This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 48 

Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc.,

 Appellant,

 v.

General Motors LLC,

 Respondent.

Russell P. McRory, for appellant.

James C. McGrath, for respondent.

Greater New York Automobile Dealers Association; Evans

Chevrolet; New York State Automobile Dealers Association; New

York State Automobile Dealers Association; Alliance of Automobile

Manufacturers et al., amici curiae.

RIVERA, J.:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit certified to this Court questions requiring our

interpretation of two provisions of New York's Franchised Motor

Vehicle Dealer Act (Dealer Act), codified at Vehicle and Traffic

Law § 460 et seq. The first question concerns the propriety of a

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franchisor sales performance standard that relies on statewide

data and some local variances, but fails to account for local

brand popularity. Based on our reformulation of the question, we

conclude that use of such a standard to determine compliance with

a franchise agreement is unlawful under the Dealer Act. The

second question asks whether a franchisor's unilateral change of

a dealer's geographic sales area constitutes a prohibited

modification to the franchise. We conclude that it does not.

I.

The underlying federal action involves a dispute

between franchisor and Chevrolet car manufacturer General Motors

LLC (GM), and a Westchester County-based franchised motor vehicle

dealer, Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. (Beck). Beck is a long-time

automobile dealership with a Chevrolet franchise dating back to

GM's predecessor-in-interest. During the predecessor's

bankruptcy proceeding, Beck entered a Wind-Down agreement to

terminate its franchise in exchange for a money payout. After GM

acquired certain of the predecessor's assets, GM rescinded the

Wind-Down agreement and entered a Participation Agreement with

Beck. The Participation Agreement, along with Beck's Dealer

Sales and Services Agreement with incorporated Standard

Provisions (Dealer Agreement), allows Beck to operate as a GM

franchise operation.

Under these agreements GM required Beck to achieve a

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specified level of sales performance within a geographic location

designated by GM, referred to as an Area of Geographic Sales and

Service Advantage (AGSSA). The AGSSA consists of U.S. census

tracts closest in proximity to the dealer, subject to certain

traffic condition adjustments. GM carves out an individual

dealer's AGSSA from a geographic sales region known as an Area of

Primary Responsibility (APR), which is shared by a group of

dealers in the same urban location. Dealers, like Beck, are

responsible for the sale and marketing of Chevrolet vehicles and

products within their respective AGSSA.

GM measured Beck's sales performance based on a Retail

Sales Index (RSI), a methodology commonly employed by vehicle

manufacturers in the United States, and applied by GM to all its

dealers. The RSI is a percentage determined by a fractional

equation, which divides a dealer's actual total retail sales

during a particular time period, by the dealer's expected sales. 

In other words, the mathematical representation of an RSI is

actual sales (the numerator) over expected sales (the

denominator), multiplied by 100.

Expected sales are determined using a multistep

formula, whereby GM determines Chevrolet's statewide market share

for a particular type of vehicle segment--for example a mid-sized

sedan or pickup truck--then multiplies that number by the total

retail motor vehicle registrations in the dealer's AGSSA for that

same segment, and repeats the process for each vehicle segment. 

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The results for each segment are combined to achieve the dealer's

total expected sales in its AGSSA. By way of illustration,

assume in a given year that Chevrolet has a particular mid-sized

sedan model and that the sales of that model represent 12% of all

mid-sized sedans sold in New York State (constituting one vehicle

segment). Further assume that the number of mid-sized sedan

registrations in a dealer's AGSSA is 1500, meaning there are 1500

mid-sized sedans registered in the AGSSA. In that case, 1500 is

multiplied by the 12% statewide share, equaling 180 expected

sales for this segment. This same mathematical formula is

repeated for each segment of vehicles in which Chevrolet

competes, meaning in each segment for which Chevrolet has a model

that could be sold in New York state. Assume four segments

total, and that the formula results in the following expected

sales by segment: 180, 120, 75, 25. These are added together for

a combined number of 400. The 400 represents the dealer's total

expected sales and will be the denominator in the equation used

to determine the dealer's RSI.

As stated, GM includes in the dealer's expected sales

only registrations for vehicle segments in which Chevrolet

competes, and does not include registrations for non-Chevrolet

vehicle segments. Through this segmentation or

"segment-adjustment" GM accounts for local popularity of

particular types of vehicles. For example, if pickup trucks are

less popular in a given AGGSA, compared to the rest of the state,

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a dealer's expected sales are adjusted downward.

A 100 RSI constitutes satisfactory performance of a

dealer's sales obligations under the Dealer Agreement. 

Nevertheless, GM treats this not as a perfect score but as an

average score, and as explained in the Dealer Agreement, GM

expects dealers below 100 "to pursue available sales

opportunities exceeding this standard." GM's Dealer Rating

System classifies dealers as follows: "Superior" for a 100 or

greater RSI, and the dealer is in the top 15% of all dealers in

the state; "Satisfactory" for a 100 RSI and the dealer is not in

the top 15%; "Needs Improvement" for a 85 to 99.9 RSI; "Needs

Significant Improvement" for an 84.9 or lower RSI and the dealer

is not in the bottom 15% of dealers in the state; and

"Unsatisfactory" for an 84.9 or less RSI and the dealer is in the

bottom 15%. 

Applying this rating system to the hypothetical dealer

in the prior example, if the dealer sells 400 Chevrolet cars,

because its expected sales were also 400, the dealer's RSI is 100

(400 divided by 400 equals 1, multiplied by 100 to achieve an RSI

as a percentage). Since the dealer achieved its target sales,

which constitutes an average sales performance, the dealer would

be rated "superior" if the dealer is in the top 15% of all

dealers statewide, or "satisfactory" if the dealer is not in the

top 15%. If the dealer with the same expected sales of 400 sells

instead 200 Chevrolets, then its RSI is 50 (200 divided by 400,

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equals .5, multiplied by 100 to achieve an RSI as a percentage).

The dealer achieved only half of its target sales, and would be

rated as "needs significant improvement" if the dealer is not in

the bottom 15% of all dealers, or "unsatisfactory" if the dealer

is in the bottom 15%.

Unless all dealers meet or exceed their expected target

sales, there will be some dealers who score below 100. A below

100 score is below average performance. Since the expected sales

number is based on an adjusted state market average, as the

number of sales increases, so do the number of actual sales

necessary to achieve a 100 RSI. In other words, the RSI sales

performance measure moves upward (or downward) depending on

market variations. Consequently, a dealer's performance is

dependent on the performance in the market against which the

dealer is measured, and the statewide market is subject to local

variations, only one of which is reflected in the RSI (vehicle

segment preference).

Under the Participation Agreement, GM required Beck to

trend-up to the 100 RSI average benchmark within three years. In

the first year Beck had to attain an RSI of 70, in the second

year an 85 RSI, and a 100 RSI in its third year. When Beck

failed to timely achieve these RSI scores it defaulted on the

Participation Agreement, and potentially became subject to a

"needs significant improvement" or "unsatisfactory" dealer

rating.

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In the middle of the second year, GM notified Beck that

it would extend the dealer agreement into future years on

condition that Beck met its performance requirements, including

achieving the 85 RSI by the second year's end, and the 100 RSI in

the third year. Failure to achieve the 85 RSI in the second year

meant that "GM shall have no obligation to extend the Dealer

Agreement." By separate letter GM also informed Beck that it was

increasing its AGSSA by four census tracts in Westchester County,

and reducing the AGSSA by seven tracts in Bronx County. 

After Beck sued GM in State court alleging violations

of the Dealer Act based on the performance standard and changes

in the AGSSA, GM removed the action to the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York. After procedural

history not relevant to the questions certified to us, Beck filed

a second amended complaint asserting, inter alia, two Dealer Act

claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The first claim

alleged that GM used an unreasonable, arbitrary and unfair

performance standard in determining Beck's compliance with its

agreements, pursuant to VTL § 463 (2) (gg), and sought to enjoin

GM from using a New York statewide average to calculate Beck's

sales performance. Beck claimed the RSI was unreasonable and

unfair as a matter of law because it failed to account for local

customer preferences and low brand popularity in New York's

downstate region. The second claim alleged that GM's unilateral

change to Beck's AGSSA was an unfair modification within the

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meaning of VTL § 463 (2) (ff), because the new area enlarged

Beck's sales territory, with the effect of increasing Beck's

sales targets and facility requirements.

The district court held against Beck on both claims,

and Beck appealed. The Second Circuit determined that resolution

of the appeal depended on unsettled New York law, and certified

two questions concerning the propriety of GM's performance

standard and unilateral modification under the Dealer Act (787

F3d 663 [2d Cir 2015]). The first certified question as framed

by the Second Circuit asks

"Is a performance standard that requires

'average' performance based on statewide

sales data in order for an automobile dealer

to retain its dealership 'unreasonable,

arbitrary or unfair' under New York Vehicle &

Traffic Law section 463 (2) (gg) because it

does not account for local variations beyond

adjusting for the local popularity of general

vehicle types?"

The second certified question concerns GM's revision of Beck's

AGSSA, and asks

"Does a change to a franchisee's Area of

Primary Responsibility or AGSSA constitute a

prohibited 'modification' to the franchise

under section 463 (2) (ff), even though the

standard terms of the Dealer Agreement

reserve the franchisor's right to alter the

Area of Primary Responsibility or AGSSA in

its sole discretion?"

II.

A. FIRST CERTIFIED QUESTION

As a threshold matter we consider GM's recommendation

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that we reformulate the first certified question because it is

predicated on the incorrect presumption that GM terminates all

dealers who have a below-average sales performance, when, in

fact, GM bases termination on the RSI and other relevant factors. 

Beck objects to the proposed reframing of the question, arguing

that the consequences that flow from the application of a

manufacturer's sales performance metric are relevant to the

statute's interpretation, and that Beck was threatened with

nonrenewal of its franchise solely because of its RSI score.

We agree with the parties that the question certified

by the Second Circuit posits a case in which below-average sales

performance results in termination of a dealership. Section 463

(2) (gg), in contrast, makes no mention of termination, and

instead applies to standards used to assess dealer compliance

with a franchise agreement. Such assessment may lead to

franchisor conduct short of termination, but which nonetheless

adversely impacts a dealer. 

We do not adopt the approach taken by our dissenting

colleague to the first certified question because whether a

franchisor's standard complies with VTL § 463(2)(gg) is in the

first instance a legal question concerning the propriety of the

general criteria by which a dealer is measured. Contrary to the

dissent's view of the statute, a standard can appear facially

unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair, without reference to facts

particular to any individual dealer. While a standard that

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appears fair as written may be applied in an unfair manner, and a

standard that is reasonable in the abstract may have irrational

consequences in practice, resolution of the reframed question

does not require the type of as-applied analysis advocated by the

dissent. Instead, we consider the standard's lawfulness against

benchmarks as framed by GM, which rely on general data and not an

individual dealer's facts.

Therefore, to provide appropriate guidance on the

statute's anticipated coverage, and in accordance with our

discretion in these matters, we proceed to answer the following

reformulated question,

Is a performance standard that uses "average"

performance based on statewide sales data in

order to determine an automobile dealer's

compliance with a franchise agreement

"unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair" under

New York Vehicle & Traffic Law section

463(2)(gg) because it does not account for

local variations beyond adjusting for the

local popularity of general vehicle types?

(see Barenboim v Starbucks Corp., 21 NY3d 460, 469 [2013]

[reformulating the certified question to track the language of

the statute at issue]; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v Walsh,

17 NY3d 162, 177-178 [2011] [reformulating a certified

question]).

As our well-established rules of statutory construction

direct, we begin our analysis with the language of the statute,

recognizing that "our primary consideration is to ascertain and

give effect to the intention of the Legislature" (People v

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Ballman, 15 NY3d 68, 72 [2010], quoting Matter of DaimlerChrysler

Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006][internal quotation marks

and citation omitted]). In this endeavor we are guided by the

principle that "the text of a provision 'is the clearest

indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe

unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning' "

(Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation

and Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d 106, 120 [2012], quoting Matter of

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 7 NY3d at 660).

As its title makes clear, section 463 of the Dealer Act

protects dealers from "Unfair business practices by franchisors." 

Section 463 (2) (gg) provides that,

"[i]t shall be unlawful for any franchisor,

notwithstanding the terms of any franchise

contract: . . . [t]o use an unreasonable,

arbitrary or unfair sales or other

performance standard in determining a

franchised motor vehicle dealer's compliance

with a franchise agreement. Before applying

any sales, service or other performance

standard to a franchised motor vehicle

dealer, a franchisor shall communicate the

performance standard in writing in a clear

and concise manner." 

(VTL § 463 [2] [gg]).

The Dealer Act does not define what constitutes

"unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair" performance standards. 

However, these determinates of impermissible conduct are familiar

concepts in the law (see Black's Law Dictionary [10th ed. 2014]

[unreasonable: "Not guided by reason; irrational or capricious";

arbitrary: "founded on prejudice or preference rather than on

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reason or fact"; unfair: "Inequitable in business dealings"]).

Notably, a standard need only violate one of these proscriptions

to run afoul of VTL § 463 (2) (gg). As a consequence, the

statute limits a range of performance standards made unlawful by

the Dealer Act.

Whether a performance standard is "unreasonable,

arbitrary or unfair" depends on considerations unique to the

franchise business, which is driven by sales in a competitive

market. A performance standard that measures dealer success

based on data that fails to accurately represent market

challenges would appear to undermine the franchisor and dealer’s

common goal of selling and servicing vehicles and franchisor

products. At a minimum, VTL § 463 (2) (gg) forbids the use of

standards not based in fact or responsive to market forces

because performance benchmarks that reflect a market different

from the dealer’s sales area cannot be reasonable or fair.

The standard employed here reflects GM’s acceptance

that market forces matter in assessing dealer sales performance.

The RSI is based on an equation in which the market-–actual and

aspirational–-sets the foundation for measuring a dealer’s

achievement. As GM's standard recognizes, a dealer works within

a constructed market–-one set both by externalities and by GM’s

business needs. Thus, GM measures a dealer's sales performance

by comparison to a statewide class of dealers, but adjusts the

standard to reflect certain local market peculiarities with

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respect to one metric: local consumer purchasing preferences for

certain vehicle types. Although having made the determination to

incorporate local concerns in its dealer performance standard, GM

has also specifically chosen to exclude from its measure the

impact of customer brand preference on dealership sales. Yet,

customer purchases are influenced not solely by preferences for a

type of vehicle, for which GM accounts through its segmentation

formula, but also by brand popularity and import bias. Moreover,

those dealers, like Beck, who service an assigned area in which

Chevrolet is less popular are disadvantaged when measured against

dealers in other parts of the state in which the Chevrolet brand

is stronger and facilitates dealer sales performance. Therefore,

once GM determined that statewide raw data must be adjusted to

account for customer preference as a measure of dealer sales

performance, GM’s exclusion of local brand popularity or import

bias rendered the standard unreasonable and unfair because these

preference factors constitute market challenges that impact a

dealer’s sales performance differently across the state. It is

unlawful under section 463 (2) (gg) to measure a dealer's sales

performance by a standard that fails to consider the desirability

of the Chevrolet brand itself as a measure of a dealer's effort

and sales ability. 

GM contends that inclusion of these factors is both

undesirable and unduly burdensome. GM essentially argues that it

can set a standard that misrepresents external market forces. 

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However, measuring the dealer's performance against a market the

dealer never faces is not reasonable or fair within the meaning

of section 463 (2) (gg). It is the equivalent of holding a

dealer in New York State to a standard based on the market of a

foreign country or another state without appropriate adjustments

for local differences. In both cases, the dealer is measured

against a sales landscape that is not within the dealer's

experience.

GM claims that the standard has a certain utility

because it is intended to identify dealers in need of

improvement. This boils down to GM desiring to rid itself of

ineffective dealers in order to increase its brand market share.

Certainly a franchisor has a business interest in addressing

weaknesses in its sales force. However, in doing so, a

franchisor must not deploy unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair

performance standards. The standard used by GM excludes local

variance in market competitiveness, and masks the dealer

mediocrity of which GM complains. To comply with the Dealer Act,

if a franchisor intends to measure a dealer's performance based

on a comparison to statewide data for other dealers, then the

comparison data must take into account the market-based

challenges that affect dealer success. Here, if Beck cannot keep

up with comparably placed dealers in its sales area, then

termination may be appropriate, but as it stands the RSI excludes

an important measure of comparability.

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Notwithstanding GM's claim that the RSI methodology is

consistent with industry norms, it remains the case that any

performance standard adopted by a franchisor to determine a

dealer's compliance with a franchise agreement is subject to the

limitations set forth in the Dealer Act. While we recognize that

industry norms are important because they express the wisdom

borne of experience, and reflect considered thought on the part

of industry members, they are not beyond the reach of the

statute. We are especially cautious in this regard because this

is an industry in which the parties hold unequal bargaining

positions, and an industry standard may reflect the entrenchment

of the very inequality and favoritism that the Legislature 

sought to counterbalance in the Dealer Act. Thus, GM may not

rely on a standard that is unreasonable and unfair simply because

of its prevalence within an industry the Legislature sought to

regulate.

Relatedly, assuming arguendo that the use of statewide

data reflects a certain administrative convenience, the standard

would still be unlawful because although it might not be

unreasonable or arbitrary, it is still unfair. Moreover, section

463 (2) (gg) prohibits unfair practices in order to protect

dealers, not to alleviate a franchisor's potential administrative

burdens associated with its performance standards.

Our analysis also furthers the Act's statutory purpose.

By enacting the Dealer Act, the Legislature sought to address a

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historical inequality in the vehicle franchise business that

favored automobile manufacturers over motor vehicle dealers

(Assembly Mem in Support of Legislation, Bill Jacket, L. 1983,

ch. 815, § 1, at 7; see New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v Orrin W.

Fox Co., 439 US 96, 100–101 n 4 [1978], quoting S.Rep. No. 2073,

84th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 [1956] [US Senate finding that the

"highly concentrated" automobile industry created a "vast

disparity in economic power and bargaining strength" between

automobile manufacturers and their dealers, in which

manufacturers "determine arbitrarily the rules by which the two

parties conduct their business affairs"]; see also Automobile

Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 USC §§ 1221–1225). The imbalance

placed dealers at the mercy of manufacturers who were able to

draft and impose protectionist agreements favorable to

manufacturers, placing at risk a dealer's financial investment

(see Assembly Mem in Support, at 7). As the Memorandum in

Support of Legislation explained, 

"[t]here is a great disparity in bargaining

power between the motor vehicle manufacturer

and the motor vehicle dealer. The franchise

agreements which have been developed over a

long course of dealing between the

manufacturer and the dealer have reached a

point where the dealer has few if any rights

in comparison to those of the motor vehicle

manufacturer. This results in an undue

imbalance in bargaining power and the dealer

is in many cases at the mercy of the

manufacturer. In reality, the motor vehicle

dealer who frequently has millions of dollars

invested in dealership real property,

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equipment and good will can do nothing to

oppose the will of the manufacturer without

jeopardizing this substantial investment.

This bill seeks to provide certain basic

protection for the dealer in areas where such

protection is deemed necessary. If enacted,

the protection afforded the dealer through

the terms of the bill would counterbalance

the numerous protections afforded the

manufacturer under the terms of its franchise

agreement with the dealer. The result would

be a healthier marketplace for all parties

concerned"

(id at 7; see New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal., 439 US at 100–101 n

4 [manufacturer's arbitrary "rules are incorporated in the sales

agreement or franchise which the manufacturer has prepared for

the dealer's signature"]). The legislature expanded protections

for dealers by enacting the Dealer Act in derogation of common

law contract rules, statutorily overriding agreement provisions

that were unfair to dealers (see VTL § 463 [2] [making the 2008

amendments applicable "notwithstanding the terms of any franchise

contract"]). The legislature thereby sought to affirmatively

"establish an equilibrium of bargaining power" (L. 1983, ch. 815,

at 7). Furthermore, by amending the statute to include section

463 (2) (gg), thereby imposing a writing requirement to ensure

transparency and a substantive measure of lawfulness, the

legislature identified the misuse of performance standards as one

unfair business practice that needed to be reined in. 

Our interpretation of VTL § 463 (2) (gg) should not be

understood as an invitation for a court to substitute its opinion

for a franchisor's determination of how best to achieve its

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bottom-line business goals. Decisions about how best to improve

the quality of dealerships and increase dealer sales involve

business judgments rightly left to franchisors, and not the

courts. Nevertheless, the legislature, by its enactment of the

Dealer Act, has determined it is in the interest of the state to

subject a franchisor's performance standards to statutory limits

in order to prevent unfair business practices, and has seen fit

to place review of franchisor standards squarely within the

authority of the courts.

B. SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION

The second certified question concerns GM's revision of

Beck's AGSSA, and asks

"Does a change to a franchisee's Area of

Primary Responsibility or AGSSA constitute a

prohibited 'modification' to the franchise

under section 463 (2) (ff), even though the

standard terms of the Dealer Agreement

reserve the franchisor's right to alter the

Area of Primary Responsibility or AGSSA in

its sole discretion?"

We conclude that such change is not an impermissible modification

within the meaning of the statute.

Under VTL § 463 (2) (ff) (1), "it shall be unlawful for

any franchisor, notwithstanding the terms of any franchise

contract . . . . [t]o modify the franchise of any franchised

motor vehicle dealer, unless the franchisor notifies the . . .

dealer in writing . . . at least ninety days before the effective

date, stating the specific grounds for such modification." A

"modification" is "any change or replacement of any franchise if

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such change or replacement may substantially and adversely affect

the new motor vehicle dealer's rights, obligations, investment or

return on investment" (id. § 463 [2] [ff] [2]). A franchise is

statutorily defined as

"a written arrangement for a definite or

indefinite period in which a manufacturer or

distributor grants to a franchised motor

vehicle dealer a license to use a trade name,

service mark or related characteristics and

in which there is a community of interest in

the marketing of motor vehicles or services

related thereto"

(VTL § 462 [6]). Thus, a modification is not limited to a change

in the franchise contract because other documents may be

constituent parts of the parties' written arrangement, reflecting

their shared interest in the sales and servicing of vehicles and

other franchisor products.

The statute provides the dealer with a private right of

action to challenge a modification, and places on a franchisor

"the burden of proving that such modification is fair and not

prohibited" (VTL §§ 463 [2] [ff] [3]; 469). Under the statute

"[a] modification is deemed unfair if it is not undertaken in

good faith; is not undertaken for good cause; or would adversely

and substantially alter the rights, obligations, investment or

return on investment of the franchised motor vehicle dealer under

an existing franchise agreement" (id. § 463 [2] [ff] [3]).

To the extent section 463 (2) makes unlawful certain

franchisor abuses, "notwithstanding the terms of any franchise

contract," this section abrogates contract principles which

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traditionally bind parties to their agreements (see B & F Bldg.

Corp. v Liebig, 76 NY2d 689, 693 [1990] ["The Legislature is

presumed . . . to have abrogated the common law only to the

extent that the clear import of the language of the statute

requires"]). As a consequence, a franchisor may not insulate

itself from the requirements and proscriptions of section 463 (2)

(ff) by contractually reserving in the standard Dealer Agreement

the power to revise an AGSSA, as GM did in this case. Otherwise,

a franchisor with superior bargaining power could easily

circumvent the purpose of the Dealer Act by reserving the right

to change franchise terms at will, even where a change results in

significant adverse affects on the dealer. 

The fact that the Dealer Agreement does not contain

details about the AGSSA does not remove a franchisor's revision

of the AGSSA from the ambit of section 463 (2) (ff) because a

change in the AGSSA is a change to the franchise. The AGSSA is a

subset of a dealer's APR, which is specifically referenced in the

Dealer Agreement. The AGSSA defines the dealer's geographic

sales area and serves as an essential metric of a dealer's sales

performance. As such it affects a dealer's competitive position

and ability to comply with its obligation under the Dealer

Agreement to "effectively sell[], servic[e] and otherwise

represent[] General Motors Products" in the dealer's designated

APR. In other words, a revised AGSSA has the potential to

significantly impact the franchise arrangement. GM recognized

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this very fact in its letter to Beck informing it of the

revisions to its AGSSA, which GM described as a notice "provided

pursuant to New York Vehicle & Traffic Law § 463(2)(ff)(1)."

However, by its terms, section 463 (2) (ff) (1) is

concerned only with those modifications that result in negative

consequences for the dealer, and which meet its requirements for

determining whether a change is statutorily impermissible. Thus,

the only prohibited modification is one that "may substantially

and adversely affect the new motor vehicle dealer's rights,

obligations, investment or return on investment." In addition,

the modification must be deemed unfair, meaning "it is not

undertaken in good faith; is not undertaken for good cause; or

would adversely and substantially alter the rights, obligations,

investment or return on investment of the franchised motor

vehicle dealer under an existing franchise agreement" (VTL § 463

[2] [ff] [3]).

Given this statutory language, we cannot say that a

revision to a dealer's geographic sales area categorically

violates section 463 (2) (ff). The revised area may not have a

substantial impact or be adverse to a dealer's interests within

the meaning of the statute. Indeed, a change could improve a

dealer's sales performance opportunities and competitive

position, for example by assigning a geographic area with greater

sales potential, by reducing the dealer's geographic area thereby

improving the dealer's RSI, or by leveling the playing field

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among dealers within the same dealer network. Thus, a revision

of the AGSSA is not perforce violative of section 463 (2) (ff). 

Rather, such change must be assessed on a case-by-case basis,

upon consideration of the impact of the revision on a dealer's

position.

Accordingly, the first certified question, as

reformulated, should be answered in accordance with this opinion

and the second certified question answered in the negative. 

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Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. v General Motors, LLC

No. 48 

PIGOTT, J.(dissenting, in part):

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 463 (2) (gg) makes it

unlawful for any franchisor, regardless of the terms of a

franchise contract, "[t]o use an unreasonable, arbitrary or

unfair sales or performance standard in determining a franchised

motor vehicle dealer's compliance with a franchise agreement." 1

These general and amorphous adjectives "unreasonable,"

"arbitrary" and "unfair" are similar to those found in the

Uniform Commercial Code and lend themselves to varying

interpretations depending on the circumstances of a particular

business situation. A performance standard that may be

"unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair" as applied to one dealer, in

a metropolitan area, may be perfectly reasonable when applied to

another in another area of the state. Because in my view a

determination concerning the reasonableness, arbitrariness or

unfairness of a particular sales performance standard necessarily

requires a factual, rather than a legal, determination, I dissent

from the majority's response to the first certified question. 

District Court conducted a bench trial over several

1 Beck does not claim that GM failed to "communicate the

performance standard in writing in a clear and concise manner,"

which is also required by section 463 (2) (gg). 

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days and rendered a determination that the RSI performance

standard, which uses a statewide sales average adjusted for local

conditions, was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair. In making

that determination, District Court considered and rejected the

testimony of Beck's expert that the standard did not account for

brand popularity and import bias, holding that the Retail Sales

Index's (RSI) use of "segmentation" adequately accounted for

those particular variables. Crediting the testimony of GM's two

experts, District Court also determined that the RSI standard was

"administratively convenient," "objective," and "uniformly

applied." That factual determination concerning the performance

standard should not be disturbed unless there is no record

evidence to support it. 

The majority reaches a different factual conclusion,

however, stating that "GM's exclusion of local brand popularity

or import bias rendered the [RSI] standard unreasonable and

unfair because these preference factors constitute market

challenges that impact a dealer's sales performance differently

across the state" (majority op, at 12-13). Putting aside that

what constitutes an "unreasonable," "arbitrary" or "unfair"

standard is a factual determination, I do not believe it is this

Court's role or function to determine, as a matter of law, that

GM's failure to include these particular "preference factors" as

part of its currently-formulated RSI violated section 463 (2)

(gg). We should be mindful that our decision will apply not only

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to the particular facts in this case, but to all automobile

manufacturers and dealerships in this state. Indeed, the Second

Circuit acknowledges that GM's performance standards "appear to

represent the industry standard" (787 F3d 663, 676 [2d Cir

2015]). 

Contrary to the majority's subjective conclusion, GM's

use of the RSI with a segmented adjustment does not amount "to GM

desiring to rid itself of ineffective dealers in order to

increase its brand market share" (majority op, 13) -- a fact that

we are not empowered to determine. However, if that were GM's

true motive, it would have stuck with the Wind-Down Agreement

that Beck signed instead of entering into the Participation

Agreement with Beck instead. Nor would GM have continued working

with Beck from 2010 through 2012 to improve Beck's performance

had it been GM's intention that the Beck dealership fail. It is

evident from the record that the RSI is a tool utilized by GM to

determine if a franchisee is achieving certain benchmarks, and,

if not, the RSI operates as a canary in the coal mine to alert GM

that the franchisee needs assistance. 

In my view, the majority's opinion sets a standard that

will require other franchisors to follow suit, and, to that

extent, its interpretation of section 263 (2) (gg) goes beyond

what the legislature intended. Therefore, I dissent. 

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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Following certification of questions by the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the questions

by this Court pursuant to section 500.27 of the Rules of Practice

of the New York State Court of Appeals, and after hearing

argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the

briefs and the record submitted, first certified question

answered in accordance with the opinion herein and second

certified question answered in the negative. Opinion by Judge

Rivera. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Abdus-Salaam, Stein and

Fahey concur. Judge Pigott dissents in part in an opinion. 

Judge Garcia took no part.

Decided May 3, 2016

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