1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

TERRY DEESE, * 

 * 

 Plaintiff, * 

 * 

v. * 1:06-cv-643-MHT 

 * 

CHAMPION ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., * 

 * 

 Defendants. * 

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO MERITS

Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, files this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based upon the merits of Deese’s claims. 

INTRODUCTION

Defendant has filed a summary judgment motion as to the causes of action brought by Deese 

but have either misrepresented or failed to properly disclose the record and allegations herein.1 

Defendant’s Motion is untimely as at the time of the filing of this Opposition, Defendant itself had 

not been able to provide any response to the perm rating of the interior walls in Deese or even what 

they were: “Q Do you know the permeance rating of any of the materials in this wall? A. No.” 

See Exhibit 1 Holloway Depo. Tr. p. 55:14-16. Defendant then uses this lack of responsiveness as a 

sword to buttress its instant Motion. 

 

1

 Defendant states that it disputes that “...the Magnuson-Moss Act is applicable to manufactured housing.” See 

Defendant’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment @ n.1. Amazingly enough, the same Defense counsel in another 

case filed a brief two weeks ago stating that “[t]he habitability claims also fail because these cases involve manufactured 

homes, which are goods subject to the UCC.” See Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief Byrd v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. 

Arbitration Case No. 30 420 00810 06. Regardless, Defendant cites case law in their Brief that finds that the 

manufactured homes are covered by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act including at page 10 of their Brief, Bryant v. 

Southern Energy Homes, Inc. 682 So.2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1996). 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 35
2

Defendant’s attorney does not think the Defendant’s 30(b)(6) deponent has a “requirement 

he make himself familiar with something he's not already familiar with”: 

Q Okay. And did you make yourself familiar with any of these studies, articles, or 

anything listed in number 17? 

MR. RITCHIE: Objection to form. There's no requirement he make himself familiar 

with something he's not already familiar with. I mean, unless you've got something 

that says he's got to go out and research this for a deposition notice, next question. I 

mean that's -- that's ridiculous. 

MR. GOULD: Well, I'm going to go through it. And if he -- Q Did you make 

yourself familiar with any of this? 

A Under my job responsibilities, I'm not required to, you know, read these things. 

I'm -- you know, the 3280, you know, I have to have general familiarity with that. 

But these aren't the kinds of things I get involved in. 

See Exhibit 1 Holloway Depo. Tr. p. 97:3-23; 98:1 (emphasis supplied). 

 Indeed, there is a “requirement” that the corporate designee under Rule 30(b)(6) make 

himself familiar with the areas of inquiry if he does not have independent knowledge: 

The Court agrees that if none of defendant’s current employees has sufficient 

knowledge to provide plaintiffs with the requested information, defendant is 

obligated to ‘prepare [one or more witnesses] so that they may give complete, 

knowledgeable and binding answers on behalf of the corporation. 

Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 10097 at * 8 (N.D. Ill. 2001); 

See also Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 148, 152 (D.D.C. 1999); Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water 

Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 67 (D.P.R. 1981); The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company v. Jafari, 206 

F.R.D. 126 (D.Maryland 2002); See Black Horse Lane Assoc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 

303 (3d Cir. 2000); Resolution Trust Corp. v. S. Union Co., 985 F.2d 196, 197 (5th Cir. 1993); 

United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 363 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. 

Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989) 

 The deponent answered “I don’t know” on nearly every area of inquiry: “ Q You didn't do 

your homework. A No, I didn't do my homework. I think that's pretty much it. I looked over my 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 35
3

resume so I would remember the dates and stuff like that.” See Exhibit 1 Holloway Depo. Tr. p. 

33:14-23; p. 34:1-14. When asked if homes that were going in the Gulf Coast Region had a 

permeable wall, Defendant’s corporate designee testified: “I wouldn't know. I don't know. I don't 

know. I wouldn't know.” See Exhibit 1 Holloway Depo. Tr p. 126:1-5. 

The undersigned is currently attempting to resolve this discovery dispute without the 

necessity of Court intervention and have Defendant provide a responsive deponent. Plaintiff 

believes that the answers to these areas of inquiry will be damaging to Defendant. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Other than the 30(b)(6) witness, the expert / fact witnesses being used by Defendant have 

testified in several other cases being prosecuted by the undersigned. When deposed in this case each 

testified that his recent testimony in the other related cases was, of course, truthful and accurate. 

Importantly, Plaintiff believes that the claims and theory being advanced by Deese are supported not 

only by Plaintiff’s experts but also by Defendant. 

 For example, Francis Conlin, Defendant’s expert in this case, recently testified that the 

testimony given in other cases was answered truthfully, although he feels Plaintiff is taking his 

statements out of context. Plaintiff believes that his statements were so damaging that the best case 

scenario for him is to allege they are being taken out of context but, regardless, this will ultimately 

be an issue for the trier of fact to determine. Mr. Conlin testified as follows: “Q. Mr. Conlin, we've 

met before, and you've given deposition testimony and arbitration hearing testimony on these same 

issues, haven't you? A. Yes, I have.” See Exhibit 2 Conlin Depo. p. 6:4-7. “Q. Okay. But you feel 

like you've answered all the questions truthfully -- A. Yes. Q. -- that you've been asked? A. Yes. 

The whole part of it, yes.” See Exhibit 2 Conlin Depo. p. 7:1-5. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 35
4

Additionally, David Tompos, another of Defendant’s witnesses stated: “Q. Mr. Tompos, as I 

stated before I got started, I've taken your deposition and you've also given testimony in an 

arbitration hearing on these same issues; that's correct? A. Yes, it is. Q. You do not, you do not 

intend to change any of the testimony that you've previously given, do you? A. I hope not. Q. Okay. 

That will save us a lot of time. I'm trying to keep these as quick as I can...” See Exhibit 3 Tompos 

Depo. p. 69:6-18. 

 The following are admissions in previous arbitration hearings by these two witnesses who 

will be testifying in this case: 

Conlin Testimony in Whitaker v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., (Exhibit 4) 

1. If a material is colder than the dew point of the air, moisture is going to condense. Conlin p. 

187: 2; p. 188: 1-2. 

2. 2 % of condensation or moisture is from diffusion while 98% of moisture gets into a building 

through the air; Conlin p. 189: 17-20. 

3. Conlin worked on the protocol and was project coordinator for “Alternatives for Minimizing 

Moisture Problems in homes in the Hot and Humid Climate” Conlin p. 202:19-23; p. 203:1; 

p. 203:9-11. 

4. Despite having worked on the protocol and was project coordinator for “Alternatives for 

Minimizing Moisture Problems in homes in the Hot and Humid Climate”, Mr. Conlin was 

not “thrilled” with the data. Conlin p. 209:23. 

5. He did not however have problems with “Minimizing Moisture Problems in Manufactured 

Homes” which he helped to write and which is on his resume. Conlin p. 228: 19-22; p. 230: 

3-7. 

6. “Minimizing Moisture Problems in Manufactured Homes” lists “Alternatives for Minimizing 

Moisture Problems in homes in the Hot and Humid Climate” as Phase Two and Conlin can 

find no “disclaimers” and does “not know” of any such language that supports his testimony 

that the data for “Alternatives” was invalid in any way even though he was not “thrilled” 

with it. Conlin p. 216: 2-3 On page 4 of this study, it states “Location of vapor retarders. In 

hot, humid climates, the interior of building shell components should be vapor permeable, 

allowing cavities to dry in the direction of the home’s interior.” Id. 

7. Oversized AC can actually have a benefit [contrary to Conlin’s report] because an oversized 

AC will run less and perhaps only runs half the time. p. 206:18-23; p. 207:14-16; p. 208: 14-

21; 

8. The bellyboard whether ripped or not will not impact exterior walls but only the flooring, if 

anything [contrary to Conlin’s report]. Conlin p. 219: 1-3. 

9. 24 CFR 3280.504(b)(1) and (b)(3) both assume outside ventilation of the wall cavity. Conlin 

p. 227: 13-14. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 35
5

10. There are no permeance requirements under (b)(3) and thus no vapor barrier is required. 

Conlin p. 231:13-21. 

11. The manufacturer did not have to use a vapor barrier on the inside of the wall. Conlin p. 

232:1-3. 

12. Conlin thinks it is ideal not to have vinyl or a vapor barrier on the living sides of the walls as 

that “would be the way you would want to do it.” Conlin p. 231:11-13. 

13. It would be ideal that you would want a vapor permeable interior wall surface. Conlin p. 

234: 1-3. 

14. Conlin thinks using a vapor barrier on the living side of the wall in these homes is “not 

ideal.” Conlin p. 233: 1-3. 

15. Placing a vapor barrier on the living side of the wall or using vinyl on the living side of the 

walls is “not ideal. And I [Conlin] don’t think I can show you any learned treatise that says 

its ideal.” Conlin p. 253: 17-23. 

16. Despite the fact that Conlin states in his report that Gypsum has the unique ability to dry and 

get wet and dry out, Conlin does not “know much about that other than what Mr. Wessel 

said...” Conlin p. 257: 18-23. 

17. Conlin agrees that you do not want mold in a wall cavity. Conlin p. 258: 19-20. 

18. Conlin thinks the Gypsum Association documents which were exhibits of Plaintiffs is a 

“reliable authority.” Conlin p. 264: 10-12. 

19. Conlin agrees thus that if there is ever a doubt, we must replace the wet gypsum. Conlin p. 

264. 

20. Conlin agrees that mold can “germinate” in 24 to 48 hours. Conlin p. 268: 7-9. 

21. Conlin agrees that you can only have limited intermittent exposure. Conlin p. 268: 17-19. 

22. Conlin agrees that you have to not only replace the gypsum but “fix the source too” or it is 

moot as it will get wet again. Conlin p. 269: 6-12. 

23. In “Moisture Problems in Manufactured Homes, understanding the causes and finding 

solutions” which was copyrighted in 2000, Conlin was a “coordinating member.” Conlin p. 

273: 15-21. On page 1.2, the second moisture drop from the top states “in hot humid 

climates avoid placing a vapor retarder on the inside of the wall.” Conlin p. 274: 12-13. On 

page 3.5, it states that “the interior vapor retarder acts like a dam holding water inside the 

wall board” and “if the wall cannot dry out, it will eventually fail completely.” On page 3.7 

under remedy, it states “Replace failed gypsum wallboard with plain gypsum covered with 

vapor permeable paint which will allow water vapor to more easily migrate through the 

wallboard.” Conlin p. 276: 6-13. 

24. A reason to do a mold sample test like Mr. Parks, would be to “investigate areas which are 

not visible.” Conlin p. 282: 4-8. 

25. When asked if he believed that the only areas where he tested were the only areas where 

there was mold, Mr. Conlin states “I don’t know.” Conlin p. 282:17-20. 

26. Despite his criticism of Mr. Parks’ testing of the wall cavities, Conlin stated that doing so 

has had “some good success.” Conlin p. 283:: 19-20. 

27. When asked why not test the wall cavites [as opposes to the outside of the home and the 

inside of the home when the case is about wall cavities], Mr. Conlin, among other things, 

states “...certainly that would have been one way to do it.” Conlin p. 285: 13-15. 

28. Conlin agrees that the HUD Code does not say it is ok to have mold in the walls. Conlin p. 

286:19-21. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 35
6

29. In “Moisture Problems in Manufactured Housing: Probable Cause and Cures” Conlin admits 

that all problems that were encountered related to moisture flow in a vapor state. Conlin p. 

289: 1-2. This study was copyrighted 2001. See attached Exhibit 5. “All of the homes 

inspected that experienced wall board failure were vinyl coated.” Id. p. 8. This study 

concluded that the vapor retarder was in the wrong location i.e. vinyl or other impermeable 

wall coverings and concluded “if possible, remove vapor barriers located on the wrong 

surfaces.” Id. p. 10 and p. 2. 

Conlin testimony in Byrd and Daugherty v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (Exhibit 6) 

30. Vol III, p. 987:12-14: “You did a swab test but you lost the swab? Yes sir.” ; “And if not and 

you screw it up, there could be legal implications. Q. Like putting it in an inbox and 

forgetting about it. A. Absolutely.” p. 926: 16-2. See also I did swab in Byrd as a clearance 

test to say everything is okay. p. 989: 1-5. 

31. Nowhere in HUD code does it say its acceptable to have mold in the wall cavities, p. 954: 9-

12. Mold can occur in 24-48 hours if it gets moist. p. 908: 8-9. 

32. Vol III, p. 909: 14-23: “Can you refute Mr. Parks’ findings about mold in the wall cavities 

from his test....I don’t know what you mean by refute....I don’t have mold testing that 

shows different.” 

33. “Redundant protection is best moisture protection, p. 921: 20-23; Belts and suspenders (is 

redundant protection.) p. 993: 12. The more things you have to keep water away from, 

that’s what I refer to as redundant protection. p. 993: 20-21. 

34. “Examination of exterior walls is key, as exterior walls are typically unaffected by possible 

installation shortcomings....” p. 810: 8-14. 

35. “Do you have any drafts? No, sir”, p. 825: 6-7. When a draft report was shown to him 

which he apparently did not realize had been produced and which had a materially different 

statement in which benefited the Plaintiff and had been removed in the final report he stated: 

 “So I didn’t mean to imply I don’t make a draft...you know I like this sentence better (in the 

draft)”, p. 826: 11-17. 

Tompos testimony in Byrd and Daugherty v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (Exhibit 7) 

36. David Tompos, Defendant’s expert, concedes that if walls are deteriorating, they are not 

performing. Vol. IV, p. 241:16-20. 

 The record demonstrates that that nowhere in HUD code does it say it’s acceptable to have 

mold in the wall cavities and mold can occur in 24-48 hours if it gets moist. (See Nos. 20 and 18 

above) The use of a continuous vapor barrier on the wall board on the interior is “not ideal” for this 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 35
7

climate but rather it’s ideal that you would want a vapor permeable interior wall surface.2 (See Nos. 

13, 14 and 15 above) 

Hot seeks cold and moist seeks dry are uncontested and basic rules of thermodynamics. 

Redundant protection is the best moisture protection. (See No. 33 above) When the dew point is 75 

degrees outside and the AC is kept at or below 75 degrees, thermodynamics dictate that the hot, 

humid air will seek to reach the colder living side of the walls but will be trapped behind the vinyl 

covered walls. (See Nos. 1 and 23 above) This means that condensation will occur all summer in 

the hot and humid climate as stated by industry studies. (See Nos. 23 and 29 above) Regardless of 

the standard to which the manufacturer builds the home under 504(b), the home must perform and 

ensure durability and quality. In gulf coast (or elsewhere), you want to limit condensation in the 

walls. “Heat moves from high temperature to low.” “Water vapor moves from high pressure to 

low.” (Exhibit 13, p. 25, Moisture & Mold Diagnostics and Mitigation) Stated differently, water 

vapor is going to move from hot, moist regions to regions that are relatively cool and dry. 

 If walls are deteriorating, they are not performing. (See No. 36 above) Implementing a 

504(b)(3) wall design never required using a continuous vapor barrier on the walls. (See No. 10 

above) In fact, a vapor permeable wall covering such as tape and texture and/or paper could have 

and should have been used. (See Nos. 10 and 11 above) In fact, Defendants have failed to identify 

the perm rating of the walls in the Deese home. However, Plaintiff believes it will be proven that the 

walls in the Deese home are covered with a vapor retarder as opposed to a tape and texture or paper 

covered wall which would provide a permeance rating of fifteen (15) or greater.3 

 

2 Defendant’s expert has testified that using a vapor barrier on the living side of the walls in this hot and humid climate 

is “not ideal. And I [Conlin] don’t think I can show you any learned treatise that says its ideal.” The ideal would be to 

have breathable, permeable wall 

3

 Defendant’s Motion is untimely as at the time of the filing of this Opposition, Defendant itself had not been able to 

provide any response to the perm rating of the interior walls in Deese or even what they were. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 35
8

 Defendant made Plaintiff’s home to act as “moisture traps” not to “control condensation” as 

required by 24 CFR 3280.504 and, more specifically, were not “dissipating condensation” as 

mandated by 3280.504(b)(3): “Wall cavities shall be constructed so that ventilation is provided to 

dissipate any condensation occurring in these cavities.” Defendant cannot point to one study that 

said placing the vapor retarder on the living side of the walls was a good practice in this hot, humid 

climate. (See No. 15 above) To the contrary, approximately thirty (30) studies and articles 

(Defendant’s expert participated in) were adamant and redundant (e.g. “never, ever”) in their 

condemnation of placing vapor retarder on the living side of the walls in the hot and humid climate 

(“the interior vapor retarder acts like a dam holding water inside the wall board”).4

 (See Exhibit 8, 

Published list of references and warnings as to the use of a vapor barrier/retarder within the hot, 

humid climate) 

Plaintiff further believes it undermines any credibility in blaming the homeowner, the 

installer and the satellite antenna installer, which is predictably and consistently done in every case 

in which Defendant’s expert has appeared. Even if true and these alleged problems are remedied 

(the antenna man caulks the alleged hole), Plaintiff will still own a home that is “not ideal” for this 

climate. (See No. 14 above) It is important to remember that by design these walls are 

manufactured to be ventilated which means to (on purpose) allow the hot humid air a direct path into 

the wall cavities where it will become trapped behind the vapor retarder for the entire summer. 

 

4 Each of these studies are in evidence as they were deemed “reliable authority” by Defendant’s own witnesses or by 

Plaintiffs’ experts. Rule 803(18) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 

available as a witness: (18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness in direct 

examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or 

other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert 

testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as 

exhibits.” See Gamble’s Alabama Rules of Evidence for Annotations; § 803(18) Learned Treaties, Periodicals and 

Pamphlets.

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 35
9

The following quotes are taken from studies performed on behalf of the manufactured 

housing industry and predate the date of purchase of the Deese home: “in order for ventilation 

drying to be effective, it is still necessary for water vapor to be able to diffuse from the envelope into 

the ventilated space. Given the importance of vapor diffusion as a drying mechanism, it is critical 

that a diffusion pathway is considered.” Exhibit 9, Whitaker Transcript, p. 535:6-23; p. 536:1-23; p. 

537:1-9. “Alternatives for Minimizing Moisture Problems in Homes Located in Hot Humid 

Climates, Interim Report” This study states that “such ventilation [as in Whitaker home] will not 

serve the intended purpose of keeping the cavity dry if the vapor pressure of the outside air is greater 

than the cavity.” Id., p. 539:9-14. Building Your Louisiana House, Homeowner’s Guide” by LSU 

AG Center Research & Extension states: “Any moisture that gets in must be able to dry to the inside 

cooler and dehumidified space. The interior side of the wall should be permeable as possible – as 

permeable as possible, meaning no vinyl wallpaper, no oil-based interior paints, no interior vapor 

barrier on insulation. Having no vapor barrier on the interior side is more important than having a 

vapor retarder on the outside. None is preferable to one on the wrong side.” Id. Transcript, p. 564:3-

9. This study states “Replace failed gypsum wallboard with plain gypsum, cover with vapor 

permeable paint, which will allow water vapor to more easily migrate through the wallboard.” Id. 

Transcipt, p. 568:15-20. This study states “The interior vapor retarder acts like a dam, holding 

water inside the wallboard. When the conditions support condensation inside the wall, the wall will 

begin to condense on the coldest material, in this case the inner surface of the wallboard. If the 

conditions for drying are poor, the outside humidity high and the vapor retarder blocks diffusion to 

the inside, moisture will begin to accumulate on surfaces and saturate the material. If the wallboard 

cannot dry out, it will eventually fail completely.” Id. Transcript, p. 570:4-23. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 35
10

In the hot and humid Southeastern U.S., the outside air is consistently above a dewpoint of 

75°F during the summer months. Exhibit 5, p. 4, Moisture Problems in Manufactured Housing: 

Probable Causes and Cures. If the homeowner decides to keep the interior temperature of the home 

below 75°F...then when moisture-laden outside air comes into contact with cold inside surfaces, 

condensation occurs. Exhibit 5, p. 4. The goal of 504 (b)(3) is to “dissipate condensation.” When an 

interior vapor retarder is used in the construction, the relative humidity at the outside surface of the 

vapor retarder can approach saturation, thereby providing an environment conductive to mold and 

mildew growth. (Exhibit10, p. B-2, Whole House Ventilation Strategies) Avoidance of using 

vapor retarders where vapor permeable materials will provide satisfactory performance. Thereby 

encouraging drying mechanisms over wetting prevention mechanisms. (Exhibit 11, p. 4). 

Express Warranty and Magnuson Moss

Defendant contends that notice concerning defects must be in writing and since Plaintiff did 

not provide written notice, notice was not proper. The warranty states that “[t]he warranty only 

applies to substantial defects that become evident within the Warranty Period and where written 

notice is provided to the Manufacturer not later than 10 days following the expiration of the 

Warranty Period.” The warranty, however, does not specify that Plaintiff must provide the written 

notice. The warranty simply states that written notice must be provided. Numerous published 

reports have indicated the manufactured home in this case was defective. These written published 

reports provided Defendant with written notice of the defect. This written notice was also provided 

within the Warranty Period because Defendant had this written notice before Plaintiff even 

purchased his manufactured home. Defendant drafted the warranty and, therefore, the warranty 

should be strictly construed against it. See Ex parte Helton, 814 So.2d 251, 257 (Ala. 2001)(stating 

the document “must be construed strictly against the drafter”); Dumas v. First Federal Sav. and 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 35
11

Loan Ass’n, 654 F.2d 359, 361, fn. 1 (5th Cir. 1981)(stating “the general rule is that a writing is to be 

strictly construed against the drafter”). Notice, therefore, was proper. 

In Rhode v. E & T Investments, Inc., the plaintiff was required to provide notice to the 

manufacturer under the terms of the warranty. Rhode v. E & T Investments, Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d 1298, 

1300 (M.D.Ala. 1998). The plaintiff in that case provided written notice, but the issue became 

whether the plaintiff had to give the manufacturer continual notice that repair work performed was 

unsatisfactory. Id. at 1303. The warranty in that case did not require the plaintiff to give continual 

notice of the defect to the manufacturer. Rhode v. E & T Investments, Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d at 1303. 

The Middle District of Alabama stated that “whether the Plaintiff gave proper notice in this case is a 

question of fact for the jury and not a proper matter for summary judgment.” Id. In the case at hand, 

Defendant was provided with proper notice because of the written reports, discussed above, and the 

fact that Defendant knew of the defect, discussed below. The warranty in this case did not require 

that Plaintiff be the one to provide written notice. Therefore, whether proper notice was given to 

Defendant under the warranty is a question of fact for the jury and Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment should be denied. 

Defendant argues that notice of the defect was given after the warranty expired and, 

therefore, a claim for breach of warranty cannot be maintained. The buyer, however, is not required 

to provide direct notice of the defect if “the seller has actual knowledge of the defect of the 

particular product.” In re McDonald’s French Fries Litigation, 2007 WL 1576550, *2 (N.D.Ill. 

2007). The reason why the buyer does not have to provide notice to a seller that already has notice 

is because of the reasoning behind the notice requirement. Providing notice of defects to the seller 

creates the possibility of settlement and provides “’ample opportunity to cure the defect, inspect the 

goods, investigate the claim or do whatever may be necessary to properly defend himself or 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 35
12

minimize his damages while the facts are fresh in the minds of the parties.’” Jewell v. Seaboard 

Indus., Inc., 667 So.2d 653, 660 (Ala. 1995), quoting Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So.2d 1101, 

1103 (Ala. 1983). As stated in Radford v. Daimler Chrysler Corp: 

Plaintiff brings claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty ...Defendant asserts 

plaintiff's claims under the Act must be dismissed because she has failed to allege 

that defendant was afforded the opportunity to cure the alleged defect...Plaintiff does 

allege, however, that defendant "was aware for years of the problems with these 

dangerous, defective instrument panels . . . Plaintiff cites Alberti v. General Motors 

Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1026 (D.C.D.C. 1985), for the proposition that the "opportunity 

to cure the defect" pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that a defendant 

knew of the alleged defect at the time of sale. Because plaintiff has alleged defendant 

knew of the allegedly defective instrument panel at the time of sale of plaintiff's car, 

I find that plaintiff has met the pleading requirement of alleging defendant had an 

opportunity to cure the defect, and will not dismiss the claim on this ground. 

 

Radford, 168 F. Supp 2d 751, 754 (N.D. OH 2001). 

Defendant had actual knowledge of the defect and, therefore, Defendant had an opportunity 

to cure the defect and enter into settlement negotiations. Requiring Plaintiff to provide notice of a 

defect to Defendant when it already had actual knowledge of the defect is redundant. 

The Uniform Commercial Code states that a “buyer must within a reasonable time after he 

discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any 

remedy.” Ala. Code 1975 § 7-2-607 (emphasis added). The warranty only provided Plaintiff with 

one year to discover latent defects in the manufactured home. Defendant essentially shifted the risk 

of latent construction defects to Plaintiff by only allowing a remedy for defects that appeared 

quickly. Badgett Const. and Development Co. v. Kan-Build, Inc., 102 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1105 

(S.D.Iowa 2000). Many courts have looked to the length of the warranty period in order to make a 

determination of whether the time limitation is reasonable. See Neville Chemical Co. v. Union 

Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1217 (3d Cir. 1970)(stating the time limitation was “manifestly 

unreasonable if it is construed to require that notice be given of latent defects which would not be 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 35
13

discoverable until after the time specified has elapsed); Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 

A.2d 494, 498 (Pa.Super. 1964)(stating “a limitation which renders the warranties ineffective as 

regards latent defects, literally covered by the warranty but not discoverable within the limitation 

period of the contract, is manifestly unreasonable and therefore invalid under § 1-204 of the code”); 

Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Intern., Inc., 672 F.Supp. 369, 382-83 (D.Minn. 1987)(stating warranty 

limitations in connection with sale of an aircraft extending up to three years was unreasonable as 

applied to a latent design defect). In Community Television Services, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 

the Eighth Circuit noted the trial court’s finding that a six-month warranty of material and 

workmanship of a television and radio broadcasting tower was unreasonable given the twenty-five 

year useful life of the tower. Community Television Services, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 586 

F.2d 637, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1978). At least one study has indicated that manufactured homes have 

comparable useful life spans as site-built homes and that the estimated median manufactured home 

life span is 57.5 years. See Carol Meeks, Manufactured Housing Institute, Manufactured Home Life: 

 Existing Housing Stock Through 1997 (May, 1998). The one year warranty period relative to the 

estimated useful life span of the manufactured home may be viewed as unreasonable, which is a 

genuine issue of material fact that must be decided. 

The Fourth Circuit has stated that “[w]hen a manufacturer is aware that its product is 

inherently defective, but the buyer has ‘no notice of or ability to detect’ the problem, there is 

perforce a substantial disparity in the parties’ relative bargaining power.” Carlson v. General 

Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 1989), quoting Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 

F.2d 296, 302 (6th Cir. 1985) overruled on other grounds. In that case, it was presumed that the 

buyer did not voluntarily accept limitation periods on his remedies when the manufacturer knew of a 

defect and the buyer did not. Id. Therefore, the limitations period was deemed to be 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 35
14

unconscionable. Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d at 296. In the case at hand, Defendant 

knew of the defect and Plaintiff did not. The manufactured housing industry has participated in 

studies as early as 1999 relating to moisture problems in manufactured homes. (See Exhibit 12, 

Moisture Problems in Manufactured Homes – Understanding Theirs Causes and Finding Solutions) 

These studies and other publications made Defendant aware of the defect and that knowledge should 

render the limitation period unreasonable. 

A party is said to have notice of a fact “when: (1) he has actual knowledge of it; or (2) he has 

received a notice or notification of it; or (3) from all of the facts and circumstances known to him at 

the time in question he has reason to know that it exists.” Jones v. First Nat. Bank of Pulaski, 505 

So.2d 352, 355 (Ala. 1987). Defendant had actual knowledge of the defect. Therefore, Defendant 

had notice of the defect. 

Defendant’s notice of the defect is not only evidenced by the fact it knew of the defect, but 

also the fact that it attempted to exclude the defect in the warranty. Defendant attempted to remove 

itself from the potential of being held liable for the defect by attempting to exclude damage it knew 

would occur caused by humidity or condensation from the warranty. Defendant knew of the defect 

and, more egregiously, intentionally tried to disclaim the problems associated with the defect. As 

such, Defendant had notice of the defect.5

Implied Warranty Claims

Alabama generally does not allow a cause of action on an implied warranty claim for 

economic loss without privity of contract. Jenkins Brick Co. v. Waldrop, 384 So.2d 117, 118 

(Ala.Civ.App. 1980). The Uniform Commercial Code, however, states that “[a] sellers’ warranty, 

 

5 When asked about Defendant’s knowledge of the studies on this problem in the Deese’s home, the 30(b)(6) deponent 

repeatedly testified “I don’t know.” Plaintiffs’ are requesting that Defendant’s produce someone who does know and 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 35
15

whether express or implied, extends to any natural person if it is reasonable to expect that such 

person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the 

warranty.” Ala. Code 1975 § 7-2-318. Although the term “in person” may appear to only allow 

recovery to a third-party beneficiary when the beneficiary has suffered physical injury, Alabama 

courts have not specifically addressed whether a nonprivity buyer claiming to be a beneficiary with 

strictly economic injury could claim to be covered by an implied warranty. Harris Moran Seed Co., 

Inc. v. Phillips, 949 So.2d 916, 923 (Ala.Civ.App. 2006). The Alabama Supreme Court, however, 

has “indicated that a vertical nonprivity purchaser might be able to recover against a manufacturer 

under just such a theory.” Id.; see Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013 (Ala. 

2002)(stating “Bay Lines presented no evidence indicating that Crane knew, when it sold the panels 

to Stoughton, that Bay Lines was a purchaser of Stoughton’s products, or that Crane intended to 

protect future customers of Stoughton, such as Bay Lines, when it warranted its products to 

Stoughton. Bay Lines, therefore, cannot rely on the warranty to support its [third-party-beneficiary] 

claim against Crane”). 

 The Alabama Code states that “[u]nless excluded or modified (Section 7-2-316), a warranty 

that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 

with respect to goods of that kind.” Ala. Code 1975 § 7-2-314. Therefore, any contract between 

Defendant and the seller in this case had an implied warranty of merchantability. Any contract 

between Defendant and the seller was intended to ultimately benefit Plaintiff, purchaser of the 

manufactured home. Plaintiff, therefore, was an intended beneficiary of the contract and, thus, the 

nonprivity claim is covered by the implied warranty of merchantability. 

 hope to avoid Court intervention. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 35
16

 The implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and habitability were also implied 

in any contract between Defendant and the seller. The contract was made with the intended purpose 

of ultimately benefitting Plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, was an intended beneficiary of the contract 

and, thus, covered by the implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and habitability, 

despite the lack of privity. 

 In order to demonstrate that Plaintiff is a third-party-beneficiary, he “must show: 1) that 

the contracting parties intended, at the time the contract was created, to bestow a direct benefit upon 

a third party; 2) that the complainant was the intended beneficiary of the contract; and 3) that the 

contract was breached.” Harris Moran Seed Co., Inc. v. Phillips, 949 So.2d at 920, quoting Sheetz, 

Aiken & Aiken, Inc. v. Spann, Hall, Ritchie, Inc., 512 So.2d 99, 101-02 (Ala. 1987). At the time 

Defendant and the seller created any contracts between them, the known end result would be to sell 

manufactured homes to customers, including Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff was the intended 

beneficiary of these contracts. Plaintiff needs the opportunity to present evidence at trial that the 

implied warranties were in fact breached. 

 The implied warranty of habitability does apply to manufactured homes, contrary to 

Defendant’s belief. See Erwin v. Shiloh Homes, 360 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978)(stating 

the case was tried on the theory of breach of warranty of habitability and, therefore, the court would 

not review on a theory of recission due to the fact that it is a different theory from that proceeded on 

below). The purpose of the implied warranty of habitability is “’to discourage much of the sloppy 

work and jerry building that has become perceptible over the years.’” Brown v. Merit Corp., 494 

So.2d 399, 400 (Ala. 1986), quoting Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So.2d 307, 310 (Ala.Civ.App. 1970). 

This purpose should apply to any home built, including manufactured homes. 

Negligence and Wanton

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 35
17

 Generally, the “discovery rule,” which tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the 

defect is discovered, does not apply to claims of negligence or wantonness, only to fraud claims. 

Henson v. Celtic Life Ins. Co., 621 So.2d 1268, 1274 (Ala. 1993). The beginning of the statute of 

limitations is not delayed even if the injury is not discovered until after it occurs, nor is the statute of 

limitations delayed due to the ignorance of the plaintiff, “at least as long as there is no fraudulent 

concealment by the defendant.” Ex parte Floyd, 796 So.2d 303, 307 (Ala. 2001)(emphasis added), 

quoting Kelly v. Shropshire, 75 So. 291, 292 (Ala. 1917). As discussed below, Defendant 

fraudulently concealed the fact that the manufactured home contained a serious defect. The statue of 

limitations, therefore, is tolled. 

 Furthermore, the statute of limitations does not begin to run for negligence and wantonness 

claims until the injury has occurred. Dorsey v. Bowers, 709 So.2d 51, 56 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998). An 

action for property damage or injury “’accrues on the date of the injury or damage, and not upon the 

occurrence of the negligence itself, or the last known negligent act.’” Id. (emphasis in original), 

quoting Rumford v. Valley Pest Control, Inc., 629 So.2d 623, 627 (Ala. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit 

has stated that “[i]t is well settled under Alabama law that a negligence cause of action accrues when 

the plaintiff can first maintain the action. . . .” Piazza v. Ebsco Industries, Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 1347 

(11th Cir. 2001). All injuries in this case stem from the moisture in the walls created by the defect. 

The injury, therefore, occurred when moisture first began to accumulate in the walls. The injury had 

to occur between the time the manufactured home was built and when the home was inspected and 

discovered to contain moisture in the walls. Plaintiff will infer that it took time for the moisture to 

build up and accumulate, meaning the injury occurred near the time the home was inspected. This 

would place the negligence and wantonness claims within the statute of limitations. When the injury 

actually occurred is debatable and “when a disputed issue of fact is raised, the determination of the 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 35
18

date of accrual of a cause of action for statue-of-limitations purposes is a question of fact to be 

submitted to and decided by a jury.” Kindred v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 742 So.2d 155, 157 

(Ala. 1999). Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, should be denied so that a jury 

can determine when the statute of limitations began to run. 

 Plaintiff is unaware of any case in Alabama which discusses both the general rule that the 

“discovery rule” does not apply to negligence and wantonness claims and the affect the rule has 

when dealing with hidden defects, like the case at hand. The Court may infer the rule is still 

applicable in cases dealing with latent defects from the fact that discovery of a defect is not 

necessary to begin the running of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, contends that the 

rationale behind the “discovery rule” “is to ‘protect those who are ignorant of their cause of action 

through no fault of their own.’” El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003), 

quoting April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 832 (Cal.App.2Dist. 1983). Plaintiff 

in this case was ignorant of the negligence and wantonness construction of the manufactured home. 

Plaintiff in this case “’should not suffer where circumstances prevent [him] from knowing [he has] 

been harmed and defendants should not be allowed to knowingly profit from their injuree’s 

ignorance.’” Id., quoting April Enterprises, Inv. v. KTTV, 147 Cal.App.3d at 831. Not applying the 

“discovery rule” in this case would deprive Plaintiff of a cause of action prior to his being aware of 

his injuries, which is manifestly unjust. 

 Defendant correctly states that, generally, “[t]he economic-loss rule prevents tort recovery 

when a product damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage 

to any property other than itself.” Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Const., Inc., 901 So.2d 84, 

106-07 (Ala. 2004). There was, however, personal injury caused to Plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered 

mental anguish and “Alabama has allowed mental-anguish damages when economic harm has 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 35
19

occurred to a person’s home.” Carrell v. Masonite Corp., 775 So.2d 121, 124-25 (Ala. 2000). 

Therefore, the economic loss rule would not apply if Plaintiff proved mental anguish. A trial is 

needed so that Plaintiff may prove to a jury mental anguish was suffered. 

 Furthermore, the result of the defect has caused more than just damage to the walls. The 

entire manufactured home has been damaged by the large reduction in the home’s fair market value 

as a result of the defect. As stated by Justice Johnstone, “[t]he mere-economic-loss rule of Carrell v. 

Masonite Corp., 775 So.2d 121 (Ala. 2000), as it applies to homes, bars recovery only for a 

particular component of a home which fails in such a way as to damage only the component itself.” 

Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 173, 185 (Ala. 2000)(Johnstone, J. concurring in part and 

dissenting in part)(emphasis in original). Justice Johnstone went on to state that “[t]he mere 

economic loss rule does not apply when the product is the entire home. Id. (emphasis added). It is 

indisputable that the entire home has been damaged as indicated by the decreased value of the home. 

Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot support any negligent or wanton manufacture or repair 

claims because Defendant did not harbor an intent not to repair the home or otherwise injure or 

deceive Plaintiff. Defendant’s intent, however, is irrelevant. Wanton conduct occurs when a “party 

acting or failing to act is conscious of his conduct, and even though without any actual intent to 

injure is aware from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions that his conduct would 

probably result in injury to another or in damage to his property.” Hooper v. Columbus Regional 

Healthcare System, Inc., 956 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Ala. 2006)(emphasis added), quoting Armstrong 

Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So.2d 665, 679-80 (Ala. 2001). Evidence will show 

Defendant was aware of the injury that would result to Plaintiff as a result of its wanton construction 

of the mobile home. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 35
20

 Defendant contends that is has no duty to construct a manufactured home free from defects. 

Defendant does not cite directly to any case, so the only evidence of this contention is the conclusory 

statements made by Defendant. The Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards states 

the following: 

Every manufacturer of manufactured homes shall furnish notification of any 

defect in any manufactured home produced by such manufacturer which he 

determines, in good faith, relates to a Federal manufactured home construction or 

safety standard or contains a defect which constitutes an imminent safety hazard to 

the purchaser of such manufactured home, within a reasonable time after such 

manufacturer has discovered such defect. 

42 U.S.C.A. § 5401(a)(emphasis added). 

Defendant states at page 15 of its Brief that “...there is no public or common law duty owed 

by manufactured home builders in Alabama or anywhere else in the country to build a perfect home 

or to perform repairs.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff is not sure what “public or common law 

duty” means but Defendant apparently did not search the HUD Code which states: “Compliance 

with any Federal manufactured home construction or safety standard issued under this title does not 

exempt any person from any liability under common law.” 42 USC § 5409 (c) (emphasis supplied). 

 In Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 222 F.3d 788, (10th Cir. 2000), the court held that the 

Act does not expressly pre-empt common-law actions, nor does the Act occupy the field of 

construction and safety of manufactured homes exclusively, so as to impliedly pre-empt all 

common-law actions.

6 

 

6 See also Shorter v. Champion Home Builders Co., 776 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ohio 1991), court held that the Act does not 

pre-empt most tort claims regarding mobile housing; In Turner v. PFS Corp., 674 So. 2d 60, (Feb 16, 1996), the court 

held that the Act and regulations adopted under it, did not pre-empt state law tort claims at issue, because those claims 

asserted a failure to comply with federal standards themselves. The court quoted the holdings of Shorter v. Champion 

Home Builders Co., 776 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ohio 1991), that the Act pre-empts state law standards, but does not preempt most state law claims. Id.

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 35
21

 This statutory language indicates that Defendant’s customers have a reasonable expectation 

that the manufactured home they purchase will be free from defects. In any event, Defendant 

appears to be admitting defects exist in the Deese home and whether damage has resulted is a 

question of fact for the fact finder. 

Mental Anguish

 The Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that “[t]he general rule is that mental anguish is 

not a recoverable element of damages arising from breach of contract.” B & M Homes, Inc. v. 

Hogan, 376 So.2d 667, 671 (Ala. 1979). However, it is reasonably foreseeable that the faulty 

construction of a home will cause severe mental anguish. Id. at 672. A purchase of a home 

constitutes the largest investment an average family will make. B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 

So.2d at 672. A home purchase places a family in debt for years and if the home bought is a new 

home, a buyer does not expect defects to exist in the home. Id. Therefore, if the defects are severe, 

it is foreseeable that a buyer would experience extreme mental anguish. B & M Homes, Inc. v. 

Hogan, 376 So.2d at 672. The Alabama Supreme Court has stated that “it is a clear indication that 

contracts dealing with residences are in a special category and are exceptions to the general damages 

rule applied in contract cases which prohibits recovery for mental anguish.” Id. 

 Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot recover for mental anguish because Plaintiff has not 

been diagnosed with regard to any physical ailment. However, 

the rule that damages for mental anguish are not recoverable for negligence which 

causes only loss to property but no physical injury or danger of physical injury to any 

person does not apply to negligence committed upon a home. A person who suffers 

both property damage and mental anguish as a result of negligence committed upon a 

home may recover for both elements of damage notwithstanding the absence of any 

physical injury to the person. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 21 of 35
22

Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d at 185 (Johnstone, J. concurring in part and dissenting in 

part); See Carson v. City of Prichard, 709 So.2d 1199, 1203 (Ala. 1998)(stating in a case involving 

mental anguish that “[t]here was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the Board 

had been negligent and that the plaintiffs had suffered damage as a result of the Board’s negligence,” 

despite the lack of physical injury). This is clearly a case where negligence was committed upon the 

home. Defendant constructed the manufactured home with a serious defect. Therefore, physical 

injury is not necessary to establish damages for mental anguish. 

 Assuming, arguendo, that residences are not placed in a special category as an exception to 

the general rule that prohibits recovery for mental anguish in contract cases, Plaintiff still satisfies 

the zone-of-danger test. The zone-of-danger test “’limits recovery of mental anguish damages to 

those plaintiffs who sustain a physical injury as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who 

are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.’” Ex parte Grand Motor, Inc., 778 

So.2d at 179, quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 752 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1999). It is hard 

to dispute that mold caused by Defendant’s negligence, which can grow quickly and cause 

immediate physical reactions, did not place Plaintiff in immediate risk of physical injury. The zoneof-danger test, therefore, has been satisfied. 

Unjust Enrichment

 A party has been unjustly enriched when the party retains a benefit unjustly. Mantiply v. 

Mantiply, 951 So.2d 638, 654 (Ala. 2006). The Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that “[t]he 

retention of a benefit is unjust if ‘(1) the donor of the benefit acted under a mistake of fact or in 

misreliance on a right or duty, or (2) the recipient of the benefit engaged in some unconscionable 

conduct, such as fraud, coercion, abuse of a confidential relationship.” Id. at 654-55, quoting Welch 

v. Montgomery Eye Physicians, P.C., 891 So.2d 837, 843 (Ala. 2004). There is no doubt that 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 22 of 35
23

Plaintiff acted under the mistake of fact that the manufactured home was free from defects. Also, 

Defendant engaged in fraudulent concealment and, thus, retained the benefit of Plaintiff’s payment 

for the manufactured home unjustly. A trial is needed to prove the elements of unjust enrichment. 

Evidence presented will render Defendant’s claim that no evidence supports the unjust enrichment 

claim inaccurate. Furthermore, Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff cannot show unjust enrichment 

because the home may be worth what it is insured for is not a correct statement of law. The 

elements of unjust enrichment only require Plaintiff to show that he acted under the mistake of fact 

that the home was free from defects and Defendant engaged in fraudulent behavior. The value of the 

home’s insurance policy is irrelevant. 

 Defendant incorrectly states that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action. See Atlantic Nat. 

Trust, LLC v. McNamee, -- So.2d --, 2007 WL 2898263, *7 (Ala. 2007)(stating “To prevail on a 

claim of unjust enrichment. . . .)(emphasis added). Courts use constructive trusts to prevent unjust 

enrichment. Berryman v. Adams, 883 So.2d 214, 217 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003). A quasi-contract is 

created when a party voluntarily obligates himself to make restitution of a benefit he received 

unjustly. Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So.2d 453, 460 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). A court’s creation of a 

constructive trust or parties’ creation of a quasi-contract is irrelevant to this case. If a party has been 

unjustly enriched, that party can be forced to make restitution to the donor. 

Fraudulent Concealment

 Defendant contends the two year statute of limitations for the fraudulent concealment claim 

expired prior to the filing of the lawsuit. However, the State of “’Alabama does recognize that a 

fraudulent concealment by a defendant tolls the running of the statute until the tort or injury is 

discovered or could have been discovered by due diligence.’” Rutledge v. Freeman, 914 So.2d 364, 

370 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004). The damage to the manufactured home could not have been discovered 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 23 of 35
24

by due diligence and Plaintiff was not “privy to facts which would ‘provoke inquiry in the mind of a 

person of reasonable prudence, [ ] which, if followed up, would have led to the discovery of the 

fraud.’” Davant v. United Land Corp., 896 So.2d 475, 491 (Ala. 2004), quoting Willcutt v. Union 

Oil Co., 432 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Ala. 1983). Therefore, the statute of limitations has not expired on 

Plaintiff because of the “discovery rule”. 

 Defendant implies that Plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on Defendant’s 

misrepresentations and, thus, Plaintiff could not have been induced to purchase the defective 

manufactured home as a result. It is reasonable to infer that if Defendant would not have failed to 

disclose the fact that the home was severely defective, Plaintiff would not have been induced to 

purchase the home. Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies the elements of fraudulent concealment because 

Defendant had a duty to disclose the fact that the home was defective, Defendant concealed this fact, 

Plaintiff was induced to purchase the home as a result of this concealment, and Plaintiff suffered 

actual damage as a result of the concealment. 

 Defendant had a duty to inform Plaintiff that the home had a serious defect. A duty to 

disclose is created and, thus, Defendant is liable for damages for nondisclosure, “[i]f the seller or the 

[seller’s] agent has knowledge of specific defects that affect health or safety and the defect is not 

known to or readily observable by the buyer. . . .” Roberts v. C & S Sovran Credit Corp. of 

Alabama, 621 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Ala. 1993). It is indisputable that exposure to mold affects the 

health and safety of Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant had a duty to disclose the defect to Plaintiff. 

 A party can bring a fraudulent concealment claim against the seller and the manufacturer. 

See Freightliner, L.L.C. v. Whatley Contract Carriers, L.L.C., 932 So.2d 883 (Ala. 

2005)(concluding in a suit against both a seller and a manufacturer that the truck manufacturer did 

not have any duty to disclose an internal audit to the trucking company which brought fraudulent a 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 24 of 35
25

suppression claim due to a defect in the tucks because the transaction did not warrant disclosure in 

this situation and the truck company did not inquire)(emphasis added). Plaintiff, therefore, can bring 

a claim against Defendant, the manufacturer. Defendant’s conclusory statement that it did not have 

a duty to disclose the defect because it was not the seller is irrelevant. A manufacturer can have a 

duty to disclose defects in certain circumstances much like a seller. 

 Defendant cites to Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. where the Supreme Court 

of Alabama looked at a warranty and determined that rather than guaranteeing the car to be free of 

defects, the warranty actually anticipated that defects would arise and provided for remedying such 

defects. Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So.2d 883, 891 (Ala. 1989). The 

Court made that determination because the statute of limitations had expired and, therefore, the 

buyer could no longer sue under the warranty because the warranty did not extend to cover future 

defects. In that case, however, not only did the buyer file suit after the statute of limitations had 

expired, but there was also no fraud involved. In Plaintiff’s case, there is fraud involved and, as 

mentioned above, the running of the statute of limitations is tolled because of the fraud. 

 Defendant cites to Mason v. Chrysler Corporation for the proposition that there is no duty to 

disclose recurring defects in a line of products to a buyer. Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So.2d 951, 

954-55 (Ala. 1995). The Court in that case stated that “[w]hen the parties to a transaction deal with 

each other at arm’s length, with no confidential relationship, no obligation to disclose information 

arises when the information is not requested.” Id. Although Plaintiff and Defendant were dealing at 

arm’s length in the case at hand and no confidential relationship existed, there are other factors that 

must be looked at to determine whether a duty to disclose a defect exists. The factors to determine 

whether a duty to disclose a defect exists are the following: “’(1) the relationship of the parties; (2) 

the relative knowledge of the parties; (3) the value of the particular fact; (4) the plaintiffs’ 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 25 of 35
26

opportunity to ascertain the fact; (5) the custom of the trade; and (6) other relevant circumstances.’” 

Armstrong Business Services, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So.2d at 677, quoting State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834, 842-43 (Ala. 1998). 

 Defendant’s knowledge of the defect was far more superior to that of Plaintiff, considering 

Defendant knew of the serious defect and Plaintiff had no knowledge about the defect. The defect 

has significantly reduced the fair market value of Plaintiff’s home, caused Plaintiff mental anguish, 

and placed Plaintiff in immediate risk of physical harm. Therefore, the value of the fact known by 

Defendant was enormous. Plaintiff also had no opportunity to ascertain the fact about the defect 

because he was not privy to any information that would lead him to inquire about the serious defect. 

 Another relevant circumstance that created a duty for Defendant to disclose the defect is the serious 

nature of the defect. Defendant knew the defect would lead to mold, which would affect the health 

and safety of Plaintiff. In Alabama, “if the seller or agent has knowledge of specific defects that 

affect health or safety and the defect is not known to or readily observable by the buyer, the seller or 

the agent has a duty to disclose and is liable for damages for nondisclosure.” Roberts v. C & S 

Sovran Credit Corp. of Alabama, 621 So.2d at 1297. Plaintiff was unable to adequately protect his 

interests and, therefore, Defendant had a duty to disclose the serious defect it had knowledge of. 

AEMLD

 As discussed above in the negligence and wantonness section, the statute of limitations 

period for the Alabama Extended Manufacturers Liability Doctrine should be tolled because of the 

fraudulent concealment of Defendant. Much like the statute of limitations for negligence and 

wantonness claims’ statute of limitations is tolled when fraudulent concealment is involved, the 

same rationale would apply to tolling the statute of limitations for an AEMLD claim. There is some 

evidence that the statute of limitations is tolled for an AEMLD claim when fraudulent concealment 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 26 of 35
27

prevents a plaintiff from discovering a defect. See Cline v. Ashland, Inc., -- So.2d --, 2007 WL 

30070, *1 (Ala. 2007)(See, J., concurring specially)(discussing an AEMLD claim and then stating 

the statute of limitations will not be postponed by plaintiff’s ignorance of the tort or injury, there 

being no fraudulent concealment involved). Defendant’s fraudulent concealment should toll the 

running of the statue of limitations. 

 Nevertheless, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until a cause of action arises, i.e. 

until the injury occurs. It is well settled that “[a] party has a cause of action, and the statute of 

limitations begins to run, on the date the first legal injury occurs, but not necessarily from the date of 

the act causing the injury.” Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So.2d 101, 125 (Ala. 

2003). The injury did not occur until moisture accumulated in the walls. The statute of limitations, 

therefore, did not begin to run until moisture became present in the walls. When the injury actually 

occurred is debatable and “when a disputed issue of fact is raised, the determination of the date of 

accrual of a cause of action for statue-of-limitations purposes is a question of fact to be submitted to 

and decided by a jury.” Kindred v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 742 So.2d at 157. 

 Defendant correctly states that the Supreme Court of Alabama has not specifically addressed 

whether a manufactured home is considered a product under the AEMLD. See Ex parte Grand 

Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 179 fn. 4 (stating that “[n]either party argues that a mobile home is not a 

product, and we express no opinion on that issue”). However, a “product” is defined as something 

distributed for use or consumption commercially and that is “(1) tangible personal property, (2) the 

result of fabrication or processing, and (3) an item that has passed through a chain of commercial 

distribution before ultimate use or consumption.” Bryan A. Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th 

ed. 2004). The manufactured home was in fact distributed commercially for use. The manufactured 

home is also tangible personal property. See Herrin v. Greentree—AL, LLC, --- B.R. ---, 2007 WL 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 27 of 35
28

2791603, *1 (S.D. Ala. 2007)(stating “Under Alabama law, the mobile home is deemed to be 

personal property, not real property). The manufactured home was produced as a result of 

fabrication. The manufactured home also was passed from Defendant, to a distributor, and 

ultimately to Plaintiff for use. Therefore, a manufactured home is a “product” for purposes of the 

AEMLD. 

 Also, although the Alabama Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether a 

manufactured home is a product, it has treated it like it was a product. In Foremost Ins. Co. v. Indies 

House, Inc., the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a manufactured home alleging violations of the 

AEMLD, among other claims, after the manufactured home caught on fire. Foremost Ins. Co. v. 

Indies House, Inc., 602 So.2d 380, 381 (Ala. 1992). The defendant raised the no-causal relation 

defense arguing there was no causal relation between its handling of the manufactured home and the 

defective condition. Id. at 381-82. The Court stated that the “[no-causal relation] defense is 

available only to persons distributing a finished product or in the process of distributing a finished 

product. By implication, this defense is not available to the manufacturer of the finished product.” 

Foremost Ins. Co. v. Indies House, Inc., 602 So.2d at 382 (emphasis added). The Court held the nocausal relation defense was inapplicable because the defendant was the manufacturer of the finished 

product. Id. In the case at hand, Defendant was the manufacturer of the finished product, the 

manufactured home. 

 The Alabama Supreme Court later recognized its implication that a manufactured home is a 

product. As mentioned above, the Court stated in a footnote in Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc. the 

following: 

[n]either party argues that a mobile home is not a product, and we express no opinion 

on that issue. But see Foremost Ins. Co. v. Indies House, Inc., 602 So.2d 380, 382 

(Ala. 1992)(holding that an assembler of a mobile home is deemed to be a 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 28 of 35
29

manufacturer of a finished product, that is, the mobile home, for purposes of 

determining the applicability of the affirmative causal-relation defense under the 

AEMLD. 

Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d at 179, fn. 4 (emphasis added). 

The Alabama Supreme Court did not address whether a manufactured home is a product, but it did 

point out that it had treated manufactured homes as products. 

Furthermore, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot maintain an AEMLD claim because “the 

only claims made by [Plaintiff] relate to property damage to the product itself, there is no cause of 

action and Defendant is entitled to a judgment in its favor.” Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, page 29 (emphasis added). So, Defendant has argued that an AEMLD claim is improper 

because the manufactured is a product for purposes of the economic loss rule (although there is an 

exception that applies in this case) and is not a product to satisfy the elements of the AEMLD claim. 

 Plaintiff contends Defendant had it correct in the former argument, that the manufactured home is a 

product. 

 Plaintiff contends that a manufactured home is a product because the courts in Alabama have 

applied the economic loss rule to manufactured homes. See Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 

at 178-89 (agreeing that the plaintiffs “made no allegation and offered no evidence indicating that 

they suffered any injury to themselves or to their property (other than the mobile home) and that the 

[plaintiffs] alleged only injury to the mobile home itself”). The economic loss rule prevents a 

plaintiff from recovering under a tort theory when the only property damage is to the product itself. 

Carrell v. Masonite Corp., 775 So.2d at 124. Manufactured homes must be products since the 

economic loss rule applies. In this case, however, the economic loss rule is rendered inapplicable 

because of the exception to the rule discussed above. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 29 of 35
30

 Defendant claims Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements to prove violation of the AEMLD 

because the defect was not “unreasonably dangerous.” The Supreme Court of Alabama has 

determined the terms “defect” and “unreasonably dangerous” are synonymous, “that is, defective 

means unreasonably dangerous and has no independent significance.” Casrell v. Altec Industries, 

Inc., 335 So.2d 128, 133 (Ala. 1976). Therefore, the Court determined an unreasonably dangerous 

defect is one which renders the product not fit for the intended purpose of the product. Id. The 

Eleventh Circuit has drawn on this definition when determining whether a plaintiff satisfies the first 

element of an AEMLD claim and stated that “[u]nder the first element of the prima facie case, a 

defect in a product is defined as ‘that which renders a product ‘unreasonably dangerous,’ i.e., not fit 

for its intended purpose.’” Goree v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 958 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 

1992), quoting Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d at 133. The Eleventh Circuit went on to 

state that a plaintiff only has to establish that the product was unreasonably dangerous, not that his 

injury was caused by the specific defect. Id. Based on the interpretations of the Supreme Court of 

Alabama and the Eleventh Circuit, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that a product is not fit for its 

intended purpose to establish the product was unreasonably dangerous. The Plaintiff in this case has 

proven that the manufactured home failed to serve as a suitable place of residence, which was the 

intended purpose of the manufactured home. 

 Defendant correctly states the general rule in Alabama is that a plaintiff cannot recover under 

an AEMLD claim if the only damage was to the product itself. Wellcraft Marine v. Zarzour, 577 

So.2d 414, 418 (Ala. 1990). As discussed above, however, more than just damage to the 

manufactured home was caused. Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and “Alabama has allowed 

mental-anguish damages when economic harm has occurred to a person’s home.” Carrell v. 

Masonite Corp., 775 So.2d at 124-25. The economic loss rule does not apply because Plaintiff has 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 30 of 35
31

suffered mental anguish. 

 Furthermore, the result of the defect has caused more than just damage to the walls. The 

home’s fair market value has decreased, which is an injury to the entire home. An injury to the 

entire home renders the economic loss rule inapplicable. Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d at 

185 (Johnstone, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Plaintiff, therefore, can maintain his 

AEMLD claim and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 

 Also, as discussed above, the zone-of-danger test “’limits recovery of mental anguish 

damages to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical injury as a result of a defendant’s negligent 

conduct, or who are place in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.’” Ex parte Grand 

Motor, Inc., 778 So.2d at 179, quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 752 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 

1999). It is hard to dispute that mold caused by Defendant’s negligence, which can grow quickly 

and cause immediate physical reactions, did not place Plaintiff in immediate risk of physical injury. 

Plaintiffs should be allowed to present evidence to the fact finder in this respect which includes 

Defendant’s witnesses and a responsive 30(b)(6) deponent. 

Damages

 It will be proven that Defendant knew the defective design of the walls in the manufactured 

home would produce condensation if placed in areas of high humidity. Defendant, therefore, 

attempted to disclaim damage caused by high humidity or condensation in its warranty. The 

disclaimer should be deemed ineffective because Defendant had access to information that put it on 

notice about the latent defect and Defendant failed to disclose such information to Plaintiff. A 

company should not be allowed to commit fraud on a consumer by disclaiming a known defect. 

 The purpose of the warranty was to provide Plaintiff with a home free from defects. The 

purpose of the warranty was never achieved because of the serious defect of the manufactured home. 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 31 of 35
32

 Due to the defect and Defendant’s knowledge of the defect, a jury may likely find that the warranty 

failed its essential purpose. If the jury finds the warranty to have failed its purpose, Plaintiff would 

be able to recover damages, despite Defendant’s exclusion of the defect in the warranty. See Liberty 

Homes, Inc. v. Epperson, 851 So.2d 449, 453 (Ala. 1991)(stating “When a jury finds that the limited 

warranty has failed of its essential purpose, it may then award damages allowed by the Uniform 

Commercial Code”). The warranty’s purpose “was to provide [Plaintiff] with a home reasonably 

free from defects, and there [is] evidence to show that this purpose was never achieved, 

[Defendant’s] warranty may be deemed a failure.” Id.

 Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the warranty, or at least the portion of the warranty that 

excludes liability for damages caused by the known defect, is unconscionable. In Alabama, “[t]he 

test for determining whether an agreement in unconscionable is ‘whether there are (1) terms that are 

grossly favorable to a party that has (2) overwhelming bargaining power.’” Carraway v. Beverly 

Enterprises Alabama, Inc., --- So.2d ---, 2007 WL 2070354, *4 (Ala. 2007), quoting Steele v. 

Walser, 880 So.2d 1123, 1129 (Ala. 2003). Defendant knew of the defect and then drafted a 

warranty that specifically excluded that defect in the hopes of insulating themselves from liability. 

Excluding liability in a warranty for a known defect certainly could be considered grossly favorable 

to Defendant, especially considering Plaintiff did not have knowledge of the defect. Defendant also 

had overwhelming bargaining power, given the warranty was a contract of adhesion and Defendant 

is sophisticated in legal and business matters and Plaintiff is unsophisticated. Therefore, the 

warranty is unconscionable or, at the very least, the portion of the warranty that Defendant drafted in 

an attempt to shield itself from liability is unconscionable. Defendant has attempted to analogize 

this case to Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 628 So.2d 405 (Ala. 1996), and contends that Plaintiff cannot 

recover for a future injury. However, injury has already occurred, unlike the artificial heart valve in 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 32 of 35
33

Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian. Mold has already begun to grow in Plaintiff’s walls, decreasing the value of 

the manufactured home. Furthermore, as a result of the decrease in fair market value, Plaintiff has 

suffered mental anguish. This case does not involve a hypothetical future injury, but rather an injury 

that has already begun to occur. 

 Furthermore, Plaintiff will prove that the disclaimer or limitation in the express warranty 

does not exclude the damages Plaintiff is claiming in this case. This is because damage to the 

exterior walls is not as a result of the “installation” issues listed in the disclaimer. The disclaimer or 

limitation states as follows: 

THE WARRANTY DOES NOT COVER: 

Deterioration or damage from high relative humidity, condensation, ground moisture, 

the use of moisture producing appliances (i.e., kerosene heaters, humidifiers, etc.) or 

extended moisture exposure caused by plants, building attachments or accessories; or 

the failure to maintain adequate ventilation in and/or underneath the home; or the 

failure to properly vent the dryer exhaust away from the home; or the failure to 

provide an adequate vapor barrier; or the failure to provide adequate drainage away 

from the home; 

(Ex. 1, Defendant’s Ex. 18, pp. 4, 5: ¶ 3). 

 Plaintiff will prove that Defendant’s own expert has stated that exterior walls are generally 

not impacted by such installation related issues such as found in the warranty disclaimer in previous 

cases and that studies in which he participated support this contention. Defendant’s own expert 

admitted: “Examination of exterior walls is key, as exterior walls are typically unaffected by 

possible installation shortcomings....” Exhibit 6, p. 810: 8-14. This concurs with Plaintiff’s expert 

opinion.7

 Regardless, such issues are left for the fact finder. 

 

7 Defendant’s expert is not credible when he contradicts himself and the studies in which he participated. He also was 

less than candid in other areas: “Do you have any drafts? No, sir”, Exhibit 6 p. 825: 6-7. When a draft report was shown 

to him which he apparently did not realize had been produced and which had a materially different statement in in which 

benefited the Plaintiff and had been removed in the final report he stated: “So I didn’t mean to imply I don’t make a 

draft...you know I like this sentence better (in the draft), p. 826: 11-17.

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 33 of 35
34

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment based on merits be denied and that this Court enter such relief as is just. 

/s/ C. Lance Gould 

C. LANCE GOULD (ASB-0913-G66C) 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

OF COUNSEL: 

BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, 

METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C. 

Post Office Box 4160 

Montgomery, Alabama 36103 

(334) 269-2343 

(334) 954-7555 (fax) 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 34 of 35
35

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on November 12, I served a copy of the above and foregoing document 

upon counsel of record via electronically filing this document with the Clerk of Court using 

CM/ECF system which will send notification of the foregoing upon the following: 

Gregory S. Ritchey 

Ritchey & Simpson, PLLC 

3288 Morgan Drive, Suite 100 

Birmingham, Alabama 35216 

Tel: (205) 876-1600 

Fax: (205) 876-1616 

 

 /s/ C. Lance Gould 

 OF COUNSEL 

Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 35 of 35
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-2 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-3 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 3
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-3 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 3
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-3 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 3
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-4 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-4 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 21 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 22 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 23 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 24 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 25 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 26 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 27 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 28 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 29 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 30 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 31 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-5 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 32 of 32
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-6 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 20
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-7 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 13
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-8 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-8 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-9 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 7
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-10 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 8
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 21 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 22 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 23 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 24 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-11 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 25 of 25
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 21 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 22 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 23 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 24 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 25 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 26 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 27 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 28 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 29 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 30 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-12 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 31 of 31
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 21 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 22 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 23 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 24 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 25 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 26 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 27 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 28 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 29 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 30 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 31 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 32 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 33 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 34 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 35 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 36 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 37 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 38 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 39 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 40 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 41 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 42 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 43 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 44 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 45 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 46 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 47 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 48 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 49 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 50 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 51 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 52 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 53 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 54 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-13 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 55 of 55
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 1 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 2 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 3 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 4 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 5 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 6 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 7 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 8 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 9 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 10 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 11 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 12 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 13 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 14 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 15 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 16 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 17 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 18 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 19 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 20 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 21 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 22 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 23 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 24 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 25 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 26 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 27 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 28 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 29 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 30 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 31 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 32 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 33 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 34 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 35 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 36 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 37 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 38 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 39 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 40 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 41 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 42 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 43 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 44 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 45 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 46 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 47 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 48 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 49 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 50 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 51 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 52 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 53 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 54 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 55 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 56 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 57 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 58 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 59 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 60 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 61 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 62 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 63 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 64 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 65 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 66 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 67 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 68 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 69 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 70 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 71 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 72 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 73 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 74 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 75 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 76 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 77 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 78 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 79 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 80 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 81 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 82 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 83 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 84 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 85 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 86 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 87 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 88 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 89 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 90 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 91 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 92 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 93 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 94 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 95 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 96 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 97 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 98 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 99 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 100 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 101 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 102 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 103 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 104 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 105 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 106 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 107 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 108 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 109 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 110 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 111 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 112 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 113 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 114 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 115 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 116 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 117 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 118 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 119 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 120 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 121 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 122 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 123 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 124 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 125 of 126
Case 1:06-cv-00643-MHT-SRW Document 54-14 Filed 11/12/2007 Page 126 of 126