

4 Ocean City, MD 20

4 Asbury Park, NJ 52

4 New York City, NY 45

4 Long Island, NY 41

a Severity of the hurricane (5 IS more severe than 4)

b 1993 dollars

SOURCE Applied Insurance Research, Inc , Boston, MA

lands,ll beachfront areas, on or near coastal

wetlands and estuarine shorelines, and in floodhazard zones. Notably, many of the counties most

susceptible to hurricanes (e.g., Monroe County,

Florida, where the annual probability of a hurricane striking is 19 percent) are expected to grow

at much faster rates than the Nation as a whole

between now and 2000 (l).

Loss of life from hurricanes has declined over

time, in large part due to improved weather

forecasting and evacuation planning (34). For

example, 35 deaths were caused by Andrew,

whereas many hurricanes this century have

caused many more than 100 deaths.12 Although

existing warning and prediction systems are

likely to continue to improve, people continue to

crowd into coastal areas, so the time required to

evacuate them could increase. Aging infrastructure in some areas (see ch. 5) may also contribute

to evacuation problems. Therefore, even without

increased numbers or intensities of hurricanes

(but more so with them), the potential exists for

increased loss of life in the future.

10 ~jorSt=w &OSC ckitied ZIS cti~o~ 3 or k7@a,

11 ~~=n 1955 ~19’75, develop ~on ~eris~ds ‘mmeased by 153 percent (51).

1 2 & unnamed hurricane that struck Galvestoq lkxas, in 1900 caused more than 6,000 death.
166 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 4-3--insured Losses Likely To Be Experienced Under Different

Maximum-Wind-Speed Scenarios

Estimated

1990 Estimated 1980 insured losses if

insured maximum wind speed increases

losses ($ billion)

storm Class Year ($ billions) 5 percent 10 percent 15 percent

Hugo 4 1969 4 5 7 9

Alicia 3 1963 2 3 4 6

Camille 5 1969 3 4 5 7

SOURCE: K. Clark, “Predicting Global Warming’s Impact,” Contingencies (newsletter of Applied

Insurance Research, Inc., Boston, MA), May/June 1992.

Will the intensity or frequency of hurricanes

and/or other storms increase in a warmer climate?

General Circulation Models (GCMs) cannot simulate the occurrence of hurricanes in detail (40),

but researchers have found that by modeling the

doubling of carbon dioxide (CO2, the number of

simulated tropical disturbances-although not

their intensity-increased (36) (see ch. 2 for a

discussion of GCMS). There has also been some

research on the relationship between rising seasurface temperatures and hurricane severity and

some suggestion that these may be positively

correlated. However, no unambiguous correlation has yet been established. Some have

suggested, for example, that hurricanes may be

less intense in a warmer climate (13). Additional

research is clearly needed to establish the relationship between global warming and hurricane

intensity and frequency.

What is somewhat clearer is the nonlinear

relationship between the maximum wind speeds

of hurricanes and their damage-causing potential.

Table 4-3 shows some examples of how insured

losses would increase with maxinimum wind speed.

If wind speeds for the three hurricanes shown had

been 15 percent higher, insured wind losses

would have more than doubled (13). Hence, if

climate change leads to only marginally moreintense hurricanes, substantially greater damage

can be expected.

I An Overall Coastal-Hazard Assessment

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has combined information about a variety of natural

processes and coastal characteristics with information about population density to develop an

overall coastal-hazard map (90). Factors separately considered are coastal relief, shoreline

change (a measure of sea level rise), storm surge,

frequency of major storms, frequency of earthquakes and other earth movements, stabilization

(a function of the density of structures), ice

(important only in Alaska and the Great Lakes),

and permafrost (perennially frozen ground, important in northern Alaska). Segments of the coast

are rated from very high to very low risk in six

categories. Figure 4-4 shows two simplified

segments of the USGS map. The complete map,

however, shows that Louisiana eastern Texas,

parts of the Pacific Northwest, and much of

Alaska and Hawaii are the most vulnerable

segments of the U.S. coastal zone. USGS is

currently in the process of producing moredetailed regional maps, which should be very

helpful in assessing the vulnerability of U.S.

coastal areas to climate change.

THE CHALLENGE FOR POLICY

Although development pressures in coastal

areas are driven by many social and economic

trends, government policies can influence the

appropriateness, rate, quality, and location of

development. Historically, government has subsidized coastal development, both directly and

indirectly. In particular, four important programs

and policies address the riskiness of living in the

coastal zone: 1) the National Flood Insurance
Chapter 4-Coasts I 167

Figure 4+-Coastal Hazard Assessment

)

1 Population density - -

~’ T Relie f

~ Massachusetts

New Yor k

— Overall hazard assessment

‘,(

*.,

,/ {’

,

$!

‘ L, I

Jersey ~

I

/’

New York to Massachusetts.

‘.

\

I Louisiana )

Texas

f(’r‘ c

~. s Christi

~’(

i

\– ~ rownsville

I--La 4U

L-- 11- Overall hazard assessment

Relief

Population density

Orleans

Population density

per square kilometer

_ 2000 or more

~ 500-1999

n 100-499

m Less than 100

Relief

m Less than 3 m

~ 3-9 m

m 10-19 m

m 20 m or more

Overall hazard

assessment

m High risk

~ Moderate to high

m Moderate risk

m Moderate to low

B Low risk

Texas to Louisiana.

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), “Coastal Hazards,” National Atlas of the United States of America(Reston,

VA: USGS, 1985).
168 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Program (NFIP), 2) Federal disaster assistance,

3) Federal beach-renourishment and shorelineprotection programs, and 4) the U.S. Tax Code.

These programs and policies have clear benefits,

but some of their elements have contributed to a

distortion of the Nation’s perception of the

vulnerability of living in coastal areas and have

lead to some inappropriate or ill-suited development. The goals of some coastal programs and

policies are also often at cross-purposes with one

another: improving coordination is as relevant in

coastal areas as it is in other sectors discussed in

this assessment.

9 National Flood Insurance Program

Congress made Federal flood insurance available in 1%8 through the creation of the National

Flood Insurance Program (authorized under the

National Flood Insurance Act, P.L. 90448). The

NFIP was enacted to limit increasing floodcontrol and disaster-relief expenditures and to

provide a pre-funded mechanism to more fully

indemnify victims of flood-related disasters. It

was also intended to limit unwise development in

floodplains while at the same time providing

affordable Federal insurance for structures located in special flood-hazard areas (14). Between

1978 and 1992, 430,000 flood-insurance claims

were made, and total payments, including claims

arising from Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki,

have been nearly $4.0 billion (22).

The NFIP has been only partially successful. It

has reduced somewhat the need for taxpayerfunded disaster assistance and has been a factor

motivating local government mitigation efforts.

Homes built in compliance with NFIP regulations

are some 70 percent less likely to be damaged

than those built before NFIP requirements went

into effect. Before the program was created,

affordable private flood insurance was generally

not available. However, the program has also

contributed to coastal development and has been

criticized frequently for not adequately fostering

prudent land use in hazardous areas.

The program is administered by the Federa l

Insurance Admlnls iistration (FIA), a unit of FEMA.

Under the NFIP, Federal flood insurance coverage is made available to owners of flood-prone

property in communities that adopt and enforce a

floodplain-management ordinance that meets the

minimum program standards. Coverage is available both for the structure itself (up to $185,000

for a single-family structure) and for its contents

(up to $60,000) (26). Participating communities

must adopt certain minimum floodplainmanagement standards, including: 1) a requirement that new and substantially improved structures in the 100-year flood zone13 be elevated to

or above the 100-year flood level (generally

known as base flood elevation, or BFE), 2)

restrictions on new development in designated

floodways (e.g., development within a floodway

is prohibited if it results in raising the flood

levels), and 3) a requirement that subdivisions be

designed to minimize exposure to flood hazards.

Additional standards are imposed within highhazard coastal zones (“velocity” zones, or “V”

zones), including requirements that buildings be

elevated on pilings, all new development be

landward of the mean high water value, the BFE

include wave heights greater than 3 feet (0.9

meters),l4 ad new development on dunes not

increase potential flood damage.

NFIP participation by a community is voluntary, but there are now strong incentives to

participate. Because of limited participation initially, the 1973 Flood Disaster Protection Act

(P.L. 93-234) required flood insurance for all

federally backed mortgages (e.g., for Department

of Veteran Affairs (VA) and Federal Housing

Administration (FHA) loans) and for all loans

obtained through federally insured and regulated

13‘fbo area tha! Wdd be inundated by a flood whoac elevation haa a 1 percent cbance of being _m =*hmy-,w M, tit

would occur on average only onca cvuy 100 yaua.

14 ~~~ feet to mctcra, multiply w 0.305.
Chapter 4-Coasts I 169

financial institutions. Also, disaster-assistance

grants to local governments for repair of public

facilities are reduced for those governments not

participating in the program (although individual

property owners need not have flood insurance to

be eligible for individual and family disasterassistance grants). As a result, communit y participation has been high, and about 82 percent of the

22,000 flood-prone communities have adopted

minimum floodplain-management standards (47).

However, it is estimated that less than 25 percent

of individual owners of flood-prone property

currently purchase flood insurance.

The participation of individual property owners nevertheless amounts to a considerable Federal financial liability. There are currently about

2.6 million flood policies in effect. These represent nearly $230 billion of insurance (22). The

probable maximum loss in any given year has

been estimated to be about $3.5 billion. More than

70 percent of NFIP policy holders are located in

coastal communities. Those located in the most

hazardous V-zones (some 65,000 policy holders)

represent about 2.5 percent of the policy base

(55); but between 1978 and 1992, these areas

accounted for approximately 6 percent of total

losses and 5 percent of all premiums.

Properties that existed before community regulations went into effect (i.e., pre-FIRM properties)15 are eligible for subsidized premium rates

nationwide. In the 1978-92 period, these properties represented about 80 percent of the NFIP’s

exposure while accounting for about 90 percent of

the losses. Currently, about 42 percent of the

NFIP’s policies are subsidized. Subsidized businesses pay premiums that are, on average, onethird what the full-risk premiums would be.

Through the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress

supported heavy premium subsidies on existing

construction in order to encourage broad-based

participation of flood-prone communities in the

program. Subsequently, subsidies have been reduced but not eliminated. The amounts of insurance that can be subsidized per policy are limited.

In the case of single-family-structure coverage,

this amount is $35,000. Protection above this is

purchased at full-risk rates. About 19 percent of

the $230 billion of insurance is subsidized.l6

Historically, the NFIP has suffered from several problems and has been the subject of

considerable criticism. Between 1978 and 1987,

the program ran an average annual operating

deficit of about $65 million, generating a $657

million deficit over that lo-year period (55).

Beginning with FY 1986, however, the NFIP has

been self-supporting. Rating and coverage changes

made by the NFIP through the mid-1980s have

enabled the program to build up reserves in years

when losses were less than the historical average

in order to help fund the program in years when

greater-than-average losses occurred. Post-FIRM

construction in general and post-FIRM construction in V-zones in particular have generated

surpluses whereas pre-FIRM subsidized insurance has continued to be a drain on the National

Flood Insurance Fund (74).

As of early 1993, the flood-insurance fund

contained less than $40 million in reserves. This

amount seems low when compared with potential

flood-damage liabilities. FIA’s estimates suggest

that the probability is high of exceeding the

existing surplus amount in any given year. As

table 4-4 indicates, the probability that total

annual losses will exceed $800 million nationwide is a high 30 to 35 percent, and the probability

that losses will exceed $300 million per year is 60

to 70 percent (23). The FEMA director can

borrow up to $500 million from the Treasury

without notifying Congress, and an additional

$500 million if Congress is notified. Thus,

FEMA’s present $1 billion borrowing authority is

much less than its $3.5 billion probable maximum

loss in any given year (23). FEMA estimates that

its combined borrowing authority and annual

IS ~tfi, ~op~es tit efis~ wore the development of flood-hmranm-rate m4% or ~. Most COmlmlKliti(X had m by 1975.

16 H. IAIc@ Federal Insumnce Admms “ “ tration, personal cornrnunieatio~ June 29, 1993.
1701 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Table 44-Estimated Probabilities of Exceeding

Given Levels of Flood-Insurance Losses

Probability of exceeding

Total annual loss costs total annual costs

($ millions) (percent)

300 60-70

800 30-35

1,40 0 10-1 5

1,800 2 - 7

3,500 0,05-0.50

SOURCE Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

“Estimating Probabilities of Exceeding Given Levels of Flood

Insurance Losses in a One Year Period “ (Washington, DC

FEMA, Aug. 4, 1992)

premium income are adequate 85 to 90 percent of

the time.17

The average annual cost of flood insurance per

structure, as reported by FIA, is $296.18 For

full-risk policies in coastal high-hazard zones, it

is over $800. Many homeowners would not

consider these costs modest. Compared with the

magnitude of potential liabilities under the program and the meager size of the current surplus,

however, the current cost of insurance to property

owners may not be high enough. Moreover, 86

percent of insured property owners in coastal

high-hazard areas receive insurance at subsidized

rates and pay about $440 less per year than those

without subsidies. Premiums are still set to cover

the average historical-loss year. Other possibilities would be to set the premium rate high enough

to cover a catastrophic-loss year or, perhaps, to

cover the loss associated with a 1 percent chance

of occurrence in any year.

Another problem is that although flood insurance is mandatory for new construction that uses

loans from federally insured banks, many lenders

are not ensuring that the requirement is satisfied.19 It has been estimated that there are between

8 and 11 million structures in flood-hazard areas,

but fewer than 2 million are actually covered by

flood-insurance policies (47). In Maine and Texas,

for example, 22 and 78 percent, respectively, of

properties in special flood-hazard areas that

requested disaster assistance did not have insurance (87). In some cases, properties were erroneously classified and in others, insurance policies

were allowed to lapse (87). Many properties in

flood-hazard areas simply are not required by law

to have flood insurance because they have no

mortgage or because they have a mortgage from

an unregulated lender (i.e., from a non-federally

insured lender).

Repetitively damaged properties represent another problem for the NFIP. Over 40 percent of all

flood-insurance claims have been for properties

damaged more than once (87), yet FIA does not

have the authority to cut off or substantially

restrict future coverage for such properties. lndividuals are permitted to rebuild and to continue to

receive insurance, and the program allows for a

potentially unlimited cycle of damage-rebuilddamage. Many believe that the premiums charged

to repetitive-loss properties should be raised by

FEMA to better reflect the risk of recurring flood

damage (7).

Another significant concern about the way the

NFIP functions in coastal areas is its failure to

take into account long-term erosion. This amounts

to a hidden subsidy of erosion risks because the

flood program pays claims for erosion damage,

although the risk is not a component of the rate

structure for flood insurance.

Congress initiated changes to the definition of

“flood” in 1973 to include collapse or subsidence along shorelines, and NFIP regulations

were amended to allow creation of special erosion

zones (“E” zones) and to mandate local landmanagement programs to take these hazards into

account (59). Congress has not given FEMA the

authority to map non-flood-related erosion zones

(74), however, and property owners are generally

opposed to erosion mapping. Also, FEMA has not
Chapter 4-Coasts I 171

sought to require local land-management programs (e.g., housing setbacks) to address erosion

hazards, and long-term erosion trends are generally not taken into account in FEMA’s current

floodplain mapping. V zones are the flood zones

closest physically to shoreline-erosion zones, yet

they are often narrowly drawn, and “frequently

exclude adjoining areas with virtually indistinguishable hazard characteristics” (59).

The NFIP plays a role in regulating reconstruction following a flood event. When a building is

“substantially” damaged (e.g., more than 50

percent destroyed), it must be rebuilt in compliance with the local floodplain standards currently

in force. Replacement of older, unelevated structures with newer, elevated buildings after disasters like Hurricane Andrew, for example, can

have important mitigation benefits. However,

flood policies do not pay for the increased cost of

bringing buildings into compliance with newer

standards. Thus, for example, more than 3,000

buildings in South Florida damaged by Andrew

need to be elevated, but there is no insurance

money available to do so. In addition, local

governments may choose to apply the ‘ ‘substantially damaged” standard only if damages are

greater than 50 percent of the replacement value

of the structure. This has the effect of exempting

more damaged structures from elevation and

floodplain-management requirements when rebuilding.

FIA would like to provide “increased cost of

construction coverage’ but needs authority from

Congress to do so (74). Such coverage, on

average, would cost property owners an extra $34

annually. In coastal high-hazard zones, however,

the additional premium would be substantially

more, especially for subsidized property owners.

Finally, flood-insurance maps are infrequently

revised and updated. FEMA is able to remap

communities every 9 years, on average. However,

many participating communities are growing

rapidly, and development in the floodplain can

substantially modify local flood hazards in less

time than that.

A house tumbles onto the beach at Fire Island, New

York, as a result of erosion damage caused by the

December 11, 1993, northeaster.

I Federal Disaster Assistance

The Federal Government has been involved for

many years in assisting State and local governments in responding to, and recovering from,

national disasters. Its primary authority for providing disaster relief is the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of

1974 (P.L. 93-288, as amended by P.L. 100-707).

Such assistance has, as it should, enabled communities to rebuild centers of commerce after disasters and to return (more or less) to pre-disaster

conditions. However, although financial assistance to people who have suffered a major

misfortune is often appropriate, it can also subsidize risky public and private actions and thus

function as another form of incentive for hazardous coastal development.

Disaster assistance available through FEMA

generally falls into two categories: individual and

family assistance, and public assistance. Under

FEMA’s Individual and Family Grants (IFGs)

program, grants upto$11,500 (adjusted annually

for inflation) can be made to individuals and

families to cover disaster-related expenses (e.g.,

home repairs not covered through insurance and
172 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

replacement of personal belongings) .20 Under

FEMA’s public-assistance program, States and

communities can receive grants (usually at a 75

percent Federal cost share) to cover the cost of

damages to public facilities. Eligible projects

include repair of roads, bridges, sewer and water

systems, recreational facilities, and public boardwalks, and, if certain beach-maintenance eligibility criteria are met, renourishment of beaches.

Communities not participating in NFIP, however,

receive reduced amounts of public assistance.

Applicants under the IFG program need not be in

a participating community nor have purchased

Federal flood insurance, though they must agree

to purchase flood insurance as a condition of

receiving an IFG grant.

Precisely how much of an impact Federal

disaster assistance has in encouraging (or failing

to discourage) hazardous and damaging coastal

development is uncertain Amounts of Federal

disaster assistance in recent years have been

substantial. Some $8.3 billion was spent between

1978 and 1988 on presidentially declared disasters. FEMA reports that approximately $89 million per year was spent as a result of hurricanes

and coastal-storm events during this period (55).

These disaster-assistance monies provide a significant subsidy for coastal communities, underwriting various potentially risky coastal public

investments. In several recent disasters, including

Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo, the Federal Government agreed to cover 100 percent of the costs

of eligible public-sector damages. Where the 25

percent cost sharing has been required, the State

frequently assumes half of that, leaving local

governments to assume only 12.5 percent of the

cost of such damages.

There are currently no provisions in this system

for considering the magnitude of the damage to an

individual community or the financial capability

of the State or local government to cover these

damages. High-risk communities would have

stronger incentives to ensure that public facilities

are placed in safe locations or designed in ways

that minimize future vulnerability to hurricanes or

other disasters if such factors were considered. In

many cases, the Federal reconstruction subsidy is

in addition to the original Federal subsidy used to

construct the facility.

Disaster assistance has in many ways been seen

by States and communities as an entitlement that

is deserved regardless of the extent or cause of the

damages, the ability of these jurisdictions to

assume the costs, or participation in the NFIP. In

theory, Presidential disaster declarations are only

to be issued when the resources of affected State

and local governments are clearly exceeded. Yet,

Presidential declarations (which average 20 to

25 annually; 46 were proclaimed in 1992) are

increasingly viewed as pro forma and have

occurred even where damage levels are relatively

modest and where State and local governments

could clearly have assumed the cost with little

burden. (A Presidential disaster declaration was

made after Hurricane Diana struck the North

Carolina coast in 1984, for example, even though

the $79 million in damages was relatively small

and the State could have handled the damages.)

One survey of 481 communities found that local

officials believe they can handle losses much

larger than those defined by FEMA as constituting a disaster (1 1).

FEMA has sought to reform this system in the

past, only to be criticized by representatives of

State and local governments and owners of

property in high-risk areas. In the mid-1980s, for

example, FEMA proposed that the required State

and local share of public-assistance grants be

increased to 50 percent (i.e., 50 percent Federal,

50 percent State and local) and that a set of criteria

be imposed to determine a legislative entity’s

ability to pay. These proposals met with considerable political opposition and were eventually

dropped. Many commentators, however, have

echoed the need for such reforms, which might

m WG ~ts me avtiable only to people who do not qualify for low-interest SIIMI1 Bustiess AdIQUU5 “ “ tration disaster loans.
——

Chapter 4-Coasts I 173

, , .-%

*-’ --

- -

The San Francisco sea wall.

help to promote implementation of State mitigation measures (10, 25).

In addition to FEMA, several other Federal

agencies provide some form of disaster assistance. These include loans, grants, and reconstruction monies from the independent Small Business

Administration and Economic Development Administration, the Department of Transportation’s

Federal Highway Administration (for roads and

bridges), the Department of Education (for school

buildings), the Department of Agriculture’s Farmers Home Administration., and the Army Corps of

Engineers. In all, there are some 30 Federal

disaster-relief programs (5).

One effort to coordinate the actions of the

different Federal agencies was the Interagency

Hazard-Mitigation agreement signed in 1980.

Under this agreement, an interagency hazardmitigation team is called into action immediately

after a disaster declaration and is required to

prepare a report within 15 days of the declaration.

These reports typically identify hazard-mitigation

opportunities and contain recommendations, many

of which have been pursued by FEMA and other

Federal agencies. These recommendations also

typically are considered in the Section 409

hazard-mitigation plans prepared by States (see

below). No systematic evaluation of how recom-

..-

Beach-nourishment project at Rockaway, New York.

mendations in these reports are implemented has

yet been done.

1 Federal Beach Nourishment and

Shoreline Protection

Shoreline protection, either in the form of

“hard” devices, such as seawalls, revetments,

groins, jetties, and breakwaters, or as “soft”

buildup or replenishment of beaches and dunes, is

often justified where storm surges and/or erosion

threaten well-developed coastal communities and

expensive facilities like harbors and resorts (59).

The best protective measure for a given site will

depend on the underlying physical conditions at

the site and on economic, social, and environmental costs (see box 4-B).

The Federal Government, through the Army

Corps of Engineers, has subsidized shoreprotection projects for decades. Where the benefits of shoreline protection are associated with

improving recreational opportunities or counteracting erosion, the Federal share of approved

projects is currently 50 percent. Where the

benefits include prevention of physical damage to

property, the Federal share of construction costs

increases to 65 percent. Most projects are now

justified on the basis of prevention of physical

damages, The periodic renourishment that maybe

required on some beaches after a project has been
174 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat+Volume 1

Box 4-B-Protect or Retreat?

There are essentially two types of responses to erosion and sea level rise: protect vulnerable areas or retreat

from the coast. lhe most appropriate response for a specific area will depend on an array of sodoeconomic and

environmental factors, including the number and value of coastal structures at tisk, the relative cost of protection

and retreat options, aesthetic values, and the value of preserving undeveloped areas (49). The appropriate

response will also depend on physical conditions at the site, including the availability and suitability of sand.

Protection can mean either building defenses that “harden” the shoreline against incursions of these% or

replaang eroded beach sand, as necessary, thrwgh beach noun’shmenfor replenishment Since 1946, the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers has undertaken 121 shore protection projects encompassing atotal shoreline distance

of just over 300 miles (460 kilometers).’ Another 52 projects that would protect about 230 miles of coast have been

authorized (but not yet funded) by Congress (66). About 75 percent of all Corps projects involve beach nourishment

as a basic feature, although beach nourishment is sometimes used in combination with hard structural protection

measures (91).

The number of miles devoted to beach and dune nourishment in Corps projects reflects a general community

preference for nonstructural approaches where feasible. Such approaches are especially preferable where

beaches are primary assets for coastal communities, as, for example, in Miami Beach, Florida. Beach nourishment

projects can also be expensive, but costs are site-specific and highly variable. In Miami Beach, nourishment of

a 10.5-mile stretch of coast cost about $6 million per mile in the late 1970s. Beach nourishment can be an effective

protective measure because beaches are efficient in absorbing wave energy. Usually, beach nourishments used

where erosion of a natural beach is occurring. The ability of the nourished beach to absorb wave energy may, thus,

come at the expense of its own erosion, so periodic renourishment maybe required. As an adaptation to sea level

rise, beach nourishment has the advantage that it can be abruptly halted (e.g., in favor of retreat) without

abandoning large investments when the costs of continued nourishment exceed benefits.

Some beach-nourishment projects have been criticized forhaving’life spans that are shorter than anticipated

and, more generally, for falling to perform as designed (66). Debate continues on the performance of specific

beach-nourishment projects (e.g., see ref. 39). However, it seems clear that as understanding of fill and sediment

dynamics has advanced, the performance of such projects has improved (39).

Hard structural protective measures arealsoappropriate in some circumstances. The most common are sea

walls, breakwaters, and groins. Sea walls are concrete, steel, stone, or timber structures built parallel to and on

the landward side of beaches. Their primary purpose is to protect upland areas. Like nourishment projects, they

are normally built in areas that are eroding, and thus beaches in front of sea walls may eventually disappear.

However, properly designed sea walls can protect the land behind them without causing adverse effects to

beaches (59). Sea walls are initially more expensive than beach-nourishment projects, but the periodic costs

required of beach-nourishment projects are not incurred. Some sea walls will likely have an adverse effect on the

ability of wetlands to migrate in response to sea level rise. A 20-inch (0.5-meter)2 rise in sea level could result in

the loss of35 percent of coastal wetlands if standard measures are taken to protect currently developed Iowfands;

however, 30 percent of wetlands could be lost in any case if no protective measures are taken (62).

Breakwaters are linear structures placed in nearshore waters whose purpose is to shield the shoreline from

incoming wave energy. Groins are wall-like structures constructed perpendicular to the shoreline andusedtotrap

sand moving parallel to the shore. They are usually used in combination with beach nourishment. They have often

been improperly used in the past, resulting in downdrift beach erosion.

1 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

z To convert inches to meters, multiply by 0.025.
Chapter 4-Coasts 1175

In coastal cities and seaside resort communities, the value of the land is usually great enough that decisions

to install hard structures or replenish beach sand are often made. Retreat is usually not a practical alternative in

these areas. In sparsely developed areas, the opposite isgeneraliythe case, and retreat maybe the only feasible

option (83). Gradual retreat from the coast, iimiting coastal uses to those that can be accommodated without

protection, is favored by many insurance companies and environmentalists as the ultimate solution to coastal

erosion and sea level rise. They argue that protection measures can only forestall inevitable destruction and, if

risky development is ailowed to continue, increase the costs of protection and retreat (54). Policies that promote

retreat include setback provisions that some coastal States have adopted and the Federal Government’s

fiooded-properties-purchase program and UptonJones relocation-assistance program (see main text).

A substantial amount of money has been invested in coastal areas. Owners of beachfront property are

understandably upset when their homes or businesses are threatened by erosion, and retreat to a safer site may

not be an option for many. The reality of erosion and sea level rise creates some difficuit public-policy issues.

Property owners naturally want to take steps to protect threatened iand. However, in some instances (e.g., in some

quickly eroding areas), it will probably not be desirable or economically justified from a community or national

perspective to do so, and gradual retreat will be preferred. Two issues with immense consequences for coastal

development are likely to continue to be debated. First, is the extent to which private-property owners shouid be

subsidized by taxpayers at large to maintain risky coastal development. Second, is how much property owners

should be compensated when a State limits the economic use of seaside property. These issues will become more

controversial as the amount of money invested in coastal development increases. The possibility of future sea level

rise suggests that ciear policies guiding the expectations of property owners need to be established.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

completed (see box 4-B) has not to date been Because the largest benefit of beach-protection

considered a “maintenance activity’ (if it were,

the Corps would not be involved), so these

recurring costs are subsidized as well.21 If the

Corps uses sand dredged from navigation projects

for beach nourishment, the Federal Government

currently provides 50 percent of the increased

costs that would be incurred to place this sand on

beaches rather than to dispose of it in the least

costly manner. Finally, the Federal Government

shares the costs of feasibility studies with States.

Federal aid is usually recommended to continue

through the life of the project, normally 50 years

for hard structures (91).

In recent years, the Corps has spent between

$40 and $70 million annually for beach nourishment and structural-protection measures, the majority of which has been for beach nourishment.22

projects is realized at the local or regional level,

it may be desirable to shift more of the burden of

paying for such projects from the Federal Government to the States. Responsibility for maintaining

beach-nourishment projects, in particular, could

be shifted to affected States, just as is maintenance of Corps-built flood-control projects.

States have also been active in assisting with

and subsidizing shore-protection efforts. Several

States now provide funding, often through the

issuance of bonds, for local renourishment programs, and often in combination with Federal

subsidies. In South Carolina, for instance, the

State legislature created a $10 million Beach

Renourishment Fund in 1988, most of which went

to emergency renourishment and dune-rebuilding

projects after Hurricane Hugo (43). Likewise, the

21 L. wanos, Institute of Water Resources, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, personal COm@CatiO% J~Y 1993.

22 J. HOUSleY, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, personal COXuIXMIicat@ JUIY 1993.
176 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume

State of Maryland has provided about $60 million

under its Shore Erosion Control Program (SECP)

for beach renourishment in Ocean City. The State

also provides interest-free loans and technical

assistance for shorefront property owners experiencing erosion problems, and 50 percent matching funds to property owners who undertake

nonstructural erosion-control measures such as

planting grass (68). The State of New Jersey

recently passed a bill to appropriate $15 million

per year for shore projects, including beach

nourishment.

H U.S. Tax Code

Several major coastal-development subsidies

are also available in the U.S. Tax Code. The

casualty-loss deduction allows coastal property

owners to deduct the cost of uninsured damages

resulting from hurricanes and other natural disasters. Allowable deductions are determined by

subtracting the post-storm value of property from

its pre-storm value, less insurance received.23 The

deduction is only allowed where losses exceed 10

percent of adjusted gross income.

Other U.S. Tax Code subsidies include interest

and property-tax deductions for second homes

(which comprise much of coastal development)

and accelerated depreciation for seasonal rental

properties. These types of subsidies are largely

hidden, and estimates of their aggregate cost are

hard to come by. There is little doubt, however,

that the extent of implicit public subsidy is

substantial.

1 Other Development Subsidies

Coastal growth is subsidized by a variety of

other Federal development programs and grants.

The Farmers Home Administration, for example,

provides subsidies in the form of communityfacility loans, business and industry loans, and

rural housing loans (88). The Department of

Housing and Urban Development provides guar1

anteed home loans, as does

Veterans Affairs. The Rural

the Department of

Electrification Administration provides loans for development of

electrical systems, and the Environmental Protection Agency has provided considerable funding

for water systems and for wastewater treatment.

Extensive funding for the construction of highways, roads, bridges, and other improvements

that make many otherwise remote coastal areas

readily accessible has been provided by the

Department of Transportation and is one of the

more significant factors affecting the development of barrier islands. Most of these development-related grants and subsidies are not limited

to coastal areas, and estimates of their magnitude

and of their impacts in coastal regions are not

available.

OBSTACLES TO BETTER MANAGEMENT

Improvements in the Federal and State programs that affect development in the coastal zone

are possible and, considering the potential for

increasing vulnerability in coastal areas as a result

of global climate change, desirable. However,

several impediments to reducing risk exist. Among

these are the fact that people continue to be

attracted to coastal areas, the notion of subsidies

as social entitlements, private-property concerns,

the cost of change, and institutional fragmentation and regulatory obstacles.

1 The Attraction of Coastal Areas

The economic and personal attraction Americans have to coasts can be seen as an obstacle to

many coastal-management reforms. Recent surveys of coastal-property owners suggest that

many have a solid appreciation for the danger and

riskiness of building and living in coastal areas,

but see hurricanes and coastal storms as simply a

necessary part of the tradeoff for the benefits of

coastal living (6). Table 4-5 shows the results of

a questionnaire mailed to owners of beachfront

u S= now 455 on Stem, hurricanes, and floods in 26 U.S. Code (’U. S. C.) 165.
Chapter 4-Coasts I 177

Table 4&Results of a Mail Survey of 132 Owners of Beachfront Property in

South Carolina After Hurricane Hugo That Asked the Question:

“Now that you have experienced the effects of a hurricane, has this had any influence on your

feelings about owning beachfront property?”

Percent

1. Yes, would not buy beachfront property again 6

2 Yes, would like to sell my property and buy property in a safer location 7

3. No, hurricanes are just a normal risk in beachfront areas 39

4. No, the benefits and enjoyments of beachfront living outweigh the

potential risks 42

5. Other 6

SOURCE: T. Beatley, Hurricane Hugo and Shoreline Retreat: Evacuating the Effectiveness

of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, final report to the National Science

Foundation, September 1992

property in South Carolina heavily damaged by

Hurricane Hugo. Even those who were devastated by such events did not generally have regrets

or plan to move to safer locations. A related

obstacle is the economic advantage of beachfront

locations. Owners of beachfront property maybe

reluctant to relocate structures at risk until they

have nearly collapsed into the surf because the

income from renting these units on the beach is

substantially higher than it would be on sites

farther inland. Also, equivalent beachfront property is often unavailable or too expensive.

~ Coastal Subsidies as Social Entitlements

Some coastal subsidies have, over time, acquired a constituency and set of beneficiaries who

tend to view them as social entitlements, in much

the same way that people view social security.

Similar views exist about disaster assistance.

Almost regardless of the magnitude of the damages or the ability of States, localities, and

property owners to assume the damages, many

people perceive that a disaster declaration and

disaster assistance are deserved. Taking away or

Curtailing programs such as Federal flood insurance would be opposed by communities and

coastal property owners who fear that property

values, salability, and economic attractiveness of

coastal areas would be reduced.

9 Private Property and the Takings Issue

A major impediment to more-effective and

more-sensible coastal management is concern

about impacts on private property. Specifically,

property owners who are restricted as a result of

coastal-management programs (e.g., Ocean-front

setback requirements or restrictions on filling

wetlands) may claim that these restrictions represent unconstitutional takings of private property

under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as well as under similar provisions in State

constitutions). If land-use regulations are so restrictive that they deny all reasonable economic

use of a coastal property, the courts may well

conclude that a taking has occurred.

A recent case in South Carolina, Lucas v. South

Carolina Coastal Council, illustrates the potential dimensions of this obstacle.24 David Lucas, a

South Carolina developer and property owner

who had acquired two small lots on Isle of Palms

(a barrier-island community east of Charleston),

was prevented from building on them as a result

of the 1988 South Carolina Beachfront Management Act (both lots were seaward of the so-called

“baseline”) (69). Arguing that the setback restrictions deprived him of all reasonable economic use of his property, he challenged the

restrictions as an unconstitutional taking. The

lower court found in his favor and awarded him
178 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

$1.2 million. The South Carolina Supreme Court

overruled this decision, upholding the Coastal

Council’s actions as merely preventing a public

harm and thus not requiring compensation. Lucas

appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the

majority determined that some compensation

should be paid when the value of property is

essentially destroyed by regulation. The court

reiterated the position that when land-use regulations that preclude all economic use of property

go into effect, a taking might occur (unless the

regulation serves only to enforce a preexisting

common-law doctrine, such as nuisance law). The

case was then returned to the South Carolina

Supreme Court, which, in reconsidering, found

that a temporary taking had occurred. In July

1993, a settlement was finally reached, and the

State agreed to pay Lucas $1.5 million.25 The full

implications of the Lucas decision remain to be

seen, but it will likely be cited by opponents of

more-stringent coastal land-use regulations.

Takings law is still developing, and considerable disagreement exists about when a regulatory

taking actually occurs. What constitutes a reasonable economic use, for example, remains a

debatable question. The South Carolina law did

not prevent the erection of a temporary structure

on the Lucas property, or prohibit the sale of the

lots to adjoining property owners. The use restrictions in the NFIP generally are not considered a

taking because participation by communities is

voluntary and because protecting people from the

threat of harm is part of community authority

under police powers.

Irrespective of the specific constitutional challenge of a taking, additional restrictions on the use

of land have in recent years met with serious

political opposition. Several property-rightsprotection groups, such as supporters of the wise

use movement in the West., have been established

and have been vocal in opposing additional

government restrictions (see vol. 2, ch. 5).

I Cost of Change: Perceived and Actual

Potential cost—actual and perceived-represents an obstacle to many proposed program

changes. Coastal-land acquisition, for example,

may entail major expenditures, given the high

price of coastal property. Public subsidies for

relocation of vulnerable structures could also

involve substantial public expense. On the other

hand, some alternatives are relatively inexpensive,

and their perceived costs may be much higher

than their actual costs. Adoption of coastal

building standards, for instance, actually involves

a relatively small increase in the cost of home

construction (l).

In addition, attention is frequently focused on

the initial costs of programs without considering

the resulting long-term cost reductions. Although

relocation subsidies (e.g., the Upton-Jones relocation assistance, discussed below) may involve

substantial upfront costs, they serve to curtail

future-loss expenditures, sometimes on properties that would likely be damaged again. Similarly, public acquisition of wetlands, floodplains,

and other sensitive coastal lands, although expensive initially, can serve to prevent future public

costs that could be many times higher (e.g., costs

of disaster relief and ecological damages).

I Institutional Fragmentation and

Regulatory Obstacles

An important obstacle to better management,

especially at the Federal level, is institutional (or

organizational) fragmentation. No single Federal

agency or department has responsibility for coastal

management and coastal-damage risk reduction.

For example, the Coastal Zone Management

program is administered within the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) ;

responsibility for wetland management is shared

by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

the Corps of Engineers, and many others (see vol.

2, ch. 4); FEMA has responsibility for flood

~ South caroIina intends to nxoup its money by selling the lots for development. However, thc new build.@ -tWstip*@ tit*

owner must remove structures that ever flood or become seaward of the dunes because of beaeh erosion (50).
Chapter 4-Coasts I 179

insurance; and several agencies and offices are

involved in disaster assistance. These different

Federal programs and initiatives are not wellcoordinated and there is no unified, comprehensive strategy for reducing the risks of living on

the coast or for addressing specific issues such as

climate-related sea level rise. Moreover, the

perceived missions of these different agencies

vary considerably, and can result in actions and

programs that work at cross-purposes. FEMA

has historically seen its mission not in terms of

coastal management, but in terms of helping

families and communities respond to, and cope

with, natural disasters.

Hazardous coastal development is caused, in

part, by an inadequate regulatory and enforcement framework. Many coastal States and localities have minimal controls on the location and

quality of development. Although some States

have adopted fairly stringent coastal setback

requirements, for example, many others frequently permit new development close to the

ocean front and in locations subject to erosion

threats. North Carolina requires major coastal

structures to be set back 60 times the average

annual erosion rate (61). Yet, South Carolina

effectively has no fixed shoreline setback, and

through a special permit procedure, allows development very close to the ocean.

Few coastal States or localities prohibit development within floodplains, although structures in

these areas may be subject to certain design

requirements, such as being elevated to or above

the 100-year flood level. To the uninformed coastal

resident or buyer of coastal property, securing a

State or local permit maybe falsely perceived as

a “certification’ of the safety of a coastal site or

location. Moreover, ensuring full community

compliance with existing floodplain-management

regulations is difficult because FEMA’s enforcement and monitoring staff is small.

The extensive wind damage from Hurricane

Andrew illustrates the looseness with which

many development codes have been implemented

and enforced. The South Florida Building Code

(with a wind-design standard of 120 miles (190

kilometers) 26 per hour) was generally viewed as

one of the most stringent performance-based

building codes in use anywhere. Yet, problems

with enforcement and implementation (and with

the provisions of the code itself) have raised

questions about the stringency and effectiveness

of coastal regulations. A grand jury in Dade

County recently issued a report extremely critical

of the “shoddy” building practices evident in

South Florida (8). Among the problems cited by

the grand jury were inadequate and lax building

inspection, inability to control untrained and

unlicensed building contractors, and corruption,

apathy, and high turnover in the Florida Building

and Zoning Department. Strengthening the code

(including changing the ways roof systems are

constructed) and increasing Federal wind standards for mobile homes (most of which were

destroyed in the hurricane) were recommended.

In many coastal areas, building codes are

simply not required. In 12 coastal States, adoption

of building codes is left entirely up to local

officials (53). In South Carolina, for instance,

local governments are under no requirement to

adopt a building code (although if they choose to

do so, it must be the State’s standard building

code). In Texas, no State building code is

mandated, and counties do not even have the

authority to adopt building codes if they wanted

to-leaving many rural and unincorporated areas

without any construction standards.

ENCOURAGING LESS-DAMAGING

COASTAL-DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS

The existing policy framework does include

several major programs and policies that seek to

reduce the risks of living on the coast and that

could serve as the foundation for policy changes

in the future. As mentioned earlier, the NFIP has

26 ~conv~ miles per hour to kilometers per hour, multiply by 1.609.
180 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

mandated, from its beginning, the adoption of

.

certam minimum standards for floodplain management. In recent years, the program has been

giving much greater attention to risk reduction

and hazard mitigation. Some relatively recent

changes to the NFIP, discussed below, include

the Section 1362 Flooded Properties Purchase

Program, the Upton-Jones relocation-assistance

program, and the Community Rating System.

Recently, several bills introduced in Congress

have proposed further reforms, and these initiatives are described here as well. Other programs

that have positively encouraged mitigation and

risk reduction (or have the potential to do so)

include the Federal Hazard Mitigation Grants

program (Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act),

State hazard-mitigation plans (required by Section 409 of the Stafford Act), the Coastal Barrier

Resources Act (COBRA; P.L. 97-348), the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; P.L.

92-583), and the State coastal-management programs through which the Federal CZMA is

implemented.

M Section 1362 Flooded Properties

Purchase Program

The NFIP, despite some limitations, has improved gradually over the years, and certain

programs and provisions have been developed

that move it in the direction of greater hazard

mitigation and loss reduction. One of these is the

Section 1362 Flooded Properties Purchase Program. Authorized in 1968 by a section of the

National Flood Insurance Act, the program allows

FEMA to break the damage-rebuild-damage cycle

that accounts for many damage claims.

Under the program, FEMA can offer to buy out

owners of damaged property, paying the difference between the fair market value of the structure and the allowable insurance claim, plus the

value of the land on which the structure is or was

located. The community must agree to participate, must be willing to accept the land, and must

prepare a plan for its use that ensures that it will

never be developed in the future. Eligible properties must have had Federal flood insurance and

must meet one of several damage criteria (e.g., be

damaged substantially beyond repair).

The Section 1362 Program has been used

sparingly: since first funded in 1980, FEMA has

acquired only about 100 properties per year.

Modest amounts of funds are set aside for Section

1362 purchases, and there seems to be a bias

against using those funds in coastal areas; because land in coastal communities is often very

expensive, it is usually possible to get a greater

“bang for the buck” when these limited funds are

used along rivers. Since 1980, Congress has

appropriated less than $5 million per year for

Section 1362 funds, and in some years, FEMA

has not spent it all.

1 Upton-Jones Relocation Assistance

Another major change in the flood-insurance

program was passage of the so-called UptonJones Amendment. An amendment to the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987

(P.L. 100-242), this provision sought to make

available funds for subsidizing the demolition or

relocation of shoreline structures that are subject

to fairly immediate erosion hazards. Under the

NFIP prior to Upton-Jones, a property owner

could not receive any flood-insurance payment

until the structure was actually damaged.

Under Upton-Jones, owners of shorefront property with Federal flood insurance are eligible

for sizable demolition or relocation subsidies.

Specifically, the amendment provides up to 40

percent of the insured value of a building for

relocation (or 40 percent of the cost of relocation,

if less) and up to 110 percent of the insured value

of a structure for demolition. Relocation funds

can be used for, among other things, new site

preparation, construction of a new foundation,

and utility hook-ups.

To qua.ii@, structures must be within a zone of

imminent collapse. FEMA defines this area as
Chapter 4-Coasts I 181

Figure 4-5--FEMA’s Criteria for Imminent-Collapse and Setback Determinations

Under the Upton-Jones Amendment

Dune scarp

vegetation line

Minimum 30-year setback distance

4 b

Zone of

imminent collapse

~/

A

(lo +3!5X4)) ,/1u

1

/

/

C2

‘.-’”- ._/ --”- -/d-- ‘ \

I Measured/ 1 Erosion rate = 4 feet per year

reported

distance

Beach scarp/

high water line

NOTE: To convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.

SOURCE: National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990).

seaward of a line 10 feet plus 5 times the average

annual rate of erosion, as measured from a

reference feature such as the normal high-water

line (fig. 4-5). The provisions also require the

State or local government to condemn structures

or certify that they are in danger of collapse. Once

FEMA declares a structure subject to imminent

collapse, the owner has a certain reasonable time

to relocate or demolish it, after which only 40

percent of losses can be recovered in the next

storm or flooding event.

Once demolition or relocation occurs, certain

restrictions are placed on the availability of new

insurance. Specifically, to receive flood insurance, any future development on the property

must be located landward of the 30-year erosion

line for structures with one to four dwelling units

or landward of the 60-year line for larger structures. Structures moved to a different site must

also meet these and whatever other floodplainmanagement restrictions are in effect in the new

location.

To date, use of the Upton-Jones Amendment

has been limited. As of April 1992, only 494

claims had been filed. Of these, 283 were

approved, 217 for demolition and 66 for relocation. The average value of demolition claims has

been more than twice that of relocation claims

(79). Low participation can be explained in part

by a general lack of awareness about the program,

a reluctance to remove or interrupt income from

rental properties, a lack of suitable or affordable

relocation sites, and problems encountered in

condemning structures (e.g., many States do not

allow condemnation unless there is actual structural damage (59)).

Despite considerable support for the concept,

the Upton-Jones Amendment has not decreased

NFIP expenditures or induced voluntary, anticipatory action by owners and has been insufficient

to overcome individual and market incentives for
182 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

ocean-front owners to remain on the coastline (17,

18, 56). The National Research Council has

recommended that relocation be encouraged over

demolition, relocation behind the 30-year erosion

line be mandated, easements or some other form

of legal restriction preventing use of vacated

shorefront areas be required, and insurance be

terminated or premiums raised for structures

within the zone of imminent collapse that are not

relocated or demolished after a certain time (59).

The Upton-Jones program could be criticized

as underwriting private risks because it encourages risky coastal development if property owners expect relocation assistance in the future (7).

Also, the program applies only to individual

properties: Upton-Jones provisions can be used to

relocate one structure even as another one is being

built on an adjacent, eroding site. The suggested

changes mentioned above, in addition to coupling

program benefits to more stringent erosion management for new construction (e.g., coastal setbacks), would serve to substantially eliminate

such incentives.

1 Community Rating System

FEMA has recently initiated a program, the

Community Rating System (CRS), to reward

communities for the additional activities and

programs they undertake to minimize flood damages beyond the minimum requirements of the

NFIP. Specifically, the insurance premiums of

property owners within communities that undertake flood-damage-reduction activities are reduced based on the extent of eligible activities

undertaken. CRS gives credit for 18 mitigation

activities, grouped into four categories: public

information, mapping and regulations, flooddamage reduction, and flood preparedness (see

table 4-6). Points are assigned to activities

depending on the extent of their implementation

within the community and their likely effectiveness at achieving CRS objectives (24).

Points allocated to individual measures are

added to produce the community’s total points,

which are then used to determine the extent of

premium reduction for property owners. As table

4-7 indicates, premium reductions range from 5 to

45 percent for property within Special Flood

Hazard Areas (i.e., A and V zones). A maximum

5 percent reduction is allowed for property

outside Special Flood Hazard Areas, largely

because premiums are already low in these areas

and because the measures for which credits are

given are directed at the 100-year-flood zones.

The numbers of communities participating in

the CRS program have so far been modest. In FY

1993, only 565 communities took part (3 percent

of those participating in the NFIP). This small

percentage, however, does represent about 45

percent of the flood-insurance-policy base. The

level of mitigation effort for most participating

communities has been relatively low, with the

vast majority of communities (about 78 percent)

eligible for only a 5 percent reduction in policyholder premiums. Another 15 percent of communities are eligible for 10 percent reductions.

Twelve communities were given reductions of 15

percent, and one qualified for a 25 percent

reduction. 27

Questions nevertheless remain about the CRS

strategy. It is not clear whether the most active

local governments would not be undertaking

these kinds of mitigation actions, anyway. Some

of the measures for which local governments are

given credit, such as hazard disclosure, may not

lead to clear hazard or damage reduction. Conversely, credits are not now given for some measures, such as erosion management, that might be

desirable. The CRS approach could also be

criticized for further reducing premiums paid in

hazardous areas. As an alternative, several of the

measures for which localities are given credit (e.g.,

erosion setbacks) could simply be made mandatory as conditions for participating in the NFIP.

27 Data on the COmmunity Rating System provided by C, Keegu Federal Emergency Mmagement Agency, JWL 3, 1993.
Chapter 4-Coasts I 183

Table 4-6--Community Rating System Designed by the Federal Emergency

Management Agency to Encourage Communities to Minimize Flood Damage

Percent of

Activity Maximum points Average points applicants

allowed earned requesting credit

Public information

Elevation certificates

Map determinations

Outreach projects

Hazard disclosure

Flood-protection library

Flood-protection

assistance

Mapping and regulations

Additional flood data

Open-space preservation

Higher regulatory

standards

Flood-data maintenance

Storm-water management

Flood-damage reduction

Repetitive-loss projects

Acquisition and relocation

Retrofitting

Drainage-system

maintenance

Flood preparedness

Flood-warning program

Levee safety

Dam safety

1 37a

140

175

81a

25

66

360a

450a

785’

12oa

380a

441 a

1,600

1,400

330’

200a

900a

120a

73

140

59

39

20

51

60

1 15b

101 a

41

121

41

97

23

226

173

0

64

1 0 0

92

53

40

77

45

20

42

59

41

37

11

13

3

82

5

0

45

a Maximum Points revised since the 1990 community Rating System schedule. 

b 1990 credits revised to reflect the 1992 Community Rating System schedule.

SOURCE. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Interagency Hazard Mitigation Survey

Team Report on the Northeaster Storm, FEMA 973-NJ-DR (Washington, DC: FEMA, January 1993)

1 Hazard-Mitigation Programs and

Requirements Under the Stafford Act

There have also been some reforms in the

Federal disaster-assistance framework in recent

years. The 1988 amendments to the Stafford Act

created a Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

(HMGP) (Section 404), which provides Federal

matching funds for 50 percent of individual State

and local mitigation projects. The grant funds are

tied to disaster declarations and are limited to 10

percent of the total Federal share of the publicassistance monies made available for permanent

restorative work.

FEMA had approved 206 applications for

hazard-mitigation grants through 1992, obligating approximately $43 million. As table 4-8

indicates, these funds have been used to finance

various types of mitigation, including improving

public-private facilities (e.g., floodproofing sewage treatment systems), constructing drainage

systems, purchasing equipment, relocating structures, developing planning programs, promoting

education and training activities, and improving

land. Nearly 60 percent of the funds were used for

improvements to public-private facilities. Only

about 11 percent of these grants were used for

relocation or acquisition, and only about 3 percent
184 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 4-7—Premium Reductions for Special

Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) and Non-SFHAs in

the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s

Community Rating System

SFHA NonSFHA

premium premium

Points reduction reduction

earned Class (percent) (percent)

4,500+ 1

4,000-4,499 . . . . . . . 2

3,500-3,999 . . . . . . . 3

3,000-3,499 . . . . . . . 4

2,500-2,999 . . . . . . . 5

2,000-2,499 . . . . . . . 6

1,500-1 ,999 . . . . . . . 7

1,000-1 ,499 . . . . . . . 8

500-999 . . . . . . . . . . . 9

0-499 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

45 5

40 5

35 5

30 5

25 5

20 5

15 5

10 5

5 5

0 0

SOURCE Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National

Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System Coordinators

Manual (Washington,DC: FEMA, July 1992.

for planning programs, such as development of

beach-management plans, hazard-mitigation plans,

and zoning- and building-code ordinances (41).

A joint task force of the National Emergency

Management Association and the Association of

State Floodplain Managers was formed to evaluate HMGP. Among the concerns identified were

the slow pace of implementing the program, the

lack of “hazard mitigation principles and guidance, ’ difficult.ies in State-level coordination,

and the failure of States and localities to identify

mitigation opportunities before a disaster occurs.

The specific recommendations of the joint task

force include: creating State teams to respond

to disaster declarations; developing and endorsing a Federal-State hazard-mitigation strategy

after each disaster declaration to identify mitigation opportunities; updating and refining State

hazard-mitigation plans through the Federal-State

agreement; strengthening technical-assistance

activities (e.g., through training and publication

of handbooks); and improving guidance on project eligibility (41). Of special importance are the

task force’s conclusions that FEMA should better

enforce State hazard-mitigation-plan requirements

and seek to elevate the priority and importance

Table 4&—Rank of Project Categories by Dollar

Amount and Percent of Estimated Obligations

in the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

(January 1989 to August 1992)

Type of project $ Millionsa Percent

Public-private facilities 25 58

Drainage projects 6 14

Equipment purchases 5 12

Relocation of structures 5 11

Planning products 1 3

Education and training <1 1

Land Improvements <1 1

Total 43 100

a 1992 dollars

SOURCE. Joint Task Force on the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program,

The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.” An Evaluation Report,

prepared by National Emergency Management Association, the

Association of State Floodplain Managers, and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, September 1992

given to these plans. Land use, relocation, and

nonstructural programs are perhaps underrepresented in the HMGP. The overall level of funding

seems modest, but not all available funds have

been obligated because too few eligible projects

have been proposed.

The Stafford Act also made mitigation an

eligible expense under the FEMA publicassistance program (Section 406), and thus allows

the Federal Government to contribute 75 percent

of the funds for reconstruction improvements to

the infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, and utility

lines) to make them less vulnerable to future

damage. Before these changes were made, mitigation expenditures were not eligible for public

assistance, and if State and local governments

wanted to rebuild damaged infrastructure to

higher standards, they had to bear the entire

expense. Section 406 could be more useful to

States than the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

because opportunities for mitigation can be identified and taken advantage of quickly during the

damage survey process, the mitigation can be

incorporated into reconstruction without having

to go through a grant-review process and compete

with other projects, and the amount of money
Chapter 4-Coasts I 185

available is not limited by the 10 percent cap of

the Federal share of public-assistance monies.

The existing Federal disaster-assistance framework does have some significant ‘‘teeth’ for

promoting and requiring hazard mitigation. Section 409, although rarely used, states that the

President may make disaster assistance conditional on State or local actions to mitigate hazards

(’‘including safe land use and construction practices”). In addition, States receiving disaster

assistance are required to prepare a State hazardmitigation plan-a so-called Section 409 plan.

These plans are intended to require States (and

local communities) to confront the natural hazards they are subject to and identify programs and

policies that can be implemented to reduce those

hazards. In theory, FEMA can withhold disasterassistance funds if the programs and policies

contained in the plan have not been implemented.

Politically, however, this is quite difficult to do,

and FEMA has chosen not to adopt such a

stringent approach. Most States required to prepare Section 409 plans have done so. However,

FEMA lacks a clear system for monitoring State

progress and compliance with Section 409 plans.

Furthermore, once a disaster is over, States are

relieved of much of the pressure to undertake

planning and mitigation activities.

9 Coastal Barrier Resource Act

CoBRA, enacted by Congress in 1982, represents an attempt to move away from some of the

ill effects of Federal subsidies such as flood

insurance and disaster assistance. COBRA’S stated

objectives are to reduce growth pressures on

undeveloped barrier islands; to reduce threats to

people and property of disasters and minimize the

public expenditures that typically accompany

such disasters; and to reduce damage to fish,

wildlife, and other sensitive environmental resources.

. . .-

..— ... .

. . . . ,,, - -+...

Morris Island lighthouse, once on solid ground, now

sits in the Atlantic Ocean off Charleston, South

Carolina.

The act designated the Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS), originally comprising

186 undeveloped barrier-island units, including

453,000 acres (183,500 hectares)28 and 666 miles

of shoreline. After a certain date, several Federal

subsidies would no longer be permitted in these

designated areas, including new flood-insurance

policies, monies for infrastructure construction,

and nonemergency forms of disaster relief. The

Department of the Interior is responsible for

implementing the program.

Barrier islands were defined in the act as

including sand deposits, such as barrier islands

and spits, and ‘associated aquatic habitats,” such

as adjacent marshes and estuaries. A barrier island

was deemed to be undeveloped, and thus eligible

for inclusion in the system, if it had less than one

walled and roofed building per 5 acres of land;

there was an absence of urban infrastructure on it

(e.g., vehicle access, water supply, wastewater

disposal, and electrical service to each lot); and

~ ~ CoKIvm acres to hectares, multiply by 0.40S.
186 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

it was not part of a development of 100 or more

lots (32).

CBRS was expanded in 1990 under the Coastal

Barrier Improvement Act (P.L. 101-591) to include 560 units comprising 1.3 million acres and

1200 shoreline miles (88). In addition, under the

1990 act, the Department of the Interior was

directed to map all undeveloped coastal barriers

along the Pacific Coast (for eventual inclusion by

Congress in CBRS).

Several studies have sought to evaluate the

effectiveness of CoBRA at discouraging barrierisland development (31, 32,42, 88). These studies

suggested that COBRA has not stopped development pressures on undeveloped coastal barriers,

although the withdrawal of Federal subsidies has

had some effect on discouraging new development there. The General Accounting Office (GAO)

noted that the “availability of accessible coastal

land is limited [and] populations of coastal areas

are expected to increase by tens of millions by the

year 2010. This population increase will further

spur market demand, providing an incentive for

developers, owners, and investors to assume the

risks associated with owning and building in

these storm-prone areas” (88).

The study results suggest several policy directions, including the acquisition of undeveloped

barrier lands despite the high cost of such a

strategy .29 Some studies in the past have argued

that despite the high cost of acquisition, the public

savings in the long term still justify such purchases (e.g., see ref. 55). One study (42) recommended removal of the remaining forms of

Federal subsidy allowable under the current U.S.

Tax Code (e.g., casualty-loss deductions); prohibition of all loans made by federally insured

banks and lending institutions (originally waived

under Section 11 of CoBRA); prohibition of

Federal block grants; and prohibition of federally

funded projects occurring outside, yet affecting,

designated units.

H The Coastal Zone Management Act and

State Management Programs

The 1972 enactment of the Federal CZMA has

served as a major catalyst for improved coastal

planning and management. Under Section 305 of

the act, the Federal Government-through the

Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management within NOAA-provides grants for the

development of State coastal-management programs. These programs must contain certain

elements, and once approved, Section 306 of the

act provides funding for State implementation.

Funds are provided on a Federal-State cost-share

basis. The Federal share was initially as high as 80

percent, but shares are now equal. In addition to

the financial incentive for participation, States

were also encouraged to participate as a way of

exercising some degree of control over Federal

actions and projects in their coastal zones. Thus,

once a State’s plan is approved, subsequent

Federal actions must be consistent with it (per

Section 307) to the extent practicable.

Although the program is voluntary, participation has been very high. Of the 35 coastal States

and Territories eligible for funding, 29 now have

federally approved plans (notable exceptions

have been Texas and Georgia, but each is now

working toward developing a program). Illinois

is the only eligible State not developing a program (note that States along the Great Lakes are

also considered “coastal”). Moreover, CZMA

has clearly served as a major catalyst for the

development of more-extensive and moreeffective coastal-management programs. Compared with the State-only management frame

work that existed before CZMA, there is little

doubt that current coastal-development patterns

and practices are more protective of sensitive

@ ~f=ue 88 dtisesthe fee-simple and less-than-fee-simple approaches. F@-si.uIPlc ~tiitiOn hlvOh@ ~“ fllllo~P$

or the endre ‘bundle of rights.’ Izss-than-fcesimplc acquisition involves purchasing less than full ownership, or a partial interest in tk lan4

typically the right to build or develop on all or a portion of the land.
Chapter 4-Coasts I 187

coastal resources and have reduced the exposure

of people and property to coastal risks (9, 33).

States have considerable freedom under CZMA

to craft a coastal program to fit their individual

needs and circumstances. It must include certain

basic components, however, including identification of the boundaries of the coastal zone,

definition of permissible land and water uses

within the zone, creation of an inventory and

designation of areas of particular concern, and

identification of the means by which the State will

exert control over activities in the coastal zone.

Some States-Florida and New Jersey, for

example--have taken a networking approach,

pulling together into their coastal programs several already-existing management provisions. Other

States, such as North Carolina, have created

entirely new management and regulatory frameworks and new State decision-making bodies to

implement the program (9).

There is considerable variation in the specific

provisions and management tools used in State

coastal programs and in their stringency and

extent of coverage. Some State programs clearly

have made major strides in reducing the riskiness

of coastal development. At least 13 States now

impose some form of coastal setback, requiring

new development to locate a certain distance

landward of the ocean (table 4-9) (38, 59,71, 89).

Increasingly, these setback requirements are

calculated according to local erosion rates. North

Carolina, for example, uses one of the toughest

erosion-based setbacks. Specifically, for smallscaIe development in beachfront areas, new

development must be set back a distance of at

least 30 times the average annual rate of erosion

for that particular stretch of coastline, measured

from the first stable line of vegetation (61, 71).

Development must also be landward of the crest

of the “primary dune” and of the landward toe of

the “frontal dune. ” For larger structures, the

setback is doubled to 60 times the annual rate of

erosion.

Other types of restrictions are also imposed.

Under New York’s Coastal Erosion Hazard Areas

Table 4-9--Status of U.S. Setback Authorities

State or Setback New policies

Territory Iegislation for sea level rise

Alabama.. . . . . . . . . . .

Alaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

American Samoa. . . . .

California . . . . . . . . . . . .

Connecticut . . . . . . . . . .

Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . .

Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Georgia. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guam. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hawaii. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Illinois. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Louisiana. . . . . . . . . . . .

Maine. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . .

Massachusetts. . . . . . .

Michigan. . . . . . . . . . . .

Minnesota. ... , . . . . . .

Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . .

New Hampshire. . . . . .

New Jersey . . . . . . . . . .

New York . . . . . . . . . . .

North Carolina . . . . . . .

Northern Marianas. . . .

Ohio. ...... 0,..,....

Oregon. . ,. . . . . . . . . . . .

Pennsylvania. . . . . . . . .

Puerto Rico.........,

Rhode Island. . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . . . . . .

Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Virgin lslands. . . . . . . .

Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Washington. . . . . . . . . .

Wisconsin. . . . . . . . . . .

Yes

N o

N o

N o

N o

Yes

Yes

N o

No

Yes

N o

N o

Yes a

No

N o

Yes

N o

N o

N o

Yes b

Yes

Yes

Yes a

No

No

Yes

Yes a

Yes

Yes

No

Yes a

N o

N o

N o

No

No

—

No

No

N o

N o

N o

—

N o

No

N o

Yes

No

No

N o

N o

No

No

No

N o

No

—

No

N o

No

—

N o

Yes

No

—

No

No

No

a State haS a construction setback, but It is not primarily for coastalerosion-hazard purposes.

b The State setback currently applies only to projects requiring a

State coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) permit (i.e., projects

of greater than 24 residential units). A proposed bill would revamp

CAFRA and give the State greater control over oceanfront areas.

Local municipalities have authority for “sub-CAFRA” projects

through dune- and beach-protection ordnances.

SOURCES: J. Houlahan, “Comparison of State Coastal Setbacks to

Manage Development In Coastal Hazard Areas,” Coastal Management, vol. 17, 1989; P. Klarin and M. Hershman, “Response of Coastal

Zone Management Programs to Sea Level Rise in the United States,”

Coastal Management, vol. 18, 1990.
188 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Act,30 for example, in certain erosion zones (i.e.,

so-called ‘structural hazard zones’ ‘), only ‘movable’ structures are permitted (71). Specific

density limitations are imposed by some States in

certain high-risk locations. Under North Carolina’s program, for instance, development in inlet

hazard zones is restricted to structures less than

5,000 square feet (450 square meters)31 in size,

and generally must not exceed a density of more

than one unit per 15,000 square feet of developable land (61).

Some coastal States have also imposed significant restrictions on the building of erosioncontrol structures (e.g., seawalls, revetments, and

groins). North Carolina, South Carolina, and

Maine have banned the construction of new,

permanent shore-hardening structures altogether.

Such actions serve in the long run to reduce

destruction of beaches, and put property owners

on notice that should a beachfront structure

become subject to erosion hazards, it will not be

permissible to allow the construction of such

protective (yet damaging) structures. States like

North Carolina have managed to resist recent

political challenges to such controls.

Most coastal States have also imposed restrictions on development in tidal, or saltwater,

wetlands, and a smaller number apply restrictions

to nontidal, or freshwater, wetlands. States typically require a permit before certain activities can

take place in wetland areas, and usually include a

more expansive list of potentially damaging

activities than those regulated under the Federal

Section 404 program (see below and vol. 2, ch. 4).

Regulated activities typically include discharging

dredge material, draining wetlands, cutting trees,

and destroying vegetation. These regulations

often extend to adjacent buffer areas as well. State

wetland standards often incorporate many of the

key concepts contained in the EPA-developed

Section 404(b) guidelines, including restricting

development activities to water-dependent uses

and forbidding such activities where practicable

alternatives exist.

Most state wetland programs also require

mitigation when natural wetlands are destroyed or

damaged. Imposed mitigation ratios-the amount

of created, restored, or enhanced acreage required

for each acre of natural wetland destroyed or

damaged--can be two-to-one or greater (77).

Many State coastal programs also seek to

manage rebuilding and reconstruction after hurricanes or other major flooding events. Most State

programs require development permits for rebuilding substantially damaged structures. Hurricanes and coastal-storm events, while exacting

substantial human and economic cost, often

represent opportunities to rebuild in ways that

minimize exposure to future risks (e.g., through

relocation and through elevating structures and

setting them further back from the water).

The South Carolina Beachfront Management

Act (BMA), originally created in 1988, contained

some of the most stringent reconstruction provisions in the country when Hurricane Hugo hit the

coast a year later (see box 4-C). In enacting the

BMA, the State sought to explicitly implement a

long-term shoreline-retreat policy. Under the

original act, habitable structures that were found

to be “damaged beyond repair’ (i.e., damaged by

more than 662/3 percent) could only be rebuilt

landward of a no-construction zone (the so-called

“dead zone”). All structures rebuilt within a

larger 40-year erosion zone were also required to

move as far landward as possible (see fig. 4-6).

The rebuilding of pools and recreational amenities damaged more than 50 percent was also

prevented, and restrictions were placed on rebuilding erosion-control structures if damage was

greater than 50 percent. Vertical seawalls could

be replaced with sloping barriers, but only under

certain conditions (6, 70).

Opposition to the rebuilding restrictions after

Hurricane Hugo was intense, especially by beachM ~cle 34, New York Environmental Conservation hlw.

31 ~ conv~ WW feet to square metera, multiply by 0.093.
Chapter 4--Coasts 1189

Box 4-C-South Carolina, Hurricane Hugo, and Coastal Development

No natural event illustrates the vulnerability of coastal areas to erosion, flooding, and wind damage rmre

convincingly than the onslaught of a major hurricane. Hurricane Hugo, which hit the coast of South Carolina in

1989, was an unusuaily powerful storm. Classified as a category 4 hurricane (see box 4-A), Hugo was one of the

most powerful storms ever to strike the East Coast of the United States. The storm surge accompanying Hugo

exceeded 20 feet (6 meters)’ above mean sea level in some locations (84). This high water level, plus strong winds

and heavy rains, destroyed coastal real estate and affected farms, forests, and coastal habitats along much of the

181-miie (2904dlometer)2 South Carolina coastline. Such intense storms are rare, but hurricanes of lower intensity

and strong storms are a recurring, year-round phenomenon along the eastern seaboard. Each year, millions of

dollars of damage to public and private infrastructure and property occurs along the East Coast as a result of these

storms. In addition, significant, though usually less well-publiazed, damage occurs to the natural environment.

Each year, as well, population in coastal areas increases more rapidly than population in other parts of the

country. As a consequence, the exposure of people and property to coastal hazards is steadily increasing.

Development pressures in South Carofina and throughout the Southeast are Intense. Between 1980 and 1990,

for example, South Caroiina’s population increased by 13 percent. In coastal counties, however, population

increased by 22 percent, and in the popular Myrtte i3each resort, it increased by over 40 percent (15).

Damage to South Carolina from Hurricane Hugo was extensive and was a resuit of both the intensity of the

storm and the density and type of development in the area it struck. The following catalog of losses caused by

Hugo illustrates the variety of ways that human lives and ecosystems can be disrupted and suggests the necessity

of implementing strong coastal-zone-management policies and of educating the public about the risks of living in

hazardous areas.

Homes and buildfnga-l+urricane Hugo caused about $7 billion in property damages in North and South

Cardim Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, the four principal areas affected. Charleston County, South cardi~

was one of the hardest hit areas, suffering more than $1.9 billion in damages, about 30 percent of the assessed

property value of the area Acoording to the American Red Cross, Hugo destroyed 3,307 single-family homes in

the major impact area. An additional 18,171 homes sustained major damage, and 56,580 sustained minor

m.Mofethan 12,600 tilehomes were destroyed, and approximately 18,000 units ofmultifarnitydweilings

were either destroyed or damaged (1 9). Despite the large number of homes destroyed, many homeowners rebuilt

in the same location. Over 90 percent of homes destroyed in the hard hit and affiuent communities of Sullivan’s

Island and Isle of Palms, for example, were rebuiit in approximately the same place, a pattern that was repeated

in many beachfront communities.

Tourism-South Carolina’stourist industry depends heavily on coastal attractions and generates rnorethan

$8 billion annually. The tourist industry suffered amajorblowfrom Hurricane Hugo. In the Charleston Metropolitan

Are% for example, attendance at local attractions dunhg the 3 months following the storm was down 72 percent

compared with attendance during the same period the previous year. Attendance finally returned to normal levels

3 years after the storm.

Forests and the forest Industry-About half the land in South Caroiina’s coastal counties is devoted to

either forestry or agriculture. Over 1.8 million acres (0.7 million hectares)3 of the State’s coastal forests were

-bY ~nd and waterr. @WM on timberlands =US~ W l+urfica~ Hugo amounted to about $1 biilion.

1 TO convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.

2 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609

3 TO convgrt acxes to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

(Continued on next page)
190 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 4-C-South Carolina, Hurricane Hugo, and Coastal Development-(Continued)

Seventy percent of saw timber in Francis Marion National Forest northeast of Charleston was downed, and over

6 billion board feet (12 million cubic meters)4 of pine and hardwood sawtimberwere damaged. The amount of dead

and downed wood amounted to 3 times the annual harvest in the State, enough to house virtually all the peopie

of West Virginia. The damaged trees are now more susceptible to fire and insect attack.

Agriculture-The agriculture industry suffered over $320 miiiion in damages from sait contamination and

high winds. immediately after the hurricane, sodium concentrations on some agricultural iands near the coast were

120 times the average annual concentration, and signs of sait stress can stiii be found on vegetation in coastai

and tidai areas (30). Further inland, vegetables and orchards were heaviiy damaged by the high winds, and many

farm structures also sustained damage.

Seafood industry-Of the 316 commercial fishing vesseis iicensed in South Caroiina, 58 (18 percent) were

damaged or destroyed. The totai damage to vessels amwnted to about $3 miilion (85).

Tax receipts-The effects of Hurricane Hugo on South Caroiina’s tax base were mixed. Because a iarge

number of properties were destroyed, short-term reductions in tax collections did occur, but this impact was not

severe. The property tax rate and other fees were temporarily increased in some hard-hit areas after the storm

to maintain services and compensate for ioss of some dweliings from the tax roils~ However, many homes

destroyed by Hugo were increased in size when rebuilt, and thus assessed at higher rates than before the storm.

About haif of the property loss attributed to Hugo was uninsured, so State income taxcoiiections were negatively

affected as a resuit of income write-offs from casuaity iosses.

Ironically, because of increased demand on lodging, accommodation tax collections increased foiiowing the

storm. The area also experienced a significant increase in personai income, in part because ofadramatic increase

in coastai construction jobs. By the Spring of 1990, neariy 8,000 construction jobs had been added to the State’s

economy, more than offsetting the 6,800 jobs temporarily iost in the twrist industry. As a resuit, income and saies

tax collections increased, and the net affect on State tax collections was considered a “wash.” One estimate set

the impact on State tax collection at only $12 miilion, a figure too smaii to conclusively attribute to Hugo (80).

Shoreiine impacts and beach renourishment—Extensive shoreiine erosion was caused by Hurricane

Hugo. Some of the most noticeable effects inciuded the erosion of the primary dune riige system and the reduction

in width and siope of beaches. To repair eroded beaches, the State and severai coastai communities spent over

$1.5 miilion on emergency dune scraping, over $7 miilion for the piacementof 1.2 miilion cubic yards (0.9 miiiion

cubic meters)e of sand on Grand Strand beaches, and about $1.2 miliion for sand fencing and revegetation

between North Myrtie Beach and Foliy Beach (44).

Coastai wetiand~ait marshes escaped significant damage from Hurricane Hugo. Primary productivity in

these coastai marshes was virtuaiiy unaffected. The high tide during Hugo’s iandfail may have spared marshes

from potentiai wave damage. During the months after the storm, some marshes advanced into adjacent forests

suffering from sait damage, iending support to the hypothesis that sizabie storms are capabie of aitering the

boundaries between salt marshes and upiand ecosystems (29).

Marine and coastai wiidiif-immediately after the storm, a reduction of sait and oxygen in coastai waters

iedtoextensive mortality of sea iife in some areas. Repopulation of most areas occurred within 2 months after the

storm, however, as water quality improved (46). Heavy erosion of nesting areas on barrier isiands during the storm

affected some bird populations, inciuding brown peiicans and royai terns. iniand, wit h the exception of afewareas

4 TO convert board feet to cubic meters, multiply by 0.M2.

5 Som taxes are still at the raised levels.

6 TO convert cubic yards to cubic meters, multiply by 0.765.
Chapter 4-Coasts 1191

affeoted by the highest storm surges, heavy wildlife mortality was not noted. Some wildlife in forested areas

damaged by Hugo, however, maybe suppressed for aconsiderabie period beoause damaged forests will require

deoadesto reoover. Forest species Iikelytobe affected inolude gray squirrels, the redackdd woodpecker, and

some forest songbirds (12). Overall, exoept for coastal forests, the natural environment weathered the storm with

little long-term damage.

Personal ioase-During the first weeks after Hurricane Hugo, some disaster vktims experienced anxiety

and mental disorientation (4). Eight in 10 reported experiencing more than normat depression (57). Although

these emotional effects of Hugo decreased with time, other personal losses oould not be restored. These h?clude

iternsdestroyed in the hurricane that, although oflitt!e intrfnsiovalue, had great personal significance toindjvkkmis.

Coastal development isadouble-edged sword in South Caroiinaj asit is in other States. Living nearthecoast

has a strong attraction for many, and as communities grow, bcai revenues increase and public servioes jmprove.

However, as people move to ooastal areas, they expose themselves not only to occadmd intense events jike

Hurricane Hugo but to more mundane, but stijl potentially costly, risks such as erosion and sea level rise.

Hugo-strength storms are rare, but category 2 and 3 hurricanes strike the South Carolina coast about once every

7 or 8 years, on average.

SOURCE: MA. Davidson, Exeeutlve Dlreetor, South Carolina Sea Grant Coneortlum,K.H. Duffy, Duffy and Awe&tee, DJ. Smith,

Southeast Regional Climate Center, and A. Felts, University of Charfeetoo, pereond eommunicatbn, May 1% 1993.

front-property owners.32 Moreover, several *-

undertaken assessments of the issue (45). Eleven

ings decisions (e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina of these have initiated new public and intergovCoastal Council) suggested that the State’s finan- ernmental processes (e.g., forming a sea level rise

cial liability in cases where the dead-zone restric- task force), and 13 States have existing regulaFigure 4-8-New Zones Established by

Beachfront Legislation

tions prevented all reasonable use of a parcel

. . .-

tions that are adaptable (or partially adaptable) to

could exceed $100 million. In 1990, the South

Carolina legislature amended the law, completely

eliminating the dead zone and creating a special

variance procedure allowing development to

occur even further seaward than the dead zone

under certain conditions. Despite creating somewhat stronger rebuilding restrictions for erosioncontcol devices, the 1990 revisions in many ways

represent apolitical “retreat horn retreat” (6).

Increasingly, State coastal programs arerequiring that local governments prepare hurricane and

coastal-storm recovery and reconstruction plans.

North Carolina was the fiist State to impose such

requirements, but other States have followed suit

(e.g., Florida and South Carolina) (34). Some

States have begun to explicitly incorporate conSetbaok

line t 1 I

1 /’

Baseline

No ~

~ construction I

I 1 zone \

I 1 1 1 I 8 1

I I I

1 t

1

1 1

I 1

1 I

1

1

I I

i

1

sideration of sea level rise into their programs.

Seventeen coastal States have ofilcially recogSOURCE: T. Beatley,“RiekAlloeatlonPolby in the Coaetal Zone: The

Current Frameworkand Future Direetbne,”eontraetor report we~ared

nized the problem of sea level rise and have for the Office of Twhnology Aeeeeement, February 1993. . .

32 some IYJ beachfront structures located in the no-construction zone were found to be damaged beYond repti by Hugo.
192 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 4-D-The “Maine Approach”

One response to sea level rise that may allow room for wetlands to migrate (see vol. 2, ch. 4), as well as

maximize the human use of the coastal zone at minimum cost, has been implemented by the State of Maine. This

State has adopted a poticy of allowing development in the coastal zone to continue subject to the constraint that

structures will have to be abandoned if and when sea level rises enough to t hreaten them (52). Ail new structures,

therefore are presumed movable. This so-called “Maine approach” will likely be less expensive than preventing

development because coastal land would remain in use until the sea rises a given amount, whereas restricting

development prevents the property from being used in the interim even though its inundation maybe decades

away. The presumption of movability is more flexibte than restricting development because it does not require a

specific estimate of how fast the sea will rise or the shore will retreat or how far into the future one should plan.

It also enabtes private real estate markets to discount iand prices according to information on the risk of sea ievel

rise.

The Maine approach can be implemented in several ways. Maine has explicitly adopted this policy along its

sand dune and wettand shores, with regulations that: 1) prohibit bulkhead construction, 2) explicitly put property

owners on notice that structures are presumed to be movable, and 3) require property owners to affirmatively

demonstrate their intention toabandonthe property before being granted a permit to erect a structure in any area

that would support wetland vegetation if sea level rises 3 feet (0.9 meters). Although implemented in 1989, the

Maine approach has not yet been tested, so it is uncertain how weli the approach will work if sea level rise actually

becomes a problem. States’ abilities to require or induce private property owners to allow coastal wetiands to

migrate with arising sea wiil hinge on the batance between t he rights of private property owners and public trust

doctrines. if the Federal Government wishes to promote this type of adaptation, it might do so through changes

in the Coastal Zone Management Act (P.L. 92-583) when it is reauthorized in 1995.

several other State~”nduding North Caroiina-have impliatly adopted the Maine approach along the

ocean coast by prohibiting the construction of sea walis while continuing to allow construction of bulkheads along

wettand shores. In some States, a strict interpretation of the common iaw “pubtic trust doctrine” wouid hold that

as the shoreline migrates inland, so do the public rights to use tidelands for access and environmental purposes,

inciuding wetlands. Finally, private conservancies can implement this approach by purchasing coastal iands and

then reseiiing them at a slight discount in return for deed restrictions prohibiting bulkheads or requiring that the

property revert to the conservancy whenever the sea reaches a threshold.

SOURCE: Office of T~nology Assessment, 1993.

future sea level rise (e.g., coastal setbacks, such as more)(45) (see box 4-D). Also, in certain fiontalthose discussed above). Only three, however,

have adopted new policies specifically to respond

to sea level rise (45).

Under Maine’s Natural Resources Protection

Act, wetland buffer zones are established to

anticipate migration in response to sea level rise.

As this zone moves in the future, development

within it must also move (specifically, development must be relocated or abandoned if water

encroaches on the development for more than a

6-month period or if it is damaged 50 percent or

dune areas (where some development is permitted), developers are required to build structures

exceeding a certain minimum size to take into

account a predicted 3-foot rise in sea levels over

the next 100 years (45).

Some State programs have sought to facilitate

and promote landward relocation of structures. In

response to rising Great Lake levels, the State of

Michigan created the Emergency Home Moving

Program (EHMP). Under this emergency program, the State provided loan-interest subsidies to
Chapter 4--Coasts I 193

property owners wishing to relocate lakefront

structures threatened by erosion (71, 76). Property owners had a choice of either a 3 percent

interest subsidy on the frost $25,000 of relocation

costs or a one-time grant of $3,500. As a

condition of this assistance, property owners had

to move their structures at least 45 feet landward.

The State also implemented an Emergency Home

Flood Protection Program, which provided similar subsidies for the elevation of threatened

structures (71).

Another strategy some States are using is the

acquisition of coastal-hazard areas and sensitive

lands. State programs, such as Florida’s Preservation 2000 program and California’s Coastal

Conservancy program, have been very effective

at protecting wetlands, beaches, and other sensitive coastal lands through outright purchases.33

Many State coastal programs also impose some

form of real estate disclosure requirement, which

may be useful in discouraging hazardous development. Under North Carolina’s program, for

example, an applicant must sign an Areas of

Environmental Concern Hazard Notice to acknowledge that “he or she is aware of the risks

associated with development in the ocean-hazard

area and of the area’s limited suitability for

permanent structures” (61). Under South Carolina’s modified beachfront-management program,

similar disclosure provisions are required when a

special beachfront variance is issued (6).

Building codes and construction standards

represent another important component of many

State and local risk-reduction strategies (although

not necessarily an explicit component of a State’s

coastal program). Coastal structures can be designed to better withstand hurricane winds, waves,

and storm surges. Building codes may be Statemandated (as in North Carolina) or locally

mandated (as in South Carolina) and can vary

substantially in stringency. The Federal CZMA

does not mandate that States impose building

codes, and, in some 12 coastal States, adoption of

building codes is left as a local option. It is not

uncommon for rural areas especially to have no

construction standards (53).

The stringency of the wind-design standard to

which coastal structures must be built is one

variable in State programs. Under the N.C.

Building Code, for instance, construction on the

Outer Banks must be designed to withstand wind

speeds of 120 miles per hour (mph). Structures

there must also adhere to fairly stringent piling

and foundation standards (34). The benefits of

North Carolina’s standards are illustrated by

comparing damages from Hurricanes Alicia and

Diana in Texas and North Carolina, respectively

(75). Though the storms were comparable in

strength and wind speeds, resulting damages were

much less in North Carolina. The lower damages

appear to be due in part to North Carolina’s

mandatory construction standards and to the lack

of any control over building in unincorporated

areas of Texas (see ref. 58).

The South Florida Building Code (SFBC) is

considered one of the strongest prescriptive codes

anywhere and similarly mandates a 120-mph

wind-speed standard. However, inspections of

damage from Hurricane Andrew identified several potential deficiencies in the code, including

poor performance of roof coverings, poor connection between the roof system and the building,

inadequate use of staples to attach plywood

sheathing, and problems with windows and wall

siding (65). Local enforcement and buildercompliance problems were also identified. Although a relatively strong code, some have argued

for even tougher standards given the location,

frequency, and potential magnitude of future

storm events; density of development; and consequent greater threat that projectiles torn from one

home will hit other homes. Others argue that

tougher enforcement, not stronger standards, is

needed.

33 ~esewation XI(ICI is a l~yeu pro~~ eshblish~ in 1990 with the intent of acquir@ $3 billion of environmentally WXISifie Mova

10 years.
194 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

The Federal CZMA, then, has stimulated

considerable coastal planning and management

that may not otherwise have occurred or would

have occurred more slowly. Participation has been

high, and even the two nonparticipating oceanfront

States, Texas and Georgia, have been developing

programs (Section 305 funds are now available

again under the 1990 reauthorization of CZMA).

CZMA has suffered from certain implementation problems, however. First, funding levels

have not changed much since the early 1980s,

with annual implementation monies (Section

306) staying at about $33 million (89). Given the

magnitude of the management tasks, individual

State allocations seem modest. Provision of

additional CZMA monies to States specifically

for the development, strengthening, and enforcement of strong shorefront and hazard-areamanagement provisions could return benefits

many fold. Second, the Federal coastalmanagement program has also historically suffered from a lack of clear and uniform performance standards. Some States have aggressively

managed and controlled coastal development

whereas others have done little. Third, NOAA has

not applied sanctions to States that do not

implement their adopted and approved programs.

Although programs can be “disapproved,” this

action has never been taken. (On the other hand,

the 1990 CZMA amendments now provide for

“interim sanctions” if a State is not performing

adequately.)

POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Although some important improvements in

managing coastal development have been made

in recent years, additional improvements are

likely to be needed to forestall unwise development and to decrease existing vulnerability. The

potential for sea level rise and more frequent

and/or intense storms as a result of climate change

adds to the already significant vulnerability of

both developed and natural areas in the coastal

zone. The following options for readjusting the

existing incentive structure in coastal areas

should be viewed as a starting point for additional

discussion about appropriate changes. These possible changes are summarized in table 4-10.

1 Revamping the National Flood

Insurance Program

The NFIP still provides subsidies to a substantial number of buildings in high-risk coastal areas.

Current NFIP policy has been established by

Congress, and Congress could make program and

policy changes to the NFIP to reduce these

subsidies and otherwise improve floodmitigation activities and reduce damages from

coastal hazards. Several bills suggesting such

changes have been introduced into the 103d

Congress, including S. 1405, the National Flood

Insurance Reform Act of 1993, and H.R. 62, the

National Flood Insurance, Compliance, Mitigation, and Erosion Management Act of 1993.

Several options discussed below could be incorporated into these bills as they evolve.

Option 4-1: Raise premium rates for the

policyholders who receive subsidized flood insurance. Despite the gradual increase in rates over

the years, the average yearly premium paid by

coastal property owners remains modest relative

to the risk. The potential for catastrophic future

storms and sea level rise associated with climate

change suggests that the risks of living near the

coast will be greater in the future. If the availability of flood insurance is to be maintained, rates

may need to be raised to reflect these factors.

Currently, rates reflect only average annual losses; occasional catastrophic losses can be much

higher than average. Rates might be raised to

incorporate an ‘increased cost of reconstruction’

benefit into policies.

Option 4-2: Mandate erosion-management

standards. The current NFIP does not adequately

address long-term erosion trends. One way it

could do so would be to require minimum

erosion-management standards. For example,
Chapter 4-Coasts I 195

Table 4-10--FederaI Programs and Laws Influencing Coastal Development:

Status and Potential Changes

Federal Key Legislative Existing mitigation Potential changes and

program provisions basis provisions policy options

National Flood Provides Federal flood

Insurance insurance to property

Program owners in participating

(NFIP) communities

Communities must adopt

minimum floodplain

management

provisions (e g.,

elevation to 100-yearflood level, restrictions

to building in floodway

Disaster Individual and family

assistance grants program

Public-assistance grants

on 75-25 cost share

Coastal-barrier

management

Federal tax

benefits

Coastal zone

management

National Flood Minimum floodplainInsurance Act management standards,

Flood Disaster Upton-Jones relocation

Protection Act assistance

Community Rating System

1362 flooded properties

purchase program

Stafford Disaster Mitigation grants program

Relief and Section 409 State

Emergency mitigation plan required.

Assistance Act

— — Withdraws Federal Coastal Barrier

subsidies for new Resources Act

development in (COBRA)

designated Coastal

Barrier Resources

System (C BRS);

prohibits issuance of

new flood insurance,

post-disaster

assistance, and other

development funds,

Casualty-loss deduction, U S Tax Code

Interest and property tax

deductions for second

homes.

Accelerated depreciation

for seasonal rental

properties.

Federal funds and Coastal Zone

technical assistance Management Act

for developing and (CZMA)

implementing State

coastal-management

plans (cost-share

basis).

Adjust premium rates

Mandate erosionmanagement standards.

Curtail insurance for highrisk, repetitive-loss

properties,

Prohibit new insurance in

risky locations.

Incorporate sea level rise in

mapping and rate

structure

Expand relocation

assistance

Reduce Federal share for

public assistance

Require more stringent

mitigation

Impose ability-to-pay

standard

Eliminate public-assistance

funds altogether,

Review criteria for declaring

disasters.

Further limit subsidies.

Expand coverage to other

sensitive lands.

Promote State coastal barrier

resource acts.

Acquire undeveloped areas

Eliminate or reduce tax

benefits for coastal

development

Create tax deductions to

support mitigation.

State coastal-management Mandate stronger

plans (e.g., ocean-front development controls.

setbacks, land Expand resources available

acquisition, construction to coastal States.

standards, post-storm

reconstruction

standards).
196 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 4-10--Federal Programs and Laws Influencing Coastal Development:

Status and Potential Changes--( Continued)

Federal Key Legislative Existing mitigation Potential changes and

program provisions basis provisions policy options

Beach Provision of funding and

renourishment technical assistance

and shore for beachprotection renourishment and

shore-protection

projects.

Federal cost share from

55 to 90 percent

Federal Restricts discharge of

wetland dredge and fill

protection materials into U.S.

waters.

Federal Flood

Control Acts (of

1917, 1936, 1945,

1955, 1968; for a

detailed review of

these, see ref. 71)

Section 404 of the

Clean Water Act

Discourage permanent

shoreline stabilization.

Increase State and local

contribution.

Phase out Federal funding of

beach renourishment.

Condition funding on

minimum State and local

coastal management.

Section 404 (b)(l) Tighten regulatory control in

guidelines, and U.S. Section 404 permit review,

Army Corps of Incorporate sea level rise into

Engineers public-interest wetland management

review. decisions.

Explore use of transferable

development rights.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1993

minimum State or local erosion setbacks could be

required as a condition of participation in the

NFIP (see also option 4.18, below). Alternatively,

communities could be penalized for failure to

adopt minimum setbacks-for example, by making them ineligible for mitigation and relocation

assistance, by raising insurance premiums, or by

reducing future claims in 10-year erosion zones.

Erosion-based setbacks, such as these in North

Carolina, represent models, although the time

frames used for calculating the setback could be

expanded. Where lot depths or project designs

allow, more extensive setbacks could be encouraged or required, for example. Another option for

addressing erosion would be to factor long-term

erosion trends into the premium rate structure for

existing and future policyholders.

A precursor for improved erosion management

is identifying and mapping erosion risks. Property

owners are not anxious to have such risks

identified due to potential adverse effects on

housing values, but construction in erosion zones

is risky and potentially costly to the Federal

Government as well as to both present and future

property owners. The Federa1 Insurance Administration is currently working, on guidelines and

standards for mapping erosion zones, but Congress needs to give the agency the authority to

begin mapping.

Option 4-3: Prohibit new insurance policies in

risky locations. NFIP could take several actions to

reduce its long-term insurance liability and to

bring the program more in line with the riskaverse philosophy of private-sector insurers. It

could acknowledge that development in certain

locations is extremely risky and prohibit all new

insurance policies in these locations. In particular,

the program could be changed so that no new

insurance would be issued in V zones or in

high-risk erosion zones (e.g., within a 10-year

erosion zone). H.R. 1236, introduced in the 102d

Congress, contained language prohibiting all new

flood-insurance policies for development seaward of the 30-year erosion line. Eventually

eliminating new insurance within the 50-year

erosion zone might also be considered.

A downside of this option is that it would limit

the number of people paying into the fund. Also,

those who insisted on building without flood

insurance might still be helped by disaster relief

after a major disaster but would have contributed

nothing in the way of insurance premiums.
Chapter 4-Coasts I 197

Option 4-4: Increase insurance premiums

after each claim on properties subject to multipleflooding claims. Current NFIP regulations do not

substantially restrict how often a homeowner may

rebuild after a loss, even if a future loss can be

reasonably foreseen. By tying insurance premiums in high-risk areas to the number of losses a

property has sustained, homeowners will have

more incentive to consider coastal hazards in

rebuilding decisions. Congress could also consider establishing a limit on the number of claims

permissible before insurance is terminated (e.g.,

just as an automobile-insurance company might

terminate a policy in the event of multiple

accidents).

Option 4-5: Incorporate sea level rise into the

NFIP mapping and rate structure. As discussed

in earlier sections, future sea level rise may serve

to substantially increase the size of the coastal

zone subject to inundation and flooding in the

future. The current NFIP mapping and rate

structure does not take this into account, in part

because FEMA contends that a 12-inch rise in sea

level would not significantly affect the ability of

the rating system to respond (21). Incorporation

of even conservative estimates of sea level rise

into FEMA maps might serve to discourage future

development in these areas and put coastal

communities and property owners on notice about

such future risks. Development that does occur in

these areas would be subject to certain minimum

flood-management standards (e.g., elevation requirements). A means of accomplishing essentially the same goal may be to update floodplain

maps more frequently. More-frequent updates

would reflect changes related to sea level rise as

well as those related to recent development. FIA

maps are currently updated, on average, only once

every 9 years. FIA’s own goal for revisions is

once every 5 years. More frequent updates would

require more staff and additional funds.

Option 4-6: Expand relocation assistance.

FEMA and NFIP could substantially expand the

emphasis given to relocation assistance. The

existing Section 1362 and Upton-Jones programs

represent good strategies but are underused and

underfunded. Section 1362, or something like it,

could be expanded and funding could be increased. Efforts could be made to expand the use

of Upton-Jones, as well, and to promote relocation as an alternative over demolition. Among

possible improvements to Upton-Jones that could

be considered are: 1) requiring relocation outside

high-risk locations (e.g., landward of the 30-year

erosion line), not simply making future insurance

conditional on such relocation, and 2) expanding

eligibility beyond the currently narrow definition

o f imminent collapse.

Incentives to relocate could be made stronger

by modifying the ways in which NFIP treats

structures that are at risk because of erosion.

Requiring higher premiums for structures seaward of certain erosion zones (e.g., the 30-year

erosion line) would create financial incentives to

relocate. Cutting off insurance to structures within

a zone of imminent collapse (e.g., within the 10-

or 5-year erosion line) after a certain period of

time (e.g., 2 years after a chosen date) may have

a similar effect, but property owners whose

homes were subsequently destroyed could still

claim casualty-loss deductions, thus offsetting

other Federal tax liabilities.

The Federal Government may also wish to help

States develop their own more-extensive relocationassistance programs. Just as the Federal Government has helped States establish revolving funds

to finance improvements in local sewagetreatment plants (see ch. 5), so also could the

Federal Government help States establish coastalrelocation revolving funds.

Under the Clean Water Act P.L. 92-500), the

Federal Government has encouraged creation of

State wastewater revolving funds through the

provision of start-up capitalization grants. Once

established, States then allow local governments

to borrow funds for the construction of new

wastewater treatment facilities or the improvement and upgrading of existing facilities. Loans

are provided at interest rates at or below fair

market (depending on factors such as a commu-
1981 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

nity’s financial circumstances and the severity of

the water-quality problem). In the case of Virginia’s Water Facilities Loan Fund, annual payments back to the fund are required, and full

repayment of loans must occur within 20 years

(e.g., see ref. 92). Thus, annual repayment by

borrowers ensures a steady pool of funds available for new loans.

Such revolving funds could be similarly useful

in providing grants to assist private property

owners in locating and purchasing alternative

coastal or noncoastal sites. State revolving funds

might be used to purchase relocation sites in

advance, later making them available to beachfront-property owners needing to relocate. Property owners could then be asked to repay the fund

for these acquisition costs, perhaps at belowmarket rates.

Such a fund could also be useful in purchasing

damaged properties after a hurricane or major

storm event, in turn selling or relinquishing these

lands to local governments for needed beachaccess points and public recreational areas. In

rare cases, land swaps may be possible, allowing

a beachfront-property owner to trade for a Stateacquired relocation lot further inland.

States could also be required to consider and

incorporate relocation strategies and programs in

the hazard-mitigation plans required by Section

409 of the Stafford Act (71). Relocation programs could be a minimum-requirement component of State 409 plans.

I Revamping Disaster Assistance

The existing disaster-assistance framework could

be modified in several ways to reduce incentives

for hazardous and costly coastal development

patterns, including the following.

option 4-7: Reduce the Federal share of

public assistance. Typically, the Federal Government share of disaster-assistance funds for States

and communities has been 75 percent. In some

recent cases, the Federal Government has provided 100 percent of the disaster-assistance monies. Although it is difficult to specify what the

Federal share of such assistance ought to be, very

high levels of assistance are probably a disincentive to improving State and local disaster mitigation. Unsuccessful efforts have been made in the

past to reduce the Federal share to no more than

50 percent. Cost-sharing proportions have

changed in other areas, however. For example,

the Federal share of water-resources-development studies has been reduced from 100 to 50

percent in recent years in a successful effort to

motivate more thoughtful State consideration of

water projects (see ch. 5).

Option 4-8: Tie disaster assistance more

strongly to State and local hazard-reduction

programs. The mitigation provisions and requirements currently included under the Stafford Act

are already strong. However, a shortcoming may

be that FEMA does not force States and localities

to adopt mitigation (e.g., a dune-protection ordinance) as a condition of disaster assistance.

FEMA rarely withholds disaster-assistance funds

from States that fail to adopt or implement

mitigation measures. Most States prepare Section 409 mitigation plans, but there is generally no

mechanism for requiring or ensuring that States

implement the plans. Thus, FEMA could adopt a

more stringent view of mitigation, more clearly

and aggressively tying disaster-assistance funds

to tangible, long-term hazard-reduction policies,

programs, and actions.

It may also be useful to establish some clearer

system for judging State accountability for Section 409 progress. States could be required to

more clearly indicate the mitigation actions they

agree to adopt and implement within a specified

time frame (e.g., adopting a shoreline setback

requirement). Although politically difficult in the

face of a disaster, the Federal Government could

specify that subsequent Federal disaster assistance would not be provided where the plan has

not been implemented. Alternatively, subsequent

assistance could be limited, for example, to no

more than 50 percent of otherwise eligible funding, or States could be required to repay disaster
.—-.

assistance if mitigation measures are not adopted

within a specified period.

FEMA could try to establish a system for

certifying that State 409 plans meet a minimum

mitigation threshold, that is, that they contain

actions and policies sufficient to bring about a

substantial degree of long-term risk reduction.

For example, coastal States could be required to

adopt a building code (or mandate local adoption)

and to ensure that an adequate system of implementation and enforcement will exist. Such

minimum construction standards (perhaps one of

several standard codes) could be made a condition

of participation in the NFIP, or of receiving

funding under CZMA. The Federal Government

could also consider raising national wind standards for mobile homes.

Option 4-9: Consider ability to pay and extent

of damages. The existing disaster-assistance framework fails to explicitly consider the ability of

affected localities and States to assume disaster

losses, or the extent of damage actually incurred.

Once a disaster area is designated, all localities

are eligible for disaster assistance regardless of

the extent or size of damage incurred. Much

Federal disaster assistance is provided in small

amounts to numerous localities--damage levels

that could clearly be covered by local governments. Furthermore, certain localities (and

States) are wealthier and have a greater capacity

to pay for and assume the costs of hurricanes and

other disasters. FEMA has proposed a $2.50 per

capita threshold for costs per disaster to determine

when local resources are adequate and when

Federal funds are not necessary or appropriate.

Survey data indicate that most local governments

could easily cope with this level of loss and that

a sizable proportion of governments could cope

locally with per capita losses of $14 or more (11).

A threshold provision would act as a kind of

disaster “deductible,” and Federal resources

would kick in only after it is reached. Such a

system would further contribute to greater accountability of local and State governments for

Chapter 4-Coasts I 199

their decisions and to greater equity in the

disaster-assistance system overall.

Option 4-10: Eliminate public-assistance funds.

Although not very feasible politically, certain

categories of disaster assistance could be eliminated. Although the public generally supports the

role of the Federal Government in assisting

individuals and families in recovery and rebuilding, this “helping” sentiment may not be as

strong when it comes to helping States and

localities rebuild boardwalks or local streets. One

possibility would be to develop alternatives to

outright grants, including creating a Federal

public-assistance-loan program. If local governments need to borrow funds to rebuild sewer

systems, roads, and recreational amenities, this

kind of program would make such funds available

but subject to repayment with interest. Loans

could be offered at below-market interest rates.

Such an arrangement may result in more cautious

local and State investment policies. Another

possibility might be to develop some type of

insurance fund for local governments.

Option 4-11: Through oversight hearings,

Congress could review the criteria used by the

President to declare disasters. One question that

could be investigated is whether existing criteria

are too generous in situations that are not major

disasters.

H Extending and Expanding the Coastal

Barrier Resources Act (COBRA)

Although withdrawal of Federal subsidies from

barrier-island development clearly will not stop

such development, it has been shown to slow it.

Moreover, this approach is sensible from the

perspective of taxpayer equity: if developers and

coastal property owners choose to build in

high-risk locations, at least the general public

would not have to pay for it. The COBRA experience is positive, but efforts could be made to

expand its coverage and strengthen its provisions.

option 4-12: Further limit subsidies. As noted

earlier, COBRA does not eliminate all Federal
200 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

subsidies. Important remaining subsidies include

the casualty-loss deduction under the U.S. Tax

Code, Federal block grants., and grants and loans

from federally insured banks. COBRA could be

strengthened, and coastal development on designated units further discouraged, by eliminating

these remaining subsidies. CoBRA could also be

modified to prohibit Federal subsidy of projects

and expenditures that, although technically outside the Coastal Barrier Resources System, serve

to directly encourage or facilitate development

(e.g., construction of a bridge).

Option 4-13: Expand coverage to other sensitive lands. Consideration should also be given to

expanding the kinds of lands to which Federal

subsidies are limited, including other sensitive

coastal areas besides barrier islands. These could

include coastal wetlands (and wetland buffer

zones), estuarine shorelines, critical wildlife habitat, and Other areas (see vol. 2, ch. 4). Substantial

resource-management benefits could result from

the “CoBRA-cizing” of other sensitive lands.

Also, efforts to expand the CBRS to the Pacific

Coast, although currently meeting some resistance, could be continued.

Option 4-14: Encourage the development of

State COBRAS. Florida is one State that has

imposed certain limitations on future State investments in high-risk coastal areas, but few other

States have such restrictions. One way the Federal

Government could encourage development of

CoBRAS in other States and reinforce the effects

of Federal limitations is to require as an element

of State coastal-zone-management plans that

States consider the circumstances under which

restrictions on State investments in coastal areas

might be appropriate. Restrictions on expenditures for State roads and bridges might be

considered, for example. This change could be

implemented when CZMA is reauthorized in

1995.

Option 4-15: Acquire undeveloped areas.

Although COBRA has been able to slow development of barrier islands, studies by the U.S.

General Accounting Office and others illustrate

that development will likely continue in many

places despite withdrawal of Federal subsidies

(88). Consequently, consideration should be given,

as suggested by GAO and others, to acquiring

many of the remaining undeveloped barrierisland units.

Acquisition now, though costly, may be costeffective in the long run. Acquisition is especially

warranted for barrier-island units of special ecological importance (e.g., those that contain endangered species habitat) and in areas that could

provide important public-recreation benefits. Acquisition could be encouraged at Federal, State,

and local levels, and in concert with private

conservation groups and land trusts. At the

Federal level, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

is the logical agency to spearhead such acquisition (see also vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

9 Revamping the U.S. Tax Code

As discussed in earlier sections, the U.S. Tax

Code offers several major subsidies for coastal

development, including casualty-loss deductions

for damage from hurricanes and storms, depreciation tax shelters for seasonal rental properties, and

deductibility of mortgage interest and property

taxes for second homes. The actual effect of these

tax benefits is difficult to determine. They do

represent another major category of public subsidy of coastal development.

Option 4-16: Eliminate or reduce tax benefits

for coastal development. For example, the casualty-loss deduction (that is, the deduction for

losses in excess of insurance coverage) could be

eliminated altogether for risks peculiar to the

coastal zone, or restricted only to damages that

occur to a principal residence (see ref. 71).

Option 4-17: Modify the Tax Code to support

and encourage mitigation. This could be accomplished, for instance, by providing a tax deduction

for home improvements intended to mitigate

storm damages or for expenses associated with

relocation (including purchase of a relocation lot).
—

Chapter 4-Coasts I 201

M Strengthening State and Local

Coastal Management

Generally, coastal States and localities are in

the best position to manage and control coastal

development. Also, efforts to impose land-use

planning or land-use controls at the Federal level

have met with great skepticism and political

opposition at the State level. On the other hand,

the Federal CZMA has been successful in motivating improvements in coastal planning and

management since it was passed more than two

decades ago. Significantly, the 1990 amendments

to the CZMA recognized for the first time the

potential importance of climate change and sea

level rise and called for coastal States to anticipate and plan for these possibilities. CZMA could

be further modified and reinforced, when reauthorized in 1995, to promote greater risk reduction and more sensible land-development patterns.

Option 4-18: Mandate certain specific--and

stronger+ minimum development controls. These

could include, for instance, an erosion-setback

program (already adopted by several States),

restrictions on construction of immovable buildings, a relocation-assistance program and restrictions on rebuilding damaged or destroyed structures in high-risk locations, and adoption of

minimum coastal-construction standards. Major

Federal financial subsidies could be accompanied

by the adoption of certain minimum riskreduction measures. Minimum measures could

also include wetland protection (possibly including protection of buffer and migration areas-see

vol. 2, ch. 4) and minimum consideration of sea

level rise in coastal programs.

The CZMA program could also be adjusted to

create financial incentives to undertake additional

risk-reduction measures. The current coastal-zoneenhancement grants program (Section 309) represents a movement in this direction and does

include, as areas eligible for funding, management and protection of coastal wetlands and

management of natural hazards (including sea

level rise). More comprehensively, a “coastalhazards-management program’ could be required

as a component of State CZM programs. Such a

program might be modeled after the non-pointsource-pollution-management program that participating coastal States were required to develop

under the 1990 CZMA amendments. EPA and

NOAA together oversee this program and jointly

approve the State programs. A similar arrangement could be created with NOAA and FEMA.

Option 4-19: Expand available resources. The

current level of funding provided to coastal States

is meager at best. Annual appropriations for State

program implementation (Section 306 funds)

have remained around $33 million, despite the

fact that the magnitude of coastal-management

problems is increasing. Also, since the number of

States participating in the CZM program has

increased, funding available per State has decreased. Adequate funding is needed to implement State regulatory and development provisions (e.g., setback requirements) and to facilitate

local coastal planning. Additional funding earmarked for State actions and programs that reduce

coastal risks could also be provided. Funding for

such coastal-planning activities could be a costeffective expenditure that can serve to reduce

long-term risks, as well as to better protect coastal

environmental resources.

The Federal Government could also, to the

extent possible, help to facilitate the development

and implementation of State land-acquisition

programs. Programs such as Florida’s Conservation and Recreation Lands (CARL) program and

California’s Coastal Conservancy represent some

of the most effective and sensible strategies for

protecting wetlands, barriers, and other sensitive

coastal lands and for preventing future exposure

of people and property to coastal risks. The

Federal Government could facilitate such programs by providing technical assistance and seed

monies for State acquisition funds.
202 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

1 Shoreline Protection and

Beach-Nourishment Programs

Significant subsidies to coastal development

have also occurred through the programs and

activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

including construction of shoreline-stabilization

structures and funding of beach-nourishment

projects.

Option 4-20: Discourage permanent shoreline

stabilization where feasible. Several States have

taken the lead in banning permanent shorehardening structures such as sea walls and groins.

Such Projects are costly and may actually increase

development pressures. The Corps (or Congress)

could develop a long-term coastal-management

strategy that explicitly discourages the use of

such hard shoreline techniques, except where

absolutely necessary. Priority could be given to

beach renourishment and approaches that are less

environmentally damaging.

Option 4-21: Increase State and local contributions and phase out Federal finding of beachrenourishment projects. Concurrently, States could

be encouraged to ensure that a substantial portion

of renourishment costs are borne by beach-front

communities and property owners. Ideally, the

property owners and businesses directly benefiting from these investments would bear the lion’s

share of their costs. Renourishment can legitimately be considered a maintenance cost and,

therefore, not eligible for Federal funding. Earmarking local revenue sources, such as special tax

(renourishment) districts, a dedicated sales tax, or

a tourist tax, could be encouraged.

As an alternative, Federal funding could be

eliminated entirely (or phased out over time), and

perhaps replaced with Federal seed monies for

States to establish revolving-fund renourishment

programs. An approach could be taken similar to

that used for Federal funding of sewage treatment

plants under the Clean Water Act (see ch. 5).

Option 4-22: Make the Federal proportion of

funding for renourishment projects conditional

on adoption of certain State and local coastalmanagement initiatives. These could include, for

example, setback requirements, post-disaster restrictions, and relocation assistance.

I Strengthening Wetland Protection

The Federal Government currently exercises

substantial regulatory and management control

over coastal wetlands. The existing programs,

principally Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,

jointly implemented by the Army Corps of

Engineers and EPA, could be further strengthened

to take into account future sea level rise and to

better guard against destruction by coastaldevelopment pressures. OTA’S options for improving wetland protection are discussed m

volume 2, chapter 4.

FIRST STEPS

With or without climate change, average annual property damage in the coastal zone is

expected to continue increasing (78). People will

continue to move into and develop hazard-prone

areas. As previously noted, for example, the

damage-causing potential of hurricanes is much

greater now in many coastal areas than it was

several decades ago. This greater threat is attributable mostly to the fact that the coastal zone has

become more intensively developed. Moreover,

this development trend shows no sign of abating.

Thus, coastal hazards are not just the result of

uncontrollable natural phenomena. Rather, the

growing coastal population both contributes to

and modifies such hazards.

We suggest in this chapter that improvements

can be made in allocating and managing risk in

coastal areas. However, given current demographic trends, the longer the Nation waits to

address the shortcomings of current policies, the

more difficult and expensive coping with future

disasters will be. There is no need to wait for

unequivocal information about the nature of

climate change; acting now to mitigate coastal

hazards through implementation of prudent policies is likely to save both the public and private
Chapter 4-Coasts I 203

sectors substantial sums in the coming decades, as

well as save lives and natural areas and improve

the quality of coastal living. When climate change

is considered, however, with its potential for

accelerated sea level rise and the possibility of

more-intense or more-frequent storms, the case

for strengthening existing policies is even more

compelling.

Implementation of some or all of the options

considered in this chapter could help send clearer

signals to residents, potential residents, businesses, and visitors of coastal areas about the

nature of coastal risks and the costs associated

with those risks. Many of the options suggested in

this chapter would also promote the flexibility

and efficiency needed for adapting to a changing

climate. Several bills now before the 103d Congress and some upcoming reauthorizations of

existing laws could provide excellent “targets of

opportunity” for implementing some of these

options.

■ Revamp the National Flood Insurance

Program. Congress has been considering

revamping the National Flood Insurance

Program for several years, and bills to do this

have been introduced in both the House and

Senate. S. 1405, the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1993, and H.R. 62, the

National Flood Insurance Compliance, Mitigation, and Erosion Management Act of

1993, contain provisions that partially address some of the NFIP options presented in

this chapter (e.g., erosion management, relocation assistance, repetitive losses, and insurance for risky locations). As these bills

evolve, other options in this chapter could be

incorporated.

■ Improve disaster assistance. Several bills

have also been introduced in the 103d

Congress to revise disaster-assistance policies and regulations. OTA’S disasterassistance options could be incorporated

into these evolving bills. H.R. 935, the

Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurricane Hazards Insurance Act of 1993, for

example, would establish minimum criteria

for reducing losses, recommends such measures as fiscal incentives to reduce losses,

provides for low-interest loans or grants to

retrofit facilities vulnerable to hurricanes,

and provides guidelines for establishing

actuarial premium rates for disaster insurance. S. 995, the Federal Disaster Preparedness and Response Act of 1993, would

establish, among other things, a grant program and accompanying performance standards to help States prepare for, respond to,

and recover from major disasters.

■ Strengthen coastal zone management. The

Coastal Zone Management Act will be up for

reauthorization in 1995. OTA’s coastal-zonemanagement options could be included in

reauthorization legislation at that time. In

particular, mandating that States adopt costeffective risk-reduction measures as part of

their CZM programs would help reduce

future vulnerability to climate change. Also,

the reauthorization process would be an

appropriate time to consider whether a

coastal-hazards-management program

should be required as a component of State

CZM programs. With oversight by NOAA

and FEMA, such a program could help

improve coordination among government

agencies as well as help reduce the risk of

living in the coastal zone.

■ Promote public education. The public

generally is not well-informed about the

risks associated with living in coastal areas,

and this lack of awareness has led and will

lead to large and unnecessary public and

private expenditures. Timely public education about erosion, sea level rise, flooding

risks, and building codes, for example, could

be a cost-effective means of reducing future

risk as well as future expenditures. This

“first step” does not appear in any of the

options presented earlier in this chapter;

however, education is equal in importance to

all of the programs discussed here. H.R. 935,
204 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

the Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurricane Hazards Insurance Act of 1993, provides one possibility for expanding public

education. The act authorizes education

programs and provides States the fimds with

which to implement them through the establishment of a self-sustaining mitigation fired

(Section 104). The private sector, and in

particular, the private insurance industry,

could also play an important role in increasing awareness of coastal hazards.

■ Require increased State and local contributions to beach-nourishment operations.

Most benefits of the Army Corps of Engineers’ beach-nourishment and shorelineprotection projects are realized at the local or

regional level, yet these projects are often

heavily subsidized. In most instances the

Federal share is 65 percent. Greater State and

local contributions could be required, both

for initial construction and for maintenance,

tional on adoption of stronger mitigation

measures.

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COASTS-FIRST STEPS

m Revamp the National Flood Insurance Program

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+Aandate erosion-management standards.

E Improve disaster assk?tance

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36. ~R., J. lvfitche~ and C. Senior, “TropicalDisturbances

in a m“ Climate Dynamics, 1992.

37. Hebe~ P., J. Jarrell, and M. Mayfield, The Deadliest, Costliest,

andMostIntense United States Hurricanes of this Century (and

Other Frequendy Requested H-”cane Facts) (Coral Gables,

FL: National Hurricane Center, 1992).

38. Ho- J., “Comparison of State Coastal Setbacks to

Manage Development in Coastal Hazard Areas,” coasta~

Management, vol. 17, 1989.

39. Houstcq J., “Wach.fW Performance,” Shore and Beach, July

1991.

~. ~overnm=~ Pand on Climate Change, Response Strategies working Group, coastal Zone Managelllent subgroup,

Global Climate Change and the Rising Challenge of the Sea

(77x Hague: Ministry of llanspo~ 1992).

41. Joint !Ihsk Force on the H.mmrd Mitigation Grant pro- The

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program: An Evaluation Report,

_by the NationaI Emergency Mma@ment Association

the Association of State Floodplain Managem, and the Federal

~=se~ ~AgerXy, September 1992.

42, Jones, E., and W. Stolzcmbexg, “Building in Coastal Barrier

Resource Systems” (Washington DC: National Wildlife Federation 1990).

43. Kanq T, Conserving South Carolina Beaches Through the

1990s:A CaseforBeachRenourishment (Charleston SC: South

Carolina coastal council, 1990).
206 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

44. Kaxw F., D. Stevens, and C;. Lenntm “Beach and Dune

Restoration Following Hugo,” Shore undBeach, vol. 58, No. 4,

1990.

45. Klar@ P. and M Hershman, “Response of Coastal Zone

Managemalt programs to sea I&vcl Rise in the united state%”

Coastal Management, vol. 18, 1990.

46. Know D., and R. Mastore, “TIM Sbrt-’I&m Effects of

Hurricane Hugo on Fishes and Decapon Crustaceans in the

Ashley River and Adjacent Marsh Cree4 South Cad.in&”

Journal of Coastal Research, No. 8, 1991.

47. Larsoq L., “Fl(mdplainManag cream lhe Gap Between Policy

and Implemedation or Principle and ~“ Water Resourca U“te, No. 90, winter 1993.

a.ti~ s., “Impact of Accelerated sea L&vel Rise on

Beaches and Coastal Wetlands,” b Global Climate Change

L“nkages, J. C. White (cd.) (Amsterdarq The NetherlaIMIs:

Elsevier Science RMishkg, 1989).

49. I&l- s., “National Asscasment of Beach Nodslment

Requuanents Assoaat “ cd with Accelerated Sea Level Rise,” iw

The Potential Eflects of Global Climate Change on the United

States: Appendix B-Sea Level Rise, J. Smith and D. T-

(~s.)@/@qpoqDc: U.s.mviro nmentalProtectionAgency,

1989).

50. Lehmw H., “Accord Ends I@ht Over Use of Lan4°

Wmhington Post, Section E, July 17, 1993.

51. Lins, H., Patterns and Trends qfLand Use and Land Cover on

Atlantz”c and Gu@Bam”er Islandr, USGS Professional Papa

1156 @hShil@Oa DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 1980).

52. Maine, state of, Department of Environmental Protectiq

Natural Resources Protecn”on Act: Coastal Sand Dune Rules,

January 1991.

53. Manning, B. “Building Codes and EnfOSWSWSlt by coastal

States and lkrritories of the United States,” ixx America’s

Vanishing Coastlines, National Committee on Propaty Insurame, 1988.

54. Millexnaq B., And IWo f by Sea: Fighting the Attack on

America’s Coasts (Washin@oq DC: Coast AUiana, 1986).

55. Miller, H., 71trning the We on Wasted TaDolftrrs: Potential

Fe&ral Savings from Adhl”tions to the Coastal Banier Resources System (Waahingto~ DC: National Wildlife Fcderatio&

April 1989).

S6. Miller, H., “On the Brink Coastal Location and Relocation

Choices,” ti Coastal Erosion, Has Retreat Sounded R. Platt

et al. (eds.) (Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Sciences,

university of Colorado, 1992).

57. Musham c., “Charleston After Hugo: A Study of PostHurricane Attitudes, Perceptions, and Behavior of Tri-County

Area Residents,” p- for Hotline and the Trident United

way, 1990.

58. National Committee on Property Insunmm, Amafca’s Vanishing Coastlines, October 1988.

59. National Reseamh Corn@ Managing CoastalErosion (Wash-

@tom DC: National &adern y m 1990).

60. National Reseach Councw Marine Board Commission on

., En@wemg and lkchnical Systems, Responding to Changes in

Sea Level, Engineering hnplic~m”ons (W~ DC: NatiOlld ACtt&XUy press, 1987),

61, North Carolina Division of Coastal Manageme@ A Gw”de to

Protecta”ng Coastal Resources Through the CAJL4 Pem”t

Program @ale@ NC: North Carolina Division of Coastal

hfanagemen~ 1988).

62. R@ R., “The Effects of Sea Level Rise on U.S. Coastal

Wetlands, in: The Potential Effects of Global Climate Change

in the Uniwd States: Appendix Wea Lzvel Rise, J. Smith and

D. Tfrpak (eds.) (Washin@on, DC: U.S. Environmcmtal Protection Agmcy, 1989).

63. Pa& R, M. Treham P. MauseL and R Howe, The Eff2cts ofSea

LevelRise on U.S. Coastal Wetlands andklowlands, HRI Report

No. 164 @diarqo lis, IN: Holcomb Research Institute, Butler

university, 1989).

64. Pelder, w., and A. mShir@q “Global ScaI#elRisc and the

Gm@muse Effect: Might They Be Connected?” Science, vol.

m, 1989, pp. 806-810$

65. ~,D., et al., Hum”cane Andrew-Preli~”nary Observti”ons

of W2?RC Post-Disaster Team (College StatioxL TX: Wd

. . Enpeemg Resealm Councu September 1992).

66. Pi&y, O., “’IIE Engineering of San~” Journal of Geological

Education, vol. 37, 1989.

67. Pilkey, O., and T claytq “Beach Replenishment me

National Solution?” Coastal Zone ’87, American Society of

Civil Engineers, 1987.

68. Pito, V., “Accelerated Sea Level Rise and M@and’s Coast:

Addrew@ the coastal Hazards Issue,” paper presented at the

annual meeting of the Coastal Society, Washington DC, April

1992.

69. PlatL R., “Life Afker Lucas: ‘he Supreme Court and the

DwntmMm Coastal Developer,” Natural Hazards Observer,

September 1992.

70. PI@ R, ‘E Beatley, and H. Miller, “The Folly at Folly Beach

and Other Failings of U.S. Coastal Erosion Policy,” Environment, Novanbes 1991.

71. Plattj R, H. Milk,I Bcatley, J. Melville, and B. Mathcnia

(eds.), Coastal Erosion: Has Retreat Sounded? (Boulder, CO:

Institute for Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado,

1992).

72. Propcxty Claim Services, A Division of American Insurance

Senficcs Group, Inc., “Hurricane Andrew’s Estimated Cost to

Propa’ty Insurers Revised to $15.5 Billion by Property Claim

services,” Febrluuy 1993 (press release),

73. Reidj W., and M. Trexhx, Drowning the Natural Heritage:

Climate Change and US. Coastal Bi&”versity (Washin@on,

DC: World Resourccx Institute, 1991).

74. Reilly, F., Deputy Federal Imuance Admm“ “ trator, Fekal

Administration tathnony at hearings before the

Subcmdnee on Consum er credit and Inmance, House

Banking, Ilnance, and Urban Affairs, June 24, 1993,

75. Rogers, S., P. Spar@ and K. Sparks, “A Study of the

Effectiveness of Building I@dation in Improving the Wind

Resistance of Residential Structures,” National Committee on

Ropaty Inmance, 1988.

76. St. Aman4 L., “Sea bel Rise and Coastal Wetlands:

opportunities for a Peacefd kfigratioq” Environmental Afjbirs, vol. 19,1991.

77. Salvesoq D., Wetlands: Mitigating and Regulating Development Impacts (Washington DC: Urban Land Institute, 1990).
Chapter 4-Coasts I 207

78. Showaltcr, P., W. Riebaamc, and M. My- “Natural Hazard

TksMs in the United States: A IMMnary Review for the

1990s,” Working Paper 83 (Boulda, CO: Natural Harmrda

Rescamh and Applications lnfonnatmn“ center, university of

Colorado, February 1993).

79. Simmons, M., “National Flood Inmance Program Iaalle&”

congressional Research Savicc Issue Brief, Dcccmbcs 1992.

80. South Carolina Budget and Control Board, Division of ~

and statistical Service “ s, Office of Bumoml“c Rescar@ “Economic Impact of Hurricane Hugo,” January 1991.

81. TiWJ., “GrcdxmcEffcct and Coastal Wetland Policy: How

America Could Abandon an Area the Size of~“

Environmental Management, Nwanbar/Dccunbcr 1991,

82. Titus J., and M. Greene, “An @crvicw of b Nationwide

Impacta of Sea Level Risq” h The PotentialE@cts qfGlobal

Climate Change on the United States: Appendix B+ea Lad

Rise, J. Smith and D. Tirpak (cds.) (W~ DC: U.S.

Emkmmcntal Protc!cdon Agency, 1989).

83. Titus, J., R ~ S. Leatkmnet al., “GrocnbmEffcct and

Sea Ixml Rise: The Cost of Holding Back the ~“Coastaf

Management, vol. 19, 1991.

84. U.s. hnycolps of En@ecrs and FcdcralBm~-

- Agency, Region IV, “Hurrkanc Hugo ~“

hmuary 1990.

85. U.S. Army Corps of Br@mxrs, “south Carolina sl.mrcsNorrh Portion-charlc!stolq Gcorgc~ and Horry Countica,

S.C.,” June 1991.

86, us. AmIy corps of Rn@ccrs, Institute for W- Ra30urccq

“lWR Review Rcportforu.s. congnx& Office Oflkcllnology

~~~~to ~ Report on systenu at Risk

tim climate Change” IWR Policy Study 93+5-1, July 1993.

87. U.S. C-,~ Accounting Office (GAo), Flood

Insurance: Injiwmadon on the Man&tory Purchase Requirement, RCBD-90-141FS (Washin@onj DC: GAO, Aug. 22

1990).

88. Us. Collgms, General bunting office (GAO), Coastal

Bm”ers: Development Occurring Despite Prohibition Against

Federal Assistance, (3A0/RCBD-92-115 (Washiqtoq DC:

GAO, July 1992).

89. U.S. Dcpartmeat of Commucc, National Occnmc‘ and Atrnosphcric MminMmdoQ Biennial Report to Congress on Coastal

>ne Management (washiqto~ ~: Ofiicc of &can and

Coaatal Resource~LApril 1990).

90. U.S. Geological Survq (USGS), “Coastal Hazards,” National

Atlas of the United States of America @caton+ VA: USGS,

1985) (map).

91. Vdliaxm & L., “m Federal Interest in Sbrc Pmtcctioq”

unpublished report for the Institute for Wata Resources, U.S.

Army Corpa of~ R. Belvois, V!& 1991.

920 Virginia Water Control BourcL “Virginia Revolving ban

Pund: Program Design Mare@” Richmon& VA revised July

1991.
——

Status

■ Competition for high-quality water is increasing due to population grow@ concerns for the environment, and assertion of new

water rights.

■ Significant water-quality problems; urban water infrastructure

aging; ground water overdraft is a problem in some areas.

Climate Change Problem

■ Changes in water availability could add stress to already strewed systems.

■ Changes in the frequency, duration, or intensity of floods and

droughts could occur.

What Is Most Vulnerable?

■ Parts of the Nation already experiencing considerable stress (e.g.,

many parts of the Southwest and South Florida).

■ Areas where competition for water is expected to increase.

■ The central part of the United States, which many scientists

expect to become hotter and drier.

Impediments

■ Rigid and inefficient institutions.

■ Fragmented and uncoordinated management.

= Traditional engineering solutions less acceptable economically

and environmentally.

Types of Responses

■ Promote contingency planning for floods and droughts.

■ Improve supply management (e.g., by improve coordination,

using ground and surface water conjunctively, improving reservoir and reservoir-system management).

■ Facilitate water marketing and other transfers.

- Promote use of new analytical tools.

■ Improve demand management (e.g., pricing reform and conservation).

■ Augment supplies (e.g., by adding reservoirs and building

desalination plants).

Water 5

I 209
210 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

OVERVIEW

Fresh water is an integral element of all the

systems discussed in this two-volume report. Its

abundance, location, and seasonal distribution axe

closely linked to climate, and this link has had

much to do with where cities have flourished,

how agriculture has developed, and what flora

and fauna inhabit a region. The potential for

climate change to affect, first, the current status of

the Nation’s water resources and, second, those

systems that depend on water, is of considerable

long-term importance. Exactly how climate

change will affect water resources, especially

regionally, is still unknown. Although it is

unlikely that the droughts, floods, and hurricanes

that have been so much a part of the news in the

past few years can be linked to a changing

climate, they illustrate the kind of extreme events

that climate change may make more common in

the future.

Climate change, then, is an additional factor to

consider in water resource planning. A variety of

other factors is clearly straining the Nation’s

water resources and leading to increased competition among a wide variety of different uses and

users of water. Human needs for water are

increasingly in conflict with the needs of natural

ecosystems. The stress is particularly obvious in

the West, where a high percentage of available

supplies has already been developed in some

areas, but examples of conflict among uses for

scarce, high-quality water occur throughout the

country.

The Nation faces a considerable challenge in

adapting its water resource systems to these

numerous current and potential stresses. Among

other things,

Traditional engineering solutions for developing additional supplies have become less

acceptable.

Many institutions are ill-designed to cope

with scarcity in water resources.

Few incentives exist to conserve water.

Responsibilities among Federal agencies often

overlap or conflict.

Coordination between levels of government

can be inadequate.

Flood- and drought-related costs amount to

hundreds of millions of dollars each year and

continue to increase.

Major changes are occurring in the way water

resource problems are addressed. The management of existing resources is taking on increasing

importance as the potential for developing new

supplies declines. Similarly, reallocating water

through markets from lower- to higher-valued

uses is becoming more common. Promising

practices beginning to be used include conservation, pricing reform, resenvoir-system management, marketing and transfers, conjunctive management of ground and surface water, wastewater

reclamation, and river basin planning. These

practices promote greater flexibility and/or efficiency in water resource management which will

help enable water resource systems to cope with

uncertainty and adapt to any climate change.

Necessary improvements in the management of

water resources do not, however, come easily:

proposed changes often create losers as well as

winners, so many politically sensitive debates can

be expected.

Stresses on water resources are most acute and

visible during extreme events such as floods and

droughts. The Nation’s approaches to dealing

with such events have generally proven to be

unsatisfactory and expensive. Policies that improve the ability to cope flexibly and efficiently

with floods and droughts would be valuable now

and would help prepare the Nation for a lesscertain future. It is difficult to know whether the

recent 6 years of drought in the western United

States are a rare but possible outcome of natural

climate variability, an early indication of climate

change, or a return to the average climate after a

long, particularly wet spell. Longer climate records are needed to distinguish among these

various possibilities. Regardless of the cause of

recent droughts, improving plarnning for and

management of extreme events should be a high

priority for the Federal Government.
—

Chapter 5-Water I 211

Figure %1—Water Withdrawals and Consumption In the Coterminous United States, 1985a

Withdrawals Consumption Return flows

79

Evaporation

2765

Precipitation

4200

Domestic/commerciai 39

Withdrawals

Surface/ 339 Return flow

groundwater

flows

1435 Instream/subsurface use Surface/

1096 groundwater

flow to oceans

1343 a Mil[ons of gallons per day; to convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: Adapted from W. Solley, R. Pierce, and H. Perlman, Estimated Use of Water the United States in1990, USGS Survey Circular 1081
212 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat--Volume

dependent on water (e.g., fishing and sailing) or

enhanced by it (e.g., camping),4 and the demand

for water-related recreation is growing (79).

Substantial amounts of water are used for cooling

fossil fuel and nuclear power plants. Finally,

water dilutes and/or helps carry away pollution that either intentionally or unintentionally

reaches the Nation’s rivers, lakes, and estuaries.

Throughout the country, stress on water supplies is increasing, and many of the uses for water

are being (or could eventually be) affected in one

or more regions. The increasing stress is especially obvious in arid and semiarid parts of the

country where water is not abundant, but is also

apparent in many nonarid areas as well. Population growth in some areas has stimulated increased demand for water and has been ultimately

responsible for many water-quality problems,

groundwater overdraft, and saltwater intrusion

into some freshwater aquifers.

Additionally, groups whose water rights were

not previously represented or asserted are beginning to compete for water with traditional users.

In particular, as more water is diverted from

streams for human purposes, concern has grown

about the need to reserve water for environmental

purposes. Several States now recognize rights to

instream flow (i.e., rights to retain water in the

stream channel) or have minimum-flow requirements to protect fish and wildlife, and water left

in streams is no longer considered wasted. Similarly, entities such as American Indian tribes,

whose water rights have been inadequately recognized in the past, are beginning to claim their

rights. In many cases, unused Indian water rights

are senior to the rights of those who now divert the

water. The new competitors, plus a growing

population, will all draw from the same basically

fixed supply of water.

Many of the Nation’s water institutions (e.g.,

doctrines, laws, admini strative procedures, and

compacts), first established when water use was

1

low, are proving unable to

competition amid greater

particular, many existing

cope with increasing

relative scarcity. In

institutions lack the

flexibility required to ease adjustment to changing circumstances. Finally, much of the Nation’s

water infrastructure is aging. High leakage

rates, for example, are common in urban water

systems, and many of the country’s reservoirs

need reconditioning.

Climate change cannot yet be counted among

the reasons water resource systems are under

stress. Moreover, demographic and technological

changes are likely to have a greater effect on water

management in the near term than climate change.

However, climate change does have the potential

to seriously affect some water supplies, further

stressing already stressed water resource systems.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF A WARMER

CLIMATE ON WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS

The hydrological cycle, depicted in figure

2-12, traces the cycling of water in the oceans,

atmosphere, land and vegetation, and ice caps and

glaciers. Exchanges of water among these elements occur through precipitation, evapotranspiration, and stream and groundwater flow. The

hydrological cycle has an important role in the

global climate system and both affects climate

and is affected by it (8).

Most scientists agree that global warming will

intensify the hydrological cycle (31). The increase in global average temperatures anticipated

for a doubling of greenhouse gasess could increase average global precipitation from 7 to 15

percent and evapotranspiration between 5 and 10

percent (62). Increases in temperature, precipitation, and evapotranspiration would, in turn, affect

stream runoff and soil moisture, both very important to human and natural systems. Average

global runoff would be expected to increase, but

general circulation models (GCMS) do not relia4 The f- is a combined one for fnxh and salt water.

5 Most stimtits -t 1.5d4.5‘C (2.7 and 8.2 OF) ss thcrange for an “effective COZ doubling” (32); see chapter 2 for more diSCUSSiO~
Chapter 5--Water I 213

bly predict how much (62). Certain models

predict that precipitation will increase in some

regions, whereas others suggest it will decrease

(48). The range (and therefore the uncertainty) in

the models’ predictions of soil moisture and

runoff is even greater than it is for precipitation

(34).

Most important to water resource planners is

how global warming will affect key variables

regionally. A variety of factors, including local

effects of mountains, coastlines, lakes, vegetation

boundaries, and heterogeneous soil, is important

in determining regional climate. Currently, GCMS

cannot resolve factors this small because the grid

they use-blocks of 155 to 620 square miles-is

too large (80).

Climate modelers generally agree that a first

likely consequence of climate change is that

precipitation will increase at high latitudes and

decrease at low to middle latitudes (where the

water-holding capacity of the atmosphere will be

largest (18)). Thus, in the midcontinent areas,

especially in summer, evapotranspiration could

exceed precipitation, and soil moisture and runoff

would decrease. The potential for more-intense or

longer-lasting droughts would, therefore, increase

(58).

A second likely consequence is changes in the

type and timing of runoff. Snowmelt is an

important source of runoff in most mountainous

areas. Warmer temperatures in such areas would

cause a larger proportion of winter precipitation

that now falls as snow to fall as rain. Thus, the

proportion of winter precipitation stored in mountain snowpacks would decrease. Winter runoff

would increase, and spring runoff would subsequently decrease. During times when flooding

could be a problem, a seasonal shift of this sort

could have a significant impact on water supplies

because to maintain adequate storage capacity in

reservoirs, early runoff would probably have to be

released (40). Many Western States (e.g., California and Colorado) depend on the late spring

snowmelt as a major source of water. Runoff

filling reservoirs early in the spring means that

less stored water would be available during

summer, when demand is highest. The California

Department of Water Resources has estimated,

for example, that if average temperatures warm

by 3 ‘C (5.4 oF), winter snowmelt runoff would

increase, but the average April-July runoff would

be reduced by about 30 percent.6

Sea level rise, a third likely consequence of

global warming, could have effects on water

supplies in some coastal areas. Higher sea level

would cause a slight increase in saltwater intrusion of freshwater coastal aquifers, would create

problems for levees protecting low-lying land,

would increase the adverse consequences of

storm surges, and might affect some freshwater

intakes. (Effects of sea level rise on coastal

structures and wetlands are discussed in detail in

ch. 4 and in vol. 2, ch. 4.)

CURRENT AND POTENTIAL STRESSES ON

WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS

9 Introduction

Although scientists are not yet certain about the

magnitude, direction, or timing of the regional

impacts of global climate change, much can be

said about current stresses on water resource

systems. Climate change could, exacerbate the

adverse effects of these stresses in some regions

and alleviate them in others. However, areas that

are already approaching limits for developing

new water supplies or are under stress for other

reasons should be particularly concerned about

the possibility that climate change may further

stress water resource systems and reduce the

capability to adjust. Appendix A catalogs the

major water resource problems for each of the 50

States.

6 M. Roos, Chief Hydrologis~ California Department of Water Resources, personal communication 1992.
214 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure 5-2—Average Consumptive Use and Renewable Water Supply by Water Resource Region

and

Tennessee

2/45

KEY (b

11/69 = Consumptive use/Renewable water supply

Consumptive use as a percentage of renewable supplyw

El o-1o D1G40 B4O-1O O

a Represents entire Colorado River Basin.

b Represnts entire Mississippi River Basin.

NOTE: To convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: W. Solley, U.S. Geological Survey, 1993,

I Growing Population, Increasing

Competition

Water is a renewable resource, but long-run

average supplies are essentially fixed as long as

climate fluctuates within a known range. The U.S.

population, however, is steadily increasing. By

2010, the United States is projected to add about

35 million people to its 1993 population of

roughly 256 million people. Total U.S. population is projected to grow about 7 percent over this

decade, but the populations in the 10 fastestgrowing States7 will increase by 14 to 23 percent.

Nine of these States are in the South and West, yet

‘u

developed water-supply systems in many are

already overburdened. Current demand for water

relative to annual supply in all western river

basins (except the usually well-watered Pacific

Northwest) is 10 to 50 times higher than it is in the

eastern half of the country, and some western

basins have few undeveloped sources left (26).

Figure 5-2 illustrates average consumptive use

relative to renewable water supply in each of the

water resource regions of the conterminous

states.

Large western cities, like Los Angeles and San

Diego, must import water from sources hundreds

7 h OdtX of decrcas ing projected growth rate, these arc Arizoq Neva@ New Mexico, Florid% Gcors@ Alas4 Hawaii, New Hampshire,

C& fOrni& and ~XaS (78).
Chapter 5-Water I 1215

of miles away. As a result of population growth,

atisfying the demand of such cities is becoming

more challenging, especially during drought.

Despite considerable water-storage capacity in

California, for example, many cities find it

necessary to implement emergency-rationing procedures. Other fast-growing western cities-Las

Vegas, Reno, Denver, El Paso, San Antonio, for

exampl ~e having problems ensuring adequate water supplies for the future. In the Southeast, population growth is becoming a problem

for water-supply planners in Atlanta and in some

cities in Florida.

The challenge for growing cities is to develop

or acquire new sources of water and use the water

they have more efficiently. Many opportunities

exist for using water more efficiently, and some

cities and States are addressing water-supplyrelated problems in creative ways (see the section

Adapting Water Resource Systems to Climate

and Other Changes, later in this chapter). However, a general and growing complication is that

demands for water for use in cities can and

increasingly do conflict with established or previously neglected demands for water for other

purposes, including irrigation, fish and wildlife

sustenance, ecosystem conservation, recreation,

navigation, and power generation. Areas that

become hotter and drier as a result of climate

change would likely see competition among uses

increase (see box 5-A).

~ Poor Water Quality

People also stress water systems when they

permit pollutants to enter surface Water and

subsurface groundwater.8 Pollution can diminish

supplies available for human consumption (sup

plies that in some cases are already stressed by

population growth) and can adversely affect fish

and wildlife that depend on clean water. Surface

waters may be contaminated by siltation, nutrients, salts, organic matter, and hazardous materials (94). Despite high-priority Federal and State

efforts, many supplies of surface and groundwater

are currently polluted.

Box 5-B describes water-quality problems

affecting the Rio Grande. This river presents a

particularly challenging set of problems because

it flows through an arid region where water is

much in demand and because it forms a 1,200-

mile boundary between two sovereign countries,

the United States and Mexico, that must work

together to ensure the river’s health.

During drought, when stream flows and lake

levels are low, water temperatures are higher and

pollutants are more concentrated (33). Low

stream flows in estuarine areas also enable salt

water to move further upstream, in some cases

affecting freshwater supplies. For example, in

1988, drought-related salt intrusion into the

Mississippi River Delta affected petroleum refineries at New Orleans, and fresh water had to be

barged into operate boilers and to cool machinery

(57). Rivers that normally carry high salinity

loads, such as the Colorado, can be dramatically

affected by decreased runoff. These problems

would be exacerbated in parts of the country that

become drier as a result of climate change.

Higher surface-water temperatures can be a

problem for fish that depend on cold water for

spawning, such as Chinook salmon. When optimal temperatures for salmon incubation are

exceeded by only a few degrees, increases in

mortality can be expected (l). In California’s

Sacramento River System, for example, a problem

exists during dry years when reservoir levels are

lower and water discharged from them is warmer

than normal (35). A few newer dams have

temperature-control outlets that allow water to be

released from various depths, but retrofitting dams

that do not have such controls is very expensive.

Global warming may make it impossible to

preserve some cold-water fish without providing

artificial temperature controls at large dams that

lack these controls (35). Conversely, some warm8 Groundwater conatitutca about 36 percent of municipal &inking-water supplies.
216 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 5-A-Climate Change, Water Resources, and Limits to Growth?

Many cities of the Southwest-Las Vegas, Tucson, and Phoenix, for exampltiave beautiful green golf

courses positioned like islands amidst seemingly endless expanses of parched desert. Although less likely now,

it is still possible to see fountains shooting water, much of which evaporates, high into the airon scorching summer

days. These are just two of the more obvious extravagant practices that people who have relocated from the

well-watered eastern parts of the country brought with them as they settled the arid and semiarid parts of the

American Southwest. Growing cotton and other water-intensive crops in such areas is another.

Many peopte are drawn to the Southwest by generally mild climates and outstanding recreational

opportunities and by the new, dynamic potential for economic development. High growth rates have been typical,

and the three U.S. States with the highest projected growth rates, Arizom Neva@ and New Mexico, are all add

Western States. California much of which is arid, is now the most populous of the 50 States (78).

That continued growth and development of water-stressed areas of the United States is desirable is rarely

questioned. Until recently, except perhaps forafew small settlements in out-of-the-way places, water has not been

a limiting factor in western development. Where additional water has been needed to enable further growth, water

managers have been able to find it-but now usually at increasingly long distances from where it is used or at

greater depth in subsurface aquifers. Ims Angeles, for example, imports significant portions of its water from

sources hundreds of miles away-northern California the Owens Valley, and the Colorado River. Without this

additional water, Southern California would not be able to sustain the dramatic growth that has occurred there (at

least given current usage patterns). San Diego, Las Vegas, Reno, Denver, El Paso, Phoenix, and many other

cities, large and small, face similar challenges in acquiring enough water to sustain growth or in using what water

they now have more efficiently.

Western author V#allace Stegner noted that aridity imposes limits on human settlement that can be ignored

only at one’s peril @8). So far, the impressive water infrastructure developed in the M@st during the past 100 years

has enabled society to meet its water demand and push back these limits. Growth could be difficult to sustain

without major and difficult adjustments. Expiiat growth-control policies have been limited and generally very

unpopular. Water issues, especially in the V&t, are usually framed in terms of how to accommodate urban growth

and not howtoadjust to limitations imposed byaharsh environment (70).1 Nevertheless, it maybe prudent at least

to consider the possibility that future severe water shortages in arid parts of the country will require strong and

explicit growth-limiting policies in addition to implementation of other adaptive measures. Federal constitutional

doctrines designed to promote the free flow of goods and people across State lines and the core principle of public

utility law-that water providers have a duty to serve market demand (70)-imply that growth maybe difficult to

restrict legally. Nevertheless, at some point in a possibly drier future, some industries and individuals may begin

basing their decision to move to arid areas (or to stay in them) in part on the cost and availability of water. Such

an occurrence would mark a fundamental shift in development and demographic patterns.

1 A few policies do r~nize limitations. Arizona, for example, requires developers to show that they have

a 100-year water supply before they are allowed to build. Such polides, however, generally have not fundamentally

oalled into question the desirability of continued growth. The Arizona polioy has also had some unwanted side effeots

because it has encouraged cities to take extraordinary action to find water for continued long-term growth. As a

result, the practioe of “water farming” has developed. Some rural areas are being dewatered, and economic

development in these areas has consequently been stifled.
Chapter 5-Water 1217

Box 5-B-Water Quality, Climate Change, and the Rio Grande

Poor water quality is a problem in many

parts of the country. However, in an arid region

such as southwest Texas, where water is

relatively scarce, waterquality problems can

contribute significantly to water-supply prob

Iems. This water quality/water quantity connection is especially important in the lower Rio

Grande Basin, where population growth, muniapal and industrial expansion, and an increase in irrigation have dramatically increased

the demand for water while negatively affecting water quality. Managing the water reSourws of the Rio Grande is especially diff”wlt

given the river’s bi-national status.

The Rio Grande forms the border between

Texas and Mexico for some 1,200 miles (1 ,935

kilometers)l and is one the most important

rivers in North America. It originates in Colorado as a pristine alpine stream, but as it

makes its way south and east to the Gulf of

Mexico, it becomes a river under stress.

Intensive muniapal and industrial activities

along its banks have resulted in tens of

millions of gallons of sewage yearly entering

the river. Agricultural runoff degrades water

quality by contributing significant amounts of

fertilizers and pesticides to the river. And

natural discharges of highly saline groundwater contribute to salinity problems. In

addition, a very high 72 percent of the renewThe Rio Grande Basin

3

Colorado .— -—--- -— -- -- —-—-- 1

I Oklahoma 1

~ d. \ ‘ -----

r--— --’3

UPPER BASIN

SOURCE: W. Stone, M. Minnis, and E. Trotter (eds.), The Ho Grands

Basin: Global Clhnate Cha~e Scenarios, New Mexico Water Resources

Reeearch Institute Report No. M24, June 1991.

able water supply of the basin is now consumed. This percentage is surpassed only in the Colorado River Basin

and is dramatically greater than the single-digit percent of renewable supply consumed in most basins in the eastern

United States. If current trends continue, consumption of water in the basin is likely to increase.

Climate change could exacerbate current water conflicts. Many western rivers, including the Rio Grande, would

experience a significant reduction in dependable stream flow if average temperature increases. This effect would

seriously threaten irrigated agriculture, industrial deveiopmen$ and drinking-water supplies in the region. Even if

climate change leads to a decrease in agriculture in the lower Rio Grande Basin, industrial and nnmiapal

developnmt, spurred by the North American Frw Trade Agrwment (NA~A), mght continue to place significant

demands on the river in a warmer climate. The combined effects of climate change and more-direct human-caused

stresses would pose a considerable adaptation challenge.

The Rio Grande’s drainage basin is separated into northern and southern regions encompassing a total of

182,215 square miles of arii to semiarid land in southern Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico. Some 2.7

million people live in the basin and depend on its water. Precipitation ranges from 10 inches (25 cm) per year in the

western part of the basin to up to 24 inches (60 cm) per year along the Gulf Coast, but annual evaporation exceeds

1 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

(Continued on next,oage)
218 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat%Volume 1

Box 5-B–Water Quality, Climate Change, and the Rio Grande-(Continued)

predpitation in much of the region. Many parts of the area rely on ground water to supplement scarce surface water

supplies, and groundwater overdraft is a problem in parts of the region. Concern about droughts and flooding has

led to the construction of dams and levees, so the once highly variable flow of the river is now moderated. Stored

surface water is the principle source of supply in the western part of the basin, but the lower part of the basin

depends almost entirely on surface water due to the poor quality of ground water in the area.

Historically, the Rio Grande Basin has supported apredominantty agrarian economy. Many of the crops grown

in the valley are very water-intensive, including cotton, rice, and sugar cane. To northerners, the region is known

as the “winter garden” because it supplies the country with voluminous amounts of citrus fruits and vegetables

during winter months (see ch. 6). ITre Rio Grande is almost completely diverted at JuaretiEl Paso to support

irrigated agriculture in the southern part of the basin. (Return flows and more southerly tributaries supply water to

the river below this point.)

kw flows and surface-water shortages have become a problem in the basin, as have increases in salinity in

groundwater. To date, farmers have been more concerned with water shortages than with increasing salinity. Salt

buildup in the soil, however, is certain to affect future production and may force abandonment of some agricultural

lands. Runoff laden with pesticides, fertilizers, and sediment reaches the river and further impedes water quality.

Moreover, reduced flows mean that less water is available to dilute pollutants, so their concentration in the river

increases during low-flow periods.

Municipal and industrial demands on the river are growing dramatically, driven by the region’s burgeoning

population growth. A significant increase in growth is occurring in the so-called “colonias” that have been

established along the border. These communities, which are home to many hundreds of thousands of people,

generally lack sewage systems, wastewater treatment plants, and potable water. Wastewater in some cases is

discharged directly into irrigation canals, which ultimately supply water for some crops. This lack of infrastructure,

including overflowing and inadequately lined waste dumps, has resulted in a high inadence of infectious diseases

(e.g., hepatitis and cholera), contamination of grourrdwater, and clogging of storm-water systems. Industrial

operations exacerbate these problems by discharging wastewater directiy into the river. As a result, water quality

is so low in the eastern part of the basin that only 1 percent of the water is fit for agricultural or municipal use. All

of these impacts have severely degraded water quality in the river, and, given the limited supply, could present

serious water-allocation problems in the future. Changes in management practices will ultimately be required on

both sides of the border.

The international boundary created by the Rio Grande separates much nwre than land mass: it represents the

often dramatic division of first and third world nations. The socioeconomic differences that exist between the two

countries are deeply rooted. Some of the poorest U.S. counties with some of the fastestgrowing populations are

along this border. These communities generally experience depressed economies, poverty-level incomes, short life

expectancy, low levels of education, and high population mobility. Much of the economy is based on providing food

for other parts of the United States. Economic conditions in Mexico are even worse. Such conditions make the

development of sound water-management poliaes and the development and enforcement of regulations to sustain

human and ecosystem health much more difficult.

Wildlife and migratory bird populations also rely on the river, but maintaining stream flow for environmental

purposes is not always possible because of competing demands for the water, and it will likely become even more

difficult in the future.

Conservation, recycling, shifting to dryland farming, changing water pricing, and establishing water-master

programs for the basin are among the approaches that could be used to address present and future waterquality

and -quantity problems. Focusing on improving water quality may be one way of assisting adaptation to climate

change that would be especially appropriate in the arid Rio Grande Basin.

SOURCES: This box k drawn largely from J. Schmandt and G, Ward, Texas and Global Wvming: Water Supply and Dernandh Four

Hydm/o@a/Regions (The University of Texas at Austin: The Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Pubiic Affairs, 1991); W. Stone, M. Minnis,

and E. Trotter (ads.), The Rio Grade Basin: G/obaJ C/irnate Change Scenarios, New Mexica Water Resources Research Institute Report

No. M24, June 1991.
Chapter 5-Water I 219

water fish populations are likely to benefit from

temperature rises associated with global warming

as their thermal habitat expands (52).

The contamination of groundwater is a particularly troublesome problem; once an underground

aquifer becomes contaminated, its value is impaired or lost for a long time. Fertilizers and

pesticides, effluent from various manufacturing

processes, leakage from underground storage

tanks, and oil spills can all find their way into

groundwater. The extent of groundwater pollution in the United States is not known precisely,

but some groundwater contamination occurs in

every State, and the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) has identified close to 1,000

hazardous-waste sites that have contributed to

groundwater contamination (10). The Northeast

has groundwater problems associated with industrial waste, petroleum products, and landfill

leachate, and many farming States have problems

arising from agricultural practices.

Groundwater can also be contaminated by

saltwater intrusion-particularly in coastal

States. In some cases, intense groundwater pumping has allowed salt water to intrude into coastal

aquifers. For example, Orange County, California, now injects treated, recycled surface water

into its coastal aquifer to keep salt water from

intruding. Miami has spent millions trying to

repel saltwater intrusion. Sea level rise will

enable salt water to penetrate somewhat further

into coastal aquifers (80).

Many water-quality problems will be addressed in 1993 and 1994, when Congress considers reauthorizing the Clean Water Act (P.L.

92-500). The Water Pollution Prevention and

Control Act of 1993 (S. 1114) was introduced in

June 1993 and will likely serve as the main

vehicle for considering changes in the Nation’s

water-pollution laws. Box 5-C describes some

key issues being considered.

9 Environmental Water Allocation

The value of water for environmental uses

(e.g., for preserving aquatic species and habitat)

has typically been neglected in developing water

resources for consumptive purposes (16). In the

early part of the 20th century, water was often

considered wasted if it was allowed to remain in

a stream and not put to some “beneficial’ use.

Diverting water from a stream was not especially

a problem for instream requirements as long as

enough water was available. However, the effect

of diversions on instream environmental uses has

increased as more and more water has been

developed for consumption. Over the past 20

years, popular awareness of the environment and

the desire to protect it have increased. Thus, an

important new competitor for water (or at least

one with increasing clout) is the environment:

water used for protection of wetlands, fisheries,

and endangered species or for preservation of the

wild and scenic status of a river cannot be

simultaneously available for offstream, consumptive uses like irrigation and domestic supply.

The potential for conflict between instream and

other uses of water is high. California’s Central

Valley farmers, for example, vigorously (but

unsuccessfully) opposed a provision of the recently enacted Central Valley Project (CVP)

Improvement Act (P.L. 102-575) that requires

800,000 acre-feet (af)9 of project water to be

reallocated or set aside for fish, wildlife, and

habitat restoration. Similarly, South Florida’s

demands for water for the environment (e.g., for

restoring the Everglades) are in growing competition with water for humans (see box l-D).

Notably, the Endangered Species Act (P.L. 93-

205) has become a powerful preservation tool in

recent years, and many water resource managers

are concerned that vigorous enforcement of this

act to protect water-dependent species will in9 One acre-foot (@ equals 325,851 gallons of water (43,560 cubic fec~ or 1,234 cubic meters), the amount of water it takes to cover 1 ame

to a depth of 1 foot. It is enough water to sustain two average households for a year, ‘Ib convert horn acre-feet to cubic meters, multiply by

1,234!
220 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat%Volume 1

Box 5-C-Reauthorizing the Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act (CWA; P.L. 92-500), formally known as the Federal Water Pollution control Act of 1972,

is the Nation’s foremost piece of water-quaiity legislation. The ambitious goai of the originai act was to restore

@iuted waters throughout the Nation to a “fishabie, swimmable status” by 1983, to eiiminate discharges of

pollutants into navigabie waters, and to prohibit the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts. Two major

strategies for achieving these goais included establishment of a Federal grant program to heip iocai areas build

sewage treatment piants and a requirement that aii munidpai sewage and industrial wastewater be treated before

it is discharged into waterways (1 1). The comprehensive act specifies technology-based effiuentiimitations and

standards, receiving-water-quatity standards, and a discharge permit system.

The Nation has made considerable progress in cieaning up poiiuted waters since 1972. Some $540 biiiion

has been spent on water-poiiution controi (36). Currently, more than 37 biiiion gaiions (140 biiiion iiters)~ of

wastewater are treated daiiy, and about 15,500 wastewater treatment facilities and dose to 20,000 collection

systems operate in the United States. Eighty-nine percent of waste treatment fadiities now provide secondary or

advanced treatment (11).2 Asaresuit, Conventional pollutants such as bacteria and oxygendernanding materiais

have diminished. Nevertheless, and despite major amendments to the CWA in 1977, 1981, and 1987, some

significant water-quaiity probiems remain. Sedimentation, nutrient enrichment, runoff from farmiands, and toxic

contamination of bottom sediments are proving to be more persistentprobiems(11).

The Ciean Water Act wiii iikeiy be reauthorized again during the 103d Congress inan attempt to address these

continuing probiems. S. 1114, the Baucus-Chafee Water Poiiution Prevention and control Act, has emerged as

the primary legislative vehicie for revising waterquaiity iaw. The biii revisits such key issues as watershed planning,

controi of non-point-source poiiution and of toxic discharges, and funding for munidpai wastewater treatment

facilities.

Watershed pianning+l. 1114 encourages states to adopt watershed-pianning programs. A watershed

generaiiy is defined as a region that iies between two ridges of high iand and drains into a river, river system, or

other body of water. Watershed pianning refers to efforts to identify waterquaiity probiems unique to a particular

watershed, pinpoint the sources of those probiems, and devise a strategy for addressing them. This approach

recognizes that iocai soiutions to iocai problems may often be preferable to a singie nationai soiution. Voiuntary

watershed-pianning programs wouid be encouraged through a series of financiai and other incentives.

Non-point-source poiiution-Non-point-source (NPS) poiiution accounts for half the Nation’s remaining

waterquaiit y problems (11). S. 1114 wouid piace stronger emphasis on mitigation and alteration in management

practices to reduce the volume of poiiuted runoff. Mitigating NPS poiiution is difficuit, however, because it involves

changing the iand-use practiws of private landowners. Runoff from agricultural iands containing, for example,

nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers, contributes a sizabie percentage of nutrients and sediment to ground and

surface water, but urban areas, faiied septic systems, siivicuiture activities, cattie feediots, and suburban

development are sources of NPS poiiution as weii (81 ). S. 11 14directs States to submit revised NPS management

program~ntaining specific program eiements-to EPA within 30 months after the act is reauthorized.

Funding for municipai sewage treatment—The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) most recent

estimate of sewage-treatment requirements suggests that over $100 biiiion wiii be needed during the course of

the next 20 years for State and iocai governments to meet the goais and mandates of the Ciean Water Act (1 1).

The State Revoiving ban Fund established by the CWA substantially assists communities and municipalities in

1 TO convert from gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

2 Secondary treatment typicaiiy means that 85 peroent of solid and organic matter Is removed; advanwd

treatment removes more than 95 percent of pollutants and Is required when seoondary treatment is Insufficient to

proteot a reoeiving stream and meet a State’s waterquality standards.
Chapter 5-Water 1221

their efforts improve water quality, but appropriations for this program are set to expire in 1994.S.1114 expands

funding for wastewater treatment programs. Funds would be available for improving aging infrastructure,

controlling non-point-source poilution, managing estuaries, addressing combined sewer overflows and

storm-water problems, and managing animal waste.

Regulation of toxice-EPA currently regulates only about one-fifth of the industrial plants that dump toxic

substances into rivers and lakes. Non-point sources of toxic pollutants, such as pesticides from agricultural fields

andvarious contaminants in urban storm-water runoff, are currendy unregulated (36). Toxic pollutants may have

adverse effects on human and aquatic health and may remain in the ecosystem for long periods. S. 1114 calls

for EPA to identify at least 20 toxic pollutants that would have to be controlled by industry through intensive

pollution-prevention strategies. The bill also callsfornot Iessthan 60percent of thevolumeof each pollutant listed

to be reduced within 7 years and provides for the public to petition EPA to add pollutants to its list.

Wetland protection-Wetlands play a key role in preserving water quality, but the extent and nature of the

authority provided by the CWAfor wetland protection promises to be a contentious issue in CWA reauthorization.

The current version of S. 1114 does not address wetland protection, but an additional section on wetiands is

expected to be included in the final reauthorization. The Federal Government has struggled over the past few years

to reach a workable compromise with property owners, industry groups, environmentalists, and others on how and

to what extent wetlands should be protected. Major wetland issues likely to be addressed in the reauthorization

include clarifying the regulatory process and responsibilities of Federal agencies; clarifying the process through

which States can take control of permitting; paying attention to opportunities for wetland restoration through

mitigation banking; and considering whether Alaska, which has large amounts of wetiands, should receive special

treatment. (See vol. 2, ch. 4, for a compiete discussion of wetland issues.)

The reauthorization of the Clean Water Act comes at a critical time. The understanding of ecological

processes and of the effects of human influence on ecosystems is growing. However, stresses on ecosystems

are also growing. Additional data gathering and monitoring are needed to close remaining information gaps.

kgisJative efforts must attempt to balance human needs and ecological health.

creasingly impinge on development and use of

water supplies.

Although the benefits of maintaining minimum

instream flows are increasingly recognized and

are gaining legal protection in a growing number

of States (75), the rights to a significant amount

of stream flow in the West have already been

established. In Western States, rights to divert

water are acquired under the prior-appropriation

doctrine (i.e., first in time, fist in right)(see box

5-D), and many rivers are either completely

appropriated by those who got there first (senior

rights holders) or are close to being so. A few are

even overappropriated. The rights to water for

instream uses, where protected at all, are usually

very junior. This means that water for fish and

wildlife has the lowest priority, and the need for

it is satisfied only after the demands of senior

rights holders are met. During a drought, junior

and unprotected rights are most at risk, so fish and

wildlife may suffer more than they would if

instream water rights were better protected.

Clearly, growing competition between consumptive and environmental uses for water would

be exacerbated in areas of the country that

become drier as a result of climate change. If

available supplies diminish and/or demand increases, existing developed supplies will have to

be used more efficiently to satisfy both consumptive and environmental uses. Protecting adequate

instream flows to attain multiple water-use goals,

which is not easy now, could become much more

difficult in the future.

1 Uncertain Reserved Water Rights

Rights pertaining to water for the environment

are not the only “new” rights being asserted that

may conflict with established uses of water.
222 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat*Volume 1

Box 5-D-Major Doctrines for Surface Water and Groundwater

Surface Water

Riparian doctrine-Authorization to use water in a stream or other water body is based on ownership of the

adjacent land. Each landowner may make reasonable use of water in the stream but must not interfere with its

reasonable use by other riparian landowners. The riparian doctrine prevails in the 31 humid States east of the IOOth

meridian.

Prior appropriation doctrin~sers who demonstrate earlier use of water from a particular source acquire

rights over all later users of water from the same source. When shortages occur, those first in time to divert and

apply the water to beneficial use have priority. New diversions, or changes in the point of diversion or place or

purpose of use, must not cause harm to existing appropriators. The prior appropriation doctrine prevails in the 19

Western States.

Groundwater

Absolute ownership-Groundwater belongs to the overlying landowner, with no restrictions on use and no

liability for causing harm to other existing users. Texas is the sole absolute-ownership state.

Reasonable use doctrin~roundwater rights are incident to land ownership. However, owners of

overlying land are entitled to use groundwater only to the extent that uses are reasonable and do not interfere with

other users. Most Eastern States and California subscribe to this doctrine.

Appropriation-permit systern-Groundwater rights are determined by the rule of priority, which provides

that prior uses of groundwater have the best legal rights. States administer permit systems to determine the extent

to which new groundwater uses will be allowed to interfere with existing uses. Most Western States employ this

doctrine.

SOURCES: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Volume ///, Surnrnary of Water R&hfs-State Law? ar?dk$nkrktratim? Procedures, report

prepared for U.S. Army, Institute for Water Resources, by Apogee Reeearch, Inc., June 1992; and U.S. Geological Survey, fVaffona/ 144Ww

Summary 1988-8Hydm/og/c Events and Floods and Dnwghts, Water-Supply Paper 2375 (V%ehington, DC: U.S. (30vemment Printing

office, 1991).

Indian reservations, National Forests, and National Parks are reserved lands-that is, they have

been reserved or set aside ffom public-domain

lands and, as such, carry with them authority for

Federal reserved water rights (see also vol. 2,

ch. 5). These rights have priority over State

appropriative water rights acquired at a later date.

In the case of Indian reservations, they have

specifically been recognized in the Supreme

Court’s 1908 Winters decision (65), and ensuing

court cases have extended the reservation doctrine to other lands.

Significantly, many Indian claims have not yet

been exercised or quantiled, although Indians

assert large claims to both surface water and

groundwater throughout the West. Because reserved rights are often senior once they are

quantiled, junior, non-Indian water users may

have to forgo water uses in times of shortage (93).

In some cases, water for settlement purposes has

been purchased by the Federal Government born

other water users. However, the potential for

conflict between Indian and non-Indian water

users is clear and could grow in areas that become

drier as a result of climate change. Similarly,

Federal reserved rights in National Forests and

Parks have the potential for leading to disputes

between States and the Federal Government if

supplies decrease. Wilderness areas within Bureau of Land Management lands do not now have

reserved water rights, and this has been a source

of contention in most wilderness legislation

before Congress.

A still-unresolved issue is whether Indians will

be allowed and will choose to transfer some or all

of their water off-reservation. If so, flexibility
Chapter 5--Water I 223

Figure 5-3-U.S. Groundwater Overdraft

NOTE: To convert gallons to Iiters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: H. Ingram, Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona, 1993.

and economic efficiency might be enhanced, and

some wealth would be transferred from nonIndians to Indians (70). The exercise of Federal

reserved water rights for National Parks and

Forests has proved controversial, but it is one

means of providing water for such nonmarket

uses as maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat

(92).

1 Groundwater Overdraft

Groundwater overdraft is the removal of subsurface water at a rate faster than its natural

recharge rate. When groundwater is pumped

faster than this rate over long periods of lime, it is

in effect being mined and, therefore, is nonrenewable. Overdraft is a problem in several parts of the

country (fig. 5-3). It is common in the Ogallala

Aquifer, for example, which is the principal

source of water for farming on the Texas High

Plains (see box 6-G), and to a lesser degree, in

some sections of the aquifer that underlie other

Plains States. Overdraft leads to successively

higher water costs because pumping expenses

increase as the water table is drawn down. Higher

costs, in turn, can lead to adoption of innovative

water-saving strategies, dryland farming, or reduced planted area. Groundwater overdraft also

occurs in the southern half of California’s Central

Wiley, much of Florida, and parts of other States.

Some regions are trying innovative plans to

restore or conserve groundwater supplies (e.g.,

Arizona with its Phoenix-area groundwater replenishment plan).

Climate change will Meet groundwater. In

some locations, it could increase recharge, but it

could also lead to increased groundwater pumping in areas where surface-water supplies diminish. Mining groundwater may sometimes make

economic sense (as, for example, can mining

coal) but, where feasible, it should be viewed only
224 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

as a temporary adaptation to climate change. To

the degree that groundwater is mined, flexibility

to respond to future dry spells and droughts is

reduced. Overdraft may also lead to land subsidence. Temporarily increasing groundwater pumping, however, can be an effective short-term

response to drought-whether it occurs under

current climate conditions or during a future

warmer climate.

1 Outmoded Institutions

Most laws and institutions guiding the allocation and use of water were established when water

was essentially free and supply greatly surpassed

demand. These provisions served their regions

reasonably well when most new demands could

be met by developing new supplies. However,

new development is no longer either easy or

inexpensive, and in some areas, it is practically

impossible. Institutions and laws must increasingly deal with shortages and competing legitimate demands for water, many of which represent

new tasks for which they were not originally

designed (15). Subject to changing competitive

demands and societal interests, some institutions

are too rigid and inefficient to allow adequate

responses to real or apparent water scarcity. Also,

little has been done to educate the public about

water issues, and as a result, professional knowledge of the value and scarcity of water has not

been adequately disseminated.

Examples of innovative institutions are not

rare, however, and institutional change is occurring. Congress, for example, passed the Central

Wiley Project (CVP) Improvement Act in 1992,

which explicitly recognizes the importance of

instream uses for water in California’s Central

Valley and the need to balance competing demands for water. The Act includes provisions to:

1) guarantee that much more water will remain in

streams for fish or be directed to wildlife refuges,

2) remove institutional obstacles that limit beneficial water transfers and discourage conservation,

3) raise the price of Water sold to farmers,

4) establish a fish and wildlife restoration fund (to

be financed by fees on CVP water and power sales

and on water transfers), and 5) place limits on the

renewal of irrigation and municipal water contracts. In coming years, this law may serve as a

model for similar changes in other parts of the

West. Arizona’s Ground-Water Management Act,

with its goal of safe yield in the State’s important

groundwater basins, is another innovative, if

imperfect, institutional change.

Nevertheless, rigid and inefficient institutions

are common. Such institutions can add to the

stress already on water resources by making

adjustments to new situations more difficult.

When water rights are unclear, for example, as

they continue to be in parts of the West, reallocation of water is difficult. Agreements abound that

were negotiated when either information was

inadequate or future circumstances concerning

supply and demand could not be foreseen. These

agreements constrain the responses that water

resource managers can make to short- and longterm problems, and they are often difficult to

change.

For example, much water is supplied to Southern California by the Metropolitan Water District

(MWD). By statute, MWD member agencies are

entitled to water in proportion to their percent

contribution to MWD tax revenues. Los Angeles

currently contributes about 27 percent but now

uses only 5 percent of its allotment because its

other sources are usually adequate. San Diego,

however, takes up the slack and currently uses

about 30 percent of MWD supplies, although it is

entitled to only 12 percent. If Los Angeles’

supplies shrink during a drought, the city would

be entitled to claim its MWD allotment, and San

Diego, which receives about 90 percent of its

water from MWD, would have to cut back (91).

As San Diego grows, the potential for significant

water shortages could create a critical problem

during drought.

Similarly, the structure of the Colorado River

Compact and related laws governing the Colorado River System make it impossible to operate
Chapter 5-Water I 225

this system as efficiently as possible. Problems

are already apparent, given aridity, growing and

shifting populations, and the fact that the Compact, negotiated in 1922 after a few unusually wet

decades, allocates more water among the seven

basin States than the average annual flow (26).

The Colorado could be operated more efficiently

(and San Diego might have an additional source

of water) if, for example, interstate water transfers

were legitimized. A stumbling block is that States

that have water allocations through the Compact

legislation and individual contractors jealously

guard their existing entitlements and believe any

changes in the current institutional structure

could dilute their water-use rights (70).

Current stresses on water resource systems are

already motivating changes in laws and institutions. The potential for climate change adds

another, if currently secondary, reason to make

those changes. Given the uncertain impacts of

climate change on water resources, however,

institutions that are flexible (i.e., those that could

facilitate adaptation in a variety of different

climates) and that foster an efficient allocation of

water would be most responsive to changes

caused by global warming (47). As institutions

change, equity in water resource allocation could

be promoted by providing more opportunities for

the public to become involved in decisionmaking

bodies. Such involvement could stimulate healthy

debate about the values at stake in water resource

decisions.

In many cases, promoting flexibility, efficiency, and equity will require more coordination

and cooperation among the large number of

Federal, State, and local water resource organizations. (Table 5-1 shows how complex the Federal

water structure alone is.) River basins and watersheds are rarely managed in an integrated fashion,

for example, and there are clearly opportunities

for some significant increases in yield by moreefficient joint management of existing reservoir

systems (63, 64). Similarly, water-quantity laws

and water-quality laws are seldom coordinated.

Surface water and groundwater are often managed separately. The respective responsibilities of

Federal and State agencies are sometimes unclear,

and Federal Government agencies that have water

responsibilities do not always cooperate with one

another.

M Aging Urban Water Infrastructure

The current poor condition of much of the

Nation’s urban water infrastructure (e.g., pipes,

valves, pumping stations, and storm-water drains)

could affect both safety and water-supply efficiency in the future. Also, urban infrastructure

needs are likely to compete for funding with other

water-development needs.

In the Northeast and Midwest, deterioration of

old systems is especially a problem. In 1977, for

example, the Boston distribution system, due

both to leaks and nonfunctioning meters, could

not account for 50 percent of the water it had

distributed (89). Although the American Water

Works Association recommends a 67-year cycle

of replacement, many of Boston’s water mains are

over 100 years old. More recently, the Association found an average leakage rate of about 10

percent in a study of 931 U.S. utilities.l0 Although

eliminating leakage entirely is probably not

practical, opportunities exist in this area for improving the efficiency of water-supply systems.

The inability of some urban storm-water drainage and treatment facilities to handle possible

increases in flood discharges is a source of

concern. The need for additional facilities is

growing as urban areas grow. Expenditures for

new construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation do not appear to be meeting current needs,

and the potential for sea level rise and urbanization of undeveloped land will likely increase

needs in the future. Many communities will have

to invest more in storm-water drainage or face

increased property damages from flooding. In10 Unpubtihed obsmatio~, 19%?. The leakage rate in this study included water escaping fmm leaks and M,~f~ti meters.
226 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 5-l—Federal Offices Involved in Water Resource Planning, Development, or Management

Legislative offices (U.S. Congress)

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs

House Committee on Agriculture

House Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Energy and Commerce

House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs

House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries

House Committee on Public Works and Transportation

House Committee on Science, Space and Technology

General Accounting Office

Library of Congress

Office of Technology Assessment

Executive off ices

Executive Office of the President

Office of Environmental Policy

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service

Cooperative State Research Service

Economic Research Service

Extension Service

Farmers Home Administration

Forest Service

Soil Conservation Service

Department of the Army

Army Corps of Engineers

Department of Commerce

Economic Development Administration

National Bureau of Standards

National Marine Fisheries Service

National Ocean Service

Nationa Weather Service

Department of Energy

Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable

Energy

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Federal Power Administrations

Department of Health and Human Services

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

National Center for Toxicological Research

National institute of Environmental Health Sciences

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and

Development

Department of the Interior

Bureau of Indian Affairs

Bureau of Land Management

Bureau of Mines

Bureau of Reclamation

Fish and Wildlife Service

Geological Survey

Minerals Management Service

National Park Service

Office of Policy Analysis

Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement

Department of Justice

Land and Natural Resources Division

Department of State

Bureau of Oceans and international Environmental

and Scientific Affairs

Department of Transportation

U.S. Coast Guard

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development corporation

Federal Highway Administration

Independent establishments and Government

corporations

Environmental Protection Agency

Assistant Administrator for Water

Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency

Response

Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic

Substances

Federal Emergency Management Agency

General Services Administration

Public Buildings Service

interstate Commerce Commission

Panama Canal commission

Small Business Administration

Loan Programs

Pollution Control Financing Program

Tennessee Valley Authority

Quasi-officiai agencies

Smithsonian Institution

Smithsonian Environmental Research Center

Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute

Bilateral organizations

international Boundary and Water Commission,

United States and Mexico

international Joint Commission, United States and Canada

SOURCE: Adapted from J. Beecher and A. Laubach, Compendium on Water Supply, Drought, and Conservation (Columbus, OH: The National

Regulatory Research Institute, 1989).
Chapter 5--Water I 227

creased flooding potential in some areas of the

country as a result of climate change should be

cause for concern.

Most large urban areas should be able to

renovate aging infrastructure through increases in

service rates. Small and medium-size water systems, however, may have much greater problems.

The large costs associated with renovating infrastructure, meeting Safe Drinking Water Act

standards passed in 1988 (P.L. 93-523, most

recently amended by P.L. 100-572), and providing additional service to growing areas are an

especially heavy burden on smaller communities.

Small systems typically lack adequate managerial

and technical expertise and cannot benefit from

economies of scale. One recent survey of infrastructure studies concluded that the gap between

investment needs and available sources of financing the renovation of the water infrastructure is

between $4.5 and $6.3 billion per year over the

next 20 years.

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE STRESS ON

NONCONSUMPTIVE USES OF WATER

Many uses of water do not deplete the total

supply of water available; these are called nonconsumptive uses. Prominent among these are

hydroelectric-power generation, powerplant cooling, waterborne transportation, and recreation, all

of which climate change may seriously effect.

Hydroelectricity is a large proportion of the

total electricity generated in some parts of the

country. Washington State, in particular, produces 30 percent of U.S. hydroelectricity, but

hydropower is also significant in such States as

California and Tennessee. Such power production

is sensitive to droughts and is reduced when

reservoir levels are low. Reductions in hydroelectric power can usually be filled by a shift to

greater use of fossil fuels, but alternative sources

of electricity cost more and cause more pollution

(including carbon dioxide (CO2

) emissions). The

effect of drought on power generation can be

considerable: during the 1988 drought, for example, hydroelectric-power generation on the Missouri River, in the Pacific Northwest, on the Ohio

River, and in the Southeast was reduced between

20 and 40 percent (57).

A primarily nonconsumptive use for water is

11 Many power plants use power-plant cooling.

fresh water for condenser cooling and (sometimes) emergency cooling. Heated water discharged from power plants is returned to the

stream from which it was taken. Because such

water contributes to thermal pollution and can

have adverse impacts on aquatic life, water

temperature and quality are regulated by Federal

and State Governments. When water temperatures are high, power plants often must curtail

power production or use cooling towers to comply with regulations. Higher water temperatures

can also reduce the efficiency of many powerplant operations, and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission mandates that nuclear power plants

be shutdown if a specified upper temperature limit

is reached. Other water uses may be affected if

additional releases from multipurpose reservoirs

are needed to moderate water temperatures (45).

Power-system operations in regions such as the

southeastern United States are currently affected

during critically hot summers by temperature

constraints. Problems can be acute when high

temperatures correspond with peak power demands. Also, on some eastern rivers, power-plant

water needs are, at times, so large that there may

not be enough water to dissipate heat during

low-flow periods (80). Power systems could

become less reliable in a warmer climate, especially during the summer (45). In turn, powerproduction costs and consumer-electricity prices

could increase.

Waterborne transportation is also affected by

drought-and with considerable adverse impacts.

In 1988, water in the Mississippi, Ohio, and

Missouri Rivers was so low that barge traffic was

11 ~eshwaterwi~&a~ to produce the Nation’s electricity totals about 130bgd, but currently ody about 4bgd are actually consu.md (66).
228 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

impaired (37). On one of the worst days, for commodities piled up in Mississippi River ports.

example, 130 towboats and 3,900 barges were Conversely, railroads and some Great Lakes

backed up on the Mississippi at Memphis while shippers benefited. Box 5-E describes these

dredges deepened a shallow stretch of the river effects in more detail.

(57). The economic consequences of the low Recreation may seem to be a less essential use

flows were considerable: barge and towboat for water; however, in some areas, the economic

owners suffered economic losses, and agricultural value of water-related recreation outweighs its

ITO oonvert square miles to square kllorneters, multiply by 2.590.

z 10 oonvwt miles to Idlorrwters, multlply by 1.609.
Chapter 5-Water 1229

As expected, water levels intheriverresponded

to the drought by dropping precipitously. In normal

years, water flow through the river peaks in April

and May. In 1988, however, water flows began to

decline in April and reached record lows during

May that were to continue throughout the summer.

On June 8,1988, a barge-pulling tow grounded on

a section of the river near St. Louis. it was the first

of a series of navigational disruptions that would

seriously impede barge transport on the river

through late July.

Mississippi River navigation is aided by a series

of locks and dams constructed and operated by the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers along the upper

Mississippi as well as on much of the Missouri and

Ohio Rivers. During normai years, this intricate

network of water-control structures can be operated to maintain water levels and safeguard

navigation during much of the year. in 1988,

however, even carefully controlled and timed water

releases could not prevent low water levels. Fully

ioaded barges require minimum water ievels of

9 feet (2.7 meters)s to operate safely. Not only

does water at this level provide suffiaent clearance

Navigable Waters of the

Mlsslsslppl River System

fMN

SD

KS MO

TX

/

SOURCE: W. Relbsame, S. Chagnon, and T. Karl, Droughtand

Natural Resources Managementlnthe UnitadStates: Impacts

and /mpkdons by the 1987-89 Drought (Soulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1991).

to keep the barge from hitting the bottom, but it aiso generally ensures that the water is moving fast enough to

forestall the formation of shoals, sand bars that form in shallow sections of the river and jmpah navigation.

The first action managers generally take when water levels drop too Iowisto start dredging the blocked areas.

Constant work by several dredges for several days can often dear the channel enough to keep it open. A second

strategy is to limit the number and weight of the barges pulled by a towboat so the tow is more maneuverable and

the lightly loaded barges are less likely to hit bottom. A third strategy is to release more water from upstream dams,

although this can interfere with other water uses at the upstream locations (including hydropower generation,

recreation, and agricultural, industrial, and municipal water supplies). In the event of severe disruptions, alternate

navigation routes or modes of transportation may have to be found.

Costly barge backups

In 1986, managers drew on ail of these strategies and more. Following the June 8 grounding in St. Louis,

the Corps dredged that section of the Mississippi and limited traffic to barges that drafted no more than 6 feet

Despite the Corps’ efforts, watbr levels continued to drop. By June 15, water levels in that reach dipped to the

lowest Ieveis measured since 1872, when record keeping first began. In addition, water levels on a nearby stretch

of the Ohio River dropped below 8fee4 with extensive shoaling. The Corps dosed a stretch of the Ohio for dredging

from June 14 through 17. Over the next severai weeks, the Mississippi and Ohio rivers were periodically dosed

for dredging in locations that included Greenville, MS, Mound City, IL, and Memphis, TN. Even when the river

3 TO convert fwt to meters, multiply by 0.305.

(Continued on nexfpage)
230 I Preparing for an Uncertain CIimat%Volume 1

Box 5-E-Navigating the Mississippi Through MM and Dry Times-(Continued)

8! 4 “8

M

z .

ii i –

A barge and ‘towboat’ on the &fississippi River. LXJW

jlows &ring the 1988 drought strandkd thousaruh of

barges at Memphis and other river ports. The 1993

jlooding along the Mississippi and its tributaries

stranded more than 2,000 barges, costing the barge

iruikstry more than $3 million per day.

remained open, river traffic and loads were

reduced. By early July, river traffic was down

by one-fifth, and toads totaling 15,000 tons

(13.6 million kilograms)4 of commodities had

been halted.

Some barge traffic was diverted to the

Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a river system built and operated by the Corps that

parallels the southern half of the Mississippi.

The Tennessee is not usually the favored

southward route because it is slower and less

direct than the Mississippi, but it was able to

handle more than 2.1 million tons of cargo

above normal levels to relieve some of the

Mississippi barge backup. As the extent of the

disruption became apparentj some grain shipments were shifted to alternate ports and

routes on the Great Lakes instead of the

Mississippi, further absorbing some of the

barge backups and storage overflows in the

ports on the Mississippi.

Repercussions from the interruption in navigation were widespread. By the time of the dosing of the Ohio on

June 14,700 barges were backed up at Mound City, a major grain port. VViththe barges notrunningand no empty

barges arriving, grain piled up at the port. Within days, the port hadtofindstorage space for 200,000 bushels (7,000

cubic meters)5 of corn, and more than $1 million worth was simply stored on aty streets because there was no

more room in the elevators. Thus, even farmers who managed to harvest crops despite the drought (and could

potentially earn higher prices due to the lower supplies) faced the risk that their grain would spoil while awaiting

shipment. Similar pileups occurred elsewhere. By June 17,700 barges were trapped in Greenville. By the 19th,

3,900 barges were stranded in Memphis. Barge traffic wassporadicthrough late June; inearlyJuty, another 2,000

barges were held up in Memphis.

International implications

Attempts to combat low water levels and maintain navigation even led to international controversy. It is

technically feasible to increase the flow of the Mississippi River by diverting water into it from Lake Michigan

through the Illinois River channel. At one point during deliberations over how to respond to the drought the

governor of Illinois proposed to triple the normal water releases from the Lake for a limited time to help restore

Mississippi River levels. l%e increased diversion was expected to raise Mississippi levels by 1 foot at St. Louis

and around 6 inches (15 centimeters)Gat Memphis, while Ioweringthe level of Lake Michigan by only 1 or2 inches.

This proposal caused considerable controversy when intrcxixed, however, because it ignored the history of

controversy over water diversions, and because at the time of the proposal, Lake Superior water levels were well

below average even though they had been at record high Ievelsjust 2 years before. Governors of four Great Lakes

States threatened court action, and the Canadian ambassador delivered a formal protest to the U.S. State

4 TO convert tons to kilograms, multiply by 907.

5 TO convert bushels to cubic meters, multiply by 0.035.

e TO convert inches to oentimers, multiply by 2.540.
Chapter 5-Water 1231

Department. Residents on both sides of the Great Lakes considered the levels of the Lakes-already low due to

the drought-of fundamental importance and declared that the levels should not be artificially altered for any

reason. Sufficiently low lake levels could, among other things, disrupt the operation of locks, thus affecting shipping

activities and the production of hydroelectric power at Niagara and on the St. Lawrence River. In the end, the Illinois

governor backed off the proposal, and no water was diverted.

Winners and losers

The economic costs due to less-efficient barge transport may have reached $1 biiiion. Farmers, agrkuiturai

chemical manufacturers, and coai ad oii companies found it more costly to ship products as barge shipping prices

quickly rose from $9 to $15 per ton. Barge shipping was reduced 20 percent, costing the industry perhaps $200

miiiion. Other iosers included the consumers of shipped commodities, particularity utiiities forced to pay higher

prices for coal. in addition, the drought ied to a 25 percent drop in hydropower production on the river and a 15

percent decline in recreational use, and low water ieveis ailowed sait water from the mouth of the Mississippi to

travei 105 miies iniand, damaging wetlands aiong the river.

Despite considerable turmoil and costly losses to shippers and the barge industry, there were others who

benefited from the drought, partiy offsetting the overaii costs. Shippers on the Tennessee-Tombigbee and the

Great Lakes received a considerable boost in business, and showed gains in economic competitiveness due to

the greater reliability of their routes. The Illinois international Port at Chicago shipped neariy $2 miiiion worth of

grain that wouid otherwise have been shipped through Mississippi River ports, generating an income for the port

of$O.5 miiiion. On the other side of the Lakes, shipping traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway rose by 7 percent during

the summer months.

Perhaps the biggest winner was the iilinois Central Raiiroad (iCRR), a north-south system running from

Chicago to New Orieans. Because its route is roughiy paraliei to the iiiinois-Mississippi River system, the raiiroad

has iong been a competitor with the barge industry. In 1988, the going rate for shipping by rail was $8 to $12 per

ton, which put the ICRR at a considerable disadvantage in competing for cargo with the barge industry, which

generaiiy charged around $5 per ton. When barge prices increased to $14 to $15 per ton due to the backups,

however, the iCRR was weii-situated to compete.

The Flood of 1993

The Drought of 1988 illustrates the powerful role that climate plays in maintaining the navigational services

that many have come to expect from the Mississippi. in times of drought, the iow water ieveisthat caused shoaiing

and grounded tows in 1988 can aiso affect wintertime navigation because the river freezes up more quickly and

extensively in shaiiow areas. Conversely, during times of above-average precipitation, fioods can be disruptive

as some stretches of the river become nonnavigable during high fiow. Flooding aiong the Upper Mississippi and

many of its tributaries reached ievels in June and July 1993 not seen in many decades. A 500-mile stretch of the

upper Mississippi, from St. Paui to St. Louis, was shut to ail commercial traffic, leaving thousands of barges

stranded. Water Ieveis did not return to normai for more than a month, wit h costiy effects on grain shipments f rom

iowa, Missouri, iiiinois, Minnesota, and Mhconsin. Cargoes heading north (e.g., rubber, sugar, and metai from

overseas) were aiso stranded. The fiooding caused many smaii towns to be evacuated and darnaged thousands

of homes and businesses. Crop losses have been estimated to be between $5 and $10 biiiion.

Considerable uncertainty surrounds predictions of ciimate change in the Mississippi River Basin.

Nevertheless, both the 1988 drought and the 1993 flooding couid be harbingers of the challenges ahead for the

barge industry-and for others who iive near and/or depend on the Mississippi.

SOURCES: This box Is drawn largely from W. Riebsame, S. Changnon, Jr., and T Kart, Drought amf Natund IkxxJrcas Mmagement In

the United States: Impacts and hnpkahrs of the 1987-89 L)ruught (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1891), pp. 43-112. Supplemental

material came from W. Koeilner, “Climate Variabdity and the Mississippi t%ver Navigation System,” in: Sorxkta/ Responses to F?egiorta/

C/hnato Change: Forecasting by Ana/ogy, M.H. Glantz (cd.) (Bouldar, CO: Westvlew Press, 19S8), pp. 243278; Imvels Reference Study

Board, “Final Report of CCC GCM 2 X COz Hydrologkal Impacts on the Great Lakes” (Hanover, NH: Levels Reference Study Board,

Deoember 1991); and Reuters Ltd., “Midwest Laveea Straining: Mississippi River Continues to Rise,” WXhingtonPOSZ July 8, 1993,

p. A3.
232 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

operating rules changed to better reflect current

economic realities, are now pitted against Lower

Missouri River States, which want the rules to

remain the same to protect the hydropower and

navigation purposes of the System. Similar conflicts can be found in many places in the United

States, and such conflicts are inevitably more

heated during drought.

ADAPTING WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS

TO CLIMATE AND OTHER CHANGES

Recreation is an important nonconsumptive use of

water, and in many areas, one of its highest-valued

uses.

use for irrigation or other purposes. Low lake

levels may leave recreational boating docks high

and dry and may affect shoreline property values.

Low flow conditions in mountain streams affect

white-water rafting, fishing, and other types of

water-related recreation.

Current allocation problems on the Missouri

River illustrate the value of’ water-related recreation, the considerable conflicts that can develop

between instream and offstream uses for water,

and the conflicts that can arise among different

instream purposes. The Upper Missouri River

Reservoir System (UMRRS) is operated by the

Army Corps of Engineers for a variety of purposes, chief of which are irrigation, navigation,

and flood control. The Corps, however, is under

pressure from upstream States to give greater

consideration to recreation and fish and wildlife

interests in operating the System. When priority

is given to navigation during drought periods,

boating facilities in upstream lakes (for example,

Fort Peck Lake in 1991) can be left high and dry,

and fish habitat can suffer. Upper Missouri River

States (Montana and North and South Dakota)

have decried this situation because, as the Corps

notes, the recreational value of the UMRRS, at

$65 million annually, is now roughly four times

the economic value of navigation (2). Upper

Missouri River States, which would like to seethe

Water resource planning is a complex political,

economic, sociological, scientific, and technological endeavor (60). Therefore, adaptation to

change, whether climate or otherwise, will rarely

be straightforward. Adaptation measures must

accomplish several objectives if they are to be

successful. They must address the sources of

stress, whether due to short-term or long-term

imbalances between supply and demand, threats

to water quality, high costs, or other factors. They

must be politically and administratively feasible--

water resource systems exist in complex institutional environments, and changes must be capable of operating in conjunction with existing laws,

agencies, and regulations. (Box 5-F describes

some important water responsibilities of key

Federal agencies.) Changes should enhance the

flexibility and robustness of water resource systems because the timing and magnitude of regional climatic events may change in as yet

undetermined ways. And, finally, costs and benefits arising from institutional changes must be

perceived as equitable if they are to be supported

and remain successful in the long run (23).

Adaptation measures in the near future are

likely to be taken in response mainly to problems

more pressing than climate change, but many of

these measures could also address climate change

concerns. Consideration of the potential for

climate change in water resource planning could

sometimes make a difference in the choice among

types and timing of new policies or projects.

Hence, even without sufficient regional da@ it
Chapter 5-Water 1233

Box 5-F-important Water-Related Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies

The Federal Government is involved in virtually every aspect of water resource planning, management

regulation, and development. In all, at least 35 units-including agencies, bureaus, and services-within 10

different Federal departments, as well as 7 independent agencies and several bilateral organizations, currently

exerase some responsibility for water programs and projects(4). These programs are governed by more than 200

Federal rules, regulations, and laws. Some 7 House committees and 13 subcommittees, plus 6 Senate committees

and 10 subcommittees exerase responsibility over distinct aspects of water resource development and

management (13) (see table 5-3). Responsibilities of some Federal agencies with important water-related

programs are listed below.

Department of Agriculture (USDA)

Soii Conservation service (SCS)-Heips faimers deveiop soii and water conservation pians and arrange

for cost-share funding for implementation of conservation practices. In cooperation with other agencies, offers

advice to farmers on pesticide and fertilizer use and land management. Severai programs promote water quaiity,

including the Conservation Reserve Program, the wetlands Reserve Program, the Agricuiturai Water Quality

Protection Program, and the Smail Watershed Program.

Department of the Army (DOA)

Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)-In budgetary terms, the most important Federal water resources

development agency. Responsible for planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of projects for

fiood control and floodplain management water suppiy, navigation, hydroelectric power, shoreiine protection,

recreation, fish and vddlife management, and environmental enhancement. Reservoirs managed by the Corps,

which inciude most of the iargest reservoirs in the United States, hold atmt 65 percent of the Nation’s stored

surface water. The Corps has undertaken several climate-change-related studies, including analysis of deasion

making about water resources given the uncertainty of climate change.

Department of Commerce (DOC)

Nationai Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-Within the context of its coastal zone and

fisheries management responsibilities, concerned with watershed management and non-point-source poiiution;

Office of Hydrology provides streamflow and fiood-forecasting services.

Department of Energy (DOE)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-issues licenses for nonfederal hydropower projects;

considers measures to preserve environmental quality, protect fish and wiidiife, and maintain scenic values, as

weii as those to maintain dam safety, flood control, and recreational opportunities.

Federal Power Administrations (FPAs)-Five Federal power administrations market hydroelectric power,

inciuding Bonneville, Southeastern, AlaslGL Southwestern, and Western Area Power Administrations.

Department of the Interior (lX)i)

Bureau of Reciamatlon (the Bureau)--suppiies municipal water to 25 million peopie in 17 western States,

provides irrigation water for 10 miilion acres (4.05 miiiion hectares)l of western farmland, and operates 52

hydroeiectricfaciiities that generate 46 biilion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually (making the Bureau the Nation’s

1 lth iargest electric utility). The facilities operated by the Bureau provide iocal flood controi, fish and wiidlife

1 TO convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

(Continuedon next page)
234 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat*Volume 1

Box 5-F–important Water-Related Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies=(Continued)

enhancement and recreation. The Bureau has established the Global Climate Change Response Program to

study the potential impacts of global climate change on water resources in the 17 W@stern States.

Geological Survey (USGS)-Conducts assessments of the quality, quantity, and use of the Nation’s water

resources; produces annual state-by-state summaries on special topics (e.g., floods and droughts). USGS has

initiated a Global Change Hydrology Program, the objectives of which include improving methods for estimating

the sensitivity of water resource systems to climate variability and change across the range of environmental

conditions existing in the United States and improving understanding of the effects of climate change on the

hydrology of watersheds.

Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)-bad Federal agency for conservation of fish and wildlife and their

habitats; responsible for endangered species, freshwater and anadromous fisheries, certain marine mammals,

and migratory birds. Manages 700 national wildlife refuges; assesses environmental impact of hydroelectric dams,

stream channelization, and dredge and fill operations. An FWS goal is to assess the significance of gtobal climate

change on fish and wildlife.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Plays a major role regulating water quality by issuing permits for discharge of pollutants into navigabte waters,

developing criteria that enable States to set waterquality standards, administering State grant programs to

subsidize costs of building sewage treatment plants, setting national drinking-water standards, and cooperating

with the Corps to issue permits for the dredging and filling of wetiands, for example. Mkxks wfth States to promote

watershed management and reduction in non-point-source poilution. EPA is the lead agency for the National

Estuary Program.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Undertakes hazard mitigation, preparedness planning, relief operations, and recovery assistartce for floods

and droughts and other natural and humanmade disasters; has undertaken a study of the possible impact of sea

level rise on the National Flood Insurance Program.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Government-owned corporation that conducts a unified program for advandng resource development and

economic growth in the Tennessee River Valley region. ll!A manages the 50 dams and reservoirs that makeup

the TVA system. Its activities include flood control, navigation development, and hydroelectric power production.

TVA is studying the sensitivity of its reservoir and power-supply systems to extreme weather.

may be important to take some actions soon or in (e.g., building in flood-prone areas) until better

the relatively near future to avoid clirnate-change- information about climate change, future water

related regrets later. Projects that require long demand,12 and other factors is available. A few

lead times for construction or implementation measures might be motivated solely in anticimay deserve special attention with respect to pation of a changing climate, but most are likely

climate change. In some instances, it may be to be taken primarily in response to other

advantageous to avoid taking certain actions stresses.

12 ~j=~g fi~e de~d ~ ~~ excqtio~ly dif&dt, and studies have shown tM most fo==ts mein tie 196@ ~1~~ of

current water use have been substantially in error (60). Projecting demand is complicated because the future regulatory fkamework for water

resource management and the types of adaptation that will be politically, economically, socially, and environmentally feasible am unctdn.

The importance of climate change in water resource planning relative to these other sources of uncertainty is diftkult to gauge.
Chapter 5-Water I 235

Potential adaptation measures are considered

in several categories below: demand management, water reallocation, and supply management

all deal with using existing supplies more efficiently. Supply augmentation increases the amount

of water available by developing new sources.

Flood and drought contingency planning introduces more flexibility during emergency situations and helps to mitigate damages.

H Demand Management and Water

Reallocation

Until relatively recently, the preferred approach to satisfying the water needs of growing

communities has been to develop untapped supplies. As new water-supply sources have become

less accessible, and as developing them has

become more expensive and less acceptable

environmentally, managing demand and enabling

voluntary water reallocation have taken on increasing importance. Demand management and

water marketing could be very important in

coping with climate change, both because they

promote efficiency and because they enable a

considerable amount of flexibility in water resource management.

The objective of demand management is to use

water more efficiently, and many regulatory and

water-pricing options can be used to promote the

development and use of more-efficient water-use

technologies and practices. Demand-management

options include such measures as: 1) modifying

rate structures, 2) reducing landscape water use,

3) modifying plumbing and irrigation systems,

4) conducting educational programs, and

5) metering. Temporary measures can provide

great flexibility in relieving stress during

droughts. Efficiency gains from permanent measures could offset or postpone the building of large

and costly structures that might otherwise be

needed to deal with climate change and other

factors leading to increased demand.

Demand-management measures are also important because they often have short payback

periods and lead to reduced capital and operating

costs for water supply and wastewater treatment

facilities. Water saved through demand management can be made available to protect wetlands

and fish and wildlife habitats, and reduced

wastewater and drainage flows can yield additional environmental advantages.

The important question is not whether demandmanagement practices should be pursued, but

how conserved water will be used. If the water is

to be used entirely to meet the needs of unlimited

urban growth, for example, water-use problems

are likely to recur at a later date. Flexibility can be

maintained by reserving some conserved water

for instream purposes.

Likewise, the primary objective of enabling

water reallocation is to promote more-efficient

water use. Water reallocation is facilitated by

allowing water to be marketed, that is, transferred

from willing sellers to willing buyers. Water

marketing is an important means of transferring

accurate price signals regarding the value of water

and is therefore closely linked to demand management (65). If owners of inexpensive water are

allowed to sell it at higher market prices, they will

have an incentive to conserve, and those willing

to pay higher prices for water are unlikely to do so

only to use it inefficiently.

Water Reallocation Through Marketing

and Other Transfers

Water has very different costs depending on its

use and typically has the lowest value in those

sectors that consume the most of it. The disparity

between the relatively high prices paid by urban

entities and the low prices paid by agricultural

users suggests that opportunities exist to use

markets to allow more-efficient allocation of

water.

However, the lack of institutional and legal

mechanisms for facilitating markets has so far

limited their development. Other types of transfer

arrangements that may or may not be considered

‘‘marketing can also be effective. Most of the

water trades and transfers occurring to date have
236 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

The California State Water Project currently transfers

about 2.5 million acre-feet (3 billion cubic meters) of

water annually from northern to southern California.

Together with California’s Central Valley Project, it

comprises one of the most massive water-redistribution systems in the world. Shown is the California

Aqueduct and the Ira J. Chrisman Wind Gap Pumping

Plant near Bakersfield, California.

involved the transfer of water from rural agricultural uses to municipal or industrial uses; some

trades, however, have been made between agricultural regions.

Properly implemented, water markets and transfers can serve to reallocate: water quickly and

efficiently under current climatic conditions.

Marketing arrangements can vary from “permanent’ sales13 of water to short-term, seasonal, or

dry-year agreements. Box 5-G illustrates a permanent transfer in which California’s Metropolitan

Water District agreed to improve the Imperial

Irrigation District’s canal system in exchange for

the water saved by these improvements. Box 5-H

illustrates an innovative dry-year agreement, also

in California, designed to meet demand during

droughts.

Each of the types of reallocation agreements

described in boxes 5-G and 5-H could also serve

to provide more-efficient and flexible use of

water in the event the number, duration, or

intensity of extreme events increases. Indeed,

severe drought conditions in the West between

1987 and 1992 may offer a glimpse of what

problems a future, drier region would encounter

and of some of the measures that might be taken

in response. Approaches similar to California’s

Drought Water Bank are likely to be useful in

other regions and could eventually become permanent institutions. Such sales of water to

higher-value uses would ensure that as much

economic productivity is maintained in a region

as possible.

An additional characteristic of water markets is

that they do not inherently require long lead

times to establish, such as are required of new

dams. California’ s Drought Water Bank, for

example, although not without problems and not

a full-fledged market, was implemented in several

months. Water markets and market-like transfers

may allow society to delay or avoid more-costly

or less-flexible adaptation options.

Despite the advantages of water reallocation,

the possibility that water transfers could adversely affect parties not directly involved in

them has left some people wary. Several issues

that often arise are: What review process or

standard should be used to balance the benefits to

farmers from water trades against the secondary

economic effects on the local community? What

are the obstacles facing a sale or trade when

farmers receive their water from an irrigation

district or pursuant to a contract with a Federal

water project? How will transactions cope with

surface-water return flows and groundwater recharge? Who protects freshwater fisheries, recreational white water, and other ecologic and

aesthetic values of rivers (65)? Some States have

taken steps to modify their water codes to address

13 Pmmn@ that is, from the point of view of the entity selling the wata. Such a transfer would not~prohibit the wat= ilom

being resold.
Chapter 5-Water 1237

Box 5-G-Permanent Transfer: Conserving Water In California’s Imperiai Valley

Southern California has four major water sources, and aii are threatened to some degree. increasingly strict

waterquaiity regulations threaten the use of some iocai water supplies (9O percent of which is groundwater);

importation of Colorado River suppiies is being scaled back as Arizona’s Central Arizona Prqect comes on iine;

litigation is forcing Los Angeies to reduce importation of water from the Owens Vaiiey and Mono Lake Basin; and

in 1982, the future of obtaining additional water from northern California was clouded as voters rejected the

Peripheral Canal across the Sacramento-San Joaquin Deita (29).

Southern California’s population is expanding even as its traditional water supplies contract. Los Angeies and

San Diego are two of the country’s IO fastestgrowing counties (44), and the region’s population of 14 miilion could

grow to 18 miiiion by the year 2010 (29). Because population growth is expected to outstrip recent declines in per

capita water use, Southern California couid soon face severe water shortages. As part of its efforts to avoid such

shortages, the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) has been active in pursuing opportunities for water transfers. One of the iargest transfers pursued by MWD isaconservation agreement with the imperiai irrigation District

(iID).The ilDdiverts 2.9 miiiion acre feet per year (af/year)l from the Coiorado River and is Caiifornia’siargest water

user, but in the early 1980’s, ilD was criticized by State Government and the courts for wasting water. The California

Department of Water Resources was able to identify operational and physicai improvements in iiD’s

water-distribution system that couid save an estimated 438,000 af of water per year (54).

in 1988, after years of intense and sometimes acrimonious negotiation, MWD and iiD reached an agreement

in which MWD agreed to fund iiD conservation projects in return for an estimated 100,000 af of saved water per

year (54). MWD is to contribute money directiy to the iiD Conservation Fund, which is controlled entireiy by iiD.

Projects must be approved by a program coordinating committee appointed by MWD and iiD. Projects wili include

iining canais; installing gates and automation equipment; constructing spiii-interceptor canais, regulatory

reservoirs, and taii-water recovery systems; and other monitoring and management measures. The Program

Coordinating Committee is responsible for seeing that ail projects are operating within 5 years of the effective date

of the agreement (54).

in addition to construction costs for the originai prqects, MWD is to pay for any conservation structures that

need to be replaced during the term of the agreement. MWD is also to pay ongoing direct annuai costs of

nonstructural programs, such as those invoiving monitoring and management, and $23 miiiion for indirect costs,

inciuding costs of environmental damage, lost income from hydroelectric generation, public-information programs,

and litigation on reiated issues. in return, MWD expects to receive approximately 100,000 af of conserved water

per year for 35 years at an average total cost of approximately $128/af (Pius $20/af for pumping (54)).

Many iegal and institutional obstacles had to be overcome to conclude the transfer agreement. Controversy

surrounded the issue of whether or not iiD was Iegaiiy abie to seii conserved water; some argued that under

anti-waste provisions of California State iaw, the conserved water should automatically revert to holders of the next

priorities for Colorado River water. The issue was eventually sidestepped by referring to the agreement as a“water

saivage arrangement” rathert han a saie, but t he issue may stiii be raised in future litigation (54). Agreements aiso

had to be reached with the Coacheiia and Paio Verde irrigation districts to ensure that MWD would be aiiowed

to receive the conserved water because these irrigation districts’ Colorado River priorities are iowerthan iiD’s but

higher than MWD’S.

Despite the numerous institutional obstacles and other difficulties, the MWD-ilD transfer arrangement is seen

as a success by both parties. MWD is satisfied to receive additional water suppiies at a reasonable price, and ilD

has been pleased to receive an improved distribution system at MWD’S expense (54).

13.6 billion cubic meterwyear; to convert from acre-feet to cubic meters, multiply by 1,234.
238 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 5-H—A Drought-Year Option: California’s Drought Water Bank

In December 1990, California was in the midst of its fourth consecutive year of drought Reservoir storage

was only 32 percent of capacity, statewide precipitation averaged only 28 percent of normal for the 1990-1991

water year, and most snowpacks were less than 30 percent of normal. Both the State Water Project (SWP) and

the Central Valley Project (which, respectively, account for about 7 and 22 percent of California’s water supplies)

were forced to cut back sharply in water deliveries. SWP, for example, announced cutbacks of 90 percent to

municipal users and was forced to suspend all deliveries to agricultural users. The State Department of Water

Resources (DWR) was predicting that the drought would likely continue into the new year, and the State Water

Resources Control Board had prepared a list of draconian regulatory measures that might need to be taken to

mitigate the crisis (30).

On February 15,1991, with no expectation of sufficient rain for the season, C%vernor Pete Wilson anmxmced

a four-~”nt plan to deal with the drought. As part of the plan, he established the Drought Water Bank. Intended

to operate only during the emergency, its charge was to purchase water from willing sellers and sell it to entities

with critical needs (7). Bank members could be coprations, mutual water companies, or public agencies (other

than DWR) that had responsibility to supply water for agricultural, municipal and industrial, or fish and wildlife

needs. Members were required to meet rigorous criteria (e.g., they must have already made maximum use of all

available supplies) to qualify as having critical needs. Sellers were assured that transfers would be considered a

reasonable beneficial use of water, not constitute evidence of waste and not be evidence of surplus water beyond

the terms of the agreement. The Bank was not intended as a precedent for California water policy or law, but was

undertaken solely to help cope with 1991 drought conditions.

Water for the Bank was acquired through land fallowing (i.e., not planting or irrigating a crop), using

groundwater instead of surface water, and transferring water stored in local reservoirs. Most of the 351 contracts

negotiated were for fallowing land, but the Iargestacquisition came from transferring stored water. The Bank init”dty

paid sellers $125/per acre-foot (af)l but after rainfall in March exceeded expectations, estimates of water needs

were lowered, and a few sellers were offered $30/af. The bank, in turn, sold the water for $175/af (sometimes

1 TO convert acre-feet to cubic mOtWS, mdidy @ 1,234.

these issues, but State water codes are not uniform environmental impact on Owens Viilley was

and not equally conducive to transfers.

Water transfers have a controversial history to

overcom~the earliest often took place without

adequate consideration for equity, regional economics, the environment, or areas of origin.

Water transfers have sometimes been refemxl to

as ‘‘water grabs” because gains to the receiving

water users have often come at the expense of a

loss of water security and opportunity for water

users in the area of origin. The classic example is

the Owens Wiley of eastern California, where

early this century agents for the City of Ims

Angeles made several disguised purchases of land

for the purpose of diverting the associated water

hundreds of miles to the south. The economic and

devastating, and the Valley has never recovered

(53). Box 6-D describes how water transfers have

hastened the decline of farmingin Colorado.

Transfers do not necessarily result in losses,

however, and the transfers described in boxes 5-G

and 5-H contain features that make them beneficial to buyers and sellers, and they have generally

been successful in increasing available supplies

without significantly endangering “third-party”

interests. As experience is gained with transfer

mechanisms and States ensure protection of

third-party interests, some current concerns

should be allayed (50).

Promotion of interstate, as well as intrastate,

transfers could help make management of water
Chapter 5-Water 1239

the amount paid to sellers, contract administration costs, and conveyance iosses. Buyers also paid the cost of

conveying water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Deita to their service area

Surprisingly, the Bank was able to purchase about 820,000 af of water in about 45 days. Eventuaiiy, about

400,000 af were disbursed to Bank members for critical needs, and 260,000 af were carried over into 1992 for

SWP. Some of the excess water acquired wasiost in conveyance or was used to maintain waterquaiity standards

in the Delta The rest was used to replenish carry-overcapacity as insurance against the possibiiitythat the drought

couid continue into 1992.

in ail, particularly ghen the lack of experience California had with water trading and the crisis nature of the

program, the Water Bank was cons”~red very effective in reallocating water. Many were concerned, however,

that water trading would have adverse impacts on iocal economies and on the environment. indeed, there were

some iosers; however, the adverse economic impacts were minimai, and overaii, the Bank created substantial

gains for Caiifornia’sagricuiture and economy. Failowed iand accounted for only about 10 percent of planted area

in major counties, and even where fallowing represented the iargest portion of decline in planted area the overaii

net effect on county personal income and total employment was reiativety smaii. The jobs that were lost in exporting

regions were more than offset by the jobs gained in importing agricultural regions. Estimated income gains in

importing agricultural regions ($45 miiiion) were more than thr~ ti~s greater than estimat~ inco~ iOSSeS in

exporting regions ($13 miiiion) (30). Estimatti ~t ~~fits in urban areas were OVer $~ miiiion) even without

accounting for the value of increased carry-over storage.

Many people beiieve that the Bank has just scratched the surface of its potentiai for facilitating transfers.

Some, however, are concerned with this success. Environmentaiists worry that there is currently no mechanism

for allocating water to fish and wiidiife. Imcai offidais remain concerned about the possible impact an expanded

water bank could have on their tax base and on social-services budgets. Rurai communities fear that banking could

accelerate either their demise or their development into suburban areas. Considerable disagreement exists about

whether the Water Bank shouid be permanent or implemented onty during emergencies. Neither rural areas nor

environmentalists want urban areas to use the Water Bank as an excuse for forgoing water deveiopmem

conservation, or reclamation programs. Minimizing future Bank impacts on Iocai economies may be possible by,

among other things, ensuring a wide regional distribution of faiiowed area increasing reiiance on groundwater

exchanges, and switching to less-water-intensive crops (30).

resources more flexible and efficient, especially Demand Management Through IWchg Reform

where infrastructure for transftig the water Water conservation could be promoted not

already exists. Such transfers, for example, could

be useful in the Colorado River Basin. Without

only by allowing markets to provide accurate

price signals, but by changing some pricing

some vehicle for transmitting price signals across t)ractices that lead to inefllcient water use. PerState borders, low-value irrigation uses in the

Upper Basin States have the potential to displace

high-value urban uses in the Lower Basin, where

water may have 10 times the value. Several

proposals for interstate marketing of Colorado

River water have already been made, including

recent ones motivated by the California drought

that began in 1986 (9). Increased aridity in the

Southwest, possibly as a result of climate change,

will likely focus additional attention on interstate

transfers in the future.

~aps one of the biggest obstacles to more-efficient

water use is that Americans are frequently

charged much less for water than it costs to supply

it. Water is usually treated as a free resource in the

sense that no charge is imposed for withdrawing

water from a surface or underground source.

Users may pay for storing water and for transporting it to where it is used (although sometixnes at

highly subsidized rates), and also for treatment of

the water and disposal of the return flows, but

there is rarely any charge to reflect the value of
240 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

water for a given use, that is, the opportunity costs

of putting water to one use at the expense of

another (22). As a result, few people have

incentives to use water efficiently. Policies that

underprice water have been much criticized for

not promoting efficient use in urban areas and on

lands irrigated with federally supplied water (91).

Urban pricing structures often include such

economically inefficient practices as: 1) using

average-cost rather than marginal-cost pricing,14

2) using decreasing block rates—in which the

cost of the last units consumed is lower than the

cost of initial blocks, 3) recouping a significant

fraction of facility costs through property taxes

rather than through charges based on water use,

4) failing to meter individual consumers, and

5) failing to use seasonal pricing if marginal cost

varies by season. These common practices provide inappropriate price signals to consumers and

lead to overuse of water. They also result in

overinvestment in water-supply facilities relative

to investment in other methods of providing or

conserving water and relative to expenditures on

other goods and services (92).

The large Federal subsidies received by farmers who contract for water with the Bureau of

Reclamation (the Bureau) likewise lead to overuse of water. The Bureau, which was established

in 1902 with the principal goal of assisting the

development of family farms in the arid West,

now supplies about 30 million af of water per year

in the 17 Western States-—about 25 percent of

western irrigation. The cost-recovery provisions

in reclamation law provide Federal subsidies for

irrigation, and these have grown substantially

over time. Subsidies on irrigation capital costs,

such as interest-free repayment of capital, have

reached levels of over 90 percent, and historically, program-wide subsidies of irrigation capital costs have been estimated at 85 percent (91).

Interest-free repayment for irrigation appears

to be an anachronism in the 1990s. The West has

been settled, and States now have their own water

resource programs. Where farmers must pay

prices that reflect the market value of water, there

will be greater motivation to use water more

efficiently. However, small price increases will

likely do little to motivate changes in use if the

gap between the price paid and the market price

remains large.

Improvhg Conservation Practices

Many technical and regulatory possibilities

exist for using water more efficiently (see table

5-2). Additional water-conservation research could

also help realize new savings opportunities and

bring down costs of existing ones.

Conservation is likely to have more potential

for reducing water use in irrigated agriculture

than in cities, given that 85 percent of all water

consumed is for irrigation. Moreover, in the

agricultural sector in Western States, traditional

water law has been a powerful disincentive for

practicing conservation. For example, where the

prior-appropriation doctrine is practiced, farmers

must use the water they have appropriated or they

face losing it. Savings of agricultural water can be

obtained by such practices as lining canals,

recovering tail water at the end of irrigated fields,

and better scheduling of water deliveries. Savings

might also be made possible by developing more

water-efficient crop varieties or crops with a

higher tolerance for salt (18).

The High Plains of Texas illustrate the potential for conservation in agriculture (see box 6-G

for details). Here, the high costs of pumping

groundwater for irrigation motivated a substantial

public education program and widespread use of

water-saving technologies. Where irrigation costs

are low, as in much of California’s Central

Wiley, there is little incentive to spend money on

water conservation.

Significant savings are available through urban

conservation efforts as well, and the rate of
Chapter 5-Water I 241

demand growth in this sector is much higher than

it is for agriculture. Municipal water-conservation

programs are in operation in cities from Boston to

San Diego, yet in most parts of the country, a

strong water-conservation ethic has not developed. Nevertheless, examples of innovative municipal programs abound, and many of these

programs could be applied more broadly. One

innovative and flexible program is the Conservation Credits Program of Southern California’s

MWD. Under the terms of this program, MWD,

a wholesale water corporation, pays $ 154/af (less

than its cost for developing other new supplies)

for demonstrable water savings from qualifying

local-agency conservation programs, with an

upper limit of one-half of the program cost, To

qualify, local-agency projects must result in

decreased demand for MWD imported water, be

technically sound, and have local support (44).

Many of the approved conservation projects

are aimed at implementing the 16 Best Management Practices (BMPs) proposed by MWD and

other urban water districts.15 These include retrofitting showerheads and toilets; conducting

home-water audits, distribution-system audits,

and large-landscape-water audits; finding leaks

in distribution systems; instituting landscaping

requirements; and several other practices expected to save substantial amounts of water (44).

MWD’s goal is to conserve 830,000 af/year by the

year 2010.16 If conservation programs are perceived as equitable and fair, people are more

likely to support them.

As important as conservation can be, it does

have its limits. In areas where comprehensive

conservation has begun, demand management

may not yield large additional savings (47). To

the extent that conservation is successful and

growth in demand continues (e.g., through increases in population), long-term watermanagement flexibility through decreased water

use will be harder to achieve. The limits of

Table 5-2—Ways to Use Water More Efficiently

Effective water-saving measures for urban areas

Modify rate structure to influence consumer water use,

including:

■ shifting from decreasing block rates to uniform block rates

■ shifting from uniform rates to increasing block rates

■ increasing rates during summer months

■ imposing excess-use charges during times of water shortage.

Modify plumbing system, including:

■ distributing water-saving kits, including replacement showerheads and flow restrictors

■ changing plumbing standards

■ requiring or offering rebates for ultra-low-flow toilets.

Reduce water-system losses, including:

■ using watermain-leak-detection survey teams followed by

water main repair or replacement as necessary to reduce

system losses

■ monitoring unaccounted-for water

■ conducting indoor-outdoor audits

■ starting a meter-replacement program

■ recycling filter plant backwash water

■ recharging groundwater supplies.

Meter all water sales and replace aging or defective meters in

a timely way.

Reduce water use for landscaping, including:

■ imposing lawn watering and other landscape-irrigation

restrictions

■ developing a demonstration garden

■ publishing a xeriscape manual

9 using nonpotable water for irrigation

■ imposing mandatory water-use restrictions during times of

water shortage.

Conduct water-conservation education of the public and of

school children, including special emphasis during times of

water shortage,

Effective water-saving measures for farms

Use lasers for land leveling.

install return-flow systems.

Line canals or install piping to control seepage.

Control phraetophytes (although these plants may be

considered valuable habitat).

Use sprinkler and drip irrigation systems.

Schedule irrigation by demand.

Use soil-moisture monitoring.

Use deep pre-irrigation during periods when surplus water

is available.

improve tillage practices.

Use evaporation suppressants.

Use lower-quality water.

install underground pipelines.

Grow drought or salinity-tolerant crops.

SOURCE: W. Anton, “implementing ASCE Water Conservation Polk-y,” in: Water Resources Planning and Management: Proceedings of

the Miter Resources Sessions at Water Forum '92, Water Forum '92,

Baltimore, MD, Aug. 2-6, 1992.

15 M. Mo- Me&opoli~ Water District of Southern Californ@ personal Co-tication, AuWt 1~.

‘6 Ibid.
242 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

conservation are far from being reached, but in the

absence of new developments in conservation

technology, conservation can be expected to have

diminishing returns. ultimately, additional solutions may be needed. Moreover, once the easy

options have been implemented, additional conservation may require higher costs and important

lifestyle changes, and these may be resisted by the

public.

Policy Options: Improving Demand Management

Demand management, where practiced, has

generally been a State or local concern rather than

a Federal one. However, if it chooses to do so,

Congress and/or the Executive Branch could

stimulate demand management in various ways.

Option 5-1: Amend the Clean Water Act to

allow Federal grants to States for wastewater

treatment projects to be used for conservation

investments. These State revolving funds (SRFS)

can now be used for sewage treatment facilities

but generally not for conservation. However, to

the degree that conservation reduces the volume

of water that needs to be treated, the cost of

sewage treatment is reduced. Grants for SRFS are

set to expire in 1994. Congress could continue

this funding when it reauthorizes the Clean Water

Act and, in Title VI of the Act, could make

conservation explicitly eligible for revolvingfund loans. States might, in turn, offer favorable

loan terms to communities that achieve suggested

water-efficiency goals.

Option 5-2: Lead by example by promoting

greater water-use efficiency in Federal facilities.

The Federal Government owns or leases about

500,000 buildings of various sizes and some

422,000 housing units for military families. It

also subsidizes utility bills for some 9 million

households of low-income families (77). Thus,

Federal facilities and subsidized housing represent an opportunity for the U.S. Government to

play an important role in promoting water-use

efficiency. Currently, however, Federal agencies

have little incentive to conserve water. Most

agencies do not even meter their water use or have

the baseline data needed to determin e the payback

period and cost-effectiveness of efficiency

measures.

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486)

does encourage water conservation in Federal

facilities, but, in contrast to the act’s detailed

treatment of energy conservation, it treats water

as an afterthought. Congress should clarify its

intent regarding water conservation, including,

for example, how funds authorized for efficiency

programs are to be divided between energy and

water conservation. Congress might direct

agencies to: 1) establish programs to reward

innovative and/or cost-effective water-conservation measures, 2) use models that predict water

use [e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers Institute

for Water Resources Municipal and Industrial

Needs (IWR-MAIN) model (73) to identify opportunities for improved water-use efficiency,

and 3) amend Federal acquisition regulations to

facilitate Federal procurement of efficient waterUse technology.

Option 5-3: Increase funding for the development and use of water-saving technologies.

The Water Resources Research Act of 1984 (P.L.

98-242) authorizes funding for such purposes.

However, no funds were appropriated for the act’s

competitive matching-grant fund in 1993. Moreover, no funds have ever been appropriated under

sections 106 and 108 of the act, which specifically

authorize grants for water-related technology

development, including conservation and waterreuse technologies.

Option 5-4: Reform tax provisions to promote

conservation investments. The Tax Reform Act of

1986 (P.L. 99-514) clamped down on the ability

of cities and States to use tax-exempt bonds to

finance any projects except those that clearly

benefit the public (72). The benefits of most

conservation technology (e.g., plumbing retrofits

and advanced irrigation systems) have been

considered to be mostly private and, hence, the

technology has not been eligible for tax-exempt

financing. To promote more conservation investment, Congress may wish to revise the tax code to
Chapter 5--Water I 243

define conservation investments as having substantial public benefits and, hence, to be eligible

for tax-exempt-bond financing.

Option 5-5: Reform pricing in Federal water

projects. Although it may be difficult to reform

the pricing of water supplied by existing Federal

projects, Congress could eliminate subsidies on

future projects, such as for interest-free repayment of construction costs or loans. Alternatively,

Congress could require, through legislation, that

all entities that stand to benefit from new,

subsidized, federally developed water study and,

if necessary, reform their current pricing structures before water is delivered (92). Ignoring

possible price reforms would result in inefficient

expenditure of Federal funds.

Policy Options: Facilitating Water Marketing

As with demand management, Federal law

usually defers to State law regarding water

marketing and other transfers. However, the

Federal Government could help facilitate mutually beneficial transfers in several ways. It could

provide stronger leadership, improve the implementation of its own policies, influence State

Governments through the use of incentives or

disincentives, and clarify some ambiguous elements of reclamation law. Present uncertainty

over the rules governing a market can slow and

raise the effective costs of transactions. The

Federal Government could also have some influence in helping to ensure that transfers are fair for

those not directly involved in the exchange and

that they do not adversely affect instream uses of

water.

Option 5-6: Urge the Department of the

Interior (DOI) to provide stronger leadership in

facilitating water transfers. In December 1988,

DOI adopted a set of principles for facilitating

voluntary water transfers involving Bureau of

Reclamation facilities. However, the Bureau has

not effectively implemented these directives, and

they have not been applied consistently in all

regions (42). Stronger leadership could include an

unambiguous public statement by DOI and Bureau officials endorsing water transfers as a means

of solving water resource problems, more

emphasis within the Bureau on transfers, and

consideration of the recommendations made by

the Western Governor’s Association (WGA).

WGA recommended that DOI work with it to

develop a package of amendments to reclamation

law to facilitate transfers (%).

Option 5-7: Clarify reclamation law on trades

and transfers. Reclamation law was written when

western settlement and water development were

being emphasized and when little or no consideration was given to the transfer of water rights or to

contractual entitlements on federally constructed

water projects. There are several ambiguities in

this body of law regarding the transferability of

water. For example, can conserved water be

transferred, or does a farmer who saves water by

using it more efficiently lose rights to it?17 It is

also at times unclear whether State or Federal law

governs transfers on Federal projects. Clarification might be accomplished through a formal

solicitor’s opinion by DOI or, alternatively,

through new legislation.

Option 5-8: Clarify rules regarding the marketing of Indian water. The nature of water rights

for many Indian tribes is still open to question. A

key issue is whether Indian water rights, once

quantified, will be salable or leasable, and, if so,

with what restrictions. Allowing water entitlements of Indian reservations to be leased with no

more restriction than non-Indian rights would

facilitate greater efficiency and flexibility of

water use. Equity issues regarding Indian water

are important and usually controversial. Indians

have often been treated unfairly. At the same

time, many non-Indians have come to depend on

inexpensive water that may legally belong to

Indian tribes, and current users could, in theory,

17 At issue is whe~er the 1902 Reclution Act (32 Stat. 388) imposes any additional requirements, beyond thOSe Of Stite law, for water

on Federal projects.
244 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

be required by Indians to pay significantly more

than they do now. Indian claims have often been

settled through legislation, and in some cases, the

legislation has specified the degree to which

Indian water is leasable (21). Language ensuring

the ability of Indians to market water or transfer

entitlements could be included in all future Indian

water settlements.

Option 5-9: Provide ways for Federal agencies to buy water for environmental purposes.

Federal participation in water markets could play

a role in preserving or enhancing instream uses, a

goal that could become increasingly difficult to

achieve if water demand increases and/or supply

decreases. Water rights for instream-flow purposes are usually held by States but are often

junior in nature and could thus be the first to be

curtailed during a drought. Stronger protection

could be acquired by allowing public agencies

charged with protection of fish and wildlife and

other instream uses of water to participate in

water markets. In States that allow non-State

agencies to acquire instream rights, Federal

agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service

could be funded to acquire water rights where

existing statutes afford inadequate protection.

Flexibility would be enhanced by allowing agencies to make not only permanent purchases of

water rights but also short-term purchases during

drought periods, when instream uses of water are

most likely to be under stress (92).

~ Supply Management

Opportunities exist for signicant gains in

water-use efficiency through better management

of existing (i.e., developed) water supplies. Such

opportunities may be realized by: 1) improving

coordination of water resource management,

2) enhancing the flexibility of reservoir

reservoir-system operations, 3) expanding

conjunctive use of ground and surface water,

4) taking advantage of new analytical tools

forecast systems.

and

the

and

and

Improving Coordination

In large part, water resource systems throughout the United States have developed independently of one another, their geographical limits

usually coincident with political rather than

watershed boundaries. Not surprisingly, water

resource management in the United States has

evolved in a fragmented and uncoordinated fashion. Coordination has not mattered greatly where

water is abundant, but it is becoming increasingly

important in those parts of the United States

where water resources are becoming relatively

more scarce and/or polluted. It will become even

more important if global climate change results in

decreased water supplies in some areas.

The most efficient way to manage water

resources is the comprehensive river basin or

watershed approach. At its best, such an approach

would entail managing reservoirs in the watershed to meet multiple demands as a single system

rather than individually, managing groundwater

and surface water jointly, managing waterquantity and water-quality issues together, and

integrating floodplain and wetland management

with other aspects of water resource management.

Managing in this way would not only increase

usable water supplies but would also benefit other

valuable uses for water (e.g., for habitat and

wetlands preservation and for recreation). River

basin management would also improve the flexibility and efficiency desirable in policies suited to

a changing climate. Comprehensive planning and

management is likely to become increasingly

important wherever opportunities for developing

new supplies grow scarce and water becomes

subject to greater competition among competing

uses.

The concept of river basin management is not

new and, in fact, is widely accepted in theory

among water resource professionals, ecologists,

and others. However, such management practices

are the exception rather than the rule. Although

many are aware of the benefits of more-integrated

management, coordination and cooperation to

this end have been very difficult. Responsibilities
Chapter 5-Water I 245

for water supply are generally separate from those

for water quality; responsibilities for groundwater

are often separate from those for surface water;

Federal goals and responsibilities within a basin

may conflict with State or local ones; and Federal

and State boundaries seldom coincide with groundwater basins or surface watersheds. The diversity

and inflexibility of water-rights laws, inadequate

incentives for efficiency in water use, and inadequate research, information, and training support

for improved water resource coordination practices can also make river basin planning difficult

(72).

Nevertheless, river basin and watershed planning is attracting renewed attention. The U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency strongly supports the approach, and its regional offices are

now participating in about 35 small watershed

projects around the country (82). Moreover,

legislation recently introduced to reauthorize the

Clean Water Act (S. 1114, the Water Pollution

Prevention and Control Act of 1993) contains

important watershed-management provisions, including some for designating areas for watershed

management, developing watershed-management

plans, and providing for incentives and public

participation.

Reservoir and Reservoir-Systern Management

Individual reservoirs are often designed and

constructed by one jurisdiction (e.g., a water

district). The operating rules for the reservoir are

also usually centered around meeting the needs of

the clients of the constructing agency, given the

storage and delivery constraints imposed on the

reservoir when it was constructed. Where there

are several reservoirs on a river system (possibly

operated by different jurisdictions or even in

different States), yield of the system as a whole

can often be increased if joint operational rules

are considered. For example, rather than meeting

the downstream demands of a particular area

solely from the reservoir owned by that jurisdiction, more than one upstream reservoir may often

be used. If the timing and amount of releases can

be coordinated, often everyone can gain.

Discovering and taking advantage of these

opportunities involve a good deal of coordination

among different water agencies and include such

tasks as developing flow and storage models that

are accepted by all of the jurisdictions involved;

simulating likely stress events, such as floods and

drought; studying trial responses to such simulated events; and developing written agreements

for joint operation of facilities. It often takes years

and the commitment of key individuals to implement these steps, but the effort can be very

successful.

For example, starting in 1977, the Interstate

Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB)

sponsored several studies of the potential for

joint, rather than independent, operations during

drought periods among the three principal Washington, DC, water suppliers. Using a riversimulation model developed at Johns Hopkins

University, ICPRB determined that existing reservoir capacity was underutilized, and that if the

local water suppliers would coordinate the timing

of withdrawals from upstream reservoirs, they

would be able to increase system yields dramatically and avoid spending large sums on construction of new reservoirs. A series of written

agreements was approved in 1982 specifying how

joint operations would be carried out during

droughts. Joint management of existing facilities

in the Potomac River Basin increased system

yields by over 30 percent (about 90 million

gallons per day). Between $200 million and

$1 billion was saved, compared with previously

evaluated structural alternatives for meeting future supply needs, and environmental impacts

were substantially reduced (63).

The potential exists throughout the Nation for

improving operational efficiencies of multireservoir systems through systems analysis. Moreover, the Federal role in contingency planning

and systems-analysis studies could be large

because federally constructed reservoirs are often

intermingled with nonfederal reservoirs on the
246 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

same river system. The Colorado River System is

one important prospect for application of moreefficient operating rules. The Bureau of Reclamation operates all major storage facilities on this

river, whose water is so crucial to the arid

Southwest. Potentially, results of Federal simulations of long-term water availability on the

Colorado (including analysis of various climate

change scenarios) could ease the way for Colorado River Basin States to begin considering new

operating rules of mutual benefit.

An important reason for the difficulty in

making efficiency and flexibility improvements

in the management of reservoir systems (and

individual reservoirs) pertains to the process by

which Federal water projects are authorized and

regulated. The two agencies responsible for most

large Federal water projects are the Army Corps

of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation.

Both the studies and the projects these agencies

undertake are authorized by Congress. The projects are usually based on a detailed feasibility

study by one of the two agencies. Both the study

and the subsequent congressional authorization

typically emphasize individual projects, and the

operating agencies are closely bound to use

projects only for the original purposes specified in

authorizing legislation. Rarely do the computed

benefits from a project reflect what might be

achieved if the operation of the project were

integrated in a systematic way with other existing

and proposed projects, either Federal or local.

Initially, most new projects are more than

adequate to serve the existing demands. Over

time, however, demands may increase, and structural or operational changes may be required.

Historically, structural changes (i.e., construction

of new storage facilities) have been emphasized,

and opportunities for ‘‘creating’ more water

through better management and/or reallocation

have received little attention. This may occur

because there is no regular review process devoted to finding such opportunities and because

whenever changes in operating policies are proposed, there are inevitably people who believe

their interest lies in maintaining the status quo

(64).

Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and

Surface Water

Groundwater and surface supplies are managed

independently inmost States and are governed by

different legal systems and separate agencies. The

integrated management of ground and surface

water, often referred to as conjunctive management, has the potential to significantly improve

water-system performance and increase the flexibility and reliability of water resource management (see box 5-I).

Storage of water underground is desirable

because it makes possible the use of water that

otherwise would not be captured (20). Conjunctive management can be used to balance seasonal

variations in water supply and demand, enabling

groundwater to be used in lieu of surface water

during dry periods; to eliminate the need for

additional treatment and surface-distribution facilities; to allow water suppliers to meet customer

demands more cheaply and easily than would be

possible through independent management of

separate systems; and to enhance yields through

less-conservative operation of existing storage

facilities (e.g., a conjunctive management study

of Houston found that system yields could be

increased by 20 percent (63)). Another conjunctive use is blending surface and groundwater to

produce an overall usable medium-quality supply

(e.g., by blending high-quality surface water with

brackish groundwater not otherwise usable).

Cities such as Los Angeles, Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Houston already have conjunctiveuse plans, but conjunctive management is still not

used in most major population centers (72). Not

all communities have access to groundwater

supplies, but conjunctive management may be

feasible for some that do not, as long as they are

linked to a river or distribution system. Each plan

is unique, and the most equitable and efficient

approaches are closely tailored to the physical

characteristics of the water resources (e.g., rates
Chapter 5-Water 1247

Box 5-l-Seasonal Storage: The Metropolitan Water District’s Interruptible

Water Service and Seasonal Storage Programs

Rainfall and snowmelt tend to be seasonal events, so the availability of water supplies in communities that

rely on surface water can vary wtdely during the course of the year. Water demand also varies with the seasons,

typically being much higher during the summer and lower during the winter. Balancing supply and demand in the

face of these variations is possibte only with the use of storage facilities. Southern California’s Metropolitan Water

District (MWD) has used its Interruptible Water Service (IWS) Program and its Seasonal Storage Program (SSP)

to encourage conjunctive management as a method of enlarging local storage capacity.

The IWS Program began in 1981 when MWD offered to sell water at discounted rates to member agenaes

that could demonstrate an ability to continue serving customer needs in the event that water deliveries from MWD

were interrupted (44). Operation of the program allowed MWD to take advantage of exms supplies in the

Cotorado River and the State Water Project by delivering the water to local agencies when it was available and

ceasing the deliveries when it was not. Most of the local agencies chose to meet the IWS requirements by

developing new artificial-recharge and pumping faaiities to store the water underground and then pump it back

out during suppJy interruptions.’

The IWS Program led to problems for some participating agencies, however. Retail agencies were required

oniy to demonstrate sufficient local production capacity to continue ti”ng customer deliveries in the event of

MWD interruptions, rather than agreeing to actually store the water in new or underutilized facilities. Some

agencies found thatthey were able todemonstratethis capacity on paper much more easily than they were actually

able to produce the water when needed.2

MWD discontinued the IWS Program and replaced it with the SSP in 1989. The concept is the same:

discounted water is used to encourage MWD’S retail-agency memtws to develop local facilities for storing excess

winter flows for subsequent use during low-flow, high-demand summer months. But terms of the SSP require local

agencies to actually store the water, either directly in surface reservoirs and aquifers or indirectly by using the water

in lieu of existing groundwater pumping (44). MWD has found that the SSP has encouraged development of local

storage capacity, eased peak demands on the MWD delivery system, and worked better for the retail agencies

than the program it replaced. An additional benefit is that MWD’senergy costs for pumping the water to its service

area are lower in the winter than in the summer.3

1 D. Adams, Directorof Resources, MetropoHtan Water Districtof Southern California, LosAngeles, personal

communication, July 1992.

2 l~dm

3 [~dm

of discharge, the degree to which groundwater is sion of ground and surface-water laws, regulaconnected to surface supplies, the rate and amount

of lateral movement within the groundwater

basin, and the susceptibility of the basin to

degradation from saltwater intrusion or other

sources).

As with integration of surface-reservoir systems, conjunctive management can provide the

robustness and flexibility desirable for adaptation

to climate change. Similarly, however, a profutions, and agencies may be involved in a shgle

conjunctive management project, so agreements

can take a great deal of time to negotiate. ‘l%is

amount of time may diminish as experience with

different schemes grows.

Analytical Tools and Forecast Systems

The state of the art of analytical tools used by

water resource managers has improved signifi-
248 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

cantly in recent years. Various types of models

currently being developed or refined could dramatically improve water resource decisionmaking, for example, by providing information about

how benefits from competing demands for water

could be optimized, how pursuit of a particular

water-management goal could affect competing

goals, how major land-use changes in a basin

(e.g., urbanization) could affect water availability, or how environmental quality could be

improved. Many of these tools, however, are not

yet available or are not being used routinely.

Several agencies have small programs or initiatives to develop and implement tools for advanced hydrologic and climate forecasting to

reduce risk in water-management decisions. For

example, both the U.S. Geological Survey and the

Bureau of Land Management have been working

with the University of Colorado’s Center for

Advanced Decision Support for Water and Environmental Systems (CADSWES). CADSWES is

helping the agencies develop anew generation of

water resource modeling systems. A joint pilot

project using these new systems has recently been

planned to study the sensitivity of several western

areas-the Gunnison River Basin and the American, Carson, and Truckee Basins-to climate

change (51).

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Weather Service also has an advanced modeling initiative, the

Water Resources Forecasting System (WARFS).

The goal of this program is to provide improved

stream-flow forecasting, building on existing

river and flood-forecasting services and NOAA’s

weather- and climate-forecasting capabilities, its

planned Next Generation Weather Radar program, and its Automated Surface Observing

System. The Denver Water Department and the

Bureau of Reclamation, among other groups,

have recently used the methodology in a pilot

program to increase water yields from three

reservoirs serving the Denver area while optimizing benefits from other competing demands such

as hydropower and recreation (39). The Extended

Streamflow Prediction component of WARFS

will allow a hydrologist to make extended probabilistic forecasts of values of stream flow and

other hydrological variables, which can be used

for flood-control planning, drought analysis and

contingency planning, and hydropower planning.

The Army Corps of Engineers has developed

several models that, among other things, enable

communities to evaluate demand-management

programs and allow systems operators to consider

alternative operating strategies (e.g., the Corp’s

IWR-MAIN model). Much of the new software

available is significantly more uier-friendly than

earlier versions, enabling models to be built

quickly, more easily, and at a fraction of the cost.

The Corps’ research laboratories have also been

developing innovative methods and models for

analyzing water-environment problems that are

not traditionally part of its mission.

The new analytical tools, promising as they are

for improving water resource management, are

based on the assumption that the climate of the

future will be similar to the climate of the past.

Thus, historic patterns of temperature and rainfall

have been assumed to provide a good indication

of the range of expected future values. Climate

change may mean that the assumption of a

stationary climate may no longer be the best

predictor of future conditions. Hence, some

procedures currently used to plan and design

dams and other structures and to conduct hydrologic analyses may need to be modified to account

for this additional source of uncertainty. Among

these procedures may be those used in floodfrequency analysis for floodplain planning, in

determining g the probable maximum flood or

design flood for darn design and darn-safety

analysis, in statistical analyses of historic runoff

patterns for reservoir-system planning, and in

stream-flow forecasting for reservoir operations

and flood control.18
Chapter 5--Water I 249

Policy Options: Improving Supply Management

Systems integration and the reallocation of

supplies based on current needs could provide

significant gains in water-management efficiency

and flexibility, and there appear to be many

opportunities for such gains. Several ways that

the Federal Government could promote better

management are considered below.

Option 5-10: Resurrect the former Water

Resources Council or create a similar high-level

coordinating body. A new council or committee

could play an important role in improving cooperation and coordination among the many Federal

agencies with water-related responsibilities and

among Federal, State, and local governments and

the private sector. The new council might be

strengthened relative to the original one by

appointing a full-time chair, who would report

directly to the President. It could be charged with

reviewing interagency and intergovernmental policies and programs to promote consistency, fairness, and efficiency and, more generally, with

elaborating and overseeing national water policy.

The original council was established by the Water

Resources Planning Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-80).

Legislatively, this council still exists, but Congress would need to restore funding for it.

Option 5-11: Promote the reestablishment and

strengthening of Federal-State river basin commissions as another way to improve coordination

among agencies. River basins, not political jurisdictions, are the natural management units for

water. Integrated management can only work if

the multiple parties with jurisdiction in any given

watershed can be brought together in some way to

explore common problems and pursue joint

solutions. Section 321 of the Water Pollution

Prevention Control Act of 1993 addresses watershed management and could be broadened, if

desired, to explicitly address the formation of new

Federal-State commissions. The Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB) or

the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC)

could serve as models.

ICPRB is jointly funded by member States and

the Federal Government. It serves as a neutral

ground for the basin States and the Federal

Government to discuss mutual problems. Although ICPRB has no regulatory authority, it does

provide sophisticated technical assistance in solving problems around the basin. The combination

of political neutrality and technical competence

has allowed ICPRB to successfully mediate many

disputes. To promote establishment of this type of

river basin commission, Congress could establish

a grant program to make funds available (e.g., for

establishing technically competent staffs) to

groups of States that choose to negotiate such

compacts.

DRBC, in contrast, was established with considerable authority to control the diversion of

surface and groundwater within the Delaware

River Basin; coordinate Federal, State, and private reservoir releases during droughts; and limit

pollution discharges. Individual States have retained veto power over all decisions, but DRBC

has proved relatively effective as a setting for

negotiating disputes. A Federal representative is

a co-equal member of the commission. The

DBRC policy was fully implemented only after

many years and much controversy, but in its

present shape, it could serve as a model for other

States.

Option 5-12: Require the Army Corps of

Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to

undertake periodic audits to improve operational

efficiency. Currently, the agencies do not systematically reassess project operations to meet changing social and economic trends (although extreme

events may trigger a reallocation study), nor is

legislation authorizing a project systematically

reviewed to determine whether it needs to be

updated. Congress would need to give the operating agencies a clear mandate to do such studies,

and appropriate additional money for this task.

Option 5-13: Enhance the ability of the Army

Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to modify operations of projects to meet

changing conditions. Currently, operating rules
250 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

based on project authorizations going back many

decades appear to give the operating agencies

little latitude to improve operations or to respond

in the most effective manner to droughts, and

what little flexibility exists is difficult to exercise

when water is in short supply (64). Many changes

either require or are perceived to require legislation before they can be legally implemented. The

authorization for a project need not require that

the expected benefits of the project be derived

from that project alone.

To fully achieve the potential benefits of

operating several reservoirs as a system, either for

dealing with the possible impacts of climate

change or for simply improving the current

management of water resources, Congress could

give the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau

of Reclamation the administrative flexibility to

deliver the expected benefits in the most effective

manner (or, in cases where such flexibility is

available, clarify its extent). New legislation,

perhaps as part of the next omnibus water bill,

likely in 1994, would probably be required.

Where additional benefits can be created through

systems management (e.g., additional water and

increased power revenues). Congress would need

either to direct the agencies in how to distribute

these benefits or direct them to develop a procedure for doing so.

Option 5-14: Tie funding of Federal water

projects to adoption of improved watermanagement practices by the States-such as

developing State groundwater management plans,

facilitating transfers, and improving demand management. There is some precedent for using

incentives or disincentives to encourage desirable

activity. For example, in exchange for supporting

funding of the Central Arizona Project, the

Secretary of the Interior required that the State of

Arizona adopt a groundwater law aimed at

reducing pumping to a safe annual yield (92).

Similarly, it may be possible for the Federal

Government to require a State to adopt laws that

facilitate water transfers before the State can

receive Federal funding for projects or other

activities.

Option 5-15: Increase finding for the development and promotion of new analytic tools in

systems-analysis studies. These new tools promise a substantial payoff in improved water resource management, but funding for agencies to

develop them has been inadequate. NOAA, for

example, has so far been unsuccessful in getting

sufficient funds for its WARFS initiative. Water

resource research funding for the U.S. Geological

Survey (USGS) has been cut substantially in

recent years. Congress might also want to consider facilitating the development of analytical

tools that incorporate climate uncertainty into

traditional hydrologic analyses.

Available modeling and forecasting tools (e.g.,

the IWR-MAIN model) have not been widely

disseminated and used by State and local agencies. If Congress wishes to promote the greater

dissemination of these tools, it could increase

funding under Section 22 of the Water Resources

Development Act of 1974 (WRDA, P.L. 93-251).

These funds are available for “ training and technical assistance to States and water utilities for a

variety of traditional water resource management

needs. Section 22 could also be extended to cover

problems that cross over from water resource

management to environmental systems management (e.g., watershed management and wetland

restoration).

1 Extreme-Events Management:

Droughts and Floods

Natural climate variability almost guarantees

that the signal of climate change will be difficult

to detect. Drought and floods are among the most

extreme expressions of this variability, and whether

or not climate change is definitively detected,

they will continue to occur. However, moreintense, longer-lasting, or more-frequent extreme

events such as these could occur in some areas in
. -—

a warmer climate (43).19 If this happens, societal

vulnerability would increase and would pose new

challenges for public institutions and the private

sector.

Both floods and droughts cause significant

losses to human and natural systems. For example, costs and losses from the 1988 drought,

during which roughly 40 percent of the United

States was severely affected, have been estimated

to be at least $39 billion (57). For this reason,

potential changes in the extremes of these events

are perhaps of even more concern than are

long-term changes in temperature and precipitation averages. Effective management of floods

and drought is extremely important if their

impacts are to be minimized. Just as in the

supply-management issues discussed above, lack

of coordination among and within levels of

government has been and continues to be a key

constraint to more-effective management. Some

near-term improvements in how extreme events

are managed would help mitigate any surprises

that climate change could bring.

Droughts

Drought, although difficult to define precisely,

is generally the consequence of a natural reduction in the amount of precipitation received over

an extended period of time (usually at least a

season). A drought’s severity can be classified by

its duration, intensity, and geographical extent.

Factors such as high temperatures, high winds,

and low relative humidity are often associated

with the occurrence of a drought and can significantly aggravate its severity. The demands made

by human activities and vegetation on a region’s

water supplies are sinificant factors affecting

how large the societal and ecological impacts of

a drought will be. Population growth and increasing competition for water will lead to greater

vulnerability to drought; the potential for climate

Chapter 5--Water I 251

Six years of drought in the western United States

reduced water supplies stored in reservoirs and ma&

water resource management much more difficult. Low

water levels are conspicuous in the amount of bare

earth exposed in this aerial view of Luke Oroville. The

California State Water Project begins here, where

water from the Feather River watershed is stored.

change provides an additional incentive to improve drought management.

Drought impacts are usually less obvious than

flood impacts (e.g., drought rarely results in

structural damage). Impacts typically accumulate

slowly over a considerable period of time, and

they may linger for years after the drought itself

has ended. For these reasons, the effects of

drought on society, the economy, and the environment are more difficult to quantify, and the

provision of disaster relief is thus more challenging. Droughts can provide instructive, if imperfect, analogs to climate change, illustrating problems that could occur more often in a warmer

climate (24, 57).

Government responses to previous droughts

(e.g., in allocating water from Federal multipurpose reservoirs, providing disaster assistance,

19 fi~eme CWXMS could also become less intense, shorter, or less fr~uent in different areas-the picture is not yet clear-but the results

would be of less coneem and are not pursued further here.
252 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

fighting fires, and protecting wildlife refuges)

suggest that drought policies could be much more

effective than they are now (100). U.S. drought

policy is essentially based on the sentiment that

drought is a rare and random event rather than on

the reality that it is a normal part of climate

variability. As such, Government response to

drought has typically been reactive rather than

proactive, usually focused on crisis management

rather than risk management. Significantly, only

23 States had drought plans in 1992, and most of

these were inadequate (99, 100). The weakness of

the reactive approach is evident in the uncoordinated, untimely, and largely ineffective response

efforts that have characterized past droughts

(101). Drought relief, at least as it is usually

provided now, has often been a disincentive to

adopting strategies to minimize risks associated

with drought, such as purchasing crop insurance,

and may unintentionally reinforce some poor

management practices (see ch. 6).

Many studies, including, those of the Western

Governors Policy Office (1978), the General

Accounting Office (1979), the National Academy

of Sciences (1986), the American Meteorological

Organization (1990), and the Interstate Council

on Water Policy (1987, 1991), summarized in a

recent report (100), have called for improvement

of drought contingency planning. Most have

urged development of a national drought plan that

would better define the respective roles of the

various agencies that have drought-management

responsibilities; promote coordination among Federal agencies and among Federal, State, and local

levels of government; establish eligibility, repayment, and other requirements for drought assistance; and provide such assistance in a more

timely, consistent, and equitable manner. Although such objectives appear to have considerable merit, not much progress toward meeting

them has been made to date. A new study by the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-a recently completed 4-year assessment of drought management—

could provide the basis for developing a national

policy for improving water management during

drought (95).

The United States may benefit from studying

the new Australian drought policy. It applies only

to agricultural drought and is based on the

philosophy that drought should not be considered

a natural disaster but, rather, as part of a highly

variable climate and one of the risks farmers face

in managing farm operations. Rather than emphasize drought relief, the Australian Government

stresses provision of high-quality information so

farmers can make better decisions, offers incentives to farmers to adopt sound droughtmanagement practices, and discourages farmers

who pursue unsustainable farming practices in

drought-prone areas from relying on drought

relief (98). The long-term goal of this policy,

which could also be used to promote sound

practices in other sectors affected by drought

(e.g., urban areas), is to reduce vulnerability to

drought, increase productivity, improve the allocation of resources, and enhance self-reliance.

Executive Order 12656, signed by President

Reagan in November 1988, is intended to guide

emergency water planning and management responsibilities of Federal agencies. The order

specifies a lead role for the Corps of Engineers for

national security emergency preparedness for the

Nation’s water resources, including coordination

of planning activities at the national, regional,

State, and local levels (75). This order could

provide a vehicle for bringing together relevant

agencies to focus on both drought and flood

management. However, it has thus far had little

impact. The Corps’ own 1992 study of the status

of emergency preparedness concluded that, despite the order, coordination of activities had not

improved. Among other things, the study noted

the absence of an overall Federal framework

clearly defining the agency responsibilities described by the order, an absence of a clear

definition of the types of disasters for which plans

are to be developed, the low level of staffing and

funding assigned to emergency planning, and,

perhaps most significantly, resistance on the part
Chapter 5-Water I 253

of other Federal agencies and State officials to

giving the Corps control over emergency planning (75).

Floods

Floods affect smaller areas than do droughts

and are shorter-lived events but are, along with

droughts, among the most costly of weatherrelated phenomena.20 The importance and challenge of managing floodplains and mitigating

flood losses are underscored by the costs of floods

in dollars and lives: between 1979 and 1988,

average damages from flooding amounted to

about $2.4 billion per year, and an average of 95

deaths each year is related to flooding (102). Parts

of each of the 50 States have experienced flooding

(28) and, in all, about 7 percent of the U.S. land

area is subject to occasional flooding. Principal

areas subject to flooding are along rivers and

adjacent to lake shores and sea coasts. Flash

flooding along arroyos and ephemeral streams is

of special concern in the arid Southwest (102).

Since the 1930s, considerable progress in

mitigating flood damages has been made. Both

structural (e.g., building reservoirs and levees)

and nonstructural approaches (including flood

forecasting and implementing floodplain regulations) have been used. The success of the National

Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), created in

1%8, is supported by the fact that more than

18,000 of the 22,000 flood-prone communities in

the Nation now participate in the program, and

most of the 40,000 stream miles in the United

States have been mapped for flood risk (103).

Also, important technical improvements in flood

forecasting and warning systems have been made.

Despite the progress, however, flood darnage is

increasing at about 1.5 percent every year (about

$200 per 1,000 people per year) (19). An update

of a 1987 study for the Federal Emergency

Management Agency estimated that 9.6 million

households and $390 billion in property are at risk

from flooding (5). Mitigation has fallen well short

Every State has experienced some flooding at one time

or another, and as more people move into flood-prone

areas, the exposure of people and property to potential

flood risks increases. The homes shown here were

flooded in 1986 when the Yuba and Bear Rivers

overflowed their banks near Marysville, California.

of what was expected when current policies and

activities were initiated. Also, some trends and

disturbing problems indicate that despite recent

efforts, vulnerability to flood damages is likely to

continue to grow: 1) populations in and adjacent

to flood-prone areas, especially in coastal areas,

continue to increase, putting more property and

greater numbers of people at risk, 2) floodmoderating wetlands continued to be destroyed

(see vol. 2, ch. 4), 3) little has been done to control

or contain increased runoff from upstream development (e.g., runoff caused by paving over land),

4) many undeveloped areas have not yet been

mapped (mapping has been concentrated in alreadydeveloped areas), and people are moving into

such areas without adequate information concerning the risk, 5) many dams and levees are

beginnin g to deteriorate with age, leaving prop

erty owners with a false sense of security about
254 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

how well they are protected, and 6) some policies

(e.g., provision of subsidies for building roads

and bridges) tend to encourage development in

floodplains (38).

Climate change could increase flood risk.

Although considerable uncertainty exists, climate

change could bring more-frequent and/or moreintense floods. Given that development in and

near floodplains is expected to last a considerable

period of time and that ‘the Nation’s ability to

predict the magnitude and frequency of future

events is still limited, it may be prudent to

consider the potential effects of climate change

when decisions are made (or revised) about the

type and amount of development allowed in

vulnerable areas. In the absence of sufficient data,

flexible and cautious policies are preferred.

An important constraint to better floodplain

management mirrors a common constraint in

other areas of water resource management: many

Federal agencies have some flood-control responsibilities, and they are often unable to work in a

coordinated fashion. The four principal Federal

agencies involved in construction, operation, and

maintenance of flood-control facilities are the

Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, and the

Tennessee Valley Authority. The multiple missions of these agencies overlap, and agencies may

disagree on who is in control and what structures

should be built and for what purposes. The

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

plays an important role in administering the NFIP

and disaster assistance. The involvement of State

and local agencies, the private insurance industry,

and developers, all with different goals, adds to

the difficulty of coordination (19).

In practice, no truly unified national program

for floodplain management exists, nor are there

many examples of effective regional bodies. Such

a unified plan could be of” great value in sorting

out the respective roles of” each level of government and the private sector, in establishing the

relative importance of multiple floodplain management objectives (including flood-loss reduction and natural-value protection), and in promoting implementation strategies.

An even broader problem is that floodplain

management is usually addressed separately from

other aspects of water resource planning and

land-use policy. Ideally, regional floodplain management would be considered as part of a broader

plan addressing in addition water-quality and

-quantity issues, habitat and open-space preservation, and other land-use and development concerns (19) (see vol. 2, chs. 4, 5, and 6).

Policy options for Improvlng Drought Management

Previous drought-assessment and -response

efforts have suffered from the lack of coordination of activities at the Federal level and from lack

of coordination among Federal, State, and regional drought-management activities. Greater

integration of activities could be fostered in

several ways and could help reduce vulnerability

to future droughts and enable scarce resources to

be used more effectively.

Option 5-16: Create an interagency drought

taskforce with the authority to develop a national

drought policy and plan. Congress could do this

or the authority of existing Executive Order

12656, which was established to guide emergency water planning and management responsibilities of Federal agencies, could be used. Such

a plan should define specific, action-oriented

response objectives and contain an integrated

strategy for implementing them. Leadership of

the task force could be either a designated lead

agency or the Office of the President. All Federal

agencies with drought-related missions and representatives of State Government, regional organizations, and the private sector should be included.

Results of the Corp’s National Drought Management Study, the most recent Federal effort, would

provide a good point of departure (95).

As part of the development of national policy,

Federal agencies’ drought-relief programs should

be reviewed, including, for example, soil- and

water-conservation programs and the Federal

Crop Insurance Program. These reviews should
Chapter 5-Water I 255

Table 5-3—Possible Risk-Management and Risk-Minimization Measures the Federal

Government Could Consider to Lessen the Effects of Drought

Assessment programs

Develop a comprehensive, integrated national drought-watch system (NDWS)

Inventory data availability in support of an NDWS

Develop new indexes to assist in the early estimation of drought impacts in various sectors

Establish objective “triggers” for the phase-in and phase-out of relief and assistance programs

Legislation, public policy

Develop a national drought policy and plan

Examine Federal land-use policies to ensure appropriate management of natural resources and

consistency with national drought policy

Review all Federal drought-relief-assistance programs, Federal crop-insurance program, and other

agricultural and water policies for consistency with national drought policy

Public-awareness programs

Establish a national drought-mitigation center to provide Information to the public and private sectors

Improve data information products and delivery systems to provide timely and reliable information to

users

Develop and implement water-conservation-awareness programs

Drought-preparedness planning

Promote the establishment of comprehensive State drought plans

Promote intergovernmental cooperation and coordination on drought planning

Evaluate worst-case scenarios for drought management

Evaluate the potential effects of climate change on regional hydrology and its implications on Federal

and State water policies

Promote the establishment of drought plans by public water suppliers

Conduct post-drought audits of Federal drought-assessment and -response efforts —— —

SOURCE: D. Wilhite, “Drought Management and Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, December 1992.

include taking an inventory of current assistance

programs and their eligibility requirements, identifying overlapping responsibilities, and examining the distribution of financial resources to relief

recipients. Reviews could also examine the timing and effectiveness of relief.

Additional components of a national drought

policy could also include:

1. Adopting risk-management and riskminimization practices such as those listed

in table 5-3. Federal agencies could consider following the lead of Australia, where

the government does not ignore the need for

assistance during severe drought but promotes more self-reliance while at the same

time protecting the natural and agricultural

resource base. Drought relief, for example,

could be made contingent on adopting ways

2.

to minimize drought risk (e.g., buying crop

insurance) (see ch. 6).

Supporting post-drought audits of assessment and response efforts. All episodes of

severe drought in the United States provoke

some degree of response from the Federal

Government. At times, such as during the

1974-77 and 1988-89 droughts, massive

levels of drought relief are targeted for the

stricken area. However, comprehensive postdrought audits of assessment and response

efforts are not routinely conducted. Audits

could identify successes and failures of

recent efforts and provide a basis for revising drought policies to improve future

responses. An interagency task force might

direct university or private research groups

to conduct the audits to avoid appearance of

bias.
256 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

3. Developing a national drought-watch system. The climate-related monitoring activities of the Federal Government are split

among many agencies and subagencies,

which means that a comprehensive national

assessment of drought conditions does not

exist. Given that recognition of drought can

be slow, a national early-warning system

would be useful to support a more proactive

national drought policy and plan. Several

specific actions might be considered:

1) create a national drought-watch team,

possibly under the authority of the interagency drought task force, to routinely assess

precipitation, temperature, soil moisture,

groundwater levels, stream flow, snowpack

conditions, runoff potential, and reservoir

and lake levels, and 2) create a national

agricultural weather-information office within

the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

to address more adequately the needs of the

agricultural community for climate-related

information. Such an office would provide

a focus for existing USDA weather-related

programs and would oversee needed new

ones.

Policy Options for Improving Flood Management

The Federal roles in flood management include

overseeing national flood policy, coordinating

floodplain management efforts, providing technical guidance and education, and regulating and

funding some State, local, and private activities.

Some options that may promote these roles and

introduce greater efficiency and flexibility into

flood management are considered below. Others,

including possible reforms of the NFIP, are

discussed in the context of coastal development in

volume 2, chapter 4.

Option 5-17: Create a national floodassessment board, to consist of representatives of

Federal, State, and local agencies and the private

sector. The board could establish a set of national

goals for floodplain management together with a

timetable for their achievement, assess existing

Federal flood programs and responsibilities, recommend changes in missions of Federal agencies

to eliminate overlap, and assign responsibilities

where gaps occur.

Such a board could also promote the refinement and implementation of State floodplain

management plans. Much energy has already

been expended on developing State and local

mitigation plans, but these plans are often more

paper exercises than practical guides to action.

Plan implementation could be aided by developing a model floodplain management plan, conducting regional training programs, and expanding efforts to educate the public about the nature

of flood hazards and the natural values of

floodplains.

The board could facilitate multiobjective flood

plain management. Floodplains may contain homes,

businesses, recreation sites, fish and wildlife

habitats, and historic sites, among other things.

Each of these features is usually managed separately rather than as an integrated package, and

conflict among different interests is often the

result. The Federal Government could do more to

facilitate State and local programs to manage in a

more integrated fashion by, for example, providing technical assistance and grants-in-aid. As part

of the Clean Water Act reauthorization, Congress

could provide incentive grants to States or communities that undertake multiobjective watershedmanagement initiatives.

Finally, the board might be directed to conduct

an evaluation of various programs and activities

(such as FEMA’s) to determine their effectiveness or to assess how to improve the acquisition

and utilization of data on flood damages. An

interagency flood-insurance task force has been

proposed in Title V of H.R. 62, the National Flood

Insurance Compliance, Mitigation, and Erosion

Management Act of 1993, that could, as currently

envisioned, undertake this activity. However,

State, local, and private participation on the

flood-assessment board would, in general, improve its effectiveness.
Chapter 5-Water I 257

Option 5-18: Direct the National Flood Insurance Program to base risk calculations on

anticipated development, rather than on current

development. Recognition of the impact of increased runoff on flood damage is a weak area in

the National Flood Insurance Program. Currently,

floodplain delineation is based on the development that exists in the basin at the time the

hydrologic and hydraulic studies are done (19).

As development in the basin increases, peak

flows and volumes increase, which will result in

a change in the 100-year flood, possibly turning

it into a 50-year or lo-year event. A changing

climate would also alter future flood risks and

might similarly be considered to the extent

possible. The long-term benefit of this policy

would be to prevent or alter construction in areas

that could become (or are likely to become)

flood-hazard zones in the future.

9 Supply Augmentation

Several alternatives exist for augmenting supplies of water. These include, among others,

expanding the capacity to store water that could

not be used immediately and would otherwise not

be available for use later, desalting sea (or

brackish) water, diverting water through new

pipelines and aqueducts from low- to highdemand areas, and treating and reusing wastewater.

Reservoirs and Climate Change

Periods of high water demand rarely correspond to times of high water supply. Building

reservoirs has been a common solution to the

problem of storing water during high-flow periods and releasing it for later use as needed.

Currently, there are more than 2,650 reservoirs in

the United States with capacities of 5,000 af or

more. The combined capacity of these reservoirs

is about 480 million af, of which 90 percent is

stored by the 574 largest. There are also at least

50,000 smaller reservoirs, with capacities ranging

from 50 to 5,000 af (14).

After decades of reservoir building, the Nation’s reservoir infrastructure is largely in place.

There are still opportunities to build additional

reservoirs, but the pace of new construction has

slowed dramatically in the past decade. One

reason for the slowdown is the high cost of new

reservoirs and the scarcity of available funds. A

second is the fact that there are relatively few

good undeveloped sites left. In addition, public

attitudes about the environment have changed,

and many people no longer believe that the

benefits of new-reservoir construction outweigh

the costs. Reservoirs have destroyed substantial

riparian habitat, blocked free-flowing sections of

rivers, interrupted migration corridors, and deprived downstream wetlands of sediment. Consequently, it is now very difficult politically to build

major new dams.

Currently, climate change is not explicitly

considered by the Nation’s largest reservoir

operator-the Army Corps of Engineers, the

Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation

Service, or the Tennessee Valley Authority-in

renovating or managing existing reservoirs or in

planning and designing new ones. Uncertainty

about the regional impacts of climate change on

runoff makes it difficult to justify changing

design features or operating rules at this time (67).

Also, the high fixed-discount rate used in costbenefit analyses heavily discounts those benefits

of a new project that might occur several decades

in the future. Hence, when standard economic

discounting rules are used, specific features

integrated into reservoir design to anticipate

climate change would be difficult to justify

economically. Finally, the Corps argues that

reservoir-design criteria have been based on an

engineering-reliability -based strategy that builds

in considerable buffering capacity for extreme

meteorologic and hydrologic events. Thus, many

of the 500 largest existing reservoirs may already

have the capacity and operating flexibility desirable to cope with a changing climate (27).

Still, many existing reservoirs are currently in

need of major or minor rehabilitation. As rehabil-
258 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

itation work is undertaken, engineers could consider whether regional climate change data or

costs justify modifications based on anticipated

climate change. The need for more storage space

or flood-control capacity could sometimes be

satisfied by undertaking such structural modifications as increasing the height (which often also

requires increasing the bulk) of a dam and

enlarging its spillway. (Even without considering

climate change, many small, nonfederal dams and

a few Federal ones lack adequate spillway capacity.) Enlarging a reservoir is not without environmental costs because additional land would be

inundated. Where feasible, temperature-sensitive

fish species downstream from a dam could be

accommodated by mixing the colder, deeper

water in a reservoir with warmer, surface water.

Such temperature control can be accomplished by

retrofitting multiple-level outflows to a dam’s

outlet works .21 Enlarging one reservoir in a

reservoir system may also allow the entire system

to be operated more flexibly (see Supply Management, above).

Despite concerns about reservoirs, some new

ones are likely to be required (even if not

specifically in response to climate change). Generally, anew reservoir would be a robust response

to the uncertainty of climate change-it would

21 w Would cost abut $85 million for Sbasta Darn in Northern Ctioti, for ex~ple.
Chapter 5-Water I 259

allow greater operational flexibility whether the

future brought more intense droughts or more

floods. However, a reservoir is also a fixed,

permanent structure, so before large amounts are

spent on an irreversible decision, the costs and

benefits of a new reservoir should be weighed

against those of other adaptation options. For

those new reservoirs required, overbuilding as a

response to uncertainty may no longer be appropriate or feasible. Given high costs, the trend

toward reduced Federal contributions to waterproject construction, and upfront financing requirements, new reservoirs are likely to be

smaller and will probably be designed with less

buffering capacity for extreme events (56). With

less margin for error, complementary strategies,

such as emergency evacuation and flood-warning

plans and water conservation and reallocation,

become relatively more important (67). These

strategies, however, incur greater residual risks to

people, the consequences of which must be taken

into account in a full analysis of social, economic,

and environmental benefits and costs.

Desalinization

Desalination is not likely to be an important

water-supply option in the United States in the

next two decades. The costs of desalinating water,

especially sea water, are still very high relative to

most other options. However, desalination has

several characteristics that make it worth considering as a supplementary source of reliable

water, especially in water-short coastal cities.

Desalination plants are currently very expensive to build and operate relative to most other

options. High energy costs are an especially

significant constraint. However, in principle,

desalination of sea water offers consumers access

to an inexhaustible and noninterruptible source of

supply that is free of competition for water rights

(46). Desalination offers a flexible way to maintain deliveries during prolonged dry periods. It is

completely independent of rainfall or of deliverThe Yuma Desalting Plant is the world’s largest

reverse osmosis unit. Located in southwestern Arizona

just north of Mexico, the plant desalts highly saline

drainage water from farmlands east of Yuma before

the water enters the Colorado River. This operation

lowers the overall salinity of the Colorado and enables

the United States to meet its treaty obligation to deliver

water of acceptable quality to Mexico.

ies from outside the service area. When not

needed, a desalination plant can be shut off,

saving some operational expenses. Desalination

plants can also be used in conjunction with

traditional stored supplies to allow more-efficient

use of these supplies during wet or normal years

(e.g., more water can be drawn from a reservoir

than might otherwise be safe). Incremental adjustments to the size of a plant can be made to respond

to changing circumstances.

The case of the City of Santa Barbara illustrates

the potential of desalination to provide flexibility

during prolonged dry periods. Santa Barbara has

very little groundwater and is not yet connected to

the California State Water Project (SWP), so it

normally relies on local surface-water sources to

meet 90 to 100 percent of its 16,000-af/year water

demands. 22 This reliance on local surface-water

22 B, Fawmq @ of SaU@ Barbara Water Department pCrSOd cOmmtication, JUIY 1992.
260 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

sources left Santa Barbara quite vulnerable to the

recent California drought. To reduce its vulnerability to future droughts, city voters-by a wide

margin-approved plans to build a small ($40

million) reverse-osmosis plant to convert sea

water to fresh water. Despite its cost, the city sees

its desalination plant as a good way to

droughtproof its water-supply system. The 7,500-

af/year plant has been operational since March

1992. It was operated briefly during its commissioning period but has been on standby since local

water-supply reservoirs have filled because of

favorable weather conditions.

The siting of desalination plants is not as

constrained to specific locations as are reservoirs.

Because desalination plants occupy much less

space than dams and reservoirs, it may be easier

to find suitable land for them. On the other hand,

desalination plants can still be sizable industrial

facilities, which some find objectionablein coastal

settings. In most cases, the high capital and

energy costs of desalinated water constrain the

near-term penetration of this technology in the

United States. Brine disposal is also of some

concern and may add to the long-term operating

costs of such a facility.

Interregional Diversions

Over the years, many ideas have been proposed

for diverting large amounts of water from watersurplus to water-deficit areas of the continent.

Many plans have been proposed to bring water

from the Pacific Northwest via pipelines and

aqueducts to the populated regions of the Southwest. Among these have been proposals to divert

water from the Columbia River, the Mississippi

River, and several Canadian rivers. None of these

proposals are currently being seriously considered by water planners. All are prohibitively

expensive, most would likely entail unacceptable

environmental impacts, and the massive quantities of water that they could supply are probably

unnecessary. Politically, such projects are not

now feasible. Few, if any, potential waterexporting areas are willing to give up water that

may ultimately affect their growth potential or

that may be needed for instream uses. Conversely,

it is debatable whether additional growth should

be subsidized in water-short areas, especially if

there are indications that those regions could

become drier as a result of climate change.

Interrgional diversions should not be ruled out

completely, however. Climate change could cause

a reconsideration of major diversions in the more

distant future.23 Moreover, in areas of increased

precipitation, “high-flow- “ slumming” diversions

may be attractive. Many of the existing plans are

technically feasible, and although currently unlikely, some rivers now classified as wild and

scenic could, in theory, be diverted. As long as

other less-expensive and environmentally more

sound options are available, little support of

interregional diversions is likely to develop.

Reclaiming Water

Traditionally, water has been supplied to municipal residents, used, treated, and then discharged as wastewater effluent (12). Much of this

wastewater could be recovered and reused where

potable-quality supplies are not needed. Landscape watering, industrial cooling, groundwater

recharging, and toilet flushing are among the

many uses to which reclaimed water could be put.

Reclaimed water could be treated to drinkingwater standards at greater cost, but this may not be

necessary because its use on golf courses and the

like would enable high-quality water now used

for these purposes to be shifted to potable uses.

The use of reclaimed water is one of the most

promising new sources of water supply, especially because virtually all water uses create

wastewater and, therefore, generate a reliable
Chapter 5-Water 1261

Box 5-J-The Use of Reclaimed Water in St. Petersburg

Freshwater suppiies for the city of St. Petersburg, Florida are limited because it is located at the end of a

peninsula. The city’s growing population led the Southwest florida WWer Management District to declare St.

Petersburg a “water shortage area” in the early 1970s. At about the same time, the State legislature mandated

that wastewater treatment plants discharging to polluted Tampa Bay start to treat their wastewater to a quality

equal to that required for drinking water. St. Petersburg responded to these two actions by initiating a program to

terminate disposal of wastewater into Tampa Bay and at the same time to ensure an adequate drinking supply

through the year 2020 by recycling the city’s wastewater (71).

Several financial, institutional, and educational barriers had to be overcome before the reclaimed-water

program could be implemented. Because it proved to be too expensive to treat wastewater to potable standards,

the city decided to use reclaimed water only for irrigation and industrial-cooling purposes. This required not only

upgrades to existing treatment plants aml storage facilities, but a new distribution system completely separate from

the potable-water system. St. Petersburg was able to afford the cost of building a separate water-delivery system

only because Federal (i.e., Environmental Protection Agency) and State funding was available to offset some of

the planning, design, and construction costs (71).

The city had to work closely with the State Department of Environmental Regulation to write regulations that

would aflow for the distribution of reclaimed water, and it had to overcome initial public skeptidsm. A

public-education campaign resulted in both acceptance and pride in the innovative program on the part of city

residents.

Since 1992, St. Petersburg has had four treatment plants, which treat and chlorinate water to a high standard

of quality, with all pathogens being completely removed. Approximately 10 million gallons per day (mgd)l of

reclaimed water is routed through a separate distribution system to 7,340 customers who use the water for

irrigation and cooling. The city hires inspectors to ensure that cross-connections between the two systems do not

occur, but the reclahned water is of high enwgh qualit y that occasional mistakes have not resulted in any adverse

health effects to consumers.

The reclaimed-water treatment and distribution system has the capacity to reach 11,000 customers with

potential demand of 20 mgd; the dty feels that it can reach this level of service in another 5 years. Total water

demand in the city (potable and nonpotable) is approximately 42 mgd, so reclaimed water for nonpotable uses

could eventually account for half of all St. Petersburg water deliveries.

By substituting reclaimed water for potable water in irrigation and cooling, the aty estimates that it has

eliminated the need for expansion of its potable-water-supply system until the year 2030 (59). St. Petersburg prides

itself on becoming “the first major municipality in the United States to achieve zero waste-water discharge to

surrounding surface waters” (71), and now receives money for water that it previously had to pay the State for

permission to dump into the bay. Other communities in the United States and beyond have recognized the city’s

accomplishments by sending a steady stream of visitors to iearn firsthand about the aty’s dualdistribution system

138 million iiters per day; to oonvert from gallons to liters, multiply w 3.785.

supply. Many communities are already using or about the quality of reclaimed water. Compliance

plarming to use reclaimed water (see box 5-J), but with environmental and health regulations is

the costs of reclaimin g water are high. Moreover, currently a major source of delay for reclamation

costs may not decline much with advances in projects, but as wastewater reclamation and reuse

water-treatment technology because a major ex- become more common, these delays are likely to

pense is for construction of separate distribution diminish.

systems. Development of this new source often The Metropolitan Water District (MSVD) of

requires an active campaign to educate the public Southern California has sought to encourage
262 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

development of wastewater reclamation facilities

and to help its member agencies overcome

financing problems by offering agencies $154 for

each acre-foot of “new water” produced, provided that this water replaces an existing demand

for imported water from MWD. Together with the

$322/af it would cost local agencies to buy an

equivalent amount of imported water from MWD,

the subsidy makes reclamation projects economical for many local agencies.24 MWD also finances

up to 25 percent of the cost of initial feasibility

studies in order to encourage consideration of

reclamation possibilities. California hopes to be

using 500,000 af of reclaimed water per year by

2010 (6).

Policy Options for Encouraging

Structural Improvements

Option 5-19: Require that the potential for

climate change be considered in the design of new

structures or the rehabilitation of old ones.

Climate change uncertainty adds another complex dimension to project scaling. Because climate could potentially change during the long

lifespan of these structures, steps taken now to

increase flexibility could prevent problems from

developing decades in the future. In particular, the

Nation’s water agencies could be directed to

evaluate the costs and benefits of adding additional volume, spillway capacity, or temperature

controls to existing or new structures.

Option 5-20: Appropriate funds for wastewater reclamation, desalination, or other watersupply research. Congress could consider using

the authority of sections 106 and 108 of the Water

Resources Research Act of 1984.

FIRST STEPS

Water resource management has two essential

objectives: to ensure that enough water of adequate quality is available during normal and

drought periods for all necessary demands--

including environmental ones-and to ensure

that water in the form of life- and propertythreatening floods does not get out of control.

Growing stress on water resource systems and the

possibility that new stresses such as climate

change will arise make these objectives increasingly difficult to accomplish. The demand- and

supply-management options discussed in this

chapter (table 5-4) are likely to be increasingly

important as means to cope with growing stress

on water supplies. These options contribute

greater flexibility, greater efficiency, or both to

water resource management and thus aid, generally, adaptation to climate change.

Considering climate change alone, there are no

compelling arguments why any one supply- or

demand-management option should be preferred

to another. All are important and would contribute, if sometimes only in small ways, to improved

water resource management in a changed climate.

However, the system is very inefficient now,

given numerous institutional obstacles, lack of

incentives to conserve water, overlapping and

sometimes conflicting responsibilities of Federal

agencies, and lack of coordination among levels

of government. Fundamental changes are needed

in the way water is valued and used; those

changes can begin with steps that both relieve

existing stresses and make sense for climate

change. Implementing the suggestions below—

drawn from the whole range of options discussed

above-would likely create the conditions for

future progress in water resource planning and

management.

■ Improve extreme-events management.

Perhaps the most important actions that

should not be delayed concern improving the

management of extreme events. Floods and

droughts will continue to occur even if they

cannot be linked definitively to climate

change. Improving flood and drought management now could help minimize both

near-and long-term losses. Important first

m D. m, Dirmtor of Resources, Metropolitan Water District of Southern _O1l’l& hA.t@s, PUWlld ~mmdMtioQ J~y lm.
Chapter 5-Water I 263

Table 91-Summary of Options to Improve Water Resource Management

Institutional

Resurrect the former Water Resources Council

Reestablish and strengthen Federal-State river basin commissions

Create an interagency task force to develop a national drought policy

Create a national flood-assessment board

Integrate floodplan management into basin-scale planning

Research and development

Fund the development and use of water-conservation technologies

Fund the development and use of waste-water-reclamation technology

Increase funding for development and promotion of new analytic tools

Incorporate flexibility into the design of new structures or the rehabilitation of old ones

Direct Federal levers

Revise the tax code to promote conservation investment

Provide stronger leadership to facilitate water transfers

Clarify reclamation law on trades and transfers

Reduce Federal obstacles to Interstate transfers

Clarify the rules regarding the marketing of Indian water

Allow Federal agencies to buy water for environmental purposes

Expand the scope and/or nature of the Western Water Policy Review

Conduct post-drought audits

Direct the Interagency floodplain Management Task Force to promote the preparation of State

floodplain management plans

Economic Incentives and disincentives

Allow state revolving-loan funds to be used for conservation investments

Reform pricing in Federal water projects

Tie funding of State water projects to adoption of Improved water-management practices

Encourage adoption of risk-management and -minimization practics to mitgate drought effects

Operational

Encourage water conservation in Federal facilities

Require operating agencies to undertake periodic audits to Improve efficiency

Give Federal operating agencies greater ability to modify project operations to meet changing

conditions

a An order of priority has not been established.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1993.

steps could be for Congress to direct the m

executive branch to create an interagency

drought task force with authority to develop

a national drought policy and, similarly, a

national flood-assessment board to establish

national goals for floodplain management.

Title V of H.R. 62, the National Flood

Insurance Compliance, Mitigation, and Erosion Management Act of 1993, establishes a

flood-insurance task force. This bill could be

broadened to create a more comprehensive

flood-assessment board. The President could

establish an interagency drought task force

without additional authority, but Congress

may wish to direct the Administration to do so.

Promote management of reservoirs on a

basin-wide level. Operation of reservoirs

within the same basin as a single system

rather than individually, as is often the case,

could greatly improve the efficiency and

flexibility of water-quantity management.

Making such operations easier would also

assist development of the more integrated

approach desirable for managing water quality, wetlands, flooding, and drought. New

legislation, perhaps as part of the next

omnibus water bill, could grant the Army

Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of

Reclamation greater administrative flexibility to do this.
264 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

■

■

m

Promote water marketing. Among many

institutional problems that Congress may

wish to consider are those related to water

marketing. As long as adequate attention is

given to protecting third-party interests,

water markets could provide an efficient and

flexible means of adapting to various stresses,

including a changing climate. Of the several

options identified in this report for reducing

impediments to creating water markets, early

action to clarify reclamation law on trades

and transfers and to define the Federal

Government’s interest in facilitating the

creation of markets would be most useful.

Congress could urge the Department of the

Interior to provide stronger leadership to

assist transfers. Evaluation of water marketing should also be thoroughly considered in

the Western Water Policy Review, authorized in late 1992 by P.L. 102-575, the

Central Wiley Project Improvement Act.

Promote use of new analytical tools. Further development, dissemination, and use of

new modeling and forecasting tools could

greatly assist water resource management.

Some current development efforts (e.g.,

NOAA’s WHS initiative) have not been

adequately funded, and the most advanced

tools now available are not yet being used by

many States or water utilities. Small sums

spent now promoting dissemination and use

of these tools could save substantial sums

later. Section 22 of the Water Resources

Development Act of 1974 authorizes funding for training and technical assistance to

States and could be used to promote use of

analytical tools. Congress may also want to

consider providing funds to develop or

refine tools that incorporate climate uncertainty into traditional hydrologic analyses.

Promote demand management. Several

‘‘targets of opportumity” for improving wateruse efficiency are likely to present themselves in the 103d Congress. The upcoming

reauthorization of the Clean Water Act

stands out. State revolving funds (created

under Title VI of the act) have been a

successful means for funding wastewater

treatment plants. In CWA reauthorization,

Congress could consider making conservation projects eligible for revolving-fund

loans. This would not only promote demand

management but would reduce the amount

of water that needs treating. The Federal

Government could also make a contribution

to promoting efficient water-use practices by

setting an example in its own numerous

facilities. The Energy Policy Act of 1992

proposes just this but concentrates primarily

on energy conservation rather than water

conservation. A technical-adjustment bill to

the Energy Policy Act may be considered in

the 103d Congress and would provide a way

to clarify and underline congressional intent

toward water conservation in Federal facilities.

Expand the scope of the Western Water

Policy Review. With the enactment of Title

XXX of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 (P.L.

102-575), Congress authorized the President

to oversee a major water-policy study. Under

the heading Western Water Policy Review,

Title XXX directs the President to undertake

a comprehensive review of Federal activities

in the 19 Western States that affect the

allocation and use of water resources and to

make a report to appropriate congressional

committees by the end of October 1995 (87).

Congress has authorized or undertaken

more than 20 major studies since 1900 to

provide a basis for improving national policies that affect water management. Some

have led to important changes in policy;

others have been largely ignored. Despite the

uneven record of these studies, a new study

is warranted: two decades have lapsed and

many demographic, economic, environmental,

and attitudinal changes have occurred since

the last comprehensive study of water
. —.——

resource problems was completed by the

presidentially appointed National Water Commission (NWC) in 1973. Some of the areas

that need detailed attention now include

demand management, quality-vs.-quantity

issues, instream-water values, social and

environmental impacts, water marketing and

pricing, land use in relation to water resources, cost sharing and upfront financing,

comprehensive urban water planning, ways

to promote integrated river basin planning,

and development of analytical tools. Climate

change is not mentioned as a factor motivating the Western Water Policy Review, but

the study could provide an opportunity to

assess more fully how climate change may

affect water resources and to evaluate policy

options that might help with adaptation to a

warmer climate.

Congress could expand the scope and/or

nature of the Western Water Policy Review.

Water problems are not all in the West, so a

more general review of national water policy

Chapter 5-Water Im 265

may make sense. Expanding the currently

authorized study would, however, greatly

increase its complexity. Also, other committees of Congress may want to become

involved, and broader State or regional

representation would probably be required.

Broadening the study could be accomplished

by amending the legislation or by Executive

Order. If the Western Water Policy Review

is not expanded to include the entire United

States, Congress could authorize a similar

follow-on study of eastem water issues.

The Western Water Policy Review may

also provide an opportunity to explicitly

consider land-use practices and water resource issues jointly. One shortcoming of

most previous water-policy studies is that

land and water use were not considered

together. However, the relationship between

the two is a close one, and there appear to be

significant opportunities to improve both

water-quantity and water-quality management by improving land-use practices. FurWATER-FIRST STEPS

8 Improve extreme-events management

Direct the executive branch to create an interagency drought task force with authority to develop a national drought policy.

Direct the executive branch to create a national flood assessment board to establish national goals for floodplain

management.

m Promote management of reservoirs on a bssin-wide level

--Grant the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers greater administrative flexibility to manage reservoirs

basin-wide in the next 1994 Omnibus Water Bill.

m Promote water marketing

--Clarify reclamation law on trades and transfers

-Urge the Department of the interior to provide stronger leadership to assist transfers.

--Require evaluation of water marketing in the Western Water Policy Review, authorized by P.L 102-575.

■ Promote use of new analytical tools for water modelling and forecasting

-Use funds under Section 22 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1974 to promote use of analytical tools as part of the

training and technical assistance to States.

E Promote demand management

--Make conswvation projects eligible for revolving-fund loans in the Clean Water Act reauthorization.

-Clarify the stated congressional intent of promoting water conservation in Federal facilities with a technical-adjustment bill to

the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L 102-486).

● Expand the scope of the Western Water Policy Review

--Evaluate land-use practices and water resource issues jointly.

--Include an analysis of the eastern States now or authorize their study after the western review is completed.
266 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume

thermore, any study focused exclusively on

water resources might fall short of providing

a basis for coping with all of the problems

that could arise if climate changes.

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92. Wahl, R., “me Mauagem@ of Water Resources in the Western

U.S. and Potential Clknste -,” contractor report prepared

for the OffIce of ‘lkchnology Assessment October 1992.

93. Wallace, M., “Indian Water Rights Settlements,” NW w

sented at the Office of ltzhnology Assessment wokshop on

Western Lsnds, Boukkr, CO, July 23, 1992.

94. Water Quality 2000, A National Agenda for the 21st Century

(Alexan&@ VA: Water Quality 2000, Water Bnvimnmcnt

FederadoQ 1992).

95. W*k W., “National Study of Water Management During

Drought Results Oriented Water Resources Management”

paper pmented at the 20th Anniversary COnferexxe of the

Water Resources Plamdng and Managemerit Division of the

American Society of Civil B@necrs, Seattle, WA May 3-5,

1993.

%. Western Governors’ Association Water Eflciency: Opportunities @r Action (Denver, CO: Water Efficiemy Working

@OllP, 1987).
Chapter 5-Water I 269

97.

98.

99.

100.

We-stern States Water Counc& ‘61nterregional Water Trans- 101.

fers,’ a report requested by the Nevada State @#ature, May

1991. From remarks by former Arizona Governor Bruce

Babbitt before the Seventh Annual We-stem States Water 102.

Council Wates Management Symposium in Scottsdale, AZ,

Oct. 10, 1990.

White, D., D. Collins, and M. Howdm “Drought in Austmlia:

Prediction, Monitoring, Management and Policy,” in:

DroughtAssessment, Management, and Planm”ng: Theory and

Case Studies (Bostom MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 103.

1993).

Wilhite, D., “Drough4” in: Encyclopedia of Earth System

Science, Volume 2 (New York: Academic Press, Inc.,

1992),

Wilhite, D., “Drought Management and C&ate Change, ”

Wi.lhite, D., N, Rosenberg, and M, Glantz, ‘Improving Federal

Response to Droughc” Journal of Climate and Applied

Meteorology, vol. 10, 1986.

Wingerd, D., and M. Tseng, ‘ ‘Flood and Drought Functions of

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ” ti National Water

summa ry 19&8~My&ologic Events and Floo& and

Droughts, U.S. Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper

2375 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Offke,

1991).

Wrigh4 J,, and D. porter, ‘‘Floodplain Management and

Natural Systems,” paper presented at the National Forum on

Water Management Policy, Anerican Water Resources Association Washington DC, 1992<

contractor report prepared for the 0fi3ce of ‘Ikdmology

Assessmenfl December 1992,

APPENDIX 5.1–WATER RESOURCE CONCERNS:

REGION BY REGION AND STATE BY STATE

New England Region

Development of surface and groundwater is substantial here. Municipal and industrial pollution is localized. Drought is rare. The lack of

redundancy of water supplies indicates vulnerability.

Connecticut--Small reservoirs susceptible to below-average rainfall are networked with larger, robust reservoirs; point and non-point

contamination; potential flooding due to convective storms in the summer, hurricanes in the fall, and snowmelt in the spring.

Main--Abundant water resources; localized groundwater pollution due to urbanization agriculture, and industrial-municipal waste;

saltwater intrusion potential in coastal areas with high groundwater withdrawals; drought rare, but characterized by low stream flows, low

groundwater levels, and high forest-fire risk 20 percent of Maine’s electricity is derived from hydropower flooding possible during spring

snowmelt.

Massachusetts-plentiful water resources, but not well-distributed in proportion to population density (large cities in the east and reservoirs

in the west); quality of certain supply lakes and reservoirs threatened by high sodium concentrations; Boston supply particularly susceptible

to drought; potential widespread flooding caused by spring snowmelt with rain and tropical storms.

New Hampshire-Abundant water resources; summer stream flows and groundwater supplies rely on seasonal snowmelt tourismrecreation industry dependent on water resources; regional drought rare, but droughts do affect public water supply occasionallly, possible

flooding due to spring snowmelt tropical storms, ice jams, and intense thunderstorms.

Rhode Island--Generally sufficient water supply; most feasible supplies already developed and groundwater pumped at capacity, so

redistribution possibly ncessary to meet future water demand; coastal aquifers and reservoirs endangered by saltwater intrusion others

endangered by contamination wetlands (10 to 30 percent of the State) susceptible to prolonged drought potential flooding due to convective

storms, tropical storms, and snowmelt with rainfall.

Vermont—Abundant water resources of generally good quality; some localized groundwater contamination in areas of high population

density, severe drought rare, but even short droughts can affect agriculture and livestock-public supply storage capacity provides l-year

buffer, flooding potential from tropical storms, intense frontal systems, or snowmelt with rainfall,

Mid-Atlantic Region

Water supply is becoming an issue in some metropolitan areas, saltwater intrusion is occurring along coasts, and industrial and municipal

pollution is an issue.

Delaware--Municipal and industrial usage causing increased water-supply pressure in heavily populated regions; peak usage coincides with

low-flow periods, causing capacity problems; Dover relies exclusively on groundwater in a region subject to overdraft (northernmost and

central Delaware); saltwater intrusion in coastal areas; toxics in the sediments, water column, and biota of Delaware estuary, but improving,

regional flooding potential due to tropical storms and local flooding by convective storm.
270 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Maryland--Water supply well-managed for heavy reliance on surface water, drought stresses domestic supply, groundwater use on coastal

plain subject to saltwater intrusion; point and non-point pollution; Hurricanes and convective storms potentially cause floods.

New Jersey-surface water in New Jersey wed extensively, but supply development outpaced by demand, making drought dangerous;

surface-water quality threatened by agricultural runoff and industrial-municipal dischharge as well as saltwater intrusion in coastal areas;

groundwater quality threatened by toxins (l,224 known or suspected hazardous waste sites in 1986); potential flooding due to frontal systems

and tropical and convective storms.

New York-Demand in New York City significantly exceeds safe yield; Long Island depends solely on aquifers susceptible to saltwater

intrusion and drought historic water rights create competition and restrict reallocation non-point sources of pollution threaten surface and

groundwater quality in several areas; toxic plumes from inactive hazardous waste sites are mobilized by increased precipitation; sea level rise

would affect the New York City and Long Island metropolitan areas and the lower Hudson River estuary (Poughkeepsie supply intake and New

York City emergency pumping station); potential regional flooding from frontal systems, spring snowmelt, and tropical storms, local flooding

due to convective storms.

Pennsylva nia-Water supply potentially a critical problem; although supply is adequate under normal conditions, drought causes problems,

especially for smaller supply systems; quality of surface and groundwatar jeopardized by drainage from coal-mining areas and non-point

sources in agricultural areas, all compounded by acid precipitation convective storms, tropical storms, rain on frozen ground or snow pack,

and ice jams all potential instigators of flooding.

Virginia--Considered to be a water-rich state; still, some community-supply systems face insufficient capacity (especially along the

southeastern coast); saltwater intrusion potential in coastal areas; localized pollution of surface and groundwater, possible flooding caused by

tropical and convective storms.

South Atlantic Region

Here, the use of available water resources is increasing, and municipal and industria 1 development causes shortages in some cities.

Alabama-Abundan t water resoume& some highly industrialized areas risk shortages during drought if development continues; localized

groundwater contamination due to mine-tailing leaching. saltwater intrusion, and waste sites; potential flooding due to tropical storms or

hurricanes and frontal systems.

Florida --State’s water resources are a source of competition between municipal, industrial environmental and recreational uses;

population pressure in some areas; coastal aquifers subject to saltwater intrusion, so sea level rise would reduce safe yield; need for increased

storage capacity western and southwestern Florida particularly vulnerable to drought sensitive ecosystems and brackish water subject to

flooding; Everglades National Park is entirely below the 8.5-foot (2.5-meter)l contour, 34 percent below l-foot contour majority of population

lives on coastlines, very low elevation so sea level rise could be devastating, frequent flooding usually along the coast due to hurricane and

tropical-storm surges; most thunderstorms per year in the Nation

Georgia-Surface water extensively used in the northern parts of the State and groundwater in the south; high-growth areas with increasing

municipal, industrial environmental, and downstream “ - requirements susceptible to drought; saltwater encroachment on coastal aquifers (would

be exacerbated by sea level rise); competition for water stored in major reserving groundwater overdraft in southwestern corner due to

agriculture; potential flooding due to frontal systems, convective storms, tropical storms and hurricanes.

North Carolina--Abundant,water resources some areas approaching limits of available supply; localized pollution by toxins, nutrients,

and sediments; flooding and coastal erosion potential, saltwater intrusion from sea level rise, drought impacts agricultural and domestic use,

exacerbates increasing competition for water regional flooding potential associated with tropical storms and hurricanes.

South Carolina --Plentiful water resources; need management and coordination of surface and groundwater resources; quality generally

good, some nutrient, dissolved oxygen, saltwater intrusion and suspended solids problems locally, development pressure on wetlands;

potential flooding caused by hurricanes, tropical storms, and thunderstorms.

Lower Mississippi Basin

Water supplies here for medium- to small-sizedcomntuni$aare vulnerable to drought, and industrial pollution on and salinity present problems.

Arka nsas-Abundant water resoures dissolved solids sediment and saltwater intrusion in the southeast comer restrict use in some areas;

groundwater overdraft in some areas; agriculture susceptible to drought; possible flooding from tropical and convective storms.

Louisiana—Water resourcesfor municipal and indusdtrial supply, agriculture, navigation, environmental uses, and recreation; due to relianc e

on rain and shallow water tables, even short droughts greatly affect agriculture; coastal erosion, l0SS of marshes, and subsidence claim large

amounts of state land annually, more than half of the state is a floodplain so hurricanes and tropical storms, convective storms, or upstream

events can endanger large parts of State.

1 To convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.
Chapter 5-Water I 271

Mississippi-Abundant water resources; agricultural base of the State economy(and catfish farming) creates large drought risk (1988

drought was devastating); saltwater intrusion of aquifers; desire to tap into Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers for more supply; potential

flooding due to frontal systems in the winter and hurricanes and tropical storms in the summer.

Ohio River Basin

Municipal water supplies fir median-and small-sized communities and Ohio River flows are vulnerable to drought here.

Indiana--Abundant water resources; self-supplied industry is the major user; quality problems downstream from municipal and industrial

discharge points; low flows of drought hamper navigation on Ohio River possible flooding from frontal systems, convective storms, and rain

with snowmelt.

Kentucky--Abundan t water resourccs during most of the year, seasonal and areal variation; competition between municipal water supply

and irrigated agriculture during low flows; coal mining oil and gas operations, agriculture and domestic waste discharge adversely affect water

quality; agricultural loss and forest-fire danger during drought; possible flooding from frontal systems and convective storms.

Ohio-Ample surface-water supplies; municipal supply for medium-sized communities fragile during drought agricultural runoff,

sedimentation, mining, and hazardous-waste-disposal sites create quality problems; instream flows for navigation are an important

consideration during drought despite public works, floods from frontal systems and convective storms affect the State every year.

Tennessee--Generally considered a water-rich State, but limitations visible during drought; smaller supply systems of eastern Tenessee

susceptible to drought non-point-source pollution and toxic-waste sites affect quality of surface waters; low dissolved-oxygen concentrations

in reservoir releases; localized groundwater contamination some localized overdraft during drought; hydroelectric-power generation at 24

dams susceptible to drought thermal-power generation suffers from increased surface water temperatures during low flows; lack of irrigation

infrastructure stresses agriculture during drought; flooding potential due to frontal systems and thunderstormsgreatly mitigated by

flood-control works.

West Virginia--Abundant water resources; some localized water-quality problems due to non-point sources such as manufacturing,

municipal waste, coal mines, and farms; drought not a major concern, but potential flooding of flat and narrow valley floors due to frontal

systems and cyclonic and convective storms is a major problem.

Upper Great Lakes-Upper Mississippi Basin Region

Management of the Mississippi and Missouri River systems is difficult during drought. Additional problem arise as a result of fluctuating

Great Lakes levels and of impacts on water quality. The heavy chemical and biological loading of the upper Mississippi due to industrial,

municipal, and agricultural pollution is a problem.

Illinois-Abundant water resources; self-supplied industry is major user; small community water supplies susceptible to drought;

point-so-pollution prevention improving, non-point Sources Such as agriculture harmful; drought impacts navigation on the Mississippi;

potential flooding due to rainfall with snowmelt or stalled frontal systems.

Iowa--Municipal water supply generally sufficient even under drought conditions; agricultural and livestock production would suffer

significant losses in any drought; water-quality problems caused by agrochemicals leached into ground and surface water; many naturally

tainted aquifers; potential flooding due to rapid spring snowmelt or convective storms.

Michigan-Abundance of water reaources; industry is major user; competition between upstream and downstream users; potential drought

impacts on water level in Great Lakes and diversion practices; control of toxics in surface and groundwater and Great Lakes water quality has

become prioriy, flooding infrequent, but usually due to rainfall during snowmelt.

Minnesota-Abundant water resources; drought affects Mississippi River management for water supply and navigation; Minneapolis-St.

Paul needs alternative veto Mississippi for water supply; rural withdrawals depend on groundwater; potential flooding due to convective storms

and snowmelt with rain in the spring.

Missouri-Abundant water resources; northwestern water supplies subject to drought stress; increased groundwater withdrawals and impact

on water-baaed recreation during drought saltwater intrusion into aquifers; Occasional flooding due to Thunderstorms and stalled frontal

systems.

Wisconsin--Water-rich state; industry is largest user; agriculture and tourism affected by drought 5 percent of State energy from

hydropower, increasing competition for use; potential flooding caused by frontal systems, snowmelt, and convective storms.

Plains States Region

Drought is a frequent problem in this region. Competing uses of Missouri reservoirs--agricultural, tribal, recreational, and

downstream--have led to management stresses. Small-community water supplies are vulnerable, water tables are low due to intense

agricultural and urban consumption and groundwater depletion. Agricultural runoff has caused pollution, and the salinity of surface water

is high.

Kansas--Water resources distributed unevenly, surface water in the east and groundwater in the west; most diversions are for irrigation;

groundwater overdraft (e.g., the Ogallala Aq uifer) is occurring, and many areas are closed to further appropriation; adverse water-quality
272 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

impacts due to irrigation, petroleum production, agrochemicals, waste sites; agricultural droughts fairly routine; potential flooding due to

stalled frontal systems, intense convective and tropical storms.

Nebraska-Abundant water supply although quantity varies anally, seasonally, and annually; irrigation is major user, localized

groundwater overdraft; salinity problems in the South Platte River and canal systems originating in Colorado; interstate legal compacts and

decrees on North and South Platte, Republican, and Blue Rivers; reservoir releases necessary to navigation on the Missouri; significant drought

impact on agriculture, small community supplies, older well systems, and fish and wildlife; potential flooding due to thunderstorms, ice jams,

and snowmelt in the RockyMountains.

North Dakota--Water is an important but scarce resource; reservoir system is critical due to seasonality of flows; limited water-distribution

systems from reservoirs; agriculture, tourism, and recreation affected by drought high salinity of surface water agricultural drainage of

wetlands; potential flooding due to spring snowmelt with rainfall.

South Dakota-Missouri River is the only reliable stream flow because of seasonal variability; demands on reservoir system from

recreation, downstream navigation, agriculture, and future users--strong desire to stabilize agricultural production with reservoir system;

drought disastrous for agriculture industry; eastern half of State vulnerable to groundwater overdraft interstate water resource conflicts on the

Missouri; potential flooding due to snowmelt with rainfall, frontal systems.

Southwest Region

The agricultural economy here is vulnerable to drought.

Oklahoma-substantial water resources, unevenly distributed; groundwater in the west, surface water and reservoir storage in the east

drought detrimental to agriculture, industrial-municipal water supply, tourism and recreation, instream flows, and hydropower, salinity

problems in the Arkansas and Red Rivers; water-rights-allocation controversy; potential flooding due to convective and tropical storms.

New Mexico--Water scarce in generally arid state; surface water is completely appropriated and any supply reduction brings shortages;

agriculture vulnerable to drought extensive storage capacity on perennial streams; groundwater overdraft in aquifers not associated with

streams; irrigation is the largest user of water, quality degraded by municipal-industrial discharge into Rio Grande, saline and contaminated

agricultural runoff, urban conlamination of some groundwater, most water use governed by interstate compacts, Supreme Court decrees,

international treaty; intrastate conflict over instream-offstream uses; potential flooding due to local thunderstorms, melting snowpack with

rainfall frontal systems from Pacific.

Texas-A semiarid to arid state; only eastern third of State has sufficient water on dependable basis; Houston, Corpus Christi, Dallas, and

Fort Worth dependent on surface reservoirs of limited capacity Ogallala Aquifer of High Plains very slow recharge, substantial overdraft,

Seymour Aquifer contaminated by oil-drilling activities; saltwater intrusion possible in coastal aquifers, salinity problems in Ogallala Aquifer

and Rio Grande; low and hypersaline flows into coastaI estuaries and wetlands threaten species; agriculture and livestock losses due to drought;

increasing competition between irrigation, urban uses, recreation, wildlife, tourism, and saltwater-intrusion correction; potential flash floods

due to convective storms and regional flooding due to tropical storms and hurricanes; potential conflict with Mexico over allocation of

groundwater.

Rocky Mountain Region

In this region, competition between instream and offstream users is growing, and water rights are controversial--American Indians vs. States

vs. Federal Government. The salinity of surface and groundwater is high, agriculture in the region is vulnerable to drought, and there are

shortages in municipal water supplies during low flow.

Colorado-Rapidly approaching maximum utilization of water resources; increasing conflicts among urban, agricultural, recreational and

environmental uses of water, especially during drought; downstream States claim rights to water originating in Colorado; groundwater

overdraft problems in arid eastern Colorado; conlamination of ground and surface water near toxic-waste sites; salinity problems in lower

Arkansas River and in the San Luis and Grand Valleys; potential flooding due to thunderstorms, snowmelt, rain on saturated ground.

Monta na-Abundant water in major rivers; seasonal flow in smaller eastern rivers, so supply can be a problem; persistent water shortage

in some areas; competition between irrigators and instream users (especially trout fishers); competition with downstream states; dependence

on surface water makes agriculture more vulnerable; potential quality degradation due to mining, agriculture, forest practices; potential flooding

due to snowmelt with rainfall, spring runoff.

Utah--Relatively scarce water resources; supply sources near population writers exhausted; variability of supplies (6 years of drought

preceded by 4 wettest years on record); water-quality problems with seasonal low flows; localized drought at least once a year affects small

communities, agriculture (especially grazing), instream flow for fish and wildlife; salinity high in lower reaches of streams; potential flooding

due to rapid snowmelt with rainfall, intense thunderstorms, and lake rise.

Wyoming--Water resources dispersed unevenly, perennial streams in the west and ephemeral streams in the east; extended drought

well-known affects agriculture and forest-fire hazard; most surface water committed under interstate compacts and court decrees; competition

for surface waters between agriculture, municipalities, and industry; thunderstorms, snowmelt with rainfall, and stalled frontal systems can

cause flooding.
Chapter 5-Water I 273

Lower Colorado River Basin South Pacific Coast Region

The competition between municipal supply and irrigation in this region is increasing, as are conflicts between instream and offstream uses

and over Indian, State, and Federal water rights. Salinity problems occur with surface and groundwater.

Arizona-Water a limited resource; shortages on Colorado River system (water apportioned to Arizona by the Colorado River Compact);

groundwater overdraft due to both agricultural and population growth; industrial wastes, agrochemicals, salinity, and mining contamination

of groundwater, 30 Superfund sites; Colorado River desalinization at national border, drought impact on rangeland, agriculture, recreational

use of reservoirs; potential flooding due to snowmelt with rainfall, thunderstorms.

California-Most water in the north, most use in the south; entire State susceptible to drought (central and southern especially), which

affects every use, from irrigation to municipal-industrial supply; population pressures in south and central; drought exacerbates groundwater

overdraft, increases forest-fire potential, harmful to recreation and tourism; significant hydroelectric-power generation groundwater supply

pressured by toxic contamina “ tion and coastal saltwater intrusion salinity problems in parts of San Joaquin Valley due to irrigration saltwater

intrusion of Sacrament@ San Joaquin Delta interstate agreements and water-law constraints; growing competition between instream and

offstream uses; potential flooding due to frontal systems from Alaska meeting moist tropical air.

Nevada-A very arid state; municipal water supplies insufficient in some cities, such as Las Vegas, Reno-Sparks, Lovelock, Wendover,

Dayton, and Incline Village; agricultural demand relies on surface water, so is susceptible to drought competition among urban agricultural,

municipal, tribal, and environmental uses; Colorado River withdrawals governed by Colorado River Compact and Nevada has inadequate

share; bi-state agreements on three western rivers; widespread groundwater overdraft due to municipal and agricultural use; localized aquifer

contamina“ tion; salinity high in Virgin River; wetlands and fisheries susceptible to drought; low flows create water-quality problems;

endangered fish in some Great Basin lakes; potential flooding due to snow-melt and rain, localized thunderstorms.

Northwest and Pacific Region

In this region, municipal supplies for smaller communities are susceptible to drought, and competition among power-generation, fish and

recreation, and instream and offstream uses generally is intense. Drought has had significant impacts on forest health.

Alaska-Water abundant overall; local supplies not sufficient for Anchorage and Juneau; sources not dependable during the winter when

streams freeze or stop flowing, but drought not a major concern; suspended sediments in glacially fed rivers; ground and surface water pollution

in populated areas; ice-jam floods common, intense storms and snowmelt occasionally bring floods.

Hawaii--Abundant water for size; small communities have only short-term water supply, but most droughts are short-term events;

population and economic stress on island of Oahu leads to pollution; drought affects agriculture; major storms or hurricanes can bring flooding.

Idaho--Seasonality of surface water is major constraint on use, reservoirs supplement low flows; smaller communities have supply

problems during drought; competition between municipal-industrial withdrawals and irrigation; drought affects agriculture, hydropower,

tourism, recreation, forest-fire hazard; local pollution due to irrigation return flow, mine tailings, municipal-industrial waste; potential flooding

due to snowmelt with rain, thunderstorms, ice jams.

Oregon-Abundant water in the west, limited water in the east; reservoir storage augments summer low flows, allows enormous

hydroelectric production; coastal communities lack storage to deal with drought drought impacts on power production, fish, recreation

agriculture, and forest-fire hazard; water-quality degradation from pasture and agricultural runoff, municipal and industrial discharge;

groundwater overdraft in the east exacerbated by drought potential flooding due to snowmelt and rain in the west, convective storms in the

east.

Washington--Water supply adequate, but unevenly distributed areally and seasonally; heavily populated areas of western Washington

reaching limits of municipal-industrial supply; drought affects agriculture, hydropower (Washington produces 30 percent of U.S.

hydroelectricity), tourism and recreation fisheries, wetlands, and navigation 60 percent of annual river flow through hydrological system is

snowmelt; saltwater intrusion in San Juan and Island Counties, potential for all coastal areas; localized groundwater contamination potential

flooding due to snowmelt with rain, thunderstorms in the east.

SOURCES: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), National Water Summary, 1985--Hydrologic Events and Surface Water Resources, Water-Supply Paper

2300 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986); USGS, National Water Summary 1986-Hydrologic Events and Groundwater

Quality, Water-Supply Paper 2325 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988); USGS, National Water Summary 1987-Hydrologic

Events and Water Supply and Use, Water-Supply Paper 2350 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990); USGS, National Water

Summary 1988 -89--Hydrologic Events and F1oods and Droughts, Water-Supply Paper 2375 (Washington, DC: U.S. Governme nt Printing Office,

1991); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The National Study of Water Management During Drought: Report of the First Year of Study (Fort Belvoir,

VA: U.S. Army, Institute for Water Resources, 1991); National Regulatory Research Institute, Compendium on Water Supply, Drought, and

Conservation, NRRI 89-15 (Columbus, OH: National Regulatory Research Institute, October 1989); letters from State water resource agencies.
Agriculture 6

Status

w Adaptable private sector in a very competitive and growing world

market.

■ High payoffs to public investment--but declining public interest.

■ Increasing environmental restrictions.

Climate Change Problem

g Potential changes in crop and livestock productivity.

■ Market-driven responses may alter regional distribution and

intensity of farming.

What Is Most Vulnerable?

■ The long-term productivity and competitiveness of U.S. agriculture are at risk.

■ Consumers and farm communities face high costs if the process

of adaptation is slowed.

Impediments

■ Institutional rigidities and disincentives (e.g., commodity programs, disaster assistance, water-marketing restrictions).

■ Uncertainty makes it hard for farmers to respond effectively.

m Potential environmental restrictions and water shortages.

■ Technical limits-availability of suitable crops and practices for

new climate.

■ Declining Federal interest in agricultural research and extension

Types of Responses

■ Remove institutional impediments to adaptation (in commodity

programs, disaster assistance, water-marketing restrictions).

w Improve knowledge and responsiveness of farmers to speed

adaptation (informational support, knowledge transfer, process

innovation).

■ Support research to enhance productivity through improved crops

and farming practice (either directed at a general expansion in

productivity or targeted to specific constraints and risks). I 275

NOTE: Parts of this chapter are drawn from a paper prepared by W.E. Easterling for the

Office of Technology Assessment (27).
276 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

OVERVIEW

In contrast to many natural resource systems

examined elsewhere in this report, agriculture is

an intensively managed, market-based system.

Worldwide agricultural systems have evolved

and adapt continuously to wide geographic differences in climate and to the risks associated with

normal climate variability. In the past, agriculture

has also been able to adjust to changes in

economic conditions-such as the rapid changes

in energy prices and export markets over the past

two decades. There can be little doubt that the

American agricultural sector will make further

adaptations in response to changing climate

conditions, with market forces rewarding and

encouraging the rapid spread of successful adaptation. Yet, the possibility of unavoidable warming and drying in the major agricultural regions of

the United States (see ch. 2,) argues for examining

the potential for coping with climate change and

for considering what public action might be

appropriately taken in anticipation of an uncertain

climate change.

For some farmers, simple adjustments in farming practices or crop selection may transform

potential yield losses into gains. But for others,

available responses will not compensate for the

effects of harsher climates and water scarcity. The

current limits to adaptation are well-illustrated by

the geographic limits of where crops can be

grown now. Without adequate moisture, farming

becomes economically impractical. Increases in

the intensity of conflicts between agriculture and

the natural environment may also limit the extent

to which adaptation is possible. For example, if a

warmer climate leads to the expansion of intensive farming north into the Great Lakes States,

land drainage could threaten ponds and wetlands,

and increased use of farm chemicals could add to

water pollution. In the arid West, greater demands

for irrigation water could aggravate existing

conflicts over the use of scarce supplies. Environmental concerns, whether aggravated by climate

change or not, appear likely to constrain future

expansion of agricultural production. Thus, despite adaptation, the possibility that agricultural

yields will be threatened, particularly if climate

becomes warmer and drier, cannot be discounted.

In a world where population growth is steadily

increasing the need for food, any threat to growth

in agricultural productivity must be taken seriously. For American farmers, already facing

increasingly competitive world markets, any decline in productivity relative to the rest of the

world could mean lost markets. For consumers, a

decline in farm productivity growth could mean

rising food prices. Estimates of economic effects

of climate change on the United States range

from damages of $10 billion to benefits of $10

billion (4). If the United States is to have a margin

of security against the uncertainties of climate

change, continued support is essential for research that enhances agricultural productivity and

expands future options for farmers (e.g., new

crops and improved farming systems).

Given the scale of the agricultural economy, a

series of even small missteps and delays in the

process of adaptation could, in the aggregate,

prove very costly. Limited information and institutional impediments seem likely to restrict the

farmer’s ability to respond efficiently to a changing climate. The capability of the agricultural

sector to respond to climate change can be

improved through efforts to speed the movement

of research results and new technologies into farm

practice. In a future in which farmers must be

increasingly responsive to change, the removal of

unnecessary institutional impediments to adaptation is essential. For example, the framework of

U.S. farm-support and disaster-assistance programs-which in many cases limit the farmer’s

incentives to change crops or farming practices

rapidly and efficiently-should be reconsidered.

Climate change is almost certain to create both

winners and losers, despite agricultural adaptation. Consumers will bear much of the cost of any

decline in agricultural yields through higher

prices. Some farmers might benefit from higher

commodity prices, despite generally declining

yields. Even so, other farmers will suffer because
Chapter 6--Agriculture I 277

of relatively severe local climate changes and

because of the inability--caused by a variety of

factors-to respond effectively to change. Adaptation might itself result in some undesirable

social and environmental impacts, particularly if

climate change leads to rapid shifts in the

geographical range of crops or in the intensity of

farming practice. If climate warms considerably,

the range over which major U.S. crops are planted

could shift hundreds of miles to the north. Rapid

geographical shifts in the agricultural land base

could disrupt rural communities and their associated infrastructures. With agriculture and the rural

economy already changing rapidly, and with the

added uncertainties of climate change, it is

impossible to do more than speculate about what

effects climate change might have on rural

communities.

This chapter provides a brief overview of U.S.

agriculture and of the major trends facing it,

examines the role that climate plays in agricultural production, and considers whether or not

U.S. agriculture can be maintained under a

changing climate. The nature of adaptation possibilities and the constraints that may limit the

ability of the farm sector to respond successfully

to a changing climate are considered. Finally, a

potential role for the Federal Government in

sustaining or improving agriculture’s ability to

cope with the uncertainties of a changing climate

is discussed.

U.S. AGRICULTURE TODAY

The United States has an abundance of good

agricultural land and a favorable climate for

producing food, feed grains, and fiber. Cropland

accounts for about 22 percent of the total U.S.

land base (110). An additional 27 percent of the

land base is in pasture and rangeland.1 In 1990,

Past plant-breeding efforts have been successful in

increasing productivity of crops such as wheat. Efforts

to develop varieties that are better able to withstand

environmental stresses, such as pests and droughts,

may reduce the use of agrochemical inputs that are

needed partly to compensate for unfavorable

environments.

the food sector2 accounted for 17 percent of the

civilian labor force, provided 15 percent of gross

national product, and accounted for 11 percent of

total U.S. exports (109). Although the relative

importance of agriculture to the U.S. economy

has declined steadily over time as the rest of the

economy has grown in scale and complexity,

agriculture remains of substantial economic

importance.

1 Cropland is land used for the production of cultivated crops (e.g., grains, hay, fruits, and vegetables) for barvest. Pusfureland is land used

for grazing, including once-forested land converted to forage cover and natural grasslands that are productive enough to support active

qement of fomge plants. Rangelands are natural grasslands of low productivity.

z The food sector includes farm production plus the associated processing, manufacturing, transport, and marketing industries. The

farm-production sector itself employs just 1.5 percent of the U.S. civilian labor force and provides 1.2 percent of the gross national product.
278 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure 6-1—U.S. Production, Domestic

Consumption, and Exports of Wheat, Corn,

and Soybeans

I

G- ‘oor==n

K

~ 50

(!Y

nUII_____L

Wheat Corn

JiiiiL

Soybeans

NOTE: Three-year average based on 1989, 1990, and 1991 data.

The capacity of U.S. farmers to produce

agricultural products far exceeds domestic needs.

The United States produces more than half of the

world’s soybeans and 40 percent of the world’s

corn (maize). Much of the U.S. farm output is

exported (fig. 6-l), and about 30 percent of the

Nation’s cropland is now producing for export

(110). Even these statistics understate the current

capacity to produce food. Of some 400 million

acres (160 million hectares)3 of cropland, about

65 million acres were withdrawn from production

in 1991 (109) under various acreage-reduction

programs, including the Conservation Reserve

Program (CRP) (see box 6-A). Approximately 80

million acres now in pasture or forests could be

converted to productive cropland if needed

Exports and domestic consumption sum to U.S. production. (112).4

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Wash- The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). divides the country into 10 regions for the

—

3 lb convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

d This includes lands tbat have high or medium potential for conversion to agriculture (see table 7 in the appendix of ref. 112).
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1279

intended to result in the enrollment of 10 million acres. Limited appropriations have so far resulted in a smaller

program than was initially authorized.

The Environmental Easement Program provides annual payments and mst sharing forupto 10 years to farmers

who agree either to have easements that provide long-term protection for environmentally sensitive lands or

long-term reduction of water degradation. Participants must agree to a conservation plan to be developed in

consultation with the Department of the Interior. Payment cannot exceed fair market value, No implementation

has occurred to date.

Pesticide Provisions require that producers (under threat of financial penalties) must now maintain records on

the application of restricted-use pesticides for2 years. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

(FIFRA) (P.L. 100-532) was amended to make USDA responsible for programs on the use, storage, and disposal

of agricultural chemicals.

The Sustainable Agricultural Research and Education Program (SARE), also referred to as the Low-Input

Sustainable-Agriculture Program (LISA), is a competitive grants program designed to respond to the need for

a more cost-effective and environmentally benign agriculture, [t is unique in blending research on farming

systems with strategies for ensuring that findings are made usable to farmers, Emphasis is placed on farmer

participation and on-farm demonstrations. The program is currently funded at $6,7 million, although funding of

up to $40 million is authorized.

Continuing USDA Assistance Programs

The Agricultural Conservation Program, initiated in 1936, provides financial assistance of upto$3,500 annually

to farmers who implement approved soil- and watermnservation and pollution-abatement programs. An

increasing emphasis is being placed on water quality projects.

Conservation Technical Assistance, also initiated in 1936, provides technical assistance through the Soil Conservation Service to farmers for planning and implementing soil and water conserva tion andwaterquality practices.

The Great Ptains Conservation Program, initiated in 1957, provides technical and finandal assistance in Great

Plains States for conservation treatments that cover the entire farm operation. Assistance is Iimitedto $35,000

per farmer. The program emphasizes reducing soil erosion caused by wind through the planting of windbreaks

or the conversion of croplands to grass cover,

The Resource Conservation and Development Program, initiated in 1962, assists multicounty areas in

enhancing conservation, water quality, wildlife habitat, recreation, and rural development.

The Water Bank Program, initiated in 1970, provides annual payments for reserving wetlands in important

nesting, breeding, or feeding areas of migratory waterfowl,

The Rural Clean Water Program, initiated in 1980, is anexperfmental program implemented in 21 project areas.

It provides cost sharing and technical assistance to farmers who voluntarily implement approved bestmanagement practices to improve water quality.

The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) Soil and Water ban Program provides loans to farmers and farm

associations for sdl and water conservation, pollution abatement, and improving water systems that serve farms.

FmHAmayalso acquire 50-year conservation easements as ameansto help reduce outstanding farmer loans.

Research and Extension Activities

- The Agricultural Research Service conducts research on newandalternative crops and agricultural technology

to reduce agriculture’s adverse impacts on soil and water resources,

■ The Cooperative State Research Service coordinates conservation and water quality research conducted by

State Agricultural Experiment Stations and allocates funds for competitive grants, including those related to

water quality research.

■ The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) monitors the condition of agricultural soil and water resources, provides

information to encourage better soil management, and supervises conservation-compliam plans.

s The Extension Service provides information and recommendations on soil conservation and water quality

practices to farmers, in cooperation with State extension services and SCS.

(Continued on next page)
280 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 6-A–Major Federal Programs Related to Agriculture and the Environment-(Continued)

Environmental Protection Agency Programs

H 1987 Water Quality Act Section 319 Programs (P.L. 95-217) require States and Territories to fileasssmed reports with

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify the navigable waters where water quality standards cannot be

attained without reducing non-point-source pollution, including pollution from agricultural sources. States are also

required to file management plans with EPA that identify steps that will be taken to reduce non-point-source pollution.

All States have now filed assessment reports and management plans. The act authorizes up to $400 million for

Implementing these plans, with $52 million awarded in 1992.

■ The 1987 Water Quality Act National Estuary Program provides for the identification of nationally significant estuaries

threatened by pollution, for the preparation of conservation and management pfans, and for Federal grants to

water-pollution-control agencies for the purposes of preparing plans. Under this program, USDA technical assistance to

farmers has helped to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous discharges into the Chesapeake Bay by about 20,000 tons

(1.8 million kilograms)2 annually.

■ The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentidde Act (P.L. 100-532) gives EPA responsibility for regulating pesticides,

including agricultural insecticides and herbicides. EPA registers new pesticides and reviews existing pesticides to ensure

that they do not present an unreasonable risk. The Agency may restrict or ban the use of pesticides determined to be

a potential hazard to human health or the environment.

● The Safe Drinking Water Act (P.L. 93-523) requires EPA to publish drinking water standards for contaminants that can

have adverse health effects in public water systems. These same standards are being used to assess contamination in

groundwater supplies in private wells. The act also established a weflhead-protection program to protect sole-source

aquifers from contamination by pesticides and agricultural chem”mls.

z To convert tons to kilograms, multiply W W7.

SOURCE: Office of Technology AssesernenL 1993; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (ERS),

Agricultural Resoum#: Cmpland, Water, and Conservation SituatiorrandOutlook, ERS AR-27 (Washington, DC: USDA).

presentation of farm statistics, as illustrated in regional distribution of cropland and irrigated

figure 6-2. About 65 percent of U.S. cropland is

found in the Corn Belt region, the Northern

Plains, the Lake States, and the Southern Plains

(112). Of all the States, California, Iowa, Illinois,

Minnesota, Texas, Nebraska, and Florida have the

highest cash revenue horn farming. Irrigation,

rather than extensive farm acreage, accounts for

the high value of farm production in several of

these States (California, Texas, and Florida). The

17 Western States, Arkansas, Florida, and

Louisiana account for 91 percent of irrigated

acreage. California, Nebraska, Texas, Idaho, and

Colorado account for almost half of the irrigated

acreage. Overall, irrigation agriculture makes up

only 5 percent of the land in farms and 15 percent

of the harvested cropland, but provides a striking

38 percent of crop production, by dollar value

(109). Much of this value is from fruits, vegetables, and special~ crops. Figure 6-3 illustrates the

crop acreage in the United States.

I Crop and Livestock Production

in the United States

Agriculture varies considerably across the

Nation due to differences in climate, geography,

and economic conditions. Figure 6-4 shows

several distinctive farming areas that differ significantly in farm size, income, and production (57).

Although not exhaustive in covering the Nation’s

farm lands, this characterization of farms gives a

fair sense of the diversity in U.S. agriculture.

Farms of the Corn Belt and Great Plains provide

the largest share of the Nation’s grains and

livestock products. Farms there tend to be large,

and farmers rely on farming for most of their

income. California produces fruits and vegetables, dairy products, livestock, and grains, with

most crops coming from large, irrigated farms.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 281

Figure 6-2-The USDA Agricultural Regions of the United States

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, The Second RCA Appraisal: Soil, Water, and

Related Resources on Nonfederal Land in the United States-Analysis of Conditions and Trends, Miscellaneous

Publication No. 1482 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1989, slightly revised May 1990).

The Mississippi Delta region produces cotton,

soybeans, and rice. Farms of the Coastal Plains

produce mostly poultry, dairy products, cattle,

and soybeans. The Wisconsin-Minnesota Dairy

area provides dairy products, cattle, and corn,

with most production coming from small farms.

Tobacco, poultry, cattle, dairy, and soybeans are

typical farm outputs of the Eastern Highlands and

the Southeast Piedmont. Farms in these two areas

tend to be small and often provide only a part of

the farmer’s total income.

The primary annual crops grown in the United

States in terms of economic value and area of land

use are the grain crops-corn, soybeans, and

wheat (table 6-l). Although grown across the

country, most of the output of these three crops

comes from the Corn Belt, the Lake States, and

the Great Plains. Box 6-B outlines how climate

interacts with major U.S. grain crops. The cash

value of fruits and vegetables (combined) is about

equal to that of grains. Fruits and vegetables are

largely grown under irrigation,5 require a relatively small amount of land, and exist in such

extensive variety that it is hard to imagine climate

change threatening overall supplies-as long as

water is available. However, individual growers

of these crops maybe at some risk of losses under

rapid climate change.

1 Trends in U.S. Agriculture

A general overview of major U.S. agricultural

trends forms a baseline against which to measure

the effects of climate change. Technical, social,

and economic change have greatly transformed

U.S. agriculture over the past 40 years. Regardless of climate change, U.S. agriculture faces

several trends in the coming decades that will

almost certainly persist.

s About 65 pereent of ve&table CIVpS snd 80 p~t of orchard crops are irrigated (107),
282 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Figure 6-3--Regional Distribution of Cropland and Irrigated Cropland in the United States

’

00 ‘~

,,v

North- Appalachian South- Lake Corn Belt Delta N. Plains S. Plains Mountain Pacific

east east States

NOTE: To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, The Second RCA Appraisal: Soil, Water, and Related Resources on

Nonfederal/Land in the UnitedStates--Analysis of Conditions and Trends, Miscellaneous Publication No. 14S2 (Washington, DO: U.S. Department

of Agriculture, June 1989, slightly revised May 1990).

M!

it

A center pivot irrigation system. The sprinkler system

rotates to irrigate about 130 acres.

SlOW Growth in Domestic Demand

Domestic demand for agricultural products

will grow slowly, probably at no more than 1

percent per year (24). Population growth in the

United States, the major determinant of domestic

demand for agricultural products, is now at about

1 percent per year, and is expected to drop lower

(114). Per capita income growth in the United

States, even if it proves to be substantial, is unlikely

to add much demand for agricultural products.6

Increasing World Demand

Worldwide growth in population and per capita

income are such that world agricultural demand

may increase by almost 2 percent a year over the

next 50 years (20). Much of this new demand will

6 B~ 1970 and 1992, the average consumer’s food budget declined from 22 to 16 percent of total purchases (113). Only oncqmmx

of the eonsum er’s food budget now pays for the cost of basic agricultural commodities, as compared with one-third in 1970 (113).
Figure 6-4-Characteristics of Nine Farming Regions

Western Great Plains. Typical farms have large Western Corn Belt-Northern Plains. Most farmers Wisconsin-Minnesota Dairy Area. This area relies

acreages. The farm population relies more heavily here work full-time on their farms. The area relies on heavily on dairy sales. A relatively low proportion of

on farming for income than in seven of the eight farming for income more so than any of the other production comes from Iarge farms. Fewer than 30

other regions. There are low rates of part-tlme region;. Farmers comprise the largest

farming and off-farm employment. total rural population (almost a third) in

proportion of the percent of farmers hold full-time jobs off the farm. The

this region. farm population IS more dependent on farming income

than in many other regions.

\

California Metro. Farm

income IS derived mostly

from sales of fruits,

vegetables, and other

crops not covered by major

Federal commodity

programs. Average farm

size IS very large. The

farm population IS very =

mobile in comparison to

other regions.

Core Corn Belt. Farm

program crops provide

most farm sales. Most

farmers are full-time

operators. The farm

population (everyone who

lives on a farm) earns more

than half its income from

nonfarm sources, but many

rely mainly on farm

income. Farm families

make up much of the rural

population.

Eastern Highlands. This

region IS characterized by very

low sales per farm, and a high

percentage of sales coming

from small farms. Farm

operators are most Iikely here

to work full-time off the farm, so

farm households are not very

dependent on farm Income.

Southeast Piedmont. This

area relies less on farm

program crops or dairy

products than other areas. It

has the h!ghest proportion of

farmers with full-time off-farm

jobs. Farming provides less

than the average portion of

total household income.

Farmers make up only a small

part of the rural population.

g

~

@

/

Coastal Plains. Farms in this region

rely somewhat more heavily on T

program crops and less on dairy sales

Delta. This region IS the most dependent on sales of farm g

than the national average. The

program crops, which provide 85 percent of gross farm percentage of farmers working full-time ~-

Income. Although less than 30 percent of farm operators off-farm IS about average, but the c

work full-time off the farm, 54 percent have some areas IS less dependent on farm =

employment outside agriculture, the national average. income than are most other regions. c

z

w

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, adapted from D. Martinez, “Wanted: Policies to Cope with Differences in Farming Regions,” Farmline, vol. 8, No. 11, 1987, pp. 11-13. m

u
284 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Table 6-1--Harvested Acreage and Value of

Principal Crops, 1991

Acreage Crop value

(millions of acres) ($ billion)

Corn for grain . . . . . . . . . . .

Hay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soybean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Wheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sorghum for galn. . . . . . . .

Vegetables . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fruits and nuts... . . . . . . .

Rice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Peanuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sugar beets and cane.. . .

Tobacco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

62

58

77

12

11

7

4

3

2

2

1

18

11

11

7

5

1

10

8

1

1

2

3

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agrfculture, Agricultural Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

come from developing countries. Meeting the

growing need for food will require substantial

gains in farm production throughout the world.

lncreasing Productiviy and Output

U.S. agricultural productivity and yields are

likely to continue to grow, but there is much

disagreement over whether growth will remain as

rapid as it has been in the past. Over the past four

decades, U.S. farm yields increased at an annual

rate of about 2 percent (24). Future gains in output

are expected to be harder to achieve than they have

been in the past (83), and gains averaging just

1 percent a year are predicted (1 12). For the United

States, the best prospects for continuing to increase

output lie in improved farm productivity. Conventional breeding strategies, more-efficient use of

technical inputs, new biological technologies, and

new information technologies may all contribute to improvements in farm productivity (103).

Competition for World Markets

With relatively stable domestic demands, U.S.

farmers will increasingly look toward export

markets. The best opportunity for growth in U.S.

exports will be in the rapidly developing, populous countries of Asia and Latin America (24).

However, uncertainty about future levels of

agricultural production abroad leave it somewhat

unclear whether foreign demand for U.S. agricultural products will increase. The advantage that

U.S. farmers have long enjoyed in export markets

could weaken as gains in productivity in foreign

countries lower production costs relative to those

in the United States.

Increasing Environmental Concerns

Strong environmental concerns could limit

U.S. agricultural output and increase production

costs. 7 A portion of the past gain in U.S. agricultural productivity has come at the expense of

the environment. Salinization of soils, groundwater contamination, excessive erosion, and loss

of wildlife habitat hav--in some areas-been

the direct result of poor farm-management practices (112). Partially offsetting this has been the

decline in land use for agriculture. As crop yields

per acre increase, the total land area needed for

U.S. agricultural production could decrease by as

much as 30 percent over the next 40 years (112),

thus reducing many land-use conflicts.

Society’s increasing interest in protecting and

preserving environmental values has led to stronger

environmental policies. In the United States, this

has meant taking some agricultural lands out of

production (through the Conservation Reserve

and Swampbuster Programs) and requiring changes

in farming practices (Sodbuster Program). (Box

6-A describes Federal environmental programs

related to agriculture; see also vol. 2, ch. 4, of this

report.) The trend toward stronger environmental

regulation will probably continue, with a likely

increase in control overwater pollution from agricultural sources (e.g., fertilizers and pesticides).

Stronger environmental protection policies may

cause agricultural costs to rise, unless technologies that help farmers reduce environmental

damage and land-use conflicts are developed.

T Although with other competing industrialized countries likely to be faced with similar environmental regulation it is somewhat unclear

how Us. competitiveness might be &ffected.
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1285

Box 6-B–Primary US. Farm Products

Corn-4orn is the principal crop of the United States, grown on more farms than any other crop and with an

annual production value of $18 billion in 1991 (table 6-l). Production is concentrated in the Corn Belt, which

accounts for over half of U.S. corn acreage. Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio,

Michigan, South Dakota, and Missouri are the leading producer States, together accounting for over 80 percent

of U.S. production. Corn yields are very susceptible to dry weather conditions, with drought-related losses often

high. Water supply is most critical in the few weeks just before and after tasseling, which is when the tassel-like

male flowers emerge. A dry spring t hat allows early planting can be important for maximum yields. Cool nights are

also important for maximum corn yields; the warm night temperatures are a major reason the corn yields of the

Southern Piedmont States are smatlerthan the Corn Belt’s.l Reflecting the dependence on reliable moisture, farms

that grow corn under irrigation have average yields almost 60 percent higher than do farms without irrigation in

the same region. Irrigation is most common in the M&tern Great Plains States of Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado,

and Texas. The United States exports over 20 percent of its corn and produces 40 percent of the world’s supply.

Most corn is used as livestock and poultry feed.

Soybean-oybeans are the second most valuable crop in the United States.2 The primary soybeanproducing region overlaps the Corn Belt. Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana, Ohio, and Missouri are the leading

producers. The soybean has a great ability to recover from ctimate stresses because of its indeterminate

(continuous) flowering. The wide variety of genetic types available has allowed the crop to be grown in many

climatic zones. Although grown in the South, soybeans do better in the cool-weather States. Melds in the South

are hurt by uneven patterns of rainfall, diseases associated with dampness, and hot and dry conditions during the

August pod-filling period. The United States exports 35 percent of its soybean production and provides over half

of the world’s supply. Soybeans are used in cooking oils, livestock feed, and several industrial applications.

Wheat—Wheat is the third-largest field crop in terms of total production value. Wheat is grown across the

United States, although a large area of the Great Plains running from North Dakota and Montana down tothe Texas

panhandle accounts fortwo-thirds of U.S. production. The Pacific States are also major producxws. Kansas, North

Dakota Oklahoma, Washington, and Montana are generally the leading producers. Wheat infrequently grown in

areas where there are few profitable alternatives. In dry areas, it is common to leave land fallow in alternate years

to allow soil moisture to accumulate. Late spring freezes and inadequate moisture after flowering are the primary

threats to yields. Winter wheat varieties are planted in the fall and harvested in spring or early summer-avoiding

the threat of hot summer temperatures. These varieties account for about 75 percent of U.S. production. Where

there is sufficient moisture and long growing seasons, winter wheat is sometimes double-cropped, with sorghum

or soybeans grown during the summer. Spring wheats are planted in spring and harvested in late summer. These

varieties are grown along the nort hem U.S. border, especially in Nort h Dakota, where winters are long and harsh.

The United States produces about 10 percent of the world’s wheat supply and exports half of its production.

Livestock and poultry—Livestock products (including poultry and dairy) account for about 53 percent of the

total value of U.S. farm sales. Sales of cattle and dairy products are by far the largest component (almost 70

percent) of these livestock-related sales. The primary cattle regions are located west of the Mississippi and east

of the Rocky Mountains, where t here is access to both grazing lands and feed grains. Much of t he U.S. production

of earn and a large portion of soybean production goes to animal feed. Texas, Nebraska and Kansas are leading

cattle producers. Hog production is strongly linked to the corn-producing regions, with most production occurring

in Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Indiana. Poultry production is widespread, with much of it in the South.

1 R.S. Loomis, Department of Agronomy, University of Californlaat Davis, personal Communication, Apr.22,

1993.

2 Excluding hay, which includes various grasses and @JUmOS (Such as alfalfa) grown for ani~l ‘Od*r.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Servkx, Agr?kultural

/rrigation and 14@ter Use, Agrlculturai Information Bulletin 636 (Washington, DC: USDA).
286 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Changing Farm Structure

The traditional small farm is gradually being

replaced by the large, technologically sophisticated agribusiness.8 Farms producing under $40,000

in annual revenues still account for almost 71

percent of the 2.2 million farms in the United

States. 9 However, large farms-the 14 percent of

farms with annual sales of over $100,000-now

account for almost 80 percent of farm production

(91). Small farming enterprises are increasingly

less significant to the business of producing food.

Overall, farms are declining in number at 1 to

2 percent per year, with neighboring farm lands

being consolidated into single, larger farms (91).

As a result, average farm size has been increasing,

rising from 213 acres in 1950 to 460 acres by

1990.10 The trend toward consolidation of U.S.

agricultural production into larger businesses will

likely continue (24). Along with the increasing

concentration of farm production on fewer large

farms, there has been a decline in the rural

population that depends on farming. on-farm

populations declined from 15 percent of the U.S.

population in 1950 to less than 2 percent in 1990.

The declines in farm and rural populations are

expected to continue (62, 101). By the time significant climate change might occur, farming will

look much different from the way it looks today.

THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate and climate variability are already

major risks to agricultural production. Agricultural losses due to climatic fluctuation are an

expected part of farming. Farmers plant knowing

that in some years, weather will cause poor yields.

To minimize their exposure to climate risk,

farmers take steps such as planting an appropriate

crop, using water-conserving land-management

practices, and diversifying sources of income.

Such responsiveness suggests that farmers will

adjust to perceived changes in climate variability,

regardless of whether this is due to climate change

or recognized as such by the farmer. However,

future climate changes could present agriculture

with unprecedented risks and circumstances.

Climate change, if it occurs, will be global,

perhaps with large-scale winners and losers.

There will be regional differences in the pace,

direction, and extent of climate changes. Some

regions are likely to be helped by climate change,

while others are harmed. There is no way of

knowing whether gains would offset the losses,

but a changing climate would surely affect world

agricultural markets and regional patterns of land

use on a long-term basis. Not only will there be

changes in average climatic conditions, but there

may also be a change in the frequencies of rainfall

and temperature-related extreme events. Although

it is not clear that climate variability will increase,

increases in mean temperature alone can lead to

more-frequent periods of extended high temperatures (59). The changing frequency of extreme

high-temperature events, rather than a gradual

rise in average temperature, may present the

greatest threat to farmers.

Adaptations made on the farm will be important in offsetting potential declines in yield. In

some cases, simple adjustments in farming practices may transform potential yield losses into

yield gains. Still, the extent to which adaptation

will fully offset any negative effects of climate

change might be constrained by cost and by limits

to the availability of water and fertile soils.

Conflicts over the environmental consequences

of agriculture and the use of scarce water resources may become increasingly contentious

(see ch. 5), limiting the possibilities for adaptaS It is unclear how climate chaqye might affect farm structure. The large, specialized farming enterprises may prove to be fmanc ially and

_eWy better prepared to respond to climate changes than the typical smaller farm. On the other han~ it could be that smaller farms with

low capitalizatio~ high diversification in source of income, and low input requirements will prove less vulnerable to climate change.

9 F-produc~ ~der $40,M) in gross sales do not produce enough income to SUppOfi a ftiy by today’s living s~~s.*Y of

these farms are owned by individuals who work full time in other jobs (91).

10 F- producing ova $loo,M@” in KWXIU(X aver~e over 1!500 ~ra.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 287

tion. Warming could eventually shift the potential

range of crops hundreds of miles to the north (7).

If crop ranges shift significantly and rapidly under

a changing climate, communities that depend on

agriculture could be greatly affected. Although

most studies have concluded that there is no

immediate threat to U.S. food supplies (4, 87), the

possibility of even moderate reductions in longterrn food supplies cannot be ignored as an

underlying cause for public concern.

9 Sensitivity of Crops and

Livestock to Climate Change

Virtually every aspect of farming is affected by

weather and climate. If soils are too dry or too

cold, seeds will not germinate. If soils are too wet,

farmers have difficulty getting equipment into

muddy fields to plant or harvest. Most importantly, climate controls biological productivity. In

most plants, the process of flowering and developing harvestable organs depends in a complex

way on the seasonal patterns of temperature and

daylength. Crop yields are sensitive to daily and

seasonal levels of solar radiation, maximum and

minimum temperatures, precipitation, and carbon

dioxide (C02), and to the soil-drying effects of

winds and high temperatures. All of these factors

could be altered under climate change. Whenever

climatic conditions depart from those expected,

they pose some risk to agriculture.

For agricultural crops, beneficial effects from

increasing concentrations of atmospheric CO2 are

expected. Crops respond to increased concentrations of atmospheric CO2 with greater photosynthetic efficiency, improved water-use efficiency,

and greater tolerance for heat, moisture, and

salinity stresses (1, 49, 52). The greater photosynthetic and water-use efficiencies result in larger

and more-vigorous plants and increased yields

(78).11 It is not known precisely how the direct

effects of higher C02 concentrations will influence crop yields under actual field conditions.

Experimental results suggest that under a doubling of atmospheric CO2 (and otherwise ideal

conditions), yields may improve by 20 to 60

percent for crops such as wheat, soybeans, and

rice--the C3 crops (5, 49).12 Yield increases of

perhaps no more than 20 percent are expected for

corn, sugar cane, and sorghum--the C4 crops. The

actual extent of the beneficial impacts from

elevated CO2 will depend on there being suitable

temperatures and adequate supplies of nutrients

and soil moisture.

Several factors may complicate the prediction

that rising C02 will be a blessing for agriculture.

The relative growth advantage of C3 plants over

the C4 crops could change regional patterns of

crop production. If C3 weeds start growing faster,

C4 crops like corn and sugarcane could face

increased competition from them. (The converse

is alSO true, of course; C3 plants could face reduced

competition from C4 weeds.) The nutritional

quality of plants and grain might decline because

of the changing balance of carbon and nitrogen (a

result of increased uptake of carbon). This, in

turn, might lead to increased insect damage, with

insects consuming more plant material to compensate for lower nutritional quality (6).

Regional warming itself can be either beneficial or harmful. In more northern regions, where

cool temperatures result in short growing seasons,

the beneficial effects of increased seasonal

warmth may dominate. Irrigated crops, which

include most of the Nation’s fruits and vegetables, should also benefit, especially if longer

growing seasons allow double-cropping. Water,

if available, can compensate for the stress of high

temperatures. But warming tends to speed up the

development of plants, shortening the period in

which fruit formation and grain filling occurs, and

11 Note tit despite improv~ water-use eftlcimcy, crop water r~tiernent.s may increase because of tie kgcr ptit Siu.

[z me catego~tion of plants as CJ or Cg is based on the mechanism by which COZ is used in the cell (see Ch. 2). At Ckvated C02

concentrations, the inefllciency of the C3 process in producing sugars is overcome, and Cq plants respond with greater growth improvement

than do C4 plants.
288 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

so reduces yields. This effect on yields is especially notable in wheat and corn (2). Warmer

nighttime temperatures, even in the absence of

warmer daytime temperatures, will increase

transpiration and can reduce a plant’s ability to

recover from the rigors of high daytime temperatures. High temperatures can damage the process

of pollination (corn pollen begins to lose viability

at 97 OF (36 ‘C)) and can damage fruit and flower

formation (cotton fruit aborts after 6 hours at

temperatures over 104 OF (40 ‘C)). High temperatures can stress plants directly, reducing growth

rates in most crops at temperatures above 95 OF

(35 ‘C). Finally, higher temperatures lead to

increased evaporation, reducing water availability unless drying is offset by greater precipitation.

Because water is generally the limiting factor in

agricultural production, any soil drying tends to

reduce yields. Corn yields are especially sensitive

to moisture stress in the weeks around tasseling.13

Crop yields and farm-management costs can be

influenced in other, less-direct ways. Changes in

the frequency or range of insects and fungal

diseases seem likely to result from warmer

climates, longer growing seasons, and changes in

moisture levels. Pollination may be affected if the

timing of plant development is out of phase with

the presence of pollinating insects. Climate warming may alter the geographical distribution of

existing pests now limited by winter temperatures

and may allow for increased rates of successful

invasion by exotic migrants. The severity of

existing pest problems could be increased as

longer growing seasons allow for the development of extra pest generations and as warmer

temperatures raise the likelihood that pests will

survive through the winter (70; see also ch. 2).

Several pests, such as the southwestern corn borer

and the corn earworm, could pose a greater threat

to Corn Belt production. As a result, pestmanagement costs may rise. Farmers may also

face changes in the costs of drying, storing, and

transporting grain. A longer growing season

might allow grains to be more fully dried in the

fields, thus reducing costs. Grain-transport costs

could be increased if reduced water flows limit

barge traffic on the Mississippi River, as happened during the drought of 1988 (12) (see box

5-L). Livestock and poultry would also be affected by a warmer climate. Continued exposure

of cattle to temperatures above 86 OF (30 ‘C) can

slow weight gain, reduce milk production, and

increase mortality (39, 50). Problems can be

amplified if night temperatures rise disproportionately more than day temperatures (47) because animals need cool nights to recover from

hot days. Livestock and poultry farming may also

be affected indirectly, through changes in the

price of feed, in water availability, in diseases,

and in the availability and productivity of grazing

lands. For example, any decline in acreage

planted with crops in the Great Plains would lead

to a corresponding increase in the land available

for grazing. For the existing grazing lands,

changes in soil moisture will have the greatest

effect on the plant species composition and

productivity (16).14

Climate change will threaten agriculture most

in areas such as the western Great Plains, where

heat stress and droughts are already problems and

where increased irrigation would be costly. The

extreme crop losses that occur during droughts

provide a striking illustration of potential vulnerability. During the drought year of 1988, Illinois

corn yields were almost 45 percent lower than

previous years’ (110). Figure 6-5 shows the

sensitivity of U.S. corn yield to drought and other

weather-related factors. Cropland now under

irrigation in arid regions facing reduced water

supplies and increased competition for water will

13 mtie flowers that form on the top of com plants are commonly referred to ss ~sek.

14 Direct eff~~ of elevated C02 may not be significant on _lands constrained by moisture and nitrogen. It is possible, however, that

increased carbon uptake by forage plants without corresponding increases in the amount of nitrogen assimilated by those plants could reduce

their nutritional value for livestock (40).
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 289

Figure 6-5-Corn Yields in the United States, 1950-91

140 —

I

120

-@ 1 0 0

:

-1 60/0

20

I

o I I I I I

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

NOTE: To convert bushels of corn per acre to metric tons per hectare, multiply by 0.063.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

annual).

be at risk and will likely require increasingly

sophisticated water-conserving technologies. In

Western States, for example, warming could lead

to a reduction or earlier melting of the winter

snowpack that now provides much of the region’s

irrigation water (see ch. 5). On the other hand, if

moisture levels increase and allow a northwest

shift of the Corn Belt into the deep, fertile soils of

the Dakotas, there might be little threat to yields.

An expansion of the Corn Belt into that region is

already under way (84). Over the past decade,

plant breeders have developed corn varieties with

a shorter growing season and thus have extended

the corn region several hundred miles to the north.

The various effects of climate changes on

agricultural yield are only suggestive of the

potential economic harm from climate change.

Exactly how consumer food prices and the

profitability of agriculture are affected by climate

change will depend on the aggregation of farmlevel responses to changes in climate. Large-scale

adjustments in the location and intensity of food

production have the potential to offset much of

the direct effect of climate change. Box 6-C describes some studies that have looked at the market

responses and economic effects of climate change.

I Conflicting Goals and Competing

Demands for Water

Agriculture’s attempts to adjust to climate

change could have several potentially undesirable

consequences. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) warns that environmental

concerns and constraints on the availability of

land and water could add to the difficulty of

maintaining agricultural yields under a climate

change (87). Any increased use of irrigation

water would be in conflict with the growing

demand for other uses of water. The potential for

a shift in the Corn Belt into northern areas of the

Lake States raises particular concern. This is an

area of thin soils, with poor drainage and uneven
290 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box &C-Previous Studies of

Agriculture and Climate Change

In the 1980s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) commissioned many

major studies of the potential effects of

climate change on U.S. agriculture (87)1.

The Agency emphasized the use of crop

simulation models to predict the effects of

various climate-warming scenarios on crop

yields (75, 80), and gave little attention to

technical changes in agricultural systems

or the adaptive responses of farmers. The

warm ing scenarios were generated by general circulation model (GCM) experiments

under the assumption of doubled atmospheric carbon dioxide (C02). The GCMs

used predict eventual atmospheric temperature increases of 7 to 9 ‘F (4 to 5 ‘C) for

many regions of the United States, and one

of the models predicts severe drying for

most of the agricultural land in the United

States (see ch. 2). Representative projections of yieid changes from two GCMs are

presented in the figure at right.

EPA found that climate change would

affect crop yieids and livestock productivity

and would result in a northward shift in the

crop production zones. Although warming

alone might lead to sharply reduced agricultural yields (over 50 percent decline in

some regions), the direct effects of doubled

COZ could offset much of the potential

decline in crop yields. Still, EPA predicted

that yieidswouiddecline substantially under

the more-severe climate scenarios, especially where droughts become more frequent. Yields across the Southern and

Central States were considered particularly

vulnerable, largely because of drying. A

few northern locations, such as Minnesota,

were expected to show yield improvements

1 ~ Council for Agricultural SclenOe and

T*nology(18) drew together perhaps the best

overview of agriculture under climate ohange.

Rosenberg and Grosson (79) investigated onfarm adaptation to climate change in the U.S.

Midwest. A National Academy of Sdenoe study

(65) reviewed the possible ways that agrloulture

could adapt to climate change.

50 ,

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SOURCE: C. Roeenzweig, “Potential Effects of Climate Change on

Agricultural Production in the Great Ptains: A Simulation Study,” in:

T% Potential Effects of Globai Climate Change on the Unit& States,

Appendix C, Wlume 1, J. Smith and D. Tlrpak (ede.) (Waehlngton,OC:

U.S. Environmental protection Agency, 19S9).

NOTE: Yietds reflect COa fertilization effect. GFDLGeophysicaI Fiuid

Dynamice Laborato~; GISS-Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
Chapter 6--Agriculture 1291

(in some cases, by more than 40 percent). Including COZ effects and assuming no adaptive response, a reduction

in the Nation’s agricultural yields was projected as the most iikely outcome of climate change.

Projected yieid changes such as those described in the EPA studies suggest potential harmful effects of

ciimate change but, ultimately, cost changes to consumers and agricultural producers are the concern. Exactly

howconsurnerfood prices and the profitability of farm production are affected will depend on farm-level reactions

and market adjustments to climate change. Indeed, it is often not understood that farmers could benefit from the

higher prices that would result from a reduction in all farm yieids. Farming systems wili change in response to crop

productivity shifts and changes in commodity prices. Market-level adjustments in the location and intensity of food

production worldwide wili determine the prices faced by individual farmers and consumers.

Aithough the EPA studies did not explicitly consider farm-level adaptations, they suggested that farmers could

act to offset some of the projected yield declines (3, 26,80). A few basic agronomic adjustments were considered

(80). For drytand corn (i.e., corn that is not irrigated) in the Southern Plains, altered planting dates showed little

effect in offsetting the yield reduction caused by CJirnate warming. More dramatic effects of short-term adaptations

were found for dryland and irrigated wheat. A switch in cultivars led to improved wheat yields in most of the

simulations.

Others studies took a more comprehensive look at on-farm adaptation. One examined the natural resource

base of the Missouri-Iowa-Nebraska-Kansas (MINK) region, investigating the effectiveness of several farm

practices and innovations in offsetting effects of climate change (79), In the absence of adaptive response, they

found that a permanent shift to warmer and drier climate conditions reduces net regional income by 1.3 percent.

After ac~nting for direct C02 effects and short-term adaptations by farmOrS, regionai economic losses are

reduced to 0.3 percent(11 ). More significantly, the study considers plausibie innovations in crop genetics and farm

management that could further reduce the risks to the region’s future economy t hat are posed by climate change.

Effects of economic adjustments through shifts in the location and intensity of production were considered

in one study (3). Shifting crops to better-suited locations would be an important adaptive mechanism that would

offset much of the potential economic cost of ciimate change. The study used a regional-market model of U.S.

agriculture to examine the economic effects of changes in crop productivity due to climate change. Economic

damages were significantly less than would have resulted in t he absence of shifts in the location and intensity of

production. Economic effects range from damages of $10.3 billion to benefits of $10.9 billion, depending on which

GCM scenario is considered (4). Depending on the climate scenario, overall crop production decreases by 20

percent or increases by 9 percent. Corresponding to these supply changes, commodity prices increase by 34

percent or decrease by 17 percent. In either case, farmers benefit while consumers bear the burden of higher

prices under the harsher climate scenario.

One assessment of the world trade in agricultural products under climate change found that despite a

potential for substantial effects of climate change on crops, interregional shifts in location and intensity of

production and the opportunity for trade very much buffer the world from the threat of climate change (46). Price

changes in international markets promote interregional adjustment in production and consumption. Essentiality no

aggregate economic effect on the United States results, and economic effects on the overall world economy are

estimated to be similarly small. Another assessment of world agricultural trade under a climate change found

beneficial effects from world trade, with interregional adjustments offsetting 70 to 80 percent of the potential yieid

declines (81). Despite this finding, that assessment reached an important and less-than-optimistic conclusion:

although the United States itself may not face market losses, some parts oft he developing wortd t hat must import

food could suffer from higher food prices and an increased risk of hunger.

SOURCE: Office of Twhnology Assessment, 1993; W.E. Easterling, “Adapting United States Agriculture to Climate Change,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, January 1993.
292 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

terrain, raising the possibility of reduced produc- Costs of main taining farm production. Increased

tivity and increased environmental damage. In- use of chemical pesticides to counter these threats

tensifkd farming in these northern lands would could add to water pollution problems. In areas

change the nature of an area now rich in forests, where farming activity declines, there could be

wetlands, and other natural habitats. Crop pests, dislocations in local and regional economies (see

if they expand in range or severity, might raise the box 6-D).

Box 6-D-Water Transfers in the West: Winners and lasers

Colorado provides a good illustration of the complexities surrounding already scarce water supplies in the

M&t. Many climate models predict drying in the central parts of North America. With growing urban demands for

water, increasing environmental cxmcerns related to instream flows, and less water to go around, future conflicts over

water seem likely to increase in intensit y. An examination of existing conflicts related to water transfers in Colorado

illustrates some important social impacts that need to be considered when climate change policy is formulated.

Water transfers in Colorado are gradually moving water from irrigated agricultural to urban use. Over the past

two decades, dties have purchased water rights on some 80,000 acres (24,300 hectares)l of agricultural land (out

of some 3 million acres total irrigated land). The transfers are driven by economics. As costs for developing new

municipal water supplies have increased, Colorado’s cities have found it cheaper to purchase water rights from

nearby agricultural areas. For farmers or ranchers, the sale of water rights has provided a desperately needed

financial windfall at a time when the agricultural economy has been severely strained by high debt, poor weather,

and low commodity prices. Faced with a sagging rural economy, the farmer who is offered by a city two to five times

more than the value of water in agriculture sees a deal that is too good to refuse. For example, landowners in the

Arkansas River Basin, who might lease a 40-acre field to a farmer for a profit of $2,500 per year, were able to sell

the water rights to that land for $200,000 to the city of Aurora.

It would seem that such water transfers are awin-win situation. With farmers accounting for only 2 percent of

the population and contributing 3 percent of economic output, yet consuming 92 percent of Colorado’s water, small

transfers of water from agriculture seem to offer the right solution to urban water shortages. The acre-foot of water

that allows production of about $90 of wheat or $250 of beef will provide 4 years of water for a typical urban family

of four. The farmer makes money by selling, and the city gets more than enough water to support a growing

population. However, there are losers in almost every water transfer. The losers in Colorado have been the already

poor counties and communities left with no future economic base after water sales to cities.

In the seven counties of the Arkansas River Basin in southeastern Coiorado (see figure), large amounts of

water have already been transferred to urban use. Prolonged droughts in the 1950s devastated the farm economy

and triggered the first water sales to the city of Pueblo. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were major sales of water

to the cities of Pueblo, Colorado Springs, and Aurora, spurred first by speculatively high water prices and later by

economic troubles in the farm economy. By 1985, about 14 percent of the water rights in the seven-county basin

had been sold for urban use. The dry climate of this area offers little opportunity for profitable farming unless land

is irrigated. The decline in farm production has meant local suffering.

Particularity hard hit is Crowley County<tiich has seen 85 percent of its water rights transferred to cities.

IJttfe of the money received by farmers was reinvested in the local area Rather, about 80 to 75 percent of the money

went to pay taxes and debts of farmers who were already on the verge of bankruptcy. Crowley County already has

the lowest assessed value of any Colorado county. Within the next few years, all land that has Iostirrigation will be

reassessed and the tax base will decline further. lhe burden of funding schools, local government and other public

services has shifted to the rernahing few residents and farmers who chose not to sell their water. Colorado water

law allows the transfer of water without regard to secondary consequences within the community. Despite attempts

to jump-start the local economy with construction of a new prison, most prison employees have chosen not to live

1 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by O.aos.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 293

The Arkansas River Basin of

Southeastern Colorado

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294 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

So much land and water is used for agriculture

that any climate-induced changes to agriculture

would have profound effects on competing uses

for these resources (see ch. 5 and vol. 2, chs. 4

and 6). Cropland and pasture account for 30

percent of land use, and irrigation of agricultural

land accounts for 84 percent of consumed water

(88). Land and water resources are particularly

vulnerable to expansion of agricultural activity

and to increases in the intensity of irrigation or in

the use of farm chemicals. Many agricultural

States have already lost much of their original

wetland area (see vol. 2, box 4-E) and forest cover

to agriculture.

Competition for scarce water is likely to be

particularly important under climate change (3,

4). Whether increases in irrigation are possible

will depend on water availability and costs. If

withdrawal of water for agriculture does increase,

wildlife habitat and other services that depend on

freshwater flows will be increasingly threatened,

particularly if climate change reduces or alters the

seasonal timing of stream flows. On the other

hand, without sufficient water for agriculture,

farm yields will be reduced. The western regions,

already facing water shortages, may see renewed

pressures to construct large water-resourcedevelopment projects (see ch. 5). These projects

have in the past been in conflict with the goal of

protecting natural habitats.

Water quality may also be affected by a

changing climate. Farm chemicals and wastes can

infiltrate groundwater, and surface-water runoff

and drainage can carry salts, farm chemicals, and

sediments to adjacent water bodies (see box 6-E).

With altered patterns of precipitation and regional

agricultural activity and with altered dilution

rates in streams and aquifers, the nature of the

water pollution problem on a regional scale could

change substantially. Concern over pollution

Box 6-E—irrigated Agriculture and Water Quality: The Kesterson Case

Climate change models suggest that many parts of the interior United States will become hotter and drier. One

potential response to this is to increase the area of cultivated land under irrigation. Although increased irrigation may

prove to be attractive to farmers, it is not without environmental costs-including potential damage to soils, water

quality, and wildlife. The case of the Kesterson National wildlife Refuge shows how failure to antiapate potential

waterquality problems can lead to severe contamination and suggests that future public efforts to support irrigation

should proceed with caution and a thorough understanding of risks.

The Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge was established in 1970 along the San Joaquin River in California’s

intensively farmed Central Valley (figure). The 5,900-acre (2,390-hectare)i refuge harbored a diverse array of

migratory and resident waterfowl, including ducks, geese, herons, and coots, as well as an assortment of fish,

mammals, and raptors. Located in a State that is estimated to have lost more than 90 percent of its wetlands over

the past two centuries, Kesterson appeared to be a crucial part of efforts to conserve California’s biological heritage.

In the spring of 1983, some of the ducks, coots, grebes, and stilts born at Kesterson Reservoir at the southeastern

edge of the refuge emerged from their eggs deformed and crippled-with oddly shaped beaks, missing wings,

twisted legs, and unformed skulls. Many died shortiy after hatching. The U.S. fish and Wildlife Service, which had

investigated fish die-offs at Kesterson in 1982, conducted laboratory analysis that suggested that the disappearance

of fish and the deformities of birds stemmed from a common cause+musually high concentrations of selenium in

the Kesterson Reservoir water. Trace amounts of selenium occur naturally in the soils of central California, as in

many parts of the arid Southwest. The contamination of Kesterson Reservoir was caused by a combination of water

development projects and irrigation practices. Selenium had leached from agricultural soils, moved through

drainage systems, and became concentrated in the Kestereon Reservoir. At high concentrations, the selenium

proved deadly. Kesterson Reservoir lies at the drainage end of the San Luis Unit of the V&tiands Water DistriiL

operated by the Bureau of Reclamation as part of the huge Central Valley Project. The saline soils of large sections

of the San Luis area were not easily used for irrigated agriculture. The success of irrigated agriculture in saline soils

1 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1295

depends on the application of enough water to

flush salts out of the upper layers of soil. But the

soils of San Luis presented an additional complicatiorw+hey are underlain by an impenetrable layer of day that prevents the drainage of

irrigation water. If the soils were irrigated enough

to flush away salts, the poor drainage would

cause the water table to rise, drowning roots of

crop plants and depositing more salts in surface

soils. Subsurface drainage was necessary to

make the cropland productive.

As part of larger efforts to bring water to the

Central Valley, the Bureau of Reclamation

_0annin9 water sup@y systems in the San

Luis Unit starting in the 1950s, and by 1960, was

authorized to begin construction of a system that

came to include the San Luis Dam, Canal, and

Reservoir. To achieve the proper balance of

irrigation and drainage for agricultural production, the Bureau of Reclamation planned an

extensive 188-mile (300 -kilometer)2 drainage

system to take drainage flows from the San Luis

Unit into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.

Only the first 85 miles of the drain were ever

completed. By 1975, the drain had reached

Kesterson Reservoir—and that is where it

stopped. Controversy over potential effects on

water quality in the Delta and lack of Federal

funds prevented completion of the full drainage

system.

Since 1975, drainage water carrying selenium and other salts leached from the San Luis

soils have emptied into the Kesterson Reservoir.

Over the years, selenium and other potentially

toxic trace elements concentrated in reservoir

waters. The selenium was further concentrated

Kesterson Reservoir and Surrounding Areas

Sacramento-San

/

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SOURCE: Office of Technology Aseesernent, 1993, adapted from R.W.

Wahl, Markets for Federal Water: Subsides, Property Righte, and the

Bureau of Reclamation (Washington, DC: Reeources for the Future,

19s9).

in vegetation and small organisms on which waterfowi feed-a process known as bhconcer)tfat~o=ventually

producing the startling birth defects and mortality among young birds seen in 1983. Concern over possible risks to

humans led the State to issue a health advisory, warning against eating duck hunted on the refuge. California’s State

Water Resources Control Board found concentrations of selenium up to 10 times higher than permitted by public

health standards and other trace elements in amounts that exceeded Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

water-quality standards. By 1985, the Board declared the San Luis drainage water a hazardous waste that would

have to be treated and cleaned up accordingly. Drainage into the reservoir was finally halted in 1988. [n less than

a decade, Kesterson went from being a cornerstone of California’s wildlife conservation program to a national

symbol of environmental disaster. The Kesterson case is an extreme exampie of how irrigated agriculture may harm

water quality-a particularly ill-fated confluence of FederaJ water projects, natural soil properties, and conflicting

goals. However, the Kesterson problems are not unique. In the East, soluble salts have long ago been washed from

z To ~nvert miles to kilometers, multiply @ 1.609.

(Continued on next page)
296 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 6-E-irrigated Agriculture and Water Quality: The Kesterson Case-(Continued)

the soils by rainfall. But in the VW@ the accessibility of salt-bearing formations and iow rates of precipitation

combine to make much of the region subject to salinity probiems (figure below). Even on nonirrigated c@and,

saline deposits can develop in areas of poor drainage. Drylandfarmingpractices, alternating crop artdfaiiowyears

(apossibleadaptation toclimatechange), maythemseivesaddto saiinityprobiems. Crop-faiiowrotations useless

water than would natural vegetation, and the unused soil water can carry salts to Iow-iying areas.

Can a case like Kesterson happen again? Federal actions at water projects around the Nationwil undoubtedly

be more cautious in the future. However, in most Western States, irrigation and consumptive use still take priority,

whiie protection of adequate water flows and water quality forwiidiife, fish, recreation, and other naturaiuses remive

short shrift (see ch. 5). Climate change may well increase the demand forwaterdiversions for irrigation, potentially

ieading to increased conflicts over water use and environmental quality.

SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; A. Dinar and D. Zbrrnan (ede.), Tbe f%onornlcg amfhf~tof ~tia~

Dndna@ /n AgrkxNure (Boeton, MA: Kluwer Academic Publlehers, 1991); R.W. Wahl, Matke& Ibr Fe&m/ Waten Sub8Jdha9, Pro@y

R/@aJ, and the Bureau of Redamatlon (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 19S9).

The Potentiai for Water-Salinit y Problems

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Servioe, The Sacond RCA ~radaaf, Miacetlaneoue

publication No. 14S2, 19S9.

horn agricultural sources may limit the extent to lands of the Northern Plains. As a result of

which agriculture can adjust to climate change. climate change, economic forces could bring an

Although an overall expansion in cropland additional 3 million acres into new production in

seems unlikely (112), spatial shifts in the pattern the South, with much of this cropland created by

of land use may still be disruptive to natural the clearing of forests (23). Such an expansion of

environments (4). For example, increases in farm farmin g into highly erodible or environmentally

acreage are projected in the environmentally sensitive lands would be inconsistent with envisensitive lands of the Lake States and the erodible ronmental goals (see box 6-A).
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 297

TECHNOLOGIES FOR

CLIMATE CHANGE

ADAPTATION TO

Past experience suggests that U.S. farming is

flexible and innovative enough to permit relatively quick changes in management practices

and in crop choice. History is replete with

examples that illustrate the responsiveness of

agriculture and agricultural research to challenges

(see boxes 6-F and 6-G). In responding to climate

change, farmers can draw on the large array of

tactics and strategies they already use to protect

themselves against climate risk (see box 6-H).

Many tactics, such as changing planting dates or

cultivars, require little change in the nature of

farm management and can be implemented rapidly. Other adjustments, such as adding irrigation

or switching crops, require substantial changes in

farm equipment and management, and will occur

somewhat more gradually. Together, these may

provide the first line of defense against climate

change.

Agricultural adaptations that draw on current

practices may be effective for a time in dealing

with climate change. There is a reasonable

chance, though, that climate change could

eventually overwhelm the effectiveness of current adaptation possibilities. That is a compelling

reason to consider the long-term prospects for

new technologies. Long-term adaptation may

require fundamental improvements in the technologies available to farmers. In the past, expansion of agricultural technology has occurred both

as a market-induced response to a changing

environment and through publicly supported

efforts aimed at overcoming perceived resource

constraints. U.S. farming has been supported in

this by: 1) a sophisticated system of agribusiness;

2) a publicly supported land-grant university,

research, and extension system that channels

technology to farmers; 3) a transportation infrastructure organized to move food rapidly from the

farm to an interlocking system of local, regional,

national, and world markets; and 4) a market

economy that quickly rewards successful adapta-

,.

: . . ,

. .

w.

-.

. . .

An ARS soil scientist inspects severely salt-damaged

farmland in California’s San Joaquin Valley.

tion. These institutions have provided U.S. agriculture with the ability to adapt to rapidly

changing economic conditions and should, if

well-maintained and directed, provide the basis

for future adaptation to climate change.

Adaptation may be slowed by impediments to

flexibility in crop choice, such as those imposed

by Government farm-support programs (54). The

net effect may be to discourage transition to

cropping systems that are better suited to the

changed climate. Uncertainty and inadequacies in

the information available to farmers, both about

climate change and effective responses to it,

could slow the rate of adaptation. Policies that

restrict or distort agricultural markets are also

important constraints to effective adaptation

(18, 20). The subsidies provided to farmers in

some countries tend to discourage farming in

regions where agriculture is more productive, and

so raise overall costs of world food production.
296 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 6-F--tiistorical Examples of Adaptability in Agriculture

Adaptation of crops to different climatic regimes: the case of wheat and corn

Expansion of a crop into anew region often requires that the crop tM adapted to a newdimatic regime. Here

we describe how hard red winter wheat and dryfand corn have undergone such adaptation.

Hard red winter wheat—Hard red winter wheat has accounted for about half of all wheat produced in the

United States. The figure below shows how much the production zone for hard red winter wheat expanded from

1920 to 1980 (76). Once limited primarily to Nebraska and Kansas, the crop is now grown as far north as the

Canadian Prairie Provinces and as far south as the Rio Grande River. This process of expansion hasocwrredeven

during times of hardship in the farm economy (such as the prolonged drought and economic depression h the 1930s

and the su@us production and depressed crop prices in recent years).

Through the efforts of crop breeders and agronomists, hard red winter wheat has been effectively adapted to

colder temperatures and drier conditions. lhe crop is now grown in northern locations that are about6°F (3.5°C)

cooler and 15 percent drier than where growth was possibie in 1920. The southward expansion of the crop has not

been as striking as the northward spread. Still, average annual temperatures at the current southern boundary of

the crop are almost 3.5 ‘F (2 ‘C) higher than they are at any location in the crop zone of 1920. The expansion in

the hard red winter wheat range has come about from steady improvements in productivity made possible by the

development of improved wheat varieties and farm-management practices (42).

Extent of the Hard Red Winter Wheat Zone in 1920 and 1980

SOURCE: N.J. Rosenberg, ‘The Increasing C02 Concentration in the Atmosphere and Its Implication on Agricultural Productivity, Part 11:

Effecta Through C02-induced Climatic Change,” C/hnat/c Change, vol. 4, 1982, pp. 239-254.
Chapter 6--Agriculture 1299

—————. —.1

The development and adoption of semi-dwarf Proportion of Wheat Planted to

varieties in the 1940s (varieties whose stalks Leading Varieties in the United States

support heavier, grain-laden heads) boosted wheat ~0

productivity (21). Continued breeding efforts since

the 1940s have resulted in the great diversity of 70

r~’

Top 10 varieties

wheat varieties now being used by US. farmers. 60

The progression to greater varietal diversity over ~ s.

Y

/

time (see figure) has been associated with better ~ Top 5 varieties

adaptation] of wheat to local growing conditions. ~ 40

Breeding for disease resistance helped the expan-

‘:-~~-~ ;

siontothe south. Selective breeding forcold-hardy ~

varieties of hard red winter wheat helped the

expansion of wheat to the north. 10

Improved farming practices, especially the use o1--- ———7--—— — - 1

of nitrogen fertilizers, better soil-moisture manage- 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979

ment practices, and large self-propelled machinery, have increased the productivity of wheat SOURCE: D.G. Dalrymple, “Changes in Wheat Variet:es and Yields in

the United States, 1919-1984,” Agricu/fura/ History, vol. 62, 1988, pp.

growers. The practices of stubbling-in (i.e., direct 20.36,

seeding of winter wheat into untilled fields immediately after harvest of the previous crop) and snow

trapping (e.g., using snow fences to collect snow

on fields) have reduced the risk of winterkill and permitted an expansion of the crop northeastward into Canada’s

western agricultural Provinces (86).

The past performance of the research community in developing new ways for wheat to overcome climatic

constraints suggests the enormous capacity of the community to respond in the future. For example, as a

consequence of breeding programs, the genetic diversity of hard red winter wheat is increasing; this greater

genetic diversity should provide the raw material for further progress in crop development (19). This is but one

example of the promise for future progress in adaptive agricultural research.

Dryiand corn—Perhaps even more remarkable t han the spread of hard red winter wheat into the Canadian

Prairie Provinces is the recent adaptation of dryland corn to that same region. Farming systems in the semiarid

northern Great Plains have historically suffered from overdependence on a narrow range of crops, especially

wheat (56). This overdependence made the region vulnerable during times when wheat prices were depressed.

Recognition of this problem caused farmers, working in concert with the local agricultural research establishment,

to seek an alternative crop.

The Lethbridge Research Station devoted 8 years of research to adapting corn to the climate of southern

Alberta (56). Relative to regions of t he United States that produce significant quantities of dryland corn, southern

Alberta is drier, the frost-free season is shorter, cumulative seasonai warmth is lower, and day length (period of

daylight) is longer. The long day length can delay flowering, and the short growing season then provides little time

for maturation.

In response to these challenges, plant breeders at bthbridge have deveioped hybrids that have reduced

sensitivity to day length and a short juvenile phase, so that the tassei starts to grow within a week of plant

emergence. Moreover, breeders have successfully selected for varieties with a short interval between the opening

of the mrn tassels and the production of silk, which appears to give corn plants increased tolerance to drought.

In dryland trials, corn yields from these new varieties are competitive with those of barley and wheat (56). These

results dearly illustrate how directed research (i.e., the desire to diversify cropping systems in sout hem Alberta)

can overcome major climatic constraints on crop production.
300 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1301

Box 6-G—Adaptation to Declining Groundwater Isels in the High Plains Aquifer

The High Ptains, or Ogallala, Aquifer is a large The Ogallala Aquifer

geologic formation of porous sand that underlies

approximately 200,000 square miies (520,000 hectares)l in the U.S. Great Plains (see figure). The

vast aquifer supplies water for most of this region’s

agricultural, domestic, and industrial uses. The

response to growing water scarcity in this region

may serve as a useful model for adaptation to

climate change (37).

By 1980, some 150,000 agricultural irrigation

wells were pumping water from the High Plains

Aquifer. Use of groundwater rose steadily from 7

million acre-feet (18.6 billion cubic meters)2in195

0

to 21 million acre-feet by 1980 (117). In these eatly

days of irrigation, publicinformation about irrigation

technology and the status of the aquifer was limited

(118). Waste was obvious, and widespread pumping from the aquifer was causing groundwater

tables to drop. Serious declines in groundwater

occurred in the southern Plains, with water tables

dropping more than a 100 feet (30 meters) in parts

of Texas (43). in Kansas, almost 40 percent of

MT

available groundwater had been withdrawn by

‘h

increased threats to critical wetland habitats 

1980. With dedining groundwater in Kansas came

used

\r

by the whooping crane. A groundwater resource

that once seemed inexhaustible appeared, by SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

1980, to be in danger of eventually running dry.

Declines in the aquifer resulted in increased irrigation-pumping costs because it takes more fuel to pump from

lower depths. This increased cost has in turn prompted technical and institutional adaptations. A survey of

agricultural water users across the High Plains Aquifer region found that the preferred technical adaptations to

dedining grwndwater Ieveis were increased irrigation efficiency and the practice of conservation tillage (51). Under

conservation tiilage (e.g., no-till and reduced-till management), crop stubble is left on the field after harvesting,

shielding soils from sun and drying winds. A switch to low-pressure irrigation systems in the southern Plains States

(53) increased irrigation efficiency by greatly reducing evaporative water losses. Overall irrigated acreage has also

declined, and many farmers have switched to low-water-intensity crops such as wheat cotton, and sorghum (66).

Institutional responses to scarcer groundwater on the High Plains have occurred at local and regionai levels

(48). The effectiveness of local poiicy has varied from State to State. Kansas, for example, passed a groundwater

=nagement law that made possible the formulation of regionally controlled groundwater management units (66).

These units provide orderly development of the High Plains Aquifer with tools such as the spacing of wells, limits

on numbers of wells, metering of water use, and promotion of water conservation. Areas of Nebraska have imposed

similar restrictions and metering requirements. The Cheyenne Bottoms Wildlife Area of Kansas is a 13,000-acre

(5,200-hectare)3 wetiand that provides critical habitat for the wtmoping crane and some 5 million other migra1 TO ~nvert square miles to hectares, multiply by 2.590.

2 TO convert acre-feet to cubic meters, multiply by 1,230.

3 TO convert acres to heotares, multiply by 0.@5. (Continued on next page)
302 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

tory waterfowl that pass through each spring. The Kansas State Engineer has been able to impose restrictions on

groundwater pumping in order to protect recharge rates into this wetland.

Texas, the State that could benefit most from strong groundwater governance, has rather weak groundwater

management institutions (92). Unlike the other 49 States, Texas uses an absolute ownership rule in determining

rights to groundwater. The rule, based on English common law, states that an owner of a parcel of land owns from

the “sky above to the depths below” (92), which includes the water on, above, and below the surface. The absolute

ownership rule has proved to be a formidable disincentive for landowners to agree to regulation of their water at

the local level. Nevertheless, in the High Plains of northwest Texas, increasing water scarcity has resulted in

innovations in the institutions for coordinating groundwater use and promoting water conservation.

The 5.5 million acres in the 15 northwest Texas counties that constitute the High Plains Groundwater

Conservation District No. 1 (44) receive just 12to 16 inches (30to 41 cm) of precipitation per year, but overlie part

of the Ogallala Aquifer. Irrigation with groundwater pumped from the aquifer has allowed the region to grow large

quantities of cotton, barley, sorghum, and corn for many years (74). The High Plains District was created in 1951

largely to address the needs for groundwater conservation. The District has been “dedicated to the principle that

water conservation is best accomplished through public education” (44). Accordingly, the District focuses its efforts

on research and demonstration projects, publishing free information about groundwater use and methods for

conserving water, performing on-farm water-efficiency testing, and carefully monitoring groundwater levels and

water quality.

One of the earfiest District efforts was to reduce open-ditch losses. Water losses from open ditches were as

high as 30 percent per 1,000 feet of ditch (44). The District performed ecanomic analyses that showed farmers it

would be cost-effective to stop losses (1 18). As of 1989, 12,097 miles (1 9,500 kilometers)4 of underground pipeline

had been laid to replace open ditches (44). Cost-effective systems for recovering irrigation tail water were also

developed and demonstrated by the District (74). New technology in the form of time-controlled surge valves for

furrow irrigation and low-energy precision-application (LEPA) methods for spray irrigation systems were widely

demonstrated and promoted by the District. Surge valves and shortened furrows resulted in 10 to 40 percent

improvements in furrow-irrigation water losses, while LEPA systems reduced center-pivot irrigation losses from

around 40 percent to as low as 2 percent (W. Wyatt, ated in ref. 74; 44). In 1978, the High Plains District in

conjunction with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Soil Conservation Service initiated an on-farm water-efficiencyevaluation program. In many cases, suggested water and energy savings were sufficient to pay back farmers’ costs

within 1 or 2 years (74).

The High Plains District has a goal of reaching an equilibrium between groundwater withdrawals and aquifer

recharge, as measured during a 5- or 10-year average. So far, net groundwater depletions in the Ogallala Aquifer

underlying the District have declined from a 5-year average of 1.4 billion gallons per day (bgd) (15.3 billion liters

per day)5 in 1966-71 to an average of 0.43 bgd in 1981-86 and 0.16 bgd in 1986-91. A 25 to 40 percent cutback

in groundwater use has been achieved (74); part of the cutback can tM attributed to reductions in irrigated and

planted area and several years of above-average rainfall (118, 44). Nevertheless, improvements in water-use

efficiency and aquifer sustainability have led District officials to conclude that their voluntary, education-based

approach to water conservation has been successful (44, 119).6

The various societal and individual responses to growing water scarcity suggest that farming regions may

adapt well to a slowly changing climate. Perhaps more impressive than the ability of farmers to undertake technical

adaptation has been the relative ease with which institutions have developed to promote more effiaent use of scarce

water resources. Still, despite the positive changes that have occurred in this region, one should not be overly

optimistic. Groundwater depletion continues in much of the aquifer--even though at reduced rates-and many

farmers face a reduction in future farm income as they decrease their water use.

4 TO convert miies to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

5 TO ~nvert gallons to liters, muitiply by 3.785.

6 B. Williams, Director of Administration, High Plains Water Conservation District, Lubbock, TX, personal

communication, July 1992.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
Chapter &–--Agriculture 1303

Box 6-H--Current Technologies for Adapting to Climate Change

Changes in planting and harvesting practices

Climate warming may allow farmers to plant earlier in the spring. Earlier planting could lessen the chances

of damage from heat waves at critical stages of plant growth. Shifting the period when a crop’s leaf area is largest

so that it matches the months of rwudmum sunlight would increase growth rates. Earlier planting would also allow

earlier harvesting because warmer temperatures speed up plant development. Earlier harvesting reduces the risks

of late-season field losses. Earlier maturation may also allow grain crops to dry more completely in the field,

eliminating or reducing the need for artificial drying.

Warmer springs imply a longer growing season. Early planting in combination with a longer-season cultivar

may allow farmers to increase yields by taking advantage of the longer season-provided that moisture is

adequate and the risk of heat damage is not too great. For risk-averse producers, earlier planting combined with

a shorter-season cultivar may give the best assurance of avoiding the large losses associated with hot summer

temperatures. Planting a mix of cultivars with different maturation times could increase the probability that some

portion of the crop is exposed to the most favorable dirnate during a growing season (93).

Planting seeds deeper in the soil and reducing planting densities (plants per acre) are two simple ways of

evading drought stresses. Planting seeds deeper may give them access to more moisture, which would facilitate

successful germination. Smaller pfant populations reduce competition among plants for available soil moisture.

Tactics for conserving moisture

Several moisture-conserving practices have been used to combat drought and aridit y (77, 94, 97) and may

be useful in adjusting to climate change. Conservation tillage is the practice of leaving the residue of the previous

season’s crop on the surface of the field, rather than plowing it under the surface. Conservation tillage protects

fields from water and wind erosion and can help retain moisture by reducing evaporation and increasing the

infiltration of preapitation into the soil. Conservation tillage also decreases soil temperature. Furrow diking is the

placing of small dikes across the furrows of the field to aid the capture of rainfall. Terracing, or contouring, can be

used to more efficiently trap precipitation on sloped fields. However, the construction of terraces can be costly.

Crop substitution is potentially a way to conserve m“sture. some crops require less water and tolerate warm,

dry weather conditions better than others. For example, wheat and sorghum are more tolerant of heat and dryness

than is cwn. Microdirnate modification can be achieved through the use of shelterbdts, or windbreaks. Shelterbelt

systems are linear configurations of trees or tall annuals surrounding one or more sides o? agricultural fields.’ They

greatly reduce wind speed across the protected field, benefiting plant growth by reducing evaporative-moisture

losses (77). They are particularly effective in windy regions that otherwise have little natural woody vegetation, but

they are costly in terms of land use.

Irrigation scheduling is the practice of supplying crops with irrigation water only when t hey need it. It adjusts

the timing of the irrigation and the amount of water to match actual field conditions. Irrigation scheduling requires

sources of information about soil-moisture conditions and, when using ditch irrigation, close cooperation among

farmers. A study of four Nebraska counties found that irrigation scheduling on center-pivot systems reduced

irrigation-water use by 9 percent and saved farmers an average of $2.10/acre in pumping @sts (8). Low-energy

precision application (LEPA) is an adaptation of the center-pivot irrigation system; low-pressure application of

water near ground level results in less water loss to evaporation. Trickte irrigation applies water as drops or trickles

through pipes on or below the soil surface. These very efficient but high-cost irrigation systems are now in common

use only for fruit crops and highly valued vegetable crops.

1 sunflower and corn have been used In California and Arizona, respectively, as wincfbr=lw around highly

valued crops.

(Continued on next page)

.. -—..- _ — -----
304 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

.——— ——

Box 6-H-Current Technologies for Adapting to Climate Change-(Continued)

Increased irrigation

Increased irrigation is one obvious means of coping with drier conditions. However, inadequate water

supplies and high costs will limit this option in some regions. Regions that are currently reaching the limit of existing

irrigation-water supplies (e.g., the Southern Plains and California) will be unlikely to support additional

irrigation-water use (35, 69). Irrigation may decline because of increased urban competition for water and because

of possible reductions or seasonal changes in the timing of stream flows. Irrigated acreage may increase only in

eastern regions, where water supplies are adequate. Under a climate change, irrigated acreage as a percentage

of total cultivable land could increase by perhaps 3 percent in the eastern t hird of the United States (69). The trend

toward increased irrigation in the eastern United States is already under way.

Equipment purchase and increased farming intensity

Ciimate change may cause the quantity and quaiity of production inputs to change. Severai agricultural

experts argue that climate change may encourage farmers to aiter their investments in on-farm infrastructure in

order to: 1) purchase equipment necessary to change cropping systems, 2) expand the size of operations in order

to offset ciimate-induced yieid reductions, and 3) eniarge storage facilities to provide a buffer against extreme

events such as drought and pest and disease outbreaks (68). Others note that farmers make investments in

apparently excess equipment capacity to better ensure that farm activity can be compieted before a period of

unfavorable weather (90). intensification of farming in areas beneficially affected by climate can be a way to

maintain overaii farm yieids.

Reduced farming intensity

if the frequency of poor yieids increases, some farmers may reduce the amounts or quaiity of inputs to

production (89). One exam pie wouid be to make fewer passes over the fieid for cultivation in order to hold down

energy costs. Aiiowing irrigated acreage to revert to dryiand farming or grasslands may occur when water is short

or when water deiivery costs rise, as has aiready happened in the southern Ogaiaiia Aquifer (see box 6-G).

Faliowing (hoiding iand out of production for a year in order to accumulate sufficient soii moisture) is often a

necessary practice in dryiand wheat farming. in the extreme, acreage abandonment (inciuding not harvesting

pianted acreage and converting to woodiands) can be the most effective cost-cutting response to an unfavorable

ciimate (60). Successful adaptation from t his perspective means finding t he most profitable means of farming; it

does not mean that past production ieveis are necessarily maintained.

Heiping iivestock adjust

Severai tactics may be used to heip iivestock adjust to excessive heat (38). The temperature of animais’

surroundings can be reduced by providing shade or partiai sheiters. Trees make the best shade because they

provide protection from direct sunlight and beneficial cooiing as moisture is transpired from ieaves. During a3-day

heat wave in Chino Vaiiey, California, in 1977, more t han 700 dairy cattle died (38). Deaths in lots with adequate

shade were aimost 70 percent iower than those in iots where cattie had inadequate shade. Evaporative cooiers

that iower air temperature in animal sheiters can be effective in iimiting productivity iosses under high temperature

conditions (38). Anirnai wetting is an effective way to iower the surface temperature of animais. This can be

accomplished with a sprinkler system controlled by a timer. Maintaining iarge feed reserves is another tactic that

iivestock farmers use to iower their risk of facing feed shortages during ciimate extremes (9).

Farm structure and marketing practices

Increasing the scaie of farming operation may in some cases effectively reduce the variabiiit y in income and

yieids. Strategic specialization can be an advantage in a smaii number of safe crops (55). Efficient farming in the

“safest” crop is certainiy a f requent+md perhaps t he best-defense against climate risk. On dryland farms in the
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1305

——

Western Great Plains, where crop failures from drought occur regularly, farmers grow wheat or sorghum, using

conservative and low-cost methods. To the east, where rainfail is more abundant, corn and soybeans are the

dominant crops. Large-scale farming enterprises can hedge against localized c4imate risks by diversifying

geographically, spreading their farm holdings across climate zones. In the face of increasing climate uncertainty,

the value of crop diversification on individual farms through the addition of less-risky crops may increase. A 1985

survey of farmers in Florida and Alabama found that they deal with variable climate risk by keeping their operations

diversified (9). The large variability from decade to decade in Illinois corn yields can be seen as an example of a

response to climate change, and farmers there have responded to the perception of increasing climatic risks by

diversifying.

Owners of citrus groves in north-central florida adapt to the risks of w“nterfreezes by diversifying their sourca

of income more than do the citrus growers to the south, whc face less risk (61). Corporate ownership or

partnerships allow each investor to risk relatively little income. The fruit is often sold through vertically integrated

cooperatives, rather than in on-the-spot markets, as in the south. This marketing practice allows for speedy

processing of freezedamaged fruit, a benefit that compensates for lower average prices. Changes in the structure

of farm ownership and vertical integration through contractual marketing arrangements can be effective

institutional ways to spread the risk inherent in farming.

SOURCES: W.E. Easteriing, “Adapting United States Agriculture to Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of

Technology Assessment, January 1993; Offica of Technology Assessment, 1993.

—

Ultimately, the ability of agriculture to adapt to

a changing climate may be most dependent on

continued success in expanding the variety of

crops and techniques available to farmers. Biotechnology appears to offer hope of continued

improvement in agricultural productivity well

into the next century. Expected improvements in

overall agricultural productivity and plants with

increased tolerance to pests, drought, and heat all

offer the chance for increased buffering against

the direct risks of Mure climate change. The

success of these and other potential improvements in farm management and productivity will

be increasingly sensitive to how well new knowledge is transmitted to the farmer. The role of

agricultural reseaxch and extension in conveying

information to farmers and in promoting innovation is likely to take on increased importance

under conditions of changing climate. Research

must be tied to the development of information

and management technologies if it is to remain a

source of improved productivity (85). In the

absence of such a focused effort to tie research to

the needs of farmers, promised gains from new

technology may not materialize.

II Current Technologies for Adaptation to

Climate Change

Approaches that can be used now to adapt to

climate change range from changing planting and

harvesting times to increasing-or decreasing—

the intensity of farmin g (see box 6-H). Some of

these approaches are technical, such as irrigation

scheduling or the use of evaporative coolers to

help livestock adapt to the warmer temperatures.

Others involve changes in farm scale and ownership as ways to reduce exposure to risk. Still

others are straightforward changes in agronomic

practices, such as earlier planting or reduced

tillage. These may provide the first line of defense

against climate change.

I Prospects for Future Technologies

The impressive past productivity gains in

American agriculture do not guarantee continued

technological improvement, but biotechnology,

computerized management, and other technologies could usher in an era of new advances. The

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) (103)

reports that projected plausible increases in annual rates of yield for major agricultural commod-
306 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table 6-2—Projected Annual Rates of Growth

in Agricultural Yields (percent)

Less new Most likely More new

technology technology technology

Corn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -0.2

Soybeans. . . . . . . . . . . 0.1

Wheat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8

Cotton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

Beef (meat/feed). . . . . . 0.2

Swine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2

Dairy (milk/feed) . . . . . . 0.2

Poultry (meat/feed) . .. 0.1

1.0

0.4

2.0

1.7

0,7

1,6

0,4

0.5

2.0

1.2

4.4

NA

1.7

2.4

0.5

1.5

NA -Not available.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, A New

Technology Era for American Agriculture, OTA-F-474 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1992).

ities range from 0.4 to 2 percent (table 6-2), but

such future advances cannot be taken for granted.

Some analysts are concerned that if farmers

continue to use conventional technologies, yields

of many important crops (e.g., rice, corn, soybeans, and cotton) may reach their maximum

potential within the foreseeable future (83, 85).

Yield increases from conventional breeding and

increased efficiencies in farm management

should continue over the next few decades.

Breeders continue to be successful in finding

ways to redistribute a plant’s energy into grain

production rather than leaf production, for example. Other gains continue from more-intensive

management and from the breeding of plants that

respond well to the use of fertilizer and irrigation.

Further success with these approaches may be

increasingly difficult to achieve (83, 85). Although average yields achieved by farmers are

still less than record and potential yields, that gap

has closed steadily. Biotechnology could speed

up the process of cultivar development (25), and

innovative farm management could reduce the

environmental costs previously associated with

intensive farm practices.

Biotechnology

Biotechnology involves the use of molecular

genetic tools to mod@ plants, animals, or microorganisms. By using recombinant-DNA15 and

cell-fusion techniques, scientists can isolate, clone,

and study individual genes. Such knowledge

allows for direct modification of the genetic

structure of plants and the development of microorganisms or biochemical products, such as

enzymes and hormones, that will improve the

growth and performance of agricultural crops and

livestock. Biotechnology does not itself provide

new cultivars, but rather provides the source

material for more-rapid advances through conventional plant breeding. A National Research

Council study suggested that Federal support of

biotechnology needs to be expanded if long-term

advances are to be achieved by the time they are

needed (63).

New tissue-culturing and genetic-engineering

tools combined with traditional agricultural breeding methods are allowing scientists to alter plants

to incorporate greater disease, insect, and weed

resistance, and to better withstand environmental

An insect-ravaged cotton leaf is compared with one

that has been genetically engineered with a protective

gene from Bacillus thuringiensis.

15 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 307

stresses such as cold, drought, and frost. These

techniques are also improving the understanding

of plant resistance and are allowing the development of improved pest-control agents. Crops that

exhibit increased insect resistance and herbicide

tolerance are expected to be commercially available by the middle to late 1990s (103). Plants with

improved resistance to diseases should become

commercially available over the next decade or so.

Improved insect resistance in plants has been

achieved by introducing genes that produce the

toxin from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (a

natural insecticide). Some success is also occurring in attempts to develop crops that are resistant

to the broad-spectrum, environmentally safe herbicide glyphosate. Soil microorganisms that can

control weeds and soil-borne nematodes and

insects are also being developed. All of these new

ways to control pests biologically offer hope for

reduced use of herbicides and insecticides. 16

Progress in improving tolerance to water and

heat stress is complicated by a lack of knowledge

about the physiological mechanisms of stress.

Thus, genetically engineered plants tolerant to

such climate stresses are unlikely to be developed

in this decade (103). Development of commercial

plant varieties with improved nutrient intake (i.e.,

they use fertilizers more efficiently) also appears

unlikely within the next two decades. A better

understanding of the key roles that associations

between microbes and plant roots play in the use

of nutrients--often supplied in the form of

fertilizers-is still needed. If nutrient uptake can

be improved, a secondary benefit would accrue in

water-quality improvements because fertilizer

losses to surface and groundwater are a significant source of pollution problems (as well as

being costly to farmers),

Precise application offertilizers is possible using the

experimental global positioning unit being installed

on this tractor.

Information and Management Technologies

Future improvements in productivity may increasingly rely on the development of information and management technologies and the effective transfer of knowledge to farmers (85).

Improvements in information technologies and

the technology of farm management offer alternatives to the intensified use of traditional farm

inputs as the basis for expanded agricultural

production. Improved efficiency in the use of

farm inputs and practices can increase productivity and has the potential to reduce the environmental costs associated with farming. Central to

this is improved understanding of plants, animals,

and farming systems, which may rely on the

increased use of computers, better computer

software, the use of smart machines and control

systems, in-field and remote sensing, geographical information and imaging systems, and electronic networks or other communication technologies.

16 some fe~ titthe development of herbicide-tolerat plants ~~ lead to ~ inc,re~~ use of h~bicides, SO far, howevti, efforts have&n

focused on developing plants that tolerate one of the more benign herbicides, allowing less use of persistent and toxic herbicides (30). See

reference 103 for a discussion of the risks related to the uses of biotechnology,
308 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Farmer and engineer check automated weather station

that feeds data into the COMAX software system to

update its prediction of cotton yield and to suggest a

harvest date.

Although computers have already had an

impact on farm management, they could contribute a lot more. Systems for livestock management

and for access to weather and marketing information are the best-developed applications to date.

The earliest new applications of computersoftware technology to attain broad use may be

simple ‘‘expert systems’ that help the farmer

diagnose and respond to very specific production

problems, such as disease (103). More complete

decision-support packages for farm management

might begin to be available within a decade (103).

Much effort is still needed in the development of

crop-simulation models to support integrateddecision-management software.

The potential for the use of advanced technologies is already being demonstrated on farms that

grow highly valued crops. The means exist for

sensing temporal and spatial variations in field

conditions and delivering irrigation water, fertilizer, and pesticides to each area of the field

precisely as needed. Irrigation of highly valued

crops is now automated on some farms; it relies

on computer programs, soil-moisture sensors, and

weather-data networks (17). Farm machinery that

can selectively till, weed, or fertilize only those

areas in need of attention is also being produced

commercially. Widespread use of advanced agricultural technologies and computerized information

services is not likely to occur until costs decline

significantly and the technologies have been

adapted for a wider range of production systems.

Information-retrieval systems, allowing farmers access to electronic networks and collections

of farm-management information based on

compact-disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), are

likely to be available by the mid-1990s. The

packaging of information and decision-support

technology in a manner that makes it useful to

farmers will be critical to enhanced farm productivity. The extension services and the private

sector will need to be prepared to take advantage

of the new communications techniques to deliver

effective and integrated decision-support services. The USDA Agricultural Research Service

has recognized the importance of research into

integrated management systems and information

technologies. However, research on and teaching

of computer software and computer-assistedmanagement tools are not yet well-established in

agricultural schools (103).

New Crops and Cropping Systems

The idea that new crops could help stabilize

and diversify the farm economy is hardly new.

Only a handful of crops is being readied for

possible commercialization in the near future (72,

102). Cuphea is an oilseed that can replace

imported coconut oil in soaps and detergents, but

commercialization will depend on the develop-
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 309

ment of varieties that retain their seeds better.

Crambe and winter rapeseed provide erucic acid,

used to produce plastics and lubricants. Crambe

tolerates climate conditions similar to wheat.

Winter rapeseed can be double-cropped, grown

over the winter in the Southeast and southern

Midwest. 17 Both could be commercialized quite

rapidly under current conditions. Guayule produces a high-molecular-weight rubber that is

well-suited for use in tires. The guayule plant

tolerates the arid conditions of the Southwest, but

problems with low yields must still be overcome.

Jojoba is a desert evergreen with seeds that

provide a substitute for sperm oil and for some

petroleum-based oils. Jojoba oil is already used in

the cosmetics industry and may be useful in

commercial waxes, lubricants, and polishes. Bladderpod tolerates low annual rainfall, and its seeds

contain oils that substitute for castor oil in plastics

production. Continued efforts in plant breeding

are necessary to increase the oil content and

yields. Kenaf is a warm-weather plant that

produces a fiber with a cellulose content similar

to that of wood. The fiber can be used in

high-quality newsprint, cardboard, and highquality paper. Late-season dryness and some

salinity are tolerated, but there must be adequate

water during the initial period of germination and

growth. Kenaf appears to have considerable

promise for commercialization.

New crops have their own drawbacks, however.

It is difficult to develop new markets when existing crops or synthetic chemicals are competing for

them. A limited genetic base can slow cropbreeding advances and may leave crops vulnerable

to unanticipated pests and disease. By and large,

new crops succeed only when they are safer and

cheaper than the old or fit a unique market niche.

Several Federal programs fund research and

development of new crops or new uses for

existing crops. The Food, Agriculture, ConservaA stand of Kenaf, a fibrous plant with potential to

supplement wood-based paper pulp, is inspected at

Rio Farms in Texas’ Rio Grande Valley.

tion, and Trade Act of 199018 (P.L. 101-624), for

example, established the Alternative Agricultural

Research and Commercialization Center within

USDA to provide research and financial assistance in commercializing new nonfood products

from agricultural commodities. Less attention is

given to new food crops because these tend to

compete with existing farm products. There are,

however, various food crops grown elsewhere in

the world or with limited production in the United

States (e.g., sorghum and various minor grains

and grain legumes) that may offer opportunities

under climate change. New specialty crops, multicropping approaches, and integrated agro-forestry

17 ~uction of can04 a qring rapeseed low in erucic acid developed in Cana& and suitable for human and animal foods, is now

expanding rapidly in the Northern Plains States.

18 Ref~ to SU~CI_I~y u tk 1990 F= Bill.
310 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

and livestock operations may become viable future

options for smaller farmers who do not have the

capital to rely on high-technology farming.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Reducing risks associated with variability in

farm yields has become a central part of U.S.

agricultural policy. Various institutional and structural measures are designed to support the farm

sector and buffer the consumer from fluctuation

in supplies and prices of farm commodities.

These include commodity support programs,

disaster-assistance programs, and subsidized irrigation. (See box 6-I for discussions of these

programs.) In addition, the agricultural sector is

supported by an extensive research and extension

network.

Commodity programs are of three types: price

support, income support, and supply management. Although not viewed as buffers against

climate risk, the commodity programs do provide

participating farmers with protection against the

loW prices that result from bumper-crop yields.

The costs of these commodity programs are

shown in figure 6-6.

The disaster-assistance programs, including

disaster payments, crop insurance, and emergency loans, provide direct relief to farmers

suffering weather-related losses. In recent years,

Congress has provided disaster payments for

losses beyond some specified percentage of

normal yields (35 to 40 percent in 1992), providing partial compensation to any farmer suffering

losses in excess of that amount. low-interest

emergency disaster loans are available to family

farmers experiencing crop losses of at least 30

percent. Individual farmers become eligible for

emergency loans once their county has been

declared a disaster area by the President or the

Department of Agriculture. Federally subsidized

crop insurance is also available to almost all

farmers. Farmers may insure up to 75 percent of

their average crop yield, receiving payment on

additional losses if weather causes yields to fall

below the insured level. Up to 30 percent of the

cost of insurance is paid for by USDA. Federal

expenditures on disaster-assistance programs are

shown in figure 6-7.

U.S. public-sector agricultural research and

extension is a dual Federal-State system that is

credited for much of the remarkable growth in

America’s agricultural productivity. Public research expenditures in agriculture have produced

high returns (32). Much of this success can be

attributed to the effective transfer of knowledge to

farmers and to a decentralized structure that has

maintained a focus on practical research problems

(82). The public agricultural research system

includes the State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAESs) and USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Economic Research

Service (ERS). The Cooperative Extension Service (CES) is the network of Federal, State, and

local experts that delivers research results to

farmers and feeds problems back to researchers.

USDA’s Soil Conservation Service (SCS) also

serves a technology-transfer role, encouraging

soil and water conservation in farm management.

(Box 6-J discusses the USDA departments and

their activities in more detail.)

Private research by food and agricultural industries and innovation by farmers have also played

a significant role in sustaining agricultural productivity. Increasingly, agricultural industries are

conducting their own research whenever there is

the possibility for developing proprietary products. However, industry has relied on the public

sector to provide funds for much of the basic

research and evaluation.

Despite the strength of the overall agriculturalresearch establishment, there has been some

debate about how well it is prepared to deal with

the future (10, 73, 99). Federal funding for

agricultural research has seen little or no increase

(in deflated dollars) over the past two decades

(see fig. 6-8). Hope for future improvements in

agricultural productivity has increasingly come to

rely on advances in basic science achieved

outside the traditional agricultural-research struc-
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1311

Box 6-l-The Institutional Setting for Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change

Commodity support programs

A major goal of current agricultural policy is the achievement of stability in farm incomes and commodity prices.

The 1990 Farm Bill authorizes through 1995 continuation of the various commodity programs that support farm

incomes and crop prices. The commodity programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s

(USDA’s) Commodity Credit Corporation.f It provides support to producers of about a dozen commodities. The

so-called program cfops+vheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, rice, and cotton-are covered by defidencypaymen~ nonrecourse-loan programs and by acreage-reduction programs. Other commodities, such as soybeans

and other oilseeds (e.g., sunflower and canoia), are covered only by the nonrecourse-loan programs. Meat poultry,

fruits, and vegetables receive no direct support. Total support expenditures of the Commodity Credit Corporation

are shown in figure 6-6. The commodity programs have at times been very costly, vAth outlays reaching a high of

almost $26 billion in 1989. By 1990, commodity-program payments and related expenses had declined to just over

$6 billion. Annual progr~ payments were pro@cted to remain below $12 billion under the provisions of the 1990

Farm Bill (95). However, FY 1993 payrrwnts are now estimated at $17 billion because of bumper corn yields and

high outputs of other program crops.

Price support-Price support is provided through r?onrecourse bans. In essence, the Government sets a floor

price (the /oan rate) for covered crops-guaranteeing farmers this prica for their crop. In practice, farmers borrow

at the loan rate, with their crop as collateral against the loan. The loan is intended to be a marketing tool that allows

farmers to temporarily store some of their crop and to sell it over a period of a few months, thus avoiding any glut

on the market and the resulting steep drops in market prices. If market priis remain below the loan rate, a farmer

can choose to forfeit the crop instead of repaying the loan.

Income support—income support is provided to farmers through direct payments called c%fkkmypaymenfs.

Payment is provided whenever market prices fall below a target price, which is typically set above recent ma~et

prices. Deficiency payments make up the difference between the target price and the market prii (or the loan rate

if that is higher). Farmers are guaranteed at least the target price for the portion of their crop that is eligible. To qualify

for adefidency payment a farmer nwst have planted that crop on some portion of the farm for the past 5 consecutive

years. A farmer’s crop acreage base for a commodity is the 5-year average of acreage planted in that crop. Only

the crop acreage base is eligible for deficiency payments, with payment made on average yields from the 1981-85

period.

Supply management-Participation in the price-and income-support programs is voluntary (for most crops),

although participating farmers can be required to reduce the acreage they @ant.2 Acreage reduction programs,

under which some land is removed from production or is otherwise restricted in use (i.e., planted to soil-conserving

crops), are set for each commodity by USDA. Acreage reduction is intended to restrict supplies, thus holding up

farm prices and limiting Federal expenditures under the support programs.

A growing criticism of the deficiency-payment programs has been the inflexibility they impose on the farmer.

A farmer loses base acreage and eligibility for deficiency payments when program acreage is planted in a crop other

than the crop for which the farmer is enrolled. Establishing eligibility in a new crop takes 5 years of continued

production. lltus, a farmer could sacrifice considerable income in order to sw”tch crops. Previous OTA reports have

noted how this has inhibited the introduction of new industrial crops (102), discouraged conservation rotations (100),

and favored the production of quantity rather than qualit y in crops (98).

Partly in response to these concerns, the 1990 Farm Bill (as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act, or OBRA, of 1990; P.L. 101-508) introduced some degree of flexibility into the defiaency-payment programs.

1 IJSDA’s Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Servioe (ASCS) administers and finanoes ~mmodlty

programs through the Commodity Credit Corporation.

2 certain other crops, such as sugar and peanuts, have mandatory supply-control programs that operate at

Iittte or no cost to the Federal Government but do impose higher crests on consumers by restricting supply in order

to maintain high prices.

(Continued on next page)
312 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box 6-l—The Institutional Setting for Agricultural Adaptation

to Climate Change-(Continued)

Farmers may now shift up to 25 percent of their cropacreage base to the production of other crops,3 without having

that acreage removed from their program base. Under the 1990 Farm Bill, the defidency payments are now made

for only 85 percent of base acreage. On the 15 percent of the base acreage (nofrm# flex acres) on which payment

is not received and, optionally, on an additional 10 percent (optkma/ ~lexacres) of the base acreage, farmers can

plant most other crops without loss of their program base! An increase in the normal flex acres to 20 or 25 percent

is being considered in the FY 1994-98 budget reconciliation.

Disaster-assistance programs

Disaster payments-Disaster-payment programs provide farmers with partiat compensation forcroplosses

suffered due to natural disasters or adverse weather. Since 1990, partial compensation (up to 65 percent) has

been provided to all farmers for crop losses greater than 40 percent (35 percent for holders of crop insurance).

Certain other permanently authorized programs, such as the livestock programs, provide assistance onty to

farmers in counties that have been dedared eligible by the President or the Secretary of Agriculture.

Before 1985, various omnibus farm bills authorized continuing disaster-payment programs. Since 1985,

disaster payments have been provided annually through ad hoc congressional legislation. The Federal Crop

Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365), which broadened the availability of crop insurance, was intended as the first

step away from the disaster-payment programs. The Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198) sought to further

discourage the use of disaster payments as the primary means of farm risk management However, political

pressures led to passage of supplemental disaster-assistance acts and appropriations for disaster payments in

each year from 1986 to 1992(15). After the drought year of 1988, the Federal Government paid out nearly $4 billion

in disaster payments to farmers and livestock producers (fig. 6-7). The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade

Act of 1990 (the 1990 Farm Bill, P.L. 101-624) offered no new policy for disaster-assistance programs.

Critics of disaster-payment programs have argued that much of the risk inherent in farm production is unfairly

transferred to the general public (e.g., see ref. 36). Past programs were also considered unfair because they were

not equally availabie to atl who suffered crop losses; only farmers growing program crops or farmers within counties

declared to be disaster areas were eligible for payment. Some argue that disaster payments reduce the farmer’s

incentive to limit exposure to risk encouraging production of high-risk crops in marginal areas. Such programs are

thought to perpetuate marginal and inefficient farming practices.

Crop insurance-Federally subsidized crop insurance is available to almost all farmers. It provides a means

for the farmer to spread the cost of occasional crop losses overtime, reducing annual fluctuations in farm income.

Under the crop insurance program, farmers may insure up to 75 percent of their average crop yield, receiving

payment on additional losses if natural disasters or adverse weather causes yields to fall below the insured level.

Up to 30 percent of the cost of insurance is paid for by the USDA for coverage up to 65 percent. No additional

subsidy is provided on extra coverage.

Federal crop insurance has been available to farmers since 1939, although restrictions on coverage limited

its use until 1980. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 represented an attempt to expand the crop insurance

program. Under this legislation, crop insurance was subsidized for the first time, and the eligibility for insurance

3 There are SOme restrictions on the orops that can be planted. Fruits and vegetables are not aJlowed. @rt~n

other crops are excluded at the discretion of the Seoretary of Agriculture. These exclusions have included peanuts,

tobacoo, trees, and tree crops.

4 in 1991, 8outof 41 million potential flexaores were oonverted fromtheoriginal program wops. ~odefid-y

payment is provided for aops grown on flex aores, although loan support is provided. The loss of defidenoy

payments on optional flex acreage reduces the kwentive for their use.

5 Disaster payments were authorized only Acre crop inSWanCO was Unavakdie. -use crop Insufana

was available in all counties, this essentially meant that disaster payment could be authorized only through

supplemental legislation.
Chapter 6--AgricuIture 1313

was greatly expanded. Despite the stated goal that crop insurance would replace disaster payments as the primary

tool of farm risk management, participation in the program was disappointing.G The intent of the 1980 Act and the

Food Security Act of 1985 to encourage the purchase of crop insurance was undercut by subsequent disaster

payment programs.

Incentives to participate in the crop insurance program have been diminished by high premium rates,

inadequate coverage, perceived administrative problems, and expectations of continued disaster payments

(13,14). Many farmers choose instead toself-insure through savings or by otherwise acting to reduce the variability

of farm income through pooled ownership or conservative management practices. The farmers who do purchase

crop insurance tend to be those facing the highest risks, keeping program costs and premiums high.7

Even with what many farmers find to be high premium rates, crop insurance in the United States has been

heavily subsidized. From 1980 to 1990, the Federal Government paid farmers $3.3 billion more than it received in

premiums (96). In addition, the Government spent more than $2 billion on administrative expenses over this period.

Since 1980, premiums have covered IittJe more than 40 percent of total program costs. In 1988, the Federal crop

insurance payout to farmers exceeded premium receiptsbyarecord$616 million. As with disaster payments, the

unintended consequence of crop insurance has been the encouragement and subsidy of farmers most at risk.

The 1990 Farm Bill called for a move toward an actuarially sound insurance program (i.e., one with premiums

sufficient to cover expected losses) but postponed the decision on a major overhaul of crop insurance and disaster

assistance programs. Despite Administration and House proposals to eliminate funding, the 1991 Agricultural

Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-506) maintained funding for the crop insurance program.

Low-interest loans-Emergency loans are provided through USDA’s Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)

to eligible producers who have sustained losses due to natural disasters. The emergency loans are offered at a

subsidized interest rate to farmers experiencing crop losses in counties that have been dedared disaster areas by

the President, the Secretary of Agriculture, or the Administrator of FmHA. In the 1970s and early 1980s, some

$2 billion of new loans were made annually under this program. [n recent years, the importance of the program as

a source of new loans has been greatly decreased. Eligibility is now restricted to family farms experiencing crop

losses of more than 30 percent, having crop insurance, and otherwise unable to find credit. Despite the reduction

in new loans, program expenses have increased significantly throughout the decade. Costs have risen (pealdng at

$2.2 billion in FY 1989; see fig. 6-7) because of the interest subsidy on existing loans and because of rapidly

increasing default rates on earlier loans.

Subsidized irrigation water

The application of irrigation water to crops to supplement precipitation has been a powerful tool for stabilizing

crop yields in the face of climatic variability in both humid and semiarid regions. The Reclamation Act of 1902

mandated several federally sponsored irrigation projects, ~“nly in the form of large reservoirs (36). Prices for

Federal irrigation water have been subsidized at less than the full costs of storage and conveyance and well below

the market value of water in alternative uses. According to the Bureau of Reclamation, almost 10 million acres of

land in 17 V&tern States received project irrigation water in 1985 (17 percent of the total irrigated acres in the

United States). The Congressional Research Service (119) estimates that the subsidy ranges from $60 to $1,800

per acre, depending on the irrigation district. Such water-pricing policies, coupled with the institutional cx)nstraints

farmers face in marketing the water they do conserve, have discouraged the efficient use of irrigation water. VVdh

the increasing demand for water for nonagricultural uses, the opportunity costs of restricting Federal-project water

to irrigation are increasing. (See ch. 5 for more details on water issues.)

6 By FY 1988, particip~tjon in crop insurance was 23 percent of eligihle acres, well below the target rate of

50 percent. In 1989, participation In the insurance program rose to 40 percent of the eligible acres. The increase

occurred beoause many producers who participated In disaster assktance programs in 1988 were required to buy

crop Insurance.

7 A recent survey in Virginiaand Montana found that insured farmers were In a riskier situation than uninsured

farmers. Insured farmers were less likely to have irrigation and had less income and savings and greater debt (36),

SOURCE: Offica of Technology Assessment, 1993.
314 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

[7 -

u

n

Price suppori

Income support

Other expenses

n

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

‘1---- -

iii

ii

- 0

L’

2

0L

Emergency loans

Dlsmter payments

Crot3 Insurance

1980 Il__O_R 1981 1982 1983

—.—

n

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Chapter 6-Agriculture 1315

Box 6-J-Structure of the Agricultural Research and Extension System

The Agricultural Research Service (ARS)of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conducts basic and

applied research in agricultural sciences and technology and also maintains extensive collections of seeds, clonal

materials, and genetic stocks of farm animals. ARS research is in such areas as environmental quality, agricultural

sustainability, rural development, food safety, nutrition, marketing, soil and water cxmservation, and the biology and

production of crops and livestock. Research is conducted at five ma@r regional centers in Mar~and, Pennsylvania,

Illinois, Imuisiana, and California, and at about 130 other locations, many of which are assoaated with universities.

The regional centers are concerned primarily with the development of new products that will result in alternative

markets for agricultural commodities. A national program staff is responsible for pianning and coordinating the

research program and for allocating funds to the agreed-upon national research priorities. Research is generally

directed toward basic science that is national in significance, long term in nature, and unlikely to be adequately

addressed by private or State research efforts. For example, ARS has de-emphasized the breeding of most crop

varieties on the assumption that private and State efforts are adequate. Instead, emphasis has turned to genetics

and the development of germ plasm that can be used by industry to develop new varieties. ARS employs

approximately 2,700 scientists and research engineers and had an H 1993 budget of $695 million. In FY 1991,

ARSexpenditures on biotechnology were about $81 million, and expenditures on sustainable-agriculture research

were estimated to be about $120 million.’

The Land-Grant Colleges of Agriculture were established with the passage of the Merrill Act in 1862. The

Merrill Act provided Federal grants to States to fund creation of colleges that would offer practical programs of higher

education focused on agriculture and the mechanical arts. In many States, the original land-grant college grew to

become the foundation for the State University system. In 1890, Congress passed the second Merrill Act, which

provided additional yearty Federal funds to the Iandgrant institutions and required that States provide college-level

agricultural education to biack as well white students. Seventeen Southern and border States created separate

black agricultural schools.

The State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAESS) were established with the passage of the Hatch Act

of 1887. The act created the agricultural experiment stations as departments within the college of agriculture at

land-grant institutions and provided annual Federal funding to support agricultural research and experimentation.

Today, there are 57 SAESS, one in each State and Territory. These institutions include laboratories, field sites, and

research farms. Roughly 12,000 State+mployed agricultural researchers work in the network of land-grant schools

and the associated Agricultural Experiment Stations. Overall, the SAES system spends about $1.6 billion (~ 19w)

on research, most coming from State funds. In 1990, USDA provided $224 million to State Agricultural Experiment

Stations. Other Federal agencies provided an additional $144 million in agricultural research money.2

The Cooperative State Research Service (CSRS) is a coordinating agency within USDA charged with

dispersing Federal funds to SAES and to the State land~rant institutions. CSRS also administers grants programs

that fund agricultural research. Each SAES receives Federal funds through CSRS according to a formula first

specified in the Hatch Act of 1887.3 The formula funds have been valuable as a stable funding base for long-term

and applied research. Additional Federal funding is provided through competitive grants to individual researchers.

Competitive grants have been used to strengthen the scientific foundations of agricultural research and to direct

basic scientific research to areas of national interest. These grants are based on scientific merit, as determined by

1 J. van schilfgaarde, Associate Deputy Administrator, Agricultural Research %WiOO, person~ ~mmunication, May 27, 1993.

2 The National Sdence Foundation, the National Institutes for Health, and the Department of Ener9y are

among the largest of the many other sources of Federal funds for the agricultural research stations.

3 Hat& Act funds are allocated by a formula: 20 percent of the money is allooated equally among SAESS,

at least 52 percent is allocated In proportion to the State’s share of overall farm and rural population, and the

remainder-if not needed for administration costs-ca n be allocated to cooperative researoh between States.

(Continued on next page)
316 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

ture. As funding goes increasingly to new and broadening of the capabilities and reach of the

specialized areas of scientific research, traditional

research addressing the day-to-day problems that

plague agricultural production may be neglected

(100). Federal funding for the extension services

has also declined (in deflated dollars), while their

mission has broadened beyond providing for the

traditional family-farm constituency (73). Observers question whether the State or county

extension service agents still have the expertise to

assist farmers in undertaking new technologies.

Encouraging basic science while maintaining an

effective link between scientific research and real

farm problems is a challenge that will require a

existing research and extension system.

POLICY OPTIONS

The resiliency of the farm sector will be

enhanced by broadening and improving the

choice of crops and technologies on which

farmers can draw. In particular, advances that

improve farm yields and efficiency in input

use-that is, use of water, energy, fertilizers,

pesticides-offer hope for meeting the growing

demands for food and for resolving conflicts

between agriculture and the natural environment.

In a future that will be increasingly competitive
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 317

1400 -

I

1000 1

400 ;

Figure 6-8—Appropriations for USDA Agricultural Research and

Extension Programs for FY 1972-93

+ ‘Rs + CSR S

—

+ ES ~ Total

I

I

Current Issues,” 93-83 ENR, January 1993.

and uncertain, the roles of the educated farmer

and of the agricultural research and extension

services in speeding the transfer of knowledge to

farmers become more important. The potentially

high costs of climate change can be reduced by

improving the capability of farmers to successfully adapt.

The ability of farmers to adapt to climate

change may be constrained by several factors:

1) inflexibilities imposed by commodity support

programs, 2) inflexibilities in disaster-assistance

programs, 3) increasing competition for scarce

water, 4) technical limits to increased productivity, and 5) an inadequate framework for planning

the long-term needs of the agricultural sector.

Each of these factors and related policy options

are discussed below.

H Commodity Support Programs

Commodity support programs are designed to

stabilize farm supply and maintain farm incomes

(see box 6-I). The means by which they currently

do this may discourage the changeover from one

cropping system to another that is better suited to

a changed climate. For example, if climate change

creates a situation in which crops are shifted to the

north, the financial penalties imposed under

current programs on farmers who change crops

will slow the rate of adjustment and so add to the

cost of climate change (54). On the other hand, if

elevated C02 results in enhanced crop yield but

no shift in range, there may be more-frequent

bumper crops and low commodity prices, but

substantially higher costs in farm-income support.

The deficiency-payment programs result in the

greatest disincentive for farmers to switch crops

(see box 6-I). First, crop choice is often driven by

the level of support payments rather than by

market prices. Relatively high target prices, such

as those seen in the past decade for corn,

discourage a switch to crops that might otherwise

be more profitable at market prices. Second,
318 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

because support is linked to establishing and

maintaining a record of continued production in

a particular commodity, farmers are penalized

when they do switch crops. With the distortion of

underlying market-price signals and penalties for

crop switching, farmers may persist in growing

crops that are not well suited to changed climate

conditions. The public will bear the costs of this

misallocation of productive effort through higher

commodity prices or program costs.

The deficiency-payment programs have also

been criticized for discouraging sound management and leading to an expansion of farming into

marginal lands, many of which are highly erodible or otherwise environmentally sensitive.l9

Because traditional rotation. crops such as leguminous forages, are not covered by any support

programs and detract from the acreage in program

crops, farmers are discouraged from engaging in

sound rotation practices (100). This exacerbates

erosion and encourages the use of chemical

fertilizers.

Equally serious are the problems that result

from coupling deficiency payment to farm yields.

Because deficiency payments are directly related

to output, farmers have a strong incentive to

maintain high yields through the intensive use of

farm chemicals. The price subsidy also encourages an expansion of agriculture into marginal

lands. At the same time, under the Conservation

Reserve Program, the Wetlands Reserve Progam,

and various water-quality incentive programs,

farmers are paid to remove erodible lands from

production and to reduce environmental damages.

This is why the farm programs have been

compared with ‘driving a car with one foot on the

gas and the other on the brake.”20 The expansion

of farming into marginal lands and the discouragement of conservative farming practices expose the public to risks of higher program costs

and greater disaster-assistance needs under climate change, along with the likelihood of increased environmental damage.

Partly in response to these concerns, the 1990

Farm Bill as amended by the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) introduced some degree of flexibility into the deficiencypayment programs. Farmers may now shift up to

25 percent of their program acreage base to the

production of other crops, without having that

acreage removed from the program base-that is,

from the total acreage used to calculate their

benefits. On 15 percent of the base acreage

(normal flex acres), there are no deficiency

payments but the farmer is free to switch to other

crops. 21 An additional 10 percent of the base

acreage (optional flex acreage) may also be

switched to other crops, but deficiency payments

are lost if the land is planted in other crops (see

box 6-I). As a budget-reducing measure, an

increase in the normal flex acres to 20 or 25

percent is being considered in the FY 1994 budget

reconciliation.

I Policy Options: Commodity Support

Programs

Option 6-1: Allow fiull flexibility (normal crop

acreage). The Bush administration and others

have suggested that farmers be allowed to grow

any program crop they choose on all acreage

normally planted in program crops and be eligible

for deficiency payments on whichever crop is

grown. This approach, known as normal crop

acreage (NCA), eliminates most of the inflexibili19 ficvio~ @I’A reports hvc noted how this Mexibility in farm programs has inhibited the introduction of new ~usti CrOps (102),

discouraged conservation rotations (100), and favored the production of greater amounts of-rather than higher-quality~ PS (98).

~ se~tor Rudy Boschwi~ R-MN. Address presented at a conference held by the Cent= for t.hc Study of FoR@i Affti, A@ltOL VA

NOV. 25, 1986.

ZI ~em are Some restictiom on tine crops that can be planted. Fruits ~d vegetables ~~t d10w4 ~d~“ other crops are excluded

at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture. These exclusions have included peanuts, tobacco, trees, and tree crops.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 319

ties in crop selection.

22 However, fully reducing

the inflexibilities also requires an adjustment in

the methods by which target prices or farm-income-support payments are set, perhaps by making farm-income support independent of crop

production. Without this, crop choice will still be

largely driven by target prices, and not responsive

to climate change. Congress could incorporate the

NCA approach into the definition of the farmer’s

base acreage in the 1995 or subsequent farm bills.

A concern with the NCA approach is that it

reduces USDA’s control over the supply of

individual crops because acreage set-aside requirements can no longer easily target specific

crops. This lack of control raises concerns about

increased instability in farm prices. Farmers now

growing crops without program support have

expressed concern that they will be unfairly

exposed to new competition from supported

farmers who switch crops (participation in most

commodity programs is voluntary). Another concern is that farmers’ crop choices may still be

driven largely by the target prices set for individual crops, thus limiting responses to climate

change and market prices. To deal with this, some

uniform method for setting target prices is needed.

Alternatively, the current deficiency-payment programs could be replaced with an income-support

program that is not coupled to crop production.23

Option 6-2: Increase flex acreage. The flexacreage approach appears to have been successful

in introducing some flexibility in crop choice 24

and in reducing the potential costs of commodity

programs (through the elimination of deficiency

payments on normal flex acres). Congress could

gradually increase normal or optional flex acreage in successive farm bills, further adding to

farmers’ flexibility in crop choice.

Normal flex acreage could be increased to at

least 25 percent in the next farm bill. Because

deficiency payments are withdrawn on normal

flex acres, the costs to the Government of

commodity programs would also be reduced.25

Subsequent farm bills could further increase

normal flex acreage. Gradually phasing out farm

support in this manner appears to follow the

direction set by the 1990 Farm Bill, avoiding the

substantial difficulties associated with any full

restructuring of commodity programs. However,

linking increased flexibility to reduced farm

support may prove hard for farmers to accept.

An alternative would be to increase optional

flex acreage. So far, however, farmers have

shown little interest in using the optional-flexacreage allowance because program support is

lost when the acreage is planted to new crops (an

indication of how much the support programs do

influence the behavior of farmers). Still, an

increase in the optional flex acres may offer

somewhat more flexibility than now exists, allowing farmers to respond to significant changes

in market prices and growing conditions. A

farmer who uses optional flex acres maintains

eligibility for program support, regaining support

if the land is replanted to the program crop. This

protection somewhat reduces the risks involved in

changing cropS.

H Disaster-Assistance Programs

Periodic losses caused by climate variability

are inherent to farming. Farm prices, land values,

and farming practices adjust so that farmers, on

~ me NCA appro~h WaS brkfly used by USDA in 1978 and 1979. Although there is little indiCdOn that there W~ my funmen~

problems, it was Iater abandoned by the agency and the Senate Agricultural Committee. See reference 29 for details on NCA programs.

~ See reference 28 for discussion of proposals to decouple farm-income-support payments from yields. Even with payments tit me

unrelated to farm yields, any subsidy will tend to encourage a higher level of farming activity than would othenvise be profitable (28). Farmem

have been reluctant to accept income support that is independent of farm yields, perhaps fearing that such an approach seems more like welfare.

~ IrI 1991, 8.3 of 41.3 million potential flex acres were converted horn the Ori@ pro~~ C~PS.

2S It amm ~ely tit ~ a budget-cutti.rlg measure, normal flex acreage will be incmwxl to 20 Punt under the lW4B@@ R~ncfl~tion

Bill.
320 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

average, are adequately compensated for climate

risk under competitive market conditions. Subsidies and disaster assistance have distorted the

market, encouraging expansion of farming into

marginal lands and reducing incentives to undertake safe farming and sound financial practices

(54). Much of the burden of increased risk-both

the monetary costs and any environmental costs

associated with conversion of marginal lands to

farming-is placed more broadly on society. The

Australian Government, faced with similar concerns, is moving to eliminate all agricultural

disaster payments and to replace them with

programs that encourage self-sufficiency and

information on sound farming practice (116).

The costs of disaster-assistance programs (crop

insurance, disaster payment, and emergency loans;

see box 6-I) can be expected to rise if climate

change leads to more-frequent episodes of

drought and related crop losses. The subsidies

provided by these programs reduce farmers’

incentives to recognize and adapt to increasing

climate risks, which imposes further costs on the

general public. Reducing these subsidies will

better prepare the farm sector to respond to

changing climatic risks and should also prove

beneficial in reducing conflicts between agriculture and the natural environment.

Society does benefit from stable food prices,

and well-designed risk-spreading programs contribute to this stability. Disaster-assistance programs should be restructured-not eliminated—

to encourage farmers to limit their exposure to

climate risk and thus to lower the costs of the

programs to society.

1 Policy Options:

Disaster-Assistance Programs

Option 6-3: Define disasters formally, with

assistance provided only for unusual losses.

Congress could formalize the criteria for receipt

of disaster payments and eliminate the crop

insurance program. Currently, disaster-payment

programs are provided each year in ad hoc

legislation passed in somewhat pressured situations and driven by immediate needs. It is

unlikely that disaster payments will be eliminated. Farmers have come to rely on this protection, and Congress faces considerable pressure to

provide it. If requirements for disaster-payment

programs were form W, some of the more

undesirable features might be controlled. For

example, all farmers could be provided with free

coverage against truly catastrophic climate events,

but otherwise would receive no disaster payments. With this change, farmers’ incentives to

undertake precautionary farm-management and

financial practices could be greatly increased, and

buffering against climate change risks would be

improved.

Currently, disaster-assistance programs compensate farmers who have experienced crop

losses of at least 35 to 40 percent. Partial

compensation is received

amount.

Congress could set

pensation to a level

exceeded (say, a loss

for losses greater than

the trigger for comthat is less frequently

of -- .55 or 60 percent).

A .

Alternatively, coverage could be eliminated

for farmers who have repeated losses. For

example, farmers might be limited to receiving payments two times within any 10-year

period.

A permanent disaster-payment program could

be authorized, providing payment to any farmer

who experiences significant weather-related

losses. With universal coverage, potential inequities that result if eligibility is limited to farmers in

declared disaster areas are removed. One of the

strongest objections to eliminating crop insurance

(that to do so strips farmers of individual protection against climate risks) would thus be removed. However, with a permanent and universal

program of disaster payments, expenses might

become less controllable.

■ To reduce budget expenses, farmers or farm

counties could be required to contribute to a
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 321

disaster-assistance fired in order to be eligible for disaster payments.

Recent disaster-payment programs have set

payments based on losses relative to “normal”

production. This is usually based on average

yields over a period of years, with extreme yields

(either high or low) excluded from the average. It

would seem unwise to exclude ‘‘abnormal’ years

from the average if climate change is in fact

altering normal climate.

■ Congress could require that a moving average of crop yields over the past 5 years be

used to determine normal output.

Option 6-4: Combine disaster-payment and

crop insurance programs. Congress could combine disaster payments and crop insurance, giving

all farmers free catastrophic-loss coverage (partially compensating for losses beyond some high

limit) and offering additional coverage to those

who are willing to pay. The Federal Crop

Insurance Reform Act of 1990 considered by the

101st Congress would have provided such a

combined disaster-assistance program. All farmers would have received disaster protection for

losses exceeding 50 to 70 percent (depending on

participation in other farm programs), The crop

insurance program would have remained essentially unchanged, with subsidized coverage available for crop losses greater than those covered by

the catastrophic policy.

Proponents of the plan argued that it would

eliminate the pressure for supplemental disaster

legislation and would encourage farmers to protect themselves against ordinary climate risks.

Opponents were fearful of the potential costs.

Although administrative expenses and the insurance subsidy would be largely unchanged, expenditures on disaster payments could increase with

universal coverage. Opponents also expressed

concern that the proposed plan would eliminate

any chance of making the crop insurance program

sound.

Option 6-5: Improve the crop insurance program. In principle, crop insurance provides an

attractive mechanism by which farmers can

reduce the inherent variability in farm income.

However, few would argue that the goals of the

Federal crop insurance program have been met.

Participation is limited, program costs are high,

and disaster payments remain a primary cushion

against climate risks. Because of the high cost of

insurance and the expectation of continued disaster payments, participation in the crop insurance

program is primarily limited to farmers in highrisk areas.

Several potential reforms of the crop insurance

program were suggested to Congress during

debate of the 1990 Farm Bill (13, 14).26 Some

analysts and researchers have sought to reduce

subsidies on crop insurance, hoping to make the

program actuarially sound (i.e., self-supporting).

Many have sought to encourage greater program

participation through increasing subsidies, reducing deductibles,27 improving administrative procedures, modifying in the means by which losses

are calculated, or requiring crop insurance for

eligibility in other farm programs. A more radical

reform would combine crop insurance and incomesupport programs into a revenue insurance

scheme that would guarantee a minimum farm

revenue.

Congress could choose to revisit the many

reforms that have been suggested in the past. The

success of any reforms in the crop insurance

program would be contingent on expanded participation, which would allow crop insurance to

replace disaster payments. The resulting restructured program might then offer both improved

risk management and reduced costs over the

current combination of crop insurance and disasX w Fed~al crop hwance commission Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-546) authorized the formation of a 25-member commission to identify

problems with the crop insuran ce program and to make recommendations for increasing farmer participation.

27 me hi@es[ level of coverage that can be purchased requires farmers to absorb the fmt 25 percent of losses. Many farmers consider such

losses sufficiently rare that insurance is an unneeded expense.
322 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

ter assistance programs. However, if greater

participation is achieved through higher subsidies

and lower deductibles, these benefits might well

be lost.

Option 6-6: Provide a self-insurance program

for income stabilization. Congress could consider

a program modeled roughly on individual retirement accounts (IRAs), under which farmers

would be encouraged to self-insure against climatic risks. The program could be supplemented

with catastrophic coverage either through crop

insurance or disaster payments, and it would

allow farmers to smooth the fluctuation in their

income over time.28 Farmers would be allowed to

set aside income, tax-free, into a self-insurance

account. Annual deposits up to a maximum

amount (say, $15,000) would be allowed, with no

further deposits allowed once the account reaches

some maximum cap (say, $150,000). The cap

would encourage active use of the account for

income smoothing, and the tax-free status would

encourage participation. Withdrawals could be

made at any time, subject to income tax payment

at that time (with no penalty for early withdrawal,

in contrast to the IRA model). Existing disaster

programs might be gradually phased down, until

they provide only protection against truly catastrophic events.

B Water-Use Efficiency

Many climate-change forecasts suggest that

agricultural regions of the United States could

become hotter and drier, so efficient use of

irrigation water might be required to maintain

farm production (see box 6-I). Farmers who can

manage water efficiently would be better prepared to respond to harsher climate conditions.

Unfortunately, many farmers have little incentive

to conserve water because of subsidized prices,

inadequate institutional arrangements for regulating access to groundwater, and limited marketability of conserved water. Farmers who receive

water from Federal irrigation projects generally

pay less than the water costs (see box 5-F). The

subsidized price encourages high levels of agricultural water use. Farmers who do conserve

water may be inadequately rewarded for doing so

or may actually be penalized under some State

laws. Water saved may even be forfeited.

1 Policy Options: Water-Use Efficiency

Chapter 5 provides a thorough discussion of

water issues. Agricultural water use is one component of several broader options discussed in

that chapter. Among them are the options involving: 1) reform in pricing in Federal water projects

(option 6-7, or 5-5), 2) clarification of reclamation

law on trades and transfers of water (option 6-8,

or 5-7), and 3) reform of tax provisions to promote

conservation investments (option 6-9, or 5-4).

Incentives for installing efficient irrigation equipment and for undertaking water-conserving farmmanagement practices could be implemented

through direct subsidy or in exchange for eligibility in existing commodity-program or water

subsidies. 29 Soil Conservation Service standards

for soil suitability and irrigation efficiency could

be used to determine eligibility for incentive

programs (see ch. 5 for details).

1 Agricultural Productivity

Broad-based research directed at enhancing the

long-term basis for increased agricultural yields is

an essential element of a public research strategy.

Public efforts should be directed at those areas not

adequately handled by the private sector. In other

words, the Federal effort may be best directed at

basic science, long-term or high-risk technology

2s &forc the ‘fhx Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) was passed, taxes could be computed on the basis of “hwOmC ave. “ Farmers,

who regularly experience fluctuating incomes, have felt they were unfairly treated by the elimination of this provision (31). The approach

offered here provides the bentilts of income averaging, plus a strong incentive to actually smooth fluctuations in income.

29 Subsidies titlowm the c~iM cost ofinstallingnewi rrigationequipment may emo~gt!com~ationby f~ersti*dyus@ mtio~

they could also lead to the undesirable! outcome of more overall irrigation. This should not be an insurmountable problem.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 323

development, and other areas where private profit

is limited but public value is high. Biotechnology

and related genetics research may offer at least a

partial solution to the problem of sustainin g the

ability to produce food over the long term.

Continued public research is needed to build an

understanding of the genetic and biological bases

of nitrogen fixation, drought and heat tolerance,

and pest and weed resistance. Efforts are needed

in the development of new germ plasm that could

be the basis for subsequent commercial development of plant varieties. Protection of existing

germ plasm in traditional and nontraditional

crops is also important because it ensures the

ability to develop new crops and strains in the

future.

Conventional breeding efforts should not be

ignored as a source of productivity gains in the

near term. The ability to manipulate complex

genetic characteristics through biotechnology remains limited.30 For example, conventional

breeding may offer the best immediate hope for

improving drought and heat tolerance in crops.

Efforts to expand the diversity of available

cultivars through crop breeding may provide

insurance against an uncertain future climate.

Attention to the development and commercialization of new crops may become more important in

a future under which climate change might

threaten the competitiveness of traditional crops.

Public efforts will be needed for those crops and

market or climate niches that receive little attention from commercial breeders. It may be important to develop crops and cultivars that are

adapted to warmer or drier climate conditions.

Efforts toward developing cultivars that require

small amounts of farm chemicals would help

relax the environmental constraints that might

otherwise limit expansion of farm output.

Equally important are efforts to enhance the

knowledge and skills of farmers and the technology of farming. Farmers face a future in which

they must be increasingly responsive to world

competition, environmental concerns, and the

uncertainties of climate change. The competitiveness of the U.S. farm sector will increasingly

come to rely on its ability to farm with greater

skills than the rest of the world. One of the most

important attributes of future technologies will be

the ability they give farmers to deal with unanticipated changes. Information and management

technologies in the form of computer software,

sensors, robotic and control equipment, and other

packaged-knowledge products can provide this

flexibility. These intelligent farm technologies

offer the potential for substantial gains in efficiency of farm management and for reductions in

agriculture’s undesirable environmental consequences. The role of technology transfer also

takes on increased value under a changing climate. If farmers are to adapt to any sort of change

in a timely manner, efforts must be made to

provide them with accurate, convincing information on the effectiveness of new farmin g systems,

crops, and technologies. The private market may

respond to meet some of these needs, but a public

role seems imperative.

B Policy Options: Agricultural Productivity

Option 6-10: Enhance research on and development of computerized farm-management systems. Congress could act to enhance the role of

the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) as the

center of excellence in design and integration of

new information and management technologies

into farm-management systems. Increased competitivegrant funds could be provided to universities and

private researchers to carry out the research

needed to fill critical knowledge gaps that are

barriers to delivery of new agricultural technologies to the farmer.

The potential to develop and expand the use of

intelligent information and management (i.e.,

using land-based or remote sensors, robotics and

controls, image analysis, geographical informa-
324 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

tion systems, and telecommunications linkagespackaged into decision-support systems or embodied in intelligent farm equipment) to improve

crop and livestock production and farm-resource

management is considerable. Tractors are now

produced commercially that can plant, till, or

apply chemicals as needed to specific areas of a

field. There are also commercial packages (including computer hardware and software, sensors, and telecommunications linkages) that can

control irrigation and provide decision support for

fertilization and pest-control application. Only

farmers growing the highest-valued crops (such

as fruits and vegetables) can afford these systems

now.

Long-terrn public funding has been essential to

the development of the few existing commercial

packages. Enhancing these systems and reducing

equipment costs to allow broader application will

require considerable research and development

effort. ARS proposed a program of research on

intelligent farm-management systems under the

Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology’s (FCCSET’S) 1994

Budget Initiative on Advanced Manufacturing.

ARS expects that $1 million will go to integrated,

or intelligent, farm-management-systems research.

ARS had initially hoped for a larger role in the

FCCSET initiative, sufficient to provide $6 million for intelligent farm-management-systems

research. The strategic plan for the State Agricultural Experiment Stations also considers this a

high-priority area for new research, suggesting a

need for $47 million in new funding (33). No

other single area was considered to need this large

a funding increase.

Option 6-11: Improve the research and extension process by expanding farmer input. Congress could support an expanded role for farmers

in assessing the effectiveness of farming practices

and in disseminating results of research on

innovative farm practices. A broad-based program of grant support for systematic on-farm

experimentation and a database on farmers’

financial successes and failures under different

farming systems could help farmers adapt to

climate change.

Farmers are most convinced by the success of

other farmers-rather than by information from

experiments conducted on university lands under

ideal management conditions. State experiment

stations have already found that demonstration

plots on farms are excellent teaching aids and

succeed in getting farmers to more quickly adopt

certain practices. The willingness of farmers to

take up new techniques (including techniques

designed to reduce the environmental costs of

farming) could be further enhanced if farmers

were more extensively included in the research,

experimentation, and inforrnation dissemination

process.

Support on-farm experimentation. Abroadbased program of support for on-farm experimentation in new cropping practices would

be useful in providing the information that

would help farmers adapt to climate change.

A model that could be built on for this

purpose can be found in the Sustainable

Agricultural Research and Experiment

(SARE) program funded under the 1990

Farm Bill (see box 6-A). Under this program,

Federal funding is provided to experiment

stations to support farmer participation in

research and on-farm demonstration projects. One possibility is to pay farmers for

conducting field tests to demonstrate the

success or failure of new farming systems in

real-world situations, working with experimentstation, Soil Conservation Service

(SCS), or extension-service personnel.31

Farmers could be compensated if they bear

the risks of trying unproven technologies.

Develop a database on successful practices. In conjunction with a program of

31 U~y, Only now ren~ mtlst be paid for setting up experimental plots on farmwa’ fields. ‘IIM State of Illinois IUM found it dl=~

to use farmers’ fields than to own eropland and has been able to sell some research facilities as a result.
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 325

on-farm experimentation, there could be

support for a wider program of recordkeeping to establish a database on the financial

successes and failures of farming systems.

An easily accessed database, giving farmers

access to records and information on successful farm-management practices, could

help speed adoption of successful practices.

Such databases could be developed and

maintained at State experiment stations (or

distributed on compact disk) and be made

accessible by phone line to personal computer users, Software that could provide easy

access to the database and efforts to organize

the database into a useful format would be

required. Cooperative support for farmerinitiated networks and information exchanges

might be another way to increase the efficiency with which farmers accept innovations in farming practices,

Option 6-12: Support agricultural biotechnology and genetics. Congress could maintain or

increase funding for regional centers of excellence in agricultural genetics and biotechnology

research. Increases in competitive grants in areas

of particular interest could be used to direct the

research effort. Areas of obvious long-term national interest include programs addressing the

understanding of photosynthetic efficiency, nitrogen fixation, tolerance to heat and drought, and

the development of crops that require reduced

herbicides or pesticides. Although climate change

does raise the importance of research about

drought and heat tolerance, this area should be

promoted in tandem with pursuing broader gains

in productivity, where the probability of success

and the ultimate payoff may be higher.

Option 6-13: Support conventional cropbreeding programs. Congress could encourage

USDA to sustain or increase public, conventional

crop-breeding efforts. Crop breeding offers the

most immediate hope for providing improved

cultivars that are adapted to particular climatic

niches. This may be especially so given the

number of ‘‘wild” varieties that have yet to be

studied and that could improve the existing

domestic crops. Efforts at expanding diversity in

cultivars are not adequately supported by the

private sector unless investors anticipate profitable markets. Conventional breeding is also

considered necessary for the maintenance of

desirable cultivar attributes. One consequence of

ignoring this maintenance effort can be an increased need for pesticides to compensate for

declining resistance to pests. This unglamorous

side to breeding has been underfunded. Further,

breeding of minor but potentially valuable crops,

such as forages, small grains, and oats, may be

getting too little attention from either the Government or the private sector.

Option 6-14: Increase support for the development of new commercial crops. Development

and introduction of new commercial crops can be

a slow process. Successful commercialization

relies on a combination of farmer and market

readiness that may be difficult to achieve. Availability of new crops might provide U.S. farmers

with opportunities to diversify to counter the

threat of climate change or a chance for profitable

specialization. Congress could expand ongoing

USDA research aimed at improving the commercial characteristics of several promising alternative crops. Priorities should be given to crops for

which there are potentially profitable markets and

perhaps to crops suited to hot or dry conditions.

Congress could authorize assistance to businesses

to establish crops and product markets, once the

development of commercially stable varieties has

been demonstrated.

~ Planning Needs

By improving the process of agricultural resource assessment and program evaluation, USDA

could improve its ability to develop responses to

major issues like climate change. A model might

be the program and assessment process that is

undertaken by the USDA Forest Service under the

Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 (P.L. 93-378). (See vol.
326 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--VoIume 1

2, ch. 6, for a more complete discussion of OTA’S

RPA assessment.)

USDA currently provides periodic assessments

of agricultural soil and water conditions and

trends under the appraisal process, authorized by

the Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act

(RCA) of 1977 (P.L. 95-192). Despite the considerable background effort that goes into these

analyses, the assessments are narrowly focused

on the specific concerns of USDA’s Soil Conservation Service. With little extra effort, USDA

could provide a full assessment of trends in the

agricultural resource, farm ownership, rural economic conditions, agricultural technologies, supply and demand, and the impact of farm programs

and subsidies. Included in this evaluation could

be an assessment of climate change as one of

many possible significant future disturbances to

supply and demand, as the Forest Service has

been doing. On the basis of this assessment,

USDA could develop a program document that

clarifies the agency’s direction and justifies its

programs as a whole.

1 Policy Option: Planning Needs

Option 6-15: Broaden the focus of the current

Resources Conservation Act appraisal. Congress

could amend the current authorization for the

RCA appraisal process, creating a new agricultural program and assessment process modeled on

the RPA program and assessment of the USDA

Forest Service. As in the Forest Service, the

assessment should be made by staff members who

are not tied to a specific: action agency within

USDA (currently, the RCA is tied to the Soil

Conservation Service).

FIRST STEPS

If public policy aims to ensure that U.S.

agriculture can adapt to climate change and

maintain its competitiveness in world markets,

there is a wealth of policy options, as outlined

above. However, the most pressing targets for

policy appear to be:

—removing the impediments to adaptation that

are created by commodity support programs,

disaster assistance, and irrigation subsidies;

—improving technology and information transfer to farmers in order to speed the process of

adaptation and innovation in farm practice;

and

—supporting research and technology that will

ensure that the food-production sector can

deal successfully with the various challenges

of the next century.

The agricultural sector of the U.S. economy is

already unusual in the great amount of public

money spent in support of research, development,

and technology transfer. The steady stream of

technological improvements that have resulted

has allowed the United States to feed a growing

world population at increasingly low cost. In

recent yearn, the focus has shifted away from how

effective the effort has been, pointing instead to

the expense of farm programs and the environmental consequences of intensive farming. However, if the United States wants to remain

competitive in the world market even though

rapid population growth is increasing the demand

for food while biological limits to productivity

growth seem ever closer, public efforts to support

the continued growth in agricultural yields remain

necessary. With its technological and institutional strengths, the Nation should be in a position

to enhance its role in a growing world agricultural

market. But in the competitive world market,

success will rely on continued improvements in

productivity and on the skills of U.S. farmers as

they innovate and adapt to changing market

conditions.

Climate change adds to the importance of

efforts to increase agricultural productivity, to

improve the knowledge and skills of farmers, and

to remove impediments to farmer adaptability and

innovation. Efforts to expand the diversity of

crops and the array of farm technologies ensure

against a future in which crops or farming systems

fail. Efforts to enhance the adaptability of farmers—to speed the rate at which successful farming
Chapter 6-Agriculture I 327

systems are adopted--can lower the potentially

high costs of adjusting to climate change.

All of the options described in the previous

section are of some value if implemented today,

even if no climate change occurs. Many options,

particularly those related to research and extension, are being pursued to some degree. Others,

such as the options to modify commodity support

programs, disaster assistance, and irrigation subsidies, have been much discussed. In general,

climate change strengthens the case for actions

already being considered or underway rather than

suggesting new directions of effort.

Several of the options we have suggested

should be addressed promptly. Research on information and management technologies is important now because of the time needed to develop

and implement new technologies and because of

the lack of effort now being made (33). Modifications to the farm commodity program are included as first steps because there appears to be a

window of opportunity to implement changes.

Disaster programs fit in much the same category;

frustration with current programs makes some

political action likely. The difficulty experienced

in redesigning the agricultural programs suggests

all the more that these reforms be placed on the

agenda early so the process of change can begin.

Although conventional crop breeding has not

been included in the list of first steps, it is an area

that merits more attention. Efforts to improve or

maintain the desirable cultivars appear to be

underfunded for many crops-as more glamorous

research areas have attracted public funds and

private efforts have focused on larger markets.

Some areas of obvious concern, such as biotechnology research and new-crop development,

have not been included as first steps. This is not

because they are unimportant or not urgent, but

rather because there is considerable effort under

way already. Improvement in the effectiveness of

the extension process, through more deliberate

inclusion of farmers and better dissemination of

data, may ultimately be of great importance.

However, there seems to be little cost to waiting

before implementing such actions. Perhaps most

important here is that existing technologytransfer services should not be allowed to decline

to the point that they cannot be rebuilt. Institutional changes that will encourage the conservation and efficient use of irrigation water will also

be important in buffering agriculture against the

threat of climate change. (See ch. 5 for a discussion of water issues.)

Revise the commodity support programs

to encourage responsiveness to changing

climate and market conditions Congress

addresses farm issues every 5 years in

omnibus farm bills, with the next one likely

to be debated for passage in 1995. The

annual budget-reconciliation process and

agricultural appropriations bills offer intermediate opportunities for revisions in commodity support programs. The high expenditures on commodity support programs and

the previously successful implementation of

the flex-acreage program have made it very

likely that flex acreage will be increased in

the current budget-reconciliation process.

This revision provides the opportunity for

reducing expenditures on commodity support and increasing the adaptability of farmers to climate change. A further increase in

flex acreage or other more substantial revisions in commodity programs (e.g., introduce normal crop acreage) would probably

have to be considered in the 1995 Farm Bill.

Use the 1995 Farm Bill to modify disasterassistance programs. Since the late 1970s,

Congress has been considering how to best

structure the crop insurance and disasterpayment programs. After a flurry of proposals and studies before the passage of the 1990

Farm Bill, the programs were left essentially

unchanged. There is, however, an ongoing

sense of frustration with the current system

that suggests that major revisions are likely

to be considered in the 1995 Farm Bill. It

remains unclear what the best option is for
328 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

revising these programs. However, any program that provides a. greater incentive for

farmers to reduce their exposure to risk

should help in preparing for the risks of a

climate change. Features of a restructured

system might include:

-defining disasters formally, with assistance

provided only for unusual losses;

-eliminating either crop insurance or disaster

payments (i.e., do not have one program

undercut the incentives to participate in the

other);

—limiting the number of times a farmer could

collect disaster payments; and

—requiring farmers to contribute to a disasterpayment fund (payment could be related to

past claims), thus providing an incentive to

reduce exposure to risks.

■ Enhance the agricultural technology base.

Congress could act to enhance research in

computerized farm-management systems. The

competitiveness of the farm sector will

increasingly depend on technological advances that improve the efficiency of U.S.

farmers-rather than on further increases in

mechanization and intensity of input use.

Computerized farm-management systems will

be increasingly important to the farmer’s

ability to increase yields, control costs, and

respond to environmental concerns. Limiting the runoff and leaching of farm chemicals

depends most on careful timing of application

and on applying only what is needed.

ARS has suggested that about $6 million

annually would allow considerable improvement in its current program.32 Funding this full

$6 million program or similar support by

Congress would provide for the development

and broader use of technologies that have the

potential to greatly enhance the efficiency of

farming and increase the flexibility with

which farmers can respond to climate conditions. ARS already provides leadership in this

area.

32 J. Vm Schilfga,arde, Associate: Deputy ~“ “ trator, Afyicultural Research Senicc, U.S. Deptient of Agriculture, personal

communication, July 1993.
Chapter 6-Agriculture [ 329

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116. White, D., D. Collins, and M. Howdm “DroughtinAustralia:

Prediction, Monitoring, Management and Policy,” in:

DroughtAssessment, Management, andPlanning: Theory and

Case Studies (Bosto~ MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers,

1993).

117. Wilhite, D.A., “The Ogalla.la Aquifer and Carbon Dioxide:

Are Policy Responses Applicable?” iru Societal Responses to

Regional Climate Change: Forecasting by Analogy, M.H.

Glantz (cd.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp.

353-374.

118. Wyatt, A.W., “Water Management-southern HiglI Plains of

ltxas,” irx Proceedings of the Natural Resources Luw

Center’s ?Welfih Annual Summer Program, Innovations in

Western Water Luw and Management (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado School of Law, 1991).

119. Zinq J., Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,

“Subsidies for Irrigated Agricultural Lands in the Arid

West-an Overview,” 85-594 ENR, February 1985.
Appendix A:

List of

Tables

and

Figures

TABLES

Chapter l---Summary Page

Table l-l—List of Boxes in Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Table inbox l-A—The Sensitivity and Adaptability of Human Activities and Nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Table in box l—B-Potential Climate Change Impacts for Various Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 3—Research

Table 3-1—List of Departments and Agencies or Bureaus Involved in USGCRP Research. . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Table 3-2---Congressional Authorization Committees and Appropriations Subcommittees with

Significant Legislative Authority over Agencies with a USGCRP Component. . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Table 3-3A—FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Research by Agency and Function...,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Table 3-3B—FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Adaptation Research by Agency and Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Table 3-4A-Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for the Third Science Element, Ecological

Systems and Dynamics (ESD), Compared with Percent of Each Agency’s GCRP

Budget for E-SD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Table 3-4B--Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for the Fifth Science Element, Human

Interactions (HI), Compared with Percent of Each Agency’s GCRP Budget for HI...... 135

Table in box 3-A--Potential Uses of Remote-Sensing Data, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Volume 1

Chapter4--Coasts

Table 4-1—Estimates of Insurance-Industry Potential Losses in 1987 Resulting from a Recurrence

of Past Hurricanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Table 4-2-Estimated Cost of a Major Hurricane Striking Densely Populated Areas (or Major Cities). . 165

Table 4-3—Insured Losses Likely To Be Experienced Under Different Maximum-Wind-Speed

Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Table 4-4--Estimated Probabilities of Exceeding Given Levels of Flood-Insurance Losses.. . . . . . . . . . 170

Table 4-5—Results of a Mail Survey of 132 Owners of Beachfront Property in South Carolina After

Hurricane Hugo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

For a list of boxes, see chapter l, pages 8-9.

1333
334 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Table 4-6--Community Rating System Designed by the Federal Emergency Management

Agency to Encourage Communities to Minimize Flood Damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Table 4-7—Premium Reductions for Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAS) and Non-SFHAs in

the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Community Rating System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Table 4-8—Rank of Project Categories by Dollar Amount and Percent of Estimated

Obligations in the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (January 1989 to August 1992) . . . . . . 184

Table 4-9—Status of U.S. Setback Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Table 4-l--Federal Programs and Laws Influencing Coastal Development:

Status and Potential Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Chapter 5—Water

Table 5-1—Federal Offices Involved in Water Resource Planning, Development, or Management . . . . . 226

Table 5-2—Ways to Use ‘Water More Efficiently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Table 5-3—Possible Risk-Management and Risk-Minimization Measures the Federal Government

Could Consider to Lessen the Effects of Drought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Table 5-4--Summary of Options to Improve Water Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Chapter 6-Agriculture

Table 6-1—Harvested Acreage and Value of Principal Crops, 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Table 6-2—Projected Annual Rates of Growth in Agricultural Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Volume 2

Chapter 4-Wetlands

Table 4-1-Wetland Vulnerabilities to Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Table 4-2—Responding to Climate Change Impacts on Wetlands: Summary of Reported

State Wetland Protection Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Table 4-3-Examples of Laws and Agencies That May Be Affected by Various Policy Options . . . . . . . 197

Table in box 4-D--Economic Values of Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Chapter 5—Preserves

Table 5-1—National Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and Wilderness Areas in the United States.. . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Table 5-2—Management Goals for Some Federally Protected Natural Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Table 5-3—Examples of Benefits from Ecosystem, Species, and Genetic Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Table 5-4--Species and Ecosystem Most at Risk from Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Table 5-5--Options for Strategic Information Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

Table 5-6—Options for Enhanced Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Chapter 6-Forests

Table 6-1—Human Values Associated with Forest Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

Table 6-2—Area of Timberland in the United States by Major Forest Type, 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Table 6-3—Forest Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

Table6-4--Ch aracteristics of Higher-Risk Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

Table 6-5—Major Federal Acts or Programs Affecting the Use of Forest Lands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Table 6-&Suitability of Silvicultural Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

FIGURES

Chapter l-Summary

Figure l-l-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under Two GCM Climate Change Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Figure 1-2-Soil-Moisture Changes for Agricultural Lands and Areas of Natural Cover, by GCM

Climate Change Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A–List of Tables and Figures I 335

Figure l-3-The Delaware River Basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Figure l-4--An Assessment of Coastal Hazards: Texas and Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Figure l-9--Water Withdrawals and Consumption in the Coterminous United States, 1985......,.. . . . 43

Figure l-6--Preserves and Climate Change, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Figure l-7-Current and Projected Range of Beech Under Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Chapter 2-Primer

Figure 2-1—Long-Term Global Temperature Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 2-2-The Greenhouse Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Figure 2-3-Measured and Equivalent C02 Concentrations in the Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Figure 2-4--Expected C02 Concentrations in the Atmosphere According to Various Emissions

Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Figure 2-5--GCM-Estimated Changes in Temperature and Precipitation from a Doubling of CO2 . . . . . 76

Figure 2-6-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GISS climate Change Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 77

Figure 2-7-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GFDL Climate Change Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Figure 2-8-Approximate Distribution of the Major Biotic Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Figure2-9--Long-TermTempratmemdC0 2RecOrdstirnAt~tic1ceCO m s m d R=en t

Atmospheric Measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Figure 2-10-The Distribution of Holdridge Life Zones Under Current Climate conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Figure 2-11-Percent of U.S. Land Area Shifting HoldridgeLife Zones After C02 Doubling.. . . . . . . . . 96

Figure 2-12-The Hydrologic Cycle Shows How Water Moves Through the Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Figure 2-13-Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GFDL and GISS Climate Change scenarios,

by Land-Use and Cover ~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Figure in box 2-A-Modeled Topography of the United States by Use of Two Different Grid Sizes. . . . 69

Figure in box 2-C--U.S. Coastal Marine Fisheries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Chapter 3-Research

Figure3-lA--Organizational Chart for the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering,

and Technology (FCCSET). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-lB--Organizational Chart for the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES)..

Figure 3-2-Priority Framework for USGCRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-3-Functional Architecture of USGCRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-4--U.S. Global Change Research Program Budget by Agency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-5-USGCRP Focused Budget by Activity Stream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-6--USGCRP Budget by Science Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-7-FY 1993 USGCRP Budget of Focused and Contributing Programs by Agency . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-8-Alternative Organizational Schemes for Global Change Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure in box 3-A-Incoming, Reflected, and Scattered Solar Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113

114

116

117

120

121

122

123

145

128

Volume 1

Chapter 4-Coasts

Figure 4-1-Historical Land Loss of Poplar Island in Chesapeake Bay as a Result of

Sea Level Rise and Erosion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Figure 4-2-Schematics of a Developed and an undeveloped Barrier Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Figure 4-3A-Intensity of Historic Hurricanes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Figure 4-3B--Damage-Producing Potential of Historic Hurricanes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Figure 4-4-Coastal Hazard Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Figure 4-5-FEMA’s Criteria for Imminent-Collapse and Setback Determinations Under the

Upton-Jones Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Figure 4-&New Zones Established by Beachfront Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Figure in box 4-A--Saffir-Simpson Hurricane-Intensity scale.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
336 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Chapter 5—Water

Figure 5-l—Water Withdrawals and Consumption in the Coterminous United States, 1985. . . . . . . . . . . 211

Figure 5-2—Average Consumptive Use and Renewable Water Supply by Water Resource Region . . . . . 214

Figure 5-3-U. S. Groundwater Overdraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Figure in box 5-B-The Rio Grande Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Figure in box 5-E-Navigable Waters of the Mississippi River System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Chapter 6-Agriculture

Figure 6-1-U.S. Production, Domestic Consumption, and Exports of Wheat, Corn, and Soybeans. . . . 278

Figure 6-2-The USDA Agricultural Regions of the United States.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Figure 6—3-Regional Distribution of Cropland and Irrigated Cropland in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . 282

Figure6-4--Characteristics of Nine Farming Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Figure 6-5-Corn Yields in the United States, 1950-91. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

Figure 6-6-Net Outlays of the Commodity Credit Corporation, 1982-91. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

Figure 6-7-Costs of Federal Disaster-Assistance Payments Over the Period 1980-90. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

Figure6-8-Appropriation for USDA Agricultural Research and Extension Programs for

FY 1972-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

Figure in box 6-C-Change in Simulated Crop Yields After Doubling of CO2, by Region,

Under Two GCM Climate Change Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

Figure in box 6-D-The Arkansas River Basin of Southeastem Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Figure in box 6-E--Kesterson Reservoir and Surrounding Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

Figure in box 6-E-The Potential for Water-Salinity Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

Figure in box 6-F-Extent of the Hard Red Winter Wheat Zone in 1920 and 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

Figure in box 6-F-Proportion of Wheat Planted to Leading Varieties in the United States... . . . . . . . . 299

Figure in box 6-F-Midwestern Soybean Acreage in 1949 and 1982. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Figure in box 6-G-The Ogallala Aquifer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Volume 2

Chapter4--Wetlands

Figure 4-1-Cross-Sectional Diagrams of a Northeaster Salt Marsh and a Riparian Wetland System. . 167

Figure 4-2-General Distribution of Wetlands in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Figure 4-3-Wetland Acreage Lost in the United States, 1780s to 1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Figure 4-4-Extent and Location of Artificially Drained Agricultural Land in the United States, 1985. 171

Figure in box 4-D---Relationship Between Wetland Processes and Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Figure in box4-F--Wetland Changes in the Mississippi River Active Delta (1956-78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Chapter 5-Preserves

Figure 5-1-Preserves and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Figure 5-2-Landownership of the U.S. Land Base. . . . . . . . . . . ,.,.,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Figure 5-3-Habitat Needs of Elk, Eagles, and Grizzly Bears in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. . 226

Figure 5-4A-Federally Owned Lands: Agency Jurisdiction,..,,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Figure 54B-Federally Owned Lands: Percentage of State Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Figure 5-5-Recreational Visits to National Parks.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Figure 5-6-Geographical Distribution of Some Federal Natural Areas, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

Figure 5-7-Authorizations and Total Annual Appropriations of Land and Water Conservation Fund.. 267

Figure 5-8-Ecosystem Types Represented on Federal Land.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

Figure 5-9—Ecosystem Types Represented in National Wilderness Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Figure in box 5-F-Biosphere Reserve Sites in the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Figure in box 5-G--Stillwater National Wildlife Management Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Figure in box 5-L-GAP Analysis Example: Distribution of Endangered Hawaiian F inches in

Relation to Existing Nature Reserves on the Island of Hawai in 1982. . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Figure in box 5-L-The National Science Foundation’s Long-Term Ecological Research Network. . . . 272
Appendix A–List of Tables and Figures I 337

Chapter 6--Forests

Figure 6-l-USDA Forest Regions of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Figure 6-2-Forest Density Within Advanced Very-High-Resolution Radiometer Pixels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Figure 6-3-Area of Forest and Nonforest Land by Region, 1987.,.,...,...,., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

Figure 6-4-Major Forest Types of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Figure 6-5-Status of U.S. Forest Land and Distnbution of Timberland Ownership, 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

Figure 6-6--Timberland Ownership by Region, 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

Figure 6—7-Forest Area Planted or Seeded in the United States by Section and by Ownership. . . . . . . . 309

Figure 6-8---Forest Fires in the United States, 1924-87. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

Figure 6-9--Current and Projected Range of Sugar Maple under Two Models of Global Warming. . . . 322

Figure in box 6-B-Average Carbon Storage per Acre of Forestland in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
—

Appendix B:

Acknowledgments

In addition to the workshop participants and the advisory panel listed in the front of this Report, OTA wishes

to thank the individuals and organizations listed below for their assistance with this Report. These individuals and

organimations do not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this Report. OTA assumes full responsibility for

the Report and the accuracy of its content.

Joe Abe

EPA

Carlton Agee

OTA

Dave Almand

BLM

Patricia Anderson

NSF

Cecil Armstrong

USFS

Dick Arnold

USDA

Marilyn Arnold

Environmental and Energy

Study Institute

Adela Backiel

Congressional Research Service

Tom Baerwald

NSF

Dick Ball

DOE

Robert Barbee

NPS

Mary Barber

Science & Policy Associates, Inc.

Keith Bea

Congressional Research Service

Michael Bean

Environmental Defense Fund

Barbara Bedford

Cornell University

James Beever

Florida Game & Freshwater

Fish Commission

Michael Bessler

BOR

Clark Binkley

University of British Columbia

H. Suzanne Bolton

NOAA

Mark Brinson

East Carolina University

Blabby Brown

OTA

Mike Buckley

FEMA

Bill Busch

NOAA

Dixon Butler

NASA

I 339
340 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Anne Carey

USDA

Katherine Duffy

Duffy and Associates

Indur Goklany

DOI

Jae Edmonds

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Pete Carlson

Alaska Division of Tourism

Julie Gorte

OTA

John Elkind

Council on Environmental

Quality

Ross Gorte

Congressional Research Service

Barbara Cherry

NASA

James Gosselink

Louisiana State University

Elizabeth Chornesky

OTA Joanna Ellison

Bermuda Biological Station

for Research, Inc. James Gosz

NSF

James Clark

Duke University

Gary Evans

USDA William Gregg, Jr.

NPS

Stan Coloff

BLM

Jack Fellows

OMB Dennis Grossman

The Nature Conservancy

Peter Comanor

NPS

Arthur Felts

University of Charleston Howard Gruenspecht

DOE

Charles Cooper

San Diego State University Robert Fischman

Indiana University Joan Ham

OTA

Lynne Corn

Congressional Research Service Len Fisk

NASA Frank Harris

NSF

Pierre Crosson

Resources for the Future Wendell Fletcher

OTA Chuck Hassebrook

Center for Rural Affairs

Jim Curlin

OTA Mike Fosberg

USFS Jimmy Hickman

USFS

William Davis

EPA Carl Fox

University of Nevada Robert Hirsch

USGS

Todd Davison

FEMA Doug FOX

USFS Donald Hodges

Mississippi State University

John Dennis

NPS Jerry Franklin

University of Washington Marjorie Holland

Ecological Society of America

A.V. Diaz

NASA Bob Friedman

OTA John Housley

COE

Erich Ditschman

Clinton River Watershed

council

Mary Gant

HHS Lee Ischinger

FWS Bert Drake

Smithsonian Environmental

Research Center

Thomas Gedna

Oklahoma School of Electrical

and Computer Engineering

Dale Jamieson

University of Colorado

Paul Dressier Tom George

USDA

Anthony Janetos

NASA
Appendix B–Acknowledgments I 341

Katherine Jesch

USFS

Larry Larson

Association of State Floodplain

Managers, Inc.

Paul McCawley

USDA

Stanley Johnson

Institute for Policy Studies

John McShane

Don Laurine FEMA

NOAA William Jordan Ill

University of Wisconsin

Arboretum

Gary McVicker

Steven Weatherman BLM

University of Maryland

Mark Meo

University of Oklahoma Linda Joyce

USFS

Eugene LeComte

National Committee on

Property Insurance Jerry Meillio

Woods Hole Ecosystems Center Fred Kaiser

USFS Bob Ledzion

BOR Robert Mendelssohn

Yale University Sally Kane

NOAA Simon Levln

Princeton University Ben Mieremet

NOA A

Kerry Kehoe

Coastal States Organization Roy Lewis III

Lewis Environmental Services, Inc. Hal Mooney

Stanford University John Kelmelis

USGS Steven Light

South Florida Water

Management District

Lewis Moore

BOR Paul Ketty

University of Ottawa

David Mouat

Desert Research Institute

Harry Lins

USGS

John Kirkpatrick

USFS

Tom Muir

USGS

Orie Loucks

University of Miami

Robert Knecht

University of Delaware

Kit Muller

BLM

Jane Lubchenco

Oregon State University

Gordon Knight

BLM

Alan Lucier

National Council of the Paper

Industry for Air and Stream

improvement

Mary Fran Myers

University of Colorado

Marge Kolar

FWS

Dan Newlon

NSF

Paul Komar

OTA

Ariel Lugo

Puerto Rico Department of

Natural Resources

Elvia Niebla

USFS

Stanley Krugman

USFS

Stephen Nodvin

NPS

James Kushlin

University of Mississippi Kathy Maloney

USFS

Maria Lacayo-Emery

USFS

John Nordin

USFS Stephanie Martin

University of Washington

Larry Langner

USFS

Douglas Norton

NASA Mark Mauriello

New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection

and Energy

Edward LaRoe

DOI

John Pastor

University of Minnesota
342 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Ari Patrinos

DOE

Robert Schallenberger

FWS

Steven Sonka

University of Illinois

Jon Pershing

Department of State

Joel Scheraga

EPA

Raymond Squitieri

Council of Economic Advisors

Rob Peters

Consultant

Karen Schmidt

Environmental and Energy

Study Group

Eugene Stakhiv

COE

Mike Phillips

OTA

Linda Stanley

Rust y Schuster DOI

Rutherford Platt BOR

University of Massachusetts

at Amherst

Marty Strange

J. Michael Scott Center for Rural Affairs

University of Idaho Norton Strommen

USDA Boyd Post

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Cooperative State Research

Service

Fran Sharpels

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Byron Tapley

Eileen Shea University of Texas at Austin

Brooks Preston NOAA

Senate Committee on Agriculture,

Nutrition, and Forestry

Eugene Tehru

David Shriner D O T

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Jack Ward Thomas

Pacific Northwest Forest and

Range Experiment Station

J.C. Randolph

Indiana University

Max Simmons

Congressional Research Service

Peter Raven

Missouri Botanical Garden Shelby Tilford

NASA

Benjamin Simon

D OI

Steve Rawlins

USDA Dennis Tirpak

EPA

David Smith

Southeast Regional Climate

Francis Reilly Center

FEMA

Don Trilling

Joel Smith DOT

EPA John Reilly

USDA Dennis Truesdale

Lowell Smith USFS

EPA Courtney Riordan

EPA Eugene Turner

William Smith Louisiana State University

Yale University Steve Ragone

USGS Lim Vallianos

Dave Solenberger COE

General Accounting Office

Michael Ruggiero

NPS Jan van Schilfgaarde

Wayne Solley USDA

USGS

Nora Sabadell

NSF Virginia Van Sickle-Burkett

Bill Sommers FWS

USFS

R. Neil Sampson

American Forestry Association Hassan Virgi

Working Group on Global

Change, Executive Secretary

David Sandberg

USFS

Jack Sommers
Charles Wahle

Congressional Research Service

Geoffrey Wall

University of Waterloo

Jonathon Weiner

DOJ

Rodney Weir

NOAA

Trina Wellman

NOAA

William Werick

COE

Robin White

OTA

Don Wilhite

University of Nebraska

Jeffress Williams

USGS

Paul Windle

EPA

Appendix B–Acknowledgments 1343

Phyllis Windle

OTA

Frank Young

HHS

Mike Young

USDA

Joy Zedler

San Diego State University

Jeffery Zinn

Congressional Research Service
Index

adaptation to climate change

agricultural, 6, 13, 18-19,44-46 I/II]; 276-277,

286-328 V]

anticipatory actions, 3 ~

choosing strategies, 15-16 ~/111

coastal areas, 6, 18, 40 U/D]; 154-204 ~

communication of risk and, 25-26 ~

contingency p] a.nning, 26-27

defined, 2-3 w]

flexibility in policy making, 16-17, 18 ~

forests, 6, 15, 19,23,55 ~; 320-330,347-349 @l]

fragmentation, 19,23,25

historical examples, 298-300 ~

managed vs. unmanaged systems, 102-103 ~]

photoperiod and, 87 fl~; 287,299,303 ~

preserves, 19, 53 [I/H]; 235-238, 244-250, 258-268,

276-277,279-291 ~]

rate of change and, 4 U/n]

research, 16-17, 23, 27, 30, 35, 111, 132-139, 147-

148 11/’I1]

species adjustments, 91-95 [~; 179-181 ~

water resources systems, 6, 18,42 ~; 232-235 ~]

wetlands, 12, 111 ~/ii]; 172-185 ~

agriculture

adaptability, 6, 13, 18-19,44-46 ~; 276-277,

286-328 ~]

biotechnology applications, 284,306-307,315,323,

325 [r]

climate change effects, 5, 13, 15, 45 ~; 286-296 D]

commodity support programs, 17, 19, 45, 46 ~; 276,

297, 310,311-312,317-319, 326,327 ~

competition for world markets, 284 D]

crop insurance, 21, 26, 33, 36-37, 45 ~; 254-255,

312-313,320,321,328 ~]

cropping systems, 46 ~; 287, 308-309 ~

disaster assistance, 19, 26, 36-37,45-47 ~I]; 276, 310,

312-313,319-322,326-328 ~]

domestic demand, 282 ~]

drought and, 13,45 ~]; 288,293,304-305 ~

@land, 33 ~; 218,291,296,299 ~

economic issues, 276, 277-278, 280, 288, 291, 292 ~

environmental concerns, 284, 289, 292,294-296 ~

farm structural changes, 286,304-305 ~

Federal programs, 278-280,284 ~

fertilizers, 88 ~; 219,307 u]

growing season, 13,33 ~; 287,303 ~]

information and management technologies, 46 ~; 284,

305,307-308,323-328 ~

institutional setting, 310-316 ill

intensive farming practices, 33,46,87-88 ~; 304 ~

legislation, 46-47 ~; 278-279,311,312,318, 321 ~]

rnicroclime modification, 303 ~

policy options, 46=47 fl/ii]; 316-328 ~]

in prairie pothole region, 26, 33-34 11/111

regions of United States., 281, 283 U]

research and extension, 16-17, 22, 26, 35, 46, 133, 135

~]; 279,297,299,305,308, 309,310,317,323-324,

326 ~

salinization problerns, 259, 284, 294-296, 297 (11

Sodbuster Program, 284 ~

soil conservation, 278, 279, 301, 310, 322, 324 u]

soil moisture and, 10, 11 ~; 303 ~

subsidies, 17, 19 ~; 192, 297, 310, 312-313, 318,

320 ~

Swarnpbuster Program, 284 ~; 192-194,201 ~

technologies, 45,46 ~; 297-309 ~

trends, 281-286 ~

water demand and supply, 31,45 ~/Il_j; 288-289,292-294,

296,300,313, 322 ~

NOTE: Volumes 1 and 2 of the report are indicated by ~] and [II], respectively.

I 345
346 I Preparing for an Unwrtain Climate-Volume 1

water pollution, 29,32 ~; 217,219,278-279,284, 292,

294,296,328 ~; 168, 17’0-171, 251 ~

wetlands, 26, 28, 31, 33-34, 47 ~; 276, 278 U];

170-171, 192-194, 199,200 ~]

world demand, 282-284 ~

see alko crops; irrigation; livestock; U.S. Department of

Agriculture

Alabarn& 270,273,305 ~

Alaska, 13,50-52,81,82 ~]; 166,221 ~; 161, 163, 168,

185,209,221 ~

alpine areas, 91 ~]; 181,225 1~

American Indians, 212,222,243 ~

Antarctic

ice cores, 80 ~

ozone layer hole, 73 ~]

arid West

agricuhww, 276 ~

drought, 210,288 ~

irrigation subsidies, 240, 313 ~

precipitation pattern shifls, 9 [~1

protected natural areas, 52 ~q

snowmelt, 213 ~

water supplies, 212 ~

water transfers, 18 ~]; 292-;!93 ~

wetlands, 13, 47, 125 ~; 167, 176, 178-179, 181,

184-186,201,202,209 ~]

&iZOM, 215,223,224,237, M, 250,272-273 ~

Arkansas, 13 ~]; 270,280 ~

Arkansas River Basin, 228,292,293 ~

Association of State Floodplain Managers, 184 ~]

Babbitt, Bruce, 30,37 ~

bamier islands, 39, 79 ~]; 154, 156, 158, 165, 176-178,

185-186, 199-200 ~; 194 ~

Battelle Paci.tic Northwest Laboratory, 141, 143 ~

bears, 225,226,2411111

biodiversity

conservation, 49, 55-56, 109 ~~; 220, 232-233 ~;see

aho natural areas

Everglades, 29 ~

forests and, 336-342 ~

Gap Analysis Project, 129 ~]; 270-271 I?Il

National Biological Survey, 37,48,53,129,137,149, 150

~; 283-284 ~

preserves and, 19,49 ~]; 239,258 ~

protection, 53 ~; 258 ~]

wetlands, 167, 172, 178, 180, 182-183, 186 ~]

Biosphere Reserves, 29 ~; 230,246-248,275,288,

289 ~

biotechnology, 23 ~; 284,306-.307,315,323, 325 ~

birds, 29,33,51,93, % ~; 218,226,301 ~; 165,

226-228 ~

Brown, George, 117 ~

Bureau of Land Management, 50 ~; 222, 248 ~; 188,

222,224,225,229,231, 235,237,240,242-244, 261,

270,277,279,289,313, 33;!-334, 336,338,340,344,

347 ~

Bureau of Reclamation, 43, 136 ~]; 233-234, 240, 243,

246, 248,249-250,254, 257,263, 294,295, 313 ~;

204,252 ~

California, 273 ~]

agriculture, 31 ~; 280, 294-297, 304, 315 ~

Central Wley Project, 31 w]; 219,223,224,236,238,

241,296-297 ~; 209,252,255 ~]

coastal population, 31 ~

drought, 22,32 ~; 238-239,261 ~

Drought Water Bank, 236,238-239 ~

fins, 1,90 ~, 261 ~

f100dS, 253 ~

Imperial %lley, 237 ~]

irrigation districts, 237-238 ~

Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge, 294-296 ~

Metropolitan Water District, 224, 236, 237, 241, 247,

261-262 U]

Owens Mey, 216,237,238 ~

Peripheral Canal, 32 ~; 237 ~

San Joaquin Viilley, 294-296,297 ~

San Luis Dam, Canal, and Reservoir, 295 ~

State Water Project, 31 ~; 236,238,251,259 ~

water issues, 13,31-32 ~]; 214-215,216,219,222, 223,

224, 227, 236, 237, 240-241, 246, 247, 259-262,

294-2% ~; 210 ~

wetlands, 155, 160-161, 183,209, 277 ~

Canada, 33 ~; 230-231,260,298,299 ~; 190 ~

carbon dioxide, 71-74, 75, 87-89,94,98 ~

Antarctic ice cores, 66,71,80 ~

atmospheric concentrations, 50, 65,66,73, 80, 89 ~

doubling effects, 70,75,76,93 ~; 166,290 ~

ecosystem productivity, 88-89 ~

emission scenarios, 72, 73 ~

fertilization effect, 11, 66, 70, 87-89 ~; 287 ~;

175-176,323 ~

long-term records, 71,80 ~

SinkS, 51 ~; 165, 168, 185, 310-311 ~

CtibOU, 50 ~; 185,225 ~]

Carnegie Cornmis sion, 143 ~]

Carnegie Mellon University, 140, 143 ~]

Carson River Basin, 248,251 ~

Chesapeake Bay, 81,87 ~; 157 n]; 163, 175, 176, 183,

199 m

chlorofluorocarbons, 65,72, 73, 112 ~

Clean Water Act

fuhery improvement, 82 ~

municipal sewage treatment funding, 197-198, 202, 220-

221,242 ~

non-point-source pollution, 215, 220 ~]; 200 ~

reauthorization, 44 ~]; 219,220-221 ~

water conservation, 44 ~; 264 ~

watershed management, 25,48 ~]; 205, 206, 209, 210,

220,215,256 ~

wetlands protection, 36,48 ~; 202, 221 ~; 154, 155,

157, 159,178-179,188, 189, 191, 195-196, 198,200,

203,205-206,209-212 ~]

clouds and cloud cover, 68, 87 ~
Index 1347

coastal areas

barrier islands, 39,79 ~; 185-186,199-200 ~

beach nourishment and shoreline protection, 41-42 ~;

154, 168, 172-176,202,204 ~

building codes, 199 ~

demographic trends 155-156 ~]

development pressures, 39,40 ~; 166 ~]

development subsidies, 17, 18,21 ~; 172, 176,177 ~]

disaster assistance, 21,41 ~; 171-173, 198-199 ~

erosion, 9,26,39,41,51,79 ~; 155,156, 157,170-171,

181, 187-188, 191, 194-195, 201 ~; 173, 182, 183,

186 ~]

flood insurance, 18, 21, 26, 41 ~; 168-171, 180-182,

194-198 ~]

flooding, 155, 156, 157 ~]; 186 @IJ

hazard assessment and mitigation, 26,40 ~]; 166, 167,

174-175, 183-185, 198-199,200,201,203 (J]

hurricanes and coastal storms, 13, 39,90 ~]; 154, 155,

159-166, 171, 188-191 ~]

institutional fragmentation and regulatory obstacles, 18

~]; 178-179 ~]

land acquisition, 200,201 ~

management legislation and programs, 21, 41 ~]; 154,

178-179, 185-194, 196,201 ~]; 193 ~

mangroves, 29, 99 I?/II]; 160, 172 I?U

policy options, 4042 ~]; 194-204 U]

population pressures, 5, 13,31,39,82 ~; 154,156 ~

retreat policies, 175, 179, 188, 192-193, 197 ~; 207 ~

risk allocation and management, 154 ~; 201 ~

saltwater intrusion, 13,32,96 ~; 215 ~; 176, 182 ~

sea level rise, 8-9, 13, 39, 79,93,94 ~; 154, 155-157,

159, 197 ~; 173-174, 182, 186 ~]

setback provisions, 175, 179, 181, 187, 196,201,202 ~;

193, 195,206 ~

“takings” issue, 177-178, 191 ~

tax code subsidies, 21-22 ~; 168, 176,200 ~

V zones, 168, 169, 171, 181, 196 ~

vulnerability, 5,6, 13, 15,39 ~]; 154-166 ~

wetlands, 9, 12, 15, 21,47 ~; 159, 160, 165, 190, 202

~]; 169-170, 180-183,186,193,201 ~]

Coastal Barrier Resources System, 185,200 ~

Colorado, 213,215,238,246,248, 272,280,285,292,293

~]; 179,257 ~]

Colorado River Compact, 224-225 ~]

Colorado River Basin, 13 ~; 216,224-225,237,239, 246,

259 ~

Columbia River, 260 fl]; 175 ~

Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES),

113-115, 118, 121, 132, 133, 136, 138, 146 ~

Committee on Science, Engineering, and public Policy

(COSEPUP), 4,6,110 ~

Comecticut, 269 ~]

consenfation

biological diversity, 49,55-56, 109 ~

Federal programs, 278-280 ~]

forest, 55-56 [I/II]; 346 ~

funding, 54 ~]; 265-266 ~

habitat, 236-238 ~

incentives, 21 ~; 287-288 ~

SOil, 278, 279, 301 ~

species, 54, 127 ~]; 235-238 ~

wetlands, 278 ~]; 192-193 ~]

see also water conservation

Conservation Reserve Program, 233,278,284,318 ~; 190,

191, 194,268,287 ~]

Consortium for International Earth Science Information,

274 ~

conventions and treaties

Biodiversity Convention, 109 WII]

Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2, 109 U/II]

Montreal Protocol, 73, 109 ~]

crop insurance, 21, 26, 33, 36-37,45 [I/II]; 172, 199,

254-255,312-313,320, 321,328 ~]

crophmd

distribution and land area, 277,282,294 [1]

forest clearance for, 296 D]

hatvested acreage, by crop, 284 ~

irrigated, 282, 287-289, 294-296, 301-302 ~]

soil moisture, 100 ~]

crops

adaptation to climate change, 1’7 w]; 291, 298-300,

308-309 ~

barley, 302,311 ~

breeding, 277,289,298-299,306, 323,325, 327 Q]

contingency pl arming, 22 ~

corn, 278,284,285,287,288, 289,291,298,299,300, 302,

303,305,306,311 ~

cotton, 87 ~; 284, 301, 302, 306, 308, 311 ~

disease- and pest-resistant, 299,306-307 U]

drought-tolerant species, 300 U]

exports, 277-278 ~

genetically engineered, 307,325 U]

Kenaf, 309,311 ~

new crops, 300, 308-309, 325 ITJ

nutritional quality, 287 ~

oats, 300, 311 ~

oilseeds, 309, 311 ~

range, 9 ~]; 276, 277 ~

rice, 284, 287, 611 ~

sensitivity to climate change, 13,45, 81 ~]; 287-289 ~

simulation, 290, 308 ~]

sorghum, 284, 287, 301, 302, 303, 305, 309, 311 U]

SOJ&MllS, 45,81 ~; 278,284,285, 287, 300, 305, 306,

311 ~

sugar cane, 287 ~]

wheat, 33, 34 ~]; 277, 278, 284, 285, 287, 288, 291,

298-299,300,301,303, 305,306,311 ~]

yields, 290,305,306,322-323 ~

see also crop insurance

Crown of the Continent Project, 249 [H]

dams, 17 ~]; 215,258,293 U]

Delaware, 269 ~]

Delawiue River Basin, 23,24 w]

Delmarva Peninsula, 157 ~

desalination, 259-260111
348 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

disaster assistance

agricultural programs, 19, 26, 36-37, 45-47 ~]; 276,

310,312-313,319-322, 3:26-328 ~]

congressional oversight, 199 [1]

for crop losses, 7,21,45,46-47 ~;

deftig disasters, 21,46-47 11/IIJ; 320,328 ~

Federal share, 198,310 ~

CrOp iIISUHUICe, 21, 26, 33, 36-37, 45 ~; 172, 199,

254-255,312-313,320, 321,328 ~]

emergency loans, 173, 176,279, 313 ~]

hazard-reduction programs and, 166, 198-199111

for hurricanes, 7 fl/II]; 154, 172 ~

legislation, 41,46-47 ~]; 17’1, 183-185,203,312,313,

321 ~

Mississippi River floods, 7 WDJ, 228-231 ~, 175 ~

payments, 7,47 ~]; 154, 172,310,312,321,328 U]

policy options, 4748 ~; 198-199,203,310,319-322,

326,327 ~]

Pxtsidential disaster declarations, 178, 185, 199,312 ~

public assistance grants, 168-169,171-172, 198,199 ~]

reforms, 19,21,40,4647 ~; 154,172-173,198-199 ~

risk perception and, 21,26 ~~

self-insurance program, 322 CIl

disease, 14,88-89 ~]; 224 ~

drought

agricultural effects, 13,45 ~]; 288,293,304-305 ~]

assessment programs, 255 ~

Australia, drought policy, 252, 320 ~

Cab.forni% 22,32 ~]; 238-239 ~

economic effects, 228 ~

Florid% 28-29 ~

fiequcncy, 69 ~

government assistance, 34 ~]

inland water transportation and, 227-231 ~, 288 ~

interagency task force, 22,43 [~

legislation, 255 ~

management, 27, 42 ~; 251-256 ~

pests and, 94 ~]

policy options, 43 ~;254-2i6 ~

prairie potholes and, 33-34 ~]

precipitation pattern shifts and, 9 ~

preparedness plsnnin g, 255 m

public-awareness programs, 255 ~]

severity index, 69 ~; 228 ~

State plans, 27 ~, 252 ~

water bank, 236,238-239,279 IU]

water resources and, 42 ~]; 210, 251, 293 ~; 179 ~]

Ducks Unlimited, 129 ~; 195 [lTJ

Earth Day 1993,2 ~

Ecological Society of America, 138 ~; 268,269 ~

economic issues

adaptation nxearch, 133-134 ~11’1

in agriculture, 276-278,280,288, 291 ~

drought, 228 U]

fisheries, 31 ~;163-lW, 183 ~

forests, 302, 316, 328-330, 332, 335-336, 341-342,

345-349 IJI-J

gross national product, 10 ~

preserves, 232 ~]

transportation, 14, 15 ~; 227, 231 ~

water quality and quantity, 5,7 ~]

wetlands, 154-155, 162-164, 166, 178, 183 ~

ecosystems

adaptability to climate change, 6,79-80 ~

anthropogenic stresses, 66, 88, 90-91 ~

arctic, 87 ~]

corridors, 242-243 ~

declines and diebacks, 93-94 ~

direct climate impacts, 91-96 ~

fragmentation, 19,49,66,90 ~; 239-240 ~

Greater Yellowstone, 19 ~; 226,243-245, 2S0 @IJ

Holdridge Life Zones, 91, 95, % ~

management models, 244-250 @IJ

research, 35,53-54, 111, 148-150 ~; 269 ~

restoration, 17 ~; 154-156,276-277 ~

water resources and, %-98 ~

education, see public education

Electric Power Research Institute, 143 ~

endangered and threatened species, 29, 30, 31, 47, 53, 93

~]; 219,221,235-238 ~; 162,165,183,186,190,

192,208,221,225,232-233, 241,258,268 ~

energy use

sensitivity and adaptability, 6, 14, 15 ~

water resources and, 211-213, 227 ~

Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 150 ~

Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve pro268 ~

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

adaptation march, 133, 135 ~

agriculture-related programs, 280 ~]

assessments of climate change, 100, 102-103, 110,

143 ~

climate change research, 75, 133 ~; 289, 290 ~;

207 ~]

Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program, 193,

199,200,210-211,268, 270 ~

watershed management, 245 ~

wetland management, 48 ~; 178 ~; 155, 157,179,188,

189, 193,205,206 ~

evapotranspiration, 13,33,65,69,77,97,98 ~

Executive Orders

Executive Order 11988 (Flood Plain Management), 192,

198 ~]

Executive Or&r 11990 (Protection of Wetlands), 155,

192, 198 ~

Executive Order 12656,252,254 ~

Experimental Forests, Ranges and Watersheds, 23,56 ~;

231 ~

extreme events

climate change and fkequency of, 1,66 ~; 250-251 ~

contingency planning, 5,22-23,26-27 ~

management, 4243 ~; 250-257,262-263 ~

@iCy O@OIIS, 22-23 ~; 194-202, 254-257, 319-322

~; 342-347 ~]

uncertainty about, 10-11 ~
Index 1349

wetlands effects, 172, 176, 183-184 IITj

see also droughts; f~es; floods

farms, see agriculture; crops

Farmers Home Administration, 173, 176, 279, 313 ~]; 192,

201,203,212 ~

Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and

Technology (FCCSET), 20, 30 n.7, 38-39, 110, 113,

139, 146, 148 ~; 324 ~

Federal Crop Insurance Program, see crop insurance

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 156, 168 ~

Community Rating System, 180, 182 ~; 208 ~]

disaster assistance, 171-173, 179, 198-199,254 ~

flood insurance, 178-179, 180, 197 [Ii; 193 ~]

floodplain mapping, 171, 197 ~

hazard-mitigation requirements, 41 ~; 198-199,203 ~

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 233 ~]

Federal Insurance &-hm.ru‘ “stration (FM), 168, 171, 196 ~

Fim Island, 171 ~

fms

ecological benefits, 51,90, 100 ~]

forest, 1,9, 12,22,26,27, 100 ~], 317, 32AI, 325,327,

329, 330,342-347

management in protected areas, 261-263 ~

fisheries

Aleutian-North Pacific, 13,50,51-52,81-82,86 ~;

185 ~]

anadromous species, 82,95 ~

commercially important species, 83-85 ~]

die-offs and declines, 29, 31,81 [~

effects of climate change, 13,51-52,81-82 ~]; 173-174,

183 ~]

endangered and threatened, 31 ~~

estuarine-dependent, 81 ~~

industry, 50, 81-82 w]; 190 ~

Imuisiana-Gulf of Mexico, 84 [I/II]; 173-174 ~

overfishing of, 51-52 ~]

oysters, 81 ~; 186 ~

regional charactetitics of, 83-85 11/Il_j

Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, 31 ~

salmon, 31, 50, 81, 82 ~; 215 ~]; 226

Shlimp, 29 ~]; 174, 186 ~

striped bass, 31, 81 ~; 183 ~]

temperature effects, 81 ~]; 215, 219 ~

wetlands role, 47, 81 ~~; 163-164, 174, 181 ~

Fish and Wildlife 2000,277 ~]

flood-control measures

coastal areas, 174-175 [Ii; 183 ~

Federal agencies involved in, 254 ~]

jurisdictional fragmentation, 25 ~]; 233-234 U]

migration of wetlands and, 12 ~/lIl; 182 ~

and storm surges, 213 ~

water resource pl arming and, 42 ~

and wetlands, 47 ~; 162, 164, 166, 168, 174, 182,

183 ~]

floodplain

development, 10 ~/II]; 253 ~]; 192 ~

management, 43 ~; 168, 179-180,253,256 ~]; 208 ~

mapping, 171, 197 ~

wetlands, 161 ~1]

floods

coastal areas, 39 [I/II]; 155111

infrastructure aging and, 227 ~]

insurance, 168-171, 180-182 ~]

land area subject to, 253 ~]

management, 253-254, 256-257 U]

Midwest (1993), 1,7, 10, 15, 22 ~; 231 ~; 203 ~

national assessment board, 22,43 ~]; 256 ~

policy options, 22 ~; 256-257 ~

vulnerability to, 253-254 ~

see also National Flood Insurance Program

Florida

agriculture, 280, 285, 305 ~

barrier islands, 39 w]

building codes, 179, 193 ~

coastal management, 187, 191, 193, 200 ~]

coastal population and development, 155, 156, 164, 174,

179 ~

droughts, 28-29 ~

endangered species, 241 ~]

Everglades, 25,28-30 D/II]; 219 U]; 205,209 ~

fisheries, 84 ~

flood control, 28 ~]

hurricanes, 1,7,22,28,29 ~]; 154-156,163-165,171 [1]

mangroves, 172 ~]

protected areas, 257 ~]

sea level rise, 79 ~]; 156, 157 ~

water issues, 28, 42 ~]; 215, 219, 223, 261, 270 ~;

210 m]

wetlands, 160, 161, 164, 175, 182, 207, 209 ~]

Forest I.zgacy Programs, 57 ~/H]; 335,341,341 ~]

forest management, 6 [I/II]

even-flow-harvest requirement, 22 ~; 347-348 ~

private lands, 56 ~]; 334-336 ~]

protection of forest health, 22,56 ~/IIl; 343-347 ~

public lands, 332-334 [II]

risk communication, 22,26 ~]

response to climate change, 17, 55, 56 ~; 330-336 ~

trends, 27 ~]; 317, 319-3201111

Forest Stewardship Program, 57 ~/II]; 335,341,342 ~]

Forestry Incentives Program, 57 ~~; 335,341,342,346 ~

forests

adaptability, 6, 15, 19,23,54,55 11/II]; 320-330 ~]

Blue Mountains, 27 ~; 318-319, 329 ~]

boreal, 50,51 ~]

carbon releases, 51 ~]

COZ concentrations and, 66 ~/II]; 323 ~]

conservation and preservation methods, 55-56 ~]

declines and dieback, 9, 12, 54, 55, 56, 93-94 ~;

342-346 ~

dispemal and colonization rates, 12 ~; 304-305,

308-309,311,315 ~

fins, 1,9,12,22,26,27,100 ~; 261-263,317,324,325,

327, 329, 330, 342-347 ~

forest health, 22,56 ~]; 343-347 ~]

fragmentation, 21, 55 ~~; 326 ~]
350 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

hurricane darnage, 189-190 [1]

incentive programs, 56-57 ~TI]; 342, 346-349

land area, 54 ~; 303-304,308-309,311, 315 ~

legislation, 56-57 ~]; 312-314,343,346,348 ~]

migration, 12, 14,52,54,94 [I/II]; 321-323,332-333,336

monitoring, 125 ~]

policy options, 21,22 ~; 336-349 ~

precipitation pattern shifts and, 9 ~

private lands, 21 ~; 341-342,346-347,348-349

research, 23, 55 ~

resources, 301-303, 315-317 ~

seed banks, 23, 55-56 ~/II]; 336-338 ~

vulnerability, 6, 15, 19,54-55 fl/11’l; 324,326-328 ~

types, 304 ~]

see afso timberland

fossil fuels, 2 ~]; 212,227 ~

General Accounting Office (GAO), 186, 200, 252 ~; 189,

264 ~]

general circulation models (GCMS), 78,91,99 ~]

COZ doubling effect, 76 ~]; 166,290 U]

global climate change predictions, 68-70 ~

precipitation changes, 76 ~]

principles, 68 ~]

runoff predictions, 212-213 p]

soil-moisture predictions, 9, 11,69,77-78,99, 101 ~~

temperature predictions, 2, 29,67,76 ~

uncertainties and generalities in, 68-70 ~]; 213 ~]

vegetation shifts, 91 ~]

Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL), 9, 11,76,

78,99-101 ~; 290 ~; 322 ~

Georgia, 157, 186, 194,215,270 ~; 164,210 ~

Gibbons, John, 112 ~]

Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), 9, 11, 76-78,

100-101 ~; 290 ~; 322 ~]

Gore, Albert, 147 ~/11]

Great Lakes, 13,14,75 ~]; 166,186,192,228,230-231 ~;

186 ~]

greenhouse gases

atmospheric concentrations, 65, 74,75 ~~

Climate Convention and, 2 ~111

emissions, 2, 74 ~

feasibility of reduction, 2 ~/iI]

predicted changes in, 71-73 fl,q

SOU.KXS, 72, 73 ~]

groundwater

adaptation to declines in, 301-302 ~]

integrated management with surface water, 23, 25 ~];

210,250,246-247,301-302 ~

overdrafts, 9 fl/H]; 212,218, 2!23-224 ~]

pollution, 219,284 ~]

precipitation pattern shifts and, 9 ~

reasonable use doctrine, 222111

saltwater intrusion, 29 ~; 155, 212, 213,217, 219 ~;

176 ~]

Gulf Coast (U.S.), 12, 13, 39 [I/II]; 156, 159, 164, 167,

217-218 ~]

Gulf of Mexico, 79 ~]; 156-157 U]; 175 ~

Gunnison River Basin, 248 ~]

habitats

consemation plans, 236-238 ~]

fragmentation, 3,5,13,19,86,92-93,96 ~

needs of wildlife, 226 ~

wetlands, 164-165 ~]

Hawaii, 1,71,85 ~]; 166,273 ~; 168 ~]

hazard assessment, coastal, 26,40 ~; 166, 167,

183-185 U]

Hazard Mitigation Grants program, 180, 183-185 ~

health (human), 6, 14, 15 ~/ll”j

HoMridge Life Zones, 91,95,96 ~

hurricanes and storms

Andrew, 7,22,29 ~; 154-156, 163,165,168,171,172,

179, 193 ~]

coastal effects, 13, 39 ~; 159-166, 189-191 ~

contingency plans, 22 ~]

damage-producing potential, 161, 163, 166,202 ~

economic costs, 163, 165, 168, 172, 189-191 ~

Federal disaster payments, 7 ~; 154, 172 ~

flood-insurance claims and payments, 168 ~

historic, 159-160 V]

Hugo, 7,22 ~; 154, 155, 163, 165, 168, 172, 175-176,

188-191 ~]

Iniki, 154, 155, 168 ~

intensity, 11,75 ~; 159, 160, 162-163 ~]

personal losses, 159, 191 ~

property damages, 189 ~]

redevelopment in high-risk areas, 25 ~]

Saffi.r-Sirnpson scale, 162-163 ~

hydrologic cycle, 96-97 ~]; 212-213 ~]; 165, 174, 175,

186 ~]

hydropower, 9 ~]; 211,227,231,233,248 ~

ice/snow melts

agricultural effects, 289 ~

mountain snowpacks, 32, 67, ;

oceanic effects, 79 m]

IU1’10ff and, 213 ~]

sea ice, 50-51,71, 79 ~]

sea level rise and, 69, 79 ~

temperature increases and, 70

transportation and, 14 ~/11]

1 ml

156 ~

w]

Idaho, 273,280 ~; 244,260 ~

~OiS, 186,231,271,280,285, 288,305,315 ~]

Illinois River, 228,230 ~]

Indian Reservations, 222-223,243 ~]

Indiana, 270,285 ~

indigenous cultures, 50, 51, 83-85 ~]; 212 ~; 185 ~

information technologies

agricultural applications, 46 ~/IIl; 284, 305, 307-308,

323-328 ~]

Geographic Information Systems, 129 ~; 273 ~

inland watemays

barge traffic, 227-228,288 ~

dredge and fill activities, 188, 189, 198, 229-230 ~
Index I 351

drought effects, 227-231, 288 ~

shipping, 14 ~/TI]

insects, 81, 86, 88-89, 94 ~/IIl; 288

IntergovemmentaI Panel on CIimate Change (IPCC), 2,4,6,

72, 115 fl/11]

climate change predictions, 10, 32, 68, 73, 111 ~]

scientific assessment of climate change, 71,74, 100, 102,

103, 110, 118 [MU

sea level predictions, 78-79 ~]; 156, 159 ~]

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, 245,

249 [1]

Interstate Council on Water Policy, 252 ~

Iowa, 33 [I/In; 271, 280, 285 IIj; 181 (II]

irrigation

adaptation to climate change, 303-304 ~]

alternatives to, 296, 301 ~]

conservation technologies, 4 ~; 282, 301-305 ~]

cropland distribution and acreage, 280, 282, 294, 301 ~

groundwater withdrawals for, 301 ~]

moisture consewation and, 303 [1]

Newlands Project, 252-253 ~]

with reclaimed water, 261, 293 ~

in saline soils, 294-296 ~]

scheduling, 303, 305 ~]

subsidies, 17, 26 ~/II]; 240, 310, 313, 322, 326, 327 ~;

200 @]

water quality and, 294-296 ~

water supplies and, 217, 237, 239, 276, 288-289, 304 ~

wetlands losses and, 184 ~]

Kansa.s, 271,285, 298,301 [1]; 183 ~

Kentucky, 271 ITl

Kissimmee River, 28, 29-30 ~; 204 ~]

Land Acquisition Priority System, 208,266 ~]

Land and Water Conservation Fund, 230, 237 ~

Land-use planning, 129 ~/II]; 201 ~]; 159, 206, 207, 229,

248 [II]

Legislation

Acid Precipitation Act, 141 ~~

Agricultural Credit Act, 203 ~]

Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 221 [II]

Baucus-Chafee Water Pollution Prevention and Control

Act, 220 P]

Central VWey Projecl Improvement Act, 224,264 ~

Clean Air Act, 314,318 [II]

Clean Water Act, see Clean Water Act

Coastal Barrier Improvement Act, 186 ~

Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 40,48 ~; 180,185-186,

199-200 ~]; 193, 194,201, 212 ~]

coastal development, 191 ~]

Coastal Zone Management Act, 21,37,40,41 ~; 180,

186-188, 191-194, 199, 201 ~]; 192, 193 ~]

Coastal Wetlands Pkmning, Protection and Restoration

Act, 192, 194,202 ~

Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978,56-57 ~],

335, 346 ~

Dingell-Johnson Act, 191 IITJ

drought-related, 255 ~

Duck Stamp kt (see Migratory Bird Hunting and

Conservation Stamp Act)

Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurricane Hazards

hlSUHiIICe Act of 1993,41 ~]; 203,204 ~

Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, 48 ~;

190, 191-192, 194,208,209,212,267 ~]

Endangered Species Act, 30, 31 ~; 219 ~; 192,

210,223,233,235-236, 255,258,267,288,313, 315,

319 pI]

Energy Policy Act of 1992,44 ~; 242,264 ~

Energy Security Act, 141 ~

environmental impact assessments, 38 ~

Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act,

29 ~

existing statutory language, 37-39 ~

Farm Bills, 36-37,46, 56 ~; 278-279, 312, 313, 321,

324,327 ~; 335,341,346,348 ~]

Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937, 191,

267-268 ~

Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act of 1950, 191,267-

268 ~]

Federal Crop Insurance Act, 312 ~

Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1990,321 ~

Federal Disaster Preparedness and Response Act of 1993,

41 ~; 203 ~

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 279,

280 ~

Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 313,

334 ~

Federal Power Act, 38 ~

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 189 ~

Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1980,54 ~; 291,

266,268,288 ~

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 38 ~; 192 @Il

Flood Disaster Protection Act, 168 ~

Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act, 309,312

~; 190, 192,194,268,335,341 ~

Food Security Act of 1985,312 [~; 191, 192, 194 ~

Forest Ecosystems and Atmospheric Pollution Act of

1988,279,343 ~

Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research

Act, 336,343 ~]

Forest and Renewable Resources PI arming M of 1974,

312, 325 ~

forest management, 56 ~]

Hatch Act, 315 ~

Henderson Wetlands Act of 1984,209 ~]

Housing and Community Development Act, 180-181 ~

Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 190 ~

Magnuson Fishery Act, 82 ~

Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 228 ~]

Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act

(Duck Stamp Act), 184,189,190, 194,200 ~

Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 228 ~

Merrill Act, 315 ~]

Multiple Use and Sustained-Yield Act, 312 ~

National Environmental Protection Act, 276 ~
352 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat%Volume 1

National Environmental Policy Act, 38 ~]; 155, 192,

199,255,312 ~

National Forest Management Act, 347 ~

National Flood Insurance Act, 168, 180 ~; 193 ~]

National Flood Insurance Compliance, Mitigation, and

Erosion Management Act of 1993,41,43 ~; 194,

203, 256,263 ~

National Flood Insurance Reform Act, 194,203 ~

National Forest-Dependent Rural Communities Economic

Diversification Act of 1990,336,348 ~]

National Forest Management Act, 22 ~; 312 ~]

National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,228,234,

314 ~]

National Parks and Recreation Act, 245,314 ~

National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of

1966,228 ~

North American Wetlands Conservation Act of 1989, 190,

208 ~]

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 311,318 ~

Open Space Preservation Act of 1991,200 ~]

Pacdlc Northwest Electric Power Plannin g and Conservation Act, 38 ~

Pittrnan-Robertson Act, 191 [D]

protected natural areas, 228-230 ~]

public land acquisition, 38 ~1.IJ

Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 334 ~]

Reclamation Act of 1902,313 ~

Reclamation Projects Authorization and M@stment Act

of 1992,44 ~; 264 ~

Refuge Recreation Act of 1962,228,264 ~

research authorization, 38 MQ

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899189 ~]

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 171, 180, 184, 1.98 ~

Safe “ Drinking Water Act, 227,280 ~

Science Policy Act of 1976,20,38-39, 146-147 ~

Smith-Lever Act, 316 ~

Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act, 326 ~

Tax Reform Act of 1986,242 ~]; 194,200 ~]

Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake-Water Settlement Act,

254 ~]

U.S. Global Change Research Act, 39, 113, 150 ~]

Water Bank Act, 190, 194,200 ~]

Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 219,245,249

I?J; 209 ~

Water Quality Act, 280 ~

Water Resources Development Act, 29,44 ~]; 250,264

~; 192 ~

Water Resources Pl arming Ac1., 38 ~; 249 ~

wetland protection, 47,48 ~Q; 188 ~]

Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 1’79, 229,256 @l]

Wilderness Act, 221,224,229,239,256, 267,312 ~]

Wildlife Refuge Adrmms “ “ tration Act, 264 ~

livestock, 200, 202, 280-281, 285, 288-290, 300, 304, 306,

309-310 ~; 178 ~

Long-Term Ecological Research Program, 268,271,283 ~

huisiana, 39,40 ~; 156-157,166,215,270, 280,315 ~;

160, 163, 173-174, 182, 192, 194,204,209 ~

Maine, 159, 170, 188, 192,269 ~; 182,206,207 ~

Man and the Biosphere Program, 246-247,275,288,289 ~;

see ako Biosphere Reserves

marine mammals, 50,51, 52 ~; 190-191 ~

Marine Sanctuaries Program, 194 ~

Maryland, 157, 176,269,315 ~]

Massachusetts, 225,240,269 ~]; 164,210,259 ~

Massachusetts Institute of ‘Ikchnology, 143 ~

Mauna Loa Observatory, 71 ~

methane, 51,65,72,73 ~

Mexico, 215,217-218 ~]; 190 ~]

Michigan, 192-193,271,285 ~; 189 ~

migration

corridors, 12 ~]; 223-224, 242-244, 286, 287 ~

facilitation of, 187,206-208 ~

flyways, 183,227,247,253,255 ~

forests, 12 ~]; 321-323,332 ~]

fragmentation of habitats and, 92-93 ~; 181,242 ~

obstacles to, 12, 93,94 ~; 180, 182, 186 ~

preserves, 247,250-251 ~]

wetlands, 12,47, 93,94,99, 100 ~; 166, 192 ~; 176,

180, 182, 186,206-208 ~

Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, 189 ~

Minnesota, 33 ~]; 271,280,285,290 ~; 173, 181 ~

Mississippi, 270 ~; 164, 173, 174 ~

Mississippi Delta, 12,79, 129 ~; 157,215 ~]; 173-175,

182, 183 ~

Mississippi River

barge backups, 227-231,288 ~

diversions, 260 D]

drought effects, 10 ~; 228-231 ~; 175 ~

flooding, 7, 10, 15,22 ~; 228-231 ~; 175,204 ~

Gulf Outlet, 204 ~

international controversy, 230-231 ~

navigation on, 228-231 ~

MiSSOUli, 13 ~]; 229,230,271,285 ~

Missouri River, 227,229,232 ~]

Mitigation and Adaptation Research Strategies (MARS),

118, 132-134, 138 ~

models/modeling

crop simulation, 290, 308 ~

Extended Streamflow Prediction, 248 ~

funding for, 250 ~

hydrological, 38,44 ~; 248 D]

Integrated Climate Change Assessment Model, 143 ~

for water-management decisionmakm“ g, 248 ~]

Weather Resources Forecasting System, 248 ~

see also general circulation models

Montana, 33 ~; 232,272,285,313 ~; 173, 181,244,

277 ~]

municipal sewage treatment, 220-221 ~; 155, 200-201 ~

National Academy of Sciences @JAS), 54, 100,

102-104,140,143,149, 252 ~]; 157,166,185-186,

281-282 ~

National Acid Precipitation Assessment program (NAPAP),

140-142 ~]
Index 1353

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 119, 131,

136, 141 ~/11]

ecological studies, 125, 134-135 ~]

Global Climate Change Program, 274 ~]

Mission to Planet Earth, 122-124 ~~

National Biological Suney, 37,48,53, 149, 150 ~; 199,

200,210-211,283-284, 289-290 ~]

National Commission on the Environment, 145 fl/111

National Committee on Propexty Insurance, 165 ~]

National Estuary Program, 234,280 ~; 193 ~]

National Flood Insurance Fund, 169-170 [1]

National Flood Insurance Program, 166 ~

claims and payments, 163, 168, 170 ~]

coastal high-hazard (V) zones, 168, 169, 171, 196-197 ~

community participation, 168-169, 253 V]

costs per structure, 170 D]

disaster-assistance grants, 168-169, 172, 199 ~

erosion zones and management standards, 170-171, 194-

195 ~

Federal financial liability, 169, 196 ~

flooded-properties-purchase program, 175, 180 ~

floodplain-management standards, 168, 179-180 ~]

hurricane damages, 163 ~

legislation, 41,43 ~; 168, 194,203 ~

mandatory participation, 168, 170 ~]

mapping and rate structure, 197 ~]

premium rates, 21 ~; 169, 194, 197 U]

reform options, 21,22,40,41 ~/H]; 154, 194-198, 203 ~

risk calculations, 257 ~]

sea level rise and, 22 fl~; 197 ~]

Section 1362 Flooded Properties Purchase Program,

180 ~

Upton-Jones Relocation Assistance, 175, 178, 180-182,

197-198 ~]

wetland development and, 193, 206, 208 ~

National Forest Genetic Resources Program, 56 ~]; 337 ~

National Forests, 50 ~; 190, 222,223 [1]; 229, 230,231,

309 l-11]

National Institutes of Health, 315 ~]

National Marine Fisheries Service, 31 (I/II]; 155, 157, 188,

189 ~]

National Marine Sanctuaries, 231 ~]

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adrmru“ “stration; 231 ~]

adaptation research, 133, 136-137 ~

coastal-hazards-management program, 41 ~~; 178, 186,

194,201,203 ~

Estuarine Habitat Program, 208-209 ~]

Habitat Restoration Program, 203 ~

National Acid Precipitation Assessment Plan, 141 ~]

non-point-source-pollution-management program, 201 ~

Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management,

188 ~]

USGCRP research budget, 131 ~]

Water Resources Forecasting System, 248,250,264 ~]

wetlands protection, 188, 193, 194 ~]

National Park Service, 30,136 ~]; 188,220,221,223,224,

226,228,233,243-245, 251,255,260,275,278, 285,

313-315,332,334,344 ~

National Parks

acquisition of sites, 266, 267, 286 ~]

categories, 228 ~

Everglades, 25,28-30 D/II]; 219 D]; 205,209,251 ~1

Glacier, 238,249,251 ~

Grand Canyon, 238 ~]

endangered species, 235 ~

land area and sites, 226 ~]

legislative framework, 228,234 ~

management philosophies and goals, 221, 223, 230,

262-263 ~

research needs, 282 ~]

Rocky Mountain, 257 ~]

value, 232, 238 ~

water rights, 222, 223 ~

Yellowstone, 100, 132 ~/II]; 220, 227, 238, 251,

261-263 ~

Yosemite, 238,251 ~]

National Research Council, 112,136-139,145 w]; 306 ~:

181, 185 ~]

natural resources

agriculture, 275-329 U]

coasts, 153-204 ~]

forests, 299-351 ~

preserves, 219-291 ~

water, 209-273 ~]

wetlands, 153-213 ~]

National Science and ‘lkchnology Council, 147 ~

National Science Foundation, 35, 133, 137, 141, 143, 149

W-m; 315 p]; 193 ~

I.mng-Term Ecological Research Program, 271-272 ~]

National Water Coremission, 265 ~

National Weather Service, 193 ~]

National Wetlands Inventory Program, 125, 129 ~]; 162,

165, 199,200,278 ~]

National Wetlands Policy Forurn, 185,200,208 ~

National Wetlands Priority Consemation Plan, 190, 191 ~]

National Wild and Scenic River System, 229, 230 ~]

National Wilderness Presemation System, 221, 224, 228-

230, 243, 267, 278, 279, 285 ~]; see afso wilderness

areas

National Wildlife Refuges, 50 ~; 220,227,279 ~]

acquisitions, 190, 194, 266, 286 ~

Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan, 238,247-

248 ~]

Browns Park, 250 ~]

Cheyenne Bottoms Wildlife Area, 301-302 [1]

~S biCS, 250 ~

Ding Darling, 257 ~]

endange~d and threatened species, 235 ~

Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 243 ~]

Kesterson, 294-296 ~; 251 ~

land area, 226,240 ~

legislative framework, 228 ~]

management philosophies and goals, 221, 223, 225, 231,

238-239,260,264 ~]

Pelican Island, 228 ~]

policy options, 282,286 ~]
354 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat&Volume 1

Stillwater, 251,252-254 ~

water-allocation issues, 252-254 ~]

wetlands, 171, 255 ~]

natural areas

acquisition policies, 17,21,2,2,36,54 ~]; 222,264-268,

291 ~

adaptability, 19,53 ~; 21!0, 258-264,266-268 ~

Alaskan, 50 ~

buffer zones, 242-243,244,245,246 ~

climate change and, 49 ~; 222, 254, 256-258 ~

defined, 224-225,227 ~

distribution, 227,240,247 ~m

disturbance management challenges, 259-264 ~

economic issues, 232, 236 ~IJ

and endangered species conservation, 235-238, 258 ~]

exotic species, 260-261 ~

fn management, 261-263 @IJ

human impacts, 248,250-251,263-264 ~

institutional fragmentation, 20, 52 ~; 220, 222, 240,

243, 250 ~

invento~ing, and monitoring, 22, 23 ~; 268-279,

280-285 ~

land acquisition, 189-190 ~]

landscape fragmentation, 23!~-240, 241-243 ~

legislative framework, 228-2.30 ~

management philosophies and goals, 52 ~; 220, 221,

222,223,230-231,244-246 ~]

pest control, 260-261 ~

protection strategies, 284-289 ~

research, 22,23 ~]; 268-2’79, 280-284 ~

shifling with climate change, 49 ~; 220 ~]

size considerations, 5, 19,23 ~; 225-226, 241 ~]

stresses (existing), 49 ~];:220, 239-253 ~

Sustainable Biosphere Initiative, 138 ~; 269 ~

water allocation issues, 251, 252-256 ~

see a/so national parks; naticml wildlife refuges; wilderness areas

me] Nattue Conservancy

Last Great Places Initiative, 246-248,273,283,288 ~

National Natural Heritage Program, 230,273 ~

wetlands protection, 195 ~]

Nebraska, 271,280,285,298,301 ~; 183 ~

Nevada, 12 ~; 215,216,273 ~]; 183 ~

New Hampshire, 269 ~

New Jersey, 157, 176, 187, 269I ~]

Pine Barrens, 245-246 ~

New Mexico, 216,217,246, 272 ~

New York, 156, 157, 171, 173, 187,269 ~]

Adirondack Park, 248-249 ~lJ

non-point-source pollution, 201, 220 ~]; 199, 200 ~

North American Free Trade Agreement, 217 ~

North Carolina, 133 ~; 172, 179,187,188,191,193, 195,

270 ~]; 161, 182 ~

North Dakota, 33,34,48 ~]; 232,250,272,285,289 ~;

181 ~]

Northern Forest Lands Study, 249 ~

Office of Management and Budget, 117, 121, 147 ~

Office of Science and ‘Ikchnology Policy (OSTP), 20,38-39,

54, 113, 149 ~; 281-282 ~

Ogallala Aquifer, 223,301-302,304 ~]

Ohio, 271,285 ~

Ohio River, 227-229 ~

oil and gas exploration and development, 50,52 ~;

190 m

Okefenokee Swamp, 90 ~

Oklahoma, 272,285 ~; 183,259 ~

Oregon, 159,273 ~; 155,210 ~

Blue Mountain forests, 27 ~; 318-319,329 ~

Orovi.lle, Lake, 251 ~

ozone layer depletion, 67, 73, 112 ~

Pennsylvania, 270,315 ~; 173 ~]

pest control, 14,56,81,86,89 ~; 260-261,279,292,

307 ~]

photosynthesis, 87$88,96 ~]; 175 ~

policy issues and options

adaptation and mitigation mearchprogram, 147-148 ~

agI’iCUkU.d, 4647 ~; 316-328 ~

barrier island subsidies, 199-200 ~

beach-nourishment and shoreline-protection programs,

202,204 ~]

biodiversity protection, 336-342 ~]

classiflca.tion criteria for research, 147 ~

coastal zone management, 200, 201, 203-204 ~];

206-208 ~

commodity support programs, 17, 19, 45, 46 ~;

317-319,326,327

communication of risk, 19, 21-22, 25-26 ~

consemation incentives, 21 ~; 287-288 ~]

contingency pl arming, 19,22-23,26-27 ~]

cross-ageneycoordination, 48 ~]; 201 ~; 186-187,202,

282,288-289 ~

disaster assistance, 47-48 ~]; 198-199, 203, 319-322,

326,327 ~

drought management, 43 ~]; 254-256 ~

flood insurance, 194-198,203 D]

flood management, 256-257111

forests, 21,55-56 ~]; 336-349 ~]

geographic fragmentation, 19-21, 23 ~]; 186-187,

244-250 ~

irrigation subsidies, 322, 326, 327 ~

land acquisition, 21,54 ~]; 200 ~; 196-197,207,

291 ~

National Biological Survey, 37, 48, 53, 149, 150 ~;

283-284,289-290 ~]

protected areas, 21,53-54 ~]; 210,279-291 ~

reauthorization cycle, 36-37 ~

reseamh and information gaps, 19, 23, 27, 30, 35 ~

research augmentation, 19, 20, 53-64 ~]; 144-150 ~;

210-211,213,281,290-291 ~

science interface with, 117-119 ~

statutory language, 37-39 ~

U.S. Global Change Research Act amendments, 150 ~]

water-demand management, 242-243 ~
Index 1355

water-marketing, 243-244 ~

water-quality management, 48 ~11

water-supply management, 249-250, 262 ~]

wetlands protection, 21, 47-49 ~]; 200, 202 ~];

195-213 ~

poph.r Island, 157 ~]

population growth

agricultural demand and, 282, 284 ~

coastal areas, 5, 13, 31, 39 [~1

water supplies and, 212, 214-215, 218 ~

Potomac River Basin, 245 ~]

prairie potholes, 9, 12,26,33-34,47,48 ~; 160-161,181,

183-184, 186, 190,202 ~

precipitation

distribution and forms, 79,98 w]

predicted changes, 9,65,69,75-76,98 ~

soil moisture and, 10, 77 w]

temperature increases and, 10, 68 ~

water resources and, 13 o~

wetlands and, 19 ~; 175 ~]

presemes, see natural areas

Presidential Initiatives, 113 ~1]

public education

coastal hazards, 41 D/II]; 203-204 ~

drought mitigation, 255 D]

risk communication through, 26, 41 w]

water conservation, 240, 302 ~

public lands

acquisition policies, 17, 21,22,36 w]; 264-268 ~]

administration of, 50 ~]; 226, 231 ~]

for nature conservation, see natural areas

water rights, 222, 223 [1]

Puerto Rico, 189 [1]; 209 [II]

Puget Sound, 159 [~; 175, 182 [II]

recreation, 6, 25 ~I]; 211-212, 228, 231, 232, 248 ~;

162-164, 168, 183, 184, 202,232,239,328-330 ~

remote sensing, 123-132 [I/II]; see ako satellites

research

adaptation, 30, 111, 132-139, 147-148 u/TI]

agricultural, 16-17, 22, 26, 46 C/II]; 279, 297, 299, 305,

308-310,317,323-324, 326 ~

appropriations process, 35-36 fl/11]

cross-agency coordination, 20, 22, 54, 131-132 ~/TI’j;

282-283 ~]

ecosystem-scale, 35, 53-54, 111 ~/lI]; 290 ~

integration of information systems, 270-274 ~]

new developments, 115-117 w]

policy options, 20, 53-64 ~/II]; 144-150 ~; 281,

290-291 ~

in protected areas, 239 ~; 282 ~]

satellite vs. nonsatellite measurements, 122-131 ~~

wetlands, 23, 4849 ~/H]; 193-195, 210-211, 213 @l

see also U.S. Global Change Research Program

Research Natural Areas, 229,231, 272-273 ~]

reservoirs and reservoir systems, 7, 32, 43 ~]; 210, 227,

232,244-246,251,257-259, 263-264,294-296,

313 m

Resource Conservation and Development Program, 279 ~

Rhode Island, 269 ~

Rio Grande Basin, 13 ~]; 215,217-218, 249-250,298,

309 ~

river basin management, 20 ~; 210,224-225,244,249 ~

rivers, flood-control measures, 10, 12 ~

IUIIOff, 69-70, 77, 86 ~; 212-213, 217 ~

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, 159, 239,295 ~

Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, 26,31-32 ~];

216 ~

San Francisco Bay, 32 ~]; 159 ~]; 155-156, 175, 182 ~

San Joaquin River, 294-296 ~

satellites

Earth Observing System, 122-124, 127, 139, 140 ~

Landsat, 126-127, 129, 130, 131, 132 ~]

limitations of, 130-131 w]

passive sensors, 126 n/111

temperature measurement, 67 ~

sea level rise

cause, 68-69, 78-79 ~

coastal effects, 8-9, 13,39, 79,93,94 w]; 155-157, 159,

213 ~

f100d iIISUEUICe and, 197 ~

historic, 78 ~]

Louisiana, 173-174 ~]

Poplar Island erosion, 157 w]

predicted changes, 32,65,74,78-79 1111]

saltwater intrusion, 13, 55 ~]; 213 ~]; 182 ~]

setback legislation and, 187 U]

storm surges and, 8-9 ~]; 155, 162-163,213 ~; 173 ~]

wetlands and, 9, 12, 19, 29, 47 ~]; 192 ~]; 176 ~

seed banks, 23, 55-56 ~1(11

Small Business Mn_unIs “ “ tration, 163, 173 ~]

Small Watershed Program, 233 ~

soil moisture

agriculture and, 10, 11, 34 ~; 303, 308 u]

precipitation patterns and, 10,77,86 ~

predicted changes, 11,69,77-78,99, 101 ~

remote sensing, 127, 129, 131 ~]

soils

carbon emissions, 51, 98 ~]; 185 ~

conservation, 233, 254, 279 m]

erosion control, 284 ~]; 164 ~

nutrient cycling, 88,96, 98-99 ~]; 175 ~]

percolation rates, 77 D/II]

salinization, 259, 284, 296, 297 ~

vegetation changes and, 98-99 m]

Sou~ Carolina, 1;5, 157, 175, 177-179, 188-191, 193,

270 ~

South Dakota, 272,285,289 ~]; 181 [II]

South Florida Water Management District, 29 m]

South Platte River, 293 ~

species

adarXation to climate chamze. 49 ~/Hl; 179-181 ~
356 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat%Volume 1

extinctions, 5, 17-18 ~; 224, 241-242 ~

nonnative (exotic) and nuisance, 29,89,90,92 ~; 169,

223,260-261,288 ~]

reproductive failure, 91, 94 @@]

vulnerable, 259 ~]

see also endangered and threatened species

States

Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plans, 190, 192 ~

contingency plans for extreme events, 27 ~

protected areas, 230 ~]

wetlands protection, 195 ~]

statutes, see legislation

subsidies

a~cuhu.ral, 17, 19 ~/II]; 192, 297, 310, 312-313, 318,

320 ~

coastal development, 17 Wl; 176, 177111

forestxy, 56-57 ~~; 342,346-349 ~

irrigation, 17, 26 ~; 240, 310, 313 ~]

risk communication through reforms} 21 ~/11], 26

Superior, Lake, 230 ~]

surface water

integrated management with groundwater, 210,

246-247 ~]

prior appropriation doctrine, :222 ~]

nparian doctrine, 222 ~]

Sustainable Biosphere Initiative, 268,268 ~

“takings” issue, 177-178, 191 II]; 159, 200 ~]

taxes

casualty-loss deductions, 176, 186, 200 ~

coastal development subsidies, 40 ~; 168, 176, 186,

200 ~

losses due to hurricanes, 190 ~

reforms, 40 ~; 242-243 ~,

policy options, 21-22 ~]; 200,322 ~]

risk communication through reforms, 21-22 ~]

water-conservation incentives, 242 ~]

wetlands conservation incentives, 190, 191, 194, 200,

212 ~]

temperature

changes in, 1, 2, 10, 14, 65, 66, 68, 73, 75, 76, 91 ~]

crop yields and, 288 ~]

global long-term record, 67,80 ~

plant productivity and survival and, 80-81 11~

role of, 80-81, 86 ~]

water, 81 fl/II]; 215, 217 ~

Tennessee, 126 [I/II]; 258, 227-;!31, 271 [1]

Temessee Valley Authority, 133, 141 ~; 234, 254, 257,

258 [1]

Terrestrial Ecosystems Regional Research and Analysis

Laboratory, 274 ~

lkrrestrial Research Interest Grcup, 138-139 ~; 273-274

m

Texas, 272,309 D], 209 ~}

agriculture, 240, 280, 285, 301 ~

building codes, 179 (I]

coastal hazards, 40 ~/H]; 156, 157, 179 ~]; 173 ~]

coastal management program, 186, 194 U]

flooding, 157, 170 ~

High Plains, 223,240 ~]

hurricanes, 159, 163, 193 ~

preserve, 248 ~

sea level rise, 156, 157 ~]

water issues, 13 ~; 215, 217, 222, 223, 240, 246, 301,

302 ~

wetlands, 160, 182, 183 ~]

Tijuana River, 175, 182 ~

timberland

farmer-owned, 308-309 ~

hurricane damage, 189-190 ~]

National Forest lands, 309,311

ownership and management, 304-305, 308-309, 311,

315 ~

private timber industry lands, 305,308 ~

public lands, 311,315 ~]

revenues for conservation, 202 ~]

tourism, 6, 50,52 ~]; 189 ~; 239 ~

transportation, 14, 15 ~; 228-231,288 ~]; see aZso inland

watexways

treaties, see conventions and treaties

Txuckee River Basin, 248,252 ~]

tundra, 185 ~

adaptation to climate change, 185 ~]

arctic, 178, 179, 181, 185 ~

carbon releases, 51 ~]; 185 ~]

C02 fertilization effect, 87 ~]

indigenous people, 185 ~

permafrost, 13,51 ~/IIl; 161, 175, 176, 185 ~

vegetation changes, 51 ~]

wetlands, 13, 47 ~/II]; 161, 175, 176, 179, 181, 185 ~

United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development, 2,

109 ~

Educational, ScientKlc , and Cultural Organization,

246 ~]

Environment Program, 71, 103 ~

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Dredged Materials Program, 204-205 ~

drought-management assessment, 252, 254 ~

flood control, 254 ~

inland water projects, 175,229 ~]

Institute for Water Resources Municipal and Industrial

Needs, 242 ~]

Kissirnmee River restoration, 29-30 ~

policy options for improvements in, 249-250 ~

reservoir management, 43 ~]; 232,246,257,263-264 ~

responsibilities, 233 ~

shoreline protection and beach nourishment, 41-42 ~];

159, 173-175,202,204 ~]

water demand-management evaluation program, 248 ~

wetlands protection, 48 ~; 178, 202 V]; 155, 157, 158,

164, 174, 188, 189, 192-194, 199,203-206,210,

212 pl]

U.S. Department of Agriculture, 141 ~

agriculture regions, 278, 280, 281 ~
Index 1357

Agricultural Stabilization and Consemition Service, 311

~]; 188, 191 ~

Alternative Agricultural Research and Commercialization

Center, 309111

assistance programs, 279 ~

Commodity Ctedit Corporation,311, 314 ~

drought-watch system, 256 [TJ

Economic Research Service, 316 [1]

Farmers Home Ad.num“ “stration, 173, 176, 279, 313 ~;

192, 201,203, 212 ~]

National Resource Inventory, 193 ~]

research and extension, 16-17, 22, 26, 35, 46, 133, 135

fl~l; 279,297,308,310,315-316, 323-325 ~

resource assessment and program evaluation, 325-326 u]

Soil Conservation Semice, 233,254, 157,279,302, 310,

316, 322, 324, 326 0]; 157, 188, 190, 193 ~

Water Bank Program, 190 ~]

water-related responsibilities, 190, 233 ~

wetlands protection, 48 ~/H]; 157,171, 184, 188, 190, 191,

203, 212 ~

see also U.S. Forest Service

U.S. Department of Commerce, 141 D/II]; 233 ~; 163 ~]

U.S. Department of Defense, 133 ~]; 188 ~]

U.S. Departxnent of Energy, 131, 133, 136, 141, 143 fl/II];

233,315 ~]

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 136, 141

11/11]

U.S. Department of Housirtg and Urban Development, 133

ll~l; 176 Kl

U.S. Department of Interior

adaptation research, 133, 135 ~

coastal barrier mapping, 186 ~

conservation incentive programs, 287 ~

ecosystems research, 274, 281 [~

Everglades policy, 30 ~/H]

global change research budget, 119-120 ~]

interagency activities, 141 fl/II]; 245 w]

land acquisition, 266 ~

land-management agencies, 224,225,228,240-241 ~

monitoring initiatives, 270, 274 ~]

National Biological Survey, 37, 48, 53, 149-150 ~/IIJ;

199,200,268,278,283 [11]

public lands, 35, 131-132 ~/11]

water-marketing role, 44 ~]; 243, 264 ~]

water-related responsibilities, 233-234 [1]

see also National Park Service; U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service

U.S. Department of State, 141 ~

U.S. Department of Transportation, 173, 176 ~

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 168, 176 ~]; 200 ~]

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 220,226,231 ~]

Endangered Species Program, 235-238 ~]

f~hing limits, 31 ~/11]

Gap Analysis Project, 129 ~; 193, 199, 208,

270-271 ~

land acquisition, 200 U]; 190 ~1]

lands administered by, 225,228, 244 ~]

management philosophy, 221, 238-239 ~]

National Wetlands Inventory Program, 125, 129 l?/IIj;

162, 192, 193, 199,200 ~

National Wetlands Research Center, 193,210 ~]

North American Waterfowl Management Plan, 202,

208 ~]

responsibilities, 234 ~

“take” permits, 237 ~

wetlands protection, 48 ~; 155,157,164,165,170, 179,

188-190, 192, 193, 199,212 ~]

water rights, 244 D]

U.S. Forest Service, 56, 125 ~; 188, 222,225-227, 229,

231,240,242,244,249-251, 261,263,266,270,274,

279,289,309,312,313, 325,326,332,334,336, 338,

340,343-345,347,349 m

U.S. Geological Survey, 136, 137 ~]; 166, 234,248,250

u]; 193,199 m]

U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)

adaptation and mitigation research, 23, 110, 112, 116,

138-139, 147-148 ~]

appropriations, 121-122 ~]

Assessment program, 23, 111, 115-117 ~

balance among participating agencies, 110, 131-132 ~

broadening, 145-148 ~]

budget, 23, 35, 112, 116, 119-132, 139, 143, 148 ~;

281 ~]

Climate and Hydrologic Systems and Biogeochernical

Dynamics research, 120 ~

Earth Process Research, 120, 136 [I/III

Ecological Systems and Dynamics research, 23, 53-54,

111,120,134-136,139, 148-150 ~]; 269,275,281,

290-291 ~

Economics Initiative, 136 w]

Human Interactions research, 120, 134, 136, 139 ~

integrated assessments, 111, 112, 140-143, 146, 150 [T/lTJ

mission and priorities, 3, 4-5, 30, 49, 110-112, 114, 116,

118-133, 136-138, 139 ~

Integrated Modeling and Prediction, 115, 120 ~

oversight, 143-144, 150 ~

policy options, 143-150 ~]; 281 ~]

structure, 110, 112-115, 117 ~

Utah, 272 U]; 183 m]

Vermont, 269 ~

Virgin Islands, 189 ~

Virginia, 163, 198, 270,313 ~

Washington, 159,227,273,285 ~]

water allocation

agricultural demand and, 288-289, 292-294, 296, 313 ~

conservation practices and, 240-244 ~

demand management and reallocation, 4243, 44 ~;

210,235-244,264 ~

“dry-year” option contracts, 293 ~

institutional problems, 18 ~]; 224-225 ~

marketing and transfer arrangements, 32, 42, 4344, 45

~]; 210,235-239,243-244, 264,313,322 ~

pricing reform, 21,42 ~; 210,218, 235,239-240,

243 ~
358 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

prior appropriation doctrine, 179, 251 ~

Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, 31,32 ~

transfers, 18 ~; 225, 250, Z!92-293, 322 ~

Water Bank Program, 279 ~

water conservation, 210, 240-244 ~]

demand management and, 42 l~; 210,240-243,264 ~

and drought management, 254. ~

economic incentives and disincentives, 240-243, 263 ~

in Federal facilities, 44 fl/II]; 242 ~]

interruptible water service programs, 247 ~

metering and use restrictions, 301-302 ~

municipal programs, 241, 242 ~

policy options, 242-244 ~]

pricing reforms and, 239-240,243 ~

public education and, 240-241,302 ~]

reclamation and recycling, 4344 ~]; 210, 218, 243,

260-262,264,322 ~

seasonal storage programs, 247 ~][

supply management, 244-250 ~

tax reforms and, 242-243, 322 ~

technologies, 242-243,289,301 U]

wetlands protection and, 184 [~

water quality

agriculture and, 29, 32 ~; 217, 219, 278-279, 284,

294-296 ~]

drought and, 215 ~

Federal programs, 279 ~

f~h populations and, 215, 219 ~

incentive programs, 318 ~]

legislation, 29 ~; 219,220-221, 278-279p]

non-point-source pollution, 215, 220 ~

Rio Grande and, 217-218

thermal pollution, 81 ~; 215,217,227 ~]

Water Quality Incentives Program, 278-279 ~

water resource system stress

population, 214,216 U]

water quality, 215-219 ~, 28-29 ~

environmental needs and, 219 ~]

reserved water rights, 221-222

groundwater overdraft, 223-224

outmoded institutions, 224-22!$ ~, 18 ~

aging water tiastructure, 225

climate change and, 210,212-213 ~, 15 ~, 75-78 ~

Water Resources Council, 249 ~j; 196 ~

water rights, 18 ~]; 212, 221-2’23, 225,240,243-245,302

~]; 178,179,251,255 ~

water supply augmentation, 257-:262 ~

reservoirs, 257-259

desalination, 259-260

intemgional diversions, 260

wastewater reclamation, 260-262

water supply management

coordination, 21,23-25,36,42 ~], 210,244-245,263 ~

reservoir system management, 245-246 ~

conjunctive use, 246 U]

analytical tools and forecast systems, 247-248,250,264 ~]

river basin commissions, 249 [~

water resources council, 289 ~]

water project reassessment, 249-250 ~

groundwater management, 250,301 ~]

extreme events management, 250-257,262-263 ~

floods, 253-254,256-257,262-263 ~

CkOU@tS, 27,42,251-252,254-256, 262-263 ~

Wt@fOW1, 13, 29, 33,34, 126 ~; 235-238, 294, 301-302

~; 155,162,164, 183-186, 194,218,221,228 ~

watershed management, 25,36 ~; 220,225,244-245,249,

250 ~; 209-210 ~

West (U.S.), see arid West

West Virginia, 190,271 ~

Western Governor’s Association, 243,252 ~]

Western Water Policy Review, 44 ~; 212,264-265 ~

wetlands

adaptation to climate change, 12, 15, 111 ~];

172-185 ~

agriculture, 26, 28, 47 ~; 276, 278, 294 ~; 170-171,

192-193, 199,200 ~

alpine, 181 ~

biodiversity, 167, 172, 178, 180, 182-183, 186 ~

buffer zones, 192,200 ~]; 207 ~

coastal, 9,12,15,47 ~; 159,190 ~; 160,169-170,179,

181-183, 186, 194 ~]

conservation, 278 ~; 159, 192-193 ~]

coordination of protective efforts, 48 ~]; 191-192,

212-213 ~

deftition for regulatory purposes, 157-158, 165 ~

distribution, 50 ~; 160-161,168, 170 ~

economic issues, 154-155, 162-164, 166, 178, 183 ~

extreme events and, 172, 175, 176, 183-184 ~

Federal programs and legislation, 4748 ~; 154-159,

187-208,211-212,278 ~

fberies, 81, % ~]; 163-1 (M, 174, 179, 181, 183,

185 ~]

flood management and, 22,47 ~; 162, 166, 167, 174,

181-183, 186 ~

forested, 129, 161 ~], 176, 183 ~]

thgrnentation, 25 ~, 171-172, 176, 181, 186 @IJ

Ikshwater nontidal, 160, 168 ~

groundwater declines and, 301-302 ~

importance, 47 ~; 162-166, 168,183, 188 ~

interagency taak force, 198 ~

inventory, 125, 129 ~]; 162, 199, 200 ~

land acquisition, 189-190, 194, 198-199,207-209 ~]

10ss, 19,47 ~]; 170, 179, 180-181, 184 ~

management, 17 ~; 178 ~; 186-187, 208-210 ~

mangroves, 160, 175 ~

migration, 12,47,93,94,99, 100 ~; 192 ~]; 176, 180,

181, 182, 186, 187,206-208 ~

mitigation and restoration, 12,48 ~]; 221 ~]; 154-155,

174, 188, 190-191, 194,201-206,250 ~

monitoring, 23,47,48, 129, 131 ~; 186, 187, 193-194,

199-200,202,208-210, 213 ~

“no-net-loss” policy, 5,47 ~; 185-186, 192, 195, 198,

209 m

policy challenges and options, 47-48 ~]; 200,201 ~;

185-186, 195-213 ~]

e U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:l 993-301-804/96971
Index 1359

prairie potholes, 9, 12, 26, 33-34,47, 48 ~/II]; 160-161,

181, 183-184, 186, 190, 202,208,278 ~]

priorities, 21,47 ~/H]; 157-158,206-209 ~

protection, 48 fl/II]; 200-202 ~; 165, 178-179, 184,

195-201 ~1]

research, 23,48-49, 111 ~/H]; 193-195,210-211, 213 ~]

Iiparia, 13, 47, 125 ~/IIl; 167, 176, 178-179, 181,

184-186, 201, 202,206 ~

salt marshes, 87 11/II]; 160, 167, 175 ~]

saltwater intrusion, 176, 182 ~

sea level rise and, 9, 12, 19, 47 ~/II]; 173-174, 182,

186 [n]

species adaptation to climate change, 179-181 ~]

State, local and private programs, 195 ~]

tidal freshwater marshes, 160, 175, 182, 188 ~

tundra, 13,47, 87 ~/Kj; 161, 175, 176, 179, 181, 185 ~]

typeS, 160-161 ~

vegetation, 93, 94 ~; 160-161 ~]

vulnerable areas, 12, 13,47 w]; 181-185 ~]

Wetlands Reserve program, 48 ~; 233,278,318 ~]; 190,

191, 194,202,212,268,287 ~

White House Office of Environmental Policy, 196,212 ~

wilderness areas, 50 ~]; 221,225-227,235,239, 243,246,

251,256,261,263,267, 278,279,282,286 ~]

wildlife

adaptation, 92 ~

habitat fragmentation, 86 ~

management, 192 ~]

migration ability, 92-93 ~

trapping, 165 ~

Wisconsin, 271,285 ~]

wise use movement, 178 ~

World Meteorological Organization, 71, 103 ~/TIl

Wyoming, 272 ~; 244 ~]