J-A29045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

THOMAS WILLIAM STEVENSON, JR. 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 439 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County

Criminal Division at CP-10-CR-0001689-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: January 4, 2024

Thomas William Stevenson, Jr. (Appellant), appeals from the order 

denying his first petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

This Court set forth the factual history in a prior appeal:

Corporal Michael Lewis testified that on September 9, 2015, he 

used a confidential informant [], Amanda Beck, to perform a 

controlled buy of drugs from [Appellant]. Beck performed several 

controlled buys for Corporal Lewis in exchange for anticipated 

leniency for her own pending drug arrest. On this occasion, 

Corporal Lewis asked Beck to call her dealer, [Appellant], and set 

up a heroin buy. She then went to the police barracks. Corporal 

Lewis confirmed that she was not carrying drugs[.] Corporal Lewis 

provided Beck with $240 in marked cash and a video camera 

disguised as a key fob, which he asked Beck to use to record a 

picture of [Appellant] and his apartment number, as well as 

anything else that she could capture without detection. Corporal 

Lewis then drove Beck to the apartment building where she was 

to conduct a drug buy.
J-A29045-23

- 2 -

Beck testified that when they arrived[,] she walked up the 

stairs in the apartment building, knocked on the door, and 

[Appellant] answered. She gave him the money and then went to 

retrieve the heroin bags[,] which [Appellant] had hidden behind a 

fire extinguisher in the hall outside of his apartment. When she 

picked up the heroin [Appellant] had set aside for her, Beck 

realized that [Appellant] had shorted her a couple of bags, and so

[she] went back to the apartment. There[, Appellant] retrieved 

the extra bags and gave them to [Beck]. Beck then walked back 

to Corporal Lewis’s car, and gave the bags of heroin to him.

During [Appellant’s jury] trial, the Commonwealth 

introduced the video recording that Beck captured of the sale, 

without any objection. The Commonwealth provided evidence 

that the drugs purchased were identified as 28 stamp bags of 

heroin.

At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, defense 

counsel orally moved for judgment of acquittal, stating simply, “I 

would like to make a motion for judgment of acquittal based upon 

the facts .... I defer to Your Honor on the testimony and evidence 

that’s been presented.” The court denied the motion.

During jury deliberations, the court received a note from 

jurors asking to watch the video of the controlled buy, and asking, 

“Does everyone confirm person male [sic] in video is [Appellant?]” 

The trial court declined to answer the question regarding the 

identity of the male. However, [the court] brought the jury back 

into the courtroom to watch the video. After watching the video 

in the courtroom, the prosecutor offered to send his laptop 

containing a copy of the video back with the jury into the jury 

room:

District Attorney: Your Honor, do you want the video to go 

back with them?

THE COURT: If you want to send your laptop back with 

them?

District Attorney: I’m okay with that.

Defense Counsel: Do you have any files on there?
J-A29045-23

- 3 -

THE COURT: It is an exhibit, so, they’re welcome to look at 

it.

District Attorney: All right. Can you set it up so they can 

play it?

THE COURT: Okay. We’re adjourned.

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 237 A.3d 1075, 558 WDA 2019 (Pa. Super. 

filed June 9, 2020) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (citations and some 

brackets omitted). Pertinently, Appellant did not testify.

The jury convicted Appellant of possession of heroin, possession with 

intent to deliver heroin, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 The trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 33 to 132 months in prison. On direct 

appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See id. (unpublished 

memorandum). Appellant did not seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court.

On June 23, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant timely PCRA 

petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel who, after receiving several 

extensions of time, filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf. The PCRA 

court held a hearing. Appellant’s trial and direct appeal counsel, Komron 

Maknoon, Esquire (Attorney Maknoon), testified. On March 24, 2023, the 

PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30) and (31).
J-A29045-23

- 4 -

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court and Appellant 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for review:

I. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular 

case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no 

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

a. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to properly plead Appellant’s issues on direct appeal and/or 

properly preserve the issues for appeal, thus waiving all issues 

for direct appeal.

b. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object or request a mistrial during the Commonwealth’s 

opening and closing arguments when the prosecutor injected 

his personal opinion as to the credibility of the Commonwealth 

witness.

c. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request a no adverse-inference jury charge, and Appellant 

was prejudiced as a result of the omission.

d. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to lodge an objection to the prosecutor providing his laptop to 

the jury in the deliberation room to review the video of the 

alleged drug transaction.

e. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the numerous comments made at trial by 

Commonwealth witnesses regarding alleged prior bad acts 

committed by Appellant when no notice was provided by the 

Commonwealth under Pa.R.E. 404(b).

f. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to seek a motion to strike the jury panel at the time of jury 

selections after learning that one of the jurors was the aunt of 

the Commonwealth witness as said prospective juror was left 

alone with the jury panel[,] thus potentially tainting the jury.

II. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
J-A29045-23

- 5 -

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (some capitalization altered).

“Our standard of review in PCRA appeals is limited to determining 

whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free 

from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 

2009). 

Appellant raises numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We 

presume that counsel is effective, and the appellant bears the burden of 

proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa.

2012). The appellant must demonstrate 

(1) The underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s 

action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis 

designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to 

the effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome if not for counsel’s error.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). Failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to an ineffectiveness 

claim. See id.

First, Appellant asserts Attorney Maknoon was ineffective for failing to 

preserve various claims for appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-22. On direct 

appeal, Appellant argued 1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 

convictions; 2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; 3) the trial 

court erred by permitting the jury to view a video of the controlled buy on the 

prosecutor’s laptop during deliberations; and 4) the trial court erred by 

denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. This Court concluded 
J-A29045-23

- 6 -

Appellant waived all four issues. See Stevenson, 558 WDA 2019 

(unpublished memorandum).

In his argument, Appellant points only to Attorney Maknoon’s 

acknowledgement, during the PCRA hearing, that these four issues were 

waived on direct appeal, and counsel had no reasonable basis for his failure 

to properly preserve the claims. Appellant’s Brief at 21 (citing N.T. (PCRA), 

11/17/22, at 7-9). Appellant states,

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the 

evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support that 

Appellant constructively and/or actually possessed the narcotics 

and paraphernalia in question nor possessed them with the intent 

to deliver.

Id. Appellant does not address the merits of the underlying sufficiency claim, 

or discuss potential merits of the other three issues that were waived on direct 

appeal. See generally Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1289 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (“We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor 

shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument....” (citation 

omitted)). Absent an adequate discussion of the previously waived claims, 

Appellant fails to establish that the issues would have entitled him to relief, 

had Attorney Maknoon properly preserved them for review.2 Thus, Appellant’s 

first claim fails.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also challenges the jury’s access to the controlled-buy video in a 

separate issue, which we discuss infra.
J-A29045-23

- 7 -

Appellant also argues Attorney Maknoon was ineffective for failing to 

object to the prosecutor’s comments about Beck’s credibility during opening

and closing statements, or to request a mistrial on that basis. Appellant’s 

Brief at 22. Specifically, Appellant challenges the prosecutor’s comment 

during opening statements: “And I’m telling you now -- and I met with [Beck] 

and I have talked with her, she is telling the truth. She is going to tell you 

the truth.” Id. at 22 (citing N.T (Trial), 2/26/19, at 18). Appellant further 

cites the following statements from the prosecutor’s closing argument:

• “But I don’t think [Beck] had the wherewithal to get those 

drugs planted in there before she met with the State Police that 

day. I don’t think she would leave $240 just sitting somewhere 

in there and then get the drugs, come out and say, okay, I got 

him set up, I got the drugs, he sold me the drugs.”

• “It’s not a question of whether or not she came in and told the 

truth today. It’s a question of whether or not you believe that 

she was capable of faking this deal to set him up. Do you really 

think she could do that[?] I don’t -- I don’t think she could do 

that.”

Id. (citing N.T., 2/26/19, at 90-91). Appellant points to Attorney Maknoon’s

testimony at the PCRA hearing that if he were to try the case again, he would 

object to the prosecutor’s statements because Beck’s credibility was central 

to the case. Id. at 23-24.

A claim of ineffective assistance grounded in counsel’s 

failure to object to a prosecutor’s comments may succeed when 

the petitioner demonstrates that the prosecutor’s comments 

violated a constitutionally or statutorily protected right.... The 

touchstone is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor.

....
J-A29045-23

- 8 -

Not every unwise, intemperate, or improper remark made 

by a prosecutor mandates the grant of a new trial. Reversible 

error occurs only when the unavoidable effect of the challenged 

comments would prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a 

fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors 

could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict.

Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 720-21 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

and brackets omitted). 

A prosecutor may not express a personal belief concerning the credibility 

of trial witnesses. Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1020 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). “However, the prosecutor may comment on the credibility of 

witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Further, a prosecutor is allowed to respond to defense arguments 

with logical force and vigor. ... If defense counsel has attacked 

the credibility of witnesses in closing, the prosecutor may present 

argument addressing the witnesses’ credibility. See 

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 572 Pa. 105, 813 A.2d 761, 768 

(2002) (rejecting defense contention that the prosecutor 

improperly vouched for the credibility of prosecution witnesses 

since “the prosecutor was reviewing the testimony of several 

prosecution witnesses after defense counsel had attacked their 

testimony, in an effort to counter the argument of defense 

counsel”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 527 Pa. 118, 588 A.2d 

1303, 1305 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor’s comments stating 

that a defendant had lied were neither unfair nor prejudicial when 

given in response to the comments of defense counsel in relation 

to the credibility of witnesses, and when they were supported by 

the evidence).

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 544-45 (Pa. 2005) (brackets and 

some citations omitted).

As Appellant suggests, the prosecutor made one statement during oral 

argument tending to indicate he believed Beck would be credible. See N.T., 
J-A29045-23

- 9 -

2/26/19, at 18. However, we will not ignore the greater context within which 

that statement was made. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 

668 (Pa. 2007) (“A challenged statement by a prosecutor must be evaluated 

in the context in which it was made.”). Before describing the testimony Beck 

would offer, the prosecutor explained Beck’s role as a confidential informant 

and acknowledged that confidential informants often have “checkered pasts.” 

Id. at 17. The prosecutor conceded that Beck had prior arrests and pending 

charges. Id.; see also id. (“So, [Beck] doesn’t come in here with clean 

hands. And she’s going to own that, she’s going to admit to that.”). 

Additionally, the prosecutor reminded the jurors that they were responsible 

for deciding Beck’s credibility. Id. at 18 (“[Y]ou make your determination on 

whether or not she is credible.”). On this record, we conclude Appellant’s 

comment, within the context of the prosecutor’s entire opening argument, 

would not “prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a fixed bias and 

hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors could not weigh the 

evidence and render a true verdict.” Watkins, 108 A.3d at 721.

Moreover, the record reveals that Attorney Maknoon attacked Beck’s 

credibility in his closing argument. Attorney Maknoon described Beck as a 

“dishonest drug dealer who is addicted to drugs....” N.T., 2/26/19, at 81; see 

also id. (“What would she be willing to do to stay out of trouble[?] Anything. 

Anything. So, she’s dishonest.”); id. at 82 (arguing, “[S]he’s a hustler....”). 

Attorney Maknoon also stated that Beck “is worth zero for credibility.” Id. at 
J-A29045-23

- 10 -

85. Because Attorney Maknoon repeatedly attacked the credibility of the 

Commonwealth’s primary witness, the prosecutor’s statements were fair 

rebuttal. See Chmiel, 889 A.2d at 544-45. Appellant’s claim therefore lacks 

merit, and his ineffectiveness claim fails.

In his third claim, Appellant argues Attorney Maknoon was ineffective 

for failing to request a no adverse inference jury charge. Appellant’s Brief at 

25. According to Appellant, the jury likely drew an improper adverse inference 

against him based on his decision not to testify at trial. Id. at 26.

“A ‘no adverse inference’ instruction directs the jury that they may not 

draw any adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to testify in his own 

defense, because the defendant has the absolute right not to testify if he so 

chooses.” Commonwealth v. Stanley, 830 A.2d 1021, 1022 n.1 (Pa. Super. 

2003). This instruction must be given unless a defendant expressly waives 

the jury charge through an on-the-record colloquy. Id. at 1025 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 674 A.2d 217, 222 (Pa. 1996)). Counsel’s 

failure to request either a no adverse inference instruction or a colloquy to 

waive the jury charge is not per se prejudicial. Id. at 1026.

It is undisputed that Appellant declined to testify in his defense. The 

trial court conducted an on-the-record colloquy regarding Appellant’s right to 

testify. N.T., 2/26/19, at 72-73. Before charging the jury, the trial court 

reviewed all relevant jury instructions with Attorney Maknoon and the 

prosecutor. See id. at 76-79. The court did not mention the no adverse 
J-A29045-23

- 11 -

inference charge, and Attorney Maknoon did not request it. Further, Attorney 

Maknoon did not object to the absence of a no adverse inference instruction

during the final charge to the jury.

Appellant argues, “it is clear that the jury drew an improper adverse 

inference” from his decision not to testify. However, our review discloses that 

during preliminary instructions, the trial court advised the jury of Appellant’s 

right not to testify:

At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, the attorney for the 

defendant may present evidence for the defendant. But as I told 

you before, the defendant has no obligation to offer 

evidence or to testify. Under the law, every defendant’s 

presumed to be innocent [and] has a right to remain silent. 

The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

N.T., 2/26/19, at 4 (emphasis added). During the final jury charge, the trial 

court reiterated that the burden of proof lies exclusively with the 

Commonwealth:

A fundamental principle of our system of criminal law is the 

defendant’s presumed to be innocent. ... [A] defendant’s 

presumed to remain innocent throughout the trial unless and until 

you conclude based upon careful and impartial consideration of 

the evidence that the Commonwealth has proven him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges made against him. It’s 

not the defendant’s burden to prove that he’s not guilty. ... A 

person accused of a crime is not required to present evidence or 

to prove anything in his own defense.

Id. at 94-95.

Although the trial court did not expressly give a no adverse inference 

charge, its instructions were sufficiently equivalent. See generally 
J-A29045-23

- 12 -

Commonwealth v. Milliard, 260 A.3d 143, 1363 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed 

July 13, 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 12-13) (appellant was not 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request a specific no adverse inference 

charge or object to its omission where the trial court provided a sufficiently 

similar charge).

3

 “The law presumes the jury will follow the instructions of the 

court.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 846 (Pa. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Appellant’s claim fails because he failed to establish 

prejudice to a degree that would have altered the outcome of trial.4

Next, Appellant argues Attorney Maknoon was ineffective for failing to 

object to the provision of the prosecutor’s laptop to the jury to review the 

video of the controlled buy. Appellant’s Brief at 27; id. at 20 (acknowledging 

this Court previously found the underlying claim waived because Attorney 

Maknoon failed to object at trial). Appellant raises concerns with the jury’s 

“unfettered access” to the prosecutor’s laptop, which could have included 

other inadmissible files. Id. at 27-28.

Appellant fails to support this claim with citation to Rules of Evidence or 

relevant case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (the argument shall include “such 

____________________________________________

3 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential decisions of the 

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value.

4 We acknowledge Attorney Maknoon’s testimony that he did not request the 

no adverse inference instruction because “It’s standard and I missed it.” N.T., 

11/17/22, at 14. While this statement arguably supports a finding that 

counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to object, failure to establish any 

prong of the ineffectiveness test defeats a claim. Franklin, 990 A.2d at 797.
J-A29045-23

- 13 -

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Accordingly, 

we could deem this issue waived. See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 

1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (concluding appellant waived his claim by failing 

to adequately develop his argument or cite and discuss relevant authority).

Nonetheless, we note that the trial court has discretion to permit an 

exhibit to go to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Farkas, 276 A.3d 814, 819 

(Pa. Super. 2022). The court’s “decision will not be overturned absent an 

abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 646, “[u]pon retiring, the jury may take with 

it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper, except as provided in 

paragraph (C).” Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(A). 

(C) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have:

(1) a transcript of any trial testimony;

(2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded confession by 

the defendant;

(3) a copy of the information or indictment; and 

(4) except as provided in paragraph (B), written jury 

instructions.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(C).

This Court has explained,

The underlying reason for excluding certain items from the jury’s 

deliberations is to prevent placing undue emphasis or credibility 

on the material, and de-emphasizing or discrediting other items 

not in the room with the jury. If there is a likelihood the 

importance of the evidence will be skewed, prejudice may be 
J-A29045-23

- 14 -

found; if not, there is no prejudice per se and the error is 

harmless.

Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted).

Appellant does not contest the video’s admission as an exhibit during 

trial. The jury viewed the video twice during Beck’s testimony. See N.T., 

2/29/19, at 33; id. at 37 (noting video was saved on disk). Rule 646(C) does 

not expressly prohibit the jury’s use of a video in evidence during 

deliberations, nor does it restrict the medium through which a jury may view 

exhibits. We are sympathetic to Appellant’s general concerns about allowing 

a jury “unfettered access” to a prosecutor’s laptop. However, in this case,

Appellant offers no evidence that the jurors had access to the laptop without 

supervision; how long the jurors had access to the laptop; or what, if any, 

additional files the jurors might have seen on the laptop. Appellant has neither 

argued nor established that permitting the jury to view the video on the 

prosecutor’s laptop placed undue emphasis on its contents or skewed its 

importance. Cf. Dupre, supra. Because Appellant has failed to establish he 

was prejudiced by Attorney Maknoon’s failure to object, this ineffectiveness 

claim fails.

In his fifth claim, Appellant contends Attorney Maknoon was ineffective

for failing to object to comments made by Commonwealth witnesses

concerning Appellant’s prior bad acts, where the Commonwealth did not 

provide notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). Appellant’s Brief at 29. Appellant 
J-A29045-23

- 15 -

also claims a reference to him as a drug dealer “in and of itself insinuates prior 

bad acts on the part of Appellant.” Id. at 30.

Rule 404(b)(3) provides:

In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable written 

notice in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair 

opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 

notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, permitted use, 

and reasoning for the use of any such evidence the prosecutor 

intends to introduce at trial.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).

Appellant fails to support his argument with citations to relevant case 

law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Further, Appellant does not detail the specific

testimony he wishes to challenge. Appellant instead cites various pages of 

trial testimony without further explanation. The cites reference Beck’s prior 

dealings with Appellant, and Beck having been to Appellant’s apartment 

building on more than one occasion. See N.T., 2/26/19, at 26-27, 29, 30-31, 

44, 53. Importantly, Appellant advances only a bald claim that he was “clearly

prejudiced” as a result of Attorney Maknoon’s failure to object. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 386 (Pa. 2005) (boilerplate 

assertion that prejudice “is self-evident” was insufficient to establish counsel’s 

ineffectiveness). 

The PCRA court observed that Beck made only one specific reference to 

Appellant as a “drug dealer.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 4. The court 

further concluded “an objection by trial counsel would not have changed the 

outcome of the trial given the strong evidence presented by the 
J-A29045-23

- 16 -

Commonwealth.” Id. We discern no error in this determination, which is 

supported by the record. As Appellant failed to establish prejudice to a degree 

that would have altered the outcome of trial, this claim fails.

In his sixth and final claim, Appellant asserts Attorney Maknoon was 

ineffective for failing to file a motion to strike the jury panel. Appellant’s Brief 

at 32. 

Appellant avers that at the time of jury selection[], it was brought 

to their attention that one of the prospective jurors was the aunt 

of the Commonwealth witness[, Beck]. Appellant further avers 

that although the juror was not selected, she had access to the 

other prospective jurors and could have tainted the jury panel.

Id.; see also id. (stating the prospective juror was alone with the jury panel).

Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Harkins, 328 A.2d 156 (Pa. 

1974), where the appellant claimed he was prejudiced when a prospective 

juror accused him of stealing the juror’s car (an offense for which appellant 

was not charged) in the presence of other prospective jurors. Harkins, 328 

A.2d at 156-57. The trial court dismissed the prospective juror who made the 

statement, but others who heard the statement served on the jury. Id. Our 

Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by denying the defense motion 

to strike the panel, “[s]ince the other prospective jurors also could have 

reasonably understood that the accusation was directed at the appellant....” 

Id. at 157. “The fact that a reasonable inference of a prior criminal record is 

present in the minds of the jurors in and of itself mandates a new trial.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted).
J-A29045-23

- 17 -

Here, there is no indication the juror made comments about Beck or 

Appellant, and Appellant does not cite the record or any statements made by 

the juror.5 “[T]he juror was struck for cause and was not part of the impaneled 

jury for trial.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 4. Appellant suggests the 

juror might have spoken to other prospective jurors at the end of the day, 

some of whom were chosen for the jury. See N.T., 11/17/22, at 21 (PCRA 

counsel asking Attorney Maknoon, “And do you recall if [the juror] ... left with 

other p[ro]spective jurors at the end of the day and could have had unfettered 

access to talk to them about something, the case or whatever? Do you recall 

seeing her leave with the other members of the jury panel including people 

who were picked with this jury?”). As the PCRA court stated, this is “pure 

speculation.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 4. Appellant’s final claim fails 

for lack of arguable merit. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 

1223 (Pa. 2006) (stating “counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to 

raise a meritless claim”).

For the above reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying 

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

5 The record does not contain transcripts of voir dire. “[T]he ultimate 

responsibility of ensuring that the transmitted record is complete rests 

squarely upon the appellant and not upon the appellate courts.” 

Commonwealth v. Bongiorno, 905 A.2d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2006).
J-A29045-23

- 18 -

DATE: 1/4/2024