Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of

Arctic and Other Regional Impacts From

Soviet Nuclear Contamination

September 1995

OTA-ENV-632

GPO stock #052-003-01452-1
Recommended Citation: Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and

Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination, OTA-ENV-623

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995).
Foreword

ne of the lasting legacies of the Cold War, and the buildup in nuclear weaponry and military over the past 50 years, is nuclear waste and its threat to

human health and the environment. Notable examples of waste dumped into

the open environment have caused people and nations to demand information

about what was done and what health risks may result. In 1993, disclosures about Russian dumping of submarine reactors, nuclear fuel, and other wastes into the Arctic and

North Pacific Oceans brought this region and its problems into the world spotlight. People in the United States want to know about this dumping and other discharges of radionuclides into the oceans. They want to understand the risks from Russian nuclear

activities, both past and future, and the potential threat to their health and that of the

Arctic ecosystem.

Because of these concerns, Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Senators William V. Roth and John

Glenn, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to prepare this

assessment of Nuclear Waste in the Arctic.

This report examines the environmental and human health impacts from wastes

dumped into the Arctic and North Pacific regions, from nuclear contaminants discharged into these environments, and from radioactive releases from both past and

future nuclear activities in the region. The report presents what is known and unknown

about this waste and contamination and how it may affect public health. Because so

many factors are involved and science cannot provide absolute answers to many questions, this study emphasizes the need for care, caution, awareness, and prudence. It also

stresses the need for a stable and enduring institutional framework and international

cooperation for long-term observation and monitoring.

OTA received considerable assistance during this study from many organizations and

individuals. We sincerely appreciate the guidance received from our Advisory Panel,

workshop participants, numerous reviewers, contributors, consultants, and contractors.

We also received help from several U.S. federal agencies, research institutions, international organizations, the Russian Government and private institutions, the Norwegian

Government and private organizations, and others. Without this cooperation and expert

advice, OTA would not have been able to accomplish this study.

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director

O
iv

Advisory Panel

Robert P. Morgan, Chair

Professor of Technology & 

Human Affairs

Washington University

John F. Ahearne

Executive Director

Sigma Xi, The Scientific 

Research Society

James S. Allen

Manager, Advanced Programs

Georgia Tech Research 

Institute

Susan Eisenhower

Director

Center for Post Soviet Studies

Murray Feshbach

Research Professor

Georgetown University

Paula Garb

Researcher, Global Peace & 

Conflict Studies Program

University of California, Irvine

Marvin Goldman

Professor Emeritus of 

Radiological Sciences

University of California, Davis

Joshua Handler

Research Coordinator

Greenpeace International

Edway R. Johnson

President and CEO

E.R. Johnson Associates, Inc.

John J. Kelley

Associate Professor

Institute of Marine Science

University of Alaska, 

Fairbanks

Malcom MacKinnon III

President

MacKinnon Searle 

Consortium, Ltd.

Stephanie L. Pfirman

Associate Professor and Chair

Barnard College, Columbia 

University

Lydia V. Popova

Director, Nuclear Ecology 

Program

Socio-Ecological Union, 

Moscow

Caleb Pungowiyi

Director

Inuit Circumpolar Conference

William L. Templeton

Senior Research Advisor

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

William R. Wiley

Senior Vice President, Science 

and Technology Policy

Battelle Memorial Institute
Workshop Participants

RUSSIAN NAVAL SPENT 

NUCLEAR FUEL WORKSHOP

Nikolai Z. Bisovka

Naval Reactors Division

GOSATOMNADZOR

Jor Shan Choi

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory

Valeriy A. Danilian

Russian Navy, Pacific Fleet

Knut Gussgard

Norwegian Radiation 

Protection Authority

Al Hoskins

Lockheed Idaho Technology 

Corporation

John Jicha

U.S. Department of Energy

M.R. Louthan

Westinghouse Savannah River 

Corporation

Nigel Mote

NAC International

Boris P. Papkovsky

Russian Ministry of Atomic 

Energy

Andrei V. Pechkurov

Russian Ministry of 

Environment

Vyacheslav V. Ruksha

Murmansk Shipping Company

Mikhail I. Rylov

Krylov Shipbuilding Research 

Institute

Yuri V. Sivintsev

Kurchatov Institute

Aleksandr V. Tkalin

Russian Far Eastern Hydromet 

Institute

Boris Zakharkin

Russian Scientific and 

Research Institute of 

Inorganic Materials

INSTITUTIONAL ROUNDTABLE

Thomas Armbruster

U.S. Department of State

Eugene Bae

U.S. Department of Defense

Garrett Brass

U.S. Arctic Research 

Commission

Mark Dinneen

Alaska Governor’s Office

Clyde Frank

U.S. Department of Energy

Burton Hurdle

Naval Research Laboratory

Bruce Molnia

U.S. Geological Survey

Charles Myers

National Science Foundation

Charles Newstead

U.S. Department of State

Jack Ramsey

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

Stephen Trautman

Department of the Navy

Mead Treadwell

formerly Alaskan Department 

of Environmental 

Conservation

Edward Washburn

U.S. Department of Energy
vi

Project Staff

Clyde Behney

Assistant Director, OTA

Health and Environmental 

Sciences Division

Robert Niblock

Program Director

Environment Program

ADMINISTRATION STAFF

Kathleen Beil

Office Administrator

Nellie Hammond

Administrative Secretary

Kimberly Holmlund

Administrative Secretary

Sharon Knarvik

Secretary

Babette Polzer

Contractor

Peter A. Johnson

Project Director

Lois Joellenbeck

Senior Analyst

Bernard Lee

Research Analyst

German Reyes

Co-project Director

Kirsten Oldenberg

Senior Analyst

Beth Gerard

Research Analyst

CONTRACTORS

Gary Baham

The Baham Corporation

Oleg Bukharin

Princeton University

Gretchen McCabe

Battelle Memorial Institute

Florence Poillon

Editor

CONTRIBUTORS

Mike Bowes

OTA

Lee Cooper

Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory

Burton Hurdle

Naval Research Laboratory

David Nagel

Naval Research Laboratory
vii

Contents

1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options 1

Key Findings of Study 14

Policy Issues and Options 18

References 25

2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic 

and North Pacific 27

Background and Overview 27

Arctic Contamination from Non-dumping Sources 33

Radioactive Contamination from Soviet Nuclear Waste 

Dumping 45

Research and Monitoring of Radioactive Contamination in 

the Arctic, the North Pacific, and Alaska 50

Research and Monitoring: Data Gaps and Future 

Needs 60

Remediation Options 63

Conclusions 71

References 72

3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear 

Waste Dumping in the Arctic 79

Human Health Effects from Radiation 80

Sources of Ionizing Radiation 85

Potential Health Effects from Nuclear Contamination in the 

Arctic and North Pacific 86

Ecological Effects of Radiation in the Arctic and North 

Pacific Regions 106

Conclusions 108

References 110

4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future 

Contamination 115

The Russian Nuclear Fleet 117

Managing Spent Fuel from the Russian Fleet: Issues and 

Opportunities for Cooperation 133
viii

Russian Nuclear Power Plants—Safety Concerns and Risk 

Reduction Efforts 149

Conclusions 163

References 166

5 Institutional Framework and Policies 171

U.S. Initiatives and Programs Supporting Research on 

Radioactive Contamination in the Arctic 173

Monitoring and Early Warning Initiatives Designed to 

Address Radioactive Contamination in the Arctic 194

Institutional Initiatives and Programs Designed to Prevent 

Future Arctic Radioactive Contamination 202

Current Russian Institutional Structure 215

References 221

Appendix A: Reviewers 231

Appendix B: Acronyms and Glossary 233

Appendix C: Excerpts from DoD Appropriations 

Acts for FY1993, 1994 & 1995 Providing Funding 

and Authority for the Arctic Nuclear Waste 

Assessment Program (ANWAP) 237
| 1

1

Summary,

Findings,

and Policy

Options

ll major nuclear nations face nuclear

waste problems. Many also share a common history of radioactive contamination incidents stemming from inadequate

attention to environmental protection. The

United States and Russia, in particular, have

some similar nuclear waste management and

contamination problems within their respective

nuclear weapons complexes. Current work on

these problems is enhanced by recently increased

cooperation and improved public awareness of

the benefits of environmental protection. However, radioactive contamination has endangered

public health in some cases and still engenders

serious public reaction worldwide for a number

of reasons. Among these are the fear resulting

from vivid portrayals of atomic bomb victims;

concerns about chronic and long-term health

impacts from radiation exposure; distrust of governments who kept most nuclear information

secret for decades; and the presence of an environmental hazard that is difficult to detect and

even more difficult for most people to understand. Any attempt to address solutions to environmental and human health threats from nuclear

contamination must consider both the scientific

and the social realities.

Protection of the environment and public

health requires careful and responsible management and long-term control of nuclear waste. In

recent years, as the Cold War and the nuclear

arms race have abated, many nations, institutions, and individuals have become increasingly

concerned about the environmental legacy of the

nuclear age. Reports about nuclear waste dumping, radioactive discharges and accidents, and

their potential human health effects have galvanized public attention and forced nations to seek

solutions to these problems.

Nuclear waste in the Arctic is a subject that

has been brought to the forefront by recent revelations about the dumping of Soviet submarine

reactors and waste products in the sea over the

past several decades when the region off the

northwestern coast of Russia was a hub of

nuclear fleet and nuclear testing activities. The

Arctic elicits images of vast frozen expanses

with little human habitation or industry and a relatively pristine environment. But these images

are not always accurate, and contamination from

both military and industrial activities has brought

questions about its impact not only locally but in

the wider Arctic region. Box 1-1 and figure 1-1

describe the geographic focus of this Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) study. 

A
2 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

This report examines the environmental and

human health impacts from nuclear wastes

dumped in the Arctic (and, to a lesser extent, the

North Pacific), nuclear contaminants discharged

into these marine environments, and radioactive

releases from both past and future nuclear activities in these regions. Questions about the environmental and health impacts of these practices

BOX 1-1: Geographic Focus of This Study

The Arctic region is frequently defined as all areas north of the Arctic circle (66.5°N latitude), which

means it includes the Arctic Ocean, Greenland, and northern parts of the European, Asian, and North

American continents. It has distinguishing characteristics in both political and ecological terms. There are

eight Arctic circumpolar nations: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland,

and Denmark. All are signatories to the Declaration on Arctic Environmental Protection.

Alaska’s northern coast borders the Arctic. Half of the Arctic coastline, however, lies within Russia.

That country has historically used these waters as an important transportation route, linking its western

and eastern northernmost regions, as well as providing access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The

Arctic region is also home to two-thirds of Russia’s fleet of nuclear submarines and icebreakers. To

ensure access to harbors all year round, Russia maintains a nuclear-powered fleet of icebreakers, as well

as a large number of radioisotope-powered lighthouses.

The central core of the Arctic region—its ocean—is “a sea bordered by prominent countries, all of

which have concerns regarding security, resource exploitation, environmental protection, etc.” (11). Covering about 390,000 square miles, the Arctic Ocean is the world’s smallest. It is almost completely covered by six to 10 feet of ice in winter. In summer it becomes substantially open (ice free) only at its

peripheries. There are two international outlets: the Bering Strait, which lies between Alaska and Russia,

and the Fram Strait situated between Greenland and Norway’s Spitsbergen Islands. These two straits are

not only shipping lanes but also the principal routes for exchange of surface waters.

The Arctic Ocean is ringed by seas. Principal among them are the Beaufort (shared by Canada and

Alaska); Chukchi (between Alaska and Russia); the East Siberian, Laptev, and Kara Seas of Russia; and

the Barents, bordered by both Russia and Norway. The liquid and solid nuclear wastes dumped by the

Soviet Navy are located in the Barents and Kara Seas, in the Pacific Ocean along the east coast of Kamchatka, and in the Sea of Japan. In addition, an island group called Novaya Zemlya which separates the

Barents and Kara Seas was the site of most of the atmospheric and underground nuclear testing by the

former Soviet Union.

Other than Canada’s Mackenzie River, all the major rivers that flow into the Arctic’s adjacent seas are

Russian, and more than 40 percent of that flow is to the Kara Sea. Russia’s Pechora, Ob, and Yenisey Rivers empty into the Kara Sea; its Kotuy and Lena Rivers, into the Laptev Sea; and the Indigirka and

Kolyma, into the East Siberian Sea. The Pechora River, already severely polluted in some areas, has been

under additional ecological threat from leaking oil pipelines, such as the Koma oil spill, which occurred

early this year. Nuclear contamination created by facilities thousands of miles south in the Urals could

possibly migrate to the Kara Sea and the mouths of the Ob and Yenisey Rivers.

The waters of the Arctic, its sea ice, and sediments are sinks for pollutants. The water, ice, and air currents serve as mechanisms for the transborder migration of pollutants (nuclear and otherwise) originating

in all rim nations. Special characteristics of the Arctic region, such as low temperature, short and intensive growing seasons, a widely varying photocycle, permafrost, sea ice, and small number of species,

make it very sensitive to environmental insult (6). Pollutants have long residence times, and because Arctic ecosystems are already under stress as a result of the harsh living conditions, they are highly sensitive. Food chains tend to be formed from very few species: therefore, they have large natural fluctuations

and are more weakly balanced than those observed in temperate and tropical ecosystems (1).
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 3

cannot have clear and certain answers. Although

some information about waste and contamination

is available, it does not follow that we know

how, when, or where they may affect people and

their health. Because so many factors are

involved and science cannot provide absolute

answers to many questions, this study emphasizes the need for care, awareness, and prudence.

It also stresses the need for a stable and enduring

institutional framework for long-term observation or monitoring.

❚ Arctic Nuclear Contamination

Despite popular perceptions of the Arctic as an

unscathed area, it has become increasingly clear

that this important ecosystem has not avoided the

effects of industrialization and development.

Evidence of contamination by persistent organic

pollutants, heavy metals, and radioactivity has

been gathered since the 1950s but did not attract

much public interest. However, in the last three

years a tremendous amount of attention has been

directed to environmental contamination in the

Arctic from Russian nuclear sources. Although

the activities of several countries have released

radionuclides into the Arctic environment for

decades, the news of ocean dumping of submarine reactors and nuclear wastes by the former

Soviet Union has generated particular interest

and concern because it revealed previously secret

activities and enhanced the long-standing public

fear of radioactivity.

Past dumping of nuclear submarine reactors

and fuel assemblies, as well as significant

amounts of other radioactive wastes, into waters

adjacent to the Arctic and North Pacific Oceans

was disclosed in some detail by the Russian Federation in a 1993 white paper that is generally

referred to as the “Yablokov report” (3). The ultimate fate and effects of this dumping are

unknown, but possible impacts on regional environments and public health have brought concerns not only to Russia but to other countries in

the Arctic and North Pacific regions. People in

the United States—in particular, Alaska and the

Pacific Northwest—want to know about this

dumping and other discharges of radionuclides

into the oceans. They also want to know about

risks to these regions from other Russian nuclear

activities, both past and future, and the potential

threat to the environment and population beyond

Russian borders.

In the United States, a particular concern is the

possible threat to Alaskan Native communities,

their traditional food supplies, and other Alaskan

fisheries resources. The impact of dumping

radioactive wastes in Arctic waters is also a key

concern of other nations, in particular Norway,

which depends on a major fishery in the Barents

Sea and is therefore very active in supporting

research into such contamination in nearby

waters.

❚ Disclosures of Russian Nuclear 

Dumping

Rumors started to circulate in Russia in 1990 that

dumping of nuclear waste had taken place in the

Barents and Kara Seas. A conference organized

by Greenpeace International in September 1991

brought international interest and concern. At the

press conference, Andrei Zolotkov, a People’s

Deputy from Murmansk, presented a map showing purported dump sites used for radioactive

wastes from 1964 to 1986 (13). Local papers

published the maps with listings of the sites and

numbers of dumped objects (2). When the Soviet

Union made no official denial of these allegations at the subsequent 14th Consultative Meeting of the London Convention in November

1991, delegates demanded that it furnish information on past dumping (3).

Meanwhile, news of the Soviet dumping in the

Arctic was causing some concern in the United

States. In August 1992, Senator Murkowski

chaired a hearing of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that focused attention on

U.S. and Alaskan perspectives on the problem

and the many questions remaining to be

addressed. Government officials, scientists, and

representatives of Native organizations stressed

the need for more information and for cooperation with the Russian Federation to obtain it (9).
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

At the November 1992 meeting of the London 1992) of a Presidential Commission under the

Convention, the government of the new Russian direction of Alexei Yablokov, special environFederation announced the formation (in October mental adviser to the president, to gather infor-
gy 

with unofficial accounts (4) and detailed the

dumping of damaged submarine reactors, spent

fuel from the nuclear fleet, and other radioactive

waste into the Kara Sea off the archipelago of

Novaya Zemlya (as indicated in figure 1-2), into

the Sea of Japan, and in other locations. Other

than the estimated inventory of the activity of the

items dumped, which has been refined since the

release of the report by an expert group working

with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and the precise locations of some of

the dumped objects, most of the information presented in the Yablokov report remains a key

source of data about the Russians’ radioactive

waste dumping in the Arctic.

and acknowledged violations not only of international conventions such as the London Convention, but of normative documents that the former

Soviet Union had approved, which required

coordination with environmental bodies, as well

as monitoring and supervision of nuclear safety

in handling radioactive waste (3).

The report listed dumping that had taken place

in the Arctic and North Pacific since 1959.

Wastes listed as dumped in the Kara Sea and in

fjords along the coast of Novaya Zemlya

included containers, barges, ships, and submarines containing nuclear reactors both with and

without spent reactor fuel. Figure 1-3 indicates

I

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995
6 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

the reported locations of the dumped wastes. A

total of 16 reactors was dumped at five different

sites. Six of the reactors and an additional container held spent reactor fuel. The total activity of

these materials at the time of disposal was estimated in the Yablokov report to be more than 2

million curies.1 U.S. and Russian scientists have

concluded that, today, only about 5 percent of

this activity2 remains at these Kara Sea dump

sites (see table 1-1).

In the Russian Far East, the Yablokov report

listed similar dumping (but smaller quantities

and lower levels of radioactivity) in the Sea of

Japan and near the Kamchatka Peninsula (figure

1-4). It also described nuclear accidents; solid,

low-level radioactive waste dumping; extensive

low-level liquid waste discharges; the sinking of

a nuclear submarine in the Norwegian Sea; and

serious problems with the operation of current

1 Radioactive decay rates (“activity”) have two common units of measure, curies and becquerels, both named after scientists who were

active late in the last century. The curie (Ci) represents the activity of 1 gram of radium, namely 3.7 x 1010 nuclear disintegrations per

second. The becquerel (Bq) is a more modern unit and corresponds to 1 disintegration per second. 2 This reduction in estimates is due both to corrections in original inventories and to radioactive decay over time.

nuclear refueling vessels in both the Russian

north and Far East.

❚ International Response to the Yablokov 

Report

The activities discussed in the Yablokov report

generated tremendous international concern,

both about the current status of the dumped

waste and its contribution to radioactivity in the

nearby Arctic Ocean and about the potential

long-term effects of this waste. Since radionuclides can affect human health only if and when

humans are exposed to them, the key question is

whether and how they may migrate toward populations and other ecosystems (e.g., food supplies)

in the future. Over the past two years since the

Yablokov report, a number of data collection

efforts and investigations to address this question

have been undertaken by U.S. investigators, Norwegians, Russians, other nations close to the

TABLE 1-1: Objects Dumped by Northern Submarine and Icebreaker Fleets

Location Objects

Depth

(m)

Estimated activity in 1994 

(kCi)

Ambrosimov Inlet 8 submarine reactors (3 with SNF) 20 37.9

Novaya Zemlya Depression 1 submarine reactor (1 with SNF) 300 7.8

Stepovoy Inlet 2 submarine reactors (2 with SNF) 50 22.7

Techeniye Inlet 2 submarine reactors 35-40 0.1

Tsivolka Inlet 3 reactors from icebreaker Lenin and 

shielding assembly from Lenin reactor 

assembly with SNF

50 59.4

Total 16 reactors (6 with SNF)

1 shielding assembly from icebreaker 

Lenin with SNF

127.9

KEY: kCi = kilocuries; SNF = spent nuclear fuel.

SOURCES: Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov Commission”), created by Decree No.

613 of the Russian Federation President, Oct. 24, 1992, Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow: 1993); translated by Paul Gallager and Elena Bloomstein (Albuquerque, NM: Small World Publishers,

Inc., 1993); N. Lynn, et al., “Radionuclide Release from Submarine Reactors Dumped in the Kara Sea,” presented at Arctic Nuclear Waste

Assessment Program Workshop, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, MA, May 1-4, 1995; Y. Sivintsev, “Study of Nuclide Composition and Characteristics of Fuel in Dumped Submarine Reactors and Atomic Icebreaker Lenin,” Part I—Atomic Icebreaker (Moscow: Kurchatov Institute, December 1993); and M. Mount, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, personal communication, June 14, 1995.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, compiled from data from

Government Commission on- Matters Related to Radioactive Waste

Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by Decree No. 613

of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts and

Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to

the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: 1993).

Russian sites, and international agencies such as

the IAEA.

The United States has cooperated in a number

of international efforts and has established some

bilateral agreements with Russia (such as those

concluded by the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission) relevant to nuclear dumping issues. The

United States is also a party to the Declaration in

Arctic Environmental Protection approved by the

eight circumpolar nations3 in June 1991. The

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

(AEPS), a part of the declaration, is a nonbinding

statement of cooperation on the development and

implementation of programs to protect the Arctic

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1995, compiled from

data from Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive

Waste Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by Decree

No. 613 of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts

and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia:

1993).

environment. Radioactivity is one of several pollutants identified under the strategy for priority

action. The eight circumpolar nations are now

planning to establish a new council that would

provide the enforcement mechanism lacking in

current multilateral agreements on protection of

the Arctic.

The most significant U.S. efforts to investigate Arctic nuclear contamination have been the

result of money set aside from “Nunn-Lugar”

3 The United States, Canada, Norway, Russia, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and Denmark.
SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

funds appropriated by Congress for the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY 1993-95. During

each of the past three years, $10 million has been

assigned to DOD’s Office of Naval Research

(ONR) for the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment

Program to address the nature and extent of

nuclear contamination by the former Soviet

Union in the Arctic region. With these finds,

ONR has sponsored extensive research activities

including nearly 70 different field, laboratory,

modeling, and data analysis projects; three major

workshops on nuclear contamination of the Arctic Ocean; and extensive collaboration with

researchers from Russia, Norway, Germany,

Canada, Japan, Korea, the International Atomic

Energy Agency, and the Arctic Environmental

Protection Strategy. The initial results from

ONR’s Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program-in the view of many, a significant first

beyond the immediate vicinity of dumped radionuclides that might affect human health in the

short run. However, some key unknowns have

yet to be addressed, for example: 1) there has

been no detailed inspection of many of the dump

sites within the past two decades; 2) we have

limited knowledge of the possible release rates

and the long-term viability of materials used to

encase the waste; and 3) some of the critical

pathways by which radionuclides can affect

humans, such as the biological food chain or

transport on moving Arctic ice, are in the early

stages of investigation. Several other possible

“sources of contaminants that could affect the

Arctic environment are also only beginning to be

investigated.

In the Kara Sea region, for example, one

potential source of contamination is from the

large, northward-flowing Siberian rivers, at

whose headwaters (more than 1,000 miles

upstream) are located the major Russian nuclear

weapons production facilities (see figure 1-5). At

several of these sites, such as Chelyabinsk,

Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk, the largest releases of

radioactive wastes in the world have been

recorded over the last few decades. Wastes totaling more than 100 million curies were discharged into lakes and rivers at one site, and

billions of curies have been injected directly

underground. This contamination has clearly

resulted in serious health problems among local

populations and is now being studied. Research

on whether the contamination may migrate down

rivers such as the Ob or Yenisey into the Kara

Sea and the Arctic Ocean in the future is now

underway.
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 9

❚ Overall State of the Environment in the 

Russian Federation

Although this OTA report focuses on nuclear

contamination of the Arctic and North Pacific

regions, this problem is part of severe and pervasive environmental degradation of all kinds

throughout the former Soviet Union. Thus, while

people in close proximity to past and continuing

nuclear releases are at increased health risk from

exposure to radionuclides, people all over the

former Soviet Union are exposed to a host of

other environmental contaminants. Extensive air

and water contamination caused by nonnuclear

industrial and other sources and wastes can also

have health impacts. Therefore, the risks from

radionuclide releases should be considered not in

isolation, but in the context of the broader picture

of environmental contamination that follows.

Annual environmental reports now published

by Russia contain comprehensive data and information on other types of pollutant generation,

releases, and impacts.4 However, using these

data to more fully understand environmental

conditions in Russia is problematic. Of major

concern are the accuracy and coverage of the

data. A World Bank report says, for instance, that

“. . .Bank missions have found that the [environmental] data provided was in considerable error

(i.e., by factors of 2 to 5 times)” (12). International organizations providing assistance to Russia have recognized this deficiency and the

problems it causes for analysis and policy decisionmaking. Both the World Bank, under its

Russian Federation Environmental Management

Project, and the European Environmental Action

Programme for Central and Eastern Europe are

helping to set up improved environmental information systems.

To some extent, however, data are not necessary to document the poor quality of environmental protection in Russia today. The problems

resulting from chemical pollutants and waste are

simply too visible. Descriptions abound of industrial cities with dark skies during the day, rivers

4 These reports are called “Report on the State of the Environments of the Russian Federation.”

that catch fire, and “dead” lakes. These images

are reminiscent of conditions in heavily industrialized areas of the United States (and other Western countries) in the 1950s and 1960s, which

sparked the enactment and implementation of

environmental protection laws addressing air,

water, and waste.

All sectors of the Russian economy are

responsible for contributing to the country’s state

of the environment. In most cases, it is difficult

to separate military and civilian sources, since

under the Soviet system they were often one and

the same. Today, massive industrial complexes,

which may have been built primarily for military

purposes, still emit a full range of air pollutants,

release large quantities of untreated conventional

and toxic pollutants into waterways, and dispose

of hazardous wastes on land, generally in unlined

lagoons and landfills (12). For instance, only 9

percent of the toxic waste generated by the ferrous and nonferrous metals industry in 1990 was

reported recovered or safely disposed. Complexes built to produce nuclear weapons have

released radioactive wastes directly into lakes

and rivers and have injected them underground.

Urban areas are faced with overcoming all major

environmental problems. Situated as they often

are amidst industrial zones, cities are subjected to

the highest air pollution levels.

As a consequence of these policies and practices, the Russian Federation now faces major

costs to clean up and prevent future degradation

from all types of pollutants. Its 1992 State of the

Environment report concluded that, consistent

with economic decline, pollution emissions had

decreased. However, the decrease was not as

great as expected because enterprises cut back on

expenditures for environmental protection. A

year later, the State of the Environment report

noted that “no appreciable changes” in these

trends had occurred. In a recent speech, the Russian Minister for Environmental Protection

stated that in 1994, a quarter of national enterprises had actually increased their discharges of

harmful air emissions (7).
10 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

So, while there may be some diminution of

pollutant releases in the short-term, as Russia’s

market economy grows, future discharges into

the environment will also grow. To prevent this,

cleaner technologies must be incorporated into

its industrial base, and proper environmental

controls must be installed and maintained for

residual wastes. These needed actions apply

across the board to all pollution-generating

sources, whether nuclear or not.

On the nuclear side, many waste generation

and handling practices continue as before. Liquid

wastes are still being discharged underground at

weapons complex reprocessing facilities. And

although the dumping of nuclear wastes into

Arctic seas has been discontinued for now,5 a

growing volume of this waste is being generated

due to the downsizing and dismantlement of the

submarine fleets. Reprocessing of spent fuel

from nuclear reactors continues—a practice that

has been associated in Russia with increased

waste and residue. Although efforts are underway to mitigate some of the contamination from

nuclear reactor operations in the Urals, huge

amounts of waste will remain uncontrolled in the

environment for many decades, with the continuing risk of further migration.

Even as information about severe environmental contamination in the former Soviet Union

has emerged from many sources, it is the nuclear

contamination of the Arctic and North Pacific

that has attracted most attention in the United

States. The north coast of the State of Alaska sits

adjacent to the Arctic Ocean. The Bering Strait,

along Alaska’s western coast, is a principal route

for the exchange of surface waters between the

Arctic and the North Pacific.

❚ Potential Future Contamination

In addition to past radioactive contamination and

releases in the Arctic, important questions

remain about future releases, dumping, or acci5 Russia is still not a signatory to the London Convention ban on dumping of all radioactive wastes but has announced informally its

intention to refrain from dumping if possible.

dents that could add significantly to the problem.

Whereas past dumping has received considerable

attention recently from scientists and analysts,

the risk of future releases has not been subject to

the same scrutiny or careful study. OTA has

reviewed the nature and general magnitude of

this future risk and the knowledge—or lack of

it—about what actions have been, could be, or

should be taken. Even though the potential for

significant future releases may be difficult to

assess from existing data, the proverbial ounce of

prevention could well be worth pounds of cure.

Based on the limited information currently

available, there are certain key areas that pose

future contamination risks from Russian nuclear

activities in the Arctic and the North Pacific

regions. OTA has selected three of these areas

for focus and analysis in this study because they

appear to be most significant at this time: 1) the

Russian Northern and Pacific nuclear fleets, and

their vulnerabilities to accidents during the

downsizing and dismantlement now under way;

2) the management of spent nuclear fuel and

waste from these fleets, and concerns about

effective containment, safety, security, and

future releases; and 3) the possibility of accidents

or releases from Russian civilian nuclear power

plants, particularly those located in the Arctic.

It appears important to evaluate appropriate

measures to prevent future releases, dumping, or

accidents such as those that have occurred in the

past. The management of spent fuel and other

radioactive waste from the Russian nuclear fleet

presents a special concern. Serious problems

exist with the removal of spent nuclear fuel from

submarine reactors; the storage of spent fuel

aboard service ships that are used in submarine

defueling; spent fuel handling and storage at

naval bases in the Russian north and Far East;6

the lack of capacity at land-based storage facilities; the management of damaged and nonstandard fuels for which no reprocessing system

6 The northern naval bases are located mainly on the Kola Peninsula, near the Norwegian border and adjacent to the Barents Sea; the Far

Eastern bases are generally near Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan and on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 11

exists; and the transportation and reprocessing of

spent fuel at distant sites such as Mayak. Figure

1-2 shows the general location of the Russian

Navy’s Northern and Pacific Fleets.

During the past three decades, the Soviet

Union built the largest fleet of nuclear submarines and the only fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers in the world. The Russian Navy has

been retiring and decommissioning older nuclear

submarines at an increasing rate over the past

several years. More than 120 Russian nuclear

submarines have been taken out of service, and

many are in various stages of dismantlement.

Only about 40 of these have had their spent

nuclear fuel removed. Some submarines have

been out of service with nuclear fuel aboard for

more than 15 years. The most serious factors

contributing to this condition are the following:

1) Almost all spent fuel storage facilities at the

nuclear fleet bases are full, and very little spent

fuel is currently being transported to reprocessing sites to make room for fuel removed from

nuclear submarines scheduled for decommissioning. 2) There is a lack of fuel reloading and

storage equipment (including service ships,

transfer bases, and land-based storage), and what

does exist is poorly maintained. 3) There are

shortages of safe transportation containers, limited facilities for loading and moving them, organizational problems at fuel transfer bases, and

lack of upgrades of certain railways. The situation is deteriorating further, with many vessels

and facilities lacking adequate maintenance, particularly at a time when the number of decommissioned submarines is expected to grow.7

Nonstandard and damaged fuel rods8 from

submarine and icebreaker reactors present

another set of problems. Such fuel includes zirconium-uranium alloy fuel, fuel from liquid

metal reactors, damaged and failed fuel assemblies, and fuel in damaged reactor cores. Removing this fuel from reactors for temporary storage

7 Although the rate of decommissioning will decline in the latter half of this decade, by that time there will be a large backlog of submarine reactor cores (300-350) with spent reactor fuel. 8 Some reactor fuel is of unique design containing special materials that cannot be processed in current facilities. Other fuel has been

damaged due to corrosion or handling and cannot be safely moved with existing equipment.

and selecting or developing appropriate future

treatment or storage technologies are challenging

and costly and will require some technology not

now available in Russia. This process is also

moving at a very slow rate because of a lack of

resources. Additional evaluation of specific situations and some focused research or development are probably needed to ensure safe

management in the future. The question of risks

from current or future operations to dismantle

nuclear submarines and manage spent fuel has

been addressed recently in several studies and is

a priority concern.

❚ Potential Health Effects from Nuclear 

Contamination

People are worried about how extensively the

dumped wastes in the Arctic might contaminate

the environment and whether they pose current

or future hazards to human health or ecosystems.

Understanding both current and future risks to

human health requires information about the

nature and amount of radionuclides released in

the environment, and about their transport

through the environment and through food

chains to reach human beings. Understanding the

risks to ecosystems requires additional information about the effects of radiation on the variety

of organisms that make up the ecosystems.

Since the release of the Yablokov report

describing dumping in the Arctic, more has been

learned about some of the wastes, but their condition and likely radionuclide release rates

remain largely unknown. Current levels of radionuclides in the seawater and sediment in Arctic

marginal seas do not suggest that significant

releases have already occurred. Even though current risks would not appear to be increased as a

result of the dumping, future release rates and

pathways to people remain to be evaluated.

Investigations of these transport mechanisms are

now under way.
12 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Scientists have developed models to approximate the behavior of pollutants such as radionuclides in the environment. These require a

tremendous amount of site-specific information,

much of which is not yet known either for the

Arctic environment or for particular dump sites.

Several efforts are now under way to model the

transport of radionuclides dumped in the Arctic,

as well as those released at sites within Russia

along rivers that drain into the Arctic.

The most likely route of human exposure to

radionuclides in the seas is through the food

chain. Thus, in addition to information about

radionuclide movement through the physical

environment, specific data are needed for the

Arctic about biological pathways to human

beings. The marine food web is complex, and

most available data were collected in temperate

climates, rather than Arctic settings. Therefore,

information about how radionuclides are transferred and sometimes concentrated through the

food chain under special local and regional conditions is required.

People of the world are not equally at risk

from radionuclides dumped in Arctic seas or in

the Russian Far East. Current and future investigations need to focus on gathering relevant information about the dietary habits and other

characteristics of the populations who are most

likely to be exposed, such as Native northern

populations and others who rely on Arctic

marine resources. This information will be

important for a thorough risk assessment to estimate the most likely effects on human health.

Concerns about contaminants in food and the

environment can lead to stress and a disruption

of lifestyles that have a negative impact on peoples’ lives. As data are gathered, it is critical that

the public be involved in the process. Genuine

efforts are necessary to ensure that the potentially affected communities participate in decisions, provide input, and have access to the

information collected. Meaningful and understandable data are often unavailable to people

affected by environmental contaminants; thus,

their concerns go unanswered. Citizen participation in the decisionmaking process not only will

help with data availability but will improve the

credibility of the data and lead to more effective

long-term solutions.

If the released radionuclides come in contact

with people in amounts sufficient to cause health

effects, these effects are most likely to be cancers. Radiation is a known cause of cancer and

other health effects at high doses, but at the low

doses that might occur from environmental contamination its effects are less certain. International and U.S. radiological agencies have

developed radiation exposure limits for the protection of public health from nuclear-related

practices. These can be used as reference points

to calculate potential radiation exposures and the

degree of hazard that radioactive discharges and

dumped nuclear waste might pose. Research thus

far shows that radionuclide concentrations measured in the Arctic Ocean near the United States

are extremely low; thus, any existing exposures

would be orders of magnitude below currently

established limits.

However, certain contaminated sites within

Russia contain very high levels of radionuclides

that have exposed people to radiation doses

exceeding those normally considered acceptable

by the United States and international bodies.

There is substantial evidence that radioactive

wastes from certain Russian nuclear weapons

plants and other facilities have had serious health

impacts on local populations. Populations that

have been exposed due to certain nuclear accidents are particularly at risk. Both Russian and

U.S. experts are now collecting data from these

experiences that will be valuable in future health

effects studies.

Although Russian people have suffered health

impacts from nearby radioactive releases, the situation is drastically different when large regions

such as the Arctic are considered, given the

uncertainties about very low-level exposures.

There is not yet a clear answer to questions of

what the future health impacts on the wider

region may be from nuclear wastes dumped in

the Arctic and North Pacific. Estimates and

approximations of future impacts based on the

information available do not suggest a noticeable
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 13

effect on human health or on plant and animal

populations. However, many unknowns remain,

from the status of the dumped wastes, to the

likely movement of radionuclides through the

environment, to the dietary intakes of those most

likely to be exposed. Native populations in the

Arctic depend on fish and marine mammals for a

large portion of their diet; thus, special considerations are necessary when evaluating their potential for exposure to contaminants that may be

present in the marine environment.

❚ Institutional Framework and Policies

Many national and international institutions are

involved in initiatives to address solutions to the

problems of nuclear waste dumping and discharges into the sea. Some are addressing the

threat of radioactive contamination to regional

environments and human health. Others are

working to ensure careful and safe future management of nuclear activities, materials, and

wastes. An open question is whether these institutions are effective and whether their initiatives

can bring about improvements. The improvements needed, and thus the goals of many programs, are not clearly defined and sometimes

represent compromises among conflicting objectives. Because the problems are international, it

is difficult to harmonize the policies and goals of

each nation affected. In addition, many unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral organizations

have developed over the years, each with missions that evolve and change to meet the challenges of the day and to reflect unique conflicts

or cooperative moods of the time.

Against this complex backdrop, the United

States and the international community are

directing attention and resources to the problem

of nuclear contamination in the Arctic and North

Pacific Oceans. The current focus is principally

on research and data collection. Although this

focus can lead to better knowledge and understanding, it cannot provide all the answers to reasonable concerns about future impacts on human

health and the environment any time soon.

Therefore research initiatives should be supplemented to some degree by actions to monitor

conditions; to provide early warnings should

they be necessary; and to prevent future accidents or releases.

For decades, national security and strategic

implications largely determined U.S. and international interest in the Arctic. After the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, and in response

to various reports documenting that country’s

radioactive waste dumping practices, the United

States and members of the international community began to support domestic and cooperative

approaches to assess the potential impacts of

these activities. The State of Alaska also plays an

important role in these efforts.

The United States has focused most organized

efforts on and made the greatest advances in its

research initiatives. There are some gaps in the

research program relating to regions covered (not

much effort in the Far East and North Pacific, for

example), pathways investigated (biological

pathways), and other factors, but the program is

evolving as a reasonably comprehensive investigation of key problems. Much work can still be

performed by the United States, but more cooperation with Russia is needed, especially in the

area of increased access to specific dump sites

and dumped material.

The United States and other nations are now

developing plans for possible future monitoring

and warning initiatives. International cooperation

in this area is imperative if an effective assessment

and response program is to follow. International

institutions may be the most appropriate organizations to carry out such initiatives. However, longterm consistent support and the adoption of rigorous scientific implementation programs must be

ensured for these efforts to be effective.

Some attempts are under way to fund prevention initiatives, but because most of the key decisions must be made by Russia, it is difficult to

engender support for long-term substantial assistance from the United States and other countries.

OTA has identified some possible joint projects

that could benefit both the United States and

Russia and could be mutually supported. Other

countries such as Norway are proposing support
14 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

for joint prevention projects. However, the

United States Navy has not aggressively pursued

cooperation with Russia in the prevention area

because of its belief that the Russian military

does not need U.S. assistance.

One of the more significant prevention programs relating to radioactive contamination,

which has been in effect in Russia for the past

several years, involves nuclear power plant

safety. The United States and other countries

have been funding programs to improve reactor

safety in Russia as part of its overall efforts to

prevent another Chernobyl. Improvements have

been mainly in the areas of added auxiliary

equipment, training, monitoring, and warning

systems, and regulatory oversight for existing

reactors. Efforts by the State of Alaska have also

been successful in improving regional cooperation and information exchange. These efforts are

particularly important at some sites in the far

north where funding is limited and operations are

of marginal quality. Here, again, more substantial improvements such as replacing old designs

and equipment with safer systems require additional resources and major policy choices that

Russia itself must make.

Crucial to U.S. and other international assistance efforts is the need for Russia to strengthen

its institutional and legislative systems that are

responsible for environmental protection and for

the establishment of a nuclear safety culture.

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most

government agencies and institutes responsible

for managing nuclear materials operated behind

a wall of secrecy with little or no external regulatory oversight. Today, Russia is only slowly

beginning to develop the legal framework necessary to effectively enforce basic environmental

protection laws, regulate the use of nuclear

energy, and manage radioactive materials and

wastes.

In sum, all three areas—research, monitoring,

and prevention—are critical to protect human

health and the environment from widespread and

indiscriminate radioactive contamination in the

Arctic and North Pacific. Poor waste management practices have alerted the international

community. Kara Sea dumping activities by the

former Soviet Union have yet to show a direct

connection to human health impacts but have

nonetheless raised concerns and questions that

will require years to answer even partially. Longterm dedication and planning, as well as comprehensive programs within both U.S. and international institutions, will be necessary to

adequately protect the Arctic environment and

the health of Arctic populations in the future.

KEY FINDINGS OF STUDY

The following description of key findings from

OTA’s study is presented in summary form and

reflects conclusions from our review of an enormous amount of work discussed and referenced

in the other chapters of this report. It is also

based on meetings, interviews, workshops, site

visits, reviewer comments, and feedback from

our Advisory Panel.

The first question that OTA addressed in this

study was: What kinds of environmental and

public health risks are posed by the Russian Arctic nuclear waste dumping disclosed in the

Yablokov report, and how do they affect U.S.

territory? This question must be answered with

some caution. Research and data collection

efforts regarding nuclear contamination in the

Arctic marine environment are incomplete. Some

major gaps exist in our understanding of Arctic

systems and processes.

Even so, OTA’s analyses suggest that adequate data have been assembled by expert scientists to reach conclusions about immediate risks.

In particular, the research and data collected to

date indicate that no significant amounts of

radioactive materials have migrated from the

marine radioactive dumping in the Russian Arctic and Far East. This dumping refers to the sites

in the Kara Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Sea of

Japan that were covered in the Yablokov report.

Research to assess contamination from these

sites was summarized most recently in May 1995

at a workshop of the principal investigators with

the ONR Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, held in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, and
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 15

included other work sponsored by key international institutions.

Although only a few of the dump sites in the

Kara Sea have been inspected recently by means

of international survey cruises, and measurements were not exhaustive, no substantial leakage appears to have occurred, and only very local

samples show elevated radionuclide levels. In

similar measurements from U.S. and Russian

expeditions near the mouths of Russian rivers, no

large migration of radionuclides down the rivers

has been detected.9 It is well known that by far

the largest amount of radioactivity released into

the environment in Russia is found in regions

around the major nuclear weapons plants located

along the large Siberian rivers that flow into the

Arctic. Only minor releases and transport of

these radionuclides into the Arctic Ocean have

been suggested by recent research, but future

migration and impacts beyond Russian borders

constitute a plausible scenario and deserve

investigation.

Research and data collection expeditions in

the general Arctic Ocean region indicate that certain activities other than Russian Arctic dumping

and river discharges are greater sources of the

radionuclides measured to date. Radioactive contamination from European reprocessing plants

and atmospheric weapons testing in the 1960s is

identified as contributing to current low-level

Arctic contamination, whereas leakage from the

nuclear dump sites in the Kara Sea or discharges

from the Ob and Yenisey Rivers have not been

confirmed in the wider Arctic basin. European

reprocessing sources have been studied and

tracked for a long time and thus are well documented. Recent work on the European reprocessing discharge plume has provided good

indications of how Arctic Ocean circulation has

9 Sufficient data exist documenting the migration, at least at low levels, of radionuclides down the Yenisey River, probably originating

from pass-through reactors and cooling waters. See Figure 1-5.

transported these radionuclides over long periods

of time.

Many researchers are also concerned about

Arctic contamination from nonnuclear hazardous

materials. Although OTA has not investigated

nonnuclear contamination, it is clear that industrial discharges and toxic wastes have entered the

Arctic and could present problems. Thus, we

have concluded that contaminants other than

radionuclides could have a significant impact on

the Arctic environment. The relative magnitudes

of risks from other sources such as heavy metals

or persistent organics are currently unknown,

but expanded risk assessments could help evaluate these factors. While the ONR research program has been limited thus far to radioactive

contamination, other contaminants could also be

considered in the future.

OTA has carefully investigated the programs

within various federal agencies that have devoted

attention to this nuclear contamination question

and found no substantive long-term program

with specific goals. We have concluded that the

Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program

administered by the Office of Naval Research is

the only U.S. program specifically evaluating the

Arctic radioactive contamination problem. It has

accomplished significant data collection and

evaluation work over the past three years. To fill

some remaining data gaps, additional research

is needed in areas such as ice transport, biological pathways, and human exposure assessments.

Many of the scientists engaged in the ONR program recognize the current data gaps and the

need for continuing and augmenting the program

to fill them. However, the ONR program is not a

long-range effort with specific goals for the

future.
The Murmansk Shipping Company’s Atomflot facility showing the dock and service ship Lotta where spent nuclear fuel is stored (top

left); a railroad car used for transporting spent nuclear fuel from Atomflot to the reprocessing plant at Mayak (top right); the dockside

crane transferring a spent tie/ shipping cask from (he service ship Lotta to the railroad car (bottom).

I
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 17

OTA’s analysis suggests that now is the time

to make long-range plans and to structure a more

comprehensive program for the future. Preliminary assessments do not suggest a major, longterm impact on human health for the broad Arctic region from radioactive dumping and discharges that have already occurred. However,

identifying the potential for human exposure to

radioactivity in the future will require some form

of monitoring and a comprehensive, rigorous

exposure assessment. Planning for these has

started, and it would be useful for policymakers

to define the major goals and key questions so

that the risk assessment can be useful and costeffective.

Because the nuclear material dumped in the

Arctic has not been adequately contained for

long-term disposal, and because very little specific information exists about the condition of the

dump sites, it has been suggested that some form

of remediation be considered. Options for remediation range from encasement in place to

removal and disposal at a different location.

Although remediation of past dumping is being

investigated, it cannot be evaluated fully now

because of the lack of data on waste sites and

conditions. When such data are obtained, it

would be productive to study remediation

options further, estimate their risk reduction

value and cost, and choose the optimum

approaches.

Most options for the remediation of nuclear

wastes dumped into the environment are difficult

and costly. Because it is so difficult to take useful

actions after radionuclides have been released

into the environment, it is wise to consider prevention efforts now that could minimize future

accidents, releases, or discharges. There are several opportunities to enhance safety and prevent

future releases from Russian nuclear activities in

the Arctic and Far East. Support for cooperative

work in reactor safety, submarine dismantlement, spent fuel management, waste disposal,

and other related matters deserves careful consideration.

OTA’s investigations of the situation at the

local bases of the Russian nuclear fleet in the

north and Far East show that severe problems

exist in adequate management of nuclear wastes

and spent fuel from submarine reactors. These

problems include poorly maintained vessels and

other equipment for handling spent fuel, overloaded storage and treatment facilities, and a substandard transportation infrastructure. These

problems could lead to accidents or pressure to

engage in more dumping in the future if they are

not addressed soon.

There is, however, some evidence of progress

toward improving spent fuel and nuclear waste

management practices with regard to the Russian

Northern Nuclear Fleet, with the help of international assistance and cooperative efforts. With

continuation and expansion of international

efforts to address spent fuel problems in the Russian north (i.e., the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk),

some significant improvements are possible in

the prevention of future radioactive releases

there. The situation in the Russian Far East is

more problematic, however, with much less evidence of progress in international cooperation.

The United States has recently been moving

toward more cooperative work with Russia on

Arctic nuclear waste issues. U.S.-Russian collaboration in research and reactor safety has grown,

and many useful contacts have been made.

OTA’s analysis concludes that such efforts

should continue and expand in the future. These

contacts, in particular, could be used to foster

and encourage more interaction in areas dealing

with the environmental impacts of military activities. Research on Arctic contamination is

enhanced and more politically acceptable when

it is conducted cooperatively with Russia and

other countries. If monitoring and prevention

projects are initiated, they will require further

data from Russia and greater access to dump

sites. Prevention initiatives will be difficult

unless Russia takes the lead and assumes substantial responsibility.

Even though Russia must be responsible for

its own nuclear waste management, the interna-
18 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

tional community must also recognize that the

country is limited in its current capabilities and

resources. While the Russian government has

taken initiatives to identify and describe past

nuclear dumping activities, it has not been able to

provide many resources for further research or

other actions to address the problems. Russian

institutions for environmental protection and

nuclear safety have yet to be effective in regulating the military or civilian nuclear complex, but

they have been developing better capabilities

that could be encouraged over the long term with

outside assistance.

POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS

OTA’s analyses show that radioactive contamination in the Arctic and North Pacific regions is

not an immediate crisis but a long-term, chronic

problem requiring a certain level of comprehensive risk assessment, monitoring of conditions,

and prevention of future releases. Such

approaches would help ensure the greatest possible protection of human health and the environment. Current U.S. policies addressing these

issues lack long-term goals or cohesiveness and

are not likely to develop such goals without congressional direction and action.

Three possible policy areas that already have a

considerable history and institutional framework

could be considered by Congress in terms of the

direction and support of federal programs to

address Arctic nuclear contamination: 1) Arctic

research policies; 2) international environmental

protection policies; and 3) policies for assistance

to or cooperative work with the former Soviet

Union. In each case, some programs currently

exist and have defined benefits and support. If

Congress wished, it could strengthen these programs to help focus future attention and work on

the nuclear contamination problem.

❚ Arctic Research Policies

Current Policy Status

Efforts by the United States to assess the Arctic’s

radioactive contamination began only recently.

Traditionally in Arctic research, the U.S. focus

was on its strategic and national security importance. However, in 1993, as a response to reports

documenting the Soviet Union’s ocean waste

dumping, the United States adopted the “Policy

for the Arctic Region,” emphasizing for the first

time a commitment to the environmental protection of this important ecosystem and authorizing

the State Department as the implementing

agency.

Congressional support for research regarding

Arctic radioactive contamination began with the

passage of the Arctic Research Policy Act

(ARPA) in 1984. Congress established the institutional infrastructure (i.e., the Arctic Research

Commission and the Interagency Arctic

Research Policy Committee, or IARPC) to

develop and coordinate U.S. Arctic research programs. In 1992, radioactive contamination from

Soviet activities was recognized as a potentially

serious problem by ARPA. However, the statute

does not provide any specific funds to support

activities by the commission or by IARPC agencies10 regarding research on radioactive contamination in the Arctic.

In 1994, IARPC proposed a $33-million

increase in research funds to implement an Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment Program (ARCORA) which would begin in FY

1996. The requested funds, if provided, would

support five essential research-related activities

in the Arctic: 1) data and information management; 2) data retrieval and synthesis; 3) observation and monitoring; 4) development of models;

and 5) analysis of risks. Work in these areas

would allow participating U.S. agencies to assess

the sources, transport, fate, and environmental

10 The following federal agencies compose what is officially known as the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC):

Department of State; Defense Nuclear Agency; Naval Sea Systems Command; Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Coast Guard; Department

of Energy; Department of Interior; Environmental Protection Agency; U.S. Geological Survey; National Science Foundation; and National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
I

tion research program was not supported by the

Administration.

Although the ARPA established the main

institutional means for carrying out federal Arctic research, the only relevant program actually

being implemented is the congressionally authorized Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program

(ANWAP) under the Office of Naval Research of

the Department of Defense. For each of the past

three years, Congress has mandated through

DOD authorizations or Nunn-Lugar legislation

that $10 million be allocated to ONR for Arctic

research work. Figure 1-6 compares this ONR

funding to overall expenditures for Arctic

research for FY 1995.

The initial emphasis of the ONR program

involved collecting and evaluating existing Arctic environmental data. Subsequent efforts have

also included supporting numerous research

projects; holding workshops; collaborating with

various U.S. and international research organizations; and sponsoring scientific expeditions

designed to gather data in the Arctic and evaluate

potential transport pathways for radioactive

waste. ONR is also expanding its scope of

research to include the North Pacific and certain

major Russian rivers discharging into the Arctic

Ocean.

Support for U.S. research programs, other

than ANWAP, depends on the priorities established by individual federal agencies that provide

research funds. In the recent past, most federal

agencies have not considered Arctic radioactive

contamination a priority on their research agendas. At the June 6, 1995, OTA workshop on U.S.

Nuclear contamination ‘

research (ANWAP)

KEY: ANWAP = Arctic Nuclear Wastes Assessment Program.

SOURCE: C. Myers, National Science Foundation, personal communication, June 7, 1995; Office of Technology Assessment, 1995,

Arctic institutions, officials representing U.S.

Arctic research programs stated that their agencies have not provided substantial support to

carry out their national and international Arctic

research work.

The State of Alaska has played a key role in

encouraging cooperation in research with

regional governments of the Russian Far East.

This cooperation has proven successful in promoting information exchange on past contamination and possible preventive measures. Despite

the progress made to date, long-term support for

state research efforts remains limited.

During the next phase of its research program,

ONR will make the information gathered available to the scientific community and to the populations most likely to be at risk from, or to have

concerns about, Arctic contamination, The State

of Alaska actively participates in several cooper11 Namely, the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Biological Survey.
20 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

ative efforts to research and monitor Arctic contamination. Most efforts by the state emphasize

the identification of existing and potential public

health and safety hazards, particularly to its

Native residents, and the sharing of environmental data among regional governments. Alaska has

also been cooperating successfully with Russian

regional governments in improving communications, nuclear safety, and emergency response

with the involvement of Native communities.

Future Policy Initiatives

Despite the extensive institutional structure created to conduct research in the Arctic, the only

U.S. program involved in research on radioactive

contamination is ONR’s Arctic Nuclear Waste

Assessment Program. There is no current policy

to continue this ONR work through the next logical phase or to use its results to plan for a transition to comprehensive risk assessments and

monitoring.

Congress could continue its current level of

financial support for ONR’s Arctic Nuclear

Waste Assessment Program through an initial

risk assessment phase and until future monitoring or corrective measures are adequately identified. Funding of research efforts would most

likely be short-term in nature since the main

objective would be to collect the data required

for future planning, for establishing monitoring

programs, and for carrying out long-term risk

assessments, if needed. When plans are completed, Congress could direct ONR to conduct

future monitoring and assessment activities as

well. However, the nature of these activities

might require Congress to fund the ONR program on a multiyear basis to incorporate longterm planning.

Congress may, on the other hand, opt not to

fund ONR’s Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment

Program but instead request IARPC or any of

the U.S. agencies with Arctic programs to adopt

ONR’s preliminary research findings and prepare the long-range plan needed to conduct risk

assessments and monitoring. Congress might

explicitly identify the level of funding for

IARPC, or for the relevant federal agency or

agencies. Some funds would be needed to adapt

ANWAP results to other agencies’ goals and to

implement a long-range monitoring program.

Any such program should delineate clearly the

implementing roles of relevant federal agencies.

Congress could also request an annual report

covering the successes and failures associated

with implementation of the plan.

The ONR program plan currently includes

efforts to conduct preliminary risk assessment

that would be accomplished with existing funding. If Congress does not fund the continuation

of this research beyond FY 1995, this preliminary risk assessment as well as the publication of

research results to date would probably be

accomplished over the next one or two years, but

no new work could be expected to fill data gaps,

conduct monitoring, or investigate new areas. If

Congress continues funding for ONR but not for

other agencies, research on key unanswered

questions could enhance a more rigorous risk

assessment and reduce the uncertainties of environmental and health impacts. However, it would

be difficult to establish useful long-term monitoring programs, to effectively engage the

affected communities in risk assessments, or to

address public health concerns without the more

active participation and funding of other federal

and state agencies on the IARPC.

❚ International Environmental Protection 

Policies

Current Policy Status

U.S. support for international environmental protection and Arctic research has been effected

mainly through bilateral cooperation agreements

with Russia. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet

Union, most U.S. actions toward the former

Soviet Union centered on mobilizing the economic and military resources needed to withstand any potential threat. Since the Soviet

breakup, U.S. policy has become largely supportive of economic and political reform.

An extensive cooperative framework exists

between the United States and Russia, but fund-
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 21

ing for work on Arctic radioactive contamination

is limited. As part of their April 1993 Vancouver

summit, the Presidents of Russia and the United

States agreed, for the first time, to forge a new

cooperative venture in many important economic

and technical areas (e.g., energy, space, science,

technology, environment). Despite its success in

certain fields, progress by the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission—the implementing body for

U.S.–Russian cooperation—regarding research

monitoring of the Arctic’s nuclear contamination

problem is generally confined to developing

institutional relationships, entering broadly

defined agreements of cooperation, and in a few

cases, studying the technical feasibility of possible environmental solutions.

Lack of funds and government leadership

appears to have hindered progress by the GoreChernomyrdin commission in Arctic environmental work. At a January 1995 OTA workshop

on Arctic institutions and programs, some

experts emphasized that the commission lacks a

funding mechanism or a specific budget item to

support research on Arctic radioactive contamination. They also pointed to the obligation of

federal agencies to conform to the Administration’s policies and priorities. The limited

resources provided under agreements preclude

agencies from implementing fully the programs

that the commission appears to support.

Considerable concern exists about the clearly

inadequate information available on the extent of

environmental contamination, particularly in the

Russian Far East. The inadequacy of regional

environmental data and of agency resources has

also limited the ability to map the state of contamination in Russia. The fragmented nature of

the institutional structure responsible for ensuring environmental protection in the Russian Arctic region is another matter of concern.

Several international efforts are under way to

assess issues of Arctic contamination and to formulate future monitoring and preventive

approaches. These will help provide information

about contamination and serve as a vehicle for

communication and cooperation in research and

monitoring activities. The United States stands to

benefit from active participation in these cooperative efforts. The United States has participated

in several international initiatives, including the

International Arctic Seas Assessment Program

under the IAEA; the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy established by the eight circumpolar nations; and other initiatives with Russia,

Norway, and various European Nations. Many

international environmental agreements and conventions have traditionally kept nuclear issues

separate from those of other hazardous contaminants. This separation has made it difficult to formulate policy that would compare the needs and

priorities of nuclear and nonnuclear environmental problems.

With regard to nuclear wastes, the United

States has not provided an overall strategy for

selecting and participating in the most appropriate international entities. Nor has it determined

which federal agency would be responsible for

developing relevant research strategies, for formulating and overseeing implementation strategies, and for providing the financial resources

required in any joint efforts. Because so many

institutions are involved in establishing international programs it would be much more efficient

for the United States to concentrate on working

with a few selected programs that could produce

the most useful work and best advance U.S. policy goals.

Future Policy Initiatives

Congress could direct the Administration to prepare a coordinated plan for taking action on programs that result from international agreements.

A coordinated plan should incorporate such multilateral efforts as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, which includes the Arctic

Monitoring and Assessment Program. It could

incorporate the same level of U.S. leadership and

commitment exercised through bilateral cooperative programs (i.e., the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission).

Similarly, Congress could direct the Administration to maintain entities such as the GoreChernomyrdin commission and the State Department as instruments of U.S. cooperation and to
22 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

give specific funding authority to certain federal

agencies to implement any cooperative research

and monitoring projects developed under a coordinated plan. One clear benefit of a coordinated

international plan is that savings could be

achieved if two or more nations have certain elements under their control such as access to sites,

data, or key research work. Another benefit is

avoidance of duplication and, thus, improved

efficiency or cost-effectiveness.

❚ Policies for Assistance to and 

Cooperation with the Former Soviet Union

Current Policy Status

Certain policies for cooperation with the former

Soviet Union are designed as initiatives and programs to prevent future Arctic radioactive contamination. Included among the current initiatives

are those designed to improve radioactive waste

management practices and upgrade Russia’s

older and most unsafe operating nuclear reactors. Despite the differences in their nature and in

the institutional framework involved, both types

have proven useful in improving bilateral and

multilateral cooperation with Russia.

One of the existing U.S.-supported initiatives

to improve radioactive waste management in the

Russian Arctic region is the Murmansk Initiative

being implemented under the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission. This is a cooperative effort by

Norway, the United States, and Russia to expand

the liquid radioactive waste storage and processing capacity at the Murmansk Shipping Company, thereby halting the unsafe management

and ocean dumping of these wastes. Currently,

Russia continues to accumulate considerable

amounts of liquid radioactive waste, particularly

at sites where submarine and icebreaker reactors

are repaired or refueled. Design work has been

funded and construction funds have been identified for facility expansion, but the funding

authority for implementing this initiative within

the United States has often been unclear or

imprecise.

The London Convention is a major international effort designed to prohibit dumping of

radioactive waste in the world’s oceans.

Although its guidelines are voluntary in nature,

Russia’s failure to sign the convention’s 1993

decision to ban ocean radioactive waste dumping

is of great concern to many in the international

community, particularly the circumpolar nations.

One reason for concern is Russia’s dumping of

low-level liquid radioactive wastes in the Sea of

Japan as recently as 1993. Although Russia has

agreed to adhere to the principles of the London

Convention prohibiting the disposal of all types

of radioactive waste in the marine environment,

it continues to be the only country that has failed

to sign the ban formally. Therefore, the recent

signing of the Murmansk Initiative within the

framework of the 1994 U.S.-Russia Agreement

on Pollution Prevention in the Arctic is significant because it will help Russia meet its commitment to abide by the principles of the London

Convention. Russia’s voluntary commitment to

the convention, in combination with this cooperative agreement, is a good first step, but much

more work is necessary to ensure long-term compliance.

In addition to the London Convention, the

European Union, Japan, and Norway also support international cooperative initiatives designed

to improve Russia’s waste management and prevent radioactive contamination in the Arctic. The

European Union, for example, is cooperating

with Russia to identify and develop waste management technologies for application in the Kola

Peninsula. The Government of Japan, on the

other hand, is currently financing a project that

would provide facilities for treatment of some of

the liquid radioactive waste stored by the Russian Navy near the Sea of Japan.

Of the Arctic countries, Norway is the most

active in searching for solutions to the Arctic

radioactive contamination problem. Of primary

concern to Norway are the operational safety of

nuclear facilities and the management of nuclear

materials and wastes at civilian and military

nuclear sites operating near its borders. Recently,

the Norwegian government created an interna-
F/eating reactor compartments from decommissioned Russian submarines temporarily stored in Chazhma Bay near Vladivostok.

tional steering committee to cooperate technically and financially with Russia in the removal

and cleanup of a Russian nuclear waste service

ship in Murmansk (near the Norwegian border)

containing damaged spent nuclear fuel from the

naval and icebreaker fleets.

Another Norway-led initiative seeks cooperation among Norwegian, U. S., and Russian

defense communities in the assessment of military sources of radioactive contamination in the

Arctic region. On June 30, 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and his Russian counterpart

signed a Memorandum of Agreement to

exchange information on the environment, particularly in the areas of environmental protection

and cleanup, waste management, and disposal of

weapons material. No specific timetable or plan

of action was provided. Although this cooperative agreement is broad and lacks a clear plan of

action, it constitutes a potentially useful attempt

to address key problems relevant to future international Arctic protection efforts.

A second major type of preventive measure

addresses commercial reactor safety. U.S. support for a nuclear safety initiative began immediately after the Chernobyl accident in April 1986.

Initially, most cooperation consisted of information exchange by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy with their

Russian counterparts. The commitment of the

United States to cooperate with Russia in the

field of nuclear reactor safety was expanded at

the U.S.-Russian presidential summit in Vancouver, Canada, in 1993. The primary objectives of

these initiatives were to help Russia to reduce the

likelihood of future nuclear reactor accidents.

U.S. assistance to Russia on nuclear safety

issues is multiagency in nature. The State

Department and the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission are the principal coordinators; the U.S.

Agency for International Development is the

agency with overall management responsibilities; and the Department of Energy and Nuclear

Regulatory Commission are the executors.

Progress has been made under this initiative in

the areas of technical training and the provision

of some safety equipment.

I
24 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

The State of Alaska has played an important

role in cooperating with Russia to achieve

nuclear safety, particularly with the government

of the region in which the Bilibino nuclear power

plant—the nearest to Alaska—is located. Another

Alaskan undertaking was the international radiological exercise held in June 1994 on emergency

response procedures among Arctic nations. In

general, these Alaskan initiatives have helped

Arctic national and regional governments to

strengthen communications and recognize the

need for improved cooperation in the areas of

nuclear safety and emergency response.

The United States also participates in the

Nuclear Safety Account, a 1992 initiative that

finances projects designed to improve the operational and technical safety of nuclear reactors in

Russia and other states of the former Soviet

Union. In addition to the United States, the European Union has also established a short-term

nuclear safety improvement program at the Kola

Peninsula Nuclear Power Plant near the Arctic.

OTA has found that a number of national and

international programs are in place to improve

Russia’s nuclear waste management practices

and prevent similar recurrence in the future. The

varied nature and objectives of the national and

international missions supporting these programs

make it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness.

No attempt has been made by the United States

or the international community to evaluate the

overall progress made by their cooperative

nuclear safety initiatives in the Arctic and determine where improvement is needed.

Russia finds itself in the midst of a difficult

transition related to nuclear safety and waste

management. Thus far, the creation of new agencies and laws in Russia is just beginning to

address the country’s radioactive contamination

problems and lack of a nuclear safety culture. It

is crucial that Russia continue to strengthen these

efforts. Equally important is the fact that the

severe economic situation affecting this nation

now requires creative and flexible approaches by

the United States and other countries as a means

to ensure long-term cooperation.

A number of U.S.-supported bilateral and

multilateral initiatives are under way to collaborate with Russia in the prevention of future radioactive contamination in the Arctic. The major

U.S. assistance program has focused on efforts to

improve the operational safety of Russia’s most

dangerous nuclear reactors so as to prevent

another Chernobyl-type accident. Continued

attention to the goals and coordination of these

efforts is needed.

However, the areas of improving spent fuel

and nuclear waste management practices and

enhancing submarine dismantlement to prevent

future radioactive releases have only minimal

U.S. support. International cooperative efforts in

this area have been evolving, with Norway, the

European Union, and Japan taking the lead.

Although the United States may not be as threatened by future releases as other countries, it too

could benefit from reduced contamination risks

in the future, from additional progress in Russian

submarine dismantlement, and from new business opportunities for U.S. firms.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

the Russian government has made official its

intent to improve environmental protection and

nuclear safety. Although considerable progress

has been made in the area of environmental regulations, more effective approaches are still

needed. It is also crucial that Russia strengthen

its agencies responsible for environmental protection and for establishing a nuclear safety culture.

Another benefit to the United States from

cooperation with the former Soviet Union is continued, mutual demilitarization in the United

States and Russia. The common public notion is

that the Cold War is over. However, certain military institutions in both countries continue to distrust each other and are suspicious of the actions

and motives of the other side. Existing and new

international programs focusing on the environmental legacy of the Cold War could lead to a

lowering of these post-Cold War tensions.
Chapter 1 Summary, Findings, and Policy Options | 25

Future Policy Initiatives

Congress could continue current support for

U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral

cooperative initiatives to improve radioactive

waste management and nuclear safety of reactors in Russia. However, Congress could request

that U.S. decisions at the bilateral level be coordinated with those involving multilateral

approaches to avoid possible conflicts and

unnecessary or costly duplication. Adopting a

long-term approach is also helpful since establishing a government-supported regulatory and

institutional framework and developing the

safety culture needed to ensure that Russia’s

nuclear facilities are properly managed will take

some time.

Existing cooperative initiatives, however, do

not address issues of spent fuel and radioactive

waste management related to Russian nuclear

submarines and ships. To include this, Congress

could create a program within an appropriate

agency such as DOD or DOE to provide bilateral or multilateral cooperative assistance for

improving Russia’s management of spent

nuclear fuel, particularly when such efforts

would also be in the interest of the United States.

To support this program, Congress could establish a new funding authority or make use of

existing ones—for example, the Nunn-Lugar

program if the initiative involves assistance in

nuclear submarine dismantlement or the Nuclear

Safety Initiative program if the purpose is mainly

to prevent accidents and radioactive releases.

Submarine dismantlement per se does not require

advanced technology and is clearly within the

capabilities of the shipyards that built Russia’s

submarine fleet. The challenging aspects of dismantlement, however, are the safe removal of

spent nuclear fuel and the subsequent management of this and other nuclear wastes. The Russians have had problems in this area, some

related to limited resources, and others to poor

environmental protection practices; it is here that

U.S. cooperation could lead to mutual benefit

and advance U.S. interests. If Nunn-Lugar were

the vehicle to provide assistance to Russia, it

would have to be justified on the basis of an

expanded sphere of coverage that, in the long

run, could enhance demilitarization and encourage better transfer and safer storage of nuclear

materials. Perhaps the greatest benefit to the

United States would be a long-range improvement of the nuclear safety culture in Russia and a

decrease in Cold War tensions.

REFERENCES

1. Aarkrog, A., Riso National Laboratory, Denmark, “Environmental Radioactivity in the

Arctic,” Radioactive and Other Environmental Threats to the United States and the

Arctic Resulting from Past Soviet Activities,

hearing before the Select Committee on

Intelligence, United States Senate, Aug. 15,

1992, Senate Hearing, 102-1095 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1992).

2. “Crime Without Punishment,” Volna

[Wave], a sociopolitical newspaper of

Arkhangelsk Oblast, Russia, No. 40, Oct. 3,

1991.

3. Government Commission on Matters

Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at

Sea (“Yablokov Commission”), created by

Decree No. 613 of the Russian Federation

President, Oct. 24, 1992, Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal

in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow: 1993), translated

by P. Gallager and E. Bloomstein (Albuquerque, NM: Small World Publishers, Inc.,

1993).

4. Joint Russian-Norwegian Expert Group for

Investigation of Radioactive Contamination

in the Northern Seas, A Survey of Artificial

Radionuclides in the Kara Sea. Results from

the Russian-Norwegian 1992 Expedition to

the Barents and Kara Seas (Osteras, Norway: Norwegian Radiation Protection

Authority, 1993).

5. Lynn, N., et al., “Radionuclide Release from

Submarine Reactors Dumped in the Kara

Sea,” presented at Arctic Nuclear Waste

Assessment Program Workshop Woods Hole
26 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole,

MA, May 1–4, 1995.

6. O’Dowd, D.D., “Characterization of the

Arctic Environment: Introductory Comments,” Proceedings of Workshop on Arctic

Contamination, Arctic Research of the

United States, 8:66–67, 1993.

7. Romanenkova, Veronika, “Minister Describes

Pollution in Chechnya, Komi, Elsewhere,”

ITAR-TASS, in JPRS-TEN-95-003, Feb. 24,

1995, p. 45.

8. Sivintsev, Y., “Study of Nuclide Composition and Characteristics of Fuel in Dumped

Submarine Reactors and Atomic Icebreaker

Lenin,” Part I-Atomic Icebreaker (Moscow:

Kurchatov Institute, December 1993).

9. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, Radioactive and Other Environmental Threats to the United States and

the Arctic Resulting from Past Soviet Activities, Senate Hearing Aug. 15, 1992, 102-

1095 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government).

10. U.S. National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, Scientific and Technical

Information Program, Arctic and Antarctic

Sea Ice, 1978–1987, Satellite PassiveMicrowave Observations and Analysis,

NASA SP-511, (Washington, DC: NASA,

1992).

11. Westermeyer, W., and K. Shusterich, (eds.),

U.S. Arctic Interests: 1980s and 1990s (New

York: Springer-Verlag, 1994).

12. The World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report,

Russian Federation, Environmental Management Project, Report No. 12838-RU

(Washington, DC: The World Bank, Oct. 19,

1994).

13. Zolotkov, Andrei, People’s Deputy (Supreme

Soviet) for Murmansk region, translated presentation, “On the Dumping of Radioactive

Waste at Sea Near Novaya Zemlya” at the

Greenpeace Nuclear Free Seas Campaign,

Russian Information Agency Seminar: Violent Peace—Deadly Legacy, Moscow, Sept.

23–24, 1991.
| 27

2

Contamination

from Nuclear

Wastes in the Arctic

and North Pacific

lthough popular perceptions of the Arctic might characterize it as a pristine

area, it has become increasingly clear

that this important ecosystem has not

avoided the effects of industrialization and

development. Evidence of contamination by persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals, and

radioactivity has been gathered since the 1950s

but has not garnered a great deal of public attention. However, in the last three years a tremendous amount of attention has been directed

toward assessing the extent of, and identifying

possible remedies to, the environmental contamination problem in the Arctic from Russian

nuclear sources. Although the activities of several different countries have released radionuclides into the Arctic environment for decades,

news of ocean dumping of submarine reactors

and nuclear wastes by the former Soviet Union

has generated particular interest and concern

because it revealed previously secret activities

and enhanced the traditional public fear of radioactivity. This chapter analyzes available information about the wastes dumped in the Arctic and

North Pacific, what is known of their contribution to contamination of the marine environment,

and the research efforts needed to address unanswered questions. Chapter 3 discusses the information required to understand the health and

environmental impacts of this contamination.

Chapter 4 addresses other potential sources of

contamination of the Arctic and North Pacific

environments.

Past dumping of nuclear submarine reactors

and fuel assemblies, as well as significant

amounts of other radioactive wastes, into waters

adjacent to the Arctic and North Pacific Oceans

was disclosed in some detail by the Russian Federation in a 1993 government white paper

referred to as the “Yablokov report.” The ultimate fate and effects of this dumping are currently unknown, but possible impacts on local

and regional environments and public health

have raised concerns not only in Russia but in

other countries of the Arctic and North Pacific

regions. People in the United States—in particular, Alaska and the Pacific Northwest—want to

know about this dumping and other discharges of

radionuclides into the oceans. They also want to

know about other risks to these regions from

Russian nuclear activities, both past and future,

and the potential threat to the wider regional

environment and population beyond Russian

borders.

As discussed in chapter 3, a particular concern

is the possible threat to Alaskan Native commuA
28 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

nities, their traditional food supplies, and other

Alaskan fisheries resources. The impact of radioactive wastes that have been dumped in Arctic

waters is also a key concern of other nations, particularly Norway, which depends on a major

fishery in the Barents Sea and is therefore very

active in supporting research into such contamination in nearby waters.

The 1993 Yablokov report described the

extensive past history of Russian dumping of

damaged submarine reactors, spent fuel from the

nuclear fleet, and other radioactive waste into the

Kara Sea off Novaya Zemlya, into the sea of

Japan, and in other locations. It was a remarkable

document to emerge from the new government

of the Russian Federation. The report represented

the results of a tremendous effort to gather information, some of it decades old, from a multitude

of Soviet ministries and agencies; declassify it;

and report it frankly to the international community and to the Russian people. Other than the

estimated inventory of the activity of the items

dumped, which has been refined since the release

of the report by an expert group working with the

International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)

and the precise location of some of the dumped

wastes, the information presented in the

Yablokov report has not been disputed.

As the 1993 Yablokov report described, the

Soviet Union dumped a multitude of materials in

the Kara Sea and in fjords along the coast of

Novaya Zemlya in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,

in violation of international as well as domestic

laws. The wastes included containers, barges,

and ships and submarines containing nuclear

reactors both with and without spent reactor fuel.

A total of 16 reactors were dumped at five different sites; six of these and an additional container

held spent fuel (see table 2-1). The report estimated the maximum total radioactivity of these

materials at the time of disposal as more than 2

million curies. Recent studies by Russian and

U.S. scientists have reached the preliminary conclusion that about 0.13 million curies are present

at these Kara Sea dump sites today.

The Yablokov report also listed similar dumping (of materials with lower radioactivity) in the

Russian Far East (the Sea of Japan and near the

Kamchatka Peninsula). In addition, the report

described some accidents (most notably, the

explosion of a naval reactor during refueling in

Chazhma Bay near Vladivostok); solid, lowTABLE 2-1: Objects Dumped by the Northern Submarine and Icebreaker Fleets

Location Objects

Depth

(m)

Estimated activity in 

1994 (kCi)

Ambrosimov Inlet 8 submarine reactors (3 with SNF) 20 37.9

Novaya Zemlya Depression 1 submarine reactor (1 with SNF) 300 7.8

Stepovoy Inlet 2 submarine reactors (2 with SNF) 50 22.7

Techeniye Inlet 2 submarine reactors 35–40 0.1

Tsivolka Inlet 3 reactors from icebreaker Lenin and 

shielding assembly from Lenin reactor 

assembly with SNF

50 59.4

Total 16 reactors (6 with SNF)

1 shielding assembly from icebreaker 

Lenin with SNF

127.9

KEY: kCi=kilocuries; SNF = spent nuclear fuel

SOURCES: Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by Decree No.

613 of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the

Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: 1993), translated by Paul Gallager and Elena Bloomstein (Albuquerque, NM: Small World

Publishers, Inc.); N. Lynn, J. Warden, Y. Sivintsev, E. Yefimov, M. Mount, K. Gussgard, R. Dyer, and K-L Sjoeblom, “Radionuclide Release from

Submarine Reactors Dumped in the Kara Sea,” presented at Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program Workshop, Woods Hole Oceanographic

Institution, Woods Hole, MA, May 1–4, 1995; Y. Sivintsev, “Study of Nuclide Composition and Characteristics of Fuel in Dumped Submarine Reactors and Atomic Icebreaker Lenin,” Part I—Atomic Icebreaker (Moscow: Kurchatov Institute, December 1993); M. Mount, Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory, personal communication, June 14, 1995.
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 29

level radioactive waste dumping; extensive lowlevel liquid waste discharge; the accident on and

sinking of a nuclear submarine in the Norwegian

Sea; and serious problems with the operation of

current nuclear refueling vessels in both the Russian North and Far East (see tables 2-2 and 2-3).

The dumpings listed in the Yablokov report

generated a number of questions about the potential impacts of the discharged radionuclides.

Since radionuclides can affect human health and

the environment only if and when the radionuclides come in contact with them, the key question is whether and how they may migrate

toward populations and other ecosystems in the

future. Over the past two years since the

Yablokov report, a number of data collection

efforts and investigations have been supported to

address this question by U.S. investigators, Norwegians, Russians, other nations close to the

Russian sites, and international agencies such as

the IAEA. Some tentative conclusions have been

reached, but the data collected by these efforts

are not yet sufficient to accurately predict the

impacts of this dumping.

Researchers have not found evidence of

migration beyond the immediate vicinity of the

dumped radionuclides that might affect human

health in the short run. However, some key questions have yet to be addressed, for example: 1)

there has been no inspection of many of the

dump sites within the past two decades; 2) we

have limited knowledge of the possible release

rates and the long-term reliability of materials

used to encase the waste; and 3) some of the critical pathways for radionuclides to affect humans,

such as the biological food chain or ice transport,

are only in the early stages of investigation.

TABLE 2-2: Solid Intermediate- and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Dumped in Northern and Far 

Eastern Seas

Location

Depth

(m)

Activity

in Sr-90 equivalentsa (Ci)

Kara Sea, Novaya Zemlya Depression 380 3,320

Sedov Inlet, Novaya Zemlya 13–33 3,410

Oga Inlet, Novaya Zemlya 24 2,027

Tsivolka Inlet, Novaya Zemlya 56–135 2,684

Stepovoy Inlet, Novaya Zemlya 25–27 1,280

Abrosimov Inlet, Novaya Zemlya 12–20 661

Blagopoluchiye Inlet, Novaya Zemlya 13–16 235

Techeniye Inlet, Novaya Zemlya up to 50 1,845

Near Kolguyev Island 40

Chernaya Bay, Novaya Zemlya 300

Barents Sea >100

North, Total ~15,900

Sea of Japan (3 sites) 1,900–3,300 3,820

East coast of Kamchatka Peninsula 2,000–2,570 2,992

Far East, Total 6,812

aInformation from original sources used by the Yablokov commission presented the activity of solid radioactive waste as “activity (strontium-90

equivalent) curies.” These units appear to relate to the radiation measured outside the container or object and are not likely to have a consistent

relationship to actual activity. The numbers therefore can be used for comparisons only within the low- and intermediate-level solid radioactive

waste (SRW) category; more information is needed to understand the radioactivity they might represent today.

SOURCE: Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov Commission”), created by Decree No.

613 of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the

Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: 1993), translated by Paul Gallager and Elena Bloomstein (Albuquerque, NM: Small World

Publishers, Inc.).
30 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Several other possible sources of contaminants that could affect the Arctic environment

are also just beginning to be investigated. In the

Kara Sea region, for example, one serious potential source is the large, northward-flowing Siberian rivers, at whose headwaters are located the

major Russian nuclear weapons production facilities. Over the last few decades, the largest

releases of radioactive wastes in the world have

been recorded at several of these sites, such as

Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk. Wastes

totaling more than 100 million curies were discharged into lakes and rivers at one site, and over

1 billion curies were injected directly underground at two other sites. Consequences of these

releases in the local areas are now under study.

Whether high levels of contamination may

migrate down rivers such as the Ob or Yenisey

into the Kara Sea and the Arctic Ocean is currently under study.

Another related concern is the possibility of

radioactive releases from a Russian submarine,

the Komsomolets, that sank in deep water in the

Norwegian Sea in 1989. Although recent surveys

have not detected any significant releases and

researchers believe that the future threat is minimal, some have advocated actions to continue

monitoring and/or provide better barriers to

future leakage.

❚ Modeling and Risk Assessment

Research and data collection efforts within the

U.S.-supported program under the Office of

Naval Research (ONR), as well as research by

other nations and international organizations,

have provided only preliminary answers to questions about the ultimate fate of the radionuclide

releases in the oceans and rivers and their potential impact on public health in the wider region.

The traditional scientific approach to providing

such answers, known as risk assessment,

involves careful definition of the source (e.g., the

dumped material, its condition, its potential for

leaking and spreading over time, and its hazard);

careful modeling of the most likely pathways

(transport by ocean currents, by ice movement,

through the biota or food chain, etc.); and estimating the risk of human exposure and consequent health impacts based on a number of

scenarios. Some work on each of these components is in progress, including modeling of likely

pathways through the marine environment. The

modeling requires validation where possible,

with real measurements and additional data for

inputs. An integrated assessment of all of these

factors has not yet been done for the radioactive

dumping in the Arctic and North Pacific,

although planning for such a risk assessment is

now under way in the ONR program.

To produce a rigorous risk assessment would

require more data and research in areas not yet

well investigated (ice transport, biological pathways, human consumption patterns, etc.), as well

TABLE 2-3: Liquid Radioactive Waste 

Dumped or Accidentally Released in 

Russian Northern and Far Eastern Seas

Location

Activity at time 

of dumping

(Ci)

Barents Sea—open sea (3 sites) 11,779.0

Barents Sea—coastal (4 sites) 3,389.0

Kara Sea (1 site) 8,500.0

North, Total 23,668.0

Sea of Japan (6 sites) 11,984.8a

Sea of Okhotsk (1 site) 0.1

East coast of Kamchatka 

Peninsula (2 sites)

352.2

Far East, Total 12,337.1

aIncludes 0.38 Ci dumped into the Sea of Japan by the Russians in

October 1993.

SOURCES: Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by

Decree No. 613 of the Russian Federation President, Oct. 24, 1992,

Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas

Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia:

1993), translated by Paul Gallager and Elena Bloomstein, (Albuquerque, NM: Small World Publishers, Inc.); V.M. Zakharov, “Situation and

Course of Action for the Problem of Managing Radioactive Wastes in

the Russian Pacific Fleet,” Proceedings of U.S.–Russia-Japan Study

Group for Radioactive Wastes in Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk and

North Pacific Ocean (Biloxi, MS: January 1995); V.A. Danilyan, and

V.A. Vysotsky, “Nuclear Waste Disposal Practices in Russia’s Pacific

Ocean Region,” Proceedings of U.S.-Russia-Japan Study Group for

Radioactive Wastes in Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk and North

Pacific Ocean (Biloxi, MS: January 1995).
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 31

as the conduct of a multi-year project with substantial investment in resources. Most experts

agree that at least four years and several million

dollars would be required. However, the size of

the effort could be modified substantially,

depending on the detailed plan and specific

goals. Such goals would have to include (at

least): a definition of the population to be studied

for health risks; a definition of the region to be

considered; a definition of the time frame for

investigation; and a definition of the most likely

scenarios for pollutant release and migration.

❚ Monitoring

Another aspect of research and data collection

that has not yet been undertaken is long-term

monitoring of the environment and related indicators that may help provide early warning of

potential future health or ecological risks from

dumped radionuclides. The OTA review and

many experts’ conclusions point toward almost

no immediate threat to human health beyond

Russian borders, based on what is now known

about the nuclear waste dumping and discharges

under study. That conclusion, however, does not

preclude future threats from contamination that

has yet to leak and migrate. One possible way to

answer the question of future threat is to undertake a rigorous, long-term scientific risk assessment as discussed above. Another way is to

devise a monitoring program to facilitate early

detection of future releases, anticipate possible

migration, and prevent potentially adverse health

and environmental impacts.

Many experts have thought about establishing

a monitoring program for the nuclear dumping

under study, but no specific plan has been put

forward. Monitoring could take many forms. It

could be tied to some form of leak detection

devices at dump sites and possible discharge

points (river mouths); it could entail continuous

or periodic measuring of ambient concentrations

of contaminants; it could involve testing of tissues from animal species important for human

consumption (such as sampling Alaskan fish or

Arctic mammals); it could involve sampling of

some biological indicator. The first step in planning a specific monitoring program has not yet

begun; therefore, no specific goals have been set.

If a planning process were initiated, it would

be possible to evaluate other past and present

monitoring efforts for similar purposes. For

example, the Norwegians have initiated a program of measuring radioactive contaminants in

fish, other seafood, water, and seaweed in their

regions of interest in the Arctic. In the past, the

U.S. Navy has conducted surveys at the sites of

sunken nuclear submarines in the deep waters of

the Atlantic Ocean to measure any discharges to

the surrounding environment. Experience with

these and other efforts could help develop a program for monitoring nuclear contamination in

the Arctic and North Pacific. Information from

previous efforts would be useful as a first step

toward identifying possible goals and defining

approaches needed to establish an effective monitoring program.

❚ Remediation

If a significant risk is posed by radioactive materials dumped or discharged into the environment,

it is possible to consider some means of recovery, improved containment, or improved barriers

to prevent further releases. The term remediation

has been coined in the United States to cover all

of these possible measures. In the case of the

dumped reactors and solid waste in the Kara Sea

or the Russian Far East, much remains unknown

about the quality of the containment technology

used and its long-term integrity. Therefore, some

experts have suggested that the sites be

“entombed” in place with a major structure that

would encase the material and prevent future

leakage. Others have proposed recovering the

dumped materials and providing a more secure

storage on land. Studies are just beginning to

examine the cost and feasibility of some remediation options. However, much more information

is required about the condition of the dump sites

and the characteristics of the materials themselves before any practical remedial approach

could be investigated adequately.
32 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

The site that has received the most attention in

terms of remediation or possible recovery is the

location of the sunken submarine Komsomolets.

This Russian submarine sank in about 5,000 feet

of water in the Norwegian Sea with a nuclear

reactor and two nuclear warheads. Expeditions to

the site have identified a damaged hull with several holes, some of which were subsequently

sealed to minimize water circulation through the

vessel’s torpedo compartments. Some planning

for possible recovery of the submarine has been

done, but most experts consider the risk of radionuclide contamination from the Komsomolets to

be so low as to make its recovery unnecessary.

Remediation at other sites where major

amounts of radionuclides have been released

(such as the rivers flowing past Russian nuclear

production complexes) is possible, and some

work at places like Lake Karachai and the Techa

River is under way. However, these efforts

appear to be more focused on reducing exposure

risk to the local population than on preventing

future migration into the Arctic Ocean, which is

more than a thousand miles downriver.

Some future remediation efforts at the Arctic

or North Pacific dump sites may be worthwhile,

depending on the findings of the ongoing assessments of potential radionuclide release rates.

Norwegian authorities and the IAEA are planning some studies to determine the value of

applying containment or recovery techniques to

the Kara Sea sites, but no decisions have been

made as to the value of any specific technology.

Little information exists about implementation

costs and funding sources for remediation

projects at these sites, and studies to address

these questions are just beginning to be considered. The United States has not initiated any such

studies and probably could not justify them until

much more information about the dump sites

themselves is obtained and verified.

The situation described in this chapter provides only a first indication of current conditions

and of needs for possible future research. It is

evident, however, that when such material is discharged into the open environment, its fate is

very difficult to predict in the long term. The

only way to obtain answers about future risks is

by conducting onsite investigations to identify

possible problems. Practical and effective methods of monitoring may assist in observing suggestive trends or providing early warning of

releases.

Even though the disclosures of Arctic dumping and other releases caused international reactions and are a serious concern, they are not

necessarily the only major concern or the most

serious releases or impacts from radionuclides.

Other radioactive accidents and discharges of

wastes into the Arctic environment (including

those of nations other than the former Soviet

Union) could be similarly relevant depending on

many factors including, most importantly,

whether they can lead to human exposure. For

example, nuclear weapons testing in the 1960s

and the Chernobyl accident in 1986 released

large amounts of radionuclides into the atmosphere, and the resulting low-level contamination

can be widely measured throughout the Arctic.

Also, sea discharges of radioactive wastes from

nuclear processing plants in the United Kingdom

and France in the 1970s have been detected in

Arctic waters thousands of miles away.

Researchers have identified and traced specific

migration of radionuclides from bomb tests,

European reprocessing plants, and the Chernobyl

accident, through the atmosphere and the water

to various Arctic regions. In fact, since we have

little indication of migration from Russian dumping activities, this other contamination, and the

methods used to identify it, provide a context in

which the impacts of the dumping or discharges

from rivers may be investigated.

The following discussion summarizes the current understanding of the extent of radioactive

contamination in the Arctic and North Pacific

regions resulting from known sources. It evaluates how well the problem has been characterized to date and the uncertainties that remain. It

also identifies information and research gaps and

suggests important topics for future investigation.
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 33

ARCTIC CONTAMINATION FROM 

NON-DUMPING SOURCES

❚ Global Releases

Three major sources of radioactive contamination released globally have also been sources of

radionuclides in the Arctic environment. Listed

in table 2-4, these are: 1) global fallout from the

testing of nuclear weapons; 2) discharge of

nuclear wastes from European reprocessing

plants; and 3) the explosion at the Chernobyl

nuclear power plant.

The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons

by the Soviet Union, the United States, and other

nations has been the single largest source of

man-made radionuclides released into the global

environment. Millions of curies of radionuclides

were released high into the atmosphere and

widely dispersed over the globe. As described in

box 2-1, all of the largest atmospheric explosions

carried out by the Soviet Union took place in the

Arctic, on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya.

Underground and underwater tests took place

there as well. Radionuclides from global fallout

constitute a significant proportion of the radioactivity currently measurable in the Arctic Seas.

European reprocessing plants have also been

an important source of radionuclides globally

and in the Arctic. Box 2-2 summarizes the

amounts of radioactivity that have been discharged over the years, and the movement of

radionuclides into the North Sea and then to the

Norwegian Sea and beyond into Arctic seas.

The reactor accident at Chernobyl released

significant radioactivity into the environment,

but the heaviest deposition was not in the Arctic

region. Nonetheless, some cesium-137 (Cs-137)

has been deposited and transported there, as

described in box 2-3.

All three of these sources of released radionuclides have contributed to contamination of the

Arctic seas (see table 2-5) and, in addition to the

natural radiation sources discussed in chapter 3,

provide a context in which further contamination

or potential releases can be considered.

❚ Komsomolets

Another cause for concern with regard to possible future Arctic nuclear contamination is the

Soviet nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets

which sank on April 7, 1989, in the Norwegian

Sea approximately 480 km off the Norwegian

coast. The Komsomolets lies on the ocean floor

in international waters at a depth of about 5,000

feet. According to Nikolai A. Nosov from the

Rubin design bureau and the deputy chief

designer of the Komsomolets, the submarine was

powered by a single nuclear reactor of the PWR

(pressurized water reactor) type and was carrying

TABLE 2-4: Large Global Releases of Radioactivity

Source Time period Amount released (Ci) Comments

Fallout from atmospheric 

testing of nuclear devices

1952–1980 25 million, Cs-137

16 million, Sr-90

6.5 billion, H-3

Widely dispersed over the globe

European reprocessing

plants

1952–present 5.2 million total to 1986 Discharged into the Irish Sea and 

English Channel, dispersed through the 

oceans

Chernobyl 1986 50–80 million total;

6.8 million of long-lived 

radionuclides

Injected into the atmosphere, with 

heaviest deposition in Belarus, Ukraine, 

and western Russia

KEY: Cs-137=cesium-137; H-3=tritium; Sr-90=strontium-90.

SOURCES: A. Aarkrog, “Radioactivity in the Polar Regions—Main Sources,” J. Environ. Radioactivity 25 (1994); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defense-Related Installations and

Activities, Final Report. Volume I: Radioactive Contamination, Phase I: 1993–1995; U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Research, Radioactive Inventories

and Sources of Contamination of the Kara Sea by Riverine Transport, prepared by D.J. Bradley and U.P. Jenquin of Pacific Northwest Laboratory,

PNWD-2316 (Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1995).
34 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 2-1: Nuclear Testing

The first and largest source of radioactive contamination that has been measured throughout the Arctic, and throughout the Northern Hemisphere, was atmospheric testing and use of nuclear weapons.

Beginning in the 1940s by the United States and the Soviet Union, and joined in the 1950s and 1960s by

Britain, France, and China, more than 2,030 nuclear tests have been carried out worldwide, 511 of them

in the oceans or atmosphere (47). In addition, the United States exploded two nuclear bombs over Japan

during wartime in August 1945. The total yield of all of these explosions is estimated at 438 megatons,

roughly equivalent to 30,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs (48).a

The contribution of atmospheric testing to global radioactive contamination has been substantial. It is

estimated that 25 million curies of cesium-137 (Cs-137), 16 million curies of strontium-90 (Sr-90), and 6.5

billion curies of tritium (H-3) were released to the atmosphere from these tests (80). Most of the fallout

occurred between 1955 and 1966, but the annual amount of fallout from the tests has decreased steadily

since the partial test ban treaty in 1963. Atmospheric nuclear explosions have not taken place since a

Chinese test at Lop Nor in October 1980 (48).

Many of the tests carried out by the Soviet Union took place at Novaya Zemlya (adjacent to the Arctic

Ocean), including all of the very large explosions. At Novaya Zemlya, 132 tests were carried out between

September 1955 and October 1990: 87 in the atmosphere, 3 underwater, and 42 underground (71).

Despite the fact that about 94 percent of the total yield of all Soviet nuclear tests has been released at

Novaya Zemlya (3), there does not appear to have been proportionately greater atmospheric fallout in

that region. Available data suggest that the larger explosions took place at more than 1 km in height, so

that almost all of the fallout was distributed globally, rather than locally. Indeed, based on data from 1964

to 1969, the Cs-137 accumulation was lower on Novaya Zemlya than in Sweden or Finland (48). In general, nuclear fallout at the two poles is less than at lower latitudes (80), and measurements suggest that

fallout near Novaya Zemlya was similar to that in other Arctic areas (see figure 2-1). Similarly, low fallout

deposition would be expected throughout the Barents and Kara Seas. However, atmospheric transport

was generally toward the east, so it is reasonable that some close-in fallout may have been deposited

over the Kara Sea at this time (33).

Carried out in adherence to safety requirements, underground nuclear tests should not lead to the

release of radioactive fission products into the atmosphere. However, Russian scientists reviewing the

test site at Novaya Zemlya have reported that 25 of the 42 underground tests there released radioactive

inert gases and two “were accompanied with dynamic venting to the atmosphere of gaseous and evaporated products (venting of radioactivity)” (71). There have been no investigations about the ultimate fate

of these releases in the local or regional environment, but they could contribute to the general problem.

The three underwater nuclear tests conducted at the edge of the Barents Sea on the south side of

Novaya Zemlya contributed to contamination of the sediments in this area. Estimates of the inventory

expected now in Barents Sea water and sediments from this source, after radioactive decay, are very

low. Some recent measurements of sediments in the vicinity of the tests reported higher concentrations

over a limited area, thought to stem from the underwater tests (68).

Global fallout on land in the watershed of the Arctic seas constitutes another contribution to the contamination of the Arctic as rivers wash the fallout into the ocean. Rough estimates of the radionuclide contribution to the Arctic from land runoff of global fallout and other sources are shown in table 2-5.

(continued)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 35

two torpedoes with nuclear warheads as well as

conventional torpedoes (18). Much international

attention has been drawn to the Komsomolets as

a potential source of long-term radioactive contamination, especially to the extensive fisheries

resources known to exist in this region of the

Norwegian and adjacent seas within the Arctic.

As of August 1994, Soviet and Russian

authorities had sponsored a total of five expeditions to the Komsomolets, with another expedition planned for the summer of 1995. The

expeditions served to investigate the extent of the

damage to the submarine, study the physical

oceanographic characteristics of the area, take

samples for measuring the level of contamination, seal holes in the torpedo sections, and determine the future course of action.

Russian authorities have released little information concerning the design and construction of

the nuclear reactor aboard the Komsomolets.

However, they have revealed that the reactor had

a capacity of approximately 190 megawatts

(MW) and have provided an estimate of the

radioactive inventory of the reactor core. According to the Yablokov report, the reactor core contained approximately 42 kilocuries (kCi) of

strontium-90 (Sr-90) and 55 kCi of Cs-137 (25).

More recently, Russian experts from the Kurchatov Institute have revised the estimated

inventory of radionuclides in the reactor of the

Komsomolets to 76 kCi of Sr-90 and 84 kCi of

Cs-137 (48).

Russian officials have reported that the reactor

was successfully switched to stable cool-down

mode before the submarine was abandoned, the

structural integrity of the reactor compartment

appears adequate, and water exchange in the

region of the reactor compartment is very limited

(25). These are all factors that would limit the

potential migration of radioactive materials to

the outside environment.

Two nuclear-tipped torpedoes located in the

nose section of the Komsomolets present another

possible concern. Both the Yablokov commission and researchers from the Kurchatov Institute

estimate a plutonium (Pu) activity of about 430

In addition to nuclear tests for weapon development, the former Soviet Union also used nuclear

devices for other purposes. The Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosion program was active from January

1965 to September 1988, carrying out 116 nuclear explosions. The explosions were used primarily in

support of the oil, gas, and mineral industries; to explore geological features at great depths; to create

underground storage cavities; and to help extract gas and oil or extinguish burning wells. Eighty-one of

the explosions were carried out in Russia (47). It is not known whether or how much these explosions may

contribute to nuclear contamination in the Arctic, although they have certainly caused significant contamination of local areas.

aOne megaton (Mt) is equivalent to the power of 1 million tons of TNT.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 2-1: Nuclear Testing (Cont’d.)

TABLE 2-5: Estimated 1993 Inventory of 

Uncontained Radionuclides in the Arctic 

Seas

Source

Sr-90

(kCi)

Cs-137

 (kCi)

Fallout from 

atmospheric 

testing of nuclear 

devices

70 111

Runoff from fallout 

on land

41 14

Sellafield 

Reprocessing 

Plant

27–54 270–405

Chernobyl 27–135

SOURCE: A. Aarkrog, “Radioactivity in the Polar Regions—Main

Sources,” J. Environ. Radioactivity 25 (1994).
I

I

I

x

2

0

0

Northern hemisphere Southern hemisphere

SOURCE: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), “Sources and Effects of Ionizing

Radiation,” UNSCEAR 1993 Report (New York: 1993).

A significant source of contamination that has been documented to have migrated into many areas of

the Arctic Ocean is nuclear waste discharged from reprocessing facilities in Europe. Civilian plants at

Sellafield and Dounreay in Great Britain, and Cap de la Hague in France, reprocess spent fuel from

nuclear reactors, Sellafield began discharging wastes from reprocessing operations into the Irish Sea in

1952, and Dounreay in 1958; Cap de la Hague began discharging into the English Channel in 1966.

Between their start-up dates and 1986, when a comprehensive report on radionuclide discharges was

released, the three plants discharged a total of 5.2 million curies of radioactivity. The largest contribution

by far was from the Sellafield plant (4.3 million curies), followed by the plants at Cap de la Hague (0.6 million curies) and Dounreay (0,3 million curies). The discharges include at least 38 different radionuclides,

but the elements of most concern for potential health effects are the beta-emitters cesium-137 (Cs-137),

strontium-90 (Sr-90), and plutonium-241 (Pu-241), and the alpha emitters Pu-239 and americium-241

(Am-241 ) (48), Sellafield, in particular, has bean responsible for "a substantial increase in the inventories

of a number of radionuclides (e.g., Sr-90, technetium-99 (Tc-99), Cs-137, Pu-239 and 240) in the North

Atlantic as a whole and, in particular, the latitude band into which the discharges were initially dispersed

(50-66° N)” (33). Recently the new Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield began reprocessing spent fuel, so that increases in some radionuclides and decreases in others are projected. The

Dounreay facility may increase its output of radionuclides from present levels as it processes fuel from the

Prototype Fast Reactor shut down in 1994. Discharges from La Hague continue but have been substantially reduced in recent years (48).

(continued)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 37

Contributions to contamination in the Arctic from European reprocessing centers have been estimated

based on the movement of traceable radionuclides out of the Irish Sea and around the coast of Scotland

into the North Sea. From there, the contaminants are carried north through the Norwegian Sea by the Norwegian Coastal Current. The current splits, part traveling east into the Barents Sea, while the remainder

travels with the West Spitsbergen Current up through the Fram Strait into the Nansen Basin.

Based on a variety of assumptions (see below), an estimate has been made that about 22 percent of

the Cs-137 discharged by Sellafield enters the Barents Sea, en route to the Arctic Basin. At this time, it

appears that Atlantic waters entering and mixing with Arctic waters are diluting the Cs-137. Since discharges have been reduced from Sellafield, the Atlantic waters have lower contamination, and older discharges from Sellafield are now flowing out from the Arctic through the Fram Strait (33). Transit time for

the movement of Cs-137 from Sellafield appears to be 5 to 6 years to the Barents Sea (33); movement to

the Kara Sea takes somewhat longer. Transit time from the plant at Cap La Hague is thought take about

two years less.

There are many uncertainties inherent in estimating reprocessing waste contributions to Arctic contamination and the transit times of radioactive contaminants. The inflow into the Barents Sea is subject to

strong influences from wind and is therefore highly variable, making estimates of radionuclide transport

there difficult. Uncertainty in the contribution from reprocessing also stems from uncertainty in the “background” contribution from global fallout. As pointed out by Kershaw, water masses originating from different latitudes or water depths may have differing amounts of contamination from bomb test fallout. Values

of 8-16 x 10-11Ci/m3 of Cs-137 have been reported for waters of the Arctic region. Higher levels may

reflect the movement of waters from the Atlantic, at latitudes where higher levels of fallout occurred.

Further uncertainty stems from the sampling itself, which can cover only a limited portion of such a

huge volume (33).

In addition to contributions from reprocessing plants of radionuclides such as cesium and strontium,

which move with the water, the behavior of particle-reactive compounds such as plutonium could also be

of concern. Most of the plutonium released by Sellafield remains bound in the sediments of the eastern

Irish Sea (33). However, some fraction of the plutonium, mostly in the higher oxidation state, stays in solution and can be readily detected in the North Sea. Whether it has been transported as far as the Arctic

Basin is less clear. Analyses of plutonium isotopes suggest that indeed plutonium from Sellafield has

been transported as far as the Barents and Greenland Seas. To date, it has not been possible to quantify

the magnitude of this contribution (33,48).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 2-3: The 1986 Chernobyl Accident

The reactor accident at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986 was another significant contributor to global

nuclear contamination, but its specific impact on the Arctic is difficult to estimate. About 2.7 million curies

of cesium-137 (Cs-137) were released to the atmosphere and deposited in the northern hemisphere, particularly in Ukraine, Belarus, western Russia, and elsewhere in Europe (2). Based on the deposition of Cs137 recorded at different sites in Greenland, a total deposition in the Arctic of 27,000 curies of Cs-137

has been estimated by one researcher, with perhaps a total of 135,000 curies including additional contamination transported northward by the West Norwegian Current (2). Others have estimated that Chernobyl contributed 1–2 percent of the 1991 total Cs-137 concentration in the Arctic basin (33).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 2-2: European Reprocessing Facility Discharges (Cont’d.)
38 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

curies (approximately 94 percent from Pu-239

and 6 percent from Pu-240) in the two warheads

of the Komsomolets (6–10 kg of Pu) (48). Russian authorities note that the outer shells of the

two nuclear warheads were damaged during the

sinking of the Komsomolets, and because the

hatches of the torpedo tubes are open, nuclear

materials in the warheads are now in direct contact with seawater. It is impossible to predict the

precise rate of corrosion of the warheads and the

rate of release of nuclear materials without specific knowledge of the materials used for the protective coating of the warheads and the titanium

hull of the submarine. This information has not

yet been made available by Russian authorities.

However, according to researchers from the

Khlopin Radium Institute in St. Petersburg, analyses of water samples, bottom sediments, surface

sediments, and biota taken from 1991 to 1994

indicate that releases of Pu-239 from the nuclear

warheads into the environment have thus far

been insignificant (37).

Efforts have been made by the Russians to

seal the holes in the torpedo section of the

Komsomolets in order to slow the rate of corrosion of the sections of the warheads that contain

nuclear materials. During the expedition to the

Komsomolets in August 1994 by the Russian

research vessel the Academician Mstislav

Keldysh, nine holes, including two in the torpedo

sections containing the nuclear warheads, were

sealed with plugs made of rubber and titanium as

a means to prevent seawater from contacting the

missiles (7,69). Most Norwegian and Russian

experts agree that this process should minimize

the likelihood of immediate corrosion of the warheads. However, since this type of operation is

unprecedented, it is not possible to predict its

long-term effectiveness.

Considerations of the potential hazard from

the sunken submarine have focused on the eventual release of fission products such as cesium

and strontium from the reactor, and plutonium

from the nuclear warheads. It is impossible to

estimate precisely the fission product release

rates without more specific information regarding the reactor, but a recent effort using assumptions about the reactor construction and

corrosion rates both for the reactor compartment

and for spent fuel, arrived at an upper-bound

release rate of Cs-137 of about 13.5 curies per

year. Release rates of other radionuclides are

likely to be at least an order of magnitude lower

(48). As described further in chapter 3, information about the amount of curies released does not

by itself provide enough information to indicate

what the health and environmental impacts will

be, but 13.5 curies per year represents a small

source term. Understanding of the movement of

the radionuclides and how they could come in

contact with humans is required.

Given the estimate of the release rate of fission products such as Cs-137 and Sr-90 from the

submarine, the next question is where and how

quickly they might be transported through the

marine environment. In general, little is known

about the ocean currents at various depths. The

Yablokov report states that the hydrology of the

area in which the submarine sits is extremely

complex, and the speed and direction of the currents can change significantly in a short period of

time. Bottom currents in this area have been

measured at up to 1.5 m/s by Russian scientists

(25). Measurements taken by the Norwegian

Institute of Marine Research at various depths

near the Komsomolets site also indicate a strong

and variable current, with very limited exchange

between the deeper water layers (below 1,000 m)

and the surface (5,48).

Norwegian modeling studies suggest movement of the water-soluble fission products up

into the Arctic Ocean. Estimates of the potential

doses to humans through the food chain from this

movement suggest negligible contributions to

typical doses. Fishing does not occur at the great

depths where the submarine is located, and the

radionuclides are diluted tremendously when

they reach surface waters.

The model used does not describe the movement of radionuclides such as plutonium, which

are not very soluble in water. It is expected that

most of the plutonium will adhere to sediment

particles in the ocean bottom, as has been

observed near the Sellafield reprocessing plant.
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 39

Over the last 30 years, discharges into the Irish

Sea from this plant have included 200 to 400 kg

of plutonium. Ninety percent of this plutonium

remains in the sediments close to the discharge

point (18). It is expected similarly that almost all

of the 6 to 10 kg of plutonium from the Komsomolets will also remain localized in the nearby

sediments.

Given the present rate of releases and what is

known about the condition of the Komsomolets

and the physical characteristics of the region,

most experts agree that the Komsomolets does

not pose an immediate or long-term threat

(15,22,48). In addition, the Russians have taken

steps to delay the rate of release of contaminants

by sealing up holes near the nuclear warheads.

Future expeditions are planned to conduct further

research and possibly to seal up more holes, or

build a containment shield around the Komsomolets, and to continue radiological monitoring to

estimate future rates of radioactive releases.

❚ Russia’s Nuclear Production Complexes

Like the United States, the Russian Federation

has an extensive legacy of environmental contamination at its major weapons production sites.

The sites with the largest radioactive releases in

Russia are located along rivers that, thousands of

miles downstream, ultimately feed into the Kara

Sea. The heavy contamination at and around

some of these sites could contribute to Arctic

contamination if radionuclides are transported by

these rivers to the northern seas. Boxes 2-4

through 2-6, covering the weapons production

sites of Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk,

describe some of the large releases of radionuclides into the environment that may contribute

to contamination of the Arctic as they are washed

downstream. They also describe the nuclear

wastes still stored or being produced at these

sites, which have the potential for release and

eventual Arctic impact.

BOX 2-4: Environmental Contamination from Mayak Production Association 

near Chelyabinsk

The Chelyabinsk region in the southern Urals of Russia is a severely contaminated area, considered to

be one of the places most polluted by nuclear waste in the world. Tremendous amounts of radioactive

contamination are present at the site from the Mayak production complex, and the cleanup problems

posed at the site will be a challenge for many decades to come. Human impacts among the workers and

the regional population have been large and efforts are still underway to understand their extent.

The Mayak production association complex, situated about 70 km north of the city of Chelyabinsk in

the southern Urals and built in 1948, was the Soviet Union’s first plutonium production plant. The last of

the five uranium-graphite reactors that produced weapons-grade plutonium was shut down in 1990. The

complex now consists of two nuclear reactors including one to produce plutonium-238, a plant for reprocessing nuclear fuel called RT-1, a complex for vitrification of liquid high level wastes and storage of the

resulting containers of waste glass, storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and recycled plutonium and

uranium, and several other facilities engaged in defense nuclear activities (52). The Mayak complex is

located on mostly flat terrain amidst lakes, marshes, and the floodplains of several rivers, with groundwater in the area at depths from 0.9 to 4.0 m from the surface (74). The complex is located along the Techa

River, a tributary of the Ob River system that flows northward into the Kara Sea.

(continued)
40 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

According to Russian sources, approximately 1 billion curies of radioactive wastes has been generated at Mayak over the period of its operation (52). The bulk of this inventory is in the form of high-level

liquid radioactive waste and is stored in about 60 special stainless steel tanks reinforced with concrete

“shells” (60). In addition, Mayak’s solid radioactive waste burial grounds contain 500,000 tons of contaminated materials, with an estimated activity of 12 million curies (50). Moreover, Russian sources acknowledge that at least 130 million curies of radioactivity has been released directly into the environment from

Mayak, a sum that is about 2.6 times greater than the amount of radioactivity released from the Chernobyl

accident in 1986 (75).

Today, 120 million curies remains in Lake Karachai (50) and continuing release of radioactive products into the lake is a major concern. Though most of the cesium in the waste is apparently bound to the

clays at the lake’s bottom, the strontium-90 and some nitrates appear to be migrating in a ground water

plume which has spread at a rate of up to 80 meters per year and has reached the nearby Mishelyak

River (44). Some Russian specialists are concerned that the contaminated water will break into the open

hydrologic systems, contaminating the Ob River basin and ultimately flowing out to the Arctic Ocean (75).

In addition to intentional discharges and releases of radioactive wastes and materials, a severe contamination event occurred at Mayak in 1957 when a high level waste storage tank exploded, releasing 20

million curies of radioactivity. Most of the radioactive wastes fell near the tank, but 10 percent of the radioactivity was ejected into the atmosphere and carried great distances eastward. The contaminated area

extended northeast from the Mayak complex, covering about 23,000 km2 (74). Though 10,700 people

were ultimately evacuated, more then half of them were not moved for eight months, and the people

of the entire region consumed contaminated food from the 1957 harvest (12). The present activity of

the radioactive materials released to the environment is now estimated at about 44,000 curies, of

which strontium-90 is the primary contaminant (50).

Another contamination event occurred at Mayak in 1967 when a severe drought exposed a dry shoreline on Lake Karachai that had been used since 1951 for storage of radioactive waste. Winds carried

about 600 curies over a 2,700 km2 area up to 75 km from the site (50).

Some steps have been taken or planned to try to minimize further spread of contaminants into the surrounding atmosphere or groundwater. Since 1967 the Russians have been filling in Lake Karachai to limit

further air release of radionuclides (50). A plan for removing the contents of the lake for reprocessing and

disposal of high-level wastes was ruled out for financial reasons. Instead, large concrete blocks designed

to trap sediments inside them as the lake is filled are being put into the lake. Once the blocks are placed

and covered with rock and soil, the Russians may pump contaminated water from nearby wells and treat

it to remove radionuclides and try to minimize their migration (50). In the meantime, however, liquid lowlevel wastes are still being discharged into Lake Karachai (24,58).

(continued)

BOX 2-4: Environmental Contamination from Mayak Production Association 

near Chelyabinsk (Cont’d.)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 41

In addition to Lake Karachai, there are 7 other contaminated reservoirs present at the Mayak site

which are a concern from a contaminant transport perspective. Inventories of reservoir volumes and contaminants were presented at a workshop on the environment in October 1992 (75). Russian experts

include among the problems needing immediate attention the water regulation of these reservoirs, including both seepage out of the most downstream reservoir and overflow into the Techa River. For example,

the water level in one of the Techa River reservoirs has been rising steadily, necessitating raising the

height of the dam as a short term solution. With an increase in dam height, seepage of contaminated

water out of the dam increases, releasing more radioactive contamination into the Techa River system

(75). The migration of contaminated groundwater mentioned above is another serious issue, raising concerns that it will contaminate the Ob basin which leads to the Arctic Ocean (75). The Asanov Swamps, an

area of 30 km2 in the upper reaches of the Techa, are estimated to contain 6,000 curies of strontium90 and cesium-137 and pose a contamination source to the river system (12,70). Furthermore, flooding that occurred this past spring substantially widened the area of contamination (58).

The extensive contamination that has occurred at and around the Mayak complex has taken a human

health toll. As a result of the handling of weapon materials at Mayak, the large releases into the Techa

River system, the 1957 high-level nuclear waste tank explosion, and the resuspension of contaminated

wastes in 1967, radiation exposures of workers at the plants and some of the general population around

the plant exceed the average doses experienced by atomic bomb survivors. According to a 1991 internal

Soviet government report, more than 124,000 people were exposed to elevated levels of radiation from

living along the river, and more than 28,000 to doses that “may have caused significant health effects”

(52). Several thousand plant workers were also exposed. Studies in these populations have indicated

increased rates of chronic radiation sickness, as well as increases in leukemia and other cancers

(26,35,36). More studies are planned to better characterize the relationship between long-term, low-level

exposure to radiation and disease development in these populations. Meanwhile villagers who have only

recently learned of their many years of radiation exposure are under tremendous psychological stress as

they struggle to understand how it might have affected them. Many are convinced that they have gotten

sick or will get sick as a result of the radioactive contamination (21).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 2-5: Environmental Contamination from Tomsk-7

The Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC), also known as Tomsk-7 or Seversk, is located near the Tom

River approximately 16 km from the city of Tomsk in western Siberia. One of the largest weapons production facilities in the world, the site contains five graphite-uranium plutonium production reactors, a uranium enrichment plant, a reprocessing plant, and other plants engaged in the military nuclear fuel cycle

(65). Three of the plutonium-producing reactors have been shut down, and the remaining two are dualpurpose reactors that provide heat and electricity for Tomsk and Seversk, as well as weapons-grade plutonium. Tomsk-7 remains an extremely sensitive military installation and is “surrounded by double, electric security fences, guard towers, and patrolled by armed guards between the fences” (73).

(continued)

BOX 2-4: Environmental Contamination from Mayak Production Association 

near Chelyabinsk (Cont’d.)
42 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Tomsk-7 came to international attention in April 1993, when a chemical reaction caused an explosion

in a tank containing uranium nitrate solution during reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The explosion blew a

hole in the roof of the building and sent a shock wave which passed down a 100 m gallery and knocked

out a brick wall at the end (23). About 40 curies of radioactivity was released through a 150 m stack contaminating an area of more than 40 km2 to the northeast of the site (24,76). Localized release in the

plant was reported to be 4 curies of beta and gamma emitters (23). According to an international

team visiting the site soon after the incident, some decontamination had already been carried out,

and it appeared that no further offsite decontamination would be necessary (23).

A recent report from the Russian Federation Security Council presents some information on the contamination situation at Tomsk-7 resulting from the production and reprocessing activities of the last 40

years. The report estimates a total inventory of radioactive wastes stored within the industrial zone of the

site at 1.2 billion curies at the time of burial (65). The majority of this inventory is in the form of liquid radioactive waste, part of which was discharged into several reservoirs. From the mid-1960s to 1982, an estimated 127 million curies of long-lived radionuclides was released into these reservoirs (48). Efforts are

under way to fill in one of these reservoirs with soil (65). According to reports from workers of Tomsk-7, up

to 850 kg of plutonium may have been discharged into reservoirs, and 1.5 to 3 kg per month was discharged into a “special sewer” from metallurgical and machining operations (59). Cooling water from the

production reactors (low-level waste) was discharged to the Tom River in amounts up to 42,000 cubic

meters per day (11). Discharges of cooling waters continue from the dual use reactors. The Tom River

feeds into the Ob, which flows northward to the Kara Sea.

In addition to surface discharges, Tomsk-7 is one of three sites in Russia where underground injection

has been used as a means of disposal for large volumes of waste. Information from the Tomsk Oil and

Gas Geology Association in 1991 indicates that radioactive waste has been pumped into sandy layers

220-360 m deep, 10 to 13 km from the Tom River (50). Russian specialists estimate that 38 million cubic

meters of liquid radioactive waste with an activity of 500 million curies has been injected underground

(65). A more recent estimate suggests that the current activity of injected wastes at Tomsk-7 is as high as

1 billion curies (50).

Over the last few years, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and the U.S. Department of Energy

have had talks about the injection of the radioactive wastes, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)

began a study of the hydrology of the West Siberian Basin (which encompasses Chelyabinsk, Tomsk,

and Krasnoyarsk). A study circulated in April 1994 acknowledges “massive contamination” as a result of

nuclear fuel cycle activities there. It observes that though the basin is geologically stable, it is very wet

(8). PNL is continuing its study and modeling efforts to better understand how the contaminants injected

underground might be expected to move (77,78). Extensive studies have also been carried out by Russian scientists (62).

At a meeting in May 1994 in which Russian scientists discussed waste injection with U.S. scientists,

several papers were presented that provided more details on the practice. In most cases, shallow geological layers were used for low-level wastes, and higher-level wastes were injected more deeply. In

some instances, water is pumped out to create low-pressure areas that draw the wastes in desired directions (8).

(continued)

BOX 2-5: Environmental Contamination from Tomsk-7 (Cont’d.)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 43

Although “accepted rules of nuclear waste disposal” require it to be isolated in impermeable containers for thousands of years, Russian scientists say the practice of underground injection is safe because

of the impermeability of the shale and clay separating them from the earth’s surface (50). It is not clear if

or when the injected wastes could make their way into contact with human beings. Ideally, migration will

be slow enough to isolate the wastes for thousands of years, allowing many of the radioactive elements to

decay to less dangerous elements. However, further study of the hydrology of the region is necessary

before conclusions can be made.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 2-6: Environmental Contamination from Krasnoyarsk-26

The Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC), also formerly known as Krasnoyarsk-26,

Devyatka, Atomgrad, and now renamed as Zheleznogorsk, is situated approximately 60 km from the city

of Krasnoyarsk, along the bank of the large Yenisey River, which flows north into the Kara Sea. Constructed in the 1950s, most of the facility is located 250 m to 300 m underground (48). The combine consists of three RBMK-type graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors for the production of weaponsgrade plutonium; a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium, uranium, and other fission products; and

storage facilities for radioactive wastes. Two of the three production reactors at the combine have been

shut down since 1992, but the third reactor is a dual-use reactor and continues to operate, supplying heat

and electricity to the region. The two shut-down reactors had an open primary circuit that used water from

the Yenisey River to cool the reactor core and released the water directly into the river after use. The current operating reactor has a closed primary circuit and uses water from the Yenisey River in its secondary

cooling circuit (48).

Construction of a new aboveground reprocessing plant (RT-2) began in 1983 but was suspended in

1989 as a result of public opposition and economic problems (39). However, the Russian President has

recently issued a decree calling for the continuation of construction of RT-2, which when completed

would reprocess both domestic and foreign spent nuclear fuel.a Most of the liquid radioactive waste at

the site is from reprocessing activities; the completion and operation of RT-2 would greatly increase the

amount of radioactive wastes generated there.

Similar to the Mayak and Tomsk-7 nuclear complexes but to a lesser extent, local reservoirs and

ponds are used as receptacles for the discharge of liquid radioactive wastes at Krasnoyarsk-26. Four

reservoirs there reportedly hold up to 50,000 of curies (50). Efforts are reportedly under way to fill in one

of these reservoirs with soil and sorbents for cesium (50).

Liquid radioactive waste generated by the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine has primarily

been disposed via underground injection at the Severny site located within the sanitary protection zone of

the combine for the past 25 years. Severny is located on a terrace, 100 m above and 750 m from the east

bank of the Yenisey River, approximately 20 km north of Krasnoyarsk-26. A large part of the injected

waste is transported to Severny through a reportedly leaky pipeline, which has spilled an unknown

amount of liquid radioactive waste of all levels along its path to the injection site (10,48). Overall, Russian

specialists estimate that more than 4.5 million cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste with more than

0.7–1 billion curies of activity at time of disposal has been injected at Severny at three different levels

(84). The current activity of this injected waste is estimated by Russian experts at 450 million curies (17).

(continued)

BOX 2-5: Environmental Contamination from Tomsk-7 (Cont’d.)
pyqjy g

discharge of injected radioactive waste into the basin of the Greater Tel and Yenisey Rivers (1 O).

a On January 25, 1995, President Yeltsin signed the Edict on Structural Reorganization and Conversion of the Nuclear

Industry in the City of Zheleznogorsk in Krasnoyarsk Kray. This document orders continuation of construction of RT-2 after

a mandatory study by ecological experts.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

Almost nothing was known about Chelyabinsk,

Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk before the increased

openness of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.

These sites were among the secret cities established by Josef Stalin to work on military

projects. They were not listed on maps, and few

Soviet citizens even knew of their existence.

Information about the status of radioactive

sources and releases from these sites continues to

be, for the most part, very limited. The most

information has been forthcoming about the

Mayak production facility near the city of

Chelyabinsk. The Russians have openly discussed the challenges posed by this site, and

these are now being studied jointly by the U.S.

Department of Energy and Russia’s Ministry of

Atomic Energy.

Despite still somewhat limited information on

the sites, it is clear that significant contamination

of water bodies and soils has taken place at the

three nuclear production complexes. A large proportion of the releases has been in the form of

underground injection, but the human and environmental effects caused by these disposal practices-how, where, and when the radioactive

materials may resurface or make their way into

drinking water or the rivers-are still unknown.

The three nuclear production sites are located on

rivers that ultimately feed into the Kara Sea in

the Arctic (see figure 2-2). Because of the great

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 45

distances between these three sites and the Arctic, no large quantities of radionuclides appear to

have reached the mouths of the rivers at this time

(41,83). Over the long term, however, the potential contribution of these sites requires further

study because several possible scenarios of

floods or dam failures could trigger more extensive releases downriver into the Arctic seas. Box

2-7 describes the current findings from sampling

in the Ob and Yenisey rivers and the modeling

being carried out to better understand future risks.

RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION FROM 

SOVIET NUCLEAR WASTE DUMPING

Revelations in recent years have brought to light

two sources of nuclear waste contamination from

the former Soviet Union that have the potential

to contribute to contamination in the Arctic and

North Pacific. The extensive radioactive contamination at the inland nuclear production facilities

located along rivers that empty into the Arctic is

discussed above and in boxes 2-4 to 2-7. The

remainder of the chapter focuses upon the

dumped liquid and solid wastes described in the

1993 Yablokov report and what has been learned

about contamination they have contributed to the

Arctic environment.

BOX 2-7: Siberian Rivers as a Source of Nuclear Contamination of the Arctic

The Ob and Yenisey Rivers are large north-flowing Siberian rivers which empty into the Kara Sea. The

Ob is about 3,700 km long, with a catchment area of almost 3 million km2 and an average flow of almost

400 km3 per year (81). The Yenisey River has an even larger average annual flow of 630 km3 (34).

The location of both rivers is illustrated in figure 2-2. Because of the extreme temperatures in the Arctic, the rivers and their estuaries are frozen about 10 months of the year, severely reducing water

flow. When the snow in the southern parts of the catchment areas melts, tremendous volumes of

water rush downstream carrying with them sediment and ice. The ice itself also often contains sediments and particles (57). These rivers are of concern as a source of radioactive and other pollutants

to the Arctic Seas.

Potential radionuclide contributions to the Arctic Seas from these rivers come from two sources: global

nuclear fallout from atmospheric testing, and releases into the environment at the nuclear production

sites. It appears that global fallout onto land from nuclear weapons testing is by far the predominant contributor to radionuclide flow in the Ob and Yenisey rivers to date.

Starting in 1961, measurements of strontium-90 (Sr-90) in the Ob and Yenisey waters as they entered

the Kara Sea were taken by the USSR Hydrometeorological Service. These measurements permit the

estimate of the contribution of Sr-90 for the years 1961-1989 as totaling about 30,000 curies from the Ob

and Yenisey rivers together (66,82). Based on an observed ratio of Cs-137/Sr-90 of 0.1 in the river waters,

the output of cesium-137 (Cs-137) into the Kara Sea is estimated at 3,000 curies.

These estimates are consistent with nuclear fallout as the predominant source. Though most are

retained in the soil, a certain proportion of radionuclides deposited on land as fallout is ultimately washed

into these rivers. Aarkrog has estimated that the runoff of Sr-90 in an area is 10 percent of the deposition

inventory, while the runoff of Cs-137 is 2 percent (1). The catchment area of the Ob is roughly 3 million

km2, the largest among all of the rivers feeding into the Arctic. Based upon estimates of fallout deposition at different latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere (80), it is possible to estimate a contribution to

the Kara of 13,500 curies of Sr-90 and 4,590 curies of Cs-137 from the Ob River from global fallout

(uncorrected for decay). The contribution from the Yenisey River’s smaller catchment area would be

lower.

(continued)
46 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Discharges and accidents at the nuclear production complexes provide another large potential

source of radioactive contaminants to the rivers and ultimately the Arctic. As described in boxes 2-4, 2-5,

and 2-6, tremendous inventories of radioactive materials are known to contaminate the areas surrounding

three of Russia’s largest nuclear production complexes that are located near rivers that ultimately feed

into the Ob and Yenisey rivers. The Mayak Production Facility near Chelyabinsk is at the Techa River

which ultimately feeds the Ob River via the Iset, Tobol and Irtysh rivers; Tomsk-7 is on the Tom River

which also empties into the Ob River; and Krasnoyarsk-26 is situated close to the Yenisey River.

Despite the large releases at the Mayak Production Association and clear evidence of contamination

in the Techa and Iset rivers, it does not appear that measurable levels of radionuclides from Mayak or

from Tomsk have made their way down the entire length of the Ob River from the weapons complexes to

the Arctic. Cesium measurements made in sediment samples from the Ob Estuary in 1993 indicated low

levels consistent with fallout as a source (9). These samples were taken in areas where rapid flow regularly disturbs and mixes the sediments. Sediment cores collected further upstream in more sheltered

pools and channels of the Ob River were also collected in 1994 (41). Since these cores are from sites

where water flow is not as turbulent, they can provide some information about the timing as well as the

presence of radionuclides. Analysis of these samples to date suggests no measurable contribution at

these sites from the production facilities at Mayak or Tomsk. Instead, the data are consistent with a major

signal contributed by nuclear testing fallout, and an additional signal perhaps contributed by venting from

underground tests carried out in Novaya Zemlya (41,42).

An additional source of information about the possible nuclear contamination contributions to the Arctic from the Ob River comes from measurements of the radionuclide iodine-129 (I-129). From a limited

sample set, I-129 measurements in the Kara Sea and the Ob River suggest that the Ob may contribute

slightly to the I-129 inventory in the Kara Sea, though the larger source of I-129 there appears to be from

the Sellafield Reprocessing Facility (61). More information is needed to reconcile this information with the

lack of reprocessing signals observed to date in the lower Ob sediments.

Measurements of radionuclides in the waters and sediments of the Yenisey Estuary and River have

also been taken. Levels of Cs-137 in the Yenisey Estuary area were higher than those seen in the Kara

Sea or the Ob Estuary (9). Plutonium concentrations were higher than those observed in the Ob Estuary,

but not higher than at some sites in the Kara Sea (9). The higher concentrations may come from more

concentrated weapons testing fallout. However, there is also evidence that radionuclides from the direct

flow reactors at Krasnoyarsk have migrated down the Yenisey. Short-lived radionuclides characteristic of

those created in reactor cooling waters were measured in samples collected as far as 890 km from the

discharge point (83). Another Russian investigator also reports measurement of long-lived isotopes in the

river water, sediments, and biota that are thought to be from cooling waters of the reactors at Krasnoyarsk-26 (38).

(continued)

BOX 2-7: Siberian Rivers as a Source of Nuclear Contamination of the Arctic (Cont’d.)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 47

❚ Disclosures About the Dumping at Sea

The Yablokov report on radioactive wastes disposed at sea described the dumping of liquid and

solid wastes into the Arctic and North Pacific by

the Soviet Navy and Murmansk Shipping Company at several different areas in the Barents and

Kara Seas and in the Pacific Ocean (east coast of

Kamchatka) and Sea of Japan. It also detailed

All told, however, from data analyzed to date it does not appear that the majority of radionuclides

released to the environment through discharges and accidents at the nuclear production sites have

made their way down the rivers to the Kara Sea as yet. At Mayak, many of the radionuclides are thought

to remain in the Asanov Marshes, while large amounts are also held in reservoirs of the Techa River.

Since the inventories are extensive, efforts are being made under the auspices of the Department of

Defense’s Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program to model the migration of radionuclides down the

rivers either in a steady release, or in a sudden pulse that might result from a reservoir dam breaking or a

large flood. Using existing data and data currently being gathered and analyzed on the characteristics of

the radioactive sources and the rivers and estuaries, the modelers will try to estimate river contributions of

Sr-90, Cs-137, and Pu-239 to the Kara Sea. The models will address two different scenarios, a steady

continuous release of contaminants and a sudden large release of radionuclides as from dam breakage

or a flood.

Sources of radioactivity to be entered into the steady stream model are discharges from reactor cooling, from reprocessing facilities, and effects of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. U.S. experts have estimated the radionuclides released to lakes and rivers from operation of the Russian plutionium reactors

(50). Sources for modeling a pulse-like release of contaminants include reprocessing plant wastes now in

ponds and reservoirs, wastes injected into deep wells, and some other smaller potential sources. The latter sources require additional modeling to estimate movement of contaminants through groundwater to

reach the river. The movement of some of these sources is fairly well understood, such as the contaminated groundwater plume under Lake Karachai at Mayak, while movement of other contaminants, such

as from the large injection wells at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk, are more difficult to predict. Efforts to carry

out this source modeling involve several different Russian and U.S. organizations, and will probably take

several more years to complete (54).

In the meantime, for purposes of understanding potential shorter-term transnational contamination,

modelers are focusing on the most reasonably likely and significant sources of radioactive contamination

into the river which could lead to a radiation dose many kilometers away in the Kara Sea. These are

migration of radioactive contamination from the Asanov Marshes, seepage of radioactive contaminants

under the dams holding back radioactive reservoirs, and the possibility of reservoir dams giving way.

Emphasis has been heavier on modeling the Ob River, because potential sources are more readily available to the river and represent a more probable risk of catastrophic release (53,55).

Additional models are being used to consider the river transport of the contaminants. Hydrography

and radionuclide concentration data collected at various points along the Ob and Yenisey will be used to

calibrate and validate the models. The estuaries at the mouths of the Ob and Yenisey are also complex

systems which are challenging to model. Information to be incorporated includes behavior of the salt

wedge, mixing, tidal versus river flow, and the behavior of the ice in the estuary.

A large amount of data has been collected to incorporate in this series of models, and work is ongoing

to refine the models. The data demands of the modeling have lead to the accumulation of a tremendous

amount of data, which should be helpful both for addressing the basic science questions and for answering the more immediate question of potential risks from the rivers to the Arctic seas.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 2-7: Siberian Rivers as a Source of Nuclear Contamination of the Arctic (Cont’d.)
1 .

I

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, compiled from data from

Government Commission on- ”Matters Related to Radioactive Waste

Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by Decree No, 613

of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts and

Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to

the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: 1993),

releases from leaks and accidents. Figures 2-3

and 2-4 show the locations of the solid and liquid

waste dumping in the Russian North and Far

East, respectively.

Liquid wastes were reported dumped at five

different areas in the Barents Sea (along with six

other accidental releases in bays and elsewhere)

and nine areas in the Pacific Ocean (east coast of

Kamchatka) and the Sea of Japan (table 2-3). In

the Russian North, this dumping yielded over

189,634 m3 of waste with more than 20,653

curies of radioactivity. The report also notes

leaks from storage and an accident aboard a

nuclear submarine that contributed further contamination. In the Russian Far Eastern seas, the

Japan

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, compiled from data from

Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste

Disposal at Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by Decree No. 613

of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts and

Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to

the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: 1993).

volume of dumped liquid waste reported was

more than 123,497 m3

, with 12,337 curies of

radioactivity. Little information about the origin

and radionuclide composition of this liquid waste

is available, but it is likely to have originated

from cleaning operations at shipyards and from

reactor cooling systems (48).

Solid wastes were in a multitude of forms,

including containers, barges, ships, and submarines containing nuclear reactors both with and

without spent reactor fuel. According to the
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 49

Yablokov report, most of the volume dumped

was low- and intermediate-level waste produced

during the operation of nuclear submarines, surface vessels, and icebreakers (table 2-2). The

report also described dumping of high-level

radioactive wastes in the form of spent fuel and

reactors from nuclear submarines and an icebreaker (table 2-1). A total of 16 reactors

dumped at five different locations in the Kara

Sea are listed; spent nuclear fuel remains in six

of the reactors and an additional container from

the icebreaker Lenin. Attempts were made to

contain the fuel. For example, the damaged fuel

assemblies from the Lenin were reported to be

encased in a concrete and metal container, stored

on land for a period, and then dumped with the

Lenin reactor section. Nonetheless, the reactors

with spent nuclear fuel constitute the greatest

amount of radioactivity and thus the potential for

the most serious future releases. The Yablokov

report included an estimate that at the time of

disposal, the upper limit on the activity of all of

this spent nuclear fuel was 2.3 million curies.

The two largest dump sites are Abrosimov Fjord

where 1.2 million curies was deposited, and the

East Novaya Zemlya Trough, into which 799,200

curies was dumped.

Since the time of the dumping, natural radioactive decay has reduced the inventory of radioactivity. Radioactive decay calculations performed

at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,

along with revised estimates of the nuclear reactor working histories developed through the

work of the IAEA, suggest that less than 130,000

curies of radioactivity remains in the reactors and

spent fuel (43,46). 

The Yablokov report states that until 1983,

monitoring of the waste disposal areas was carried out by the Northern and Pacific fleets of the

Soviet Navy, with surveys to measure levels of

“biologically hazardous radionuclides in seawater, bottom sediments, and commercial and

marker species of water life in radioactive waste

disposal areas” (25). In addition, more extensive

radiological studies were carried out at different

times between 1960 and 1990 by various

research facilities to determine optimal conditions for radioactive waste discharge by the Navy

(25). After 1983, responsibility for monitoring

radiation conditions in radioactive waste discharge and dumping areas was given to

Goskomgidromet, the State Committee for

Hydrometeorology. The Yablokov report lists

expeditions carried out in 1975 in the Sea of

Japan, in 1982 in the Kara Sea, and the Joint

Russian–Norwegian expedition in 1992 in the

Barents and Kara Seas.

Despite these expeditions, however, the report

stresses that none of the surveys carried out after

1967 came closer than 50-100 km to solid radioactive waste disposal sites (25). This is repeated

in a recent report by Gosatomnadzor, the Russian

nuclear regulatory agency, “For 25 years no surveillance has been conducted at the solid waste

dump sites which results in that it is practically

impossible to define the condition of solid waste

protection barriers, the speed and scale of radionuclide release” (24). This remained the case

until joint Russian–Norwegian expeditions visited some of the dump sites in 1993 and 1994.

Furthermore, even though monitoring data were

collected by the Northern fleet and many related

research institutes, these collections did not constitute a coordinated system of monitoring the

radioactive objects dumped at sea, according to

the Yablokov report (25).

Much of the remainder of this chapter reports

research done and questions remaining about

these dump sites and the nature of their contribution to Arctic and North Pacific contamination.
50 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

RESEARCH AND MONITORING OF 

RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IN THE 

ARCTIC, THE NORTH PACIFIC, AND 

ALASKA1

The response to the information provided in the

Yablokov report was international consternation

and the birth or adaptation of a host of projects

and programs to characterize the situation. The

issue is, does the amount and disposition of this

waste pose any large short- or long-term risk to

public health or the environment? Because so

few data were available to the international community at the time, major efforts were made to

gather more. Interest in and research activity on

the topic are reflected in the number of workshops, international conferences, and congressional hearings held over the past few years

(table 2-6).

1 Much of the information presented in this section was excerpted from a paper prepared for OTA by Drs. Burton Hurdle and David

Nagel of the Naval Research Laboratory. Additional information was drawn from a paper prepared for OTA by Dr. Lee Cooper of Oak Ridge

National Laboratory.

In the United States, Department of Defense

(DOD) funds were used to launch the Arctic

Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP),

administered through the Office of Naval

Research (ONR).2 Internationally, the IAEA

began the International Arctic Seas Assessment

Project (IASAP) (described in chapter 5). The

Norwegians, whose large fishing industry is

potentially threatened by concerns over radioactivity in the Arctic seas, were also active in

addressing the problem through a joint Russian–

Norwegian expert group formed in 1992 for this

purpose.

❚ Findings from the Joint Russian–

Norwegian Expert Group

Expeditions carried out by the Joint Russian–

Norwegian Expert Group in the summers of

1992, 1993, and 1994 have made important con2 ANWAP has been funded through DOD at $10 million per year for FY 1993, 1994, and 1995.

TABLE 2-6: Conferences and Congressional Hearings on Arctic and North Pacific Contamination 

from Dumped Nuclear Waste

Location Dates Topic

Washington, DC Aug. 15, 1992 Hearing: Radioactive and Other Environmental 

Threats to the United States and the Arctic 

Resulting from Past Soviet Activities

Arkhangelsk, Russia Oct. 14–18, 1992 Ecological Problems in the Arctic

Oslo, Norway Feb. 1–5, 1993 Consequences of Dumping of Radioactive Waste 

in Arctic Seas

Anchorage, AK May 2–7, 1993 Arctic Contamination

Woods Hole, MA June 7–9, 1993 Radioactivity and Environmental Security in the 

Oceans

Kirkenes, Norway Aug. 23–27, 1993 Environmental Radioactivity in the Arctic and 

Antarctic

Washington, DC Sept. 30, 1993 Hearing: Nuclear Contamination in the Arctic 

Ocean

Biloxi, MS Jan. 12–13, 1995 Japan–Russia–United States Study Group on 

Dumped Nuclear Waste

Woods Hole, MA May 1–4, 1995 Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program 

Workshop

Oslo, Norway Aug. 21–25, 1995 International Conference on Environmental 

Radioactivity in the Arctic

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 51

tributions to the state of knowledge of the contamination levels in the Kara Sea and some of the

dump sites along Novaya Zemlya. Although the

research ship Victor Buinitskiy did not visit the

specific sites of the dumped nuclear wastes in

1992, researchers took water and sediment samples at 13 stations, two in the Barents Sea and the

remainder in the Kara Sea. The radiation measurements from these samples, analyzed in five

countries, were presented at a meeting in

Kirkenes, Norway.

The final report of the 1992 cruise states:

“At present time, the level of contamination

of radionuclides in the southern Barents Sea and

the Kara Sea can be attributed to global fallout,

releases from [the] Sellafield [U.K.] reprocessing plant, contribution from the rivers Ob and

Yenisey, and contribution from the Chernobyl

fallout... The possible radiological impact on

man and the environment as a result of the

observed levels of contamination is extremely

low...at present, the influence of the dumped

radioactive wastes on the general level of radioactive contamination in the Kara Sea is insignificant. However, local effects in the vicinity of

the dumping sites cannot be excluded, as these

areas were not adequately investigated.”3

The 1993 Norwegian–Russian cruise was able

to investigate some of the dump sites. The Victor

Buinitskiy visited dumpsite areas in Tsivolky and

Stepovogo Bays in Novaya Zemlya and the

Novaya Zemlya Trough in the Kara Sea to provide a general assessment of potential radioactive contamination in the water, sediments, and

biota (31). Analyses of the Cs-137, Sr-90, and

Pu-239 and 240 in collected samples indicate

that the level of radioactive contamination in the

investigated areas is low, comparable to that

observed in 1992 in the open Kara Sea. In the

Tsivolky Bay, where the Lenin reactors were

reported to be dumped, Cobalt-60 (Co-60),

which may have originated from the dumped

nuclear waste, was measured in the upper sedi3 Joint Russian–Norwegian Expert Group for Investigation of Radioactive Contamination in the Northern Seas, “A Survey of Artificial

Radionuclides in the Kara Sea. Results from the Russian–Norwegian 1992 Expedition to the Barents and Kara Seas” (Osteras, Norway: Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 1993).

ments, but components of the Lenin were not

located. The expedition located one of the submarines dumped with nuclear fuel in the outer

part of the Stepovogo Bay, and analysis of sediment samples from near its hull may suggest

some leakage of fission products from the submarine reactors. In the inner portion of Stepovogo Bay where the bottom waters are isolated

by a “sill,” elevated Cs-137 values were found.

Cobalt-60 was also present in these samples,

which may be a sign of possible leakage from the

dumped waste. Only a detailed study of Stepovogo Bay will answer this question. Concentrations of Cs-137 in surface sediments of the

Novaya Zemlya Trough, also mentioned in the

Yablokov report as a site for nuclear waste

dumping, were similar to those in the open Kara

Sea in 1992.

The 1994 Norwegian-Russian cruise visited

the Abrosimov Bay and returned to the Stepovogo Bay. The expeditions located three of the

four nuclear submarine reactor compartments

reportedly dumped in the Abrosimov Bay (32).

Preliminary data gathered on the cruise indicated

elevated Cs-137 gamma-ray levels near two of

these reactors, while only Co-60 radiation was

observed near the third. Sediment and water contamination levels were low overall, comparable

to the open Kara Sea, except for elevated Cs-137

in sediment near the dumped objects.

From the limited information available, it

appears that any leakage that may have taken

place so far from dumped wastes has at most led

to very local contamination. More extensive

inspection of the dumped objects (in particular,

all of the reactors with spent fuel) and sampling

of the environment nearby are necessary.

❚ U.S. Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment 

Program (ANWAP)

The research program undertaken by DOD’s

Office of Naval Research to address the concerns
52 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

posed by nuclear materials dumped in Arctic

seas has been a large and broad research effort.

Administered through the ONR, the program has

focused on five topics: 1) the environment

through which dumped nuclear materials might

move; 2) the character and containment of the

materials themselves; 3) their potential motion

and disposition as determined by physical, chemical, and biological factors; 4) possible risks to

people and nature; and 5) future monitoring of

the materials. The Office of Naval Research

organized its program around these topics while

utilizing existing academic, industrial, and government capabilities. The primary objective of

the program is to determine whether or not the

radioactivity dumped in the Arctic Seas by the

former Soviet Union (fSU) presents a threat to

the economy or to the health of U.S. citizens.

Box 2-8 discusses these five topics, the research

questions they engender, and the current knowledge base.

Over the past few years, water, sediment, and

biological samples were collected by five ships

in the eastern Arctic near the dump sites and

major river estuaries, and five ships collected

samples in the western Arctic near Alaska. In

1993 and 1994, research cruises to investigate

radioactive contamination in the Arctic were

conducted by U.S., Canadian, and German icebreakers, the University of Alaska Research vessel Alpha Helix, a U.S. submarine, and five

Russian vessels. A summary of the ships, cruise

regions, stations, and samples obtained in the

Arctic and nearby seas in the summer of 1993 is

given in table 2-7. The locations sampled from

these ships in 1993 and 1994 are illustrated in

figure 2-5. More than 11,000 samples were

obtained from 600 ocean stations in order to

assess background radiation from fallout and

other sources, and to search for elevated radiation levels associated with Soviet and Russian

nuclear waste.

BOX 2-8: Key Research Topics and Knowledge Base of the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment 

Program (ANWAP)

Topic Knowledge Base

1. The environment through which the

dumped radioactive materials might move:

What is the background radioactivity already

in the environment due to naturally occurring

radioisotopes and the effects of testing and

discharge from nuclear reprocessing plants?

Further, what are the physical, chemical, and

biological environmental factors that will

determine the transport and disposition of

unconfined radionuclides in the environment?

A great deal was known and has been

learned in the first two years of ANWAP

regarding radioactivity in the Arctic. The information is either already in the geographic

information system database set up for this

program or will be incorporated as soon as it

is made available. There remain, however,

significant gaps in knowledge of the spatial

and temporal distributions of radioactive

materials in the Arctic.

(continued)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 53

2. The dumped materials themselves (the

so-called source terms): What radionuclides

have been dumped, and in what quantities,

chemical states, and containers? When, if at

all, will these materials be released, and at

what rates?

Three reactor compartments dumped with

their nuclear fuel have been located during

the past two summers by joint NorwegianRussian expeditions. However, a reactor with

fuel, a container carrying spent fuel from the

icebreaker Lenin, nine of the ten reactors

dumped without their fuel, and virtually all of

the thousands of containers dumped with low

levels of radioactivity have not been found.

Location of all the reactors, assessment of

their material condition by optical examination

at least, and sampling of reactor materials and

the surrounding seafloor remain major unsatisfied program requirements. This is particularly evident for the fueled reactor dumped in

the East Novaya Zemlya Trough.

3. The movement and disposition of

dumped materials: How will the nuclear materials move under the influence of physical,

chemical, and biological factors? When and

where will they finally come to rest (e.g., sorption onto particles, precipitation on the seafloor, burial by sediments)?

Major progress has been made in calculating the physical circulation of the radioactive

materials, by assuming that they are free and

mobile in the environment, with attention to riverine inputs as well. However, benchmarking

the ability of the models to predict deep as

well as surface circulation, and the inclusion

of chemical processes such as particle binding of radionuclides and biological processes

such as bioturbation, remain for the future.

Further, the potential role of ice in influencing

or determining the motion and fate of radioactive materials in the Arctic seas is not known in

even the broadest outlines.

4. The risks to and impact on people and

nature due to the movement and disposition

of the dumped materials: What portion of the

ecosystem, if any, will be affected by the

radioactive materials carried in the water column, deposited in sediments, and incorporated in living creatures? Will concentrations

of radionuclides in the food chain, or any other

process, threaten human health or economics?

To date, several calculations have been

made by different organizations to estimate

risks to humans from the dumped nuclear

materials. Although complete in the sense that

they yield a numerical prediction of human

risk, these calculations are quite superficial.

Elaboration of the models used and acquisition of the many major parameters required as

input need to be carried out.

(continued)

BOX 2-8: Key Research Topics and Knowledge Base of the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment 

Program (ANWAP) (Cont’d.)
54 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Measurements on samples from these Arctic

surveys have just begun. Previously available

information, and the limited data obtained so far

from materials collected through this program,

have not indicated migration of radionuclides

from Russian sites to the wider regional environment. Data from localized regions in the Kara

Sea do show radionuclide concentrations that

suggest an influence of inputs from local nuclear

bomb tests, dumping, or discharge from the Ob

and Yenisey Rivers. However, limited measurements to date in the Kara Sea show generally

lower concentrations than those in the Baltic Sea

from Chernobyl and in the Irish Sea where radioactivity has been discharged from the Sellafield

reprocessing facility in the United Kingdom. 

This research is continuing during 1995, and

studies should provide further useful data.

Emphasis in FY 1995 is on carrying out a risk

assessment, examining strategies for monitoring, communication of results to concerned

stakeholders, consideration of all sources of Arctic contamination, increased Russian participation, and increased participation in national and

international forums to prevent duplication (16).

❚ Radioactivity in Water, 

Sediment, and Biota

A major thrust of the Department of Defense

program, the Norwegian-Russian collaboration,

and other international efforts has been to characterize the present level of radioactivity in the

Arctic seas, the Sea of Japan, the Ob and Yenisey

River estuaries, and other regions of interest. The

results from the DOD Arctic Nuclear Waste

Assessment Program for FY 1993–94 are given

in the annual report ONR 322-95-5 (51). Some of

the major findings are as follows:

1. Radionuclide concentrations in Alaskan

waters are low and can be explained mainly

by fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear

weapons. There may also be a weak signal

from the 1957 accident at Chelyabinsk-65.

2. Investigations by the United States and by collaborating programs from Norway, the fSU,

Korea, and Japan suggest that levels of radionuclide activity in the Arctic and Pacific

regions are low.

3. To date, measurements and analyses of radionuclide contamination in the Arctic marine

environment indicate that they come mainly

from:

a. atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons,

5. Potential monitoring of regions of

interest near the sources, along transport

paths, or at locations where people or the

environment may be at risk: What instrumentation should be in place at which locations?

What samples should be taken and measured, and over what time scales, to ensure

that transported radionuclide materials do not

exceed concentrations of concern from any

viewpoint?

Monitoring by sampling when possible,

with associated laboratory measurements, is a

well-developed practice that has been

employed in the first two years of the program.

However, open-sea monitoring of radioactivity

on demand is in a rudimentary stage in terms

of available technologies and strategies. The

relative efficacy and costs of monitoring near

the source regions, which may or may not be

susceptible to potential remediation of any

kind, or near a region of interest such as Alaskan fishing grounds, requires study.

SOURCE: B.G. Hurdle and D.J. Nagel, “Nuclear Contamination of the Arctic Seas and Estuaries; Current Status of Research and

Future Requirements,” paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment by the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington,

DC, April 1995.

BOX 2-8: Key Research Topics and Knowledge Base of the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment 

Program (ANWAP) (Cont’d.)
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 55

b. nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes carried

into the Arctic from reprocessing facilities

in Western Europe,

c. accidents such as Chernobyl and the 1957

explosion at Chelyabinsk-65, and

d. Chernaya Bay weapons tests in southwestern Novaya Zemlya.

Because the signals from sources a and b have

decreased with time, region-wide concentrations of radionuclides in the water column and

in surface sediments appear also to have

decreased from their peak levels.

4. Based on preliminary data analyses, the Yenisey and Ob Rivers appear to have had only a

modest impact on radionuclide levels in the

Kara Sea and the Arctic Ocean region in general. Small but detectable signals from nuclear

facilities on these rivers have been measured

over large areas, and there is a zone of

enhanced Cs-137 concentration near the

mouth of the Yenisey River.

5. Calculations based on Russian data of initial

inventories suggest that the total activity of

the radioactive waste dumped in the Kara Sea

region by the fSU over the last 40 years has

decayed to a level of approximately 0.13 million curies today (43). Most of this radioactivity is from the nuclear reactors that still

contain fuel, and most of this radioactivity still

appears to be contained.

6. Local sites of elevated radionuclide concentration arising from Soviet dumping and weapons testing have been identified in the Kara

Sea region. Studies in Chernaya Bay in southwestern Novaya Zemlya where nuclear weapons were tested are similar to those at

TABLE 2-7: Arctic Research Cruises Sponsored by the Office of Naval Research to Investigate 

Radioactive Contamination, 1993

Cruise Location Stations Sediment Water Biota

Alpha Helixa Bering and Chukchi 

Seas

196 500 4,700 250

G. Fersman Kara Sea (dump 

site)

66 1,000 50

Mendeleevb Kara Sea and Ob 

River

30 300 300 100

Okean Bering and Chukchi 

Seas

64 1,000 300 500

E. Ovsyn Ob and Yenisey 

Rivers, Kara

Sea

77 450 400 500

Polar Star North American 

Arctic

62 200 200 12 trawls

Polarstern Laptev Sea 22 24

USS Pargo Arctic Ocean 15 150

D. Zelensky Barents and Kara 

Seas

7 100

H. Larsen Chukchi Sea 66 100

Variousc Laptev, East 

Siberian, Chukchi, 

Beaufont, and 

Bering Seas

400

aSome samples collected from the Alpha Helix in the Chukchi Sea during 1992 will also be analyzed by this program.

bMany samples obtained by the Shirshov Institute of Oceanography from the Mendeleev will be measured.

cSediment samples collected with U.S. Navy sponsorship in the 1960s and 1970s.

SOURCE: B.G. Hurdle and D.J. Nagel, “Nuclear Contamination of the Arctic Seas and Estuaries; Current Status of Research and Future Requirements,” paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment by the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, April 1995.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment and Office of Naval Research, 1995
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 57

Eniwetok Atoll, a U.S. test site. Joint studies

by Norway, the fSU, and the IAEA have

found elevated concentrations in highly localized regions in Novaya Zemlya bays where

the Soviet Union dumped waste containers

and nuclear reactor compartments, some still

containing fuel. The preliminary results of this

trilateral program suggest little leakage from

the reactor compartments containing fuel.

Zones with elevated concentrations of Cs-137

have been identified in the Novaya Zemlya

Trench.

7. Very preliminary large-scale numerical modeling studies of water transport, run for a simulated period of 10 years, suggest that

radionuclides released to the Kara Sea region

would have their concentrations substantially

reduced by the time they reached Alaskan

coastal waters. More work is needed to substantiate and enhance this model, however,

including incorporation of the role of sediments in sequestering radionuclides.

Recently, Cs-137 activity has been reported

for sediment trapped in the sea ice in the central

Arctic. This has heightened concern over the

potential for the long-range ice transport of radionuclide-bearing sediments. The activity in one

sample taken north of the Chukchi Sea was

reported comparable to the elevated levels

present in the Yenisey River estuary. However,

other sources are possible, and the origin of this

sea ice contamination has not yet been determined. Another report of interest was the identification of a characteristic ratio of radionuclides

in the central Arctic that would most likely come

from Sellafield.

❚ Database Development

Adequate data sets for the distribution of manmade radionuclides in the Arctic Ocean and its

surroundings do not exist because of the lack of

data, particularly in the western Arctic Ocean

near North America, in the central Arctic Ocean,

and north of Siberia. Recent work related to the

current programs has made improvements in the

quantity and quality of these data but much more

needs to be done.

There are significant Russian data sources, but

these still need to be collected, compiled, and

integrated into western databases to facilitate

assessing the concentrations of radionuclides in

the water (marine, lakes, and rivers), sediment,

ice, flora, and fauna and determining how these

concentrations have varied over space and time.

It is also important to gather data collected in the

neighboring seas to determine the degree of radionuclide pollution in the Arctic relative to the

rest of the world.

As part of the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, the Naval Research Laboratory

(NRL) is currently setting up a geographical

information system (GIS) to computerize, among

other items, the extensive body of information

collected from the various scientific expeditions

sponsored by ANWAP since 1993. Completion

of the GIS would enable: 1) creation of a database of existing radionuclide data on the water,

sediment, ice, and biota; 2) development of databases of bathymetry, rivers, sedimentation, and

biota, as well as physical and chemical oceanographic, riverine, and estuarine processes; and 3)

compilation of the information needed to predict

the degree of risk posed by these radionuclides to

the Arctic environment and its inhabitants and

others who utilize Arctic marine resources.

Efforts by NRL to set up its Arctic database

have included compiling preexisting radionuclide data, developing connections with Russian

colleagues, and developing collection efforts for

new data. In addition, some efforts are directed

toward developing a system that would enable

individuals to query databases to gather statistical information. Attempts have been made to

develop a more inexpensive and user-friendly

GIS operating system so that individuals can perform their own analyses.

As of December 1994, databases were constructed at the Naval Research Laboratory for: 1)

the location of stations and ship tracks; 2) the

distribution and concentration of radionuclides in

sediments and the water column; 3) the distribution of nuclear tests, accidents, etc.; 4) the location of dump sites; 5) the distribution of various
58 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

nuclear facilities and sites of interest; and 6) digitized bathymetry, rivers, and marine resources.

The NRL work has been extended by cooperation with international programs. By 1996–97,

NRL plans to have a comprehensive radionuclide

GIS that should serve as an international platform from which information can be extracted to

carry out a risk assessment program. One possible destination of this GIS could be the database

of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)4 in Arendal, Norway. Other major

exchanges of data could be carried out with the

IAEA as well as with major national and international contributors to the GIS. NRL will also

investigate, together with the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency, the efficacy of installing

its data in the United Nations Environmental

Program’s environmental GIS facility in Arendal, Norway.

The GIS system being developed at NRL has

already proved useful in disseminating archived

information to investigators from many countries

and agencies and in sharing data.5 Data exchange

efforts have led to further cooperative projects,

such as the collaboration between the Naval

Research Laboratory and the Okeangeologia

Russian Scientific Research Institute on the

research vessel Professor Logachev in a trip to

the Svayataya Anna Trough and other areas in

the Kara and Barents Sea region during the summer of 1994.

❚ Status of Modeling

Although observations such as those compiled in

the Naval Research Laboratory’s GIS database

can provide useful pictures of past and present

levels of radioactivity at certain locations within

the Arctic seas, it would be difficult to monitor

all or even several regions of the Arctic for long

periods of time. For this purpose, tested and vali4 AMAP is a program carried out by the eight Arctic countries to monitor, assess, and report on the environmental health of the Arctic. It

is described more fully in chapter 5. 5 Data have been exchanged with the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency; Tokai University in Japan; University of Edinburgh;

Norsk Polar Institute; the Netherlands; the IAEA in Vienna; the IAEA Marine Environmental Lab in Monaco; KORDI, the Republic of

Korea Institute of Oceanography; the German Hydrographic Service; the VNII Okeangeologia in St. Petersburg; and the Shirshov Institute of

Oceanology in Moscow.

dated numerical models can provide information

that will both compliment and enhance the existing database. Numerical models can help explain

the dynamic transport pathways for the contaminants once they enter the ice or ocean system. In

addition, numerical models can “forecast” the

dispersion of radioactive materials with either

known or estimated sources. Numerical models

can illustrate processes that are determined to be

the most important for the transport of radioactive materials. Several numerical models are

presently being tested by the ANWAP community and the European scientific community. A

majority of these models are regional, focusing

on one particular oceanographic basin such as

the Kara or the Chukchi Sea. In addition, numerical models of the river systems that may serve as

major present and future sources of radioactive

contamination are also being modeled in

ANWAP.

In 1993, the NRL developed a numerical

model to include a radioactive tracer component.

The model was then tested using sources defined

by the Yablokov report; both low-level solid and

liquid radioactive waste were used, as well as the

high-level solid waste located along the eastern

side of Novaya Zemlya. In all cases it was

assumed that each source was leaking at a continuous rate based on the total amount of radioactive material dumped at that site and the period

of time over which it was dumped. A major conclusion of those studies was that at the end of a

simulated 10-year release, the levels of radioactivity in the waters along the north Alaskan coast

were approximately five orders of magnitude

lower than those found in the Kara Sea. These

results were described in the DOD Preliminary

Report to Congress entitled “Nuclear Pollution in

Arctic Seas” (72). However, research on the circulation of Arctic waters using tracers present in

these waters suggests that the model might over-
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 59

estimate the dilution. These studies suggest that

the surface waters that flow across the pole and

through Fram Strait are diluted by about a factor

of 10 (4,63,64). Such findings illustrate the need

to use experimental data to calibrate models used

to predict or estimate the movement of pollutants. Once the models of the movements of water

have been validated with experimental data, the

modeling can be further developed by accounting for the important roles of chemistry and sediments, which should be important influences in

the movement or sequestration of radionuclides.

With FY 1994 funding, NRL continued the

FY 1993 studies by adapting the model to accept

river outflow and using data from the Yablokov

report to simulate rivers as a source of contaminant release into the Arctic. Levels of radioactivity resulting from these simulations show good

agreement with observations from the Kara Sea.

Other modeling efforts are currently underway

within both ANWAP and IASAP, which will add

to current knowledge of the ultimate fate and

effects of this radioactive contamination.

❚ Monitoring

Long-term monitoring of the environment and

related indicators to help provide early warnings

of potential health or ecological risks from

dumped radionuclides has not yet been undertaken. Monitoring can serve a variety of purposes, and the type of monitoring to be carried

out, if any, must be discussed in conjunction with

the goals to be achieved. For example, monitoring can help to fill critical data gaps about radionuclide transport. The sudden release of

radioactive waste from reservoirs, storage ponds,

underground storage, or marine dump sites into

the Arctic environment poses a potentially significant long-term environmental problem. Since

measurements of the radioactivity in the Kara

Sea and the Ob and Yenisey Rivers are typically

conducted during the two- to three-month icefree summer, the transport and fate of radionuclides during the rest of the year is poorly characterized. Many researchers believe that a

monitoring system is needed to provide a better

understanding of transport processes during the

ice-covered times of the year, as well as annual

cyclical events such as the spring thaw. This

monitoring capability is not presently available.

The difficulty and expense of collecting data on

radioactivity using traditional oceanographic

cruises limit spatial and temporal coverage. In

situ monitoring could improve this situation if

the monitoring device could be deployed by air

or a convenient ship and were of low enough cost

to be considered expendable.

Other types and scales of monitoring are also

under discussion for other purposes. One Russian

official, who participated in the Woods Hole,

Massachusetts, conference on Radioactivity and

Environmental Security in the Oceans: New

Research and Policy Priorities in the Arctic and

North Atlantic, suggested that a global marine

radiation monitoring organization be established

(49). The organization’s mission, as proposed,

would be to forecast radiation impacts and to

support decisionmaking on actions to be taken

regarding radioactive marine objects. The functions of this proposed organization could be conducted in the Russian Arctic, as a case study, to

determine how effectively the organization

might operate. Nosov (49) recommends that the

organization:

■ conduct ongoing radiation monitoring of identified objects to predict their structural integrity;

■ assess the accuracy of prediction models and

update these models accordingly;

■ develop an environmental database of this

information; and

■ provide information to support decisionmaking on protection and associated mitigation

options.

As part of any monitoring strategy, scientists

need to know what instrumentation to place at

which locations, what samples to take and measure, and over what time scales. NRL is investigating various semiconductor and scintillator

detectors in sturdy, waterproof housings. It is

also developing new gamma-ray detectors (27).

Communication channels will have to be estab-
60 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

lished for these continuous, remote, bottom-stationed devices to transmit their finding to

scientists for analysis.

However, as in Nosov’s proposal, monitoring

does not stand on its own but fits within a structured plan of response to a particular need. Since

the needs have not yet been fully characterized,

there is little agreement among scientists on the

proper strategies to use in monitoring these

regions or even the necessity of monitoring. No

determination has been made as to the level of

radioactivity that needs to be monitored. Should

the existing level of contamination be monitored,

or is it sufficient for a monitoring capability to

detect only radioactivity at a level resulting in a

biologically significant dose? Many other questions also have to be addressed more fully, such

as the capabilities of in situ measurement technologies, suitable sensors, and testing of prototype systems. Most important, the purpose and

goals of monitoring require clear definition.

RESEARCH AND MONITORING: DATA 

GAPS AND FUTURE NEEDS

The conclusions from research to date must be

considered as preliminary because of the gaps in

data and analysis that remain. This section identifies some significant gaps in knowledge that

must be addressed to fully understand the potential impacts of nuclear waste dumping.

❚ Source Terms

Much remains unknown about the source terms

for the major nuclear waste dump sites in the

Kara Sea. Important work is being carried out on

land by the IAEA International Arctic Seas

Assessment Project Source Term Working

Group to learn more about the design of the reactors, their working histories, and their containment. The information should be available in

early 1996 and will be critical for understanding

the risks posed. Nonetheless, there remains a

need for more information to be gathered at the

sites themselves, such as that collected in the

1993 and 1994 expeditions of the Joint Russian–

Norwegian Expert Group. Their explorations

extended to four of the areas in which reactors

with spent fuel were reportedly dumped, but only

three out of five of the reactor compartments or

containers with spent fuel have been located thus

far.

Investigations at these sites should include:

■ a comprehensive survey and assessment of

conditions around the dumped objects—especially at those sites that have not been visited

for long periods (decades);

■ location of each of the reactors and assessment

of their condition through photographs, video,

in situ gamma-ray measurements, and systematic water and sediment sampling for radionuclides; and

■ similar assessment of containers and other

objects located during the search for the reactors. Russian Navy and Russian scientific and

technical participation is needed.

For a better understanding of the potential

impacts of nuclear wastes washed into the Arctic

from the large, north-flowing Siberian rivers, the

extent and condition of riverine contamination

from land-based sources, including groundwater

hydrology, must be more fully assessed to determine how much and how far contamination has

traveled downstream, and what the effects of

such contaminants might be to the Arctic.

❚ Container Materials

To understand the potential for future releases,

further study of the dumped containers is necessary. The lifespan and integrity of container

materials has had only brief consideration

whether they are submarines, reactors, or other

waste material containers. For example, some of

the reactors and containers have been enclosed in

furfural, a resinous material designed to prevent

contact of the reactors with seawater for several

hundred years. However, data to support this

estimate are not available. Similar uncertainty

exists about the lifespan of other container materials in seawater.
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 61

❚ Environmental Factors and 

General Sampling

A great deal still needs to be learned about the

physical oceanography and geophysics that control transport mechanisms within the Kara Sea

and northward into the Arctic basin. Surface and

bottom circulation in the Kara Sea needs to be

comprehensively examined, and the question of

ice transport should be investigated.

One need is to develop an understanding of

the dynamics of circulation characteristics,

including advection, mixing, and dispersion, of

Kara Sea waters and their interaction with adjacent seas. Knowledge of the relationships among

currents, wind forcing, tidal forcing, density

structure, and sediment resuspension is required

for this understanding. Other issues to be investigated are the ice motion in the Kara Sea, the

impact of the Siberian Coastal Current on the ice,

and possible sediment transport via sea ice into

the Arctic basin.

Finally, it is important that field operations

collect a complete set of water column and sediment measurements of radionuclide levels in the

Kara Sea.

❚ Benthic Biota

It is important to improve the database on bottom-dwelling organisms to identify and quantify

benthic biological pathways and radionuclide

transport relevant to the radiation exposure of

man as well as marine organisms. To this end, it

is necessary to investigate benthic food webs to

help identify potential exposure pathways, to

examine the sedimentation rates of particles that

scavenge radionuclides from the water column,

and to make an assessment of the radionuclide

exposure of key bottom-dwelling organisms.

❚ Marine Mammals

Our knowledge of the density of marine mammals such as bears, whales, and seals, of their

food chains, and of their use and consumption by

indigenous peoples is limited. Available data on

stable element concentrations should be used to

develop biological concentration factors for

these animals.

❚ Marine Geology

The marine geology database should be developed to identify the pathways for transport of

water, particles, and sediment-borne radionuclides brought about by variations in seafloor

morphology and sediment type, as well as the

degree of redistribution of sediment-bound radionuclides caused by local instabilities of the seabed. Detailed information is required on

sediment properties, bathymetry, acoustics, and

bottom dynamics, among other factors.

❚ Physical Oceanography

The transport and disposition of radionuclides

also depend on the physical characteristics of the

ocean. Relevant data include compilations of

temperature, salinity, density, and oxygen content; seasonal oceanographic and riverine information; and compilations of ice movement and

transport.

❚ Pathway Analysis and 

Modeling Research

There is a lack of information on radionuclide

concentration factors for biota, as well as distribution factors between sediment and water, in

the Russian Arctic region (28). Although current

ANWAP models can predict surface circulation,

there is a need to benchmark the ability of the

models against experimental data; to develop and

evaluate models that predict deep circulation patterns; and to include chemical processes such as

radionuclide binding and biological processes

such as bioturbation in these models (27).

Substantial gaps exist in our understanding of

the potential role of ice in influencing or determining the motion and fate of radioactive materials in the Arctic seas (27). Specifically, data are

needed on the transport process during the icecovered times of the year, as well as during

annual cyclical events such as spring thaw. Data

on ice gouging are also needed to understand its

potential as a means for damaging containers and
62 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

releasing radionuclides. Data are lacking with

which to assess the relative contribution of these

ice mechanisms to the redistribution of contaminants in the Arctic region (56,57).

To understand the transport and fate of radionuclides in Russian rivers and in Arctic and

Pacific seas, it is necessary to use a combination

of numerical models, field observations, and

remotely sensed data. This requires building integrated numerical models composed of different

modules such as ice; physical oceanographic,

biological and chemical processes; and riverine

sources. A numerical modeling system is necessary that can be made available to all interested

parties for studying this and other possible future

waste dumping problems in the Arctic and its

marginal seas.

❚ Monitoring Requirements

Ultimately, monitoring requirements will depend

on the needs identified in other phases of

research, particularly through a systematic risk

assessment. The monitoring required to address

some specific data gaps has been described.

Measurements of the radioactivity in the Kara

Sea, and in the Ob and Yenisey Rivers are typically conducted in the two to three ice-free summer months. The transport and fate of

radionuclides during the rest of the year is poorly

characterized, due mainly to regional inaccessibility. Continuous, remote monitoring of radionuclide concentrations and other environmental

data at dump sites or in rivers is necessary to

complete the research on radionuclide transport

in or to the Arctic seas and as an early warning

for any episodic change. A monitoring system

could provide a better understanding of transport

processes during the ice-covered times of the

year, as well as during annual events such as the

spring thaw. This monitoring capability is presently not available for the Arctic environment.

Monitoring systems do not exist that could be

deployed for a long duration in the Arctic. More

efforts are needed to organize and bring together

groups of experts in the fields of marine radiochemistry, radiation sensor technology, communications, risk assessment, ocean systems,

oceanography, and marine geology to begin to

address some of the important issues related to

monitoring.

❚ Data Availability

An understanding of the effects and potential

implications of radioactive waste dumping in the

Arctic depends entirely on the availability of reliable data indicating the extent of current contamination and the likely future disposition of the

contaminating radionuclides. A variety of factors

combined to make such data fairly scarce, however, at least as the problem first attracted attention and concern (1991–93). First, the Arctic by

its nature is an area in which research that might

be considered routine in other parts of the world

is extremely difficult. Ice, extreme cold, and

rough seas limit the times of year that research

vessels can safely or productively go out. Relatively few investigators specialize in the distinctive systems of this part of the earth, and the

difficulty means that the research is more expensive.

Second, the areas that are the immediate focus

of concern (at least in the Russian North) are

within the territorial waters of Russia, formerly

the Soviet Union, which for more than 40 years

during the Cold War did not welcome international investigators into its seas. Indeed, because

the dumping was carried out by the military, it

was secret even within the U.S.S.R. until declassified by the Yablokov commission in 1992.

However, efforts are continuing to make information more available and to improve access.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and

publication of the Yablokov report, however,

information from the Russians about the environmental status of the Arctic and North Pacific

Seas has been increasingly available. Russian

scientists and technical experts have been active

participants in conferences to facilitate data

exchange, presenting relevant information to the

international community.

A tremendous amount of information has been

collected from research under the auspices of
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 63

ANWAP, but it has not become rapidly available. Analyses are time-consuming, and many

data will first appear through publication in the

scientific literature, which is a slow process. Otherwise, abstracts are available from presentations

at workshops and meetings, and project descriptions along with a general summary of findings

are provided in the FY 1993–94 report of the

program (51).

❚ Reliability/Comparability

Since a multiplicity of institutions representing

several different nationalities have participated

in data collection to contribute to understanding

the extent of radionuclide contamination in the

Barents and Kara Seas, questions of comparability of data collection methods and analysis are

natural.

In the analysis for the 1992 joint Russian–

Norwegian cruise, the issue of data comparability was addressed scientifically through intercomparison and intercalibration exercises carried

out with the help of the IAEA laboratory in

Monaco. These showed the analytical results of

the two countries to be in reasonable agreement,

with measurements of radionuclides in sediments

in better agreement than those in water (31).

Similar comparisons were carried out for the

1993 cruise, and again fairly good agreement

was found for measurement of Sr-90 and Cs-137.

Data collected through the Arctic Nuclear

Waste Assessment Program is consolidated and

provided to Congress through annual reports

without peer review. Ultimately many of the

findings will be reported in the scientific literature after having been subjected to peer review.

The comparability of data may be of most

concern for historical data. For example, as data

from the past are combined in a GIS database, is

there any means of ascertaining the methods

used for analysis or otherwise gauging their reliability? In some cases the data were published in

the form of contour lines, without the raw numbers to indicate whether they represent the average of many individual samples or simple single

data points connected together. In such instances

it will be impossible to judge data quality. All

information collected in the future should be subjected to quality assurance standards.

REMEDIATION OPTIONS

❚ Background

To reduce or eliminate the risk posed by radioactive material dumped in the Arctic region, decisionmakers must consider what type of

remediation, if any, should be adopted to protect

public health and safety and the environment. No

attempt is made in this section to recommend an

option for remediating the dump sites. Instead,

the following material describes the information

which decisionmakers will need and outlines a

framework which could be used in the remediation decision process. Information from the two

major efforts currently underway (i.e., IASAP

and ANWAP) to gather information about transport models, pathway analyses, and possible

exposures and doses that could be received from

these dumped materials will be needed to reach

these decisions. This analysis also draws on the

work by the Group of Experts on the Scientific

Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP).

The only official forum in which remediation

options are being considered is through the

IAEA’s International Arctic Seas Assessment

Project. This group of experts is asked to make

recommendations regarding what response(s), if

any, should be taken to the nuclear wastes

dumped in the Arctic (67). The scope of their

effort does not include consideration of the

wastes dumped in the Russian Far East.

In terms of remediation options, IASAP’s

Remedial Measures Working Group is the most

relevant. The first meeting of experts participating in this group was held in Vienna on January

23–27, 1995. Although the group has not yet

issued a report from its initial meeting, background materials in support of the meeting

(referred to as “Report of Working Party 3”)

were drawn on to develop the decisionmaking

framework presented here (29). The Remedial

Measures Working Group plans to wait for the

results of IASAP’s Source Term and Modeling
64 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Working Group before making any recommendations on specific remedial actions that should

be taken (50). IASAP expects to complete its

work in 1996 (40).

In the United States, the Office of Naval

Research is also involved via ANWAP, in

assessing the risk posed by the radioactivity

dumped in the Arctic region. ONR’s goal is to

“determine with high confidence whether the

dumped and discharged radioactive material presents a threat to the Alaskan economy or the

health of U.S. citizens” (72). ONR’s research and

monitoring in this region are intended to support

the risk assessment and the decisionmaking process to determine what remediation measures, if

any, should be employed.

❚ Information Needed to Assess 

Mitigation Options

The specific information required to begin to

assess mitigation or remediation options can be

divided into two principal areas:

1. the condition of dump sites (physical, chemical, and biological factors), and

2. the status of dumped material (burial status,

structural integrity of containers, waste form,

and concentration of radionuclides, etc.).

Condition of Dump Sites

Prior to selecting a particular remedial option,

experts must obtain adequate information on the

physical and chemical characteristics of the environment surrounding the dump site. Important

physical conditions are the depth of the site; the

bathymetry of the surrounding areas to identify

prominent seafloor features; and the physical stability of the site. For example, researchers want

to know whether there are strong turbidity currents in the region that could destabilize the seabed sediment. Ocean currents around the sunken

Komsomolets submarine, for example, have been

measured up to 1.5 m/s (25). Knowledge of sedimentation rates in the region is also important.

The weather is a crucial factor. There are only

two months of reasonably good working conditions in the Kara Sea (August–September). Tides

may also be important—the tides in the Novaya

Zemlya fjords reach 180 cm (6).

Chemical conditions to be measured include

distribution coefficients (Kd) which describe the

degree to which radionuclides will be retained or

bound by sediment particles. Biological factors

include determining whether the site serves as an

artificial habitat and spawning location for

organisms, identifying benthic organisms that are

likely to be exposed to radionuclides, and measuring sedimentation rates of biogenic particles

that scavenge radionuclides from the water column.

Status of Dumped Material

The burial status of the dumped material is

important in assessing possible remediation

actions. Is the material uncovered, partially covered, or totally buried? A good understanding of

the structural integrity of the objects containing

the material (e.g., drums, boxes, submarine hulls)

is critical.

It is generally believed that the sunken barrels

or containers dumped in the Arctic seas are probably made of mild steel. Knowing the corrosion

rates and identifying any breach points in these

barrels or containers are critical in estimating

release rates of radionuclides. In addition, it is

important to be aware of the structural integrity

of submarine hulls (particularly the pressure vessels of fueled submarines). There is some indication, for example, that small amounts of

radioactivity may be leaking from the NS 601

submarine sunk in the Stepovogo Bay of Novaya

Zemlya (32). There is also concern about the

spent fuel from the damaged Lenin reactor; this

was placed in a concrete-steel box, on top of a

larger box containing three Lenin reactor components without fuel. Both boxes were placed

inside another box which was sunk in the Tsivolka Fjord. The box containing the spent fuel

might not have been welded to the box on which

it was placed and could have shifted in the process of being sunk. This box containing spent

fuel constitutes the largest single radioactive

source, by a factor of three, that has been sunk in

the Kara Sea (6).
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 65

Other important factors include knowing the

waste form of the dumped material and determining its integrity and estimated time of failure.

Furfural is a compound that was used by the

Soviets to enclose reactors and containers, and as

previously mentioned, its effective lifetime is not

known with confidence. It is important to estimate the lifetime of particular radioactive wastes

or materials more accurately in order to estimate

the release rates of encapsulated materials and to

identify possible remediation needs and options.

Researchers also need to know the types of

radionuclides contained in the dump sites and

their concentration in the environment. This

information is collected on expeditions such as

those undertaken by the Joint Russian–Norwegian Expert Group in 1993 and 1994. Samples of

sediment, water, and biota were collected and

analyzed for radionuclides such as Cs-137, Pu239 and 240, Co-60, and europium-152 and 154

(Eu-152, 154) for indications of whether and

what amounts of radionuclides have been

released from reactors or containers. In 1993,

samples taken close to the hull of a dumped submarine indicated higher concentrations of Cs137 than in the surrounding area, and the element

europium was identified. These results suggested

that radioactivity was leaking from the submarine reactor (32). Preliminary results from the

1994 cruise to two bays in which nuclear wastes

were dumped suggested some local Cs-137 and

Co-60 contamination from dumped containers of

nuclear waste, with less contamination currently

present near dumped reactors containing spent

nuclear fuel. Elevated levels observed in 1993

near the submarine reactor with spent fuel in Stepovogo Bay were not supported by repeated

onsite measurements during this expedition (19).

❚ An Integrated Framework for 

Evaluating Mitigation Options

The Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects

of Marine Pollution issued a report on the possibility of a common framework for managing

radioactive and non-radioactive substances to

protect the marine environment. This report was

written in response to questions posed by the

Inter-Governmental Panel of Experts on Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (IGPRAD). In its

report, GESAMP finds that “a frequent problem

in environmental monitoring and with assessments of the quality of the environment is that

the information gathered is hard to interpret in a

management (i.e., nonscientific) context. Thus, it

is difficult to decide whether a particular set of

environmental conditions is acceptable unless

the aspirations of society are explicitly defined”

(30). GESAMP recommends that goals be established for protecting the environment and that

tolerances or regulatory standards be established

to support these goals. With this framework in

hand, environmental impact assessments can be

used to provide a basis for designing measures to

reduce or prevent damage. The framework can

then help to identify where intervention might be

used to mitigate adverse effects. The regulatory

process, in turn, can be designed by using control

measures and performance monitoring to identify the need for any revision of decisions made

earlier in the framework (30).

Figure 2-6 depicts the overarching management framework developed by GESAMP for

protecting the environment. The framework contains a hierarchical sequence of planning, assessment, and regulatory activities that are critical for

environmental protection. Although the framework was designed as a general tool for use in

the marine environment, in its modified form it is

a relevant tool for decisionmaking concerning

the management of radioactive material dumped

in the Russian Arctic. Decisionmakers may wish

to work their way through the various steps in

figure 2-6 to help them decide what remedial

action(s), if any, are necessary. Steps 1 through 5

are the basis for making the decision in step 6.

One issue that adds to the difficulty of selecting an appropriate mitigation option is the lack of

any internationally agreed-upon mechanisms or

values for determining when it is necessary to

intervene and remediate a site (29). In other

words, steps 2 and 3 of figure 2-6 have not been

completed. Nonetheless, one objective of the

IASAP project as defined in the Report of Work-
(4)

Describe existing environment:

physical, biological, social, economic,

and other characteristics

options for control of threats,

(7)

Implement most effective control

(9)

Review controls in the light of

performance and observed trends

National priorities

Regional goals

Policies

Economic constraints

Cultural mores

Coastal models

Exposures

Seasonality

Various life stages

Broad survey

Use patterns

Natural phenomina

Seasonal variation

Discharges

Harvesting

Developments

Natural resources

Economics

Efficiency

Complications

Expertise

Legal

Administrative

Technical, social

Regular sampling

Indicators

Social survey

Improvements

Increased efficiency

New knowledge

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), Can

There Be a Common Framework for Managing Radioactive and Nonradioactive Substances 10 Protect the Marine Environment? GESAMP Reports

and Studies No. 45, Addendum 1 (London, England: 1992).
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Report of Working Party 3,” materials

given to members of the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project’s Working Group on Remediation Measures in preparation for the initial

meeting, Vienna, Austria, January 23-27, 1995

ing Party 3 is to examine possible remedial

actions related “to the dumped wastes and to

advise on whether they are necessary and justified” (29).

Steps 4 and 5 are accomplished by collecting

necessary information on the condition of the

dump sites and status of the dumped material.

This information is used in step 6 as decisionmakers select an appropriate mitigation option.

Figure 2-7, which is adapted from a figure developed by the IAEA (29) for its Remedial Measures Working Group, illustrates a framework for

evaluating options that would likely be available

to decisionmakers.

Mitigation Options

It is very possible that decisionmakers would

choose different options, depending on the conditions present at a particular dump site. For

example, one may choose an option (e.g., no

intervention) for sites containing low levels of

contamination and another option (e. g., a technical measure to contain waste in situ) for those

containing higher-activity waste in structurally

unsound containers. No attempt is made here to

identify or recommend the most appropriate

option for particular conditions at a dump site.

Instead, this section describes both the series of

steps or framework that a decisionmaker would

use in selecting mitigation options and the fac-
68 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

tors that must be considered in assessing each

option.

The first choice that a decisionmaker must

face is whether or not to intervene. In making

this initial decision, it is critical to understand the

consequences of taking no action—leaving the

dumped material on the sea bottom. IAEA refers

to this as the “base case” against which intervention measures can be judged, and efforts to complete this assessment are being actively pursued

by the other IASAP working groups (29). Even

the no-action option has two possible outcomes—an expected situation, in which forecasted consequences occur and no accidental

situations arise, and exceptional situations in

which a low-probability event occurs. Such lowprobability events can be accidents (e.g., icebergs colliding with dumped material or fishing

vessels inadvertently dropping objects on containers and rupturing them) or non-accidental

rare events (e.g., people deliberately disturbing

dumped material or seismic events rupturing

containers). Calculating this base case is a critical first step in defining outcomes against which

all other options can be compared.

In analyzing intervention options, there are

two broad choices—a passive approach and an

active approach. Under the passive approach,

options are available that do not cure the root

cause (i.e., take some action at the dump site) but

that address some exposure pathway emanating

from the root cause. Examples of such actions

include restricting the local population from

using or consuming resources from the region in

which the material was dumped. Another action

may involve relocating the local population away

from a region of radiological concern.

Under the active approach, several remediation options are available, all of which deal with

managing the dumped material in some way.

These can be divided into three generic options:

1) in situ technical modification of the material

(e.g., encapsulating the material, capping over

the material, excavating underneath the material

and burying it); 2) relocation of the material from

all sea sites to a common location; and 3)

retrieval of the material and its transportation to

land for storage, treatment, and/or disposal.

It should be noted that any of these options

would require very specialized equipment to

maneuver or deploy heavy loads and otherwise

manipulate materials underwater in potentially

rough weather. Such equipment exists or could

be developed by modifying existing vessels (20),

but the procedures would be costly.

In situ technical modification of the material

1. Encapsulate the material: Dumped radioactive material can be encapsulated by several

methods. It is possible to coat the material or

cover it with some type of cement. Various

kinds of cement are available. Cement density, setting time, and strength can be altered

by adjusting its composition. The dumped

material can also be surrounded by a structure

of steel that can be filled with cement or some

other material. The Kurchatov Institute has

studied the durability of another encapsulation

material, furfural, in seawater. Furfural is a

compound derived from oats that polymerizes

to form a solid. It was used by Russians to fill

some of their sunken reactor compartments

and act as a barrier to radionuclide release.

Some Russians have attributed a 500-year

lifetime to furfural (25), but this requires confirmation (46).

In the case of building a structure around

the dumped material (which could include a

submarine) prior to encapsulating it, a cofferdam could be built, constructed of blocks

bolted or welded together above the center

well. These blocks may be made from prefabricated pieces of steel to ease storage and handling issues aboard the workship. The internal

volume of the blocks could be either open to

the sea or filled with heavy drilling mud if

greater weight were required. Once the cofferdam is in place, the seawater from within

could be displaced by mud or cement pumped

from the drill string. Cement may be preferable because it would set in place and be more

permanent than mud (20).
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 69

2. Cap the material: The dumped material can

be covered with sedimentary material or

capped. This is a common practice used in

managing contaminated areas of dumped

dredge spoils. It is important to monitor and

maintain the integrity of the cap.

3. Excavate underneath the material and bury it:

The seabed underneath the dumped material

can be excavated, allowing the material to fall

into the depression created. The material can

then be covered with sediment, leaving no

hummocky features on the seabed. This is an

option under consideration by the Sanctuary

Manager of the Gulf of the Farallons off the

California coast for remediating radioactive

waste barrels dumped to depths of 1,000 fathoms (79). This option is of particular interest

to the Farallon Islands because of the great

depths of the dump site; the barrels’ lack of

structural integrity, which makes recovery difficult; and the artificial reef that the barrels

have produced, which attracts fish and other

organisms to the site as a habitat. If the material is buried underneath the seabed, this latter

problem is addressed.

Relocation of the material from all sea sites 

to a common location

Two types of sites are being considered in the

relocation option (46). First, the material could

be moved inside a small fjord that has a shallow

inlet to the open sea. The inlet could be dammed,

cutting off circulation to the open sea. As with

any of the options, there are significant risks and

costs associated with this option that would have

to be weighed against possible benefits. Risks,

not only to human health but also to the environment, are associated with cutting off a water

body from adjacent open waters. The factors of

greatest relevance that must be considered are

listed in figure 2-8 and table 2-8.

A second possible location may be the region

of underwater caves along the Novaya Zemlya

coast. The material from all existing dump sites

could be collected and placed in the caves. The

caves could be sealed off to prevent any water

flow. The same calculation of risks and costs versus benefits would have to be conducted.

Retrieval of the material and transportation to 

land for storage, treatment, and/or disposal

The material could be recovered and transported

to a shore-based facility for storage, treatment,

and temporary or ultimate disposal. The first step

in treatment could include sorting the material to

segregate it into different categories or sizes

appropriate for containment or disposal.

The IAEA Remedial Measures Working

Group meeting in late January 1995 reviewed

several underwater retrieval technologies,

including videos of actual operations in retrieving hazardous materials. Several types of platforms are being used to service or retrieve

underwater objects. Of particular concern to

most experts is anticipating how these technologies may perform or operate under sea ice conditions (6). Until the actual conditions of the

dumped wastes and their environments are better

understood, however, the specific retrieval

needs—if any—will not be clear.

Factors to Consider in Choosing the Most 

Appropriate Mitigation Option

Before any intervention measure is initiated, it is

important to know whether the measure is justified (i.e., will do more good than harm) and

whether the approach selected maximizes protection of human health and the environment. Several factors need to be considered at each

juncture of the decision framework (figure 2-7)

for evaluating mitigation options. Figure 2-8 lists

factors recommended by the IAEA for consideration and to the right of each factor, the various

elements associated with it. More detailed explanations of these elements can be found in table 2-

8 which describes the specifics that must be considered and why they are important.

All of the elements and their associated comments must be considered and calculated to

determine the impact that a particular factor can

have in influencing the choice among all applicable mitigation options. Once these factors have
Biota6

Workers3

Economic losses

Fisheries (loss of profession)7

Indigenous cultures 7

(change of living habits)

International conventions

National laws

Monetary cost 8

Children

Adults

Workers

Public

---- c

Workers

Normal

Accidental

Normal

Accidental

Children

Adults

Children

Adults

NOTE: Superscript numbers correspond to the elements listed in Table 2-6.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Report of Working Party 3,- materials

given to members of the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project’s Working Group on Remediation Measures in preparation for the initial

meeting, Vienna, Austria, January 23-27, 1995
Chapter 2 Contamination from Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic and North Pacific | 71

been calculated or assessed, decisionmakers can

work their way through the decision framework

described in figure 2-7 to decide which option or

set of options is appropriate for addressing the

contamination at a particular dump site. Decisions on these sites not only must be considered

in terms of the costs and benefits of different

interventions at a particular site, but must be integrated into a larger plan for the prevention or

mitigation of nuclear waste problems in the

wider region. In other words, prevention of

future dumping or of releases of nuclear wastes

must also be considered an option competing

with remediation for limited resources.

As mentioned, there are areas in which data

are either lacking or uncertain. Consequently, it

is difficult to calculate factors and their elements

precisely, a difficulty that affects risk assessment

and inhibits accurate decisionmaking. This problem is the primary driver for devising and maintaining an accurate system to monitor the dump

sites.

CONCLUSIONS

Progress has been made in assessing the extent of

current contamination in the Arctic and North

Pacific, and available information suggests that

the anthropogenic radionuclide contamination

measurable in the Arctic comes primarily from

nuclear weapons testing, from European nuclear

waste reprocessing discharges, and from the

Chernobyl accident. Nuclear wastes dumped by

the former Soviet Union, listed in the Yablokov

report, seem to have led to only very local contamination near the dump sites so far, but a thorough inspection has not yet been done at each

site.

TABLE 2-8: Elements to Consider in Assessing Intervention Measures

Element Comment

1. The avoidable individual and collective doses from 

exposure to radiation and risks of potential exposure 

situations for members of the public

Dose reductions and risk reductions from potential doses 

that would be achieved through intervention are estimated 

here. The assessments must consider critical group doses 

and population doses.

2. Individual and collective physical (non-radiological) 

risks to the public caused by the intervention measure

3. Individual and collective risks to workers in carrying 

out the intervention measure

These risks can be both radiological and nonradiological, 

and can involve both normal risks and those due to 

accidents.

4. Reassurance of the public and the workers provided 

by implementation of the intervention measutre

Removal of stress caused by situations of real or perceived 

hazard.

5. Anxiety caused by implementation of the intervention 

measure

Note that the intervention measure may transfer anxiety 

from one population group to another (e.g., if the waste is 

moved from the sea to land).

6. Impact of intervention measures on the environment, 

live, and other natural resources

7. Individual and social disruption caused by 

implementation of the intervention measure

Note that individual and social disruption may also occur if 

no intervention takes place. This could happen if living 

habits of the population are changed or fishing grounds 

must be moved.

8. Monetary cost of the intervention measure

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from International Atomic Energy Agency, “Report of Working Party 3,” materials given to

members of the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project’s Working Group on Remediation Measures in preparation for its initial meeting,

Vienna, Austria, January 23–27, 1995.
72 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Questions about potential future contamination remain, and further information is required

to address them. Data about source terms, containment, and transport factors are needed for

ongoing modeling efforts and for a thorough risk

assessment. Inspections of the dump sites are

necessary complements to expert assessments of

the size of the source terms. A system of monitoring can provide some of the needed information as well as early warning of releases.

Decisions about remediation will require consideration of many different factors in addition to

the potential impacts from the dumped wastes if

no remediation action is taken (ongoing risk

assessment efforts through ONR and IASAP).

Note that there are currently no internationally

agreed upon values for what constitutes too

much radiation at an ocean dump site. Information about the conditions around the sites and the

current disposition of the wastes will be critical

in considering the feasibility and cost of remediation or mitigation options. The management

framework developed by the IAEA (figure 2-7)

can be used to organize these and other factors

(social, political) that must be weighed in decisionmaking. Such factors must ultimately

include other potential sources of nuclear waste

contamination of the environment, such as landbased sources of high-level wastes awaiting disposal or disposition elsewhere (see chapter 4).

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| 79

3

Environmental

and Health Effects

of Nuclear Waste

Dumping

in the Arctic

t the heart of the tremendous interest in

the nuclear waste dumping that was carried out by the former Soviet Union in

the Arctic and North Pacific are concerns over the potential human health effects or

ecological impacts. People have wondered how

seriously the dumped wastes might contaminate

the environment, and whether they pose current

or future hazards to human health or ecosystems.

Understanding both current and future risks to

human health requires information about the

nature and amount of radionuclides released into

the environment, and information about their

transport through the environment and through

food chains to reach human beings. Understanding risks to ecosystems requires additional information about the effects of radiation on the

variety of different organisms that make up the

ecosystems.

Important questions remain at each step

described above. Since the release of the

Yablokov report describing dumping in the Arctic, more has been learned about some of the

wastes, but their condition and likely radionuclide release rates remain largely unknown. As

described in chapter 2, current levels of radionuclides in the seawater and sediment in Arctic seas

do not suggest that significant releases have

occurred. Even though current risks do not

appear to have increased as a result of the dumping, release rates and pathways to people remain

to be evaluated to understand the magnitude of

future risks.

Models used to approximate the behavior of

agents in the environment require a tremendous

amount of site-specific information. Much of the

specific information required is not yet known

for the Arctic environment or for particular dump

sites, although it is being gathered. Several different efforts are underway to model the environmental transport of radionuclides dumped in the

Arctic as well as those released at sites in Russia

along rivers that drain into the Arctic.

The most likely route of human exposure to

radionuclides in the seas is through the food

chain. Thus, in addition to information about

radionuclide movement through the physical

environment, data specific to the Arctic regions

must be compiled about biological pathways to

human beings. The marine food web is complex,

and most available data were collected in temperate, rather than Arctic, settings. Therefore,

information is required about the way in which

radionuclides are transferred—and sometimes

concentrated—through the food chain under the

A
80 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

special local and regional conditions existing

there.

People of the world are not equally at risk

from radionuclides dumped in Arctic seas or in

the Russian Far East. Current and future investigations have to focus on gathering relevant information about the dietary habits and other

characteristics of the populations who are most

likely to be exposed, such as Native northern

populations and others who rely on Arctic

marine resources. This information will be critical for a thorough risk assessment to estimate the

most likely effects on human health.

If the released radionuclides come in contact

with people in amounts sufficient to cause health

effects, these effects are most likely to be cancers. Radiation is a known cause of cancer and

other health effects at high doses, but at the low

doses that might occur from environmental contamination, the effects are difficult to study and

therefore less certain. For the protection of public

health, international experts have developed recommended dose limits for the general public

from human practices. These can be used to consider potential radiation exposures and the

degree of hazard they might pose.

Radiation effects on Arctic ecosystems are

still not well known. Sensitivity to radiation varies among species, but in general, plant and animal populations do not appear to be more

sensitive than humans to the effects of radionuclides in the environment (26,28). Relevant data

from Arctic environments are extremely limited.

No comprehensive risk assessment of the

impacts likely from the radioactive waste dumping has yet taken place. Ideally, the process of

carrying out a thorough risk assessment would

entail evaluating the available information to

address a specific question about risk. What is

the likelihood of a certain specific population

experiencing a health effect such as cancer? A

systematic attempt to address such questions

would help make clear the data gaps that remain.

Until such a careful analysis is carried out, it will

remain difficult to integrate the increasingly

available information to arrive at a clear answer

about future risks.

Several rough approximations of risk from the

dumped radioactive wastes have been made;

these suggest that even worst-case scenarios for

sudden release of the wastes do not pose a severe

global hazard. However, they are made in the

absence of specific information that could elucidate which populations are most at risk and what

the risks might be. A more thorough assessment

is required to answer these questions.

As more information is gathered and the risk

assessment is carried out, it is critical that the

public be involved in the process. Genuine

efforts must be made to ensure that the potentially affected communities participate in decision making, provide input, and have access to

the information collected.

After a brief review of the health effects of

radiation, this chapter examines current understanding of the health and ecological effects of

the radioactive contamination that has occurred

from the dumping of nuclear waste in the Arctic

and North Pacific (or that might result from

future contamination events). Some of the major

gaps in information and understanding are also

identified.

HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS FROM 

RADIATION

❚ Radiation and Radioactivity

Radiation is the transport of energy through

space. The energy can be in the form of particles

or electromagnetic waves. When radiation transfers enough energy to displace electrons from

atoms and break the bonds that hold molecules

together, it is called ionizing radiation. Ionizing

radiation may be released when unstable atoms

called radionuclides decay to more stable forms

or may be produced in man-made devices such

as x-ray tubes. Because biological systems are

highly structured and specific at the molecular

level, the changes caused by ionizing radiation

are usually damaging to the function of the cell,

tissue, or organ involved.

Ionizing radiation is frequently categorized

into particles and electromagnetic waves. Partic-
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 81

ulate radiation includes alpha particles, beta particles, neutrons, and protons and ionizes matter

by direct atomic collisions. Both alpha and beta

particles have mass and can travel only short distances in air or human tissue because they rapidly transfer their energy through ionizing

collisions. Both x-rays and gamma rays are electromagnetic waves or photons; they are referred

to as penetrating radiation because they travel

long distances and can penetrate dense material.

Penetrating radiation ionizes matter as it passes

through tissue and interacts with atoms, imparting energy.

Radioactivity is the property of certain unstable atoms (radionuclides) to disintegrate spontaneously, releasing radiation and forming a

different “daughter” nuclide. Radionuclides

share the chemical characteristics of their stable

forms in the periodic table, except that they give

off energy (radiation) as they decay to more stable states. For example, carbon-14 is an atom

that is produced both in the atmosphere by the

interaction of cosmic rays with matter and in

nuclear reactors. It behaves like carbon-12 in

almost every way except that it is unstable. When

it decays, it emits ionizing radiation, resulting in

stable nitrogen-14. Daughter nuclides can also be

unstable, proceeding to undergo radioactive

decay themselves. Strontium-90, a man-made

radionuclide, decays to yttrium-90 with the emission of radiation. Yttrium-90 in turn decays to

zirconium-90 as more radiation is released (6).

❚ Radiation Health Effects

The release of radioactive contamination into the

environment is of concern because of the potential harm to people and ecosystems from radionuclides. Radionuclides are carcinogens and, at

high doses, can also cause rapid sickness and

death.

The health effects of exposure to radiation

depend on many factors, including the type of

radiation, the amount of energy it delivers, the

length of time over which exposure occurs, the

organs or tissues the radiation interacts with, and

characteristics of the exposed person (host factors such as age). Most credible scenarios for

radiation doses to people from environmental

contamination are based on internal exposure

rather than external—that is, radionuclides that

are inhaled or ingested rather than those that are

outside a person. Radionuclides in the body are

referred to as internal emitters, because they continue to impart energy to the surrounding tissue

from within and, thus, can continue to harm or

alter cells for extended periods.

❚ Mechanism of Action

The hazards posed by radiation depend on its

interaction with living tissue. At the molecular

level, the electrons set in motion by ionizing

radiation can directly impact cellular macromolecules such as DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).

Radiation can also act indirectly by ionizing

water molecules to create reactive molecules

(free radicals) that can in turn attack DNA or

other cellular components as oxidizing agents.

Both direct and indirect mechanisms cause damage to the cell, particularly as a result of damage

to DNA.

The mechanism of damage to DNA and other

important cellular macromolecules is not unique

to radiation. Normal cellular processes, as well

as many other agents, cause similar oxidative

damage. As a result, natural processes exist that

can rapidly repair DNA damage. Serious effects

can result, however, when the damage is too

great for such repair processes or when a lesion

is not repaired.

When ionizing radiation passes through an

organism, several different results are possible. If

changes or damages wrought by the ionization

are not fully repaired, the cell can be killed or

prevented from reproducing. Alternatively, the

cell can be modified while still being able to

reproduce. These situations describe two categories of effects from radiation—“deterministic”

and “stochastic.”

❚ Deterministic Effects

Deterministic end points are almost all due to

high doses that overwhelm cellular repair
82 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

processes and cause cell death. Damage that kills

one or a few cells may not even be noticeable,

but beyond a certain threshold, the loss of cells

will be reflected in loss of tissue function, possible organ impairment, and death. Below the

threshold the probability of such harm is zero,

but above some dose level at which tissue function is lost, the severity of the harm will increase

with dose (28). Thus, at high doses of radiation,

the threshold for damage in several tissues is

exceeded, and severe biological effects are predictably observed.

When humans are exposed to relatively high

doses of radiation (greater than 50 rads1; see the

1 1 rad = 0.01 joule/kg = 0.01 gray.

discussion of units used to describe radioactivity

and radiation dose in box 3-1) to the whole body,

deterministic effects of radiation will occur

within hours, days, or weeks. These effects are

called acute radiation syndrome and include nausea, vomiting, fatigue, and a lowered white blood

cell count. The symptoms and their severity

depend on the dose of radiation received. Death

can result from infection, dehydration, or low

white blood cell count, and is increasingly likely

at doses greater than 100 rads. An estimate of

300 rads has been made for the median lethal

dose to humans within 60 days (35).

BOX 3–1: Units Used to Describe Radioactivity and Radiation Doses

An array of different terms and units are used to convey radiation levels and the doses of radiation to

which people are exposed. In 1980 the International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements

adopted the International System of Units (known as SI units) for radiation quantities and units to be used

internationally (69). Adoption of the SI nomenclature in the radiation field in the United States has been

slow, with the result that both the previous conventional system and the SI system are currently in use.

Conventional units are used throughout this report, with the SI conversion factors provided in this box and

equivalencies provided as necessary.

Radioactivity is the phenomenon of radioactive disintegration in which a nuclide is transformed into a

different nuclide by absorbing or emitting a particle. The activity of a radioactive material is the number of

nuclear disintegrations per unit time. The conventional unit used to express activity is the curie (Ci), which

is 3.7 x 1010 nuclear transformations per second and approximates the activity of 1 gram of radium226. The SI unit for activity is the becquerel (Bq), where each becquerel is one nuclear transformation per second (thus, 1 curie = 3.7 x 1010 Bq).

The half-life of a radioactive substance is the time required for it to lose 50 percent of its activity by

decay. Each radionuclide has a unique half-life. Activity and half-life are related, so that radionuclides

with higher specific activity (activity per gram) have shorter half-lives, and vice versa.

Levels of contamination are frequently reported in terms of activity (curies or becquerels) per unit volume or area. For example, measurements of the activity in the Kara Sea by the Joint Russian-Norwegian

Commission in 1992 found levels of cesium-137 at 3–20 Bq/m3 in sea water (8 x 10-11 –5.4 x 10-10 Ci/m3)

(30). Such measurements convey the amount of a radioactive substance present in a certain medium.

Alone, however, they provide no information about risks to human health. To understand possible risks to

health requires a host of additional information that can be used to calculate and interpret a radiation

dose.

(continued)
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 83

❚ Stochastic Effects

At doses lower than those that produce acute

symptoms, the effects of radiation on human

health are less predictable. If a damaged DNA

site is misrepaired or not repaired, and the modified cell is still able to reproduce, its propagation

may ultimately result in cancer. Development of

a cancer is understood to be a multistep process

in which modification of a cell’s DNA is a critical step that must be followed by other steps to

eventually lead to uncontrolled growth. Thus, not

every cell with damaged DNA will go on to

become cancerous. However, the more cells that

contain damaged DNA, or the more damage sites

that occur in the DNA of a single cell, the more

likely it is that one of them will ultimately

develop into a cancer. Once sufficient changes

have taken place at the molecular level, cancer

develops; cancer from low or moderate doses is

no different from one induced by high doses. In

other words, the likelihood, but not the severity,

of a cancer is roughly proportional to dose and

probably has no threshold (28). This type of

effect is called stochastic, meaning “of a random

or statistical nature.”

Numerous studies in humans and animals

have established that radiation can cause cancer

and that the incidence of cancer increases with

increasing radiation dose. What is less certain is

the relationship between the size of the dose and

the likelihood of developing cancer. At low dose

levels such as might be encountered from contamination in the environment, it is almost

impossible to collect quantitative data on human

risk. Therefore, it has been necessary to extrapoFor any potential harm from radioactivity, radiation must interact with the cells and tissues of the

human body and deliver a dose. Several different units are used to describe radiation dose. Absorbed

dose is the energy absorbed per unit mass, given in units called rad. SI units for absorbed dose are gray

(Gy), and 1 Gy is equivalent to 100 rads.a The biological effect of radiation is related to the absorbed

dose, but it also depends upon several other factors, such as the type and energy of the radiation

causing the dose. A “radiation weighting factor” is applied to the absorbed dose to account for differences in the relative biological effectiveness observed experimentally, for example, between lowenergy x-rays and alpha particles, which deposit much greater amounts of energy over the distance

they travel. Adjusted with the weighting factor, the measurement of dose is called the equivalent

dose, and is measured in units called rem. The SI unit for equivalent dose is the sievert (Sv); 1 Sv =

100 rem. Since the probability of stochastic effects also depends upon the organ or tissue irradiated,

still other weighting factors are used to account for differences in the effect of radiation on different

tissues in the body. This dose, now weighted to account both for tissue differences and differences

in the energy and type of radiation, is called the effective dose (formerly effective dose equivalent)

(28).

Some additional dosimetric terms are also used in this report. The committed effective dose takes into

account the continued doses to the body when radionuclides are taken into the body and become internal emitters. The collective effective dose relates to groups of people, rather than individuals, taking

account of the number of people exposed by multiplying the average dose to the exposed group by the

number of people in the group. The unit of this quantity is the person-rem, which is an effort to represent

the total consequences of the exposure to a population. Sometimes the collective effective dose is accumulated over a long time, spanning successive generations, depending upon the quantity and half-life of

the radionuclides (28).

aOne rad = 0.01 joule/kg = 0.01 Gy.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 3–1: Units Used to Describe Radioactivity and Radiation Doses (Cont’d.)
84 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

late from data collected on humans exposed to

much higher doses and dose rates, such as atomic

bomb survivors or medically irradiated people.

The need to estimate effects based on data from

very different conditions necessarily leads to

uncertainties in describing risks.

Other factors add to the difficulty of estimating the risks of low-level radiation. The long

period (called a latency period) between a main

exposure and the appearance of a tumor makes

studies to understand the relationship between

dose and cancer likelihood challenging. Furthermore, since cancer causes nearly 20 percent of all

deaths in the United States, and cancers resulting

from radiation do not have features that distinguish them from those due to other causes, the

subtle increases in cancer rates that might be

attributable to various environmental causes are

difficult to detect (45).

Despite these challenges, efforts have been

made to estimate the cancer impacts from low

levels of radiation. These estimates have been

adjusted repeatedly over the years, particularly as

more information has been gleaned from studies

of the atomic bomb survivors as they age and

experience their greatest risks from cancer. The

estimates differ for different cancer sites and for

different ages at time of exposure, but overall,

the National Research Council’s Committee on

the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations

(BEIR) most recently estimated that a single

equivalent dose of 10 rem (see box 3-1) to the

whole body carries a lifetime excess risk of death

from cancer of 0.8 percent, or 8 out of 1,000. If

the same dose is accumulated over weeks or

months rather than all at once, the risk is estimated to be reduced by as much as a factor of

two or more2 (45). It is important to reiterate that

these estimates are based on studies of effects at

relatively high doses and high dose rates; “studies of groups chronically exposed to low-level

radiation . . . have not shown consistent or conclusive evidence of an associated increase in the

risk of cancer” (45). As mentioned above, how2 Both of these findings are made with respect to low linear energy transfer radiation, such as x-rays and gamma rays.

ever, a variety of factors makes it extremely difficult to observe such effects in epidemiological

studies.

Genetic effects as well as cancer fall into the

category of stochastic effects of radiation. Radiation damages the genetic material in reproductive

cells, leading to mutations that can be passed to

successive generations. Like the cancer effects of

low-dose radiation, the genetic effects of radiation are difficult to study. Because the effects are

manifest in the offspring rather than the person

exposed to radiation, there can be a long delay in

observing them. Massive epidemiological studies

with long-term follow-up would be required to

gather enough data for statistical analysis. Furthermore, the same mutations that radiation

causes can occur spontaneously; therefore, estimating the contribution from radiation is very

difficult (45). Studies on the children of atomic

bomb survivors failed to detect elevations in

rates for genetic abnormalities, but because of

the size of the study population, such effects are

not ruled out. It is also possible that such effects

could manifest themselves in future generations

as recessive mutations which are hidden until

carried by both parents (8). Based on studies in

laboratory animals and studies of the offspring of

atomic bomb survivors, the percentage of genetic

diseases attributable to natural background radiation is currently estimated to be low; however,

these estimates are based on many uncertainties

(67).

The embryo is highly sensitive to radiation.

Various malformations and developmental disturbances result from irradiation of the embryo at

critical stages in the development of each organ.

Most notable in studies of atomic bomb survivors has been a dose-dependent increase in intelligence impairment and mental retardation in

people irradiated by fairly high doses between

the eighth and 15th weeks after conception. To a

lesser extent, mental retardation is also seen in

those exposed between the 16th and 25th weeks

(68). Several epidemiological studies also sug-
, p, 

power. In the United States, natural sources of

radiation provide most of the average annual

effective dose to the population, which is estimated at approximately 360 mrem each year (3.6

millisieverts (mSv); see figure 3-1) (44). These

natural sources include radioactive elements

present in the earth, cosmic rays given off by the

sun and other celestial bodies, and naturally

occurring radionuclides in the human body. To

some degree, exposure to these natural sources is

inevitable, although exposure to some can vary

depending on location and other factors. For

example, exposure to natural radioactive elements such as the potassium-40 in our bodies

from air, food, and water is inevitable (54). On

the other hand, people living at higher elevations

have greater exposure to cosmic radiation than

those living closer to sea level. People receive

enhanced radiation exposure during air travel at a

18 percent of the average effective dose to the

U.S. population. Use of x-rays for diagnosis and

nuclear medicine such as radiotherapy for cancer

are estimated to contribute most to exposures of

this type. Occupational exposures, fallout from

nuclear testing, and exposures from the nuclear

fuel cycle contribute small fractions to the average.

The pie chart of figure 3-1 illustrates the substantial contribution of background radiation to a

typical person’s total exposure to radiation in the

United States (300 mrem or about 82 percent).

However, our concern in this study is not with

doses averaged over entire populations, but with

situations in which subpopulations or individuals, in the United States or elsewhere, might

experience increased exposures because of manmade radioactivity released into the

ment.

Internal

Terrestrial 11%

Medical Xrays

80/0 Nuclear medicine

Consumer products

Occupational 0.3%

<0.3%

Nuclear fuel cycle o. 1%

Miscellaneous 0.1%

SOURCE: Used with permission from the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Ionizing

Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States, NCRP Report No. 93 (Bethesda, MD: 1987).

environ-
86 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

❚ Radiation Protection Standards 

and Guidelines

Over the years, guidelines for the protection of

populations from the health effects of radiation

have been developed and revised as understanding of these effects has evolved. The current recommended dose limits of the International

Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)

are presented in table 3-1. Standards adopted by

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

in 1991 and effective in 1994 for limits on radiation exposures from facilities licensed by the

NRC are nearly identical (51). The ICRP dose

limits are intended as a guide in considering

human practices that are carried out as a matter

of choice and are not intended to apply to doses

that might occur from exposure to natural or artificial radiation already in the environment (28).

Nonetheless, the recommended annual dose limits of 2 rem for workers and 0.1 rem (100 mrem)

for the general public provide some reference

point for considering the scale of other radiation

exposures. They are based on an estimate of the

probability of fatal cancer after low-dose, lowdose-rate, low linear energy transfer (LET) radiation to the total population of 5 x 10-4 per rem

(28). The annual dose limit for the public of 0.1

rem results in a risk of cancer mortality of about

10-5 (1 in 10,000) per year (9).

POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS FROM 

NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION IN THE 

ARCTIC AND NORTH PACIFIC

For contamination in the environment to result in

human health effects, several conditions must be

met. The contaminants or their metabolites must

be hazardous to biological systems. There must

be contact of these contaminants with people.

Last, exposure to the contaminants must occur at

concentrations and for periods of time sufficient

to produce biological effects. Understanding the

potential hazard therefore requires understanding

the agent, the exposure, and the subject (32).

In trying to understand the potential health

impacts of radioactive contamination from

nuclear waste dumped in rivers and oceans, it is

clear that the dumped radioactive wastes are

potentially hazardous to biological systems, posing, as described above, risks of cancer and

genetic and teratogenic (causing malformations

or developmental disturbances of the fetus)

effects, as well as more acute immediate illness

at high doses. Many unknowns exist, however,

both in the potential contact of these wastes with

people and in the exposure concentrations and

times that can be anticipated. The following sections examine what has been learned and what

remains to be understood about the dumped

wastes, the possible pathways of human exposure, and the populations that may be exposed.

Efforts that have been carried out to estimate

human health risks despite the large data gaps are

reviewed, along with information on possible

ecological effects.

❚ Assessing Human Exposure

Several means are used to measure or estimate

human exposure to hazardous agents. Biological

markers can be used in some instances to measure agents in the biological fluids or tissues of

exposed individuals. This approach provides the

best measure of an individual’s actual exposure,

TABLE 3-1: ICRP Recommended

Dose Limits

Dose limit (rem)

Classification Occupational Public

Effective dose 2 per year (averaged 

over 5 years)

0.1 per year 

(averaged 

over any 

consecutive 

5 years)

5 (in any one year)

Annual equivalent 

dose in:

Lens of the eye 15 1.5

Skin 50 5

Hands and feet 50

SOURCE: International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1990

Recommendations of the ICRP, ICRP Publication 60 (New York, NY:

Pergamon Press, 1991).
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 87

but suffers the drawback that some exposure to

the substance or agent has already occurred

(whole body counts, counts in teeth). A frequent

approach to estimating human exposure is environmental monitoring, the practice of measuring

levels of an agent in the air, water, and food to

which people are exposed. That information is

then used to estimate how much of the agent

might find its way to or into people based on estimates of breathing rates, skin areas, or water and

food ingestion rates. In the absence of, or as a

supplement to, information from biological

markers or environmental monitoring, knowledge of the source term is also important. The

source term refers to the quantities and types of

released radionuclides and their physical and

chemical conditions (64). This information can

provide an upper bound on the amount of the

agent released into the environment and perhaps

the rate of its release. Estimates can then be made

about how the agent might move through the

environment and potentially lead to human exposure.

The further a measurement is taken from the

potential human target, the more estimates and

assumptions are required to anticipate how much

human exposure might actually occur. In considering the health and environmental impacts of

radioactive waste dumped in the Arctic, two

questions must be addressed. Are any significant

impacts currently taking place or imminent, and

are any serious future impacts likely? Information about current levels of radioactive contamination in the environment can be used to

consider questions of current human exposure

and effects, and information about the source

term can be applied toward considering potential

future effects.

❚ Current Levels of Radioactive 

Contamination in the Environment

As discussed in chapter 2, measurements of

radioactivity in seawater and sediments in the

Arctic and Russian Far East that have been collected and analyzed to date do not suggest elevated levels indicative of large releases from the

dumped wastes. It is not clear, however, that the

waters in question have yet been sampled sufficiently and adequately to provide complete confidence in these results. Once all data gathered to

date are compiled and compared, it should be

clear where extensive sampling has occurred and

where more information from additional sampling is needed.

According to the sampling that has taken

place and been reported thus far, particularly in

the course of three expeditions by the Joint Russian-Norwegian Expert Group for Investigation

of Radioactive Contamination in the Northern

Areas, the level of cesium-137 (Cs-137) measured in the Kara Sea is between 3 and 20

bequerels per cubic meter (Bq) (8 x 10-11–5.4 x

10-10 curies/m3), compatible with levels seen over

the years from nuclear test fallout and European

reprocessing (30). To consider these values in

perspective, intervention levels derived by the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to

control doses to the public in the event of a radiological emergency are 700,000 Bq/m3 (2 x 10-5

curies/m3) of Cs-137 in drinking water, thousands of times higher than the levels measured in

seawater (60). Many samples from cruises carried out over the summer of 1994 are still being

analyzed and should be helpful in covering the

seas of interest more thoroughly.

Russian Far East

Expeditions in 1993 to sample the waters and

sediments of the Far Eastern seas found Cs-137

levels in the surface waters of about 3 Bq/m3 (8 x

10-11 curies/m3) and lower levels in the deeper

waters (22). These measurements are consistent

with expected atmospheric input from fallout and

do not suggest Russian waste dumping as a significant source of contamination in the region at

this time. Data from a joint expedition of Russia,

Korea, the IAEA, and Japan in 1994 are not yet

available.

❚ Source Term

Although measurement of current levels of

radioactivity in the environment is critical for
88 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

assessing current risks to human health and the

environment, an important step in trying to consider future risks posed by dumped wastes is to

know what wastes were dumped, how much,

where, and how rapidly they may release radionuclides into the environment. In radiological

assessments this information is called the

“source term,” referring to the quantity and types

of released radionuclides and their physical and

chemical conditions (64).

As described elsewhere, the Yablokov report

gives information about both liquid and solid

wastes dumped in the Barents and Kara Seas in

the Russian North, and the Sea of Japan, Sea of

Okhotsk, and off the Kamchatka Peninsula in the

Russian Far East (13). Aside from providing the

total activity at the time of dumping, the report

gives little information about the liquid wastes

dumped between 1960 and 1991 in the Barents

and Kara Seas or those dumped in the Russian

Far East since 1966. Because the radionuclide

composition is unknown, current contamination

levels cannot be estimated. Based on the small

volumes and irregular timing of dumping, however, it is unlikely that the dumped liquid wastes

were from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing.

Rather, it is believed that these were wastes from

reactor cooling systems and ship cleaning operations (49). In this case, radioactive contamination

is most likely to originate from tritium (hydrogen-3; H-3), with possible additional contamination by activation products such as cobalt-60

(Co-60), nickel-63 (Ni-63), and iron-55 (Fe-55).

The low level and rapid dilution of liquid

wastes suggests that they have contributed only

minutely to the radiation present in these waters

both from man-made sources such as fallout and

reprocessing and from the natural radiation

expected in seawater.

The solid wastes pose a considerably greater

hazard. They included 16 naval reactors from

former Soviet Union submarines and the icebreaker Lenin, which were dumped in the Kara

Sea and shallow fjords of Novaya Zemlya. Six of

the reactors still contained their spent fuel, and

about 60 percent of the spent nuclear fuel from

one of the Lenin reactors was disposed of in a

reinforced container. The Yablokov report estimates a total radioactivity of 2,300 kCi (kilocuries) of fission products in the spent nuclear fuel

and 100 kCi of Co-60 in the reactor components.

Almost no other radionuclides were identified,

nor was an estimate provided of current levels of

radioactivity (13).

Since the release of the Yablokov report in the

spring of 1993, great efforts have been made by

the international community to better understand

the magnitude of the risks that the dumped

wastes might pose. The Source Term Working

Group of the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP, described in chapter 5) has

made substantial progress in gathering information relevant to the amount and containment of

the dumped radionuclides. In January 1994, the

Kurchatov Institute in Russia issued a report to

IASAP containing a detailed inventory of radionuclides and information on the structure of the

Lenin’s dumped reactor section. Then in July

1994, essential details of the structure, operational history, and characteristics of the dumped

spent submarine fuel were declassified by Russian authorities. Thereafter, radionuclide inventories of the water-cooled submarine reactors and

lead-bismuth cooled reactors were also made

available to IASAP (24). Further information on

the Lenin reactor and the submarine reactors was

presented at a November 1994 meeting of the

Source Term Working Group by researchers at

the Kurchatov Institute and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (40).

Experts participating in the Source Term

Working Group of IASAP have combined this

early information with that provided by the

Yablokov report, and made an array of calculations and conservative assumptions based on the

submarines’ fuel and working histories to reach a

refined estimate of the total activity at the time of

dumping of about 991 kCi (40). When decay is

considered, the activity estimated to remain in

the icebreaker Lenin reactor compartment in

1994 was about 59 kCi (41,61). The estimate of

the activity remaining in the submarine reactors

and spent fuel in 1994 was about 68 kCi (36),

giving a total of 127 kCi for the estimated current
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 89

activity of the high-level wastes described in the

Yablokov report. This revised figure can provide

a useful basis for estimating releases of these

radionuclides into the environment and, potentially, into the food chain and ultimately their

contact with humans. Several vital questions

about the quantity and condition of the dumped

wastes remain outstanding, however.

Some of these questions concern a substance

called furfural, a compound prepared from cereal

straws and brans. A resin based on furfural was

used in the preparation and sealing of some of

the dumped reactors, including the spent fuel

from the Lenin reactor. Estimates quoted in the

Yablokov report were that the furfural-based

mixture would prevent seawater contact with the

spent fuel for up to 500 years (13), but other

experts have questioned this claim and few hard

data exist to confirm it. Apparently three different organizations within the Russian Federation

produce furfural, but their production methods

are not necessarily uniform (38). Thus, the precise composition and characteristics of the furfural sealed in various reactors are not known.

This information is of great interest because of

the role the sealant may play in delaying release

of the radionuclides and remains among the critical unanswered questions about the source term.

For the purpose of modeling the release of the

contaminants over time, both furfural and the

concrete are being assumed to last for 100 years

(39).

Several other important issues remain

unknown, such as the condition of the reactors

containing spent fuel, the corrosion rate of the

fuel in Arctic seawater, and the thickness of the

reactor compartment walls (38). All of these factors are important in estimating how rapidly or

slowly radionuclides may be released into the

environment and how much of their radioactivity

will remain as that occurs. The nature and the

condition of other dumped solid wastes are

unknown.

The Source Term Working Group is attempting to address these issues, via contracts with

experts at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow and

the State Scientific Center of Russia in Obninsk

to help gather and analyze additional information. Some officials in the Russian Navy seem to

feel that the Yablokov report revealed too much

sensitive information, and they are reluctant to

declassify additional information requested by

IASAP. Nonetheless, the group anticipates concluding its work on the submarines and reactors

in late 1995 and then shifting its focus to other

wastes described in the Yablokov report (those

described only in terms of “Sr-90 [Strontium-90]

equivalents”). A final report is expected in early

1996 (42).

Although a considerable array of unknowns

about the condition of the dumped wastes

remain, there is no evidence to indicate that large

releases of radionuclides have occurred. As

described in chapter 2, levels of radionuclides

measured in the open Barents and Kara Seas do

not indicate sources beyond the contributions

due to fallout from atmospheric testing and discharges from European reprocessing plants.

Expeditions carried out by the Joint RussianNorwegian Expert Group have thus far visited

and sampled near several sites where nuclear

waste dumping was described in the Yablokov

report. In Tsivolka Bay, where the Lenin reactors

were reported to be dumped, Co-60—which may

have originated from the dumped nuclear

waste—was measured in the upper sediments,

but components of the Lenin were not located

(31). Analysis of sediment samples from near the

hull of a submarine containing two reactors with

spent fuel in Stepovogo Bay suggests some leakage of fission products from the submarine reactors. Increased concentrations of Cs-137 (about

10 times the amounts measured in the open Kara

Sea in 1992) and the presence of Co-60 in the

bay also suggest leaching from dumped solid

radioactive wastes other than the reactors with

spent fuel (31). Concentrations of Cs-137 in surface sediments of the Novaya Zemlya Trough,

also mentioned in the Yablokov report as a site

for nuclear waste dumping, were similar to those

in the open Kara Sea in 1992. In the Abrosimov

Fjord, three of four reported submarine reactor

compartments and three of four dumped barges

were located, and there are elevated levels of
90 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

radionuclides in the sediments near these objects

(10).

From the limited information available, any

leakage that may have occurred so far from

dumped wastes appears, at most, to have led to

only very local contamination. More extensive

inspection of the dumped objects (particularly,

all of the reactors with spent fuel) and sampling

of the environment nearby are necessary.

❚ Potential Pathways of Human Exposure

Since effects from radiation can come about only

if radioactive contamination comes in contact

with humans, understanding health risks to

humans from existing or potential sources of

radioactive contamination in the environment

requires an understanding of the varied pathways

through which radionuclides can eventually

result in direct external radiation exposure or can

be ingested or inhaled. This is a considerable

challenge. Given the complexities of human

activities and diets, myriad different pathways to

humans are conceivable through inhalation,

ingestion, direct contact, or proximity.

The challenge is not new, however. Pathways

to human exposure from radionuclide contamination in the environment have been studied

since the 1960s when concerns were raised about

widespread environmental contamination from

fallout due to nuclear weapons testing. Diagrams

such as figure 3-2 were developed to help understand the fate and transport of radionuclides and

possible routes through the environment to

humans. Such conceptual models can serve as

the framework for computational models that

approximate the transport of radionuclides from

their source to humans. Increasingly, complex

dose reconstruction models have been developed

and used to try to calculate doses to humans from

a variety of sources; such models have become

important for nuclear facilities and their regulators.

The most sophisticated computer model is

only as good as the data used to construct and

test it, however. Since a tremendous number of

unknowns remain in this area, the development

and particularly the validation of models of environmental transport are limited by these

unknowns and associated uncertainties. For

example, an estimate of the dose to humans

through a cow’s grazing in a field contaminated

by rainfall through a radioactive cloud requires a

good estimate of at least 14 different parameters,

from the rate of rainfall to soil-to-plant uptake

via root absorption to the quantity of meat and

milk consumed by humans (8,9). Each of these

parameters must be entered into the model, but

some are not known to within an order of magnitude. Since many such parameters must be combined in the models, the uncertainties surrounding

them can span orders of magnitude. Frequently,

the models are used for situations in which validation prior to decisionmaking is impossible

(potential accidents, etc.).

Improvements have come about as experience

with models has increased. Most progress has

been made in atmospheric environmental modeling, such that concentrations downwind from a

continuous point source emission can now be

estimated reliably (8). Much more progress is

needed to refine and develop models for aquatic

and terrestrial systems, however. “Atmospheric

diffusion, while so complex that it is not yet fully

understood, is a relatively predictable process

compared to transport through geologic media,

or convection, diffusion, and sorption processes

encountered in the aquatic environment.”3 Such

statements are made with respect to the modeling

of processes in temperate zones. However, such

processes are even less understood in Arctic conditions.

“Above all, it needs to be recognized that the

Arctic is a very different environment than most

people are familiar with. Residence times of

materials, in marine and terrestrial ecosystems

and in the atmosphere, are generally much longer

due to the lack of moisture passing through the

system. Paradigms borrowed from experiences

of radioactive waste treatment at mid-latitude

3 M. Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity, 3rd ed., (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1987)

pathways in sea water or ice through which

radionuclides might move, illustrated in figure 3-

3. The likelihood of these pathways cart be examined through data collection and modeling. General models alone are unlikely to provide easy

answers to questions of the effects that dumping

is likely to have. A tremendous amount of detail

about a body of water is necessary to begin to

describe the mixing that takes place in it. Site

specific information is necessary about water

depth, bottom shoreline configuration, tidal factors, wind, temperature, and the depth at which

the pollutant is introduced, among others. “Each

stream, river, bay, lake, sea, and ocean has its

own mixing characteristics that vary from place

to place and from time to time.”5

Attempting to understand and predict the dispersion of a radionuclide in a water body is further complicated by other chemical, physical,

and biological processes. Do its chemical characteristics make it more likely to be found in solution or in the soils and sediments? The behavior

and distribution of radionuclides in water environments depend a great deal on how likely they

are to become associated with particles. Contaminants in solution cart be assimilated by plants

and animals or can fix themselves to suspended

solids, which then become part of the substrate

that supports bottom-dwelling communities.

Contaminants that adhere to sediments can

remain there indefinitely or be a source of contamination later if the sediments are disrupted

Legend: View of Arctic Region. Gray arrows indicate predominant

sea and ice currents. Dashed black arrow. illustrate hypothetical sea

water or ice transport pathways of contaminants which are currently

under study.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

through turbulence or changing chemical conditions (8). Prediction of the dispersion of pollutant

species that favor the particulate phase is more

difficult than for those that remain in solution. In

general, radionuclides of strontium, technetium,

antimony, cesium, uranium, and H-3 are relatively soluble and less likely to associate with

particles than the radionuclides of lead, thorium,

neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium

(54). Beyond generalities, however, radionuclide-specific, site-specific information is necessary to begin to anticipate the behavior of such

contaminants.

4 Glenn E. Shaw, professor of Physics, Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska, Fairbanks, Alaska, “Transport of Radioactive Material to Alaska,” Radioactive and Other Environmental Threats to the United States and the Arctic Resulting from Past Soviet Activities, hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Aug. 15, 1992, S. Hrg. 102-1095 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing office, 1992).

5 M. Eisenbud, Environmental Radioactivity, 3rd ed., (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1987)
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 93

Modeling Environmental Transport

In the face of these challenges, some efforts are

being made to use environmental transport models to better understand the potential outcomes

from the dumping of nuclear wastes in the Kara

Sea, as well as in major rivers emptying into the

Arctic Ocean.

A large-scale modeling effort is in progress at

the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories funded by

the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program

(ANWAP). The model covers the area from the

North Pole south to about 30° N latitude, including the Far Eastern seas and the Labrador Sea. It

incorporates ocean currents, wind, and ice with a

resolution of 1/4°. The model has now been used

to simulate inputs from the Ob and Yenisey Rivers, from solid and liquid dump sites in the Kara

Sea and the Russian Far East, and from the

Sellafield reprocessing plant on the Irish Sea.

The simulations suggest movement of the radionuclides out of the Kara Sea along three pathways, and indicate that after 10 years of constant

release from dump sites in the Kara Sea, concentrations of radioactivity in seawater near the

Alaskan coast would be about 100,000-fold

lower than those in the Kara Sea (58). The model

continues to be refined and requires additional

data from measurements in the oceans to be validated.

Another group funded through ANWAP has

focused on modeling radionuclide contamination

of the Kara Sea from the Ob and Yenisey River

systems. Using existing data, as well as data currently being gathered and analyzed on the characteristics of the radioactive sources and of the

rivers and estuaries, the modelers will try to estimate river contributions of Sr-90, Cs-137, and

plutonium-239 (Pu-239) to the Kara Sea. The

models will address two different scenarios—a

steady continuous release of contaminants and a

sudden large release of radionuclides as from

dam breakage or a flood (see box 2-2 in chapter

2).

Modeling efforts are also under way under the

auspices of the Transfer Mechanism and Models

Working Group of the IAEA’s Arctic Seas

Assessment Program. Seven laboratories are

involved in efforts using seven different models,

and researchers are currently carrying out benchmarking studies to see how the various models

compare in cases of instantaneous release and

constant release.

As all of these models are developed, it is critical that, where possible, results be compared

with empirical data or with alternative models to

ascertain the value of these results. Sensitivity

analysis—an effort to assess which inputs or

components of a model have the most impact on

the results—can shed light both on how the

model works and, to the extent that it successfully represents the real system, on what environmental factors can benefit most from further

study (49). Some uncertainty in the models is

inevitable, and should be described and quantified. Uncertainty stemming from natural variability cannot be reduced, but uncertainty arising

from gaps in knowledge should be used to direct

research toward filling those gaps. Proprietary

models are problematic because models benefit

greatly from testing, peer review, and open scrutiny of their features.

Transport Through the Food Chain

In addition to trying to understand how radionuclide contaminants in the rivers and oceans will

disperse over time through physical mixing and

dilution, it is important to consider other factors

that will play a role in human exposure to contaminants. Since the radionuclides have been

dumped into water environments, exposure

through inhalation is an unlikely or fairly remote

possibility; exchange of radionuclides into the air

can occur to some extent but should contribute

very little to human exposure. Exposure through

direct contact with radionuclides in the water is

possible but, particularly in the icy Arctic waters

that are the focus of this study, not likely to be

widespread or frequent. Radionuclides may be

deposited on beaches by the waters washing

them, however, or through transport by windborne spray, as observed near the Sellafield plant

in England (56).

The pathway most likely to lead to human

contact with radioactive contaminants dumped in
94 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

the oceans, however, is ingestion. Consumption

of marine food that has become contaminated

with radionuclides is logically the most probable

path of human exposure, but is difficult to assess.

Particularly in water environments, understanding the complex interrelationships within food

webs and the predator-prey hierarchy leading to

humans is daunting (figure 3-4). Whereas the terrestrial food chain leading to humans generally

consists of two or three separate steps that can be

controlled or modified as in farming, the marine

or aquatic environment is less defined or regular

(9). The same predator may eat several different

types of prey from different “trophic levels,” or

steps in the food chain. Furthermore, there are

species in the aquatic environment that can move

considerable distances during their lives. This

added complexity leads to use of the term “food

web” to describe the complex consumption relationships in aquatic, marine, and estuarine settings (55).

Another factor that makes estimating radionuclide contamination from the food chain difficult

is the phenomenon of bioaccumulation. Some

environmental transport processes can lead to

physical, chemical, or biological concentration

of radionuclides to levels that are considerably

higher than its initial concentration in air or

water at the point of release (55). For example,

concentration can occur as a result of purely

physical processes, such as adsorption of radionuclides onto silt or suspended solids which then

accumulate on the ocean floor (8). In addition,

radionuclides can concentrate in organisms that

consume other radionuclide-containing organisms, leading to “biomagnification.”

Concentration in biological organisms has

been an important focus of study for understanding environmental transport. Concentration factors (CF) are ratios of the concentration of the

radionuclide in the organism to its concentration

in the ambient medium. They have been measured in a variety of different species and settings, both through laboratory research and in

natural systems, and should be measured under

conditions in which the organism has reached

equilibrium with the environment (see table 3-2).

These factors tend to vary widely, partly because

the uptake of radionuclides by organisms in

water can be strongly influenced by the presence

of chemical analogs in the water. For example,

the high concentration of potassium (K) in seawater means that the uptake of Cs-137 in marine

environments is lower than that observed in

freshwater or estuarine (brackish) settings (8).

Given the variability in CFs observed in different

studies, some site-specific information is

required to select an appropriate value.

In analyzing the concentrations of radionuclides that may accumulate in an organism and

thence into a pathway for human consumption, it

is important to consider where the radionuclides

collect in the animal and whether this is relevant

to the human diet. For example, clams, oysters,

and scallops concentrate Sr-90, but the concentration occurs in their shells, which are ordinarily

not consumed (8). In general, muscle tissue tends

to have the lowest concentration of radionuclides, whereas liver, kidney, and other organs

involved in storage or excretion have the highest

concentrations (54). Thus, a CF for the specific

tissues consumed by humans is far more useful

than one derived for the entire organism.

Generalizations about concentration factors

across organism types must also be avoided, and

data must be gathered that is specific to the diet

of the people in question. Several types of seaweed growing in waters near the nuclear waste

discharges of Sellafield were observed to concentrate radionuclides. However, different species of seaweed concentrated different

radioactive elements to varying degrees so it was

important to know which type people actually ate

(7). It is critical to gather both site-specific and

species-specific information, coupled with good

information about the diet of critical populations.

Without site-specific information about the

food web and the diets of critical populations,

only a few generalizations are possible about the

radionuclides that might be of most concern for

human exposure through aquatic and marine

food webs (see box 3-2). In any one generation,
1

(3)

Benthos feeding

marine mammals

Walrus

Bearded seal

Graywhale

(3)

Starfish

(3)

Benthos feeding

marine birds

Eiders

(3,4)

Ringed seal

(3) \

Infauna:

Annelids

Bivalves

Gastropo d

Epifauna:

Mysids

Amphipods

Isopods

Crabs

Shrimp

Echinoderms

North sea lion

Dali’s porpoise

(3) (3,4)

Fish and squid

Marine: Murres

Cods Kittiwakes

Pollock Cormorants

Herring Puffins

Capelin

Sandlance

Flounders

Sculpins (3)

Squid Planktivorous

Anadromous:

marine mammals

Salmon Bowhead whale

Arctic char

Ciscos

Smelt

Whitefish \ \

(3)

Planktivorous

marine birds

Auklets

Ice invertebrates Zooplankton

Amphipods Copepods

Isopods Euphausiids

Mysids Crab and shrimp larvae

(1)

Phyloplankton, Ice algae,

Macrophytes, Detritus

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate trophic level in ascending order. Examples of each major category of biota are also listed

SOURCE: adapted from Becker, P., “Characterization of the Arctic Environment,” Proceedings of Workshop on Arctic Contamination, Arctic

Research of the United States, 8: 66-76, 1993.
96 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

the largest contributions to committed doses6

from dietary contamination are most likely to

come from radionuclides of only moderately

long half-lives (tens of days to tens of years),

such as cesium, ruthenium, strontium, and zirconium; also from H-3, and in certain circumstances, from iodine-131 and actinides (56).

In summary, considerable information crucial

to understanding the transport and fate of radioactive contaminants is lacking. Much of this

6 Committed doses take into account doses received over time from internal emitters (see box 3-1).

information must be site specific to be of most

use in modeling or otherwise anticipating likely

pathways for radionuclides. Information about

local physical and chemical characteristics of the

water body, resident biota and their concentration factors, and the behavior of the specific radionuclides in the specific environment is needed.

Data needs must be considered in the context of

the routes of exposure most likely to lead to

human beings, by taking into account the diets

and habits of people and exploring the most

appropriate transport pathways.

❚ Possible Critical Populations

Estimates or analyses of risk from environmental

contaminants usually focus on “critical populations,” groups who are most likely to be exposed

(or to have the highest exposures) to the agent of

interest. Who are the populations with greatest

likelihood of exposure to radionuclides dumped

in the Arctic and North Pacific Oceans? Without

an exhaustive understanding of the life-style,

habits, and diet of everyone, common sense suggests that those with the largest proportion of

seafood, shellfish, and marine mammals in their

diets might have the greatest potential exposure

to radionuclides released in the ocean. Similarly,

those relying most heavily on fish and aquatic

organisms from freshwater sources might be

most exposed to radionuclides released into rivers. This describes, in particular, Native northern

peoples all over the Arctic, including those in

Russia, Canada, Greenland, and the United

States (Alaska). In keeping with the scope of this

report, the focus here is on possible critical populations in Alaska.

In Alaska, many of the Native people continue

traditional life-styles that involve a significant

dietary component from fishing and marine

mammals.7 A study of the diet of Alaskan Native

adults in the late 1980s indicated a high consumption of fish—a mean daily intake more than

7 Game meats such as caribou also constitute an important part of the diet, particularly in the winter months. Caribou meat in the Arctic

frequently contains appreciable levels of radionuclides because of the caribou’s consumption of lichens (see later text).

TABLE 3-2: Concentration Factors in 

Marine Organisms

Element Fish Crustaceans Mollusks

H-3 1 1 1

Cs 100 30 30

Sr 5 2 1

Co 50 5,000 5,000

Fe 3,000 5,000 30,000

Mn 400 500 5,000

Mo 40 100 100

Ni 670 1,000 2,000

Zn 5,000 50,000 30,000

I 10 10 10

Am 250a

25b

5c

500 20,000

Cm 250a

25b

5c

500 30,000

Np 250a

25b

5c

100 400

Pu 250a

25b

5c

300 3,000

a Bottom-feeding fish.

b Planktivorous fish.

c Piscivorous fish.

SOURCES: T. Poston and D. Klopfer, “Concentration Factors Used in

the Assessment of Radiation Dose to Consumers of Fish: A Review of

27 Radionuclides,” Health Physics 55:751–766, 1988. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, Radioactivity in North European Waters:

Report of Working Group 2 of CEC Project MARINA. (Lowestoft, UK:

1989).
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 97

BOX 3–2: Radionuclides of Potential Biological Impact in Dumped Nuclear Waste

No comprehensive listing of the various radioactive elements present in nuclear wastes dumped in the

Arctic and North Pacific Oceans exists. However, it is possible to surmise some of the constituents,

based on what is known about the nature of the waste types discarded there. The wastes dumped by the

Russian Navy were primarily wastes generated in the use of nuclear reactors to power submarines. Other

wastes that may contribute to contamination in the oceans are from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

to recover plutonium for use in weapons production. The following table notes those radionuclides that

might be of most concern from a human health and ecological perspective, because of physical and

chemical characteristics of the elements.

(continued)

Radionuclide Half-Life

Fission productsa

Ruthenium-103 40 days

Ruthenium-106 373 days

Cerium-144 284 days

Zirconium-95 64 days

Strontium-90b 29 years

Yttrium-90 64 hours

Cesium-137b 30 years

Iodine-129 16,000,000 years

Technetium-99 213,000 years

Activation products

Zinc-65 244 days

Iron-55 2.7 years

Iron-59 45 days

Cobalt-57 271 days

Cobalt-58 71 days

Cobalt-60 5.3 years

Nickel-59 76,000 years

Nickel-63 100 years

Manganese-54 312 days

Chromium-51 28 days

Carbon-14 5,730 years

Actinides

Plutonium-239 24,411 years

Neptunium-239 2.3 days

Americium-241 432 years

Americium-243 7,370 years

Curium-242 163 days
98 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

six times the U.S. national average intake (46).8

Ongoing studies also indicate that sea mammal

consumption continues to be a very significant

part of the diet in some communities (47).

Some sampling and studies have been carried

out to determine the levels of radionuclides

present in the Alaskan marine environment and

food chain. Funded primarily by the Office of

Naval Research’s ANWAP, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

has overseen the analysis of five relevant sample

sets to date (16,18). Analysis of sediment samples from the Beaufort Sea in 1993 indicated a

range of Cs-137 from nondetectable up to 12 Bq/

kg dry weight (3.2 x 10-10 curies/kg), lower than

or comparable to measurements in sediment

samples collected in the Kara Sea in 1992.

Almost 100 times more gamma and beta radioactivity was attributable to the decay of naturally

occurring K-40 than to Cs-137. Ratios of plutonium isotopes measured in the samples indicated

global fallout as the principal and perhaps sole

source of plutonium. Analysis of bottom-dwell8 This study did not include communities from the North Slope, Interior Alaska, or the Aleutian Chain, however, where diets may differ

somewhat.

ing animals from the same area for plutonium

isotopes and Cs-137 showed levels that were

almost all non-detectable by high resolution

gamma spectroscopy. Chemical separation techniques resulted in Cs-137 activities ranging from

0.3 to 1.1 Bq/kg (8.1 x 10-12–2.9 x 10-11 Ci/kg).

In comparison, Cs-137 activities in mussels and

oysters collected in 1990 in coastal areas of the

contiguous United States had an average value of

0.2 Bq/kg, with a range of 0.02 to 0.4 Bq/kg (70).

In 1994, samples were collected from larger

animals that serve as subsistence food sources,

including bowhead whale (blubber, lung, and

liver), king eider (bone and muscle), and bearded

seal (blubber and kidney) (16). Very low levels

of both anthropogenic and naturally-occurring

radionuclides were found, with the highest measurement in bowhead whale liver samples of 0.44

Bq/kg of Cs-137 activity (screening values from

the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture Chernobyl task force are 370

Bq/kg of Cs-137 in food) (60). A limited number

NOTES: a) Fission products are radioactive fragments produced when a nucleus is split. Activation products are produced when

neutrons released during fission react with elements nearby. These elements can be located in the shielding and containment,

fuel cladding, and reactor structural materials. Actinides are elements numbered 89 and above on the periodic table and include

the transuranium elements produced by neutron bombardment of uranium. They tend to have longer half-lives and therefore will

be contributing radioactivity for longer periods of time.

b) Cesium-137 and strontium-90 deserve special mention because they make up a significant amount of fission products and

because of their potential to deliver internal doses over a long time. With half-lives of about 30 years each, either can be taken up

in the body and do harm to body tissues for extended periods before being cleared by tissues or decaying. Strontium behaves

like calcium in the body, eventually being deposited in the bone where it can provide a source of radiation for years. Cesium

behaves like an analog of potassium in the body; it is rapidly absorbed into the bloodstream and distributed to active tissues

where it and its decay product barium-137 emit beta and gamma irradiation. In adult body organs, the effective half-life of strontium-90 is 18 years (bone), and the effective half-life of cesium-137 is 70 days (whole body) (68). The effective half-life takes into

account both the physical half-life of the radionuclide and the time required for metabolic processes to eliminate the material, so

that it reflects the actual time that the radioactive substance is in contact with the body. In general, cesium-137 and strontium-90

are of less concern for accumulating in marine biota than in freshwater because in seawater they are much more diluted by potassium and calcium ions, their chemical analogs. Conversely, radionuclides of elements that are biologically essential but in scarce

supply in a given environment will accumulate significantly in organisms (72).

SOURCES: M. Benedict, T. Pigford, and H. Levi, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981); International Atomic Energy Agency, Assessing the Impact of Deep Sea Disposal of Low Level Radioactive Waste on Living Marine

Resources, Technical Reports Series No. 288 (Vienna: 1988); Robert C. Weast, (ed.), CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics,

69th ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1989); F.W. Whicker and V. Shultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and the Environment,

Volume I. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1982).

BOX 3–2: Radionuclides of Potential Biological Impact in Dumped Nuclear Waste (Cont’d.)
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 99

of samples from anadromous9 and marine fish

gathered across the Arctic had Cs-137 levels of

generally less than 1 Bq/kg dry weight. Exceptions were Arctic cod (2.6 Bq/kg), Arctic char

(4.2 Bq/kg) from a Siberian river, and Arctic

cisco from Prudhoe Bay (2.9 Bq/kg). Arctic

cisco and Arctic char are important subsistence

species in both Alaska and Russia, and Arctic

cod is ecologically important throughout the

Arctic seas. Activity levels of plutonium isotopes

and americium-241 were below the detection

limits of the analysis.

Fish and bottom-dwelling animals from the

southeastern Bering Sea and Norton Sound in

1994 showed nondetectable levels of Cs-137—

except in the case of fish where values were generally less than 1 Bq/kg. Additional samples,

including bowhead whale, caribou, and polar

bear collected in the spring and summer of 1995

by the North Slope Borough in Alaska, are still

undergoing analysis (16). All told, the findings to

date suggest very low levels of contaminants in

these foods, with global fallout rather than other

nuclear events (Chernobyl, waste dumping or

discharges, etc.) as apparent sources (15).

Apart from the sporadic sampling done

recently as a result of increasing concerns about

contaminants in the food chain in Alaska, no routine monitoring of the marine environment is carried out, nor is there monitoring of the food

chain, including subsistence food resources. Recommendations for such monitoring are included

in a recent report by the Alaska State Emergency

Response Commission considering radiological

threats to Alaska (2) and have been proposed to

ANWAP (14). While sampling carried out thus

far has been adequate to describe the background

levels of radionuclides in the Bering Sea, including Bristol Bay and the Norton Sound, sampling

in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas has been much

less comprehensive, and as a result the data base

is not yet adequate to describe background levels

of radionuclides (17).

9 Anadromous fish (e.g. salmon) are born in fresh water, live as adults in salt water, and return to fresh water to reproduce.

A cooperative effort between NOAA and the

North Slope Borough of Alaska is under way in

which tissue samples from animals harvested for

food will be analyzed and information about the

findings disseminated to local residents. Contingent on FY 95 funding from ANWAP, the effort

may include workshops that can provide a forum

to hear the concerns of the communities and discuss the interpretations of collected data (16,52).

Clearly, a variety of other Arctic populations

might also face potential exposures as radionuclides from dumped wastes are transported

through the environment. In particular, Native

people throughout the Arctic continue traditional

life-styles that might make exposure from the

marine food web more likely. More than 28 different groups of Native peoples live in the European and Siberian North and the Russian Far

East. Since the 1920s and 1930s these groups

have been treated as distinct, with special ordinances applied to them. Two of the groups, the

Komi and the Yakuts, are larger (populations of

344,500 and 382,000, respectively, according to

the 1989 census) and were given their own

autonomous republics within the USSR. More

than 26 smaller groups subsist as hunters, trappers, and reindeer herders, although the tundra,

taiga, and forest regions of their homelands are

increasingly damaged by industrial development,

particularly oil and gas. Populations of the

groups in 1989 ranged from 190 to 34,665 (29).

In Russia’s Siberian Arctic, for example, a

nomadic Nenets tribe of at least 5,000 reindeer

herders still live on the Yamal Peninsula as they

did in the fifth century, eating fish, reindeer, and

other food foraged from the land and rivers.

Other Nenets have settled to live as fishermen

(62). In the summer months, nomadic reindeer

herders as well as settled community dwellers

are large consumers of fish.

Indeed, all along the Arctic coast of Russia,

both Native people and “newcomers” depend

heavily upon fishing for their food supplies. This

dependence has increased in recent years. The
100 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

demise of the Soviet Union has lead to decreases

in incoming food supplies from other regions.

The converse is that fish caught commercially

are sold locally even more than in the past,

because shipping and transportation have

become more difficult10. Thus, although people

living traditional subsistence life-styles could be

expected to have the highest exposures to contaminants in fish, even those in cities along the

coasts have significant dietary input from fish.

Consumption of sea mammals is limited primarily to the Chukchi people in the far northeast

(34,53).

In Canada, concerns about radionuclide exposures of the population through the diet have

focused primarily on the terrestrial route, but an

effort to examine the variety of sources of radioactivity in the Canadian Arctic has taken place

through the Canadian Department of National

Health and Welfare. The total population of the

Canadian Arctic region is about 85,000, roughly

half of whom are Native peoples, many continuing traditional food-gathering activities (66). The

recently completed study examined the available

data on environmental radioactivity and arrived

at estimates of radiation doses to groups in six

different communities, five of them Native (or

First Nation) communities, with one non-Native

community as a reference point (20). Estimates

of doses were made for each community for a

typical adult (eating a mixed diet of subsistence,

or “country” foods, and non-country foods), a 1-

year-old child, and an adult whose diet consists

almost entirely of country foods. Estimated doses

from all sources ranged from slightly more than

200 to 1,400 mrem a year. The average estimated

dose to the hypothetical child was about 45 percent higher than to the adult with a mixed diet,

while estimated doses to the adult eating only

country foods were 75 percent higher than those

to the adult eating the mixed diet. The ingestion

of polonium-210 through the food chain was the

most important contributor to dose, as has been

found in other studies (see box 3-3). Table 3-3

10 There is an important commercial fishery in Ob Bay; fishing is done through the ice in the winter. As transport mechanisms have broken down, some people are flying in and buying fish privately and then reselling these fish elsewhere, although this is illegal (53).

shows typical concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides in seawater. 

The study drew attention to “significant gaps

in the radiological monitoring database, inconsistencies in the information of dietary quantities

and components of native diets, particularly for

children, and possible reservations regarding the

applicability of the dose conversion factors to the

Arctic circumstances” (20). These concerns and

data gaps appear to be equally relevant, if not

more so, to information about exposures elsewhere in the Arctic—for example, in Alaska.

Concern about dietary radionuclide exposures

of people with traditional or subsistence lifestyles exists in the context of a well-known precedent: the concentration of Cs-137 from fallout

in the lichen-reindeer-human food chain. In the

1960s researchers discovered that reindeer herders in several northern countries had elevated

levels of Cs-137 in their bodies (1). Subsequent

studies revealed that lichens have considerable

ability to absorb and retain atmospheric particulates. They have a large surface area and a long

lifespan, with no deciduous portions through

which to shed radionuclides annually. Lichens

are the primary food source for reindeer and caribou during the winter months. About a quarter of

the cesium eaten by caribou is absorbed in the

gastrointestinal tract and concentrates mostly in

muscle tissue (63). Reindeer and caribou consumers ingest the meat and, thus, take the cesium

into their bodies, where it is distributed to the tissues and remains in the body delivering a radiation dose for some time. Several studies have

monitored Cs-137 levels in the bodies of reindeer

herders over time, observing fluctuations correlating with the atmospheric testing of nuclear

devices and variations in diet (19,66). In northern

Alaskan Eskimos, estimated annual doses from

Cs-137 in fallout reached 140 mrad in 1964 and

1966; by 1979 this annual dose had decreased to

8 mrad because of changes in diet and slow

decreases in the amount of Cs-137 present in

lichen (19). The lichen-reindeer-human saga has
size are about twice the International Commission on Radiological Protection recommended limit of effective dose to members of the public from human practices (28).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

(a) Contribution by nuclides (%)

Pb-210

Po-21O

75

13

Rb+Ra+U+C

1

(a) Contribution by dietary items (%)

Crustaceans

23

Fish

Algae

10

Mollusks

52

Estimated relative contributions of (a) naturally occurring radionuclides and (b) dietary items to the annual dose rate to critical

groups consuming 800 grams of fish and 100 grams of crustaceans, mollusks, and algae per day.

Source: Pentreath, R. J., “Radionuclides in the Aquatic Environment, ” Radionuclides in the Rood Chain, M.W. Carter (cd.) (New

York: Springer-Verlag, 1988).
102 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

been instructive as an example of increased

exposure resulting from special dietary situations

and suggests the need for vigilance in examining

potential pathways for increased exposures.

In considering risks from environmental contaminants in the food chain, three important

harmful effects must be considered that do not

result directly from exposure to radiation. One is

the fact that when a certain food is avoided

because of concerns that it may be contaminated,

other foods must be substituted. If these are less

nutritious, are more expensive, or have more

hazardous contaminants in them, the substitution

has had a negative impact that must be weighed

against the possible negative effects of eating the

first foodstuff.

A second important result of concerns over

contamination in food is one that may have particular impact on Native people living subsistence life-styles. Traditional foods and their

hunting are a critical component of Native culture. Consuming subsistence foods is of course

normal and natural, and part of a healthy lifestyle. Events centered around gathering or sharing foods (e.g., whale festivals) are important

community events. To suggest that eating the

foods could be harmful or should be avoided for

some reason could cause tremendous disruption

of life-style and contribute to disintegration of

the culture (23,48).

A third important impact, related to the second, is the great psychological stress that can

result from fear of contaminants in food and the

surrounding environment. Many people in the

Chernobyl and Chelyabinsk (see box 2-4 in

chapter 2) populations have health problems they

believe are caused by exposure to nuclear contamination. They suffer physically and have a

changed outlook on life (11,12). Whether or not

their health problems are caused by radioactive

contamination, the people of the region observe a

heavy toll of physical effects, which also leads to

psychological stress. Similar impacts are possible in other areas, such as Alaska, where people

fear they are experiencing health effects from

radiation exposure. Many Alaska Natives have

concerns about previous exposures to radiation

such as those from nuclear weapons testing fallout in the 1950s and 1960s (21). They are very

concerned that these exposures have had a health

impact on their communities. The potential for

additional exposures can only add to those concerns and the stress experienced.

In summary, a tremendous number of

unknowns remain in considering the populations

that might be most at risk of exposure to radionuclides dumped into the Arctic and North Pacific

Oceans. Detailed studies of the dietary habits of

many coastal peoples are almost nonexistent, as

is any monitoring of the locally harvested foods

and good information about the size of the harvests. Without such information, it is difficult to

estimate what exposures are currently taking

place from background and fallout radiation, and

what concerns might be appropriate regarding

future dissemination of the dumped wastes.

TABLE 3-3: Naturally Occuring 

Radionuclides in Seawater—

Typical Concentrations

Radionuclide Concentration (picocuriesa per liter)

K-40 320

H-3 0.6–3.0

Rb-87 2.9

U-234 1.3

U-238 1.2

C-14 0.2

Ra-228 (0.1–10) x 10-2

Pb-210 (1.0–6.8) x 10-2

U-235 5 x 10-2

Ra-226 (4.0–4.5) x 10-2

Po-210 (0.6–4.2) x 10-2

Rn-222 2 x 10-2

Th-228 (0.2–3.1) x 10-3

Th-230 (0.6–14) x 10-4

Th-232 (0.1–7.8) x 10-4

a1 picocurie = 1 x 10-12 curies = 0.037 becquerels

SOURCE: adapted from R.B. Clark, Marine Pollution, 2nd ed. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1989).
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 103

❚ Risk Assessments Completed or in 

Progress

A thorough assessment of the risks posed by

nuclear waste dumping in the Arctic and North

Pacific would incorporate understanding of the

source term, detailed information on the pathways through which human exposure might

occur, and knowledge of the critical populations

to arrive at an estimate of the likely risk. Such

assessments have been carried out in the past for

other sources, as described in box 3-4. However,

the preceding sections describe the fact that vital

information, particularly about Arctic pathways

and peoples, is sorely lacking. In its absence,

several efforts have nonetheless been made by

various investigators to estimate the risks in an

effort to get a rough sense of the appropriate levels of concern.

Several of these estimates use population

doses such as the collective effective dose to

consider the potential total cancer impacts on

populations rather than the risks to particular

individuals. As described in box 3-1, the collective effective dose is calculated by multiplying

the average dose to the exposed group by the

number of people in the group. It could therefore

be the same for a very low dose to a large population or a higher dose to a smaller population.

Use of the word commitment takes into account

the fact that when radioactive material enters the

body, the material gives a dose to the person for

a certain period of time. Collective doses are

most frequently used for the purpose of comparing estimates of total cancer impacts of one

radiological source with another, using units of

person-rem.

Two such estimates were presented at a conference addressing the issue of radioactive

dumping in the Arctic in June 1993. A crude estimate of global cancer risks from Arctic contamination was carried out based on a worst-case

scenario of instant release of the calculated 1993

inventory of radionuclides in the dumped reactors (43). The analysis multiplied World Health

Organization dose conversion factors (DCFs) for

each radionuclide by the estimated radionuclide

inventory to arrive at collective dose commitments. The collective dose commitments were

summed and multiplied by a cancer risk factor

for ionizing radiation of 0.05 fatal cancer per 100

rem (28) to arrive at an estimate of 0.6 fatal cancer from exposure to the radionuclide inventory

from the nuclear wastes dumped in the Arctic.

The authors compared this to an estimate of

17,000 fatal radiation-induced cancers that could

occur as a result of the Chernobyl accident (43).

Another estimate of risks was based on the

same radionuclide activity inventory. Baxter et

al. used the inputs of Mount et al. (43), with a 16-

box model called ARCTIC2, which incorporates

oceanographic and hydrographic information

about the relevant seas (3). The model output

BOX 3–4: Dose Assessment from Anthropogenic Radionuclides 

in the Ocean: Precedents

Despite the many challenges associated with trying to assess the potential radiation doses from

ocean discharges or dumping of radionuclides, two notable precedents exist. One such assessment was

carried out on the Northeast Atlantic Dump Site, by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The other was the result of Project MARINA, an

effort to assess the impact of several sources of radioactivity in marine waters on European Community

populations.

The Northeast Atlantic dump sites are deep sea sites used by eight European countries to dump lowlevel nuclear wastes between 1949 and 1982. The NEA is requested to review the suitability of the dump

sites in use every five years, considering the likely radiological impact of dumping operations on both

humans and the environment. Such an assessment was carried out for NEA by the multinational Coordinated Research and Surveillance Program (CRESP) in 1985 (50).

(continued)
104 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

provides radionuclide concentration data, which

are used with IAEA-recommended concentration

factors to estimate corresponding concentrations

in fish. Radionuclide intake in humans is then

estimated based on fisheries data, with assumptions made about typical fish consumption.

Finally, conversions to dose were made with gut

transfer factors and DCFs from the International

Commission on Radiological Protection.

The results from this modeling and risk estimate found a range of collective dose commitment from a maximum of 15,000 person-rem (for

instantaneous release of all dumped activity

according to the Yablokov report) from Cs-137

Because surveillance data indicated no significant radionuclide concentrations in water, sediment, or

biota, a source term model was developed to estimate a release rate from the dumped objects. An

oceanographic model then was used to predict radionuclide concentrations in water and sediment as a

function of time, and the data generated were used to estimate doses to critical groups. Calculations

were carried out for three scenarios including the past dumping, the past dumping plus five additional

years at the rates typical of past dumping, and past dumping plus five years at rates 10 times those typical of the past. The following table shows the estimated peak annual doses to individuals in potentially

exposed groups as they were calculated in the assessment. The peak doses calculated were to those

eating mollusks in the Antarctic and fell orders of magnitude below the 100 mrem (0.1 rem) dose limit of

the International Commission on Radiological Protection for members of the public.

Both monitoring data and simple models were used to assess the likely doses to critical groups from

marine pathways in the European Community in Project MARINA (37). The assessment considered radioactivity from several different sources, including liquid wastes from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, liquid wastes from nuclear powerplants and other nuclear industry sites, wastes from solid waste disposal in

the northeast Atlantic (referred to above), fallout from Chernobyl, and naturally occurring radionuclides.

The table shows the estimated doses calculated in this effort due to discharges from the nuclear fuel

reprocessing plant at Sellafield and from weapons testing fallout and naturally occurring radiation.

BOX 3–4: Dose Assessment from Anthropogenic Radionuclides 

in the Ocean: Precedents (Cont’d.)

Source

Estimated source 

term at release 

(curies)

Estimated peak 

annual dosesa to individuals (mrem) Pathway, location

Northeast Atlantic

dump site

1.1 million 0.002 Consumption of mollusks

Antarctica

Sellafield >5.2 million 30-350b Fish and shellfish, Irish Sea

Fallout from weapons

testing

55 million 0.1–1.0 Fish, north European

waters

Naturally occurring

radiation

200 Mollusks, crustaceans

aCommitted effective dose arising from intakes of radionuclides in the same year.

bDoses from Sellafield were calculated to have peaked in the early 1980s and to be well below 100 mrem by

1986.

SOURCES: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, Radioactivity in North European Waters: Report of Working Group 2 of CEC Project MARINA, Fisheries Research Data Report No. 20, (Lowestoft, U.K., 1989); Nuclear

Energy Agency, Review of the Continued Suitability of the Dumping Site for Radioactive Waste in the North-East

Atlantic (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1985).
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 105

down to much lower values with more realistic

assumptions. Individual doses for fish eaters

ranged from about 6 mrem per year to 0.1 mrem

per year. As discussed in box 3-3, individuals

who consume large amounts of seafoods can

receive about 200 mrem a year from naturally

occurring radionuclides. Similar estimates were

made for the other radionuclides in the dumped

wastes, with the conclusion that Co-60 and Cs137 would dominate the contribution to total

dose commitment from an instantaneous release,

whereas C-14 would create most of the dose

commitment after a slower release (500 years).

The authors concluded that the amount of radioactivity due to wastes disposed in the Arctic seas

will be low—either comparable to or less than

those from natural or other man-made sources (3).

Two other dose assessments are presented in

the Joint Russian-Norwegian Expert Group

report from the 1993 expedition to the Kara Sea.

In one assessment, doses to critical groups are

calculated based on current levels of radioactive

contamination in the Barents and Kara Seas. The

estimates rely on dynamic models of radionuclide migration and accumulation through living

organisms (31). The models take into account

temperature, stable chemical analogs, and concentration factors. Average and maximum concentrations of Cs-137 and Sr-90 in the Barents

and Kara Seas from 1961 to 1990 were used with

experimental and calculated concentration factors and assumptions about fish consumption to

arrive at estimates of dose. Based on measured

seawater radionuclide concentrations during

these years, dose maxima were observed that

resulted from the heaviest fallout of weapons

testing in the early 1960s and from a peak in

nuclear waste disposal at Sellafield in the early

1980s. Results are presented in terms of annual

risk of fatal cancer and do not exceed 8 x 10-7 (31).

A second estimate of potential doses by the

Joint Russian-Norwegian Expert Group is based

on consideration of release of the dumped

wastes; it represents ongoing work to model different release scenarios, transport processes, sedimentation, uptake in various marine species, and

consumption of these species by humans. The

model is being developed by Riso National Laboratory, Denmark, in collaboration with the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority and the

Institute of Marine Research in Norway. The

model is based on two different regional box

models covering European coastal waters, the

Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic, with input

of experimental data from the Barents Sea. Differential equations describe the transfer of radionuclides between regions in the mode.

Radioactive decay, transfer to and from sediments, and burial by additional sedimentation are

taken into account. Because data on the source

term remain limited, the current model assumes

the presence of only four radionuclides (Cs-137,

Co-60, Sr-90, and H-3) in equal amounts of

activity at the time of discharge. Parts of the

model have been tested for reliability with measured observations, but this has not yet been done

for the Kara Sea with site-specific information.

Two different release scenarios have been

considered with this model. One assumes instant

release of all the radionuclides at the time of

dumping. The second assumes release over a

period of 100 years. According to preliminary

estimates from this model, “the collective dose

will be small for both scenarios.” However,

investigators acknowledge that incomplete information still severely limits the ability to estimate

the potential total dose (31).

In a pilot study by the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, another estimate of

the potential cancer mortality from dumped spent

nuclear fuel is presented (49). Because many

characteristics of the spent fuel and its containment are still unknown, the estimate necessarily

incorporates several assumptions about release

rates and exposure routes. If no fission products

are released for years, the estimated total collective dose commitment from Cs-137 and Sr-90

combined is 300 person-rem through the food

chain. The contribution of Pu-239 to collective

effective dose is estimated to be about 170 person-rem, and the contribution of Am-241 estimated to be about the same. The total collective
106 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

effective dose commitment from the dumped

spent nuclear fuel is summarized as less than

1,000 person-rem to the world population, and it

is noted that this is equivalent to a few seconds of

natural background radiation.

The term “risk assessment” is used rather

loosely to describe a variety of analyses ranging

from back-of-the-envelope calculations to

exhaustive consideration of all possibilities to

arrive at an estimate of the probability of an

event and associated uncertainties. Back-of-theenvelope estimates provide some useful information but clearly have considerable weaknesses. In

estimating the total cancer mortality or collective

dose, they assume distribution of the radiation

dose over the global population. This permits a

form of comparison with other sources of environmental radiation, such as fallout from weapons testing or natural radiation. It does not

convey, however, the range of doses that individuals may experience and the potential local

impacts on small communities. Also, by smoothing over the myriad uncertainties and information gaps using rough guesses, these estimates

suggest an ease and confidence in assessing risks

that are misleading.

Nonetheless, in the absence of more thorough

and detailed risk assessments, the rough estimates carried out thus far do provide valuable

information in considering the potential scale of

the radiological impact. They suggest that the

global effects of the dumping that has taken

place to date are unlikely to be catastrophic, on

the scale of a Chernobyl, and may not be detectable against the effects from other radiation, both

natural and man-made. It is clear, however, that

more information is necessary to better understand the range of risks to individuals and to

local communities.

ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION IN 

THE ARCTIC AND NORTH PACIFIC 

REGIONS

Particularly in an environment such as the Arctic,

where Native people continuing traditional lifestyles rely heavily on the local ecosystems for

food and other aspects of survival, it is artificial

to evaluate the risks to human health independent

of the impacts on the surrounding ecology. In

these settings, humans and other populations (sea

mammals, caribou, fish, etc.) are interconnected,

with humans dependent on the other populations

that make up their environment. For this reason,

it is of particular interest to understand what

impacts from environmental radioactive contamination may result to other populations in the

ecosystem.

Earlier sections indicated that radionuclides

can be transported and even concentrated

through the food chain to lead to human exposure. Beyond this, however, how are the populations that make up the food chain and ecosystem

affected by radiation exposure? As with the

study of radioactivity’s effects on humans, the

study of radioactive impacts on plants and animals began to be of concern after the first nuclear

detonations occurred in the 1940s. After many

early studies focusing only on acute effects,

emphasis had shifted by the late 1950s to more

ecologically relevant research—longer-term

experiments with much lower dose rates and

more attention to responses other than mortality

(26). Considerable activity continued in this field

in the United States until the 1970s when many

such programs were scaled back.

Repeatedly, as standards were developed to

protect human beings from the hazardous effects

of exposure to radiation, it was assumed that

these safety levels would also prove protective to

other species, if not individual members of those

species (27). The most recent ICRP statement on

the subject follows:

The Commission believes that the standard

of environmental control needed to protect man

to the degree currently thought desirable will

ensure that other species are not put at risk.

Occasionally, individual members of nonhuman species might be harmed, but not to the
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 107

extent of endangering whole species or creating

imbalance between species.11

A recent IAEA publication examined this

assumption, reviewing the relevant literature for

aquatic and terrestrial biota (26). Several effects

of radiation on plants and animals were evident

from the literature. For example, reproduction

(including the processes from gametogenesis

through embryonic development) is likely to be

the most limiting end point in terms of population maintenance for both terrestrial and aquatic

organisms. Also the total accumulated dose at

which a given response was observed increased

as the dose rate declined. Furthermore, sensitivity to the effects of radiation varies among species. In the case of aquatic organisms,

radiosensitivity increases with increasing complexity. The publication concluded:

There is no convincing evidence from the

scientific literature that chronic radiation dose

rates below 1 mGy [milligray] per day [0.1 rad/

day] will harm animal or plant populations. It is

highly probable that limitation of the exposure

of the most exposed humans (the critical human

group), living on and receiving full sustenance

from the local area, to 1 millisievert per year

[100 mrem/year] will lead to dose rates to plants

and animals in the same area of less than 1

mGy/d[ay]. Therefore, specific radiation protection standards for non-human biota are not

needed.12

The document concludes, therefore, that plant

and animal populations appear to be no more

sensitive than humans to the effects of radiation

in the environment. The literature from which

this is drawn, however, is severely lacking in

studies carried out in the extreme environment of

the Arctic.

Because of the special conditions in the Arctic, relationships or radionuclide behavior based

on observations in nonpolar regions cannot necessarily be expected to hold. For example, radio11 International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication No. 60 (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1991). 12 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Plants and Animals at Levels Implied by Current Radiation Protection Standards, Technical Reports Series No. 332 (Vienna: IAEA, 1992).

active fallout deposited on land is cleansed much

more slowly in Arctic than in more temperate

regions. The reason for this difference lies in the

relatively ineffective natural dissipative processes in the Arctic compared with other regions.

Short growing seasons and limited supplies of

heat, nutrients, and moisture lead to slower biological turnover rates that aid in the dispersal of

radionuclides (63). Similarly, concentration factors in organisms might be different in food webs

unique to the Arctic environment.

Some studies have examined the effects of

low temperature and salinity on radiation

responses in several aquatic animals. Changes in

salinity tend to increase metabolic demands and

thus make the animals more sensitive to radiation. Salinity itself, however, can be protective

since nonradioactive chemical analogs of radionuclides that might otherwise be taken up and

stored in tissues can dilute the radionuclide concentration (65). Low temperatures lengthen cell

cycle times and slow the development of lethal

biochemical lesions, but they may also slow

repair processes (25). Whether these factors

combine to make Arctic fauna more or less sensitive to radiation effects is not clear. In particular,

improved information about the doses to

reproductive tissues in critical species is needed,

along with an understanding of the distribution

of radionuclides in these tissues (25).

Effects on fertility in aquatic organisms are

first observed in sensitive organisms at dose rates

between 0.2 and 5 milligrays (mGy) per hour

(0.2 and 0.5 rad per hour), comparable to the

range observed in some mammals and indicating

that aquatic organisms are not necessarily more

radiation resistant than mammals (25). Data still

more useful for assessing the impacts of radiation on populations would be studies on the

“intrinsic rate of natural increase,” or r, which

takes into account both the death and the birth

rates. Such data are almost nonexistent. In the
108 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

freshwater crustacean Daphnia pulex, however, r

was reduced to zero at about 70 rad per hour.

The Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystems are

inherently more dynamic and unstable than more

temperate regions. Interdependent populations of

many animals fluctuate with different periodicities, leading to intermittent peaks and crises (33).

Since many unknowns remain about the populations most vulnerable to the effects of radiation

in the Arctic environment, it is not evident how

the effects of environmental radiation would

manifest themselves against this background. At

this point, no “sentinel organisms” have been

identified that can serve as early warnings of

radiation threats to the Arctic ecology.

The only published information on actual

evaluations of the effects of nuclear waste disposal in the deep sea on marine organisms has

been reports on the Northeast Atlantic dump site

used by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). For more than 40 years, lowlevel radioactive waste from nuclear powerplant

operations, fuel fabrication and reprocessing,

industrial and medical use, and dismantling and

decontamination of nuclear plant equipment

have been dumped at deep-sea sites in the Northeast Atlantic. Periodically, the Nuclear Energy

Agency reviews the continued suitability of the

site, assessing the likely radiological impact of

the dumping on both humans and the environment (50). Modeling is used to estimate the dispersion of radionuclides and the dose rates to

organisms from past dumping practices as well

as from potential future dumping at the site.

According to the modeling, which is carried out

with conservative assumptions, the dose rates

received by fish, mollusks, and crustaceans from

both past and projected dumping would not

result in discernible environmental damage. Peak

doses from the dumping of low-level waste,

except for benthic mollusks at the site, were

within the range of doses received through natural background radiation in the deep sea (25).

CONCLUSIONS

The nuclear wastes dumped in the Arctic and Far

East raise questions about impacts on human

health and the environment, both currently and in

the future. Current risks appear to be very low

since there is no indication of significant leakage

or migration of radionuclides from the dump

sites. More thorough investigation of the sites is

necessary to confirm this.

There is not yet a clear answer to questions of

what the future health and ecological impacts of

nuclear wastes dumped in the Arctic and North

Pacific will be. Estimates and approximations of

future impacts based on the information available do not suggest a noticeable effect on human

health or on plant and animal populations. However, many unknowns remain, from the status of

the dumped wastes, to the likely movement of

the radionuclides through the environment, to the

dietary intakes of those most likely to be

exposed.

Decisions about public health must often be

made in the absence of complete information,

however. In this case, concerns for public health

suggest several important needs. One is the need

to prevent further such releases of nuclear wastes

into the environment, in accord with the London

Convention. Despite the uncertainties in and controversy about the effects of low-dose exposure

to radiation, there is general agreement among

relevant international commissions and national

regulatory bodies that radiation exposures should

be “as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA),

economic and social factors being taken into

account.”13 This concept of ALARA stems from

scientific consensus that it is unlikely that the

presence or absence of a true threshold for cancer

in human populations from radiation exposure

can be proved. In the absence of a threshold the

principles of prevention dictate minimizing

exposure to the extent possible by weighing the

other factors involved. As discussed in chapter 2,

once radionuclides have been released into the

13 International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication No. 60 (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1991).
Chapter 3 Environmental and Health Effects of Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic | 109

environment it is very difficult to completely

anticipate or characterize their movement

through environmental pathways and eventual

human exposure to them. Preventing their release

to the extent possible is an obvious way of minimizing human exposure and, thus, human health

risk.

The second need is to fill some remaining

information gaps to determine whether the estimates of negligible effect are well grounded.

These include inspecting each of the dumped

nuclear reactors containing spent fuel to ascertain its condition, any local contamination that

may have occurred, and the anticipated release

rates of radionuclides. Other dumped wastes

should also be located, and their contents determined to the extent possible. Where it is learned

that releases may have occurred, strategic monitoring of critical pathways and the food chain

should take place to ensure protection of populations.

As more information is gathered and as monitoring systems are considered, it is critical that

the public be involved in the process. Genuine

efforts are needed to ensure that potentially

affected communities participate in decisionmaking, provide input, and have access to the

collected information. Protecting public health in

circumstances of limited or inadequate information involves:

1. Understanding the concerns of critical populations: What potential sources of exposure

are of most concern to the people? What is

their understanding of the hazard and its

source? What information can they provide

about foods and habits that can help improve

the understanding of potential exposures?

2. Communicating the state of knowledge to critical populations: What is known and what

gaps in understanding remain? How can these

be made known to people without scientific

training who distrust many sources of information?

3. Setting up a system of monitoring that the

population accepts and understands: Does the

system address the concerns of the community, and is access to the collected information

provided?

4. Using public input to design a warning system: What is the best way to advise people of

information from the monitoring system? At

what point and in what manner should people

be cautioned about potential exposures?

As research and efforts to assess risk continue,

they must be carried out with complete openness

about both current knowledge and knowledge

gaps, and with sincere efforts to involve the public in future decisionmaking.

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| 115

4

Sources and

Risks of

Potential Future

Contamination

ost research and data collection

efforts to date have focused on past

radioactive contamination and

releases. Beyond the contamination

that already exists, however, lies the further risk

that future releases, dumping, or accidents could

significantly add to this problem. While past

dumping and releases have received recent attention from scientists and governments, the risk of

future releases has not been subject to the same

scrutiny or study.

The following discussion is a review of the

nature and general magnitude of this future risk

and of what we know or don’t know about

actions that have been, could be, or should be

taken. The discussion is not quantitative because

the data that have been collected so far are limited. It is, however, illustrative of several areas of

potential future contamination. Even though the

potential for significant contamination may be

problematic, the risks are real, and in many

cases, the proverbial ounce of prevention could

well be worth pounds of cure.

According to information currently available,

certain areas are at risk of future contamination

from Russian nuclear activities in the Arctic and

North Pacific regions. OTA has selected three of

these areas for focus and analysis in this study

because they appear to be the most significant at

this time. These are: 1) the Russian Northern and

Pacific Fleets and their vulnerabilities during the

downsizing and dismantlement now under way;

2) the management of spent nuclear fuel and

waste from these fleets and concerns about effective containment safety, security, or future

releases; and 3) concerns about possible future

accidents or releases from Russian civilian

nuclear power plants, particularly those located

in the Arctic.

Based on the limited data currently available,

it appears important to evaluate appropriate measures for the prevention of future releases, dumping, or accidents like those that have occurred in

the past. For example, the situation with regard

to the management of spent fuel and other radioactive waste from the Russian nuclear fleet presents a special concern. There are serious

problems in Russia related to: submarine dismantlement and the removal of spent fuel from

submarine reactors; the storage of spent fuel

aboard service ships that are used in the submarine defueling process; spent fuel handling and

storage at naval bases in the north and Far East;1

the lack of capacity at land-based storage facili1 The northern naval bases are mainly on the Kola Peninsula, near the Norwegian border and adjacent to the Barents Sea; the Far Eastern

bases are mainly near Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan and Kamchatka.

M
116 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

ties; the question of what to do with damaged

fuel and nonstandard fuel for which no reprocessing system exists; the transport of spent fuel;

and the system to transfer spent fuel to, and

reprocess it at Mayak in the Ural Mountains.

Within the Russian Navy, older nuclear submarines have been retired and decommissioned

over the past several years at an increasing rate.

Over 120 submarines have been taken out of service, and about 100 nuclear submarines are in

various stages of decommissioning. Only about

40 of these have had their spent fuel removed,

and some decommissioned submarines have

been out of service with nuclear fuel aboard for

over 15 years. The most serious factor contributing to this condition is that almost all spent fuel

storage facilities at the nuclear fleet bases are

full, and there are difficulties in transporting fuel

to reprocessing sites.

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

has begun to identify some high-priority problems associated with the management of spent

fuel from the Russian nuclear fleet through discussions with Russian officials and experts.

These problems were reviewed at a special OTA

workshop on this subject in Washington, D.C., in

January 1995, where Russian officials presented

their analysis of the problem and discussed

approaches to solutions with technical counterparts from the United States.2 Some key problems with refueling and storage relate to the

current backlog of spent fuel and decommissioned submarines awaiting defueling. There is a

lack of fuel reloading and storage equipment

(including service ships, transfer bases, and landbased storage), and what does exist is poorly

maintained.

In recent years, the Russians have not been

able to transport spent fuel to the normal reprocessing plant at Mayak, and spent fuel storage

facilities are near capacity. This has become a

serious problem for fuel management operations

2 See “Summary of Workshop on Russian Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management,” U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, Environment Program (April 1995).

in the Navy and at the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC) and could affect ship operations in

the future. For example, there are indications that

GOSATOMNADZOR (GAN), the Russian

nuclear regulatory agency, plans to demand submarine defueling as a first step in decommissioning. This may further delay the processing of

decommissioning submarines.

In addition, the Russians are experiencing

problems with the current situation that result in

long-term, in-core fuel storage aboard retired

submarines. In some cases, reactor cores and

other reactor components of retired submarines

are close to or beyond their useful lifetimes.

GAN characterizes the technical condition of

these systems as “intolerable.” Under such circumstances, extended in-core storage of spent

fuel may increase the incidence of fuel failure

due to radiation or thermal damage to the cladding and to cladding corrosion. According to

GAN, these problems often cannot be observed

or controlled because of the lack of reactor monitoring equipment. However, the Ministry of

Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the Navy

claim that fuel that has not been damaged during

reactor operations is unlikely to fail during incore storage.3 They also claim that there is even

some advantage of in-core storage: after three to

five years of storage, fuel can be placed directly

in dry storage or sent to Mayak for reprocessing.

However, some fuel is already damaged, and no

complete analysis of this overall problem is

available.

Another key problem is with transportation of

spent fuel because of a shortage of railcars for

upgraded transportation casks,4 facilities for

loading and transporting the casks, organizational problems at fuel transfer bases, and lack of

upgrades in the transportation infrastructure.

This problem has recently received attention at

the Northern Icebreaker Fleet base at Murmansk,

3 This view is supported by experiments: for example, spent fuel has been kept without deterioration in-core on the icebreaker Sibir’ for

three years (53). 4 The Russians have recently introduced a redesigned transportation cask to meet international safety standards.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 117

and several spent fuel shipments have occurred

in 1995. The situation in the Far East, however,

remains serious, and no shipments appear possible in the short term.

Nonstandard or damaged fuel rods from submarine and icebreaker reactors present another

set of problems. Such fuel includes zirconiumuranium alloy fuel, fuel from liquid metal reactors, damaged and failed fuel assemblies, and

fuel in damaged reactor cores. Russia does not

have current technology to reprocess or dispose

of nonstandard or damaged fuel. Also, removing

damaged fuel from reactors for temporary storage, and selecting or developing appropriate

future treatment or storage technologies, are both

challenging and costly. This process is proceeding at a very slow rate because of a lack of

resources. Additional evaluation of specific situations and some focused research or development are probably needed to ensure future safe

management. The question of future risks from

operations to dismantle nuclear submarines and

manage spent fuel has recently been addressed in

a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

study (49). Box 4-1 presents analyses of the

hypothetical accidents used in this study.

Institutional issues are exacerbating difficulties in the spent fuel management system, as is

the problem of identifying the necessary

resources to apply to solutions. However, other

areas may also pose future risks, but they have

not been as well documented or evaluated. For

example, the major Russian nuclear test site at

Novaya Zemlya contains significant residuals of

past weapons testing. During 1955 through 1990,

the former Soviet Union (fSU) conducted at least

90 atmospheric tests there (including the largestyield explosion ever); 42 underground tests

(most of which were in tunnels into mountains),

and three underwater tests (62). Although there is

clear evidence of radiation fallout from atmospheric tests spread over major portions of the

globe, the migration of radionuclides from

underground tests has not been documented.

Some researchers, however, recommend that surveys or monitoring at the test sites may be warranted.

Other sources of radioactivity that have

caused concern because they may add to future

releases include a large number of so-called

peaceful nuclear explosions in Russia that were

used for various purposes such as excavation and

construction over a period of a several decades.

Whether radionuclide residuals from these

migrate beyond local sites is problematic, and no

careful investigations have been made. Another

concern is the extensive use of radioisotopepowered generators by the Russians in a large

number of lighthouses in the Arctic. Poor operational, safety, and waste disposal practices could

lead to releases from these devises, but no significant threats have so far been identified (49).

The following sections, therefore, present currently available information and analyses of the

areas on which OTA has focused its evaluation.

THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FLEET

The Russian fleet of nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships (including icebreakers) is

the largest in the world, with a total of 140 active

vessels at the end of 1994. During the 1970s and

1980s, the size of the Russian nuclear fleet was

substantially larger than that of the United States.

However, today, the U.S. nuclear fleet—with

about 117 vessels—is only slightly smaller. Only

three other nations have nuclear fleets—the

United Kingdom with 16 submarines, France

with 11, and China with one (36). Both the

United States and the former Soviet Union began

building nuclear-powered submarines in the

1950s and had roughly the same number by the

1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet nuclear

fleet grew faster and larger than that of the

United States. Soviet nuclear fleet strength

peaked in 1989, just before the dissolution of the

U.S.S.R.

Today’s Russian nuclear fleet consists of

about 128 active nuclear-powered submarines,

five icebreakers, and six other surface ships. An

equal or larger number of nuclear-powered ships

make up the inactive fleet and are in various

stages of lay-up or decommissioning. Much of

the inactive fleet consists of submarines awaiting
118 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

dismantlement and disposal of their nuclear fuel,

reactor compartments, and nuclear waste. The

nuclear fuel or waste from poorly managed, laidup ships could pose a threat to the Arctic or

North Pacific environment if accidents or

releases of radioactivity occurred.

The total number of nuclear submarines taken

out of service is similarly being driven by the

BOX 4-1: Case Study: Risk Assessment of Moored Submarines

A recent study by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) includes two risk assessments that

evaluate the impact of hypothetical accidents related to decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines

moored in the vicinity of the Kola Peninsula. The first assessment used probabilistic methods to evaluate

the risk and long-term impact of radionuclide leakage from 60 nuclear submarines that would have been

laid up at Northern Fleet bases located on the Kola Fjord. The model included various exposure pathways such as inhalation, external radiation, and food consumption. Due to the lack of operational data

from the Russian Navy, a somewhat arbitrary accident probability of .001 per year per ship was assumed.

This probability is equal to the accident probability of the least safe land-based commercial European

nuclear power reactors. This hypothetical accident would be initiated by large-scale atmospheric emissions caused by cooling system failure followed by overheating of the core, or perhaps by criticality

occurring during defueling of the reactor. The study concluded that in northeastern Scandinavia, the risk

of additional fatalities from nuclear reactor accidents in moored nuclear submarines is comparable to

those due to the operation of land-based commercial nuclear reactors used for electrical production. In

southern Scandinavia, the risk of cancer-related casualties would be 100 times lower from submarinebased accidents than the risk due to nuclear reactors used for electrical production. However, the Russian population exposure in Murmansk and elsewhere on the Kola Peninsula would be higher due to submarine-related accidents.

The second study consisted of a simulation of a real accident at an exact location near the city of Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula. The probabilistic model described above provides useful information

regarding mortality risks; however, the risk of injury from a real accident would be significantly higher.

This study used historical weather data to predict air mass dispersion patterns. The scenario used in the

simulation considered the consequences of an accidental release of radionuclides into the atmosphere

from a nuclear submarine being serviced at docks just outside Murmansk. The release was arbitrarily

chosen to occur on July 15, 1994. The resulting air dispersion model predicted the formation of a radiation cloud and deposition matrix that would cause both external and inhaled radionuclide exposure. During the first 48 hours, only individuals in the immediate Murmansk area would be exposed to effective

radiation doses at milliSievert levels. After that, the radiation cloud would drift north into the Barents Sea.

However, two days later the weather patterns might shift, and contaminated air masses would be transported south again across major parts of Finland and northwestern Russia. The authors of the study were

careful to note that uncertainties in real-time modeling would lead to a factor of uncertainty of five to 10

times the reported values.

The study concludes that risks associated with the operation of nuclear vessels in Russia’s Northern

Fleet and icebreakers are difficult to estimate. Accidents that lead to large releases of radioactivity would

clearly have significant local consequences, but their cross-border, international impacts would be modest. However, NATO’s analysis of the present rate of submarine decommissioning and of the Northern

Fleet’s capacity for defueling, storing, and transporting nuclear waste indicates that a problem of “considerable magnitude” exists locally in northwest Russia.

SOURCE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defense-Related Installations and Activities, Final Report, Volume I: Radioactive Contamination, Phase I:

1993–1995, (Kjeller, Norway: NATO, 1995).
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 119

Russian government’s policies aimed at reducing

the size of the Russian Navy. The actual pace of

nuclear submarine decommissioning is, however, subject to speculation and the anticipated

impact of the (yet to-be-ratified) START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) II. Bottlenecks in

spent fuel and radioactive waste management

have slowed down the pace of retirement.

❚ Location and Condition of 

the Russian Nuclear Fleet

Although some naval units of the fSU have come

under the control of former Soviet Republics

other than Russia, the two major fleets and the

entire nuclear Navy (in the north on the Kola

Peninsula and on the Pacific Coast) are wholly

Russian. In addition, Russia operates the world’s

largest fleet of civilian nuclear-powered icebreakers. These ships are operated by the Murmansk Shipping Company and based at its

Atomflot facility on the Kola Peninsula. These

icebreakers have always been an important component of the Soviet fleet because of the need to

operate during winter months.

The Russian Navy is organized into four

fleets: the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black

Sea Fleets. Like the U.S. Navy, each fleet is further subdivided into strategic and nonstrategic

elements. The ballistic missile submarine force

(SSBNs) represents the strategic fleet elements.

There are no nuclear-powered submarines in service in the Baltic or Black Sea Fleet. Thus, with

the breakup of the former Soviet Union, all

nuclear-powered submarines and ships remain

under Russian Navy command.

The nuclear-powered ships are divided

between the Northern Fleet headquartered in

Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia near the Norwegian border and

the Pacific Fleet headquartered in Vladivostok.

Traditionally, submarine forces have been allocated two-thirds to the Northern Fleet and onethird to the Pacific Fleet (36).

Table 4-1 summarizes the types and fleet

command of active Russian nuclear vessels as of

January 1995. OTA estimates that as of early

1995, a total of 128 nuclear-powered submarines

were in active service, 88 in the Northern Fleet

and 40 in the Pacific Fleet. In addition, a total of

121 submarines from the Northern (70) and

Pacific (51) Fleets have been decommissioned,

laid up, or sunk (see table 4-5). A few of these

decommissioned submarines are in shipyards for

TABLE 4-1: Russian Nuclear Fleet as of January 1995

Nuclear ships Northern Fleet/MSC Pacific Fleet

Ship class and type Total Active Active

SSBN Ballistic missile submarines 48 32 16

SSGN Guided missile submarines 22 14 8

SSN/

SSAN

Torpedo attack submarines 58 42 16

CGN Nuclear cruisers 3 2 1

AGBN Nuclear icebreakers 7 7 0

AGN Auxiliary transport 1 1 0

AGBM Auxiliary missile range 1 0 1

Total 140 98 42

KEY: MSC = Murmansk Shipping Company

SOURCES: Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1994–95, Captain Richard Sharpe (ed.), 97th edition (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 1994) ; J. Handler, “Working Paper on: The Future of the Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Force,” (Draft), Greenpeace Disarmament Campaign, May 15,

1995; T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, “Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway:

Bellona Foundation, 1994); V.A. Danilian, Russian Federation Pacific Fleet, Information presented at the Office of Technology Assessment Workshop on Spent Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management, Washington, DC, Jan. 17–18, 1995.
120 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

overhaul and upgrade, but the vast majority are

tied up at dockside waiting for defueling and dismantlement.

Both the United States and Russia are currently engaged in major efforts to reduce their

nuclear arsenals and the size of their military

forces. These efforts are driven by agreements or

treaties, budget constraints, obsolescence, and

general reduction of Cold War justifications for

military forces. Many naval nuclear ships of both

countries have been retired or inactivated on a

regular basis for more than a decade, and this

activity will probably continue for more than a

decade in the future. Ships are inactivated when

they reach the end of their useful lifetime, when

policies are implemented to reduce forces, or

when such reduction is necessary to comply with

treaty requirements that limit ballistic missile

capacity. START I and II have provisions calling

for reduction in nuclear warhead launchers over

specific time periods. START I came into force

in December 1994; START II, which was signed

in January 1993, has yet to be ratified by either

the United States or Russia. These treaties, however, specify a limit only on the number of

deployable nuclear weapons—thus, they would

require the destruction of launch tubes, but not

the dismantlement of submarines or any other

actions on nuclear-powered vessels. Some analysts, however, have projected probable actions

by the Russian Navy to comply with START I

(and START II when it is ratified), as well as

actions that will result from general demilitarization and budget reductions in Russia in the

future.

Table 4-2 contains a simplified forecast of the

Russian nuclear fleet from 1994 to 2003. The

data presented in this table are based on various

sources (2,12,29,36,48). The data indicate that

significant deactivation of nuclear submarines

(which has been under way since 1991) will continue in the near future and that another 70 to 80

additional ships or submarines will be added to

the current retired fleet (to be dismantled) over

the next decade.

The relatively rapid decommissioning of

nuclear submarines in the recent past has placed

TABLE 4-2: Projections of Russian Nuclear Fleet Composition and Numbers of Vessels, 1994 through 2003 

(Based on an Interpretation of Actions Following Treaty Agreements)

Year

Ballistic 

missile 

submarines

Cruise missile 

submarines

Attack/ 

auxiliary 

submarines Cruisers Icebreakers Other

Total

nuclear

fleet

Cumulative 

retirements

1990 61 46 74 3 7 2 193a 39

1994 48 22 58 3 7 2 140b 102c

2000 21 14 45 3 8 1 92d 157e

2003 18 13 26 3 8 1 69f 180g

a See G. Baham, “Nuclear Fleet of the fSU: A Preliminary Analysis of Dismantlement Activities,” Staff Paper prepared for OTA, February 1995.

b Submarine numbers were obtained from J. Handler, “Working Paper on: The Future of the Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Force,”

(Draft), Greenpeace Disarmament Campaign, May 15, 1995. Remaining data were obtained from Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1994–95, Captain Richard Sharpe (ed.), 97th edition (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 1994).

c This figure includes 101 nuclear submarines and one icebreaker; it does not include 20 nuclear submarines that are in “active service” but laid

up and planned for decommissioning.

d This figure includes 26 Victor III-class SSNs and 14 Oscar-class SSGNs in the total, some of which may be retired by this date. In addition,

three SSN class nuclear-powered submarines which are under construction are included in this total. For more information, see J. Handler,

“Working Paper on: The Future of the Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Force” (Draft), Greenpeace Disarmament Campaign, May 15, 1995.

e This figure includes 154 nuclear submarines, one icebreaker, one cruiser, and one auxiliary.

f This projected total assumes a 20-year service life and includes 5 Typhoon and 13 Delta class SSBNs. Also 8 Victor III class SSNs and 13

Oscar class SSGNs were included in the total count, some of which may be retired by this date. In addition, new construction of five SSN class

nuclear-powered submarines is included.

g This figure includes 177 nuclear submarines, one cruiser, one auxiliary, and one nuclear icebreaker.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 121

considerable demands on the logistical infrastructure of the Russian Navy. Two factors complicating decommissioning are the simultaneous

retirement of a large number of older, first- and

second-generation, general-purpose, nuclearpowered submarines. The normal lifetime of

these submarines is 20 years according to a Russian Navy source (11). The second factor is the

deterioration of economic conditions since the

breakup of the Soviet Union. The severely

restricted budgets of the past several years have

taken a toll on the logistical infrastructure of the

Navy.

The Russian Navy operates ten nuclear submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula and five on

the Pacific Coast, which provide home ports for

its fleet. The maintenance support for these bases

is provided by an network of shipyards and

repair facilities. The bases provide routine provisioning of consumable items and minor repair

services while the submarine is between at-sea

deployments. In addition, the critical role of

repair facilities and submarine tenders is to keep

the nuclear reactor fully serviced, as well as performing repairs on defective systems. These

tasks include removal of irradiated liquid and

solid waste, as well as replacement of spent

nuclear fuel with fresh fuel. Fuel removal is the

riskiest part of nuclear submarine maintenance.

Spent nuclear fuel represents the majority of

radioactivity in the reactor core. In the U.S.

Navy, removal of fuel is normally performed in a

naval shipyard during dry-docking. The Russian

Navy, however, refuels submarines while afloat

using service ships equipped for specialized

maintenance procedures.

❚ Russia’s Northern Fleet

At the end of 1994, the Northern Fleet had 88

nuclear submarines consisting of 32 SSBNs, and

56 SSGN/SSN5 general-purpose vessels assigned

to the Northern Fleet. A total of 70 nuclear submarines have been retired, including three that

5 SSBN (Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine); SSGN (Nuclear Guided Missile Submarine); and SSN (Nuclear Attack Submarine). See

table 4-1 for additional definitions for nuclear-powered ships and submarines.

were sunk. The locations of major Northern Fleet

submarine bases are described in box 4-2.

Nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships

are stationed at nine major bases located from the

Norwegian border on the Barents Sea to

Gremikha on the east end of the Kola Peninsula

in the vicinity of Murmansk (48). Three bases—

at Zapadnaya Litsa, Sevmorput, and the shipyard

at Severodvinsk—are connected by rail. All others, except Gremikha, have road connections.

The maps in figure 4-1 illustrate the general location of Russian nuclear facilities in the regions of

Murmansk and Arkhangel’sk.

Nuclear submarine repair and waste storage

facilities are located in the same region. The

Northern Fleet is served by the shipyards at

Severodvinsk, as well as a number of dedicated

naval facilities. Radioactive waste is stored at six

Northern Fleet locations on the Kola Peninsula

(48). The base at Zapadnaya Litsa generates

more waste than all the other bases on the Kola

Peninsula. These shipyards and other Northern

Fleet facilities are discussed in box 4-3.

Two shipyards in the north are engaged in

decommissioning Russian nuclear submarines—

Nerpa, along the Kola Fjord leading to Murmansk; and Zvezdochka, at Severodvinsk in

Arkhangel’sk Oblast.

Russia’s Pacific Fleet

There were 16 SSBNs and 24 SSGN/SSN general-purpose nuclear submarines assigned to the

Pacific Fleet at the end of 1994. A total of 51

nuclear submarines have been retired. Some of

the “active” assignments are not fully operational, but they have not been officially decommissioned either (29). Traditionally, the Soviet

Navy kept about one-third of its nuclear-powered

fleet in the Far East. The headquarters of the

Pacific Fleet is located in Vladivostok on the Sea

of Japan. Figure 4-2, a map of the Russian

Pacific Coast, illustrates the location of major

naval facilities.
122 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

The location of major bases for submarine

operations in the Pacific Fleet is described in box

4-4. Nuclear-powered submarines and surface

ships have been stationed at four major bases

(Rybachiy, Vladimir Bay, Zavety Ilyicha, and

Pavlovsk), and several minor bases from the

Kamchatka Peninsula to Vladivostok on the Sea

of Japan, near the Chinese border (31). Pacific

fleet shipyards and other facilities are shown in

box 4-5.

Murmansk Shipping Company Facilities

The operations of the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC), a private company and operator of

the Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet, are

conducted out of the Atomflot facility, which is

located north of the city of Murmansk. The base

is situated on the Murmansk Fjord, which has

waterborne access to the Barents Sea via the

Kola Fjord. Atomflot is a self-contained facility

for supporting the operations of the icebreaker

fleet. It contains workshops, liquid and solid

waste processing systems, and warehouses for

resupply of the ships. Major machinery and hull

repairs are performed at dry docks in the City of

Murmansk. Zvezdochka shipyard at Severodvinsk makes major repairs to icebreaker reactors.

BOX 4-2: Bases Serving the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy

Zapadnaya Litsa: This fjord contains the oldest submarine operating facility in the former Soviet

Union, also called Murmansk-150, probably commissioned in 1958. Four additional facilities are located

along this 16-km-long and 1- to 2-km-wide body of water, including those at Nerpichya Bay, Bolshaya

Lopatka Bay, Malaya Lopatka Bay (repair facility), and Andreeva Bay (waste storage). The Russian

Navy’s six Typhoon SSBNs are based at Nerpichya Bay. Bolshaya Lopatka services general-purpose,

guided missile and attack nuclear submarines. Malaya Lopatka is a repair facility, and the Andreeva Bay

Base stores nuclear waste materials.

Ara Bay: This is a 10-km fjord about 48 km north-northwest of Murmansk and 16 km east of Zapadnaya Litsa on the Barents Sea coast. The bay contains a small general-purpose nuclear submarine base.

Ura Bay: Ura Bay contains a complex of three facilities for servicing nuclear submarines. Ura Bay is

the largest, with two smaller facilities at Chan Ruchey and Vidyaevo.

Sayda Bay: The naval base at Gadzievo is located on the eastern side of Sayda Bay facing the town.

Strategic missile submarines are stationed at this facility. Laid-up nuclear submarines are kept at three

piers south of the town on the opposite side of the bay.

Olenya Bay: The naval base at Olenya Bay (Murmansk-60) is a small fjord, 6-km-long, located 3 to 4

km south of Sayda Bay and ending at Kut Bay.

Pala Bay: Pala Bay is a small, 4-km-long fjord that juts to the southwest at the entrance to Olenya Bay.

The town of Polyarny is located to the east, on the Murmansk Fjord. Delta and Yankee class submarines

have been stationed here in the past. Several decommissioned submarines are stored here.

Severomorsk: Severomorsk is the headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet. It is located on the

eastern side of Kola Fjord, 25 km north of the City of Murmansk. Severomorsk is a city of 70,000 in the

greater metropolitan area of Murmansk, which has 600,000 inhabitants. The base is also one of the major

storage facilities for armaments for the Northern Fleet.

Gremikha: Gremikha, also known as “Yokanga base,” is located at the eastern end of the Kola Peninsula on the Barents Sea, 300 km east of the mouth of Kola Fjord. This base has no road or rail access and

must be reached by sea. The Alfa class SSNs were based here, before they were laid up, the Oscar class

has also been based here.

SOURCE: T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, “Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol.

1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994); J. Handler, “The Northern Fleet’s Nuclear Submarine Bases,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review-Europe, Dec. 1993.
Source: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995, adapted from Handler, J., “The Northern Fleet’s Nuclear Submarine Bases,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review-Europe, Dec. 1993.
124 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Nuclear waste storage and handling is performed with the assistance of the five support

service ships listed in box 4-6. In addition, MSC

has storage facilities for low- and medium-level

waste. Table 4-3 describes the current status of

its five support service ships.

❚ Decommissioning of Nuclear 

Submarines

The Russian Navy laid up and began to decommission 15 to 25 nuclear submarines per year

from 1990 to 1994. Many of these ships had

reached the end of their useful life and had outdated weapons systems and power plant technology. If current plans are followed, an average of

six nuclear submarines per year will probably be

taken out of service by the Russian Navy during

the next decade.

Normal operation of the current Russian fleets

would require the replacement of about 20 reactor cores per year, 10 for each fleet (49). However, storage facilities currently have room for

only several additional reactor cores. The policy

of the Russian Navy has been to reserve even this

limited core storage space on service ships and

shore facilities to refuel operational submarines

only. Therefore, no spent fuel storage is available

for decommissioned submarine reactors. It is

likely that spent fuel on decommissioned submarines will not be removed for at least three to five

BOX 4-3: Northern Fleet Shipyards, Repair, Refueling, and Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities

Zapadnaya Litsaa: Radioactive waste is stored here in containers placed in a concrete bunker.

Reported past practices were to cover bunker sections in concrete and seal them as they were filled up.

Olenya Bay: The Nerpa,a,b refit yard is located in the town of Olenya Bay. This base has been

designated for dismantlement under START I. A small nuclear waste storage facility is located on the

southern end of Kut Bay on the beach of the yard.

Pala Bay: Shkval Repair Yarda is connected to the Polyarny base at Pala Bay. It is a large repair

and refit facility located at the end of the bay for SSN attack class submarines. A naval waste storage

site is located on the east side of the bay. Two waste transport ships are used for storage and movement of nuclear-contaminated materials from the refit facility.

Sevmorput: The naval shipyard at Sevmorputa is located at Rosta on the Kola Fjord, southwest of

the Severomorsk headquarters and just north of the City of Murmansk. New and spent fuel assemblies are stored at the shipyard for refueling operations. Spent fuel has been shipped directly from

here to Mayak for reprocessing in the past. New fuel assemblies for the entire Northern Fleet are usually stored here until they are picked up by service ships.

Gremikha: Gremikhaa lies in ice-free waters but has no significant rail or road access. Cutbacks

in the Navy’s budget have affected the local inhabitants, and many have left the area. Between 17

and 19 decommissioned nuclear submarines are stored here, as well as several officially operational

ships waiting for decommissioning. Nuclear waste from refueling operations is also stored on the base.

Severodvinsk: The town of Severodvinsk had 170,000 inhabitants at the end of 1993. There are

two major shipyards in Severodvinsk: Sevmasha and Zvezdochkab. They are located at the north end

of the town. The Akula class SSN are constructed at the Sevmash yard. The Yagry Island docks in

the Zvezdochka yard are also designated for the dismantlement of SSBNs under START I. Approximately one ship is now being processed at this site per year.

a These are also refueling facilities.

b Submarine dismantled yards.

SOURCE: T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, “Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol.

1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994).
Source: Office of Technology Assessment, adapted from Handler, J., “Russia’s Pacific Fleet-Submerine Bases and Facilities,” Jane’s Intelligence Review-Europe, Apr. 1994
126 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 4-4: Nuclear Submarine Bases of the Russian Pacific Fleet

Krasheninnikova Bay (near Petropavlovsk): Rybachiy is a major nuclear submarine base on the

Kamchatka Peninsula. The base is located 15 km southwest of the City of Petropavlovsk across Avachinskaya Bay.

Postovaya Bay (near Sovetskaya Gavan): Further south of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Khabarovsk Kray is a small town called Zavety Ilyicha. The town is located on Postovaya Bay between the

seaport of Vanino and Sovetskaya Gavan. Zavety Ilyicha was a small submarine base during the 1980s.

The four submarines operating out of the base were retired in 1990. Their fuel has not yet been offloaded.

The Pacific Fleet has committed to removing the submarines. The first was removed in October 1993.

Vladimir Bay (near Olga): This small submarine base is located 300 km northeast of Vladivostok, just

south of Olga on the Japan Sea coast. Vladimir Bay is relatively isolated with poor road and rail access.

The deep natural harbor is ice free during the winter months. The nuclear submarine facility is located on

the north end of the bay. A few submarines still operated from here as of late 1993. Plans to offload fuel

from decommissioned submarines were abandoned by the Navy due to protests from local residents.

Strelok Bay (Pavlovsk): A major submarine base is located 65 km southeast of Vladivostok at Pavlovsk. It housed nine SSBNs as of 1990 as well as additional general-purpose nuclear submarines.

According to Pacific Fleet press officer Captain First Rank V. Ryzhkov, as of autumn 1992 these older

nuclear-powered submarines were awaiting retirement. A report from the Pacific Fleet press office indicates that all of the Yankee and Delta class SSBNs stationed here will be retired. In addition, three submarines damaged in nuclear accidents are stored here. Additional sealed reactor compartments from

dismantled submarines are stored at Razbojnik.

Vladivostok: Pacific Fleet headquarters and operations center.

SOURCE: J. Handler, “Trip Report: Greenpeace Visit to Moscow and Russian Far East, July–November 1992: Russian Navy

Nuclear Submarine Safety, Construction, Defense Conversion, Decommissioning, and Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems” (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace, Feb. 15, 1993).

BOX 4-5: Pacific Fleet Shipyards, Repair, Refueling, 

and Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities

Nuclear submarine facilities are listed from the Kamchatka Peninsula in the North to Vladivostok in the

South along the Pacific Coast.

Krasheninnikova Bay (near Rybachiy): A major radioactive waste site for the Pacific Fleet. Is located

at the southern end of Krasheninnikova Bay, across from the naval base at Rybachiy. The unit contains

three burial trenches for solid radioactive waste, fresh fuel storage, and piers for operating its three refueling support ships and two liquid waste tankers. Shipyard 30 at Gornyak is a nuclear submarine shipyard located in the southwestern corner of the bay.

Shkotovo-22 (Military Unit 40752): On the Shkotovo Peninsula near Dunay is a large waste disposal

site. Spent nuclear submarine fuel is usually kept here prior to shipment for reprocessing at Chelyabinsk

by rail. This facility has several support ships attached to it.

(continued)
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 127

Chazhma Ship Repair Facility:a Chazhma Bay is a small refit and refueling facility also located

near the settlements of Dunay and Temp on the east end of the Shkotovo Peninsula facing Strelok

Bay. A serious nuclear incident occurred here on August 10, 1985, during the refueling of an Echo II

submarine reactor. While removing the reactor lid, control rods were partially withdrawn accidentally;

the reactor overheated and caused an explosion that killed 10 men and contaminated the surrounding environment over an area up to 5 to 30 km from the site.

Zvezda or Bolshoi Kamen:a This is a major nuclear submarine overhaul and refueling shipyard.

Bolshoi Kamen is a designated submarine dismantlement facility under START I.

a Refueling facility.

SOURCE: J. Handler, “Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet,” Greenpeace trip report, Nuclear Free Seas Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace, Oct. 27, 1994).

BOX 4-6: Service Ships of the Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet

Imandra is a 130-m-long service ship used for storing fresh and spent fuel assemblies. The ship was

built by the Admiralty shipyard in St. Petersburg and put into service in 1981. The total capacity of 1,500

assemblies allows the ship to store fuel from up to six icebreaker reactors. The ship uses a dry storage

system with waterproof receptacles each holding five fuel assemblies floating in a pool of water.

Lotta is a service ship 122 m long built in 1961. The ship was upgraded in 1993 to handle the transfer

of fuel assemblies into the newest railway shipping containers (TUK-18) for spent fuel shipment to Mayak.

The ship has 16 sections with 68 containers in each. Used fuel assemblies are stored aboard the Lotta for

a minimum of three years. The ship has 65 damaged fuel assemblies stored on-board, which cannot be

processed by the Mayak facility. These were transferred from the Imandra in 1985.

Serebryanka is a 102-m-long tanker used for offloading liquid radioactive waste directly from nuclearpowered icebreakers or the service ship Imandra. The ship has eight tanks, each with a capacity of 851

m3, and was used for discharging liquid waste directly into the Barents Sea until 1986.

The Volodarsky is the oldest ship in the Murmansk Shipping Company fleet. The 96-m ship was constructed in 1929 and is of riveted steel plate construction. Until 1986 the ship was used to transport solid

radioactive waste from Atomflot to the west side of Novaya Zemlya for dumping into the Barents Sea. The

ship has 14.5 metric tons of low- and medium-level waste stored aboard.

The Lepse is a spent fuel service ship of 87-m length built in 1934 and converted in 1962. The Lepse

is a special case: between 319 and 321 damaged fuel assemblies were stored on the Lepse. These fuel

assemblies expanded due to lack of proper cooling before they were put in built-in storage locations. The

result was that the damaged assemblies could not be removed. They remain aboard the Lepse, enclosed

within a concrete cover to reduce radiation emissions.

SOURCE: T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, “Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol.

1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994).

BOX 4-5: Pacific Fleet Shipyards, Repair, Refueling, 

and Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities (Cont’d.)
128 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

years after the reactor is shut down, and no additional shipboard or land-based storage will be

provided for spent fuel (42).

Refueling Practices

Submarines are refueled according to the schedules authorized by each fleet’s commander-inchief. Under past routine Russian naval operations, refueling was conducted every seven to 10

years and coincided with submarine refit and

overhaul.6 Starting in the 1980s, the Navy also

began defueling many retired submarines. In the

past, submarines undergoing overhaul at shipyards were refueled in dry docks. However, more

recently, the standard approach has been to refuel

while floating. Fuel is now changed not at shipyards but with Navy floating refueling facilities

(every three to five years) (see table 4-4). Icebreakers are usually refueled every three to four

years at the MSC’s Atomflot base by using service ships to transfer and store fuel awaiting

shipment for reprocessing. Table 4-4 presents a

list of 10 refueling facilities operated by the Russian Navy and MSC.

6 Refueling of submarines occurs frequently, every two and a half to five years. In case of a reactor accident, fuel management strategy is

decided by an expert council.

In the Navy, the submarine service ships used

for defueling are also known as “floating technical bases” or workshops (see box 4-7). These service ships are known in the West as PM-124 and

Malina class submarine support ships. The PM124 class is a converted Finnish-built cargo

barge. In its two steel aft compartments, the ship

can carry fuel from approximately two reactor

cores (560 fuel assemblies). The PM-124 ships

are now about 30 years old and are considered

beyond their useful lifetimes.7

Three Malina class ships—PM-63 and PM-12

in the north and PM-74 in the Pacific—are relatively modern and can serve nuclear vessels of

any type. Malina class ships are the Navy’s preferred ships for use in current fuel management

operations.8 (There are, however, problems with

the condition of these ships as well.) Malina class

ships are equipped with two 15-metric ton cranes

to handle reactor cores and equipment; each can

carry fuel from approximately six reactor cores

(1,400 fuel assemblies).

In a typical refueling operation, the submarine

is docked between the submarine service ship

and the pier of the refueling facility. (The facility

7 The PM-48, PM-124 (both based in Kamchatka), and PM-80 (based in Primorye) are out of service because of accidents and worn-out

conditions. Only the PM-125 and PM-133 are used for fuel management operations in the Pacific (27). 8 The years of production of the PM ships are 1984 (PM-63), 1986 (PM-74), and 1991 (PM-12). (35).

TABLE 4-3: Spent Fuel, Liquid, and Solid Radioactive Waste Storage at Atomflot

Ship

Displacement 

(metric tons) Fuel assemblies

Liquid waste 

(cubic meters)

Solid waste 

(metric tons)

Imandra 9,500 1,500 545 0

Lotta N/A 4,080a 0 0

Serebryanka 4,000 0 851 0

Volodarskij 5,500 0 0 14.5

Lepse 5,000 642b 46 ? (36 containers)

Ship storage 6,222 1,442 14.5

(+ 36 containers)

Land storage 0 357 <1 (incinerated)

a The capacity is 5,440, or 75% filled with undamaged fuel, of which 840 assemblies are naval fuel.

b Of which 50% are not extractable.

KEY: N/A = Not available.

SOURCES: T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, “Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994); O. Bukharin, “Nuclear Fuel Management in the Russian Navy,” staff paper prepared for OTA, November 1994.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 129

TABLE 4-4: Refueling Facilities

Northern Fleet Pacific Fleet Murmansk Shipping Company

Zapadnaya Litsa Zvezda repair yard (Shkotovo-17 near 

Bolshoi Kamen)

Atomflot base

Nerpa shipyard

(Olenya Bay)

Chazhma Bay repair facility (Shkotovo-22, 

Chazhma Bay)

Shipyard No. 10 Shkval

(Polyarny, Pala Bay)

Shipyard No. 30 at the Gornyak complex 

(Krasheninnikova Bay)

Sevmash shipyard (Severodvinsk)

Gremikha

Shipyard No. 35 at Sevmorput 

(Murmansk)a

a Because the plant is located near residential areas. refueling activities at Sevmorput were terminated by the Murmansk authorities in 1991. The

last refueling took place on December 31, 1991.

SOURCES: T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, “Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994); J. Handler, “The Northern Fleet—Nuclear Submarine Bases,” Jane’s Intelligence Review-Europe, Dec. 1993.

BOX 4-7: Service Ships of the Russian Nuclear Navy

Malina class nuclear submarine support ships are 137-m (450-feet) long, with 10,500-ton displacement. Each ship has a storage capacity of 1,400 fuel assemblies. The ships were constructed by the

Nikolayev Shipyard in the Ukraine. Each carries two 15-ton cranes for removal and replacement of fuel

assemblies.

PM-124 class (Project 326) lighters are nuclear-submarine support barges with a capacity of 560 fuel

assembles each. These units can also store up to 200 m3 of liquid radioactive waste.

(continued)

PM-63 Northern Fleet Severodvinsk (1984)

PM-74 Pacific Fleet Krasheninnikova Bay, Kamchatka (1986)

PM-12 Northern Fleet Olenya Bay, Zapadnaya Litsa (1991)

PM-124 Northern Fleet Zvezdochka shipyard, Severodvinsk

PM-78 Northern Fleet Zvezdochka shipyard, Severodvinsk

PMa Northern Fleet Zvezdochka shipyard, Severodvinsk

PM-80 Pacific Fleet Shkotovo waste site

PM-125 Pacific Fleet Shkotovo waste site

PM-133 Pacific Fleet Shkotovo waste site

PM-48 Pacific Fleet Krasheninnikova Bay, Kamchatka
130 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

provides electric power, fresh water, and other

support services.) Refueling begins with the

removal of a portion of the submarine hull and

lifting of the reactor lid.9 Measures are taken to

prevent release of radioactive aerosols to the

environment (26). In the next step, the primary

cooling circuit is disconnected and spent fuel is

removed from the reactor vessel. Fuel is removed

assembly by assembly using the cranes of the

service ship with the help of special metal

sleeves to shield spent fuel. Spent fuel assemblies are accommodated inside cylindrical cases,

which are placed in the storage compartments of

the service ship. After defueling, the reactor ves9 Immediately after reactor shutdown and prior to refueling, fuel is kept in a reactor core to allow for decay of short-lived fission products. During this initial period cooling of the fuel is provided by reactor pumps.

sel is cleaned out and the reactor section is overhauled. Reactor waste is loaded on the service

ship.10 Finally (with an operational ship), fresh

fuel is inserted into the reactor vessel, the primary cooling circuit is filled with new coolant,

the reactor lid is installed to seal the reactor, and

the portion of the hull is welded in place.

Typically, it takes approximately one month

to defuel, and two to three months to refuel, one

submarine (27). (Refueling of an icebreaker is

reported to take approximately 45 days. Five to

seven days are needed to remove spent fuel, and

two to three days to insert fresh fuel; the remainder is required for auxiliary operations (53).

10 Liquid waste—50–80 metric tons of washing water, etc., from a twin-reactor propulsion unit—is filtered and discharged into the sea.

Solid waste (155–200 cubic meters) and spent fuel (2–3 cubic meters) are stored aboard the service ship.

Pinega class nuclear-submarine support ships are 122-m (400-feet) long with 5,500-ton displacement. Each is used for transporting liquid radioactive waste. The ships were constructed at Szczecin,

Poland.

Vala class special tankers are 73-m (240 feet) long with a displacement of 2,030 tons. The ships were

constructed between 1964 and 1971 for the purpose of transportation and disposal of liquid radioactive

waste.

a Designation unknown.

SOURCES: J. Handler, “Russia’s Pacific Fleet—Problems with Nuclear Waste,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Mar. 1995; J. Handler,

“Russia’s Pacific Fleet—Submarine Bases and Facilities,” Jane’s Intelligence Review-Europe, Apr. 1994; Jane’s Fighting Ships,

1994–95, Captain Richard Sharpe (ed.), 97th edition (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 1994); T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer,

“Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994).

BOX 4-7: Service Ships of the Russian Nuclear Navy (Cont’d.)

Amur Northern Fleet Pala Guba, Kola Fjord (1986)

Pinega Pacific Fleet Bolshoi Kamen, Vladivostok (1987)

TNT-5 Pacific Fleet Bolshoi Kamen, Vladivostok

NT-27 Pacific Fleet Bolshoi Kamen, Vladivostok

TNT-11 Pacific Fleet Krasheninnikova Bay, Kamchatka

TNT-23 Pacific Fleet Krasheninnikova Bay, Kamchatka

TNT-12 Northern Fleet Pala Guba, Kola Fjord

TNT-19 Northern Fleet Unknown

TNT-29 Northern Fleet Unknown
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 131

Refueling Problems

The rate of refueling operations has declined following reductions in operational schedules for

the Russian nuclear fleet. For example, with a

refueling capacity of four to five submarines per

year, the Pacific Fleet in the past refueled three to

four submarines per year. In 1994 and early

1995, spent fuel was removed from only one

decommissioned submarine (11).11 The Navy is

facing significant delays in defueling/refueling

submarines due to the following problems:

1. Lack of fuel transfer and storage equipment:

In the past, many pieces of refueling and spent

fuel storage equipment were produced outside

Russia. The breakup of the Soviet Union and

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have interrupted the equipment supply. For example,

Malina class submarine service ships were

produced at the Nikolayev shipyard in

Ukraine. A new Malina class ship for the

Pacific Fleet had been ordered from

Nikolayev. Because of the breakup of the

Soviet Union, construction was never completed.

2. Saturation of the spent fuel storage capacity:

Because the central storage facilities and some

submarine support ships are full (see below),

they cannot take any newly removed spent

fuel. After submarine reactors are shut down,

it is necessary to keep auxiliary cooling systems running to remove heat generated within

the reactor core. To accomplish this heat

removal, it is likely that circulation within

both of the reactor coolant loops must be

maintained at a reduced level. Many Russian

submarines thus will have such continued

standby operations in place for many years.

This creates further risks of accidents or unintentional releases of radionuclides in the

future.

3. Difficulties of removing fuel from submarines

with damaged reactor cores: There are three

submarines in the Pacific that cannot be defueled because of damaged reactor cores.

11 It has been reported that only one defueling/refueling operation was conducted in 1993 in the Pacific Fleet, compared to five refuelings

and three defuelings in 1990 (27).

Experts believe that major portions of these

submarines will have to be treated as waste

and buried. The work requires significant

R&D and has not been started.

Radioactive Waste Disposal

Reactor compartments that have been prepared

for flotation are currently stored near naval bases

or beached in several locations on the Kola Peninsula and along the Pacific Coast from Vladivostok north to the Kamchatka Peninsula. In

recent years, once the reactor compartment has

been sealed, the Russian Navy has stored the

reactors floating in open bays or along rivers

near naval bases. To provide greater flotation,

one additional sealed compartment on each end

of the reactor compartment remains attached to

the package. The advantages of this method are

that the sealed package is less likely to sink than

the entire submarine, and it is easier to handle

and transport by water. Disadvantages include

the possibility that over periods of decades to

hundreds of years, seawater corrosion will penetrate the sealed reactor compartment and allow

the exchange of water with the environment. In

the United States, dismantled submarine reactor

compartments are sealed and shipped to a dry,

shallow, land burial site in Hanford, Washington.

Several Russian studies have proposed various

methods for establishing reactor compartment

disposal facilities. These include placing reactor

compartments in concrete-lined trenches or in

underground storage (42). One plan is to put

some reactor compartments in tunnels near submarine bases in the north and Far East. However,

the prospects for implementation of this program

remain uncertain. The Russian regions of Murmansk and Arkhangel’sk have reportedly agreed

to the siting of permanent storage facilities for

radioactive waste on the southwestern tip of the

island of Novaya Zemlya at the Bashmachnaya

Bay (48).
132 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

In a recent meeting of regional authorities,12

Russian officials decided to pursue studies

related to the development of a long-term solid

waste storage facility on Novaya Zemlya. The

facility would consist of deep burial trenches

covered with gravel. The proposed site is located

on Bashmachnaya Bay, on the southwestern part

of Yuzhny Island.

Evaluations were previously conducted of five

potential sites on the Kola Peninsula. A site at

Guba Ivanovskaya near Gremikha was chosen

and subsequently rejected by GAN.

Some Russian geologists believe that permafrost is a suitable storage medium for high-level

solid waste. Novaya Zemlya permafrost is 200

meters thick, stable over the long term, with no

water migration. However, Western opinion is

more skeptical. The Bellona Foundation notes

that the facility will have to be far more complex

than a simple “hole in the ground.”

❚ Dismantlement of Submarine Hulls

In recent years the Russian Navy has been dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines at

several sites. Dismantlement takes place in

Northern Fleet facilities on the Kola Peninsula

and Arkhangel’sk (Nerpa and Zvezdochka yards)

and in Pacific Fleet facilities in the Vladivostok

area (Bolshoi Kamen yard). A review of the

decommissioning procedures used by the Russians, as well as the status of the activities, is presented below.

The U.S. Navy is also conducting a major

nuclear submarine dismantlement program. The

current program began in 1992 and calls for the

United States to dismantle completely 100

nuclear submarines at a total cost of approximately $2.7 billion (30). The U.S. program,

unlike the current Russian activity, will result in

burying sealed reactor compartments in an

underground site at the Hanford, Washington,

nuclear facility run by the Department of Energy.

12 A meeting of the interagency Committee for Ecology of Murmansk was held at the Murmansk City Hall on June 21, 1995. The committee was briefed by MSC, the Kola Nuclear Power Plant, the Russian Navy, and government officials from the region.

The remainder of the U.S. submarine hulls and

equipment will be disassembled, cut into pieces,

and either recycled, scrapped, or treated as hazardous waste. Spent fuel removed from dismantled U.S. nuclear submarines is currently being

stored at the dismantlement shipyard on Puget

Sound, Washington, awaiting the results of an

Environmental Impact Statement to determine

where long-term storage facilities will be

located.

The Zvezdochka shipyard at Yagry Island in

Severodvinsk and the Nerpa repair yard on Olenya Bay are the primary facilities for dismantlement of Russian Northern Fleet nuclear

submarines. The Russian Pacific Fleet has also

begun dismantling submarines at the Bolshoi

Kamen shipyard near Vladivostok. As of January

1995, only 15 of the retired submarines had been

dismantled completely. A total of 101 submarines in both fleets are in various stages of

decommissioning (see table 4-2). Seventy of

these decommissioned submarines had not had

spent fuel removed from their reactors. Although

a large number of submarines have been decommissioned, the defueling and dismantling process

has been slow. Some of the decommissioned

submarines have been out of service with spent

nuclear fuel still on-board for more than 15 years

(30). By the end of 1994 there were 20 additional

submarines classified by Western sources as in

service which were actually laid up (see table 4-5).

Between 1995 and 2003, this backlog is

expected to continue to grow.13 An additional 70

to 80 submarines will probably be decommissioned due to both age and consolidation of the

fleet. The total number of decommissioned submarines could increase to around 180. At the current rate of dismantlement—about five per

year—it will take one to two decades to complete

dismantlement of all of the nuclear submarines

that will be decommissioned by the year 2003.

13 The decommissioning rate will be slower than in the past several years. Refer to table 4-2 for a more detailed explanation of the projected composition of the Russian nuclear fleet.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 133

The Nerpa shipyard, located in Olenya Bay, is

planning to expand its submarine dismantling

facilities to accommodate new equipment provided by the United States, using Nunn-Lugar

funds. The goal is to expand processing at Nerpa

to dismantle up to five submarines per year. The

first submarine dismantled by Nerpa in early

1995 took five months for the reactor compartment to be cut out of the hull and prepared for

flotation.

MANAGING SPENT FUEL FROM THE 

RUSSIAN FLEET: ISSUES AND 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

A key activity associated with the Russian

nuclear fleet of submarines and icebreakers is

management of the nuclear fuel. During normal

operations of the fleet, each reactor must be refueled periodically. And when submarines and

other ships are being dismantled—as they are

now—the spent fuel must be removed and stored

or processed in some way. This spent nuclear

fuel is highly radioactive, and accidents or

releases of radioactivity are possible during the

multiple steps required unless all parts of the system are technologically sound and operated

under high standards of safety and protection.

Russian naval reactors and fuels represent a variety of designs and manufactures and therefore

present unique handling, storage, and disposal

problems. Box 4-8 describes the reactor and fuel

designs (see table 4-6), and box 4-9 discusses the

integration of naval fuel into the Russian national

nuclear fuel cycle. Figure 4-3 presents a schematic diagram of the Russian naval nuclear fuel

management process.

Other problems are evident with service ships

and land-based facilities that were designed for

interim storage and are now used for long-term

storage. Also, submarines that were to be defueled immediately after being taken out of service

have become long-term spent fuel storage facilities themselves. An approach that would include

safety and operational analyses reflecting

changes in facility missions has not been developed.

TABLE 4-5: Russian Nuclear Submarines Decommisioned as of January 1995

Northern and Pacific Fleets

Status of decommissioned nuclear submarines Total Northern Fleet Pacific Fleet

Dismantled and defueled 15a 6 9

Defueled (waiting for dismantlement) or sunk 36a 20 16

Decommissioned or laid-up (with fuel on board) 70a 44 26

Total submarines out of service 121a 70 51

a Table 4-2 which is based on Western sources of information, indicates that 101 nuclear submarines were retired from service as of January 1,

1995. The additional 20 nuclear subs should be classified as “in-service, inactive” according to the Russian sources cited above. These vessels

are currently laid-up and planned for decommissioning.

SOURCES: V. Litovkin, “93 Nuclear Submarines,” Izvestia, July 9, 1993:6; V. Danilian and V.L. Vysotsky, “Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management in the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy,” paper presented at the OTA Workshop on Spent Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management, Jan.

17–18, 1995, Washington, D.C.; G. Baham, “Nuclear Fleet of the fSU: A Preliminary Analysis of Dismantlement Activities,” Staff Paper prepared

for OTA, February 1995; Gosatomnadzor, “Report on Activity of Russia’s Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 1993,”

approved by Order of the Russian Federal Nuclear Inspectorate [Gosatomnadzor] No. 61 from May 13, 1994, translated by Greenpeace International; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating

from Defense-Related Installations and Activities, Final Report, Volume I: Radioactive Contamination, Phase I: 1993–1995 (Kjeller, Norway:

NATO, 1995).
134 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 4-8: Naval Reactor and Fuel Designs

Soviet/Russian submarines have been equipped with reactors of several designs. Several submarines

of the November and Alfa classes were powered with lead-bismuth-cooled reactors (liquid metal reactors, LMRs). High power density in an LMR and its compact design allowed reduction in submarine size

while retaining the power of the naval propulsion unit. As a result, Alfa class ships were very fast. However, maintenance problems associated with neutron activation in bismuth and reactor accidents have

led to early retirement of the LMR-powered submarines.a

At present, probably all nuclear-powered vessels in Russia use one or two pressurized water reactors

(PWRs). There are three generations of naval PWRs. Reactors of the first generation were deployed

between 1957 and 1968, and all have been decommissioned. Reactors of the second generation were

deployed between 1968 and 1987 with many still in service; third-generation reactors have been installed

on submarines since 1987. The best described is a 135-MW KLT-40 reactor, which has been installed on

icebreakers since 1970. This is a pressurized water reactor with the following principal components: a

pressure vessel, a reactor lid that carries five reactivity control assemblies and four actuators for an emergency core cooling system, and a fuel core. Steam for the propulsion unit is produced in four vertical

steam generators. It is thought that submarine reactors have designs similar to that of KLT-40 but are

smaller in size.

It is believed that a reactor core consists of 180 to 270 fuel assemblies, containing several fuel rods

each. In older designs, fuel rods were round. Newer reactor core designs utilize fuel rods of cross, plate,

or cane shapes.b The level of enrichment of uranium fuel varies significantly depending on reactor core

design. (Apparently, a reactor system of a specific design may use reactor cores of different types.)

Reactors of the first and second generations were fueled with 21 percent uranium-235 (U-235). Reactors

of the third generation have cores consisting of two to three enrichment zones, with enrichment levels

varying between 21 and 45 percent U-235. Standard naval reactor fuel in Russia is stainless steel- or zirconium-clad Cermet material (dispersed fuel), in which uranium dioxide particles are embedded in a nonfissile aluminum matrix.c

Some reactors are fueled with weapons-grade (more than 90 percent U-235) or near-weapons-grade

(70 to 80 percent U-235) uranium. For example, liquid metal reactors were almost certainly fueled with

weapons-grade uranium. Also, some icebreaker fuels are zirconium-clad, uranium-zirconium metallic

alloys with uranium enriched to 90 percent U-235.d (Also, at times, reactors might have been fueled with

experimental fuels whose enrichment could differ significantly from that of regular fuel for this type of

reactor core.)

Some reactors, however, are fueled with relatively low enriched uranium: for example, in the proposed

design of a floating desalination facility, two KLT-40 reactors of the facility’s power unit are designed to be

fueled with 1.8 metric tons of uranium dioxide enriched to 8.5 to 10 percent U-235.

a One common failure mode involved localized overcooling and solidification of the coolant.

b Such shapes increase the surface of fuel rods and, in this way, improve the core’s heat transfer characteristics.

c Typically, Cermet fuels offer better mechanical integrity, swelling resistance, and containment of fission products than uranium alloys. They also have superior heat conductivity when compared with uranium ceramics.

d For example, HEU-fueled icebreakers have cores containing 151 kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. According to reactor

designers, the reactor of the nuclear-powered ship Sevmorput is fueled with 200 kg of 90 percent enriched uranium.

SOURCES: V. Kovalenko, “Braving the Chill of the Market,” Nuclear Engineering International, Jan. 1993; J. Handler, Greenpeace,

personal communication, October 1994; U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Foreign Intelligence, Radioactive Waste Management in the Former USSR: Volume III, prepared by D.J. Bradley, PNL-8074 (Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1992); O.

Bukharin, “Nuclear Fuel Management in the Russian Navy,” Staff Paper prepared for OTA, November 1994.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 135

TABLE 4-6: Russian Nuclear Naval Propulsion Reactor Design

Type of vessel Number / type reactors Power per reactor, MWt

Fuel enrichment, 

percentage Uranium-235

Submarines, first generation (1958 to 1968)

Hotel, Echo, November 2 PWR / VM-A 70 MWt 20

Submarines, second generation (1968 to present)

Charlie 1 PWR / VM-4 70 to 90 20

Victor, Delta, Yankee 2 PWR / mod VM-4

Submarines, third generation (1987 to present)

Typhoon, Oscar 2 PWR / OK-650 190 20 to 45

Akula, Sierra, Mike 1 PWR / OK-650

Other submarines

Papa (1969 to late 1980s) 2 PWR / unknown 177 unknown

November-645 (1963 to 

1968)

2 LMR / VT-1 73 weapon-grade

Alfa (1969 to present) 2 LMR / OK-550 or BM-40A 155 weapon-grade

X-Ray, Uniform, AC-12 (1982 

to present)

1 PWR / unknown 10 (X-Ray) unknown

Cruisers (1980 to present)

Kirov 2 PWR / KN-3 300 unknown

Auxiliary ships (1988 to present)

Kapusta 2 PWR / unknown 171 unknown

Sevmorput 1 PWR / KLT-40 135 up to 90

Icebreakers

Lenin (1959 to 65) 2-3 PWR / OK-150 and OK90090 5

Arctica (1975 to present) 2 PWR / KLT-40 135 up to 90

Taymyr (1989 to present) 1 PWR / KLT-40 135 up to 90

KEY: PWR=pressurized water reactor; LMR-liquid metal reactor

SOURCE: O. Bukharin, “Nuclear Fuel Management in the Russian Navy,” staff paper prepared for OTA, November 1994.
136 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 4-9: Naval Fuel: Integration into the National Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The naval fuel cycle is closely integrated with the nuclear fuel cycles of military material production

reactors and commercial nuclear power reactors. For a significant fraction of naval reactor fuel, the

design of the fuel cycle was as follows:

■ Uranium feed for naval fuel was produced by recovering uranium from irradiated Highly Enriched

Uranium (HEU) fuel from two tritium production reactors at Mayak (Chelyabinsk-65) and HEU spike

rods from plutonium production reactors in Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7.

■ Irradiated HEU fuel was reprocessed at the RT-1 plant at Chelyabinsk-65.

■ Recovered uranium (approximately 50 percent enriched) was sent to the Machine-Building Plant at

Electrostal near Moscow for fabrication into fuel rods and assemblies.

■ After irradiation in a reactor and a few years of temporary storage, fuel was sent to Mayak for reprocessing.

■ Naval reactor fuel was reprocessed together with spent fuel from research, BN-350/600, and VVER440 reactors.

■ Separated plutonium was placed in storage at the Mayak site.

■ Recovered uranium was sent to the Ust'-Kamenogorsk plant for fabrication into fuel pellets of RBMK

reactors.

The fuel cycle design was different for weapons-grade uranium fuel. HEU feed was derived from the

national stocks. Approximately 1.5 metric tons of HEU were used for fabrication of naval and research

reactor fuel annually. Some of this fuel was reprocessed after irradiation.

This nuclear fuel cycle scheme worked reliably until the early 1990s, when the disintegration of the

Soviet Union and reductions in military requirements resulted in remarkable changes. Naval fuel requirements have dropped to a few reactor cores per year. (Reportedly, in 1994, the Murmansk Shipping Company, which procures approximately two reactor cores of fresh fuel per year, became the principal

customer at the Electrostal naval fuel production line.) Also, in 1992, the Ust'-Kamenogorsk fuel fabrication plant terminated fabrication of reactor fuel using reprocessed uranium.

SOURCES: E. Mikerin, Information provided at Workshop in Rome, June 1992; E. Mikerin, MINATOM, personal communication,

May 1992.
I

Fuel transferred to central

storage facilities I

I

Fuel transferred to service ships I

In-service

submarines

Spent fuel off loaded to service ships;

new fuel on-loaded to vessels I

I I

I

De-facto long-term

storage of spent fuel

by service ships

(Russian Navy and

Atomflot)

Delays occur because

spent fuel must be

repackaged for new

cask design

When service ship is full, spent fuel

is transferred to land-based central storage

facilities as space becomes available

After three years of storage,

spent fuel is loaded into shipping casks

Casks are loaded into cars and

shipped to Mayak

Spent fuel is stored in Mayak

—..

Fuel reprocessed

De-facto long-term

storage of spent fuel

on decommissioned

submarines (lack of

capacity and/or nonstandard/damaged

fuel has been stored

Some local rail

terminals cannot

support new

cask weight

—

Source: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995
138 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

❚ Management of Spent Fuel

Institutional Arrangements

Naval fuel management in Russia involves the

work of several executive agencies and is regulated by GOSATOMNADZOR, the national

nuclear regulatory agency (see box 4-10). The

lines of responsibilities for fuel management

operations are not always obvious. MINATOM

is responsible for fresh fuel until it is delivered to

the Navy, GOSCOMOBORONPROM, or the

MSC. (Reportedly, in the case of a new submarine, fresh fuel is controlled by GOSCOMOBORONPROM until it is loaded into the reactor at a

GOSCOMOBORONPROM shipyard in the

presence of Navy representatives. After that,

responsibility for the submarine and the fuel is

assumed by the Navy. (In other cases, the Navy

is responsible for fuel from the moment it arrives

at the central storage facility to the moment spent

fuel is returned to Mayak.) The responsibility for

transportation is shared by the Navy, MINATOM, and the Ministry of Railways. After the

spent fuel has arrived at Mayak, MINATOM is

solely responsible for subsequent operations

(reprocessing, etc.). Similar arrangements exist

between MINATOM and MSC.

BOX 4-10: Russian Entities with Responsibility for Navy Nuclear Reactors and Fuel

1. Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM): MINATOM’s Main Directorates of Nuclear Reactors, Fuel

Production, and Isotope Production, and others are involved in virtually all stages of the naval fuel cycle.

Specifically, MINATOM’s responsibilities include the following:

■ R&D of reactors and fuels;

■ development of an infrastructure to support reactor and fuel operations;

■ production of naval fuel;

■ production and use of spent fuel shipping casks;

■ reprocessing of spent fuel; and

■ development of a regulatory framework for fuel management and coordination of regulatory activities with Gosatomnadzor.

2. The Navy (Ministry of Defense): The Navy assumes responsibility for fuel from the moment it arrives

at a central storage facility until it is shipped to Mayak for reprocessing. Specifically, the Navy is responsible for the safety, security, and quality of the following operations:

■ storage of fresh fuel;

■ refueling and defueling;

■ reactor use of fuel;

■ interim storage of spent fuel; and

■ loading of fuel into shipping casks and shipping fuel to Mayak.a

3. Murmansk Shipping Company (Ministry of Transportation): The company is a private enterprise.

However, its nuclear icebreaker fleet remains federal property. Its fuel management responsibilities are

similar to those of the Navy.

4. State Committee for Defense Industries (Goscomoboronprom): The Committee’s Department of

Shipbuilding operates all major shipyards and is responsible for loading fresh fuel into newly built submarines and submarines undergoing major overhaul. The committee’s research institutes and design

bureaus (e.g., Krylov’s Institute of Shipbuilding) are responsible for the integration of reactor systems and

fuel management with the technologies and operations of naval vessels.

5. Ministry of Railways: The Ministry’s Department of Special Cargo shares responsibility for transportation of fresh and spent fuel.

(continued)
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 139

There is another mechanism for organizing the

interagency work. The Russian government’s

decree on the national program of radioactive

waste management (No. 824, 14 August 1993)

designated MINATOM as a principal state customer for the program. In this capacity, MINATOM has contracted with the Ministry of

Defense, Ministry of Environmental Protection,

GOSCOMOBORONPROM, GOSATOMNADZOR, and other agencies to carry out projects

related to spent fuel management. The Ministry

of Finance was to provide MINATOM with the

required funding. The mechanism, however,

does not work very well. For example, because

of the lack of funding, MINATOM has not been

able to pay contractors for the work they have

done.

Storage of Spent Fuel in the Navy

The Russian Navy is expected to have a backlog

of 300 to 350 cores of spent fuel by the year

2000. Both land-based facilities and service ships

or barges are used for temporary spent fuel storage for the Russian nuclear fleet. The service

ships are the same ones used for at-sea defueling/

refueling. In early 1993, it was reported that

about 30,000 spent fuel elements, equal to 140

reactor cores, were in storage in the various facilities of the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets.

Table 4-7 summarizes the spent fuel status in

both fleets.

Immediately after its removal from submarine

reactors, spent fuel is put in containers—steel

cylinders with lead tops. Containers are used

both for interim storage of fuel and as part of the

spent fuel shipping casks. On service ships, fuel

is usually stored in dry, water-cooled compartments in which watertight containers with fuel

are suspended from the ceiling in tanks filled

with cooling water.

After a service ship is filled to capacity, fuel is

transferred to the land-based central sites at the

Zapadnaya Litsa and Gremikha bases in the

North and the Shkotovo waste site in the Pacific.

In the past, most fuel assemblies were directly

exposed to cooling water (and, later, encased fuel

assemblies). Safe handling of the fuel in temporary storage requires complex monitoring and

6. State Committee for the Supervision of Radiation and Nuclear Safety (Gosatomnadzor): The Committee is charged with developing nuclear and radiation safety rules and standards, supervising nuclear

safeguards, licensing and inspecting nuclear installations, and coordinating and supporting safetyrelated research. Gosatomnadzor reports directly to the President. The principal divisions of Gosatomnadzor, involved in the supervision of naval fuel management, include the headquarters’ departments of

transport reactors, fuel cycle facilities, radiation safety, and material control and accounting, as well as

the regional offices of the North-West, Ural, and Central districts. Gosatomnadzor monitors fabrication of

naval fuel, refueling, spent fuel storage, shipment, and reprocessing. Gosatomnadzor coordinates these

activities, with the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Committee for Epidemiological Protection,

MINATOM, and the Ministry of Defense. As of 1994, Gosatomnadzor was complaining about the lack of

cooperation from the Navy.b However, the strength of the Committee is increasing as testified by its role in

addressing the issues of naval fuel shipments and storage.

a Reportedly, the Navy provides the guard force to escort spent fuel shipments. MINATOM (Mayak) owns the shipping casks.

b As of May 1994, the Ministry of Defense denied Gosatomnadzor access to its naval vessels.

SOURCES: O. Bukharin, “Nuclear Fuel Management in the Russian Navy,” Staff Paper prepared for OTA, November 1994; J. Handler, “Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet,” Greenpeace trip report, Nuclear Free Seas Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace, Oct. 27, 1994); Gosatomnadzor, “Report on Activity of Russia’s Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and

Radiation Safety in 1993,” approved by Order of the Russian Federal Nuclear Inspectorate [Gosatomnadzor] No. 61 from May 13,

1994, translated by Greenpeace International.

BOX 4-10: Russian Entities with Responsibility for Navy Nuclear Reactors and Fuel (Cont’d.)
140 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

auxiliary systems. The water pool must be provided with a supply of cold water or an internal

cooling system. A system is needed to remove

contaminants that would accelerate corrosion of

the spent fuel. The system must be monitored for

radiation to detect leaks. Leaking fuel requires

special handling. This process also produces a

significant amount of radioactive waste. Finally,

any leaks from the pool to the environment must

be prevented (49). Storage accidents due to therTABLE 4-7: Spent Fuel Storage Facilities

Site Storage facility Storage fuel assembliesa

Northern Fleet:

Zapadnaya Litsa, 

Kola Peninsula

Two land-based concrete tanks 

(another tank is not operational)

20,489

PM-124 class service shipb 560

Malina class PM-12 1,400

Gremikha , c

Kola Peninsula

N/A N/A

Zvezdochka, Severodvinsk Three PM-124 class service ships 1,680

Malina class PM-63 1,400

Atomflot, Murmansk Lotta service ship 

(submarine fuel)

476

Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC):

Atomflot base, Murmansk Imandra service ship 1,500

Lotta service ship 5,440

Lepse service ship 621

Pacific Fleet:

Shkotovo waste site (military unit 

40752), Primorye

Land-based storage 8,400

Three PM-124 class service shipsd 1,680

Kamchatka waste site (military unit 

95051), Kamchatka

One PM-124 service ship 560

Malina class PM-174 1,400

a The numbers for the Northern Fleet and MSC are from the Bellona report (pp. 45-47). The Yablokov report estimates 21,000 fuel assemblies

stored in the Northern Fleet (3,000 containers with seven fuel assemblies each) and 8,400 fuel assemblies (1,200 containers) in the Pacific Fleet.

According to the report, the stores are overloaded.

b PM class ships are designed for short-term storage of spent fuel. In some cases, fuel has been on these ships for long periods of time.

c LMR fuel is believed to be stored at Gremikha.

d The PM-80 (Shkotovo) and PM-32 (Kamchatka) hold 118 and 32 damaged fuel assemblies, respectively, that are difficult to remove (Gosatomnadzor, "Report on Activity of Russia's Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 1993," approved by Order of the Russian Federal

Nuclear Inspectorate [Gosatomnadzor] No. 61 from May 13, 1994, translated by Greenpeace International).

KEY: N/A = Not available.

SOURCES: T. Nilsen and N. Bøhmer, "Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Archangelsk Counties," Report

Vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994); Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal

at Sea ("Yablokov commission"), created by Decree No. 613 of the Russian Federation President, October 24, 1992, Facts and

Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia:

1993), translated by Paul Gallager and Elena Bloomstein (Albuquerque, NM: Small World Publishers, Inc.).
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 141

mal stresses in fuel and corrosion of storage

equipment have led the Navy to move most fuel

into dry storage.14 (The Northern Fleet retains

some land-based wet storage capacity.)

At the Shkotovo waste site in the Pacific,

spent fuel is stored in a horizontal array of cylindrical cells in a concrete floor of the storage

building. Each cell accommodates a container

with seven fuel assemblies. Presently, 1,075 out

of 1,200 cells are loaded with spent fuel. At

Zapadnaya Litsa, fuel has been moved into storage facilities designed to hold liquid radioactive

waste. (The buildings have never been used for

waste storage because liquid waste was previously discharged into the sea.)

As of the end of 1993, spent fuel had been

removed from 36 out of 103 decommissioned

submarines.15 The high rates of submarine deactivation and low defueling capacity of the Navy

mean that many tens of reactor cores of spent

fuel will remain inside shutdown reactors of

floating submarines for a long time.

Spent Fuel Storage at the 

Murmansk Shipping Company

The Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC) is a

private Russian enterprise engaged in the operation of nuclear-powered icebreakers and other

commercial ships. MSC currently performs all

spent fuel management related to its icebreakers.

Discharged icebreaker fuel is initially stored onboard the service ship Imandra (capacity 1,500

fuel assemblies), which is designed to refuel icebreakers at the Atomflot base.16 After approxi14 In 1986, corrosion of fuel handling and storage equipment led to a serious accident at the storage facility at Zapadnaya Litsa (built in

the early 1970s). Because of corrosion, several containers with spent fuel fell to the bottom of the storage tank and some of them broke. The

accident resulted in a severe contamination problem and had the potential for a nuclear criticality event. (Experts of the Physics and Power

Institute in Obninsk have evaluated the probability of a criticality event for such an accident and found it to be small.) 15 According to Captain V.A.Danilian, the Pacific Fleet has decommissioned 51 submarines (including three with damaged reactor cores)

and has defueled 22 submarines [OTA workshop Jan 17–19, Washington D.C.].

16 Imandra’s storage capacity consists of six steel compartments, each holding 50 containers for 250 fuel assemblies.

mately six months of storage on the Imandra,

fuel is transferred to the service ship Lotta

(capacity 5,440 fuel assemblies).17 Lotta, like

Imandra, is an ice-class vessel. Lotta has been

equipped to handle the new TUK-18 fuel casks.

Spent fuel is stored aboard Lotta for two to three

years. On both Imandra and Lotta, fuel is stored

in dry, water-cooled storage (as described

above).18 The ships are relatively modern and in

good condition.

The service ship Lepse, however, is older and

not as well maintained. It also contains a large

amount of highly contaminated damaged fuel.

The Lepse has 643 fuel assemblies aboard. No

additional spent fuel has been loaded on the

Lepse since 1982. One of the two Lepse storage

compartments contains spent fuel from the damaged core of the icebreaker Lenin.

19 To control

radiation releases from damaged fuel assemblies,

the entire storage section, which contains 317

fuel assemblies, was encased in concrete. The

other compartment also contains a large amount

of damaged fuel, about 30 percent of the 643 fuel

assemblies. Thus, between 80 to 90 percent of

the spent fuel aboard the Lepse is either damaged

or nonextractable because it has been encased in

concrete. To develop a remediation plan for it,

MSC must inventory the remaining accessible

spent fuel to determine which fuel assemblies, if

any, are removable using existing equipment.

MSC was also constructing a land-based storage facility for interim (20 to 25 years) storage of

spent fuel. The building was 90 percent complete

when the Russian nuclear regulatory agency,

17 The Lotta has 16 storage compartments; each compartment has 68 containers containing five fuel assemblies. Since the mid-1980s,

168 of Lotta’s containers (840 fuel assemblies) have been used to store submarine fuel.

18 Thirteen containers (65 fuel assemblies) are not cooled (48). 19 Reportedly, 319 to 321 fuel assemblies from the icebreaker Lenin are stored on the Lepse; of these, 10 to 20 fuel assemblies are estimated to be seriously damaged.
142 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

GOSATOMNADZOR, indicated that it will not

authorize its operation unless the facility is

rebuilt to meet modern safety requirements.20

MSC is now reconstituting its plans for an

interim spent fuel storage facility to serve both

the icebreakers and the Northern Naval Fleet.

Two key issues that must be addressed with a

new storage facility are the disposition of zirconium-uranium (Zr-U) fuel and damaged fuel now

stored aboard service ships. Neither type of fuel

can be reprocessed currently at Mayak, and no

long-term storage is available.

MSC projects that there will be 13 cores of ZrU fuel aboard its service ships within three to

five years. Therefore, unless this fuel is moved to

a land-based storage site at Atomflot, it prevents

MSC from conducting normal refueling operations for its icebreakers. One plan under consideration is to use the Lotta to transfer the Zr-U

fuel to newly acquired dry storage casks (possibly of Western design), which could then be

stored safely at Atomflot.

A new MSC storage facility could also be

used to store any damaged fuel removed from the

Lepse. In June 1995, MSC tendered an engineering study of options for cleaning up the Lepse.

The European Union (EU) has provided

$320,000 for engineering work in support of this

effort. The goal of the effort is to inventory completely the spent fuel, perform a risk assessment,

and suggest options for a course of action.

Although Western contractors will be involved

in the effort, MSC has insisted that any research

and engineering work specifically include Russian subcontractors: OKBM (fuel design), Kurchatov Institute (science director), and VNII21

Promtechnologia (waste disposal). The U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is considering supporting the risk assessment phase of

the project.

20 According to GOSATOMNADZOR, the facility would not survive an airplane crash or other similar disaster (53).

21 All Russian Scientific Research Institute.

❚ Shipment and Disposition of Spent Fuel 

from the Russian Nuclear Fleet

Spent Fuel Shipment

Spent fuel from the Russian nuclear fleet has regularly been shipped to reprocessing facilities.

After one to three years of storage, the standard

practice is to ship naval spent fuel to the RT-1

plant at Mayak for reprocessing. In the past,

spent fuel was shipped from the facilities at

Zapadnaya Litsa, Sevmorput', and Severodvinsk

in the North. In the Pacific Fleet, fuel was

shipped from an installation, a short distance

away from the Shkotovo waste site (27).

At storage facilities, containers with spent fuel

were loaded by cranes into shipping casks and

delivered to rail terminals for loading on specially designed flatbed cars. The cars were

formed in a special train and sent on a severalday journey to Mayak.

In the past, the principal types of shipping

casks in use were TUK-11 and TUK-12 (see

table 4-8). One train with TUK-11/12 casks

could carry approximately 500 fuel assemblies.

The TUK-11 and TUK-12 casks were manufactured between 1967 and 1985. GOSATOMNADZOR banned their use in October 1993 because

of the following safety concerns: 1) vulnerability

of the casks to low temperature (below -5°C); 2)

potential for cask rupture in an accident involving a head-on collision or car toppling; 3) inadequate quality of production of the casks; and 4)

worn-out conditions of the casks, railcars, and

railway equipment (22).

Recently, the obsolete TUK-11 and TUK-12

casks have been replaced by new casks of the

TUK-18 type. One train of TUK-18 casks carries

approximately 600 fuel assemblies, an equivalent

of 1.5-2 reactor cores of spent fuel. TUK-18

casks also meet international standards and can

withstand serious rail accidents. The Northern

and Pacific Fleets have received 18 and 32 new

casks, respectively. The number of casks is suffi-
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 143

cient to make two trains. However, the number

of corresponding railcars is sufficient for only

one train.

The Military Industrial Commission, the

defense planning arm of the Soviet government,

had directed the Navy to start using new casks in

1983. The Navy, however, did not assign these

plans high priority. Subsequently, the start-up

was rescheduled and failed in 1985, 1988, and

1990. The principal technical problems of transition relate to the need for 1) new spent fuel and

cask handling equipment, and 2) upgrade of the

local road and railway networks (because TUK18 casks are significantly larger and heavier than

TUK-11 and TUK-12 casks).

These problems were overcome at the Northern Fleet shipyard, Severodvinsk: the first consignment of spent fuel in TUK-18 casks was sent

to Mayak in May 1994 by train. TUK-18 casks

were also used in the fall of 1994 to ship spent

fuel from a shutdown reactor of the naval training facility at Paldiski (Estonia).

By the beginning of 1995, new fuel handling

equipment was installed and tested with nonnuclear substitute casks aboard the MSC ship

Lotta. The first train with spent fuel (which also

carried some spent fuel from the Navy) departed

from Atomflot for Mayak in March 1995. A total

of five shipments are planned from Murmansk

by MSC in 1995.

MSC’s management has proposed that the

company could become a central fuel transfer

point in the North, which would serve both the

nuclear icebreakers and the Northern Naval

Fleet. According to the proposed scheme, submarine fuel would be transferred from the

Navy’s service ships to the Lotta prior to reloading in TUK-18 shipping casks. Because MSC

believes that its company has a well developed

technological and transportation infrastructure,

competent personnel, and a valid operating

license, consolidation of all marine nuclear fuel

transfer operations would help to avoid duplication of facilities, increase the rate of shipments,

and improve the safety of fuel reloading operations.

Implementation of this plan, however, might

be impeded by the Zr-U fuel problem. Zr-U fuel

TABLE 4-8: Spent Fuel Shipping Casks

TUK-11 TUK-12 TUK-18

Designation of fuel 

containers/number of 

containers per shipping 

cask

22 or 22M/one container 24 or 24M/one container ChT-4/ seven containers

Number of fuel assemblies 

per container/number of 

containers per shipping 

cask

7/7 7/7 7/49

Shipping cask weight 

(metric tons)

8.9 8.9 40

Designation of railcars/

number of shipping casks 

per one car

TK-4 or TK-7/4 casks per 

car

TK-4 or TK-7/4 casks per 

car

TK-VG-18/3 casks per car

Number of casks per train/

number of fuel assemblies 

per shipment

18 cars/504 fuel 

assemblies

18 cars/504 fuel 

assemblies

4-8 cars/588 to 1,176 fuel 

assemblies

SOURCE: O. Bukharin, “Nuclear Fuel Management in the Russian Navy,” unpublished contractor paper prepared for Office of Technology

Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, DC, November 1994.
144 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

cannot be reprocessed using existing facilities

and practices in Russia. Currently, the spent fuel

has to be stored aboard the service ships, Lotta

and Imandra. The fuel (13 cores total) would fill

most of the storage capacity of the two ships and

limit MSC’s ability to serve as a spent fuel transfer point. (The ships have a combined storage

capacity of 20 reactor cores of spent fuel. Of

these, a space for three cores must be reserved

for freshly discharged fuel.) MSC’s management

proposes to resolve this problem by moving Zr-U

fuel to new land-based storage facilities. The fuel

would be placed in dry storage in multiple-purpose casks that would be installed at the Atomflot base. The casks could also accommodate

damaged fuel from the Lepse. MSC, however,

needs outside funding and/or equipment to

implement this plan.

The situation in the Pacific is more serious.

The last shipment of spent fuel from the Shkotovo waste site took place in 1993. As of beginning 1995, new fuel handling equipment was

installed at the fuel storage facility at the Shkotovo waste site, and similar work has been started

at the rail terminal. There is, however, the need

to upgrade several kilometers of railway connecting the base to the central railway system

and to complete upgrading of the road between

the storage facility and the rail terminal.22 These

seemingly simple construction projects might be

difficult to implement because of lack of funding. The Navy is also considering an alternative

that would involve sending spent fuel by sea to

the shipyard Zvezda, which would serve as a rail

terminal for shipments to Mayak. The poor technical condition of the piers at Zvezda and the

lack of funding in the Navy to pay the shipyard

for fuel transfer operations may complicate the

22 Approximately 1.5 kilometers out of 3.5 kilometers of road have been constructed.

implementation of this plan.23 If, however, the

Navy cannot resolve the problem of shipments, a

new interim storage facility would have to be

built.24

The problem of shipments is compounded by

the increasing costs of reprocessing spent fuel. In

1994, Mayak increased the costs of reprocessing

from $500,000 to $1.5 million (1.5 billion to 7

billion rubles) per shipment (1.5 to 2 reactor

cores or a few hundred kilograms of heavy metals). The increase was caused by financial problems in the nuclear industry, increases in federal

taxes, and inflation.

Disposition of Spent Fuel

In Russia, naval spent fuel is normally reprocessed at the RT-1 chemical separation plant at

Mayak in the Urals. The Mayak complex was

brought into operation in 1949 to produce plutonium and, later, tritium for nuclear weapons.

During the period 1959–60, Mayak and the Institute of Inorganic Materials (Moscow) began

research on reprocessing of irradiated highly

enriched uranium (HEU) fuel such as that used in

the nuclear fleet. The research resulted in a technology to reprocess naval fuels, and a corresponding production line was brought into

operation in 1976. It was the first production line

of the RT-1 reprocessing plant.25

At present, the reprocessing complex includes

three lines for processing fuel from commercial

reactors (MTM models VVER-440,26 BN-350/

600) and from naval, research, and HEU-fueled

reactors. In addition to the reprocessing lines, the

complex includes facilities for short-term storage

of spent fuel, waste storage and treatment facili23 The Navy already has a large debt to the Zvezda shipyard.

24 The estimated time to construct a storage facility is six months. 25 In 1978, the RT-1 plant began reprocessing of spent fuel of model name VVER-440 reactors.

26 A Russian acronym: VVER=vodo-vodyanoy energeticheskiy reaktor (water (-moderated and -cooled) power reactor). The nameplate

capacity of the MTM (MINTYAZHMASH) model VVER-440 line is 400 metric tons per year of VVER-440 fuel. The historic average

throughput is 200 metric tons per year. Recently, however, the plant operated at 25 to 30 percent of its capacity. Reprocessing of VVER-440

fuel from Finland and Eastern Europe is the principal source of income for the Mayak complex.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 145

ties, storage facilities for recovered plutonium

and uranium, and other support facilities.27

The Mayak facility uses a system designed to

reprocess standard uranium-aluminum naval

reactor fuels. The facility previously had the

capacity to process four to five reactor cores of

spent naval fuel per year. Mayak can now process 12 to 15 metric tons of heavy metal

(MTHM) per year. This corresponds to 24 to 30

reactor cores per year. At the current size of the

fleet, normal fleet operations of the Navy and

MSC should not require reprocessing more than

about 10 to 20 cores per year. Thus, sufficient

capacity exists for reprocessing additional fuel

from decommissioned submarines as soon as the

pace of dismantlement operations increases.

Mayak, however, cannot presently reprocess

Zr-U fuel and damaged (or failed) fuels with its

current system.28 One problem with Zr-U alloy

fuels is associated with the difficulty of dissolving them in nitric acid. The Institute of Inorganic

Materials in Moscow has been researching several technologies to resolve this problem. A preferred method involving thermal treatment of the

Zr-U fuel has been identified. However, MINATOM has not been able to secure funding for

construction of a pilot facility at the RT-1 plant

in Mayak. In the interim, MSC is pushing for the

implementation of a plan to move all Zr-U fuel

off its service ships into a land-based storage

facility. The fuel would be housed in dry storage

casks that would safely contain the fuel for dozens of years until suitable processing facilities, or

long-term storage, can be arranged.

❚ Potential for U.S.-Russian Cooperation 

in Spent Fuel Management

OTA sponsored a workshop in January 1995

with Russian and U.S. expert participants to discuss problems with spent fuel management in

both countries. One outcome was the suggestion

that cooperative projects might be useful and

27 Mayak has a 400-metric ton wet storage facility for VVER-440 fuel; a 2,000-metric ton interim storage facility is about 70 percent

complete (65). 28 Reprocessing of fuel assemblies with surface contamination is prohibited to avoid contamination of the production line.

could lead to a number of mutual benefits.

Addressing the many problems related to naval

reactor fuel management is of major importance

from the viewpoint of environmental cleanup,

prevention of potentially serious accidents

involving spent fuel, and progress of the submarine decommissioning program. Some factors are

important to the United States as well as Russia;

however, direct technical assistance to Russia

has limitations. Other countries in Europe, especially Norway, and Japan are also interested in

cooperative work to solve these problems. Assistance programs are difficult to manage and

ensure that support ends up where it is most

needed. Also, certain assistance efforts are complicated by the military nature of nuclear naval

activities.

Box 4-11 describes some possible steps that

could be introduced to address the above problems. Most of these are recognized by Russian

experts and others as critical and necessary. The

problem with spent fuel and radioactive waste in

the Russian Navy is not new. (Even with the high

rate of defueling/refueling in the late 1980s and

the supposedly low rate of fuel shipment, it has

taken several years to accumulate approximately

120 reactor cores currently in storage in the Navy

and MSC.) The Navy had plans to modernize its

waste and spent fuel management facilities back

in the 1980s. Later, in the early 1990s, the problem was addressed in several major reports and

programs. These documents call for development

of a general concept of spent fuel management,

construction of spent fuel handling equipment

and fuel transfer bases, use of new shipping

casks, development of technologies to dispose of

nonstandard fuels and damaged reactor cores,

work on long-term storage of spent fuel and geologic disposal of radioactive waste, and development of a special training center (10).

Resolutions have been passed and plans have

been developed on both regional and site levels
146 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

as well.29 MINATOM, as a lead agency, has

contracted various institutions and agencies to do

the work. However, continuing problems with

funding have largely stalled the progress.

The OTA workshop, thus, sought to identify

areas in which cooperative work could be started

soon, would offer clear mutual benefits, and

could be supported by general agreement that its

further pursuit would be worthwhile.

1. With regard to management of damaged spent

fuel where technologies and systems are not

currently in place, it is clear that damaged fuel

is a major technological and management

29 The following measures are planned at the Severodvinsk site to improve spent fuel management operations: 1) to upgrade refueling

facilities at Sevmash, Sever, and Naval Repair Yard 412 (1993/94); 2) to develop procedures and a system of regulations for the removal of

reactor core from submarines that are decommissioned at Severodvinsk; 3) to upgrade the transportation system at the naval base Belomorskaya; 4) to upgrade the railway system at the Belomorskaya naval base (48), the Sevmash site, and the 1944 Severodvinsk-Isagorka rail link;

5) to build new storage facilities; and 6) to build new service ships (6,48).

issue. In this regard, a vulnerability assessment could be conducted to determine priorities with respect to off-loading damaged fuel

from Russian submarines, surface ships, and

fuel service ships. Similar recent efforts

regarding the problem of spent fuel include

the identification of a critical situation aboard

the service ship Lepse at Atomflot. This ship

has damaged fuel stored that has been in place

for up to 28 years. One of its two compartments, which contains seriously damaged

spent fuel, has been filled with concrete, thus

BOX 4-11: Possible Steps for Improving Spent Fuel Management and Reducing Accident Risks

1. In the area of refueling and spent fuel storage:

■ Procurement of new refueling equipment (e.g., PM-type service ships)

■ Characterization of stored fuel and storage facilities (amounts, types, and condition of fuel, and status of available storage facilities) and safety upgrades at the existing facilities

■ Analysis of options for and construction of interim storage facilities (if needed)a

■ Development of a regulatory framework determining safety criteria for safe storage of spent naval

fuel ( how long and under what conditions storage of spent fuel is safe)

■ Defueling of deactivated submarines if fuel or submarine conditions are unsatisfactory, and development of techniques for safe storage and monitoring of fuel when defueling can be postponed

■ Transfer of the Lepse to a land-based facility

■ Development of plans to decontaminate and dispose of contaminated storage facilities, the Lepse,

and facilities with damaged fuel

These measures could be coordinated with a general concept of fuel and radioactive waste management to include the disposition of nonstandard, damaged, and failed fuels.

2. In the area of spent fuel shipments (if needed):

■ Installation of equipment to work with TUK-18 casks in the north and in the Pacific

■ Upgrades of the local transportation infrastructures

3. In the area of disposition of spent fuel

4. Other necessary factors include sufficient funding, clear division of institutional responsibilities, and

improvements in personnel training and human resource management.

a Some Russian experts are concerned that additional facilities may result in a future decontamination and decommissioning

problem. These experts believe that any available funds should be spent to carry out the standard approach (shipping spent fuel

to Mayak and reprocessing). Multipurpose spent-fuel casks may answer some of these concerns should the storage situation

become critical.

SOURCE: O. Bukharin, “Nuclear Fuel Management in the Russian Navy,” Staff Paper prepared for OTA, November 1994.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 147

making the fuel assemblies very difficult to

extract.

2. It may also be useful to investigate technologies (some of which are available in the

United States) to assess the status of damaged

fuel (i.e., corrosion and potential for criticality). Remote sensing technologies (e.g., minicameras and remote techniques) could be

useful for the inspection of damaged fuel—an

approach commonly used in the United States

but apparently not readily available within the

Russian nuclear fleet.

3. It would be constructive to develop a case

study and risk analysis of fuel management

technologies using the service ship Lepse (a

service ship used for the nuclear icebreaker

fleet that contains seriously damaged spent

fuel). The Lepse is a commercial, not a

defense, vessel; therefore, it would be easier

for an international group to work on than a

Navy submarine.

4. Another possibly useful collaborative project

concerns technologies that are needed to

remove, off-load, and condition damaged fuel

for local storage, for transport to a central

storage facility, or for transport to a site for

reprocessing. Clearly, a decision will have to

be made as to which option is preferred for

matching the conditioning process to the

intended fate of the spent fuel. On this subject,

the United States could offer some lessons

learned from its research on Three Mile Island

to provide feasible conditioning options for

the Russians to consider.

5. Both Russia and the United States could benefit from an analysis of the commercial availability of dry storage and transportation

technologies that could handle damaged and

nonstandard fuel. U.S. industry has examples

of such systems and recently related applications. Mutual identification and development

of these technologies would likely benefit

both countries. Multipurpose casks for dry

storage and shipment developed in the West

are of particular interest to Russia.

❚ Management of Liquid and Solid 

Radioactive Waste from the Nuclear Fleet

In addition to spent fuel management, other

radioactive waste management problems from

the Russian nuclear fleet are evident. As stated in

the Yablokov report, past practices of the fSU’s

nuclear fleet resulted in direct at-sea discharges

of low-level liquid radioactive waste (LRW). In

the report, general areas of liquid waste disposal

are identified in the Barents Sea in the north and

the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the

North Pacific Ocean in the east (23).

Recent reports state that the Northern Fleet

stopped discharging LRW into the Arctic seas in

1992 (23). In the far east, an instance of liquid

waste dumping occurred in October 1993, but no

further discharges have been documented. In the

north, two treatment plants for LRW were built

at Zvezdochka (shipyard in Severodvinsk) and

Sevmash (a Navy base) in the 1960s but never

used and are now obsolete. At Sevmash there are

five floating tanks for Northern Fleet LRW, each

with a capacity of 19 to 24 m3.

Also in the north, at Atomflot—Murmansk

Shipping Company’s repair, maintenance, and

wastewater treatment facility 2 km north of Murmansk—LRW (primarily from icebreakers) is

treated to remove cesium-137 (Cs-137) and

strontium-90 (Sr-90), so that the effluent can be

discharged to the Murmansk Fjord. Since 1990, a

two-stage absorption system has been used with

a capacity of 1 m3 per hour and a yearly capacity

of 1,200 m3 (4).

Although this treatment facility is primarily

for icebreaker waste, it is the only facility available to also treat LRW from naval reactors. MSC

has treated all of its LRW but cannot handle the

backlog (or the amount generated annually) by

submarines in the Northern Fleet. Atomflot says

that it has the technical infrastructure to play a

critical role in managing LRW on a regional

scale. As a stopgap measure, the Northern Fleet

uses two service ships to store its LRW.
148 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Planned Liquid Waste Treatment in the North

Plans for a new treatment facility at the Atomflot

complex have been under development for the

past few years. The facility design currently proposed is based on an evaporation technology

developed by the Institute of Chemical Processing Technology in Ekaterinburg and the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow. The current proposal

would increase the capacity of LRW that could

be handled to 5,000 m3 per year. The new facility

would be designed to handle three types of liquid

waste: primary loop coolant from pressurized

water reactors (PWRs), decontamination solutions, and salt water generated by Russian naval

reactors. The LRW treatment capacity would

handle both the icebreaker fleet and the Northern

Fleet’s needs (Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk

Oblasts). The design of this expanded facility is

now under way with assistance from both the

United States and Norway. Its construction is

planned to begin in late 1995.

The Russians had planned a new facility to

handle the different types of LRW from submarines and icebreakers. It appears that the current

design cannot process large quantities of the submarine waste, which contains salt water. The

MSC now plans to build its new facility in two

phases. The second phase (currently funded only

by MSC) would extend the capacity from 5,000

to 8,000 m3 a year (an additional 3,000 m3).

MSC plans to launch a commercial project with

IVO International of Finland. This project would

involve the use of a technology developed to

remove Cs-137 from the primary loop coolant in

the naval training reactor at Paldiski, Estonia.

The facility would be upgraded and installed on

the tanker Serebryanka. The capacity of the

upgraded system is estimated as 1,000 to 2,000

cubic meters per year. Project cost is estimated at

about $1 million. The combined output of the

two facilities would handle all LRW generated

from ship operations as well as a significant

amount (several thousand cubic meters annually)

generated in the submarine dismantlement process.

Since Russia has not been able to provide the

necessary funds for the expansion of this facility,

to date, the United States’ and Norway’s proposed cooperative effort to fund the expansion

has received considerable attention over the past

year. The Murmansk Initiative, as it is called, has

involved technical exchanges, meetings, expert

site visits, and other activities in 1994 and 1995.

A facility expansion concept paper was prepared,

and an engineering design has been funded. A

discussion of the U.S.-Norwegian-Russian initiative can be found in chapter 5. This effort is one

of the first examples of international cooperative

work directed toward the prevention of further

radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic.

Planned Liquid Waste Treatment 

in the Far East

Liquid radioactive waste treatment and storage

capabilities are also in dire need of upgrading

and improvement to service Russia’s Far Eastern

nuclear fleet. In 1993, Russia and Japan began a

bilateral cooperative project to address this need.

They developed a design and implementation

plan for a new liquid waste treatment facility. An

international tender was issued for the facility in

1994, and bids were due in late 1995. Russia has

also undertaken interim measures to reduce pressures on sea dumping. Thus far, the United States

has not participated in support for this facility as

it has for the one at Murmansk (37).

❚ Solid Low-Level and 

Intermediate-Level Radioactive Waste

Solid waste is generated during the replacement

of fuel assemblies on icebreaker reactors, from

repairs in the reactor section, and in the replacement of cooling water filters, cables, and gaskets.

It is also generated from processing waste related

to the storage of fuel assemblies. Contaminated

clothes and work equipment are also part of the

waste stream. Of the waste generated, 70 percent

is low-level, 25 percent is intermediate-level, and

5 percent is high-level radioactive waste (48).

Until 1986, all low- and intermediate-level solid

waste from nuclear vessels was dumped into the

sea. Since that time, solid waste has been stored,
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 149

in some cases treated (e.g., incinerated), and in

some cases disposed.

For example, at some sites in the north, radioactive waste is currently stored in containers

placed side-by-side in a concrete bunker. Once

the bunker is filled, it is sealed and covered. The

largest storage facility for solid waste has

reached 85 percent of its capacity. Large items

that cannot fit easily into containers (reactor

parts, cooling pipes, control instruments, and

equipment employed in replacing used fuel

assemblies) are placed on the ground without any

protection or safeguards against drainage into the

sea (48).

Given the range of activities taking place in

and around the Arctic Sea and the apparent lack

of secured, monitored storage, there appears to

be a need for a regional depot to store low- and

intermediate-level radioactive waste. Similar

needs exist in the Far East.

A number of waste treatment facilities are in

place. There is an incinerator at Atomflot for

low- and intermediate-level waste. The waste

volume is reduced 80 percent by this incinerator.

The waste gases are filtered, and the ashes and

filters are stored in containers (48). Some solid

radioactive waste mainly from decommissioned

submarines is also being incinerated at a naval

facility in the north. Incinerator gases are controlled and led through special filters. When the

radioactivity of the gases is too high, the facility

shuts down—a frequent occurrence. Facility

operation appears to be erratic; the facility

reportedly runs for only one month a year due to

filtration system overload and system shutdown.

There are also discharges of radioactive gases

in connection with repairs at reactors and

replacement of fuel assemblies. Such is the case

at Severodvinsk where the annual discharge of

such gases is estimated to be up to 10,000 m3

from the labs and from storage of used fuel

assemblies (48).

Russian sources have listed the following

steps as necessary to manage waste generated in

the Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk Oblasts: (4)

■ develop new storage facilities,

■ install preliminary radioactive waste treatment

equipment at the point of waste generation,

■ implement waste minimization and decontamination methods,

■ develop safe transport facilities that meet

international standards,

■ develop a complex for radioactive waste treatment at Atomflot,

■ develop solid waste supercompaction (1,500-

2,000 metric tons of force) instead of the currently used incineration of lower-pressure (100

tons of force) compaction methods,

■ construct a specialized ship for transporting

solid radioactive waste packages to their final

repository, and

■ construct a radioactive waste repository for

solid wastes in permafrost in Novaya Zemlya.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS—

SAFETY CONCERNS AND RISK 

REDUCTION EFFORTS

❚ Background

Since the major nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl, many nations have taken actions to help

improve safety and reduce the risk of future accidents in all states of the former Soviet Union.

Specific activities in Russia, discussed in this

section, deserve particular attention in the context of preventing future radioactive contamination in the Arctic since Chernobyl releases are

among the most widespread contaminants measured today throughout the general region.

Russia has 29 nuclear power units at nine

reactor sites (see figure 4-4 for reactor locations).30 In 1993, with these reactors operating at

65 percent capacity, they provided 12.5 percent

of the electricity produced in the country.31

There are two main reactor types in Russia: the

30 Note, however, that the map lists only 24 reactors since it does not show either the four reactors at Bilibino or the one at Beloyarsk. 31 In the United States in 1993, net electricity generated from nuclear power generating units was 21.2 percent of net electricity generated

from utilities (63). For a discussion of older nuclear power plants in the United States (60).
150 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

RBMK and the VVER.32 Box 4-12 and table 4-9

describe the types and locations of Russian

power reactors. The Chernobyl reactor 4 that

exploded in April 1986 in Ukraine was an

RBMK reactor, and 11 of this type are now operating in Russia. The RBMK is a graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled reactor. Spent fuel from

these reactors is replaced while the reactor is in

operation, unlike PWRs, which must be shut

down before refueling takes place. Experts outside Russia have criticized the RBMK design,

especially since the Chernobyl accident, and

have proposed several remedies ranging from

safety improvements in existing reactors to substitution of new reactors with different designs,

to outright replacement with other fuel sources.33

It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about

the safety levels of all Russian reactors in general. Some have argued that Russian reactors are

more geared toward prevention than reaction to a

possible accident. For example, the higher water

inventory in the VVER reactors, compared to

Western-design PWRs, means that the heat-up

process following an accident in which replenishment of makeup water is not available allows

more time for corrective measures to be taken

before possible damage to the fuel. Therefore,

the need for containment and other postaccident

mechanisms becomes somewhat compensated

(3). However, this design advantage does not offset the need for improvements in Russian nuclear

power plants (NPPs) suggested by many international experts. These include new monitoring and

safety procedures that comply with international

standards, reliable operating systems, welltrained operators, and sufficient funding for

maintenance and spare parts.

32 A Russian acronym: RBMK=reaktor bol’shoy moshchnosti kipyashchiy (large-capacity boiling (-water) reactor).

33 The two main safety concerns about the RBMK are: 1) core neutronics, or nuclear reactions in the core and 2) hydraulics of the pressure tubes. With regard to core neutronics, the RBMK has a positive void coefficient, which means that reactions speed up when water is lost

from the core, for example, through excessive boiling or a loss-of-coolant accident. This happens because water serves to absorb neutrons;

therefore, when water is lost, the number of neutrons increases, thereby speeding up the chain reaction. (Neutrons promote fission by hitting

a uranium atom and causing it to split.) At Chernobyl unit 4 in April 1986, the chain reaction multiplied rapidly, generating high temperatures

that caused an explosion. The second main concern, hydraulics of the pressure tubes, has to do with the possibility of fuel channel rupture.

When reactivity speeds up, there is the possibility that several tubes might rupture simultaneously and pressure in the cavity below the reactor

cover might increase enough to lift the head off, causing all the tubes to break and lifting out the control rods—a scenario that occurred at

Chernobyl.

Very few probabilistic risk assessments have

been done to date and made available to the West

for Russian reactors; thus, accident risk claims

have not been established quantitatively. The

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) hopes to

convince Russia of the need to conduct such

assessments. Another complicating factor in

assessing the safety of Russian reactors is the

fact that after January 1, 1993, the flow of information on plant design and accidents at these

plants effectively dried up. Although the Soviet

Union did sign certain international reporting

conventions, the nations of the former Soviet

Union effectively ceased making international

accident reports in early 1993. When an event

occurs, such reports are usually made to the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD)’s Nuclear Energy Agency

or to the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), which rates and analyzes the incident

(52). 

Evaluations of U.S. efforts to improve the current conditions of reactor safety in Russia vary.

A Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC)

Nuclear Energy Committee report, the product of

the December 15–16, 1994, GCC meetings, recognized these efforts, outlined in a December

1993 agreement, as unsuccessful. The December

1993 agreement was entitled, “On Raising Operational Safety, on Measures to Lower the Risk

and on Norms of Nuclear Reactor Safety with

Respect to Civilian Nuclear Power Plants of Russia.” This agreement sought to facilitate cooperation under the Lisbon Initiative.34 However, at

the December 1994 GCC meetings, Russia

accepted U.S. explanations for failure to complete projects planned for 1994 (9,20).

34 The Lisbon Initiative refers to the current U.S. bilateral assistance program with the former Soviet Union in the area of nuclear reactor

safety, which is discussed later in this chapter.

152 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 4-12: Nuclear Power Reactors in Russia

Currently, Russia operates 11 RBMKs1 at three sites: four near St. Petersburg, four at Kursk (south of

Moscow), and three at Smolensk (southwest of Moscow). The St. Petersburg units, located in Sosnovy

Bor, St. Petersburg Oblast, are the only ones out of the 29 operating units in Russia that are run by a separate utility company, the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant Utility. The Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) operates all other power plants through an organization known as the Rosenergoatom Consortium.

Each of the 11 RBMK units has a capacity of 925 net MWe (megawatts of electricity). The first St.

Petersburg unit came online in December 1973, and the last in February of 1981. The earliest Kursk

unit dates from December 1976, and the latest from December 1985. The Smolensk units are somewhat newer, dating from December 1982 to January 1990.

The EPG-6 is a reactor type similar to the RBMK. It too is graphite moderated and boiling water

cooled. The four existing reactors of this type are found at Bilibino on the Chukchi Peninsula in the Russian Oblast of Magadan, which is about 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle in the Russian Far East. Each

of the Bilibino units has a capacity of 11 net MWe. Unit A at Bilibino began operation in January 1974,

unit B in December 1974, Unit C in December 1975, and Unit D in December 1976.

The other main type of reactor in the former Soviet Union is the VVER,2 which is a pressurized water

reactor (PWR) design, the main reactor type in the West. It is water moderated and cooled. The oldest version of this reactor is the VVER 440/230, followed by the 440/213, both of which produce 440

MWe of electricity. The oldest of the VVER reactors, the 440/230, like the RBMK, is considered by

many Western observers to have safety problems. It lacks an emergency core cooling system to prevent the core from melting after a loss-of-coolant accident. Moreover, the reactor vessel is vulnerable

to radiation-induced embrittlement, which increases the risk of fracture in the vessel. It also lacks

containment vessels to prevent the escape of radioactive materials after severe accidents. It should

be noted, however, that the model 230 has several positive features. Since it has a large water inventory and low power density, it can more easily ride out problems such as a “station blackout” when

there is a loss of the power needed to run pumps that cool the core. The model 230 also has an

“accident localization system” to condense steam and reduce the release of radiation after an incident in which most pipes in the reactor system break, thereby mitigating the danger inherent in a

design that has no containment vessel.

The VVER 440/213, a newer model, includes an emergency core cooling system, an improved reactor

vessel, and an improved accident localization system. This model, however, still lacks full containment

(except in the case of those models sent to Finland and Cuba).

The Kola NPP, with four reactors, is located in the Murmansk region above the Arctic Circle near the

northeastern border of Norway. Two of these reactors are the oldest generation units, VVER 440/230s.

They came online in June 1973 and December 1974, respectively. The other two units are VVER 440/213

units, which began operation in March 1981 and October 1984, respectively. At the end of 1994, only two

of the Kola power units were operational, and prospects are problematic for continued operation of the

remaining units because of difficulties in collecting fees owed by Murmansk Oblast industries.

The newest generation of VVER reactors in Russia is the VVER-1000, which is most like a Western

nuclear power station. It runs at 1,000 MWe, and its design includes a full containment vessel and

rapid-acting scram systems. Experts believe that this design could approximate Western safety

standards, given some modifications, such as increased fire protection and improved protection of

critical instrumentation and control circuits.

(continued)
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 153

Russian officials have stated that the United

States unilaterally determines priorities, and pays

too much attention to analysis and not enough to

practical solutions. As an example, they point to

1994 when no supplies or equipment were sent,

although some had been sent in 1993 (9). However, the Chairman of GOSATOMNADZOR

told a September 1993 meeting of Group of

Twenty-Four (G-24) representatives that the

bilateral assistance implemented in the regulatory field was timely and effective, compared

with other Western assistance (58). One possible

reason that the NRC is actually ahead of schedule is that unlike the Department of Energy

(DOE) and its contractors, NRC has not been

hampered by liability problems (52).

One of the biggest impediments to the development of a safety culture in Russia lies in the

human arena: the current low pay and low

morale of plant employees work to undermine a

concern for safety. Socioeconomics is a formidable consideration. The prospect of shutdown at a

station such as Chernobyl in Ukraine, which is

responsible for 7 percent of national energy production, carries with it the implication of social

unrest, given the extensive loss of jobs (staff of

5,800) that would ensue. Also, in the former

Soviet Union, nuclear power plants, like many

workplaces there, are responsible for providing a

host of social services for their employees. This

makes their closure a much more painful and,

potentially, more politically and economically

destabilizing measure.

According to former NRC Chairman Ivan

Selin, the three most important elements for

shoring up a strong safety culture are as follows:

1) technical excellence and operational safety

enforced by a tough, independent regulator, and

supported by timely plant operator wage payments and payments to utilities for electricity

produced; 2) a sound economic climate that

allows for a sufficiently profitable nuclear program capable of underwriting first-rate training,

maintenance, and equipment, and incorporates a

new energy pricing mechanism to encourage

energy conservation; and 3) solid organization

and management, including high-quality staffing, training, and responsible leadership. He recNovovoronezh NPP, located in southwestern Russia, has two 440/230 reactors, which began operation in December 1971 and 1972, respectively, and one VVER-1000, which began operation in May 1980.

Kalinin NPP, located northwest of Moscow, has two VVER-1000 units. Unit 1 came online in May 1984 and

unit 2 in December 1986. Balakovo NPP, which is located along the Volga River southeast of Moscow,

has four VVER-1000 units; the first began operation in December 1985, and the last, Balakovo 4, became

commercially operable in April 1993. Balakovo 4 is the newest of all Russia’s reactors and the first one

built since 1990.

Only one other type of reactor, the BN-600, a fast breeder reactor, is operating in Russia. It is known

as “Beloyarsky 3” and is located in the Ural Mountain area, about 900 miles east of Moscow. It has a

capacity of 560 net MWe and has been in operation since April 1980.

1 RBMK = Reaktor bol’shoy moshchnosti kipyashchiy (large-capacity boiling [-water] reactor).

2 VVER = Vodo-vodyanoy energeticheskiy reaktor (water [-moderated and -cooled] power reactor).

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, EIA World Nuclear Outlook, 1994, DOE/EIA-0436(94)

(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1994); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Fueling

Reform: Energy Technologies for the Former East Bloc, OTA-ETI-599 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July

1994); U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed

Reactors Safer, GAO/RCED-94-234 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994); “Funding Crisis Could

Cause Nuclear Station Shutdown,” Moscow Ostankino Television, First Channel Network, in FBIS Report/Central Eurasia (FBISSOV-94-227) Nov. 25, 1994, p. 35.

BOX 4-12: Nuclear Power Reactors in Russia (Cont’d.)
154 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

TABLE 4-9: Russian Nuclear Generating Units Operable as of December 31, 1994

Unit name Location

Capacity

(net MWe) Date of operation

Reactor

type Reactor model

Balakovo 1 Balakovo, Saratov 950 December 1985 PWR VVER-1000

Balakovo 2 950 October 1987 PWR VVER-1000

Balakovo 3 950 December 1988 PWR VVER-1000

Balakovo 4 950 April 1993 PWR VVER-1000

Beloyarsky 3 Zarechny, Sverdlovsk 560 April 1980 FBR BN-600

Bilibino A Bilibino, Chukotka 11 January 1974 LGR EPG-6

Bilibino B 11 December 1974 LGR EPG-6

Bilibino C 11 December 1975 LGR EPG-6

Bilibino D 11 December 1976 LGR EPG-6

Kalinin 1 Udomlya, Tver 950 May 1984 PWR VVER-1000

Kalinin 2 950 December 1986 PWR VVER-1000

Kola 1 Polyarniye Zori, 

Murmansk

411 June 1973 PWR VVER-440/230

Kola 2 411 December 1974 PWR VVER-440/230

Kola 3 411 March 1981 PWR VVER-440/213

Kola 4 411 October 1984 PWR VVER-440/213

Kursk 1a Kurchatov, Kursk 925 December 1976 LGR RBMK-1000

Kursk 2 925 January 1979 LGR RBMK-1000

Kursk 3 925 October 1983 LGR RBMK-1000

Kursk 4 925 December 1985 LGR RBMK-1000

Leningrad 1a Sosnovy Bor, St. 

Petersburg

925 December 1973 LGR RBMK-1000

Leningrad 2a 925 July 1975 LGR RBMK-1000

Leningrad 3 925 December 1979 LGR RBMK-1000

Leningrad 4 925 February 1981 LGR RBMK-1000

Novovoronezh 3 Novovoronezhsky, 

Voronezh

385 December 1971 PWR VVER-440/230

Novovoronezh 4 385 December 1972 PWR VVER-440/230

Novovoronezh 5 950 May 1980 PWR VVER-1000

Smolensk 1 Desnogorsk, 

Smolensk

925 December 1982 LGR RBMK-1000

Smolensk 2 925 May 1985 LGR RBMK-1000

Smolensk 3 925 January 1990 LGR RBMK-1000

Total: 29 units 19,843

a Under reconstruction.

KEY: LGR=light-water-cooled, graphite-moderated; PWR=pressurized light-water-moderated and cooled; FBR=fast breeder reactor.

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, EIA World Nuclear Outlook, 1994, DOE/EIA-0436(94) (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1994); Gosatomnadzor, “Characteristics of the Status of Safety at Nuclear Power Plants in Russia (for 1994),” (Moscow, Russia: GAN, circa 1994).
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 155

ommends that Western assistance efforts be

directed toward longer-term initiatives, such as

ensuring adequate resources and sound institutional and management arrangements, rather than

short-term approaches, such as technical fixes,

operational improvements, and regulatory procedures (51,54). Other experts agree that with the

volatile socioeconomic situation in Russia, assistance money might be wasted if it is used on

technologies that the Russians are financially

incapable of maintaining or regulating properly.

❚ International Programs Addressing 

Reactor Safety

Group of Seven and Other Multilateral Efforts

The Group of Seven (G-7) summit in Munich in

July 1992 was a seminal conference in the evolution of reactor safety. At that summit, participating countries designed an emergency action plan

for the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. Operational improvements including near-term technical assistance and training are part of the plan, as

are regulatory improvements. In response to suggestions made at the conference, donor countries

conducted assessments on: 1) the feasibility of

alternative energy sources and conservation

practices, to allow for the replacement of the oldest and least safe plants; and 2) the potential for

upgrading newer reactors to meet international

safety norms.

The World Bank, the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and

the International Energy Agency (IEA) have

been conducting these studies, which were completed recently. However, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’

Congressional Study Group and Task Force on

Nuclear Energy Safety Challenges in the Former

Soviet Union, the studies provide neither detailed

practical options on which to base U.S. policy

nor convincing arguments that might persuade

countries in the Newly Independent States (NIS)

and Eastern Europe to shut down the riskiest

reactors before their planned life spans are completed. Apparently, the G-7 and the authors of

the studies themselves concur in this opinion (7).

International Convention on Nuclear Safety

Additional multilateral efforts include the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, an agreement that would urge shutdowns at nuclear

power plants that do not meet certain safety standards. These are not detailed technical standards.

Instead, the standards that the convention stipulates are general safety principles, including the

establishment of a legislative framework on

safety and an independent regulator; procedures

to ensure continuous evaluation of the technical

aspects of reactor safety (e.g., this would require

countries to establish procedures to evaluate the

effect of site selection on the environment and to

ensure protection against radiation releases); and

a safety management system (e.g., establishing a

quality assurance program, training in safety, and

emergency preparedness plans). Work on the

convention began in 1991 in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As of September

21, 1994, 40 nations had signed the convention

including the United States, Russia, and Ukraine.

With its signing by 40 nations, the agreement can

now go before each nation’s legislative body or

parliament for ratification. The agreement calls

on signers to submit an immediate report on all

nuclear power facilities and, if necessary, to execute speedy improvements to upgrade the sites.

The convention also sets up a framework for the

review of a nation’s atomic sites by other

nations, with special provisions for such a

request from neighboring countries, which may

be concerned about the health of their populations and crops. The convention does not provide

for an international enforcement mechanism and

has no penalties for noncompliance, so as not to

infringe on national sovereignty. As drafted, the

convention designates IAEA as Secretariat to the

meetings of involved countries (1,59).

There are several other multilateral programs

whose goal is to promote nuclear safety within

the former Soviet Union. Most are smaller and

more specifically targeted than the above efforts.

The U.S. Nuclear Safety Assistance Program

The Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian

Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS) is a cooper-
156 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

ative exchange program between the United

States and the Soviet Union, which was initiated

in 1988. It was established in accordance with a

Memorandum of Cooperation under the Agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the

Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

(PUAEA)—an agreement signed in 1972. Not

until the late 1970s, however, was the nuclear

safety issue incorporated in the Peaceful Uses

Agreement, and even then action on cooperation

in nuclear safety was delayed due to the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

After the Chernobyl accident in 1986,

renewed zeal was focused on the issue of nuclear

safety within the framework of the PUAEA. On

April 26, 1988, two years to the day after Chernobyl, the JCCCNRS was created under the

Peaceful Uses Agreement. Russia and Ukraine

have been formal successors to the U.S.S.R. on

both the Peaceful Uses Agreement and the

JCCCNRS. Representatives from both the

atomic energy and the regulatory ministries in

each country act as co-chairs of the JCCCNRS.

Similarly, DOE and NRC are the co-chairs from

the United States. Although the dissolution of the

Soviet Union in late 1991 had little impact on the

progress of activity under the JCCCNRS Memorandum of Cooperation, it did usher in new operational and regulatory organizations in the

former Soviet Union and introduced economic

problems with negative consequences for nuclear

safety, including a lack of money for maintenance and shortages of spare parts.

A conference in May 1992 in Lisbon, Portugal, represented a turning point in U.S. nuclear

safety assistance to the NIS. The U.S. program

changed from a program of cooperative

exchanges to one of specific, targeted assistance.

Commonly called the Lisbon Initiative, the current U.S. nuclear safety assistance effort began

as an outgrowth of JCCCNRS and has in many

ways superseded JCCCNRS work. Nevertheless, JCCCNRS still exists and retains some of

its original working groups.

The May 1992 Lisbon meeting and the corresponding U.S. commitments made at the G-7

conference in Munich in July 1992 are the basis

for the current DOE-led program in nuclear

safety assistance to the NIS, the Program for

Improving the Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors, under the International Nuclear Safety Program (INSP). INSP activities are conducted

according to the guidance and policies of the

State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID), and the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. All four agencies work

together to achieve the objectives of the INSP,

which are the following: 1) to strengthen operations and upgrade physical conditions at plants,

2) to promote a safety culture, and 3) to facilitate

the development of a safety infrastructure.

In addition, at the Vancouver Summit in May

1993 the United States and Russia laid the

groundwork for the U.S.-Russia Commission on

Economic and Technological Cooperation, better

known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.

The first meeting of the GCC took place in

Washington, D.C., in September 1993. At that

meeting, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin agreed on a joint study on alternate sources of energy in Russia, which is being

carried out by U.S. AID in close cooperation

with the World Bank and other organizations.

Also at that first GCC meeting, the Nuclear

Safety Subcommittee, co-chaired by DOE and

NRC for the United States and MINATOM and

GAN for Russia, was formed.

❚ Activities within the 

Department of Energy

The International Nuclear Safety Program is a

Department of Energy effort to cooperate with

partners in other countries to improve nuclear

safety worldwide. Activities directed toward

raising the level of safety at Soviet-designed

nuclear power plants play a major role in this

worldwide effort. The overall objectives of the

Program for Improving the Safety of SovietDesigned Reactors include the following: 1) to

strengthen operation and upgrade physical conditions at plants, 2) to promote a safety culture, and

3) to facilitate the development of a safety infra-
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 157

structure. The thrust of the program involves

encouraging these countries to help themselves.

Work under the program is organized according

to the following major program elements:

1. Management and Operations: Major activities

involve development and implementation of

the following: emergency operating instructions (EOIs); practices and procedures for the

safe conduct of plant operations; and training

programs, including those based on the use of

simulators, with training centers at the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant in Russia and the

Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.

The program also seeks to improve emergency

response capabilities through integration and

through training and assistance in deficient

areas.

2. Engineering and Technology: The focus is on

the transfer of techniques, practices and procedures, and tools and equipment to upgrade

plant safety. Training in the use of transferred

items will also be provided to help countries

help themselves in the future. Generally, when

a hardware backfit is necessary for safety

improvement, a single plant is selected for a

“pilot demonstration” of the technology transfer. Under certain circumstances, however,

(e.g., when insufficient economic incentives

exist for the transfer of specific technologies),

similar safety upgrade projects may be carried

out at multiple plants. Upgrades in safetyrelated systems include fire safety, confinement, reactor protection, emergency power,

and emergency feedwater systems. In pursuing upgrades in the safety-related systems of

older reactors, caution is taken so as not to

encourage continued operation of these reactors. The program element “engineering and

technology” also encompasses the establishment of national technical standards. Examination of areas such as design control,

technical and material specifications, nuclear

equipment manufacturing, configuration management, and nondestructive testing methods

will be performed to determine where practices should be changed to ensure sufficient

levels of quality.

3. Plant Safety Evaluation: Safety evaluation is

an area of the program receiving increasing

emphasis (19). The idea is to develop the

methodologies, techniques, and expertise necessary for safety analyses to be performed

consistent with international standards. Plantspecific analyses will likely draw on more

general studies that have already been completed by the IAEA. Priority of work will be

decided with a view to furthering projects by

the EBRD. Activities will include probabilistic risk assessments and assistance with the

prioritization of future plant modernizations.

4. Fuel Cycle Safety: This element of the INSP

Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program

deals exclusively with Ukraine. The objective

of the Fuel Cycle Safety Program is to address

safety issues surrounding interim storage of

spent fuel in Ukraine. Assistance and training

to both Ukrainian power plant operators and

regulators will include efforts toward the

licensing of additional spent fuel storage

capacity, the procurement and delivery of dry

cask storage prototypes and related equipment

for use at the Zaporozhye plant, and assistance

as requested by Ukrainian regulators. Analysis

and strategic planning regarding the adequacy

and safety performance of spent fuel storage

systems are fundamental to the program.

5. Nuclear Safety Legislative and Regulatory

Framework: The major emphasis of this program element is on Russia. The focus is on the

development of a legal framework that promotes the following: adherence to international nuclear safety and liability conventions

and treaties; domestic indemnification for

nuclear safety liability (domestic indemnification legislation would allow for broader use of

Western safety technology); and establishment of strong, independent regulatory bodies.

The program will encourage the habit of

incorporating regulatory compliance at all

stages of engineering and operations. It will

also ensure that an appropriate regulatory

framework exists to support other INSP

project elements. Evaluation of the legislative

and regulatory status in the host country will
158 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

take place in cooperation with the U.S.NRC

program. Should improvements in the regulatory framework of the host country be deemed

necessary, assistance will be provided to complement related ongoing NRC activities.

❚ Activities within the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission programs,

begun in October 1992 under the Lisbon Initiative assistance effort in Russia, include the following:

1. Licensing Basis and Safety Analysis: This

involves training and technical assistance on

NRC practices and processes for the licensing

of nuclear power plants, research reactors, and

other facilities involved in the use of radioactive materials. This program was the firstranked priority project requested by the Russians and has witnessed nine teams of GAN

representatives travel to the United States during 1993–94.

2. Inspection Program Activities: These provide

training and technical assistance on the NRC

inspection program. Four training team visits,

two Russian teams to the United States and

two U.S. teams to Russia, took place during

1993–94. Also, NRC officials participated in a

joint pilot team inspection at a Russian plant.

3. Creation of an Emergency Support Center:

Assistance is provided in establishing incident

response programs. Again, team exchanges

took place in both directions.

4. Analytical Support Activities: These assist in

the implementation and application of analytical methodologies to the performance of

safety analyses. NRC has solicited a contractor to provide technical support in the procurement and installation of engineering work

stations. These will be useful for performing

severe accident analyses, which employ U.S.

computer codes that have been modified for

the Russian nuclear power plants. A national

laboratory has agreed to provide some analytical code training.

5. Establishment of a Regulatory Training Program: Assistance is provided in the establishment of a regulatory training program in

Russia. Nine microcomputer systems, to be

used for computer-based training, were delivered to Moscow in July 1993 and more are

being sent. Also in July 1993, four GAN officials completed a three-week assignment at

the NRC Technical Training Center (TTC), at

which they learned about the training of NRC

personnel. In August of that year, four more

GAN officials spent two weeks at the facility

learning about the use of training aids such as

simulators and the use of equipment for developing and presenting course materials.

Another contingent of GAN technical personnel visited TTC in November 1993. When further funding is available, implementation will

begin on an agreement to acquire and deliver

an analytical simulator, developed by a joint

U.S.-Russian venture.

6. Creation and Development of a Materials

Control and Accounting System: Not part of

JCCCNRS, this program offers assistance in

nuclear materials accounting and control

under the Safe and Secure Dismantlement of

Nuclear Weapons program.

7. Fire Protection Support: Technical assistance

is provided in the development and review of

fire protection inspection methodology and

implementation of this methodology at Russian reactors. NRC developed a historical fire

protection and postfire safe shutdown licensing analysis document for GAN use.35 After

the fire protection/safe shutdown licensing

document, GAN specialists visited NRC and

regional fire protection specialists to learn

about regulations, licensing practices, and

inspection methodologies in this area. Further

work in this area has been requested by GAN.

35 It should be noted, however, that MINATOM refuses to recognize the validity of GAN’s licensing procedures. Enabling mechanisms

are necessary to make licensing enforceable. Russian domestic legislation probably would be necessary in this area to resolve these differences (52).
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 159

8. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Study for the

Kalinin VVER-1000 Power Station (Beta

Project): A risk assessment study on Kalinin

is to be developed. A kickoff meeting

between the primary Russian and U.S. participants was held in May 1994. The various

phases envisioned for the project include the

following: Phase 1—Project Organization;

Phase 2—Training, Procedures Guide

Development, and Data Gathering; Phase

3—System Modeling and Accident Frequency Analysis; and Phase 4—Containment Performance. Statements of work have

been done for the first three phases.

9. Licensing and Inspection of Radioactive

Materials: Key GAN personnel are trained

in health and safety issues relating to the

licensing and inspection program at NRC for

nonmilitary possession, use, and disposal of

radioactive materials. This priority area

involves on-the-job training in nuclear materials transport, the nuclear fuel cycle, spent

fuel storage, nuclear waste programs, and

radioisotope practices.

10. Institutional Strengthening: General support

is provided to GAN in the following areas:

document control management and computer utilization, electronic information

communication, safety information publication, and the International Council of

Nuclear Regulators (NRC agreed to investigate ways to underwrite GAN participation

in council activities).

❚ Nuclear Power Plants in the Arctic

The Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant

The two Russian nuclear power plants with

potentially the greatest impact on the Alaskan

environment are Bilibino in Chukotka Oblast in

the Russian Far East and Kola in Murmansk

Oblast. Bilibino is about 810 miles from Nome,

Alaska; 1,250 miles from Fairbanks; and 1,860

miles from Juneau. Since Bilibino in the Russian

Far East is a small-capacity station (each of the

four units has a capacity of only 11 net MWe)

(megawatts of electricity), no DOE resources

have been expended to assist in upgrading it.

There is the possibility, however, that emergency

response money will be directed toward this end

in the future (55). However, NRC and GAN are

cooperating on safety aspects of this facility.

They are considering improvements in communication links between Bilibino and Moscow, in

conjunction with an emergency support center at

GAN headquarters in Moscow. Nuclear power

plants in the United States make routine daily

status reports to NRC, and NRC is working to

establish a similar system in Russia, whereby the

plants in Russia report to GAN in Moscow.

As mentioned above, the reactor design at

Bilibino is EPG-6, graphite moderated and boiling water cooled, similar to the RBMK but with

noteworthy differences. Comparisons to Chernobyl should be made cautiously. Fuel design and

uranium enrichment differ between the two reactor types. These differences affect both the risk

of an accident and its possible consequences. The

possible consequences of an accident depend on

the total inventory of fission products in the core

at the time of an accident and the fraction and

composition of the inventory that actually gets

into the atmosphere. At any given time, Bilibino

should have only about 1 percent of the total

inventory of fission products in the Chernobyl

reactor during the accident there in April 1986.

Although little is known about the actual risk of

accident at Bilibino, possible consequences of an

accident, should one occur, could be estimated

by using the knowledge available. Some

researchers have made preliminary estimates of

the consequences of an accident at Bilibino that

indicate very low concentrations of radionuclides

would be carried as far as Alaska.

All low-level waste is concentrated and stored

onsite at Bilibino. High-level waste, including

spent fuel, filters, and reactor components, is

held onsite in stainless steel-lined concrete tanks.

Fuel storage pools are closer to operating reactors than is advised in the United States.

A radiological emergency response plan exists

for Bilibino. Unlike U.S. plans, this plan is based

on actual postaccident measurements of a release

rather than on plant conditions or dose projection
160 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

models. As a result, prerelease notification of

deteriorating plant conditions, which would be

included in Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency reports in the United States, are

not possible under the Bilibino emergency

response system. The Bilibino plan’s accident

assessment categories differ from both IAEA

International Nuclear Event Scale categories and

the U.S. system of classification.36 Therefore,

some have recommended that U.S. officials

seeking direct communications with Bilibino

personnel and with civil defense (Emergency Situations Office)37 officials should become familiar with the plan and its accident assessment

categories, which are based on a wartime nuclear

attack plan. Because of fundamental differences

between United States and Russian emergency

response philosophies, some have also recommended that a “tabletop” drill be carried out

between Alaska and Chukotka. This would allow

both sides to test communication links and make

sure they understand each other.

In late June 1994, a four–day International

Radiological Exercise (RADEX) was convened

to test emergency response procedures. Three

representatives from Bilibino and from the

Chukotka Regional Government participated, as

did other representatives from the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) nations,

various Native groups, and the International

Atomic Energy Agency.38 Also, the Office of

Naval Research (ONR) is funding Emergency

Response Collaboration with the Bilibino Region

as one of the projects under its Arctic Nuclear

Waste Assessment Project (ANWAP), which is

funded by money from the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program. Under this program, in June

1994, Alaska hosted three Bilibino staff and a

member of the Chukotka regional government

for a visit that coincided with the RADEX table36 Bilibino does not use the IAEA scale, but the Russian Federation does use it when sending information to other countries and IAEA.

37 Peacetime radiological emergency response capabilities may be shifting away from the Civil Defense Committee, since there is a

reduced emphasis on civil defense with the end of the Cold War (57). 38 AEPS was established in 1989 and consists of eight countries, including the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. In 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland, these countries agreed on a strategy that includes objectives and an action plan,

calling for four implementing working groups, including the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group, which was

involved in the RADEX exercise.

top exercise. In September 1994, the principal

investigator for the Emergency Response Collaboration project under ANWAP, Mead Treadwell,

then Commissioner of Alaska’s Department of

Environmental Conservation, met with officials

of the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear

Safety in Rovaniemi, Finland, and a conceptual

agreement was reached on the development of

further linkages in emergency response. Russian

participation is responsible for about 25 percent

of both the effort and the funds that have been

expended on the Emergency Response Collaboration with the Bilibino Region project.

Under the current reporting system, accidents

at Bilibino would be reported to Moscow, from

Moscow to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, from

Vienna to Washington, D.C., and from Washington to Alaska. Moreover, under the Convention

on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,

agreed to by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and

other states in 1986, the criterion for notification

is “radiological safety significance for another

state,” as understood by the originating state.

Russian officials might reasonably argue that,

given the small size of the Bilibino plant and its

distance from the United States, even a severe

accident there would not constitute “radiological

safety significance” for another state and, therefore, would go unreported. Alaska is pushing for

direct notification from Bilibino.

Improved radiation monitoring is, of course,

integral to the detection and notification process.

Also under ANWAP, efforts are under way to

improve radiation monitoring. ONR support has

made possible cooperation between the University of Alaska and the DOE Los Alamos National

Laboratory in the installation of two atmospheric

radiation monitors for winter capability testing.

If these are successful, installation will be established at Bilibino, and personnel from the
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 161

Department of Environmental Conservation and

the University of Alaska at Fairbanks will maintain the equipment.39

The Russians have announced some plans to

expand power generation capacity at Bilibino to

120 MWe, by replacing the four 11-MWe reactors with three 40-MWe reactors. One plan under

study by MINATOM would involve construction

of floating nuclear power plants similar in basic

design to those used in Russia’s nuclear-powered

icebreakers. The floating plants would be built in

a shipyard and towed to northern Siberian locations such as Bilibino. It is not clear whether or

when funds would be available for these projects.

The existing reactors have a 25-year design life,

and the first one is scheduled for decommissioning in 2003. Plans for both decommissioning and

expansion are due in 1998. A concern at the

present time is that Bilibino is in an area of high

seismic activity, and the reactor lacks containment. In June 1992, Y.G. Vishnevskiy, Chairman

of the Russian State Nuclear Inspectorate (GAN)

stated that:

generating units of the Bilibino NPP completely

fail safety rules and standards. They have outlived their original life and must be immediately

shut down, especially since they are located in a

seismic zone.40

Although the basic reactor design would

remain the same in the proposed replacement

systems, containment for each new reactor would

be included in the changes. Prior to the expansion, installation of automatic monitoring equipment is planned for 1996. Russian authorities

have also announced plans for waste management facilities at or near the plant site, but details

are not clear. Bilibino management believes it

would require at least $16 million to make all the

modifications at the plant necessary to meet the

most recent Russian power plant standards

39 In Moscow in September 1994, principal investigator Treadwell presented a paper at the Ministry for Civil Defense Affairs, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) meeting. Conference members endorsed the idea of a monitoring

network. Follow-up meetings with the Russian ministries of Foreign Affairs, HYDROMET, MINATOM, Emergency Response, and Environment, and U.S. DOE and the State Department took place. The result was a request for a more specific proposal for the installation of radionuclide monitoring systems (15). 40 Y.G. Vishnevskiy, June 1992, quoted in “Fact Sheet: Bilibino Nuclear Heat and Electric Power Plant,” communication from U.S. Senator T. Stevens’ Office, June 1993.

(57,63). However, despite the proposed improvements, Magadan officials fear that the quality of

radiation control at Bilibino may be compromised for several reasons: 1) declining socioeconomic conditions have led many qualified

specialists to leave Bilibino; and 2) the relatively

recent separation of Chukotka from Magadan

Oblast administration, and Chukotka authorities’

refusal to accept the services of Magadan radiological labs, mean a reduction in access to, and

regulation from, other facilities (57).

DOE’s program for Bilibino, under the INSP,

includes a project to develop a training center

there. The project, which has been proposed for

FY 1995, includes assistance to determine Bilibino’s needs in terms of training and the delivery

of training center equipment.

The Kola Nuclear Power Plant

The Kola plant is located near the northeastern

border of Norway in Polyarnye Zori, Murmansk

Oblast. Kola has two of the oldest-generation

VVERs, the VVER 440/230, which has neither

containment nor emergency core cooling. It also

has two VVER 440/213s, which lack containment but do have systems for emergency core

cooling. Kola is responsible for between 60 and

70 percent of the combined production of electricity (thermal and electrical) in Murmansk

Oblast. Each reactor has one to two emergency

stops per year on average. In 1992, there were 39

reported incidents, six of which were first-level

incidents on the IAEA Event Scale and one of

which was second-level. IAEA investigated the

four Kola reactors in 1991 and determined that

the chances of reactor meltdown at the two oldest

reactors, the VVER 440/230, was 25 percent

over the course of 23 years. These two reactors

are currently 21 and 22 years old and are planned

to continue in operation until 2003 and 2004.
162 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Poor maintenance practices, as well as technical weaknesses due to reactor design, contribute

to safety hazards at Kola. A Bellona Foundation

inspection on September 14, 1992, revealed large

cracks in the concrete halls of the reactor, lack of

proper illumination, cables and wires in disarray,

elevated levels of radiation, and insufficient supplies of fire extinguishing equipment. Video

cameras monitoring reactor hall no.1 were out of

operation in August 1993. According to a 1992

report of the Russian Ministry of Security, formerly the KGB (Committee for State Security),

the operators at Kola do not recognize the importance of their work. The report sharply criticized

both MINATOM and the Russian government

for operational problems at the plant, including

the lack of qualified instructors to teach employees safety precautions. Several operators in control room no.1 had never even participated in

courses on ways to handle a crisis. Also, the

report noted that reactor construction at Kola is a

safety risk in itself and recommended shutting

down the reactors as soon as possible.

According to the Norwegian government,

which operates a monitoring station located on

the border with Russia, the Kola plant nearly suffered a meltdown in February 1993 when backup

power to cooling systems failed. Norway has

claimed that Kola is “one of the four or five most

dangerous plants in the world.”41

In the fall of 1994, a commission of MINATOM spent a week checking the station and concluded that Kola was not ready to operate in

winter conditions. Equipment stocks were insufficient, and there were few funds for procuring

fuel. Only one reactor was operational (8). The

plant has had considerable economic problems

since its customers stopped paying for the electricity they receive. The Petshenga nickel and the

Severo nickel smelting works were largely

responsible for the 14.5 billion rubles (approximately $2.96 million according to exchange rates

41 “Russia’s Arctic Struggles with Nuclear Legacy,” AP Newswire, Dec. 6, 1994.

on April 1, 1995) in outstanding claims in 1993.

Paying workers’ wages and purchasing fuel

nearly forced shutdown of the Kola plant at that

time. A number of debtor enterprises recently got

together and took out a credit of 30 billion rubles

(approximately $6.12 million) to repay the debt

in part (18,48). Three out of four Kola reactors

were shut down in September 1994, due in large

part to financial concerns (39).

However, reports on the status of safety at the

plant vary. An IAEA commission that inspected

the Kola, Balakovo, Novovoronezh, and Kalinin

stations in late 1994 is said to have found that

there was no breach of internationally accepted

operational procedures, and it did not report serious nuclear safety problems (33).

Regarding waste management, cooling water

is discharged into Imandra Lake via a 1-km-long

canal, and contaminated water is stored in tanks

onsite. Low- and intermediate-level waste is

stored near the power plant, and there is a plant

for solidifying this waste before storage. Some

low-level waste is burned in an incinerator. Spent

fuel assemblies are stored in water pools beside

each reactor. They remain there for three years

and are then sent to Mayak for reprocessing (48).

Kola, along with Sosnovy Bor, has been

scheduled to receive a new generation of PWRs,

the first of which is the VVER-640. Apparently,

the local population on the Kola peninsula has

given its approval to plans for a second plant,

AES-2, which is to be built near the first plant,

AES-1, on the shores of Lake Imandra. The first

unit of the new facility, which will include three

VVER-640 reactors, has been scheduled to start

up when units 1 and 2 at AES-1 should be

decommissioned. The other two units would

come online later. The Kola-2 project is estimated to cost $3.5 billion–$4 billion, with Germany’s Siemens Company helping to supply

equipment.42 AES-1, when all units are in opera42 Siemens has entered into a joint venture with the Russian nuclear industry, forming the company Nuklearkontrol to produce automatic

systems for controlling technological processes at nuclear power plants. Services will include development, delivery, and maintenance of

automatic systems. Siemens also plans to produce computer software for automatic control systems.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 163

tion, produces 60 percent of the region’s electricity (16,34,38).

Other advances in plant safety are being made.

An acoustic system to register leakages in the

primary cooling circuit of the two oldest reactors

is being installed (48). Negotiations are under

way for the G-7 to contribute funds to the

Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) administered by

the EBRD for upgrades at Kola reactors 1 and 2

(VVER 440/230) (13). Norway has contributed

$2.4 million to the NSA and has strongly emphasized that the Kola facility be given high priority.

Experts from EBRD, Norway, and Finland visited Kola in November 1993 to lay the groundwork for a program there.

EBRD announced in late April 1995 that it

would give $25 million to the Kola plant for

safety improvements, including equipment for

radiation control and fire risk minimization (14).

Norway contributed $24 million in bilateral

assistance to Kola in 1993 and 1994 to improve

plant safety. This money helped to pay for a diesel generator for emergency power, wireless telephones, and training in safety routines. Norway

is also providing assistance in the transfer of

technology and expertise on conservation measures and alternative sources of energy, so that

dependence on nuclear power decreases.

The Norwegian State Inspection for Radioactive Security is seeking cooperation with Russia

in the inspection of the Kola and Sosnovy Bor

power plants and has suggested investments in

support of the radiation supervision bodies in

Murmansk and at the Sosnovy Bor plant (50).

Russia, Norway, and Finland scheduled five days

of training exercises in May 1995 to coordinate

actions in case of an accident on the Kola Peninsula. Rosenergoatom and the Ministry for Emergency Situations are in charge of the training

exercises (56). Cooperation in the nuclear safety

arena with Finland includes an arrangement to

send daily status reports from the Kola plant to

Finland (57).

DOE’s projects specifically regarding the

Kola plant include a plan to build a full-scope

simulator. The scope of work for the simulator

project had been agreed upon by March 1995,

and specifications are in progress. Confinement

system upgrades have been undertaken, including projects to provide confinement isolation

valves and postaccident radiation monitors, and

measures to ensure confinement leaktightness.

Engineered safety system upgrades at Kola

include a project to provide a reliable DC power

supply for VVER 440/230 reactors 1 and 2 (66).

CONCLUSIONS

In the main, the Russian Federation has the

responsibility of addressing the issues of prevention of future accidents or nuclear waste discharges associated with the nuclear fleets and

power plants in the Arctic. The Russian government must also finance the decommissioning and

dismantlement of a few hundred nuclear-powered submarines and ships, provide reprocessing

facilities for the spent nuclear fuel from power

plants and naval reactors, construct new liquid

and solid waste treatment facilities, and upgrade

the safety of shore-based nuclear plants to comply with international standards. Russia has made

efforts to address these problems and has most of

the required expertise but lacks funding or, in

some cases, the safety and environmental protection culture to give these problems high priority.

❚ Nuclear Fleet Decommissioning

The rapid retirement and decommissioning of

first- and second-generation submarines of the

nuclear fleet since the breakup of the former

Soviet Union in 1991 has caused serious problems.

In recent years, only a small percentage of

laid-up nuclear submarines have been decommissioned. Many of these submarines have not

had their spent fuel removed from the reactor

core. The condition of submarine reactor vessels

is not well known outside Russian Navy circles.

Northern Fleet submarines are docked along the

fjords of the Kola Peninsula, near the cities of

Murmansk and Severodvinsk. Pacific Fleet laidup submarines are concentrated on the Kamchatka Peninsula and near the city of Vladivostok. Russian sources estimate that at the present
164 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

rate, it will take decades to defuel and dismantle

their decommissioned nuclear ships and submarines. The possibility of serious accidents will be

greatly increased until these laid-up submarines,

many of which have not been defueled, are fully

decommissioned and secured.

As of late 1994, about 121 first- and secondgeneration nuclear submarines had been decommissioned; however, only about 38 of these have

had their spent fuel removed from the reactor

core. Presumably, the bulk of these submarine

reactor plants have kept their main coolant loop

systems running and continuously manned at

dockside. After shutdown of the reactor, this is

necessary to prevent heat buildup and accelerated corrosion of reactor fuel elements. Prior to

defueling, each reactor must be monitored continuously to maintain proper water chemistry.

The purpose is to minimize long-term corrosion

of the fuel element containment vessel. The

greatest risk of accidental explosion and release

of radionuclides occurs during the defueling/

refueling process. However, indefinite fuel storage in submarine reactors is risky. Besides the

possibility of corrosion-related failures and subsequent leakage to the environment, the entire

ship’s hull must be treated as high-level nuclear

waste until the spent fuel is removed. Failure to

take timely action will result in the need to provide long-term storage for dozens of reactor

compartments whose reactor cores are filled with

spent fuel.

Four of these laid-up submarines have had

serious accidents during the fuel removal process, including an incident at Chazhma Bay in

the Far East, and will now require special handling to store the reactor cores safely. Safe dismantling and disposal of reactor compartments

containing damaged fuel is much more difficult

and costly than a plant with spent fuel removed.

❚ Spent Fuel Management

Spent nuclear fuel management as practiced in

Russia includes at least four stages: 1) defueling

at shipyards and on service ships; 2) loading into

transportation casks; 3) shipment by rail to the

reprocessing facilities at Mayak in the Ural

Mountains; and 4) reprocessing into fresh fuel

elements. OTA’s analysis indicates that there are

massive bottlenecks in the management of spent

nuclear fuel. The major problems presently associated with these stages are:

1. Defueling and Storage: The principal problems relate to the existing backlog of spent

fuel, high rates of submarine deactivation, and

lack or poor quality of fuel reloading and storage equipment (including land-based stores,

service ships and refueling equipment, and

spent fuel transfer bases). The continuing

presence of spent fuel on deactivated submarines and poorly maintained floating storage

facilities increases the possibility of an accident and complicates removal of the fuel in

the future.

2. Spent Fuel Shipments: Removal of spent fuel

from naval and icebreaker bases is impeded

by the difficulties of transition to new TUK18 shipping casks, installing new fuel transfer

equipment, and upgrading local transportation

links and other infrastructure.

3. Nonstandard and Damaged Fuel: Several

technical issues relate to uranium-zirconium

alloy and to damaged or failed fuels. Although

the volume of such nonstandard fuels is not

very large, its management and final disposition require additional research and technology development.

4. Costs: Because of the budget deficit and economic crisis, financing of spent fuel management operations is difficult. There are also

institutional problems related to the question

of which agency (MINATOM, Ministry of

Defense, MSC, Goscomoboronprom) will pay

for various stages of fuel management operations.

5. Personnel and Social Problems: The severe

climate, the underdeveloped social and economic infrastructure of naval facilities and

associated towns, relatively low salaries, and

the decreasing social prestige of the military

have resulted in the exodus of qualified personnel from the Navy and the shipbuilding

industry. There is also a problem of training. It
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 165

was suggested that because of insufficient

training the possibility of a serious accident

due to human error (similar to the Chazhma

Bay explosion)43 may have increased over the

past several years (26).

Recently, some progress has been made by

Russia in identifying the choke points in its

nuclear fuel cycle and taking corrective action,

particularly in the Northern Fleet and at Murmansk Shipping Company. These efforts have

benefited from a high level of international attention, assistance, and bilateral cooperative efforts

with Russia’s Scandinavian neighbors (particularly Norway), the European Union, and the

United States. Nurturing and expansion of these

efforts might achieve a significant reduction in

risk of future accidents. Progress in fuel management in the Pacific Fleet has been far less

encouraging to date. Although Japan has pledged

$100 million to assist in waste management, very

little has been achieved to date.

Liquid Low-Level Radioactive Waste

Liquid low-level radioactive waste (LLW) processing facilities are urgently required to relieve

the overcrowded storage sites at naval facilities

on the Kola Peninsula and in the Vladivostok

area.

Until 1993, the (former) Soviet Union dumped

liquid low-level waste generated from the operation and maintenance of its naval reactors into

the ocean. Although facilities had been constructed by the Soviets for treatment of naval

LRW, they were never put in operation. The

dumped waste fluids included primary loop coolant from PWR cores, as well as decontamination

solutions used in cleaning the primary loop.

The Murmansk Trilateral Initiative, which

provides support to MSC to upgrade its LRW

processing capabilities has recently been initiated. A design phase contract was signed in June

43 On Aug. 10, 1985, an Echo-II SSGN reactor exploded during a refueling operation at the Chazhma Bay repair and refueling facility.

The explosion resulted from inadvertent removal of control rods from the reactor core.

1995. Under the current plan, the next step is for

the United States and Norway to each contribute

$750,000, a total of $1.5 million for construction.

This will be used to upgrade MSC’s liquid LLW

processing capacity to handle the liquid waste

generated by MSC and the Northern Fleet. However, this is only a beginning, and no comprehensive plan for solving all of the related fuel

handling and processing, transportation, or dismantlement problems has been developed. The

Russians have demonstrated that they have the

technology to solve their own problems; what is

needed, however, is a framework for long-term

planning, commitments regarding implementation of international standards, and reliable

project financing.

Solid Radioactive Waste

Storage and handling of low-level solid radioactive waste (SRW) also requires attention, particularly with respect to long-term management of

the problems on a regional basis. The dismantlement of nuclear submarine hulls and sealing of

reactor compartments for long-term storage is

proceeding at a very slow pace. As of the end of

1994, only 15 decommissioned nuclear submarines had been completely dismantled. Although

Russian shipyards have the capacity and technology required to handle this problem, dismantlement has not been adequately funded. It is not

clear how the Russian government will provide

the funds needed for safe and comprehensive dismantlement in the future.

If submarine dismantlement continues as

planned, permanent storage for low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste, including reactor

compartments, will require at least one and possibly two regional facilities. Long-term storage

facilities for reactor compartments, which are

now stored in open water near Russian naval

facilities, will be necessary.
166 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

❚ Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety

Russian nuclear reactor safety is a major concern

of the international community. The widespread

contamination resulting from the Chernobyl

Nuclear Power Plant accident in 1986 has precipitated major international interest in the safety of

nuclear reactors operating in the fSU. Much of

the international support is focused on the prevention of potential accidents in the future. Western experts have concluded that the Russian

plants need modernization or replacement to

achieve parity with the West. However, based on

current Russian government plans, it will be

approximately a decade before a significant

number of the oldest reactors are replaced with

upgraded units. The rate of replacement will be

influenced heavily by the pace of recovery of the

overall Russian economy.

Reactor accidents at several nuclear powerplant sites would potentially be direct threats to

the Arctic environment. Two old-generation

VVER-type pressurized water reactors are

located on the Kola Peninsula in Murmansk

Oblast. The Kola plant provides two-thirds of the

electrical power to Murmansk Oblast. While

these two older plants are still operating, newer

plants incorporate more international safety standards and operating procedures. Norway, which

closely monitors operations at Kola from its

nearby border, claims that these reactor units

constitute “one of the four or five most dangerous plants in the world.”44

Bilibino, a small-capacity reactor site with

four 11-MW, EPG-6 boiling-water-type, units is

also located within the Arctic Circle in the Siberian Far East. Although the Bilibino reactors are

graphite moderated, boiling water cooled, and

similar in design to the much larger Chernobyl

RBMK units, they present less of a safety risk,

due mainly to the remote location and the small

size of the plants.

International action focused on building a

safety culture in Russian civilian nuclear programs has had mixed results to date. The most

44 “Russia’s Arctic Struggles with Nuclear Legacy,” AP Newswire, Dec. 6, 1994.

significant international assistance has come

through the European Union and the G-7. The G7 summit conducted in Munich in 1992 produced

an emergency action plan for enhancing the

safety of Soviet reactor designs. G-7 countries

have pledged funding totaling more than $1 billion.

Norway and the United States are significant

bilateral contributors to programs addressing

radioactive contamination and reactor safety in

the fSU. Early in 1995, the Norwegian government created an action plan to address the remediation of dumped nuclear waste, the operational

safety of reactors, and the hazards of weaponsrelated activities. The United States has funded

programs administered by DOE and NRC. The

bulk of this funding has been directed toward

implementing technical fixes, operational

improvements, and installing regulatory procedures at fSU reactor sites. Many experts argue

that programs should be directed toward longerterm initiatives, such as ensuring adequate Russian cash flow to operate the plants, as well as

establishing sound institutional and management

underpinning for nuclear powerplant operations.

REFERENCES

1. “40 Nations Agree to Shut Down Nuclear

Plants Deemed Unsafe,” New York Times,

Sept. 22, 1994.

2. Baham, Gary, “Nuclear Fleet of the fSU: A

Preliminary Analysis of Dismantlement

Activities,” Staff Paper prepared for U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, February 1995.

3. Bari, Robert, Brookhaven National Laboratory, presentation at the Office of Technology Assessment, November 14, 1994.

4. Bradley, D.J., Pacific Northwest Laboratory,

“Foreign Travel Report: Meeting of the

Working Group of American, Norwegian,

and Russian Experts On Radioactive Waste

Treatment, Murmansk, Russia, May 24-27,

1994,” June 1994.
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 167

5. Bukharin, Oleg, “Nuclear Fuel Management

in the Russian Navy,” Staff Paper prepared

for OTA, November 1994.

6. Bukharin, Oleg, “Resolution on the Meeting

for Complex Resolution of Problems of

Handling Radioactive Waste and Spent

Nuclear materials at Facilities of Arkhangel’sk and Murmansk Regions,” (November

1995).

7. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nuclear Energy Safety Challenges in the

Former Soviet Union, Interim Report of the

Congressional Study Group and Task Force,

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and

International Studies, 1994).

8. “Commission Says Arctic Nuclear Power

Station Unsafe,” Moscow Mayak Radio Network, in FBIS Daily Report/Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-94-193, Oct. 5, 1994.

9. “Contrasting View of Russian-US Cooperation—Viktor Mikhailov Speaks Out,” PostSoviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 2,

Jan. 16, 1995.

10. Council of Ministers, Russian Federation

“On Urgent Works in the Field of Handling

Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Materials,” decrees No. 824 of Aug. 14, 1993 and

No.805 of July 6, 1994.

11. Danilian, V. A., Russian Federation Pacific

Fleet, Information presented at the Office of

Technology Assessment Workshop on Spent

Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management,

Washington, DC, Jan. 17-18, 1995.

12. Danilian, V. A., and Vysotsky,V.L., “Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management in

the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy”, paper

presented at the OTA Workshop on Spent

Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management, Jan.

17-18, 1995, Washington, D.C.

13. Demarcq, Francois, “European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development,” paper

presented at the American Nuclear Society

winter meeting, November 1994.

14. “EBRD to Fund Reactor Safety Work at

Russian Nuclear Power Plants,” Post-Soviet

Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 2, Apr. 25,

1995.

15. “Emergency Response Collaboration with

the Bilibino Region, Chukotka, Russian Federation,” in Office of Naval Research,

Department of Defense Arctic Nuclear

Waste Assessment Program FY 1993-94,

ONR 322-95-5 (Washington, D.C.: ONR,

January 1995).

16. “Experts Will Discuss Feasibility Study of

Expanding Kola Nuclear Power Plant,”

Interfax, Oct. 11, 1994.

17. “Fact Sheet: Bilibino Nuclear Heat and Electric Power Plant,” communication from U.S.

Senator T. Stevens Office, dated June 1993.

18. “Funding Crisis Could Cause Nuclear Station Shutdown,” Moscow Ostankino Television, First Channel Network, in FBIS

Report/Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-94-

227), Nov 25, 1994, p. 35.

19. Giessing, Dan, Acting Director, SovietDesigned Reactor Safety Program, Office of

Nuclear Energy, DOE, personal conversation, May 24, 1995.

20. “The Gore-Chernomyrdin Nuclear Energy,

Energy Policy Committee Meetings,” PostSoviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 2,

No. 1, Jan. 4, 1995.

21. Gosatomnadzor, “Characteristics of the Status of Safety at Nuclear Power Plants in Russia (for 1994),” (Moscow, Russia: GAN,

circa 1994).

22. Gosatomnadzor, “Report on Activity of Russia’s Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and

Radiation Safety in 1993,” approved by

Order of the Russian Federal Nuclear

Inspectorate [Gosatomnadzor] No. 61 from

May 13, 1994, translated by Greenpeace

International.

23. Government Commission on Matters

Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at

Sea (“Yablokov commission”), created by

Decree No. 613 of the Russian Federation

President, October 24, 1992, Facts and

Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the

Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia:

1993), translated by Paul Gallager and Elena
168 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Bloomstein (Albuquerque, NM: Small

World Publishers, Inc.).

24. Handler, J., Greenpeace, personal communication, October 1994.

25. Handler, J., “The Northern Fleet’s Nuclear

Submarine Bases,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review-Europe, Dec. 1993.

26. Handler, J., “Preliminary Report on Greenpeace Visit to Vladivostok and Areas

Around the Chazhma Bay and Bolshoi

Kamen Submarine Repair and Refueling

Facilities, October 9-19, 1991,” Dec. 9,

1992.

27. Handler, J., “Radioactive Waste Situation in

the Russian Pacific Fleet,” Greenpeace trip

report, Nuclear Free Seas Campaign, (Washington, D.C., Greenpeace, Oct. 27, 1994).

28. Handler, J., “Russia’s Pacific Fleet—Problems with Nuclear Waste,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Mar. 1995.

29. Handler, J., “Russia’s Pacific Fleet—Submarine Bases and Facilities,” Jane’s Intelligence Review-Europe, Apr. 1994.

30. Handler, J., “ Testimony for the U.S. Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence,” August

15, 1992, held in Fairbanks, Alaska, Greenpeace Nuclear Free Seas Campaign.

31. Handler, J., “Trip Report: Greenpeace Visit

to Moscow and Russian Far East, JulyNovember 1992: Russian Navy Nuclear

Submarine Safety, Construction, Defense

Conversion, Decommissioning, and Nuclear

Waste Disposal Problems,” (Washington,

D.C., Greenpeace, Feb. 15, 1993).

32. Handler, J., “Working Paper on: The Future

of the Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine

Force,” (Draft), Greenpeace Disarmament

Campaign, May 15, 1995.

33. “IAEA Experts Confirm Russian Nuclear

Plant Safety,” Interfax, Nov. 8, 1994.

34. “In Russia,” Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense

Monitor, Vol. 1, Nov. 18, 1994.

35. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1993–94, Captain

Richard Sharpe (ed.), 96th edition, (Surrey,

U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 1993).

36. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1994–95, Captain

Richard Sharpe (ed.), 97th edition, (Surrey,

U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 1994).

37. Kokeev, Mikhail E., Russian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Information presented at

conference on Japan-Russia-United States

Study Group on Dumped Nuclear Waste in

the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk and North

Pacific Ocean, Biloxi, MS, January 12-13,

1995.

38. “Kola Nuclear Power Plant Project Meets

Safety Standards,” Interfax, Oct. 18, 1994.

39. “The Kola Nuclear Power Plant Searching

for Aid,” Murmansk/Severo-Zapad, Mar. 13,

1995.

40. Kovalenko, V., “Braving the Chill of the

Market,” Nuclear Engineering International, Jan. 1993.

41. Litovkin, V., “93 Submarines are Waiting,”

Izvestiya, July 9, 1993, p.6.

42. Lugavtsov, O. V. and Malakhov, A.G., “Salvaging Reactor Compartments of Retired

Submarines,” Atomnaya Energiya, No. 5,

May 1994, translated in JRPS Report/Science and Technology: Central Eurasia

(JPRS-UST-94-025, 21 October 1994).

43. McCabe, Gretchen, “Notes from the Office

of Technology Assessment Workshop (Jan.

17-18, 1995),” January 1995.

44. McCabe, Gretchen, “Technologies Planned

for and Needed to Address Radioactive

Waste Management Needs and Past Nuclear

Contamination in the Arctic Region,” Staff

Paper prepared for OTA, November 1994.

45. Mellgren, Doug, “Russia’s Arctic Struggles

With Nuclear Legacy,” AP newswire, Dec.

6, 1994.

46. Mikerin, E., Information provided at Workshop in Rome, June 1992.

47. Mikerin, E., MINATOM, personal communication, May 1992.

48. Nilsen, T. and Bøhmer, N., “Sources to

Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk

and Archangelsk Counties,” Report Vol. 1,

(Oslo, Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994).

49. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society,
Chapter 4 Sources and Risks of Potential Future Contamination | 169

Cross-Border Environmental Problems

Emanating from Defense-Related Installations and Activities, Final Report, Volume I:

Radioactive Contamination, Phase I: 1993-

1995, (Kjeller, Norway: NATO, 1995).

50. “Norway Ready to Cooperate with Russia in

Radioactive Security,” Interfax, Oct. 26,

1994.

51. “NRC’s Selin: Nuclear Safety Depends on

Sound Economy,” Post-Soviet Nuclear

Complex Monitor, Vol. 1, Oct. 5, 1994.

52. Ramsey, Jack, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Information presented at the

Office of Technology Assessment, Nov. 22,

1994.

53. Ruksha, V., Information presented at the

Office of Technology Workshop on Spent

Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management,

Washington DC, Jan. 17-18, 1995.

54. Selin, Ivan, “No More Chernobyls,” The

Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1994, p.A19.

55. Suokko, Kristin, Office of Nuclear Energy,

U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication, Oct. 24, 1994.

56. “Training Exercises Planned at Cola [sic]

Nuclear Plant,” Interfax, Mar. 13, 1995.

57. University of Alaska Anchorage, Environment and Natural Resources Institute, and

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Overview Report: Emergency

Response and Related Issues for the Bilibino

Nuclear Power Plant, (Anchorage, AK: University of Alaska, December 1993).

58. U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office,

Report to Congressional Requesters,

Nuclear Safety: International Assistance

Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed Reactors

Safer, GAO/RCED-94-234 (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

September 1994).

59. U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office,

Report to Congressional Requesters,

Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward International Agreement to Improve Reactor Safety,

GAO/RCED-93-153 (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, May

1993).

60. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, Aging Nuclear Power Plants:

Managing Plant Life and Decommissioning,

OTA-E-575 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993).

61. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, Fueling Reform: Energy Technologies for the Former East Bloc, OTAETI-599 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994)

62. U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Description

and Estimation of Environmental State on

Russian Nuclear Test Site (Novaya Zemlya)-

Contaminated Area Recovery Requirements,” prepared by Leading Russian

Nuclear Weapons Scientists, Arzamas-16,

April 16, 1993.

63. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, EIA World Nuclear

Outlook, 1994, DOE/EIA-0436(94) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, December 1994).

64. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Foreign Intelligence, Radioactive Waste Management in the USSR: Volume II, prepared

by D.J. Bradley, PNL-7645 (Richland, WA:

Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1991).

65. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Foreign Intelligence, Radioactive Waste Management in the Former USSR: Volume III,

prepared by D.J. Bradley, PNL-8074 (Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratory,

1992).

66. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of

Nuclear Energy, International Nuclear

Safety Program, Improving the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors, Program Plan,

April 1995.

67. U.S. Department of Energy, Programmatic

Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory Environment Restoration and Waste Management

Programs, Draft Environmental Impact

Statement, June 1994.
| 171

5

Institutional

Framework and

Policies

any national and international institutions are engaged in efforts to

develop solutions to the problems of

past nuclear waste dumping and discharges into the sea and to ensure careful and

safe management of nuclear activities, materials,

and wastes in the future. Whether some institutions are more effective than others, and whether

their initiatives can bring improvements, are

problematic. The improvements needed—and,

thus, the goals of many programs—are not clear

and sometimes represent compromises among

conflicting purposes. Because the problems are

international it is much more difficult to harmonize the policies and goals of each affected

nation. In addition, a multitude of unilateral,

bilateral, and multilateral organizations have

developed over many years, each with missions

that have evolved and changed over time to meet

the challenges of the day and to reflect the

unique conflicts or cooperative moods of the

times.

Within this complex backdrop, the United

States and the international community are

attempting to focus attention and resources on

the problem of nuclear contamination in the Arctic and North Pacific. The focus now is principally on research and data collection. While this

focus can lead to better knowledge and understanding, it cannot soon provide all the answers

to reasonable concerns about future impacts on

human health and the environment. Therefore

research initiatives should be supplemented to

some degree by actions that could monitor conditions; provide periodic warnings if they are necessary; and prevent future accidents or releases.

Until now, the United States has focused most

organized efforts and made the greatest advances

through research initiatives. There are some gaps

in the research program relating to regions covered (not much effort in the Far East and North

Pacific, for example), pathways investigated

(biological pathways and ice transport), and

other areas, but the program is evolving as a

reasonably comprehensive investigation of key

problems. Much work can still be performed

by the United States but more cooperation with

Russia is needed—especially in the area of

increased access to specific dump sites and

dumped material.

Minimal efforts are currently under way in the

area of monitoring and warning initiatives. It is

in this area that international cooperation is

imperative if an effective assessment and

response program is to follow. International

institutions may be the most appropriate to carry

M
172 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

out such initiatives, but one must ensure longterm consistent support of a program of rigorous

scientific implementation if they are to be useful.

Some efforts are under way on prevention initiatives but, because most of the key decisions

must be made by Russia, it is difficult to engender support for assistance from the United States

and other countries. The Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) has identified some possible

joint projects that could benefit both the United

States and Russia and could be mutually supported. Other countries such as Norway might

also be encouraged to support joint prevention

projects. Another approach would be to more

closely tie prevention projects to demilitarization

assistance under the Nunn-Lugar program. This

would require some rethinking of justifications,

but it might prove beneficial to U.S. interests as a

means of preventing future environmental

releases and simultaneously encouraging military dismantlement. In addition, support for prevention projects could be used to encourage

more cooperation in some other areas (i.e., to

gain access to dump sites for advancing research

objectives).

One of the more significant prevention programs that has been in effect for the past several

years in Russia relating to radioactive contamination is in the area of nuclear power plant

safety. The United States and other countries

have been funding programs to improve reactor

safety in Russia with some success in overall

efforts to prevent another Chernobyl. Efforts by

the State of Alaska have also been successful in

improving regional cooperation and information

exchange. Improvements have mainly been in

areas of added auxiliary equipment, technical

and regulatory training, monitoring and warning

systems, and regulatory oversight of existing

reactors. This is of particular importance at some

sites in the far north where funding is limited and

operations are of marginal quality. Here, again,

the more substantial improvements that might

include replacing old designs and equipment

with safer systems, require much more resources

and major policy choices that Russia itself must

make.

Crucial to U.S. and other international assistance efforts is the need for Russia to strengthen

its institutional system responsible for environmental protection and for establishing a nuclear

safety culture. Prior to the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, most government agencies and

institutes responsible for managing nuclear materials operated behind a wall of secrecy with little

or no external regulatory oversight. Today, Russia is only beginning to develop the legal framework necessary to effectively enforce basic

environmental protection laws, regulate the use

of nuclear energy, and manage radioactive materials and wastes. Similarly lacking are liability

protection laws capable of facilitating the implementation of nuclear safety initiatives. Currently,

various pieces of legislation are being drafted in

the Russian Parliament or State Duma that

would, in principle, help improve Russia’s regulatory system for nuclear and environmental protection. If enacted, these legislative proposals,

for example, will make government agencies and

research institutes accountable for their nuclear

material and radioactive waste management

activities.

A number of current policies and programs

have been developed in an attempt to address

various parts of the overall radioactive contamination problem. For decades, national security

and strategic implications largely determined

U.S. and international interest in the Arctic. After

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in

response to various reports documenting that

country’s radioactive waste dumping practices,

the United States and other members of the international community began to support domestic

and cooperative approaches. The State of Alaska

also plays an important role at the regional level.

A number of policies and programs have been

adopted to assess past, and to prevent future,

radioactive contamination in the Arctic and

North Pacific regions.
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 173

In addition to government efforts, two other

types of organizations considered useful for

improving environmental cooperation include

multilateral lending institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). With few exceptions, most assistance work by lending groups to

date has focused on financing projects that

embrace economic reform, privatization efforts,

and prodemocracy policies. Their progress has

been impaired by internal organizational obstacles or by Russia’s socioeconomic and institutional inadequacies. Although recent improvements in current lending approaches appear

somewhat promising, little interest, if any, seems

to exist thus far among multilateral lending organizations in supporting projects addressing radioactive contamination. The U.S. assistance

provided to Russian environmental NGOs, on the

other hand, appears successful in providing

opportunities to access information and work on

technical and scientific environmental issues,

including radioactive contamination.

In sum, all three areas—research, monitoring,

and prevention—are critical to protecting human

health and the environment from widespread and

indiscriminate radioactive contamination in the

Arctic and North Pacific. Past practices by many

nations have given a warning to the international

community that was never anticipated. Specific

dumping activities by the former Soviet Union

have yet to show a direct connection to human

health impacts but have nonetheless raised concerns and questions that will require years for

even partially satisfactory answers. To facilitate

their review and analysis in this chapter, OTA

has grouped these policies and programs into

three major categories: 1) research initiatives; 2)

monitoring and early warning initiatives; and 3)

prevention initiatives.

U.S. INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS 

SUPPORTING RESEARCH ON 

RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION 

IN THE ARCTIC

❚ Executive Branch Initiatives

For more than a century following the acquisition of Alaska from Russia in 1867, U.S. Arctic

policy focused primarily on the strategic and

national security importance of the region, with

little emphasis on environmental protection. This

policy was conducted without a formal mandate

or statement until 1971, when the U.S. government released the National Security Decision

Memorandum 144. With the promulgation of the

National Security Decision Directive 90 of 1983

and the 1986 Policy Memorandum,1 the U.S.

officially expanded its focus on the Arctic to

include research and development of renewable

and nonrenewable resources2 (61,62). The main

objectives of these directives included, among

others:

■ ensuring the protection of national security

interests including freedom of navigation in

the Arctic seas and the super adjacent airspace;

■ maintaining peace throughout the region;

■ promoting rational development of Arctic

resources for the nation’s benefit;

■ fostering scientific research to improve our

knowledge of the Arctic; and

■ developing the infrastructure needed to support defense, social, and economic endeavors.

1 Prepared by the now-defunct Interagency Arctic Policy Group.

2 According to recent reports, the Arctic accounts for about 25 percent of current U.S. oil production; 12 percent of natural gas; and extensive coal, peat, and mineral resources, including zinc, lead, and silver. In terms of renewable resources, for example, the Arctic Ocean contains nearly 5 percent of the world’s fish supplies, making it an essential source of fisheries products for the United States and particularly the

State of Alaska, which reports the largest volume and total value of fish landings for the entire nation (60, 61).
174 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Despite these directives, official U.S. Arctic

policy continued to have a strong national

defense approach, with little or no support for

research on Arctic radioactive contamination

issues until 1994. Responding to documentation

of Arctic pollution from decades of radioactive

waste disposal practices of the former Soviet

Union, the U.S. government recently reviewed

its policy on Arctic research (16). Of particular

concern was the former Soviet Union’s release of

radioactive materials and wastes into the lands,

rivers, and seas of the Arctic and in certain locations of the Pacific Ocean. The National Security

Council was requested by the State Department

to conduct the review (25).

Based on the National Security Council’s

report, on September 24, 1994, the State Department announced a new U.S. policy for the Arctic

region, emphasizing for the first time a commitment to approaches on environmental protection,

institution building, and international cooperation (63,64,94). The Arctic Subgroup of the

Interagency Working Group on Global Environmental Affairs in the U.S. State Department is

responsible for coordinating and implementing

the objectives of the new policy. With the promulgation of this new policy, the U.S. government intends to accomplish the following

objectives:

1. expand cooperative research and environmental protection efforts while providing for environmentally sustainable development;

2. further scientific research through development of an integrated Arctic research budget

that supports both national and international

science projects;

3. improve efforts to conserve Arctic wildlife

and protect their habitats, with particular

attention to polar bears, walruses, seals, caribou, migratory birds, and boreal forests;

4. strengthen international cooperation for preparing and responding to environmental disasters;

5. support international cooperation in monitoring, assessment, and environmental research;

6. involve the State of Alaska more directly in

the Arctic policy process;

7. support participation by Alaska’s Natives in

Arctic policy deliberations affecting their

environment, culture, and quality of life; and

8. improve overall international cooperation,

especially U.S.-Russian collaboration on matters of Arctic protection (169).

The 1994 policy for the Arctic region issued

by the State Department became the first official

attempt by the United States to develop a coordinated research effort on contamination of the

Arctic. Yet, like earlier executive directives, the

new policy does not mandate any specific

research plan, or provide the funds necessary to

assess Arctic contamination from nuclear activities of the former Soviet Union (8,156). The

most significant U.S. Arctic research institutional initiatives are shown in figure 5-1.

❚ Efforts by the U.S. Congress

Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984

Prior to enactment of the Arctic Research Policy

Act3 by Congress in 1984, no coordinating body

or source of information existed on the extent of

federal Arctic research programs in the United

States. The idea of establishing such a coordinating body was first issued in a report by the

National Academy of Sciences’ Arctic Research

Policy Committee. Using the Academy’s report

as a basis, members of the Alaskan and Washington State congressional delegations4 introduced a

bill in 1981 entitled “The Arctic Research Policy

Act” (157). After nearly three years of debate,

the bill was signed into law, becoming the primary instrument for the development and coordination of U.S. research policy, priorities, and

goals in the Arctic.

By enacting the Arctic Research Policy Act in

1984, Congress created the institutional infra3 Public Law 98-373. 4 Senators Frank Murkowski and Ted Stevens for the State of Alaska and Senators Slade Gorton and Henry Jackson for the State of

Washington.
KEY

Policy guidance only v

Policy guidance and funding ,

‘ \

interagency coordination and funding

Interagency coordination only , Council ,<- - “ - “ “ - - - - - “

Under consideration

\

/

NOTE: ADEC: Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation; AEPS: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy; AID: Agency for International

Development; ARC: Arctic Research Commission; ARPA: Arctic Research Policy Act; ClFAR: Cooperative Institute for Arctic Research; DOE:

U.S. Department of Energy; 001: U.S. Department of the Interior; EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; IARPC: Interagency Arctic

Research Policy Committee; IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency; JCCRER: Joint Coordination Committee for Radiation Effects Research:

NOAA: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration; NSF: National Science Foundation; ONR: office of Naval Research.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995
176 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

structure required to coordinate and conduct federal research programs in the Arctic: the Arctic

Research Commission (ARC) and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee

(IARPC). According to the congressional mandate, the Arctic Research Commission is the

body responsible for coordinating and promoting

Arctic research programs in ways that consider

all parties involved, including federal agencies,

the State of Alaska, and Native Arctic communities. The Interagency Arctic Research Policy

Committee or IARPC, on the other hand, consists of all federal agencies with Arctic research

programs and is responsible for identifying funds

to support Arctic research activities. Internationally, IARPC is also the U.S. representative to the

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy—an

effort by the eight Arctic nations (United States,

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,

Russia, and Sweden) to assess and develop

means to control and prevent further deterioration of this ecosystem.

Despite establishing the institutional infrastructure for coordinating federal Arctic research

programs, the U.S. Congress did not specify any

funding source to support the implementation of

its Arctic Research Policy Act (ARPA). In fact,

little guidance was provided on the extent to

which federal agencies were to commit resources

to support the congressional mandate. Because of

the lack of specific funding authority,5

 approving

requests to fund Arctic radioactive contamination research is generally difficult, depending on

the particular agency mission to which such

requests are made and, more importantly, given

the increasing unavailability of financial

resources among IARPC’s member agencies.

Arctic Research Commission

The Arctic Research Commission is composed

of seven commissioners appointed by the U.S.

President for the purpose of advising federal

5 Although Congress initially considered proposals authorizing funding for Arctic research, the Arctic Research Policy Act, as enacted,

did not include any provision of funds for such purpose.

agencies on Arctic research policy and programs.

They include four commissioners from academic

or research institutions, two from private firms

associated with Arctic development projects and

one U.S. Native representative. Three individuals

make up the commission’s staff: an executive

director and administrative officer in the Washington area office and a senior staff officer in

Anchorage, Alaska. A group of advisers serving

on a voluntary basis provides information and

advice on scientific and research issues of concern to the commission and assists in the review

of documents (13,20).

The Arctic Research Policy Act provides ARC

with implementing authority but only an administrative budget.6

 ARC is statutorily responsible

for developing U.S. Arctic research policy and

for assisting all federal agencies with Arctic programs in the implementation of such policy.

Reviewing the federal Arctic budget request and

reporting to the Congress on the extent of government agency compliance with ARPA are also

commission functions. In addition to serving as

liaison between federal agencies or organizations

and their Alaskan counterparts, ARC supports

and promotes international cooperation in Arctic

research (14,20). Despite these functions, and

because ARPA does not provide research funding, the commission’s efforts to persuade federal

agencies with Arctic programs to contribute

funds from their budgets has become pivotal for

ensuring the implementation of Arctic contamination research projects (20,91).

The Arctic Research Commission was the first

ARPA-related organization to recognize radioactive contamination as a key component of the

U.S. Arctic research agenda. In its Arctic Resolution of August 11, 1992, ARC indicated the need

for the United States to address those sources or

activities responsible for contaminating the Arctic environment. The commission listed the following as major Russian sources of contamination:

6 Congress appropriates the commission’s operational funds ($530,000 in FY 1993) through the National Science Foundation budget.

These funds are expended by the commission with administrative support from the General Services Administration (13, 20).
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 177

1) the use of nuclear weapons for civil excavation; 2) dumping of nuclear waste from weapons

production facilities; 3) disposal of nuclear waste

and reactors from nuclear vessels into the Kara

Sea; 4) discharge of industrial chemical pollutants into air, water bodies, and soil. The commission also recognized the need to study human

diseases and casualties associated with radiation

accidents and overexposure to fissile materials.

In a January 1994 report, the commission reiterated the need to examine the environmental and

human health impacts from these activities

through the establishment of a “multiagency,

internationally coordinated scientific monitoring

and assessment” program (13).

Despite its success in having these recommendations included in the U.S. Arctic research

agenda, the limited financial support by federal

agencies for radioactive contamination research

and monitoring continues to be a commission

concern. In the view of an ARC representative,

the failure of U.S. agencies to consider Arctic

environmental contamination as a priority

research area constitutes the greatest barrier

encountered by the commission in its efforts to

gather funds for research and monitoring programs (20).

Interagency Arctic Research Policy 

Committee

In stressing that federal Arctic research programs

be coordinated to the greatest level possible as

mandated under ARPA, the U.S. Congress established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy

Committee (also known as IARPC or the Interagency Committee). The IARPC consists of

fourteen federal agencies7 under the chairmanship of the director of the National Science Foundation (NSF). Working-level meetings are led or

chaired by the NSF Office of Polar Programs.

ARPA authorizes the Interagency Committee

to prepare and revise the U.S. overall Arctic

7 The 14 federal agencies comprising IARPC are: the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense,

Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Interior, Department of State, Department of Transportation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Smithsonian

Institution, Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Research Plan. Under this plan, IARPC provides

Congress with a detailed agenda of the federal

government’s comprehensive research activities

and programs on the Arctic for the ensuing fiveyear period. The first Arctic Research Plan report

was introduced to Congress by the President in

July 1987. The next review, which is being prepared, will be submitted to Congress later in

1995.

As required under ARPA, the IARPC, in consultation with the Arctic Research Commission,

also reviews the Arctic plan every two years and

reports to Congress. These revisions, the third of

which was recently completed, describe all significant research activities implemented by each

participating federal agency in the Interagency

Committee. Biennial revision reports inform the

Congress about research strategies planned for

adoption by federal agencies in the succeeding

two years. They are also helpful in coordinating

and implementing research activities among U.S.

government agencies (57,62).

Arctic radioactive contamination on the U.S. 

federal research agenda

Prior to 1990, there were no comprehensive

efforts by U.S. government agencies to address

Arctic environmental pollution in general, or

radioactive contamination by the former Soviet

Union in particular. The need to adopt a comprehensive Arctic research strategy in the United

States was officially recognized for the first time

at the Interagency Committee’s June 1990 meeting. Without a comprehensive multiagency

approach, participating agency members agreed,

it would be extremely difficult to ensure midand long-term funding for Arctic research programs. Committee members concluded that

opportunities for partnerships with the private

sector and Arctic residents would also be

affected (60,61). After agreeing to set forth an

integrated approach starting in 1992, IARPC
178 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

identified three major areas in which such an

approach would be most useful: circulation and

productivity, geodynamics, and monitoring.8

More recent Committee work builds upon this

initial effort by expanding the areas needed for

having a successful integrated multidisciplinary

approach to five: 1) data information and management, 2) data rescue and synthesis, 3) observation and monitoring, 4) process-oriented

research and development of models, and 5)

impact analysis and determination of risk

(63,64,65).

Radioactive contamination of the Arctic by

the former Soviet Union became part of the U.S.

research agenda for the first time in 1992. Instrumental in this decision was the concern raised by

various published reports, particularly the

Yablokov report9

—released by the Russian government as a white paper in 1993 (discussed in

chapter 2), which documented nuclear and chemical contamination from activities of the former

Soviet Union (fSU) in the Arctic. To respond to

the growing concern of the U.S. and other

nations, and consistent with ARC’s 1992 Arctic

Resolution, the Interagency Committee assumed

responsibility for assessing Arctic contamination as part of its Monitoring of the Arctic Program. To guide U.S. efforts, in 1992 the

Interagency Committee issued a policy statement

and an agenda for action.

One of the first steps taken by the Interagency

Committee to implement its agenda for action

was to host an international workshop on Arctic

contamination in Anchorage, Alaska, in May

1993. The conference provided U.S. and international agencies with an opportunity to learn the

extent of the Arctic contamination problem and

identify relevant research needs. Participating

IARPC agencies benefited considerably since the

workshop permitted review and information

exchange on existing programs, which could be

used as a baseline to support Arctic contamination research and monitoring efforts.

8 One additional area identified as part of this effort was the Bering Land Bridge.

9 This unprecedented study provides an extensive review of the Soviet Union’s dumping of damaged submarine reactors and nuclear

waste, including spent fuel from its nuclear fleet, into the Kara Sea, the sea of Japan, and other sites.

In 1993, IARPC also issued a list of long-term

goals as the basis for making the U.S. Arctic

Research Plan more effective. As part of this

effort, the Interagency Committee pointed out for

the first time the need to assess the contamination of the Arctic environment and the potential

impacts on its residents. Inherent in this

approach, as with previous Arctic research programs, is the expectation that the funding needed

to implement these goals would be the responsibility of individual federal agencies. The longterm goals of U.S. Arctic research policy as

issued by IARPC included the following:

■ Ensure that Arctic research programs are integrated and interagency in nature.

■ Promote the development and maintenance of

U.S. scientific and operational capabilities for

conducting Arctic research and for supporting

national security needs.

■ Encourage improvements in environmental

protection measures and mitigation technology.

■ Promote ecologically sound exploitation of

Arctic resources. Develop an understanding,

through research, of the roles the Arctic plays

in the global environment.

■ Improve the science base that now exists about

1) the interaction between Arctic Natives and

their environment; 2) the possible adverse

effects of transported contaminants and

changes in global climate; and 3) approaches

to respond to the health needs of these Arctic

residents.

■ Encourage the participation of Arctic Natives

in the planning and conduct of research activities, informing them of the results whenever

these become available.

■ Develop and maintain the body of information

(e.g., databases, networks) gathered from Arctic research activities.

■ Promote mutually beneficial international

research programs and cooperation (60,61).
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 179

Today, most of the research activities by

IARPC member agencies in the Arctic are conducted within the framework of these long-term

goals. Its proposed program on radioactive contamination research for FY 1996 through FY

1999, shown in box 5-1, also reflects these principles.

Internationally, IARPC participates in a number of cooperative efforts but with limited funding and institutional support. IARPC is the U.S.

representative to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)—an effort adopted by

the eight circumpolar nations to assess the extent

of Arctic contamination and encourage its monitoring and control. IARPC’s roles in this strategy

are to coordinate and support U.S. participation

and to cooperate in Arctic research activities

with other circumpolar nations. Another IARPC

role is to attract funds for U.S. member agencies

to support the AEPS program, in particular its

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, but

so far it has met limited success. (The Arctic

Environmental Protection Strategy is discussed

in detail later in this chapter.)

Another international effort supported by

IARPC is the Global Resources Information

Database (GRID) at the United Nations Environmental Program. Through its Arctic Environmental Data Directory Working Group, IARPC

has for the past two years helped GRID identify

and facilitate access to existing databases of Arctic environmental data among Arctic nations.

With funding from the State Department10 and

the ONR Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program discussed below, the U.S. Geological Survey is currently developing, in consultation with

IARPC, a cooperative effort between U.S. and

Russian scientists to establish a similar database

in Russia (91). Current funding limitations also

preclude expanding the number of experts presently working on this project.

10 $50,000

Department of Defense Arctic Nuclear Waste 

Assessment Program

Congress authorized, as part of the $400-million

Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations

Act for FY 1993 (the “Nunn-Lugar program”),

the provision of at least $10 million to assess the

nature and extent of nuclear contamination by

the former Soviet Union in the Arctic region. Of

great congressional interest was the need to: 1)

assess the actual and potential impacts that

nuclear contamination resulting from practices of

the former Soviet Union might have on the Arctic environment and, in particular, Alaska; and 2)

identify approaches that would lead to the safe

disposal of reactors from nuclear submarines,

nuclear weapons materials, and nuclear reactor

fuel and processing waste. (Issues associated

with Russia’s nuclear submarine reactors and

their associated fuels are discussed in detail in

chapter 4.) DOD was also required to provide

periodic updates of its activities to the congressional committees on Appropriations, Intelligence, and Armed Services.

In 1993, DOD became the first federal agency

explicitly tasked by Congress with the responsibility for investigating radioactive contamination

in the Arctic. To implement this congressional

mandate, DOD’s Defense Nuclear Agency delegated the Office of Naval Research (ONR) the

responsibility to establish and manage the $10-

million Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP). As part of this new responsibility, ONR created a core research program under

the Naval Research Laboratory to scientifically

evaluate past radioactive releases and to develop

models for predicting possible future dispersion.

To supplement the work of its core program,

ONR also invited proposals for Arctic-related

field research work from government and private

institutions. This component of the ONR program was characterized by some degree of interagency coordination since all submitted

proposals were first reviewed by IARPC prior to

ONR funding approval.
180 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 5-1: Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment Program

To increase Arctic radioactive contamination research, and consistent with its “Agenda for Action”

workshop findings and the new U.S. Arctic policy, the Interagency Committee has proposed a new initiative for FY 1996 known as the Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment Program (ARCORA). Considered by its proponents as an expansion of existing research programs rather than a separate entity,

this proposed strategy embodies U.S. plans to research and assess the sources, transport, fate, and

environmental and health effects of pollutants discharged directly into the Arctic or accumulated from

non-Arctic sources (64). However, the program’s budget request of $33 million annually was not

approved by the Administration. If it were supported in the future, the major radioactive contamination

research and monitoring activities under ARCORA, along with their proposing agencies and funding levels, would include the following:

1. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA): As part of its role in the Interagency

Committee’s ARCORA program, NOAA proposes to carry out the following activities:

■ Establish an integrated monitoring and modeling program to evaluate industrial and urban contamination sources and their effects on the Arctic’s marine and atmospheric ecosystem and identify

cost-effective measures for their control. An estimated $4.5 million annually for the FY 1996–99

period is expected to be needed to implement this work.

■ Fund through the interagency National Ice Center a $2-million research program to study the role of

sea ice in pollutant transport within the Arctic. Data will be gathered by using satellite, remote sensing, and buoy technologies.

■ Expand the agency’s Arctic Marine Mammal Tissue Archive Project to include both the monitoring

of selected Arctic marine species (e.g., mammals, birds, fish) and the evaluation of measures to

control the transfer of contaminants in the food web. NOAA has requested $4 million for this work.

■ Enhance NOAA’s National Status and Trends Program to include sampling of contaminants such

as synthetic chlorinated pollutants and petroleum hydrocarbons in the Arctic’s atmosphere, coastal

environment, and biota. The agency expects this $4.5-million program, in combination with its

assessments of coastal ecosystem health and coastal resource use, to be useful in future emergency response and resource development approaches.

2. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Until recently, the EPA contributed significantly to

Arctic research through various activities including its Arctic Contaminant Research Program. The

agency has now decided to “redirect” its Arctic program to promote, along with other government and

private bodies, the identification of pollution effects and the application of environmentally sound technologies. Under the proposed ARCORA initiative, EPA plans to request a total of $1 million to support

a two-year Alaska-based Environmental Monitoring Assessment Program.a

3. Office of Naval Research (ONR): In FY 1995, the Department of Defense’s Office of Naval Research

continues to assess the radioactive contamination caused by the former Soviet Union in the Arctic and

North Pacific regions, as well as its potential adverse impacts on Alaska. This $10-million program is

currently funded by DOD in addition to the $33 million ARCORA proposal.

4. National Science Foundation (NSF): In addition to supporting future workshops on Arctic radioactive

contamination, the NSF plans to fund various research projects associated with ocean and atmospheric transport in the Arctic. A total of $3 million annually for FY 1996 through FY 1999 would be

needed to support NSF’s research activities under ARCORA.

5. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): As part of the Interagency Committee’s Arctic research agenda,

DOE proposes to request $1 million annually to expand its Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Program in Alaska’s North Slope. The purpose of this expansion would be to study and monitor other

atmospheric processes (e.g., Arctic haze and aerosols) in addition to atmospheric radiation.

(continued)
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 181

The $10 million funded for ANWAP in FY

1993 was followed by $10 million for both FY

1994 and FY 1995 by means of Congressional

action in DOD appropriation bills for those

years.

The overall implementation of ANWAP is

multiagency in nature. Funds are obligated

through the Department of Defense in coordination with, among others, the Department of

Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the

national laboratories. ONR field research work is

carried out in concert with the Secretary of

Defense for Atomic Energy, the Defense Nuclear

Agency, and the Interagency Arctic Research

and Policy Committee. Many other federal agen6. U.S. Department of Interior (DOI): DOI, the federal agency responsible for managing most of the U.S.

Arctic resources, plans to support Arctic contamination research in five major areas at a cost of $8 million. The activities to be carried out by DOI’s implementing agencies—the U.S. Geological Survey

(USGS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Biological Survey (NBS)—include the following:

■ Characterization and analyses by USGS of sediment properties (e.g., morphology, geology, deposition, geochemistry, and erosion) at various seafloor locations used for waste disposal in the Arctic

Ocean. The proposed budget for this activity is $2 million annually for FY 1996–99.

■ Evaluation by USGS of the migration potential of radioactive and nonradioactive pollutants disposed at the sites considered in the previous project. Contaminant uptake by biota and releases to

atmospheres will also be studied. DOI requested a total of $1.4 million annually for this work.

■ Assessment of the Arctic’s contamination by key pollutants including radioactivity, heavy metals,

organochlorines, and petroleum hydrocarbons. This work, to be conducted by USGS, will require

about $1.5 million.

■ Establishment of a contaminant data synthesis, communication, and repository center on the Arctic.

The center is to be supported initially with information from existing data management programs.b

Subsequently, this center will include activities such as: rescue and documentation of critical

international Arctic data sets; conversion of Arctic data from analog into digital form; assembling of a geographic information system; and verification of statistical models. USGS also

plans to improve access and cooperation with other organizations that maintain Arctic data.

The estimated cost of this ARCORA activity is $1.5 million annually for FY 1996 through FY

1999.

■ Evaluation of impacts of radioactive and nonradioactive contaminants on various Arctic animal species. With a proposed annual operating budget of $1.5 million, FWS and NBS plan, among other

endeavors, to: 1) study and monitor radionuclides and other pollutants in fish, whales, walruses,

polar bears, and other animals; and 2) determine the distribution of these pollutants in walrus prey

in the Bering and Chukchi Seas.

According to its proponents, the ARCORA program will focus on evaluating the impacts of Arctic contamination on Alaska, followed by their impacts on the Arctic as a whole, and eventually their global

impacts. If funding is approved, two of the most immediate benefits expected from ARCORA’s implementation are the development of an Arctic contamination research and monitoring strategy and the development of a data management system. Similarly relevant, its proponents claim, is that ARCORA will help

provide the scientific basis needed to formulate a more successful national and international Arctic contamination policy (35,40,64,91,94,96).

aThis program is discussed in more detail in the section of this chapter dealing with monitoring and early warning

efforts.

bNamely, the USGS Arctic Environmental Directory and Arctic Data Interactive programs.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 5-1: Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment Program (Cont’d.)
182 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

cies11 and officials from the State of Alaska have

also participated in an advisory capacity.

In carrying out ANWAP objectives, ONR has

sponsored a variety of important research activities and has awarded contracts to more than 40

individuals or research groups. The initial

emphasis of the ONR program involved collecting, evaluating, and assembling into a usable

form the extensive data available on the Arctic

environment. The more than 10,000 water and

sediment samples from various oceanographic

expeditions sponsored by the program are also

providing ONR-supported investigation with

data for determining background radiation levels,

possible leakage from nuclear dump sites, and

potential migration patterns of dumped radionuclides in the Arctic.

With its initial results, from the three years of

funding to date, expected to be published in the

spring of 1997, ANWAP’s efforts to date comprise nearly 70 different field, laboratory, modeling and data analysis projects; three major

workshops on nuclear contamination of the Arctic Ocean; and extensive collaboration with

researchers from Russia, Norway, Germany,

Canada, and the International Atomic Energy

Agency (26,40,98,145). ANWAP also supports

the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program

(AMAP) of the Arctic Environmental Protection

Strategy program—nearly $390,000 total for FY

1994 and FY 1995.12 Table 5-1 shows examples

of the variety of scientific research and monitoring projects supported by ONR. According to

many experts, ANWAP represents a significant

first step toward increasing our understanding of

the Arctic contamination problem.

Attempts are now under way to expand

ANWAP’s scope of research and interagency

cooperation efforts. Program implementation has

11 These include, for example, the Department of State, Defense Nuclear Agency, Naval Sea Systems Command, Central Intelligence

Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, and National Science Foundation. 12 ONR provided $40,000 in FY 1994 to AMAP for the development of AMAP’s radionuclide contaminant database. In FY 1995, ONR

assistance totaled $349,000; of this amount, $261,000 went to database development and the remaining $88,000 to a cooperative U.S./Russian AMAP human health study (40).

been made possible by the $10 million appropriated by Congress annually for FY 1993-95. In

FY 1995, ONR is attempting to further

strengthen its Arctic contamination research program by emphasizing scientific collaboration

with Russian scientists and by expanding its

sampling and monitoring activities to include the

North Pacific region and major Russian riverine

systems such as the Ob and Yenisey River basins

(160). Funding for Russian participation in

ANWAP will exceed $1 million in 1995 compared to $500,000 in 1993. These funds will support various Arctic environmental data

exchanges and several scientific research

projects including “comparative surveys of the

Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian Seas, human

health study in the Tamyr Region, radiological

assessment of certain large mammals, monitoring feasibility studies, and radionuclide source

term characterization” (145). Sampling of nonradioactive contaminants in the Arctic might be

considered if the program is continued with additional funding in the future.

Because of the budgetary constraints ONR

does not plan to expand its work beyond the

objectives stipulated by Congress. Any expansion of the program’s scope of research and of

international cooperation in the future will probably not occur without additional congressional

support (155). As of this writing no decision has

been made about funding ANWAP for FY 1996

and beyond. And although the U.S. Vice President and the Russian Prime Minister at the June

1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting

in Moscow highlighted ANWAP as a “premier

example of cooperation in support of the U.S.-

Russian Bilateral Agreement on Prevention of

Pollution in the Arctic,” no funding was proposed (145).
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 183

TABLE 5-1: Projects Supported by ONR to Assess the Arctic’s Radioactive Contamination Problem 

and Identify Possible Monitoring Strategies

Performing institution

Type of 

project Project objectives

Alaska Department of 

Environmental Conservation

Monitoring Installation of atmospheric radionuclide monitoring stations in the 

Russian Bilibino region to improve regional emergency-response 

cooperation and information exchange

Barnard College Research Evaluation of the role played by river runoff and sea ice melt in 

transporting pollutants into the Arctic

Geomar Research Center for 

Marine Geosciences

Research Assessment of sediment transport mechanisms and their morphologic 

effect on the Arctic’s seafloor

Institute of Developmental 

Biology, Russian Academy of 

Sciences

Research Study of exposure and possible effects of radionuclides in certain 

mammals of northern Russia

Lamont-Doherty Earth 

Observatory

Research 1) Study of circulation patterns and productivity in certain areas of the 

Arctic Ocean; and 2) assessment of the pathways by which radioactive 

wastes dumped in the Arctic might enter the Arctic environment

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory

Research Preparation of a risk assessment for the Arctic’s radioactive waste dump 

sites, focusing in particular on possible impacts to indigenous 

populations and possible monitoring strategies

Mississippi State University Research Establishing an international study group to investigate radioactive waste 

dump sites in the North Pacific (including the Sea of Japan and the Sea 

of Okhotsk) and identifying possible alternative disposal methods

National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration

Research Identification of sources, their associated contamination, and strategies 

for conducting long-term monitoring in the Arctic and North Pacific 

regions

Naval Research Laboratory Research NRL is carrying out several projects for the Office of Naval Research’s 

Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, including:

■ Developing a geographical information system to archive and evaluate data obtained under the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment

Program

■ Assessing radioactive contamination in the Kara Sea and in the

region where the Ob and Yenesey Rivers discharge into the Arctic

Ocean

■ Identifying existing technologies for marine radiation monitoring

■ Developing and validating a numerical modeling system to study

and quantify past and potential dispersion of radionuclides from

Russia’s nuclear waste dump sites and land-based sources

Ohio State University and 

Canada’s Bedford Institute of 

Oceanography

Research Evaluation of sources of radioactivity in the Murmansk region

Oregon State University Research Analysis of sediment cores from the Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi 

Seas to determine recent radionuclide distribution and fate patterns

Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories

Research Improvements to the radionuclide transport model for the Ob and 

Yenesey River systems

Russian Scientific Research 

Institute of Hydrogeology 

and Engineering Geology

Research Assessment of the distribution of radionuclides in the Ob and Yenesey 

River basins, and determination of current and future transport
184 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

❚ Alaska’s Initiatives in Research on 

Arctic Radioactive Contamination

Traditionally, the Deputy Commissioner of the

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation is the individual assigned by the Governor to

represent and coordinate all Arctic environmental protection efforts involving the state. The

Deputy Commissioner participates in state,

national, and international forums. These responsibilities include, among others, coordinating

Alaska’s participation in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy’s Arctic Monitoring and

Assessment Program (AMAP); representing

Alaska in meetings held by the Arctic Research

Commission; and assisting federal agencies (e.g.,

State Department, National Security Council) in

the development and review of national Arctic

policy (150).

The State of Alaska participates actively in a

variety of regional, national, and international

efforts to assess and monitor the status of the

Arctic contamination problem. Within the

region, the State of Alaska appropriates funds to

the University of Alaska and its operating agencies to conduct Arctic research. According to a

January 1995 ARC report, about $10 million of

the $11.4 million provided by the state to the

University of Alaska was programmed for Arctic

research. Other agencies supporting state

research efforts in the Arctic include the Department of Fish and Game (about $3.5 million) and

Science Applications 

International Corporation

Research Assessment of transport processes and pathways of Soviet-dumped 

pollutants in the northwest Pacific Ocean off Kamchatka Peninsula

Texas A&M Research Quantification of man-made and natural radionuclides in the Kara and 

Laptev Seas

U.S. Army Cold Regions 

Research Engineering 

Laboratory

Research Quantification of radionuclide transport in sea ice

U.S. Department of the 

Interior

Research Biological and sediment sampling at certain Russian Arctic riverine 

deltas and islands

University of Alaska Research 1) evaluation of impacts by river ice and estuarine ice on certain Arctic 

and East Siberian seas; and 2) development, testing, and identification 

of possible applications of a remote-sensing methodology for detecting 

radioactive waste disposal sites

University of California Research Measurement of the geographic distribution (including sea ice, seawater, 

and sediment) of radionuclides being discharged into the Arctic from 

major Russian rivers 

University of Miami Research Assessment of the potential for marine microorganisms to uptake 

radionuclides discharged from dumped Soviet nuclear reactors or from 

radioactive dump sites

University of Rhode Island Research Assessment of sources, fate, and transport of radionuclides in the Arctic 

Ocean, including the Canadian Basin

University of Washington Research Assessment of the fate of contaminants from river plumes on the Arctic’s 

continental shelf

Woods Hole Oceanographic 

Institution

Research Assessment of radionuclide-contaminant transport into the Arctic from 

major Russian rivers, particularly the Ob River

SOURCES: Office of Naval Research, “Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program: Project Summary, 1994 Research,” Washington, DC, 1994;

C.D. Hollister, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, personal communication, August 15, 1995; Office of Technology Assessment.

TABLE 5-1: Projects Supported by ONR to Assess the Arctic’s Radioactive Contamination Problem 

and Identify Possible Monitoring Strategies (Cont’d.)
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 185

the Alaska Science and Technology Foundation

(more than $72 million since its inception in

1989) (12,150).

The Environmental Health and Emergency

Response Project is the major regional undertaking supported by the State of Alaska to address

Arctic contamination issues and concerns. The

project was officially established by the Governor at the Northern Forum meeting in September

1992,13 to cooperate and coordinate Arctic protection efforts among northern regional governments.

The project also emphasizes the identification of

existing and potential public health and safety

hazards, and the sharing of environmental data

among all the regional governments participating

in the Northern Forum (5, 93).

In the national arena, Alaska plans to participate in the proposed $1-million Regional Environmental Monitoring Assessment Project, a

program sponsored by the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to assess environmental contamination in the North Slope area. The State of Alaska,

through its Department of Environmental Conservation, also participates in the Risk Assessment Group of ONR’s Arctic Nuclear Waste

Assessment Program (40). Box 5-2 describes two

of the major Arctic cooperative research efforts

in which the State of Alaska participates.

Internationally, most of Alaska’s efforts are

focused on supporting the work of the AEPS, in

particular its Arctic Monitoring and Assessment

Program (AMAP). Some of the international

projects known to have extensive Alaskan participation include the following:

1. reviewing state databases known to contain information about air pollution sources and contaminated sites found throughout the state, and

reporting the results to the AMAP Secretariat;

2. providing the AMAP Secretariat with radiation data collected by state monitors and by

13 The Northern Forum is a nongovernmental organization composed of 23 governors from northern and Arctic regions. The regional

governments participating in the Northern Forum are: Alaska (U.S.); Lapland (Finland); Hokkaido (Japan); Yukon and Alberta (Canada); S.

Trondelag and the Northern Counties Association (Norway); Dornod (Mongolia); Heilongjiang (People’s Republic of China); Vaserbotten

(Sweden); the Republic of Korea; and the Russian regional governments of: Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Evenk Autonomous Okrug, Khabarovsk Krai, Magadan Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Kamchatka Oblast, Sakha Republic, Sakhalin Oblast, Komi Republic, Leningrad

Oblast, Khantiy Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, and the Jewish Autonomous Region (93, 135).

the monitors planned for installation at the

Bilibino nuclear power plant as part of a cooperative agreement with that Russian facility;

and

3. paying the salary of an expert who would help

to complete the chapter on heavy metals that

the United States is required to submit as part

of the AMAP report now under preparation

(150).

❚ Evaluation of Current U.S. Federal and 

State Arctic Research Initiatives

For more than a century following the acquisition of Alaska from Russia in 1867, U.S. Arctic

policy lacked a formal mandate and focused primarily on the strategic and national security

importance of this region. Little emphasis was

given to protection of the Arctic environment

from waste disposal activities, including dumping of radioactive materials. Even when Congress passed the Arctic Research Policy Act in

1984, calling for the coordination of all federal

research efforts, U.S. policy continued to emphasize national defense rather than environmental

contamination research.

In response to the growing concerns raised by

reports documenting the radioactive and chemical contamination of the Arctic by the former

Soviet Union, the United States has opted since

1992 to address this problem in a number of

ways. For example, the Interagency Committee

and the Arctic Research Commission have put

forth various efforts (e.g., expert workshops;

long-term research goals; research recommendations) to establish a coordinated radioactive contamination research plan. As part of renewing its

1983 policies, the U.S. government, through the

State Department, issued a new Arctic policy in

September 1994, emphasizing its commitment to

the environmental protection of the Arctic eco-
186 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 5-2: Alaska’s Initiatives on Arctic Radioactive Contamination Research

Rapid Assessment of Potentially Significant Pollution Sources in the Russian Far East

The Russian Rapid Assessment Project is an Alaskan initiative to work with the eight regional governments of the Russian Far East in the identification and collection of data from those areas in Russia considered of greatest risk to human health and the environment in the region. This initiative also seeks to

provide the basis for long-term cooperation between the United States and Russian national and regional

governments. On the completion of the project, the data collected and mapped are expected to benefit

the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program as well as the state’s efforts to prepare an emergency

response program.

Implementation of the Russian Rapid Assessment Project involves a complex array of jurisdictions. For

instance, the State of Alaska is responsible for overseeing and partially financing the project. The U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. State Department have provided funds ($100,000 and

$140,000, respectively) for its implementation. At least seven Far East regions of Russia are participating

in the project: the Chukotka Autonomous Region, Kamchatka Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, Magadan Oblast,

Primorski Krai, Sakhalin Oblast, and the Sakha Republic (184,185). According to experts, the project has

provided a great opportunity for local government officials to learn about pollution sources in their regions

since the number of contaminated sites that might be involved ranges from a few dozen (Sakhalin and

Magadan Oblasts), to several hundred (Kamchatka), to several thousand (Primorsky Krai).

As originally proposed, the implementation of this effort is twofold. The first phase consisted of training

two Russian representatives selected by a sponsoring committee or department from each Far East

region on the use of computers to collect and store pollution data. The second phase involves assisting

Alaskan scientists to enter the collected data into a computer mapping system (global information system, or GIS) so the Russians can subsequently reproduce maps of their pollution sites and areas of contamination. Training of regional representatives was carried out by the University of Alaska’s

Environmental Resources Institute (ENRI) in June 1994 (117,118,126,185).

Thus far, the Rapid Assessment Project appears to be a promising cooperative effort; environmental

monitoring data previously collected by regional organizations is being mapped for the first time. Assurances by project staff of the availability of data on Alaska’s contaminated sites to the participating Far

East regions have played a key role in the Russians’ willingness to reciprocate. Plans are under way to

develop an agreement—to be signed at a future meeting—by which all participating regions have access

to any monitoring information and results, including maps and databases (126).

After the training of Russian participants, ENRI personnel provide computers and payments of about

$125 for each project participant until each has received $1,500. Once the project is completed, computers will be returned to the State of Alaska unless the program is extended to cover other Russian regions.

Scheduled for release in September 1995, the final report and contamination maps are expected to be

highly useful to regional government officials, local concerned individuals, and various international

research efforts including the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program (117,118,184,185).

Despite progress made in improving logistics, the Russian information infrastructure continues to

hinder project implementation. Some data from the Russian regions are already being received and integrated into the GIS system. According to Office of Technology Assessment research, several barriers still

impede more effective data transfer. These include an inefficient mail service system, an unreliable telephone and fax system, and a limited computer communication system (e.g., Internet/E-mail) (185).

(continued)
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 187

system. Like the policy efforts issued during the

1980s, these new policy initiatives failed to provide or identify funding sources for implementing any radioactive contamination research

project.

Unlike ARPA and U.S. government Arctic

policy, the Office of Naval Research has conducted extensive research on radioactive contamination in the Arctic for the last three years. In

addition to data collection and analysis through

workshops and information exchanges, ONR has

also supported extensive sampling of environmental conditions in neighboring areas of Alaska

and certain coastal and riverine areas of the Arctic known to have been used by the former Soviet

Union to dispose of radioactive contaminated

materials. Although research efforts are now

more systematic than in years past, they do not

fully characterize the status and trends of pollutants in the Arctic.

Despite U.S. policy development efforts,

attracting funds for Arctic contamination

research continues to be difficult for the Interagency Committee and the Arctic Research

Commission (20,91,94,96). According to OTA

research, funds provided by federal agencies to

carry out their responsibilities under the Interagency Committee are considerably less than

those for overall Arctic research.14 In fact, the

level of funding available for Arctic contamination research totaled $16 million for FY 1993

through FY 1995, $10 million of which corresponded to congressional authorizations supporting ONR’s Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment

Program. IARPC agencies, such as the National

Science Foundation, provided the remaining $6

million. The overall federal Arctic research budget for the same period, on the other hand, averaged nearly $170 million. Figure 5-2 shows the

U.S. Arctic research budget, by agency, for FY

1992-94.

According to the currently proposed IARPC

budget request, implementation of the Arctic

Contamination Research and Assessment pro14 Due to funding limitations, unilateral efforts by the United States to assess radioactive contamination in the Arctic have been limited

primarily to a few workshops, several information exchanges, and a small number of field research projects.

The Cooperative Institute for Arctic Research

The Cooperative Institute for Arctic Research (CIFAR) was established in 1994 as a cooperative effort

among the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, and the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation for the purpose of coordinating and

integrating Arctic research activities in Alaska.

In addition to NOAA support, CIFAR received $352,000 in FY 1994 and $205,000 in FY 1995 from

ONR’s Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program to conduct various research activities through 1998.

One such project involves analysis of data on contaminant levels, pollutant transport, and associated

ecological effects on the coastal and continental shelf areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas collected

under the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment Program from 1975 to 1985. On completing

this effort, CIFAR plans to convene an international conference in the spring of 1997 to highlight the

results of the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (30,40).

CIFAR also proposes to expand Alaska’s monitoring program in Barrow to include other areas of Arctic Alaska and to sample other significant pollutants such as persistent organic pollutants and metals. As

part of this activity, CIFAR plans to explore opportunities for real-time data exchange with institutions in

the Russian Federation and other Arctic nations by use of the Internet (30,96).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 5-2: Alaska’s Initiatives on Arctic Radioactive Contamination Research (Cont’d.)
DOD DOI NSF NASA NOA A DOE DDHHS SI DOT EPA DA DOS

KEY: DOA: Department of Agriculture; DDHHS: Department of Health and Human services; DOD: Department of Defense; DOE: Department of

Energy; DOI: Department of the Interior; DOS: Department of State; DOT: Department of Transportation: EPA: Environmental Protection Agency;

NASA: National Atmospheric and Space Administration; NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; SI: Smithsonian Institution.

SOURCES: C. Myers, National Science Foundation, personal communication, Mar. 3 and June 15, 1995; Interagency Research Policy Committee, National Science Foundation, “United States Arctic Research Plan, Biennial Revision: 1996-2000,” final draft report, May 1995.

gram (box 5-1) would require about $33 million

for FY 1995. Nearly 85 percent ($27.8 million) is

expected to come from NOAA and the Department of Interior; NSF will provide about 9 percent of this total ($3 million). The level of

funding needed for FY 1996-99 is calculated to

be relatively similar to the FY 1995 budget

request. While contributions from DOE and EPA

will not exceed $1 million, it is unknown

whether the ONR program participation ($10

million in past) will continue (63,64,66).

Funding uncertainties and limitations are

obstacles for U.S. agencies in their attempts to

assess radioactive contamination and evaluate its

potential adverse impacts, In light of recent budget-cutting measures among federal agencies, little expectation exists of future increases in funds

to programs responsible for assessing the Arctic’s radioactive contamination problem,

Most experts anticipate that the search for

funds to support Arctic contamination projects

will become more difficult, particularly in light

of the present climate of competing priorities and

budgetary hardships among federal agencies

with Arctic programs.

❚ U.S.-Russian Bilateral Cooperative

Initiatives on Arctic Contamination

Research

For several decades prior to the breakup of the

Soviet Union, U.S. efforts had been centered on

mobilization of the vast economic and military

resources needed to enable the nation to withstand any potential threats. After the dissolution

of the Soviet Union—as an indication that the

Cold War was over—the U.S. Congress

embarked on an effort to assist the newly independent states, and particularly Russia, in partnerships with the United States and other

Western nations. This assistance was geared primarily to support the establishment of democratic institutions and economic reforms and

policies. U.S. assistance efforts also embraced

strategies for safe dismantlement and destruction

of nuclear weapons. Figure 5-1 shows the relationship between U.S. national and international

efforts to support Arctic research and monitoring.
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 189

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission

As part of the April 3-4, 1993, summit meeting

in Vancouver, Canada, the Presidents of Russia

and the United States agreed to forge a new

mutually cooperative venture between the two

nations. Because the venture was to be guided

primarily by high-level government officials, a

U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic

and Technological Cooperation was established

under the leadership of U.S. Vice President

Albert Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor

Chernomyrdin. Since its creation, the GoreChernomyrdin Commission (GCC), as the joint

venture is known, has lacked the funding mechanism or budget required to support any of the

cooperative initiatives undertaken under its jurisdiction (8,51).

The GCC was established shortly after the

Vancouver summit. The first commission meeting took place in Washington in September 1993.

Since then, the meeting site has alternated

between Russia and the United States. The fifth

and most recent meeting was held in Moscow in

June 1995.

The scope and complexity of the commission

have expanded since the presidential summit in

Vancouver. Created to provide a framework for

cooperating in the areas of space, energy, and

high technology, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has to date expanded to include five

additional areas of interest (business development, defense conversion, health, environment,

and agriculture). Today, the commission has

working committees for each of these issues

which are chaired by Cabinet members (figure 5-

3). The Environment Committee, headed by the

administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, is the GCC branch responsible for

developing and implementing the U.S. portion of

cooperative environmental plans with Russia

(54,180).

Little progress, however, has been attained

thus far by the commission in the field of Arctic

nuclear contamination. Most of its work, particularly that of the Environment Committee,

appears focused on the areas of sustainable management of natural resources, conservation of

biodiversity, and environmental technical assistance and education. Among the activities of current interest to the GCC, for example, are: the

application of remote sensing data and technologies; training in pollution control, risk assessment, and environmental law and economics;

cleanup of the oil spill in the Komi Republic; and

more recently, the phasing out of leaded gasoline. Of the various bilateral research initiatives

supported by the United States under the GoreChernomyrdin Commission, only one relates to

researching the radioactive contamination problem in the Arctic: the U.S.-Russian Agreement

on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental

Protection of 1994.

A cooperative research accord that might be

beneficial to U.S. efforts in assessing radioactive

contamination is the agreement between the

United States and the fSU to cooperate in

research on radiation effects, described in box 5-

3. This agreement is a bilateral, stand-alone, government-to-government accord whose implementation is coordinated with the GCC’s Health

Committee. No GCC funds are provided for

implementation of this agreement. The Environment Committee has also been active in facilitating opportunities for U.S. and Russian military

and defense communities to cooperate in solving

environmental problems (51,145,180); to prevent

future radioactive contamination, the committee

is assisting the Russians with improvements in

radioactive waste management and nuclear reactor safety—a subject discussed later in this chapter.

U.S.-Russian agreement on cooperation in 

the field of environmental protection

In May 23, 1972, the United States and the

Soviet Union signed the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Environmental Agreement, an unprecedented protocol

designed to build long-term cooperation in the

field of environmental research and ecological

protection. Despite the unfavorable diplomatic

conditions that existed between the two nations

throughout the Cold War, the 1972 agreement

proved successful in fostering collaboration
I I

Environment Committee

Chair: Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

KEY: AID: Agency for International Development; CIA: Central Intelligence Agency; DOS: Department of State; EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Exim Bank: Export-Import Bank: NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Agency; NOAA: National Oceanic end Atmospheric Administration;

OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 191

BOX 5-3: U.S.-Russian Agreement on Cooperation in Research on Radiation Effects

The breakup of the Soviet Union has provided U.S. and Russian radiation research experts with an

unprecedented opportunity to overcome some of the limitations of the scientific studies used for determining chronic radiation exposures and predicting radiation health risks.a Prior to the breakup of the

Soviet Union, there was little opportunity to study localities where populations were known to be

externally and internally exposed to low radiation levels over long periods of time. One example of

such a location is the radioactively contaminated area in Russia’s southern Urals. Recognizing the

importance that preservation and analysis of radiation exposure data from the southern Urals may

have in answering questions concerning chronic low-level exposures, the U.S. Secretary of State

and the Russian Foreign Minister, at their January 1994 Moscow summit, entered into an historic

binational agreement to cooperate on matters relating to radiation effects research. This five-year

accord,b known as the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the

Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Research on Radiation Effects for the Purpose of Minimizing the Consequences of Radioactive Contamination on Health and the Environment,

identifies six major areas of cooperation:

1. health effects studies of radiation-exposed workers and community members;

2. preservation of existing data and development of relevant databases and information systems;

3. environmental studies reconstructing past doses to human populations and assessing impacts of

radioactivity on the environment;

4. health communication of risk assessment information;

5. policy analysis, including review of detection and reporting mechanisms; and

6. support of scientific research capable of identifying means to reduce the environmental and human

health impacts of radioactive contamination.

The Joint Coordinating Committee for Radiation Effects Research (JCCRER) was established to implement the agreement.c The JCCRER is responsible for coordinating and reviewing “all aspects of

cooperation under the Agreement” and for arranging working groups, conferences, and seminars to

discuss and study radioactive effects issues.d According to Article III.5, the JCCRER may also

develop “projects and programs for radiation effects research, exchanges of scientific and technical

safety information, personnel and equipment, and procedures for addressing and resolving questions of such matters as payment of costs under this cooperation, and patent and/or publication

rights for joint activities administered under this Agreement . . .” All programs of cooperation developed under the JCCRER are to be established on an annual basis and implemented the following

year.e

Collaboration under the agreement is multiagency in nature and coordinated with the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission’s Health Committee. U.S. technical participation in the committee is carried out by

the Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Defense, and Department of

Health and Human Services. The Russian agencies currently represented at the JCCRER consist of the

Ministry for Civil Defense Affairs, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters

(EMERCOM); Ministry of Atomic Energy; and the Ministry of Health and the Medical Industry. The Department of Energy and EMERCOM are the executive agents responsible for coordinating the overall

research plan and activities agreed to by the United States and Russia under the accord.

The text of the agreement provides ample flexibility to the parties to determine the type of funding

mechanism to be employed to fund administrative and research activities. The U.S. government has budgeted more than $1 million to implement activities under this agreement during FY 1995; funding for subsequent years will be determined on a year-by-year basis. During the first JCCRER held in Bethesda,

Maryland, on October 24–25, 1994, Russia indicated its intent to provide a relatively similar level of financial support through a centralized funding authority under EMERCOM. The availability of information on

the progress made by the Russian government in carrying out this intent has not been addressed during

this first year of work under the agreement.

(continued)
192 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

between the scientific communities in both

nations.

By virtue of the Soviet Union’s dissolution

and as an effort to provide continuity to the collaborative work conducted under the 1972 protocol, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime

Minister Chernomyrdin signed on May 23, 1994,

the U.S.-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in

the Field of Protection of the Environment and

Natural Resources. This agreement replaced the

1972 accord with the Soviet Union. The conditions of the agreement will remain in force until

May 23, 1999, unless the United States and Russia sign an additional five-year extension. The

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in consultation with the State Department and other

federal agencies, is responsible for administering

the accord (144).

The 1994 agreement seeks to support longterm joint cooperation for studies on the harmful

environmental impacts of pollution and for the

development of “measures to improve the condition of the environment...including work on the

areas of pollution prevention and remediation.”15

Of the nearly 20 fields of cooperation included in

the new agreement—shown in table 5-2—the

fifth area specifically calls for both nations to

focus on protecting the Arctic environment by

15 Article I of “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on

Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources,” June 23, 1994.

For the purpose of demonstrating successful collaborative research, the JCCRER plans to focus on

implementing, at least for the first year, only a small number of radiation research projects. The areas of

study would include feasibility studies on updating dose reconstruction models, estimating carcinogenicnoncarcinogenic effects and potential risks, and assessing radionuclide metabolism in exposed residents. The Russian communities to be studied will consist of the residents living along the Techa River

and the southern Ural region, an area extensively contaminated by radioactivity from waste discharges

and accidents, and the Mayak industrial nuclear complex, where many plant workers are thought to have

been exposed to excessive radiation levels. Radiation effects among Mayak’s nonworking population are

also considered in JCCRER’s initial program of cooperation (52,87,88,179)

Since the signing of the agreement, the JCCRER Executive Committee and Project Research Teams

have focused on improving understanding of the Russian scientific approach and on developing the institutional relationship needed to collaborate successfully with the Russians. To this end, the Executive

Committee recently conducted two workshops, one in Florida to discuss implementation of selected

occupational exposure projects at the Mayak facility. The second workshop, conducted in July 1995 in St.

Petersburg, Russia, focused on how the research on radiation effects along the Techa River population

and community studies will be performed (179).

aOur knowledge about the health effects and possible risks associated with radiation exposure is based largely on

medical studies of survivors from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb explosions. In addition, the data collected from these

studies only pertain directly to populations exposed to high radiation doses for relatively short periods of time. Because of

these limitations, scientists extrapolate the data in order to develop regulatory and safety standards for controlling risks

associated with low radiation dose and low dose rates. Many critics, however, question the validity of using high-dose and

high-dose-rate to determine the risks associated with chronic low radiation exposures since, as indicated in the Agreement’s proposed implementation plan of October 1994, high-dose data do “not correspond to the pattern of exposure normally encountered or expected in the nuclear fuel cycle and in other uses of radiation and radioactive materials.

bThe agreement is to remain in force at least until 1999, at which time additional five-year extensions can be approved

by the U.S. and Russian governments.

cIn addition to the JCCRER, both governments agreed to create an Executive Committee responsible for JCCRER dayto-day activities and for initiating a few research proposals in the first year of implementation; Scientific Review Groups for

reviewing and evaluating the research conducted under the agreement; and Project Research Teams composed of the

principal U.S. and Russian scientists carrying out the work.

dArticles III.4 and III.5 of the agreement.

eArticle III.6.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 5-3: U.S.-Russian Agreement on Cooperation in Research on Radiation Effects (Cont’d.)
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 193

supporting technical and scientific projects,

information exchange, and meetings.

Active collaboration is also found in the area

of “Conservation of Nature and the Organization

of Reserves” included in the agreement. Under

this section of the agreement, various U.S. agencies—such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, the

Forest Service, and the Office of Naval

Research—have worked with Russian government agencies16 and nongovernmental institu16 For example, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, Ministry of Fisheries, and Russian Academy of Sciences. 

tions to promote natural resource conservation

and to improve technical training and research

opportunities. The research projects supported

include, among others, joint mapping of sea ice

and snow cover in the Bering and Chukchi Seas;

surveying animal populations of ecological

importance to the U.S. and Russian Arctic

regions; and conserving the genetic diversity of

threatened animal populations such as the Siberian tiger (36,83,84,178).

TABLE 5-2: Areas of Cooperation Identified Under the 1994 Agreement on

Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection

1 Atmosphere; water and soil resources

2 Environmental aspects of agricultural production

3 Preservation, conservation, and management of natural and cultural resources in the context of their 

relationship to the environment, including the organization of preserves and other specially protected areas

4 Marine and coastal areas and resources

5 Arctic and sub-Arctic areas and resources

6 Environmental impact assessment

7 Global environmental issues, including climate change, depletion of the ozone layer and conservation and 

restoration of the biological diversity of local, regional, and global ecological systems, including forest 

ecosystems.

8 Impact of environmental factors on human health and the condition of flora and fauna

9 Application of digital mapping and GIS (geographic information systems) technologies and use of sensor 

technology in addressing environmental issues

10 Energy-saving measures and creation of alternative energy sources

11 Legal and administrative measures relating to the protection of the environment, including legislation, 

enforcement, and access to the administrative and judicial systems

12 Participation of the public, including nongovernmental organizations in environmental decisionmaking

13 Education in the field of environmental protection and natural resources

14 Economics and the management of environmental issues and the use of natural resources

15 Role of the military in the field of protection of the environment and natural resources

16 Environmental emergencies

17 Earthquake prediction and assessment of seismic risks

18 Environmental monitoring

19 Any other area of cooperation agreed to by the parties

SOURCE: U.S.–Russia Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, May 23, 1994.
194 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

The Fish and Wildlife Service also plans to

participate in the joint Russian-U.S. scientific

expedition planned and funded by the Office of

Naval Research for August 1995. Collection of

water and sediment samples—also funded by

ONR—will take place in the area extending from

the Bering Strait, westward of the Chuckchi Sea

to the mouth of the Kolyma River in the East

Siberian Sea. Collected samples will then be analyzed to assess existing levels of radioactive and

chemical contamination, evaluate their long-term

effects on the marine plant and animal populations of the area, and study the pathways through

which these contaminants are transported within

this region of the Arctic (40,84,173).

Despite the increased impetus to carry out collaborative work under the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the

Environment and Natural Resources, experts

view the current economic hardship experienced

by Russia as a major obstacle limiting their participation under the agreement. In the view of an

official on the Russian side of the agreement,

adoption by the United States of “a significant

share of the [financial] burden” associated with

implementing the accord is the main reason for

the success thus far (36).

MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING 

INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO ADDRESS 

RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IN THE 

ARCTIC

❚ Concerns about Russia’s Environmental 

Monitoring Data

Considerable concern exists among Alaskan residents and Arctic nations about the limited Russian monitoring of environmental contamination,

and the inadequacy of its existing data and of the

institutional regulatory framework responsible

for monitoring and enforcement. Regarding air

and water pollution, for example, Russian monitoring efforts were generally limited to samples

taken through a federally funded network that

consisted of a few monitoring points located in

key sites. The Committee for Air and Hydrology

was the Russian agency responsible for overseeing the sampling. Under the committee’s supervision, samples were analyzed periodically for

only 10 different contaminants, and the data were

summarized and reported annually. One reason

for this appears to be that “Russian environmental laws list allowable limits for numerous pollutants but only 10 are actually considered. All the

rest are not actually measured, rather they are

estimated.” Resource limitations also preclude

more extensive sampling and data reporting, as

evidenced by the committee’s recent decision to

reduce the number of monitoring stations in the

network due to shrinking federal funds

(117,118,126).

The poor quality of data regarding contaminated lands in Russia, particularly in the Far East

region, is also of concern among Alaskans and

Russian regional governments. The responsibility for monitoring and reporting the nature and

extent of pollutants on land in Russia traditionally falls on the polluting facilities. Operating

facilities are required to collect and report all

samples for laboratory analysis to the Committee

of Environmental Protection and Natural

Resources (CEPNR). Upon completion of analysis, results are submitted to statistical bureaus

where status reports of the region’s contamination are prepared.

Because of the limited capacity of its laboratory facilities and funding shortages that prevent

the hiring of additional personnel, CEPNR’s analytical staff is often forced to test only a few pollutants. Additional contaminants could be tested

and regulated, but current funds are too limited

for CEPNR to expand its staff and testing activities (126). The inadequacy of regional environmental data and shortage of agency resources

also limit the ability to map the status of contamination in Russia’s Far East region. In the past,

mapping of contamination (e.g., in the Russian

Far East) consisted of providing a limited qualitative depiction of what was present at contaminated sites, rather than supplying accurate

pollutant levels and the locations of such contamination sources. In most instances, such data

also exclude discharges from the military’s
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 195

extensive nuclear and nonnuclear industrial complexes. Data inadequacy, according to a recently

published report, only adds to the difficulty of

addressing environmental contamination problems in Russia (48,90).

The fragmented nature of the institutional

infrastructure responsible for ensuring environmental protection in the Russian Arctic region

also precluded interagency cooperation to

improve data quality and adequacy. Prior to

1993, the responsibility for environmental protection in the Far East regions of Russia was traditionally organized by medium (e.g., water, air,

soil) and therefore carried out by more than one

committee, unlike natural resource management,

which came under the jurisdiction of one committee. Jurisdiction for air, surface water,

groundwater, and environmental protection was

generally found in separate committees. Since

1993, Russia has attempted to reorganize all

committees with a responsibility for environmental protection into one authority.

Despite Russia’s recent attempts to disclose

environmental monitoring information, the

United States and other Arctic nations are supporting studies to assess the radioactive contamination problem in the Arctic and to formulate

monitoring approaches. The following section

discusses three major monitoring initiatives: the

Regional Environmental Monitoring Assessment Program proposed by the U.S. EPA, the

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy established by the eight circumpolar nations, and the

International Arctic Seas Assessment Project

sponsored by the International Atomic Energy

Agency.

❚ The U.S. Regional Environmental 

Monitoring Assessment Program

The Environmental Monitoring Assessment Program (EMAP) is a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency project designed to gather data on

the condition and long-term trends of ecological

resources, including wetlands, forests, and

coastal areas. To reflect the increasing concern

about contamination of the Arctic environment,

and in particular the potential impact that such

contamination might have on the health and livelihood of Alaska Natives, EPA, in cooperation

with the Fish and Wildlife Service, is proposing

to establish a regional version of its nationwide

program to be known as the Regional Environmental Monitoring Assessment Program (REMAP).17

As part of project implementation, EPA plans

to first identify those methodologies used in its

nationwide monitoring and assessment program

that are appropriate for sampling and assessing

ecological impacts from pollutants in estuarine

environments.18 Once appropriate methodologies are identified, the R-EMAP program staff

proposes to assess the physical, chemical, and

biological conditions in 62 randomly selected

locations in northwest Alaska. Samples of sediments, fish, birds, and snow, for example, will be

analyzed for pollutants such as heavy metals,

PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), pesticides,

and other organic pollutants. In its first year, the

program will assess 32 estuarine locations in the

Kasegaluk and Elson Lagoons near Barrow,

Alaska.

Although the EPA’s plan is to undertake an

EMAP-like program specifically focused on

Alaska, the agency—as well as the Interagency

Committee through which the proposal was

made—still awaits OMB’s approval of the

$500,000 annual operating budget needed for its

implementation. If funded, R-EMAP might

prove helpful to national and international Arctic

research programs in which the United States

participates. Examples of these include the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program established as part of the circumpolar nations’ Arctic

Environmental Protection Strategy. The Arctic

17 Regional EMAPs are also proposed for other regions of the United States; however, the only one discussed here deals with the Arctic

region. 18 The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are cooperating with EPA in developing the design, sampling procedures, and protocols of the project. 
196 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

contamination research program under the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee will

also benefit from this project. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (discussed in

detail in the next section) will benefit because 1)

the sampling of two Alaskan estuarine systems

for pollutants identified under AMAP would take

place consistent with AMAP-approved sampling

procedures (35,172); and 2) because the monitoring techniques to be developed and tested by

EPA could be then adopted for further assessing

environmental contamination in the Arctic (35).

❚ The Arctic Environmental Protection 

Strategy

The concept of establishing a charter among circumpolar nations to promote cooperation for the

protection of the Arctic was first voiced in 1989

by the Finnish government at an international

conference in Rovaniemi, Finland, attended by

all eight Arctic countries (United States, Canada,

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and

Sweden). After consultative meetings in Sweden

and Canada, these eight nations approved the

Declaration on Arctic Environmental Protection

on June 1, 1991. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, also known as the Rovaniemi

process or the Finnish initiative, became the central component of the declaration.19

AEPS is a nonbinding legal statement for

cooperation on the development and implementation of programs to protect the Arctic environment. Its major objectives include “preserving

environmental quality and natural resources,

accommodating environmental protection principles with the needs and traditions of Arctic

Native peoples, monitoring environmental conditions, and reducing and eventually eliminating

pollution in the Arctic Environment.” To facilitate meeting these objectives, AEPS identifies

six major types of pollutants as priorities for

action: radioactivity, heavy metals, oil, noise,

acidification, and persistent organic contaminants.

19 Several non-Arctic nations and organizations also participate in the Arctic environmental protection process, generally as observers. 

Implementation of AEPS requires national

and international cooperation and coordination

of efforts. To this end, the eight circumpolar

nations have formed four major working groups

under AEPS to lead their research work in the

Arctic. They are: the Arctic Monitoring and

Assessment Program; the Conservation of Arctic

Flora and Fauna (CAFF); the Protection of the

Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and the

Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and

Response (EPP&R). Concerns about sustainable

development in the Arctic are also addressed by

the AEPS. The responsibility for coordinating

U.S. participation in these groups falls on the

U.S. State Department. The federal agencies

leading the U.S. technical cooperative efforts are

the Environmental Protection Agency, the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Science Foundation,

through IARPC, for AMAP; the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service for CAFF; the National Ocean

and Atmospheric Administration for PAME; and

the U.S. Coast Guard for EPP&R. Cooperation

also takes place among AEPS working groups,

the eight Arctic countries, and various international organizations (e.g., IAEA, London Convention). Significant collaboration and

coordination also exists between the Arctic

Nuclear Waste Assessment Program of the

Office of Naval Research and the AEPS, particularly AMAP—nearly $390,000 in FY 1994 and

1995—and to some extent PAME (40).

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

is the central component of the Rovaniemi process or AEPS. Its three main objectives are to: 1)

monitor, assess, and report on the environmental

health of the Arctic; 2) document the sources,

levels, trends, and pathways of pollutants; and 3)

assess the effect on the Arctic environment of

man-made pollutants originating in Arctic and

lower latitudes. Attempts to achieve these basic

objectives must also take into consideration the
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 197

ecological and cultural importance of the Arctic

among native peoples.

The objectives of AMAP are implemented

through the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment

Task Force, consisting of representatives from

each of the Arctic countries supporting the Arctic

Environmental Protection Strategy. Representatives from native groups, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami

Council, and the Russian Association of Small

Peoples of the North, participate in the Task

Force as observers. Representatives from nonArctic nations (e.g., United Kingdom) and international organizations (e.g., International Arctic

Science Committee) involved in Arctic research

are also invited as observers (120). With

IARPC’s support, and in coordination with the

NSF and the State Department, NOAA hosted

AMAP’s Assessment Steering Group and Working Group meetings in Washington last October

(96).

As agreed under AEPS, AMAP member

nations are responsible for preparing a report on

the assessment of the Arctic environment by

December 1996. The United States and the Russian Federation were given the lead responsibility for preparing the chapter of the report that

assesses heavy metals (e.g., sources, emissions,

environmental levels and trends and possible

effects).20 The remaining key portions of the

report are the responsibility of Canada and Norway (pathways of contamination), Canada and

Sweden (persistent organic pollutants, such as

PCBs), Norway and Russia (radioactivity), Finland (acidification), and Denmark (human

health). The plan to have the AMAP report finished by December 1996, however, appears

overly ambitious to some experts.

AMAP, to date, has focused primarily on the

collection of data from sources or activities that

emit pollutants. Analytical work to model the

mechanisms by which these pollutants affect or

might affect the Arctic environment is also under

way. To facilitate the research, AMAP has

20 Other issues of concern to AEPS include for example impacts associated with climate change, oil pollution, and noise.

grouped polluting activities into two major categories: land-based and sea-based radioactive

contamination sources. Land-based sources

include the disposal of radioactive material and

the discharge of chemical and industrial pollutants; sea-based sources refer primarily to the

shipping and dumping of radioactive waste and

of nuclear materials (10).

The United States plays a lead role in various

AMAP activities. Together with Russia, the

United States is preparing the chapter of the

assessment dealing with heavy-metal contamination. According to the U.S. AMAP representative, considerable progress has been made in the

preparation of a draft report for the heavy-metal

assessment. Several meetings with relevant international experts, particularly from Arctic

nations, are under way to collect the additional

information required to complete the assessment.

The second major U.S. activity under AMAP

involves developing the Arctic Data Directory.

This undertaking is being led by a data management expert with the U.S. Geological Survey

with funding from ONR and the Department of

State. One of the objectives of the U.S. work is to

provide AMAP countries with the technology

and technical assistance required to adapt existing data on the Arctic environment to formats

and databases that can be readily accessible by

computer (91,120,121).

The overall international budget for AMAP in

1995 is approximately $850,000, but because it

is not centrally funded, AMAP is forced to rely

on the financial and technical assistance of its

members (91,120,121). Norway is the largest

contributor, with an annual participation exceeding $500,000. The U.S. financial contribution by

IARPC agencies to AMAP for FY1995 is about

$150,000, mainly from the Department of State,

the National Science Foundation, and the Environmental Protection Agency (94,121,167).

Despite the lead U.S. role in a number of

activities, many experts continue to view the

U.S. contribution to implement its AMAP data
198 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

management activities as seriously underfunded

(91,96). Limited funding has not only been

reported for U.S. work on the chapter on heavy

metals but also for the Arctic data inventory. The

Arctic Research Commission concluded

recently that ensuring a successful “and effective

[U.S.] participation in AMAP and associated

AEPS activities” would require about $500,000

per year (15). Increasing U.S. financial support

for AMAP is crucial, especially since U.S. expertise may also be needed for the preparation of

other portions of the AMAP report, including a

chapter on freshwater contamination (167). Russia’s contribution to the program, on the other

hand, is expected to remain inconsequential, particularly because of its serious economic difficulties (16) and, to some extent, its failure to

consider Arctic radioactive contamination a

national research priority. (Russia’s environmental regulatory and institutional framework is discussed later in this chapter.)

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 

Working Group

The concept of establishing an independent program for protecting and conserving the fauna and

flora of the Arctic was first proposed as a memorandum of agreement for signing by the eight

Arctic countries meeting in Yellowknife, Canada, in 1990. Support for establishing an independent program quickly dissipated because of

the increasing interest on the part of Arctic

nations to set forth a comprehensive protection

strategy. With the signing of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and after extensive

negotiations, the Conservation of Arctic Flora

and Fauna Working Group concept was adopted

as an integral component of the strategy (107).

CAFF is composed of a Secretariat and an

International Working Group. The Secretariat

began operations in January 1994 and is located

in Ottawa, Canada. The International Working

Group consists of representatives from Arctic

government agencies and is headed by a Chair

and Vice-Chair. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service branch in Anchorage, Alaska, is the U.S.

CAFF representative. Native groups have been

highly effective in working within CAFF to have

their concerns addressed (7,11).

CAFF currently supports the preparation of

various documents relating to the Arctic marine

environment. These include, among others, an

inventory of land-based contamination sources,

the preparation of conservation strategies for

marine organisms (e.g., the seabird murre), compilation of information on seabird colonies, and

preparation of working papers on various circumpolar seabird and fish populations (107).

One of Russia’s activities under CAFF involves

the preparation of a Network of Protected Areas.

The results from these projects, considered

essential for the work planned by other components of the strategy, will be compiled into a

report by Norway and submitted to the AEPS

ministerial meeting in late 1995 or early 1996.

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 

Working Group

The Working Group on Protection of the Arctic

Marine Environment, led by Norway, first met in

Oslo in May 1994, following an invitation by the

Norwegian Ministry of Environment. The objective of this component of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy is to identify and describe

all possible threats to the Arctic marine environment and to provide a review of the international

institutional framework that currently exists for

protection of the Arctic seas. At their September

1994 London meeting, PAME members officially recognized the Arctic’s radioactive contamination by the former Soviet Union and the

possibility “of future dumping by the Russian

Federation” as critical issues (11).

PAME’s principal role in AEPS is to gather

data on the effects of man-made contaminants on

Arctic wildlife populations and habitats and to

submit a final report to AEPS ministers in 1995.

PAME is also responsible for examining possible

options or actions needed to address the problem

and for determining whether existing instruments

are sufficient or new as necessary. The five prin-
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 199

cipal areas of research currently supported by

PAME are:

1. assessing the impacts of pollution on the

marine and terrestrial ecosystems as well as

on the Native Peoples of the Arctic. A large

portion of this work is being led by Norway;

2. identifying all possible land-based sources of

pollution affecting the Arctic, such as oil, gas,

and nuclear industries; mining; industrial

activities; and coastal development. Canada is

leading this portion of the report;

3. collecting data on any sea-based activities

within and outside the Arctic but with the

potential to impact the Arctic. Preliminary

work thus far has been conducted by Norway

(primarily on offshore oil and gas activities)

and the United States (ocean dumping and

incineration);

4. evaluating all relevant international instruments for preventing and remediating Arctic

marine pollution; and

5. recommending probable approaches to solutions (10).

PAME members are expected to face various

difficult issues as work gets underway. One

example is linking environmental threats with

the level of protection provided by international

instruments and pointing out areas where such

instruments are inadequate. Because the major

focus of PAME is the marine environment,

AEPS member nations such as Canada and the

United States suggest that prior to proposing protection measures for adoption by international

organizations such as the London Convention, a

more comprehensive understanding of the Arctic

pollution problem is needed (10).

Another potential area of controversy that may

result from implementing PAME’s approaches

without extensive discussion among AEPS members is the question of maritime zones and

boundaries. With the exception of Sweden and

Finland, which lack jurisdiction over marine

waters north of the Arctic Circle, most AEPS

members, including Russia, have declared their

maritime zones along their Arctic coasts. Canada, Iceland, and Norway claim jurisdiction over

territorial waters extending up to 200 nautical

miles. Denmark’s decision to define its territorial

waters in the Arctic is expected in the near

future. In addition to PAME, these obstacles

appear potentially relevant to other AEPS programs.

Despite these potential obstacles, PAME’s

research continues to be key to identifying and

monitoring the contaminants and their sources

that currently affect the Arctic marine environment, and to supporting the activities of the three

other AEPS working groups.

Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 

Response Working Group

Consistent with the AEPS objective of ensuring

the protection of the Arctic environment, the

eight circumpolar countries established a Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response to address the problem of

acute environmental emergencies from landbased and offshore activities such as nuclear

accidents and oil spills. Led by Canada and the

United States, this group is inventorying and

assessing the potential for accidental pollution of

the Arctic from a variety of sources (e.g., chemical plants, industries, nuclear power plants) now

operating in the Arctic countries. Once completed, the EPP&R work is expected to be used

in coordination with other prevention protocols

(e.g., the IAEA and the London Convention) to

determine more precisely the types of additional

safeguards that are needed.

The EPP&R Working Group has begun to

conduct an environmental risk assessment of the

Arctic region. The study is expected to allow

EPP&R researchers to classify and inventory the

actual impact and potential risks to the Arctic

from any transboundary accidental discharge.

Once completed, study results will be employed

to determine whether relevant international institutions need to adopt additional measures to

ensure the protection of the Arctic environment

from accidental spills and releases (10).
200 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

❚ International Atomic Energy Agency’s 

Arctic Seas Assessment Project

The United Nations established the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 to carry

out two primary missions: 1) to enhance and support the peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout its member nations, and 2) to ensure that

atomic energy is not used for furthering any military purpose. One year later, at its first Conference on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations

proposed expanding IAEA’s mission to include

responsibility for controlling discharges of radioactive waste into the sea. By the end of the conference, the international community had given

IAEA the responsibility for promulgating technical and regulatory standards to prevent the ocean

dumping of radioactive substances at levels that

would affect human health and the marine environment (68,136). However, it was not until

1993 that IAEA, through the International Arctic

Seas Assessment Project, would take its first

official look at the Arctic’s radioactive contamination caused by the Soviets.21

As a result of growing concern about the possible regional and global impacts from radioactive waste dumping sites in the Arctic, the

contracting parties attending the London Convention’s Fifteenth Consultative Meeting in 1992

requested that IAEA devote attention to the Arctic radioactive contamination problem. In

responding to this request, in February 1993 the

IAEA established the International Arctic Seas

Assessment Project (IASAP). The main focus of

the project was to study the health and environmental consequences that may be associated with

the dumping of radioactive waste in the Kara and

Barents Seas and to identify probable remedial

solutions. Initially conceived as a bilateral cooperation effort between Norway and Russia,

IASAP today involves the participation of several international organizations and member

nations including the United States. IAEA plans

21 Prior to 1993, IAEA work in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union focused primarily on the identification and assessment of

sites at which uranium mining and milling activities had been conducted. One reason for focusing on this type of radioactive contamination

sources was the assumption that nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants and research laboratories, were already under regulatory control.

to phase out the IASAP project in 1996 with the

publication of a final report (69, 70, 71,72,136).

To carry out the project, IAEA’s Division of

Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Section

adopted the four working groups established at

its international meeting on the “Assessment of

Actual and Potential Consequences of Dumping

of Radioactive Waste into the Arctic Seas” held

in Oslo, Norway, in February 1994. The groups

are the Impact Assessment and Remedial Measures Working Group, the Source Term Working

Group, the Existing Environmental Concentrations Working Group, and the Transfer Mechanisms and Models Working Group. The Impact

Assessment and Remedial Measures Working

Group is primarily responsible for overseeing the

work performed by the other three working

groups and for preparing the final report to be

submitted to the London Convention in 1996

(136).

The Source Term Working Group, chaired by

an official of the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, is responsible for working with Russian

institutions and Russian contractors in a variety

of technical research areas. These include reconstructing the history of reactor fuels prior to their

dumping; collecting information on the nature

and properties of containment systems used to

prevent releases from dumped reactors; identifying the types of processing wastes disposed; and

conducting exploratory cruises to take direct

measurements of the waste packages and surrounding seawater and sediments. This group’s

findings, which are scheduled to be published

later in 1995, are expected to support the modeling work by other IASAP working groups

(39,69,136).

Through its working group on Existing Environmental Concentrations, IASAP staff collects

information on current radioactive contamination

levels in the Arctic for compilation in a global

database being developed by its Marine Environ-
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 201

mental Laboratory in Monaco. Attempts to evaluate the reliability of this database, known as

“Inventory of Radionuclides in World Oceans,”

are nearing completion (69,136).

The central element of IASAP’s fourth component, the Transfer Mechanism and Models

Working Group, is the recently established program called “Modeling of the Radiological

Impact of Radioactive Waste Dumping in the

Arctic Seas.” Under this program, IASAP staff is

working with experts from laboratory and modeling groups from IAEA, Russia, Norway, Denmark, and England in the development of

assessment models for the Arctic seas. The

progress made by this program is still preliminary and awaits more conclusive data from the

other IASAP working groups (72,131,136). In

addition to coordinating with Norwegian and

Russian experts and institutions, IASAP staff

plans to provide AMAP with its project results

(72).

Future attempts by IASAP could include the

study of radioactive contamination in the Sea of

Japan. The government of Japan is concerned

about past dumping of radioactive wastes in

areas near the Sea of Japan and about Russia’s

continued unsafe accumulation of nuclear wastes

from the Pacific fleet and decommissioned submarines in the region (29,92,99). Interest in

expanding IASAP to include the study of radioactive contamination of the Sea of Japan was

first reported at the Source Term Working

Group’s meeting held in Vienna in January 1994.

Even with the Japanese government’s efforts to

cooperate with Russia and its intention to fund

the building of liquid radioactive waste treatment

project, little progress has been made to date

toward involving the IAEA in this region. Even

if the relevant governments (i.e., Japan, South

Korea, and possibly Russia) agreed to participate

in the program, it is unknown who would provide

the financial resources to develop the research

strategy needed to effectively accommodate an

institutional infrastructure and marine environment different from the Arctic.

According to the IAEA, the United States is

one of the nations providing financial support for

IASAP activities. The U.S. contribution for the

first year of the program was $135,000, followed

by $100,000 for FY 1995 (131). U.S. assistance

is also provided in the form of support staff (for

example, by the State Department) and facilitating travel to meetings and data gathering for U.S.

experts participating in the IASAP program (by

the Office of Naval Research) (16,40,131). IAEA

is currently seeking funding from other member

states (70,72).

Evaluation of IAEA’s Arctic Seas Project

Although nuclear contamination data are being

progressively disclosed by the Russian Federation, IAEA officials point out that the work to

conclusively assess the extent of nuclear contamination in the Russian Federation continues to

face difficulties. One major difficulty is incomplete data associated with nuclear contamination.

In addition, the data are often scattered throughout a multitude of organizations that, because of

recent political changes, appear to have poorly

delineated or overlapping responsibilities. The

unavailability of data in a language other than

Russian has also hampered the agency’s contamination assessment work. Another concern is the

inability to gain access to data on radioactive

waste practices at Russian military sites. According to IAEA officials, this factor constitutes a

serious obstacle to developing a comprehensive

and accurate assessment of radioactive contamination sources in Russia.

Although IASAP represents the first major

attempt by IAEA to address environmental contamination in the Arctic, many view this undertaking as limited since it focuses only on

radioactive materials dumped in the Kara Sea.

Little or no focus is given to those radioactive

contaminants already disposed into rivers emptying into the Arctic. In addition, little information

exists on how IAEA plans to implement

IASAP’s findings once the project is completed.

❚ The Arctic Council

Despite the progress made through existing international initiatives (e.g., AEPS and Northern
202 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Forum), some view their focus as too specific

and often lacking an overall coordinated

approach and intergovernmental policy forum to

deal with the wide variety of issues facing Arctic

nations, such as trade, transport, communication,

pollution, sustainable development, and the welfare of Native communities. Due to these limitations, Canada and other Arctic nations proposed

in May 1993 to establish an Arctic Council to

serve as the principal institutional umbrella,

under which, existing and new institutional bodies will address, manage, promote, and resolve

these issues. Unlike existing initiatives which

invite Native community representatives as

observers, the Arctic Council would recognize

them as permanent members. The Council would

also serve as the vehicle to mobilize resources

among Arctic countries when needed as, for

example, in emergency situations. With the

exception of the United States, all Arctic nations

have signed by December 1994 the original

intent or declaration to create the Council. At the

February 1995 Ottawa Summit, the U.S.

announced its interest to join Canada and the

other Arctic nations to organize the Council

(8,20,67). Full participation by the United States

is anticipated soon after negotiations are completed.22

INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES AND 

PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO PREVENT 

FUTURE ARCTIC RADIOACTIVE 

CONTAMINATION

A number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives

exist today to collaborate with Russia in the prevention of future radioactive contamination of

the Arctic (figure 5-4). Depending on their

approach, preventive initiatives may focus on

supporting proper storage and processing of

radioactive waste to avoid their dumping into the

Arctic and North Pacific regions, or on improving the operational safety and emergency

22 Although U.S. diplomatic officials voice general agreement with the structure and objectives of the proposed council, discussions are

underway to, for example, incorporate the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and its working groups under the Council’s umbrella

and to rotate the Secretariat functions of the Council rather than establish a permanent Secretariat. The possibility of high-level representation

by the United States at Council functions is also unknown.

response capability of Russia’s most dangerous

operating nuclear reactors. This section discusses

the nature and status of major national and international programs to address both types of prevention approaches.

❚ Initiatives to Improve Radioactive Waste 

Management

The two major U.S.-supported efforts that are

under way to prevent the future disposal of radioactive waste by Russia in the Arctic are the London Convention and the Murmansk Initiative.

Box 5-4 describes three other assistance programs of relative significance.

The London Convention

Without exception, the efforts adopted by the

international community before 1972 to address

concerns about the adverse human and environmental impacts from ocean dumping of contaminated wastes were regional in nature. The

“Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,”

signed in November 1972, became the first global attempt to address this problem. The main

purpose of the protocol, now commonly known

as the London Convention, is that all “contracting Parties shall individually and collectively

promote the effective control of all sources of

pollution of the marine environment, and pledge

themselves especially to take all practicable

steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the

dumping of waste and other matter that is liable

to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of

the sea.” To achieve these objectives, the contracting parties are required by Article II of the

London Convention to “take measures individually, according to their scientific, technical and

economic capabilities, and collectively, to pre-
I

London

Convention

EUIS Waste

Management

System

Trilateral

Defense

Initiative

KEY

Policy guidance and agency coordination only

Less extensive cooperation

KEY: DOE: Department of Energy; DOS: Department of State; EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; EU: European Union: GCC: GoreChernomyrdin Commission.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995
204 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 5-4: Other Relevant Efforts to Improve Russia’s Radioactive Waste Management

Norwegian–U.S.–Russian Proposed Initiative Addressing Civilian and Military Sources of Nuclear 

Contamination

Of the Arctic countries, Norway is the most concerned about the need to address radioactive contamination in Russia, particularly in the Arctic region. Of primary concern to Norway are the suspect operational safety of nuclear facilities and the unsafe management of nuclear materials and wastes reported at

nuclear facilities operating near Norway’s borders. The nearby northern and Arctic regions of Russia are

of primary concern because of the unusual concentration of past and potential radioactive contamination

from civilian and military nuclear sources. These include numerous nuclear-powered ships and submarines; fissile material and nuclear waste storage sites; operating nuclear power plants of questionable,

operational safety; and unknown quantities of radioactive materials discharged into regional lands, rivers,

and seas. In 1992, for example, Norway cooperated with Russia in sponsoring an expedition to measure

the radioactive contamination levels in the immediate vicinity of dump sites in the Kara Sea (136).

With the purpose of establishing the financial and institutional framework needed to solve this problem, the Norwegian government in 1994 approved an action plan to support international collaboration for

addressing four major nuclear issues in Russia. Four major contamination sources identified in the plan

were: 1) the limited operational safety of Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities; 2) the environmentally unsafe

management and storage of radioactive materials and wastes; 3) the radioactive waste dumping in the

Kara and Barents Seas and inland rivers emptying into the Arctic Ocean; and 4) the hazards from weapons-related activities (123). The government of Norway has committed about $20 million for implementation of this plan.

Consistent with its plan of action, the Norwegian government has proposed the creation of an International Steering Committee to cooperate technically and financially with Russia in the sound removal and

cleanup of the Lepse and its radioactive cargo. The Lepse is a Russian vessel currently storing radioactive wastes, including damaged spent fuel from nuclear-powered icebreakers, in generally unsafe conditions (127). Nearly 90 percent of this radioactive cargo consists of civilian icebreaker fuel (39). Norway is

leading the work to gather international support for the proposal.

With the realization that available economic assistance is inadequate to address nuclear safety, Norway’s approach is that through cooperation and information exchange, considerable progress could be

made in institutionalizing nuclear safety as a priority among Russian decisionmakers and regional governments. Norway, like other Western nations, advocates the closing of the least safe Soviet-designed

nuclear reactors still in operation. The Kola Nuclear Power Plant located nearby is one example. Through

multilateral channels, including the action plan for Eastern Europe and the Nuclear Safety Account program administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Norway provides financial assistance for safety improvements at the Kola Peninsula plant. Through these assistance

mechanisms, Norway also encourages field participation by Norwegian technical experts (100).

Despite Norway’s participation in a variety of cooperative efforts with Russia, the numerous Russian

nuclear military facilities located in the Arctic continue to be among the most dangerous sources of

potential radioactive contamination in the region. For this reason, Norway’s Ministry of Defense recently

initiated discussions with its U.S. and Russian counterparts on areas of cooperation that might be

adopted to address this issue. According to information provided at the recent Office of Technical

Assessment workshop on spent fuel management, the main objective of this effort would be to sign a trilateral cooperative agreement under which Norway and the United States would, for example, 1) provide

technical assistance to the Russian Defense Ministry for addressing and monitoring radioactive contamination problems, and 2) support early notification procedures and information exchanges in the event of

accidents at military or civilian nuclear facilities (16,100,123,181).

(continued)
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 205

vent marine pollution caused by dumping and

shall harmonize their policies in this regard.”23

23 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (including amended Annexes) [in] International Maritime Organization, Office for the London Dumping Convention, The London Dumping Convention: The First Decade and Beyond

(London, England: International Maritime Organization, 1991). 

The London Convention requires that each

contracting party report to the Inter-GovernmenIn March 1995, Norwegian and U.S. defense officials held a four-day meeting in Oslo with their Russian counterparts to discuss the feasibility of establishing a framework for cooperation, as well as to identify “potentially unique contributions the respective militaries could make” toward improving the

radioactive contamination problem in the Russian Arctic (17,177). The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense

for Environmental Security, who is also the head of the Steering Group on Radioactive Contamination in

the Arctic, is leading the U.S. effort. On June 30, 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and its Russian

counterpart signed a memorandum of agreement to exchange information on the environment, particularly in the areas of environmental protection and cleanup, waste management, and weapons material

disposal. Although the agreement lacks a specific timetable or plan of action, this broad accord constitutes a potentially meaningful attempt to address environmental contamination issues associated with the

Arctic.

European Union’s Radioactive Waste Management System

In 1994, the European Union (EU) started a cooperative program with Russia to identify approaches

for improving its radioactive waste management system in the Kola Peninsula region.a This project consists of two phases. In phase one, the EU will provide funds for a study of the nature and extent of the

problem and identification of alternative solutions. Once this study is completed, the EU will cooperate with Russia in developing the technology and building the storage facility necessary for ensuring

proper radioactive waste management in the Kola Peninsula region. The estimated level of funding

programmed by the EU for this work is $5.4 million. Little information exists on the funding to be programmed for long-term implementation of the facility once it is built (128).

Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Program

Within the framework of the 1973 Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy agreement and the 1990 Memorandum of Cooperation with the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (MINATOM), the (DOE)

Environmental Management Program is conducting various pilot projects potentially useful to both countries. The Office of Technology Development (OTD) within the Environmental Management Program is the

government branch leading U.S. assistance in the area of radioactive waste management and technology development. Its cooperative projects have included holding technical exchange workshops and initiating pilot-scale projects for demonstrating treatment technologies for high-level radioactive wastes;

establishing electronic and computer links with Russian institutions involved in cooperative projects; and

instituting an Environmental Management Center to facilitate technology transfer between U.S. and Russian institutions working on environmental cleanup. OTD has also sponsored visits by experts from Russian technical institutes to U.S. nuclear weapons complex sites to exchange information on environmental

cleanup experience. To continue the implementation of its Russian assistance projects in FY 1996, the

Office of Technology Development has submitted a budget request for $1 million—a 20 percent increase

from its FY 1995 budget of $800,000 (163,164).

aIn addition to waste management, the EU is working with Norwegian experts to identify solutions for remediating the submarines Komsomolets and Elexis (sunk off the Murmansk coast).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

BOX 5-4: Other Relevant Efforts to Improve Russia’s Radioactive Waste Management (Cont’d.)
206 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

tal Maritime Consultative Organization, now

known as the International Maritime Organization or (IMO), and to other parties where appropriate, about its dumping activities. Since 1975,

the IMO has been responsible for executing all

secretarial responsibilities associated with the

London Convention.24 Consultation with other

members, particularly those that are most likely

to be affected, is required in case of emergencies.25 Member nations must also agree to “keep

records of the nature and quantities of all matter

permitted to be dumped and the location, time

and method of dumping” and to monitor in an

individual manner or in collaboration with other

contracting parties “the condition of the seas.”

Party states are also responsible for enforcing the

provisions of the convention among all vessels

and aircraft “registered in [their] territory or flying [their] flag.”26 These principles, however,

are not applicable to internal waters of states.27

With its signing, the international community

essentially agreed to prohibit the ocean dumping

of a variety of “harmful” substances and wastes

and to establish a licensing process to regulate

disposal of the remaining universe of substances

(75). The former Soviet Union became a signatory in January 1976, and after its dissolution, the

Russian Federation assumed the rights, responsibilities, and obligations under the convention

(21).

The London Convention’s efforts regarding

radioactive waste have grown from attempts to

determine their unsuitability for ocean disposal

nearly two decades ago to the actual prohibition

of such practices in 1994. In 1978, the London

Convention made the International Atomic

Energy Agency 28,29 responsible for defining the

types of radioactive waste unsuitable for ocean

24 Annex I, paragraph 6 and Annex II, paragraph D of the Convention. 25 Article V, Paragraph 2 of the Convention. 26 Article VI of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, 1972. 27 Article III of the Convention 28 The International Atomic Energy Agency is the international entity with the authority to carry out the convention’s recommendations

relating to dumping of radioactive wastes in the oceans. 29 Annex I, paragraph 6 and Annex II, paragraph D of the Convention.

dumping and for making recommendations about

regulating the discharge of other types of radioactive waste (136). The first radiation levels

issued by IAEA were designed explicitly to control the disposal of all high-level waste, spent

nuclear fuel, and wastes from nuclear fuel reprocessing activities.

At its Seventh Consultative Meeting held in

London in 1983, the London Convention also

made the IAEA responsible for providing scientific guidance on issues relating to the voluntary

moratorium on the ocean disposal of low-level

radioactive wastes entered into by the contracting parties (68). As a result of this work, the convention authorized the IMO to carry out the

following: 1) prohibit the dumping of any highly

hazardous or radioactive substances or wastes,

and 2) establish permitting and reporting requirements30 for substances not considered highly

hazardous or radioactive that still require special

care prior to ocean disposal. Adoption of stricter

control measures by contracting parties, for

example, banning the disposal of less hazardous

substances, is also welcome by the London Convention.31

Based on IAEA work that identified areas

suitable for ocean dumping, the London Convention limited ocean dumping to that region outside

the continental shelf located between latitudes

50° N and 50° S, and to depths of at least 12,000

feet (68). With respect to these boundary limitations, the only bodies of water easily accessible

to Russia are located in the North Pacific Ocean.

However, according to recent reports by IAEA

officials, much of the radioactive waste that was

disposed of by the former Soviet Union in the

Kara Sea, is considered high level in nature and,

30 The factors (e.g., characterization of matter to be dumped and of dumping site prior to sea disposal; method of disposal; potential

impacts) that must be considered for permit application are contained in Annex III of the London Convention. 31 Articles VI(3) and VII(5) of the Convention.
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 207

therefore, unsuitable for sea disposal and in violation of the London Convention.

Because of the uncertainty about continued

adherence by the international community to the

convention’s voluntary ban on ocean dumping of

low-level radioactive wastes, the convention signatories proposed the inclusion of this waste type

in the Black List (Annex I). In November 1993,

an agreement to voluntarily ban the discharge of

all radioactive waste and substances into the

marine environment was signed, almost unanimously, at the convention’s Sixteenth Consultative Meeting held in London. The Russian

Federation was the only party to the convention

promising to abide in principle but refraining

from formally signing the ban.

In sum, the London Convention has been

highly successful in increasing the international

community’s awareness of the potential global

environmental impacts of ocean dumping without appropriate assessment and control. Lamentably for many nations, such as those

circumpolar countries neighboring Russia, the

guidelines of the convention are voluntary in

nature and explicitly applicable to high seas and

to the territorial seas of signatory states. As a

consequence, these nations view Russia’s selfimposed voluntary commitment to the London

Convention’s official ocean ban of radioactive

waste as insufficient to ensure that further dumping does not occur. Of the preventive cooperative

efforts under way today, the most relevant is the

Murmansk Initiative—described below—because

of its attempt to improve Russia’s radioactive

waste management and “...prevent [the] dumping

of liquid radioactive wastes...in accordance with

the London Convention” (141).

The Murmansk Initiative

The Murmansk Initiative is a cooperative effort

led by the United States and Norway, with Russian participation, to expand the Russian Federation’s capacity to store and process low-level

radioactive waste (LLW) from the Northern

Fleet in the Arctic. The major objective of this

effort is to prevent the unsafe management and

subsequent dumping of this type of waste into

the Arctic Ocean.

The Murmansk Shipping Company, a recently

privatized Russian firm, operates the Russian

civilian icebreaker fleet and handles LLW. It has

also processed, for a fee, some of the low-level

radioactive waste produced by the Russian Navy

at its Atomflot facility in Murmansk. Most of the

space that the Russian Navy uses for the safe

storage of liquid LLW is full. In addition, Russia

continues to accumulate liquid radioactive waste

in the Arctic region, especially at sites (military

bases and enterprises) where nuclear reactors

from ships, submarines, and icebreakers are

operated and repaired and their nuclear fuel is

replaced.

The Murmansk Initiative is the direct result of

a shared U.S.-Norwegian concern about the need

to cooperate in solving Russia’s radioactive liquid waste storage and processing problem. Following initial discussion of the Murmansk

Initiative concept,32 the Norwegian and U.S.

governments (led by the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency in coordination with the State

Department) succeeded in securing Russian participation in the effort. Several technical

exchanges, ministerial meetings, and expert site

visits were conducted in 1994 and early 1995 to

evaluate existing needs and propose possible

facility upgrades. A concept paper prepared by

the Murmansk Shipping Company claims that, if

implemented, the Murmansk Initiative will help

improve the regional structure for safe management of radioactive waste from existing sources

including Russia’s Northern fleet (50).

On September 28, 1994, nearly four months

after the initiative was first presented to the

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the United

States and Russia issued a presidential announcement or formal statement of support. In the state32 Responding to a national concern about the possibility that the Northern fleet’s inadequate storage capacity might force the Russians to

dispose of their low-level radioactive waste into the Arctic, the Norwegian delegation participating in a 1993 London Convention meeting

solicited the cooperation of the United States to help identify a regional-based solution to this potential problem.
208 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

ment, both the Russian Federation and the U.S.

government claimed to “. . .confirm their readiness to cooperate in consistently preventing

dumping of liquid radioactive wastes, in accordance with the London Convention, and to proceed to a solution of the problem of Arctic

Pollution from all sources. To this end, the Russian Federation and the United States of America agree to undertake immediately, in

cooperation with other interested countries, a

step-by-step expansion and upgrading of a treatment facility for liquid low-level radioactive

waste in Murmansk” (141).

Implementation of this mandate calls for the

rapid upgrading and expansion of the Murmansk

facility to provide timely storage and processing

capacity for the Northern Fleet’s LLW. The ultimate goal of the agreement, however, is to serve

as “the focal point of efforts to create the infrastructure for ecologically safe processing and

storage of liquid low-level radioactive wastes in

the North of Russia”(141). Information on similar types of preventive initiatives that may be

supported by the GCC in the future is scant.

The United States and Norway have signed an

agreement with Russia to provide funding for an

engineering design report to expand and improve

the liquid LLW treatment facility operated by

MSC. The design is expected to be completed in

1995. If the recommended design is approved,

construction of the project is scheduled to start in

1996. EPA experts anticipate that the Norwegian

and U.S. governments will provide funding for

construction. Funds (about $750,000) have been

committed by EPA, the U.S. AID and DOD for

this purpose. Norway has already agreed to provide $750,000 toward the construction of this

expanded and upgraded facility (33,39,180).

❚ Initiatives to Improve Nuclear Reactor 

Safety

U.S. Bilateral Nuclear Assistance Program

U.S. participation in nuclear safety cooperation

with the former Soviet Union (fSU) began in

1986 immediately after the Chernobyl nuclear

accident. This cooperation principally involved

information exchange efforts by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission and the Department of

Energy. Two years after the Chernobyl accident,

the U.S. and fSU governments signed a bilateral

Memorandum of Cooperation formally supporting these undertakings. Figure 5-5 shows some

of the major U.S. efforts underway today to

improve nuclear reactor safety in Russia.

Because of the frequent information

exchanges conducted under the Memorandum of

Cooperation, U.S. government nuclear experts

became aware of safety problems at nuclear reactor facilities operating in the former Soviet

Union. Some of these problems included one or

more of the following: poor or unstable plant

design or construction; inadequate operation and

maintenance; and limited compliance with regulatory and safety standards such as fire protection.

The U.S. government commitment to cooperate with Russia in the field of nuclear reactor

safety was formally announced at the May 1992

Conference on Assistance to the Newly Independent States, held in Lisbon. Known as the Lisbon

Initiative, the U.S. announcement consisted of a

commitment to provide $25 million in nuclear

safety assistance to Russia and other fSU nations.

One year later at the Vancouver summit, the U.S.

president pledged to expand this assistance by

committing an additional $100 million ($80 million in FY 1994 and $10 million in both FY 1995

and in FY 1996) to help Russia with improvements in the operational safety of nuclear power

plants, implementation of risk reduction measures, and strengthening of the nuclear regulatory

framework (18,116,130). As the implementing

body of these U.S. cooperative efforts, the GoreChernomyrdin Commission established a Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety. The subcommittee

is co-chaired by the heads of the Department of

Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) for the United States and by the Ministry

of Atomic Energy and the nuclear regulatory

agency GOSATOMNADZOR for the Russian

side (116,122).
Funded initiatives

Under consideration

KEY: ADEC: Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation; AID: Agency for International Development; ANL: Argonne National Laboratory;

BNL: Brookhaven National Laboratory; DOE: U.S. Department of Energy; DOS: U.S. Department of State; EU: European Union; INSC: International Nuclear Safety Convention; NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission; NSA: Nuclear Safety Account: NSP: Nuclear Safety Program; ONR:

Office of Naval Research; PNL: Pacific Northwest Laboratory.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
210 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

U.S. assistance focuses on improving the

safety of nuclear facilities to reduce the risks of

another Chernobyl. The United States has committed approximately $205 million for equipment, technical assistance, and training through

several bilateral (e.g., Lisbon and Vancouver)

and multilateral (e.g., Tokyo and Munich) initiatives (116). Today, the U.S. nuclear assistance

program to Russia is multiagency in nature, with

AID as the manager; NRC and DOE as executors; and the State Department and the GoreChernomyrdin Commission as principal coordinators. The State of Alaska also participates

actively in regional and international cooperative

nuclear safety and emergency response programs. Box 5-5 describes two of these initiatives

Unlike other agency programs where in-country missions provide the assistance, AID manages the U.S. nuclear safety initiatives from

Washington. This departure from agency tradition is attributed largely to the short-term nature

of the assistance program and to the U.S. government’s coordinating (State Department’s Senior

Coordinator for Nuclear Safety Assistance) and

technical agency (mainly DOE and NRC) missions being located in Washington. The fact that

most of the technical expertise required to implement the safety assistance program is found in

various U.S. private engineering firms and

national laboratories has also contributed to support AID’s decision not to manage the assistance

program in Russia (174). The following section

describes U.S. government programs for implementing the U.S. bilateral nuclear safety initiative.

Department of Energy’s nuclear 

safety program

Cooperative efforts by the Department of Energy

to improve operational safety and emergency

response at older Soviet-designed reactors began

in 1990. DOE activities in nuclear safety are led

by its Office of Nuclear Energy and focus primarily on civilian nuclear power plants (140). DOE

has also proposed working with Russia on the

conversion or replacement of former weapons

production plants (104). According to recent

congressional testimony by the Secretary of

Energy, Hazel O’Leary, DOE’s responsibilities

under the U.S. nuclear safety initiative include

the following:

■ Provide the necessary resources for the development of emergency operating procedures by

Russian and Ukrainian nuclear plant personnel. The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations and about seven U.S. utilities are the

major contributors to this work. Plans to

implement the completed procedures are

already under way.

■ Assist in the establishment of two regional

nuclear safety training centers, one in Russia

and one in Ukraine. Upon its completion in

1995, the Russian training center is expected

to provide operational safety training similar

to that employed by U.S. nuclear facilities.

(The Ukrainian training center will be completed in 1996.)

■ Implement interim risk reduction activities,

such as installation of fire detection and emergency equipment and upgrade of confinement

systems, at Russia’s least safe and oldest

nuclear plants to “reduce the safety hazards

during their remaining lifetime” (104).

Although most conceptual design and feasibility work has been conducted, risk reduction

measures await implementation because of

difficulties in completing contractor’s liability

agreements.

■ Support the development of a fire safety program that strengthens Russia’s capability to

detect and mitigate fires at nuclear power

plants. U.S. safety equipment is being installed

at the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant; once

completed, the fire safety program would then

be implemented at other nuclear facilities. Initially, completion of this work was also

delayed by the contractor’s concern about
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 211

Russia’s inadequate liability protection33

(104).

As a means to implement its responsibilities

under the U.S. nuclear safety cooperation program, DOE established in 1992 a Nuclear Safety

Initiative Office at the Brookhaven National

Laboratory (BNL) in New York. This office was

to be responsible for administering the various

contracts entered into with private firms for the

delivery of safety equipment and services to Russian nuclear plants. Although its initial intent was

to actively participate in the contracting of technical work, uncertainties about adequate liability

protection forced BNL to focus only on projects

associated with an “acceptable level of risk”

(18). Since transferring its Nuclear Safety Initiative Office work to Pacific Northwest Laboratory

on October 1, 1994, BNL functions have been

limited to developing accident analysis procedures, improving communications systems,

developing an adequate regulatory structure, and

training plant personnel in maintenance and

operation (38,140).

Today, the technical work supporting DOE’s

program on international nuclear safety originates at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL),

with both Brookhaven and Argonne National

Laboratories as supporting agencies. As part of

its management responsibilities, PNL supervises

contractors and monitors the quality of the technical work being performed at Russian nuclear

facilities. Among the activities supported by this

program is training Russian nuclear personnel in

the maintenance and operational safety of

nuclear power plants. DOE has also supplied fire

alarms, hoses, and fire extinguishers to improve

the limited fire safety capability at many Russian

nuclear power plants. Plans are under way to provide additional safety and training equipment

(38,53,174).

Currently, PNL continues to support the contracts entered into by BNL entered with Russian

institutions and nuclear power plants in an

33 To overcome this obstacle, the Department of Energy signed a bilateral agreement with the Russians in 1993 to provide liability insurance protection to U.S. contractors in Russia (81).

attempt to reduce unnecessary implementation

cost while maintaining a high level of program

effectiveness. Because of its efforts to maintain

program stability, PNL will continue to: 1) support the Moscow project office established by

BNL and staffed by Russians; 2) contract work

directly with nuclear power plant personnel to

carry out the operational safety measures necessary to reduce risks; and 3) seek engineering support for training and operations from the Russian

Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations (53,81,174).

Since the establishment of the Nuclear Safety

Initiative program, DOE has received funds

through the Agency for International Development. Of the nearly $205 million earmarked by

the U.S. for availability through AID, DOE has

obtained $21.9 million (FY 1992), $14 million

(FY 1993), $55 million (FY 1994) and $8.5 million for FY 1995. Although in the past DOE

received funding through the AID budget, for FY

1996 DOE opted to submit its own request to

Congress for nuclear safety assistance projects

(116,122).

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s nuclear 

safety program

The NRC’s participation in nuclear safety cooperation projects in the former Soviet Union dates

back to 1986 when the “United States tried to

ferret out the causes and consequences of the

Chernobyl nuclear accident of April 26” of that

year (116,130). Two years after the Chernobyl

accident and several interchanges with the

former Soviet Union, a Memorandum of Cooperation was signed to promote the exchange of

information between U.S. and Soviet experts on

their nuclear programs—an area previously

regarded as secret. Upon signing of the agreement in Washington, D.C., the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor

Safety (JCCCNRS) was immediately established as the official instrument responsible for

implementing the agreement (130).
212 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

BOX 5-5: Alaskan Initiatives to Prevent Future Arctic Radioactive Contamination

In addition to its involvement in research and monitoring programs to address the Arctic’s radioactive

contamination problem, the State of Alaska also participates actively in regional and international cooperative programs designed to improve nuclear safety and emergency response in the region. Two of these

efforts, the International Radiological Exercise and the Cooperative Information Exchange with Russia’s

Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant, are discussed here.

International Radiological Exercise (RADEX)

In late June 1994, the eight nations of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the regional

governments of the Northern Forum, with support from the State of Alaska, convened a four-day International Radiological Exercise (RADEX) to discuss possible cooperative approaches that might be adopted

to improve notification and response methods among Arctic nations in the event of a nuclear accident in

the Arctic. The exercise, one of the results of an information exchange visit to the Bilibino Nuclear Power

Plant the previous year, was attended by representatives from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and various Native groups.

In addition to supporting information exchanges on each country’s national nuclear emergency programs, the Northern Forum conference also provided participating countries with an opportunity to test

their emergency response procedures. This was accomplished by conducting a “tabletop” radiation drill

involving a nuclear accident in the fictitious country of “Arcticland.” After the radiation drill, participants

discussed the types of improvements that were needed in reference to each of the three phases associated with a serious nuclear accident (threat, release, postrelease). Early results appear to indicate the

need to conduct similar drills in the future; to develop Arctic-wide emergency response strategies; to

improve information exchange; and to improve current methods for anticipating the movement of radioactive plumes through the Arctic air mass (5,149,150,183). The final results of the drill are expected to provide technical data relevant to the Russian Rapid Assessment Project sponsored by the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency and the State Department.

Of greater significance for future international cooperation was the suggestion by participants to

establish a “Regional Arctic Response Plan” as a means of improving the current notification system

adopted by Arctic nations for responding to nuclear accidents. This plan would be designed to serve as

a framework within which all emergency planning and emergency responses carried out by Arctic nations

could be more effectively coordinated, consistent with existing applicable international agreements (5).

The Alaskan government is currently supporting the drafting of an Arctic emergency response plan (149).

Cooperative Information Exchange with Russia’s Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant

In early August 1993, the Northern Forum, at the request of two of its members—the governors of

Alaska and of the Chukotka Peninsula—sponsored a visit by U.S. nuclear experts to the Bilibino Nuclear

Power Plant in Chukotka. Visiting experts from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency discussed with plant personnel possible areas in which safety improvements may be needed. The Office of Naval Research provided funding for the project.

Although no technical assessment was actually conducted, the visit to the Bilibino Nuclear Power

Plant appears to have had various positive results. Among others, it helped to 1) improve communications and cooperation between the Chukotka and the Alaskan governments; 2) set the foundation for

developing joint cooperative work to identify funds, equipment, and programs to improve safety at the

Bilibino plant; and 3) heighten the interest of other northern governments in participating in similar cooperative efforts (5,149). In June 1994, three representatives from the Bilibino plant and one from the

Chukotka regional government participated in the International Radiological Exercise, described above.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 213

NRC engaged in a number of different cooperative activities under the JCCCNRS. These

included 1) technical meetings with Soviet

experts for the purpose of exchanging information on the technical, legal, and organizational

approaches to nuclear safety employed by both

countries; and 2) extended exchange of regulatory personnel and safety research experts to

broaden their understanding of their counterparts’ regulatory structure and improve available

options for solving safety problems. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union forced NRC to

modify its then-bilateral nuclear safety cooperation program under the JCCCNRS into two joint

committees with Russia and Ukraine, and to

share the U.S committee chairmanship with

DOE.

NRC implements U.S. nuclear safety initiatives by providing the Russians—and Ukrainians—with analytical equipment or training in

key regulatory areas of nuclear plant safety.

Attempts by NRC experts primarily involve

training Russian nuclear power plant personnel

in licensing and plant inspection, emergency

response, and safety research. With the exception

of a few technical seminars held in Russia, most

NRC training activities are conducted in the

United States at the agency’s facilities or at

national laboratories.

The Agency for International Development

funds NRC activities under the Nuclear Safety

Initiative program. To implement NRC’s nuclear

regulatory and safety programs in Russia, the

U.S. Government, through AID, has earmarked

since 1992 the following: $3.1 million in FY

1992; $5 million in FY 1993; $6 million in FY

1994; $1.5 million in FY 1995; and about $10

million, for both DOE and NRC, for FY 1996

(116,122). Though delays in disbursing obligated

funds in the past have been reported (151), NRC

has recently been highly successful in carrying

out its responsibilities under the U.S. Nuclear

Safety Initiative program.

International Initiatives to Improve Nuclear 

Reactor Safety

The first official recognition by the international

community that the inadequate safety of Sovietdesigned nuclear facilities could result in serious

environmental and health problems took place at

the July 1992 Munich summit of the Group of

Seven (G-7) nations. It led to the creation of a

multinational nuclear safety program known as

the Nuclear Safety Account for the purpose of

financing operational and technical safety

improvements in Russia. In addition to the

Nuclear Safety Account, this section discusses

other initiatives being implemented or proposed

by the international community (e.g., the European Union and the International Atomic Energy

Agency) to prevent future Chernobyl-type

nuclear accidents in Russia.

The Nuclear Safety Account (G-7 Munich 

Initiative)

At their July 1992 Munich summit, the heads of

states of the Group of Seven nations identified

the inadequate safety of Soviet-designed nuclear

power plants operating in Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union as a major area for assistance by the international community. To help

solve this problem, the G-7 leaders attending the

summit approved the creation, in coordination

with the Group of Twenty-Four (G-24)

nations,34 of a multinational nuclear safety program. As prepared by G-7’s Nuclear Safety

Working Group, the assistance program known

as the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) was

designed to provide funds for the immediate

upgrade of high-risk nuclear reactors,35 in combination with the preparation of plans for their

closure (32,130).

34 The Group of Twenty-Four consists of the 24 member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, including the United States and Japan. 35 These include 15 RBMKs in the former Soviet Union and the 25 VVER 440/230s known to be in operation throughout the former

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (130).
214 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

The objective of the Nuclear Safety Account

is to finance, through grants projects, immediate

operational safety and technical improvements as

opposed to the technical assistance and assessments already financed by other international

organizations already financed. The European

Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(EBRD) functions as the NSA Secretariat, providing technical and supporting services and

cooperating with the European Community on

NSA’s behalf (42,43,44,45).

NSA’s assistance is intended to secure an

agreement from the recipient nation that unsafe

nuclear power plants will eventually be closed.

Consequently, the account focuses on implementation of immediate measures to improve the

safety and operations of nuclear power plants

that are considered essential to the energy needs

of Eastern Europe and Russia. For example,

immediate assistance may include technical

safety upgrades and regulatory improvements.

The Nuclear Safety Account may also provide

long-term assistance for cases involving the

replacement of older nuclear facilities for new

alternative energy sources or the upgrade of

more recent ones. Assistance for upgrades of

more modern plants may be provided without

any shutdown prerequisite, as long as such

upgrading conforms to safety standards enforced

by Western nuclear facilities (116,130).

Of the $785 million programmed in assistance

at the Munich meeting, nearly $268 million was

destined to assist Russia. According to NSA officials, plans are under way to grant Russia $91

million for the implementation of two nuclear

safety projects. A total of three facilities will

benefit from this program: the Leningrad, Novovoronezh, and Kola36 Nuclear Power Plants.37,38

As an essential element for grant approval, the

EBRD is currently discussing with Russian officials the terms of an agreement that would

36 The vicinity of this facility to the Arctic and its radioactive contamination potential makes upgrading the operational safety of this plant

crucial to those concerned with protecting the Arctic environment. 37 The Leningrad facility employs aging nuclear reactors similar in design to those associated with the 1986 Chernobyl accident; the

Novovoronezh and the Kola plants use reactors similar in design to Western pressurized-water reactors. 38 Because of the relative proximity of the Leningrad and Kola Nuclear Power Plants to its territory, the Government of Finland has provided financial assistance (nearly $6 million since 1992) to supported safety upgrades at these plants (102).

include limitations on the future use of unsafe

nuclear reactor facilities (80). Based on recently

reported estimates (174), the cost of replacing

Russia’s older reactors with modern alternative

energy sources may approach $20 billion and

would take at least a decade to complete.

One of NSA’s concerns about its participation

in Russia is that this might rapidly consume the

agency’s funds to carry out work in other fSU

nations still operating unsafe nuclear facilities.

Because requesting additional funds from donor

nations could be difficult and time-consuming,

NSA officials might opt to assist countries such

as Ukraine instead of Russia. The lower implementation costs of nuclear safety projects in

other nations of the former Soviet Union, such as

preparing safety plans for shutting down Chernobyl, might appear more favorable to NSA than

supporting the considerably more expensive

upgrading of Russia’s nuclear reactors (45,55).

European Union’s nuclear assistance 

program

For the past two years, the European Union’s

assistance to Russia in the nuclear field has

focused primarily on improving the operational

safety of older Soviet-designed reactors in use at

the nuclear power plant in the Kola Peninsula.

The European Union (EU) established a Program

Implementation Unit as the body responsible for

overseeing the project and for providing onsite

technical assistance and training. At a funding

level of $12 million per year, EU assistance has

been focused primarily on the purchase of specialized equipment from France and Germany to

replace equipment that is obsolete and unsafe.

According to a EU official in Brussels, this

nuclear safety assistance program might be

short-lived, extending for only about two more

years (26,128).
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 215

International Nuclear Safety Convention

As a result of increasing concern by the international community in preventing a Chernobyltype nuclear accident, in 1991 the International

Atomic Energy Agency proposed to establish an

international Nuclear Safety Convention (NSC).

A technical working group had been established

two years earlier to draft the elements of the convention. Following an invitation by the NSC Secretariat, representatives from 54 nations met

informally in Vienna in March 1995 to discuss

the range of possible options or approaches on

how to implement this international reactor

safety effort.

The Nuclear Safety Convention requires that

within the first six months it enters into force,

contracting parties must hold a “preparatory

meeting” for the purpose of adopting the convention’s procedural and financial guidelines. Parties attending the March meeting discussed the

agenda for the preparatory meeting, including

draft guidelines, reporting mechanisms, and the

possible types of nuclear facilities that will be

subject to the convention. A second meeting

might be necessary to give member countries the

opportunity to be better prepared for the ratification and implementation phases of the convention.

Although about 30 nations have already

approved the text of the convention, IAEA officials do not expect to have the number of ratifications needed to implement it until late 1995 or

early 1996. Once ratified, the international

Nuclear Safety Convention will be responsible

for coordination with countries having unsafe

nuclear facilities in an attempt to bring them into

compliance with existing internationally acceptable safety standards and practices. One of the

current concerns among IAEA officials is the

limited information on the level of country assistance that would be required to successfully

implement the convention (31,49,74,148).

CURRENT RUSSIAN INSTITUTIONAL 

STRUCTURE

❚ Environmental Protection Law in Russia

The former Soviet Union maintained a multitude

of laws and codes that, in principle, provided for

environmental protection and for the conservation and rational use of the country’s natural

resources. These legislative efforts included statutes designed to regulate air quality (1960), land

use (1970), mineral resource development

(1976), water quality (1972), and protection of

forest resources (1977). Despite these laws, the

lack of enforcement—due largely to Soviet economic policies and programs—resulted in inadequate environmental protection.

Considerable legal changes began to occur in

the fSU by the late 1980s as a result of perestroika. The 1988 Law on State Enterprises, for

example, allowed enterprises to become profitmaking entities for the first time in the country’s

history. In principle, this law also made enterprises accountable for the adverse environmental

implications of their economic development

projects. These changes, although radical for the

time, proved insufficient, having only a temporary impact on the environmental management

system of the fSU.

The first step in creating a national framework

for environmental protection was taken with

enactment of the State Law on Environmental

Protection in 1991 (124). This broad mandate not

only contains the basic principles and institutional authorities for environmental protection at

the federal and local levels, but introduces

unprecedented concepts of environmental protection (e.g., payment for use of natural

resources, pollution fees, environmental quality

standards, and environmental assessment of

major federal projects). The principal Russian

Federation agency responsible for administering

this law is the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources discussed below.
216 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Although the State Law on Environmental

Protection represents an important first step, it

does not specify the programs and goals required

to ensure the development of a more effective

environmental regulatory framework in Russia

(110). Effective implementation of this law is

further precluded by Russia’s current inadequacies with regard to its institutional infrastructure

for environmental protection, monitoring, and

enforcement. These inadequacies, in the view of

experts, are rooted primarily in the country’s

“severe economic and social upheaval” (86), as

well as in the bureaucratic legacy inherited from

the Soviet era, which did not favor environmental protection (109). Therefore, Russian efforts to

enact additional legislation might result in little

actual environmental protection unless Russia

first overcomes its current socioeconomic problems, makes all government agencies accountable to environmental laws, and strengthens its

environmental regulatory agencies.

Another current trend in Russian environmental management practices is decentralization of

responsibility from Moscow to the regions. This

strategy attempts to make regional governments

responsible for, and aggressive in, implementing

environmental protection programs. And even

though many regions lack the regulatory and policy capacity to implement effective environmental reform, the slow pace with which democratic

reform has progressed in many regions of Russia

has adversely impacted regional efforts to

improve environmental protection. Furthermore,

key institutional concepts, such as property rights

and a stable judicial system, have yet to be

clearly defined or established and serve as additional limiting factors in the successful implementation of Russian environmental policies.

Ministry of Environmental Protection and 

Natural Resources

The Ministry of Environmental Protection and

Natural Resource (MEPNR) is the primary federal agency responsible for promulgating and

enforcing environmental regulations and for

reviewing the environmental impacts of major

development projects. MEPNR also coordinates

national and regional activities relating to environmental protection and natural resource management. The agency’s enforcement and

environmental impact review functions are carried out through its regional offices.39 These

regional offices are also responsible for conducting environmental reviews of projects and for

approving or denying operating permits to activities that might harm the environment (111).

In the area of nuclear safety regulations,

MEPNR has little or no enforcement authority.

Article 50 of the 1991 State Law on Environmental Protection states that all private and government agencies or activities with nuclear

programs are obligated to comply with radiation

safety regulations and exposure standards governing the production, management, and disposal

of radioactive substances and materials. Article

50 also bans the import of radioactive materials

into Russia. However, MEPNR has received little government support in enforcing this law. For

example, although the law bans the import of

radioactive waste, Russia continues to import

spent fuel from Eastern Europe and Finland for

reprocessing at its Mayak facility. And in January 1995, President Yeltsin signed a decree to

continue construction of the RT-2 plant in

Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) in the hopes of

further developing Russia’s capability for reprocessing foreign spent fuel (47). Some believe that

these steps taken by the highest levels of the Russian government are in contradiction to the state

environmental protection law and to the mission

of MEPNR. Others in the Russian government

claim it is not a contradiction because spent fuel

is not a waste.

Overall, MEPNR’s regulatory effectiveness is

questioned both by the general public and by circles within the Russian government (23). Several

factors contribute to MEPNR’s apparent lack of

effectiveness including: 1) its relatively short

39 There are approximately 90 regional offices and several dozen special offices with limited responsibilities (111).
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 217

history; 2) the limited financial support provided

by the Russian government; 3) the limited reliability of data available to the agency for making

environmental protection decisions; and 4) the

poorly defined management and organizational

responsibilities among agencies.

MEPNR is a relatively new ministry, with its

original predecessor Goskompriroda established

only in 1988 during perestroika. Prior to this, the

former Soviet Union lacked a centralized body

capable of enforcing environmental protection

laws and regulations. MEPNR’s lack of extensive institutional experience has limited its ability to influence other more established ministries.

Since ministerial and bureaucratic interests

remain powerful forces in Russian politics,

MEPNR is at a distinct disadvantage in terms of

influencing the political process. Furthermore,

several internal reorganizations that have

occurred in MEPNR’s short history have also

disrupted its overall continuity and effectiveness.

The inadequate financial support provided by

the Russian government is considered another

major reason for MEPNR’s limited success.

Despite the number of ecological protection programs established in Russia since the dissolution

of the former Soviet Union, little funding has

been provided for actual implementation. The

possibility of improving MEPNR’s budget

appears unlikely at present in light of Russia’s

difficult economic conditions. The agency’s budgetary hardship is also of concern because qualified personnel may seek employment in other

areas, thereby depleting the pool of competent

workers.

The unreliability of environmental data on

which to formulate and oversee environmental

programs also affects the limited success of

MEPNR. Prior to its dissolution, the Soviet

Union supported environmental research activities at more than 1,000 institutions under the auspices of 70 different ministries and agencies

(108). In addition to making information gathering and dissemination more difficult, the reluctance of most agencies to adopt uniform

nationwide approaches has resulted in the production of an extensive collection of environmental data that is generally inconsistent and,

more importantly, of suspect quality and reliability. Furthermore, MEPNR has not gained access

to all pertinent information since some valuable

environmental data are still controlled by ministries related to the military and nuclear spheres.

The last major contributing factor in

MEPNR’s limited success to date relates to its

poorly defined management and organizational

responsibilities. There is a great deal of overlap

and redundancy in the mission and responsibility

of the different Russian organizations involved

in environmental protection. MEPNR is responsible for coordinating environmental protection

programs among a variety of government agencies, but thus far, interagency coordination has

been inadequate. Historically, Soviet institutions

were primarily linked vertically to Moscow, and

there were few horizontal links between individual institutions, which would have enabled them

to better coordinate efforts. This Soviet legacy

has yet to be effectively overcome as the institutional arrangements between the various ministries and organizations are being developed and

refined. Therefore, intraministerial and organizational conflicts exist today not only concerning

jurisdiction but also for an extremely limited

pool of federal funding. Furthermore, the devolution of authority from the center to the regions

has not necessarily streamlined MEPNR’s activities due in part to the fluid and often idiosyncratic dynamics involved in center-periphery

politics.

Ministry of Atomic Power

The Ministry for Atomic Power (MINATOM) is

a key player in Russia’s nuclear activities relating to operation of nuclear reactors and sources

of Arctic radioactive contamination. The mission

of MINATOM involves a variety of functions.

The most relevant are to: 1) oversee the functioning of enterprises and organizations within the

nuclear complex; 2) conduct national scientifictechnical investigations; 3) coordinate programs

in the areas of nuclear arms and radioactive

waste management; and 4) ensure nuclear and

radiation safety at its nuclear facilities (23).
218 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

MINATOM is a large government agency with

functions somewhat analogous to both the commercial nuclear industry and the Department of

Energy of the United States (e.g., nuclear energy

research and production, high energy physics,

lasers, and other civilian programs).

MINATOM was established in its present

form by presidential decree in January 1992. It

succeeded the former Ministry of Atomic Power

and Industry (MAPI), which was responsible for

all aspects of the nuclear industry, from uranium

mining and processing to research, development

and the design and manufacture of nuclear

bombs, warheads, and other devices (28). MAPI,

in turn, had been formed in mid-1989 by merging

the Ministry for Medium Machine Building,40

previously responsible for nuclear weapons, with

the Ministry for Nuclear Power, which regulated

the country’s civilian nuclear power plants. As a

result, MINATOM now has management and

oversight responsibilities for activities at civilian

nuclear power plants as well as the Russian military nuclear complex.

In addition to its military41 and civilian42

operational departments, MINATOM also contains a number of highly specialized research

institutes and production associations. The Khlopin Radium Institute in St. Petersburg and the

Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) in Moscow are among the best known.

There are also nearly 20 “quasi-private companies” affiliated with MINATOM. Examples of

these include Rosenergoatom, which is responsible for the design, reconstruction, and operation

of nuclear power stations, and Atomstroy, the

Russian group responsible for building nuclear

power stations (125).

40 The Ministry for Medium Machine Building (MMB) was the highly secretive ministry that controlled the nuclear-military complex in

the Soviet Union. MMB operated a network of secret cities across the country that was, until recently, unknown to foreigners as well as citizens of the Soviet Union. MMB was thought to be a primary claimant of economic resources and exercised a good deal of autonomy within

the rigid political structure of the Soviet Union. 41 The military branch contains primarily the Departments of Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons Production; Security; International Relations; and Design and Testing of Nuclear Weapons. 42 The civilian branch is composed, among others, of the Departments of Radioactive Waste; Nuclear Power Plants; Operation/Maintenance/Safety; and Construction and Development.

Overall, MINATOM is an extremely large and

powerful ministry. MINATOM garners support

not only in Moscow but in many of the regions

where it maintains operations. Entire towns and

cities such as Chelyabinsk-65 and Arzamas-16

are basically dedicated to serving the nuclearmilitary complex and the interests of MINATOM. Furthermore, in July 1995, Viktor

Mikhailov, Minister of MINATOM, was

appointed to the Russian Federation Security

Council, thereby increasing his role in national

politics. It is still unclear how this translates in

terms of MINATOM’s future, but the past several years have shown that Russian politics is

increasingly shaped by the individual tendencies

of its leaders, which suggests that Mikhailov’s

appointment may have strengthened MINATOM’s position relative to other ministries and

organizations.

State Committee for Oversight of Nuclear and 

Radiation Safety

The Russian State Committee for Oversight of

Nuclear and Radiation Safety (GOSATOMNADZOR or GAN) was organized in its present

form at the end of 1991 by presidential decree.43

GAN reports directly to the President and operates independently of the Russian Council of

Ministers. GAN’s responsibilities include: 1)

establishing criteria and promulgating regulations for nuclear radiation safety; 2) overseeing

and licensing all nuclear activities performed by

government, nongovernment, and private institutions in Russia; 3) organizing and overseeing the

training of workers at nuclear facilities; and 4)

reporting to the government and general public

about safety practices at nuclear facilities (106).

43 President Yeltsin issued decree No. 249 of the RSFSR “On the reorganization of the state committee on oversight of nuclear and radiation in safety of the RSFSR” on December 3, 1991. GAN’s institutional predecessor, Gospromatomnadzor, was by and large an ineffective

regulatory agency whose authority extended only to civilian industries, not to the military or to enterprises of the military-industrial complex.
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 219

GAN’s responsibilities vary between the

national and regional levels. GAN headquarters

is responsible for the organization and implementation of national policy on nuclear and radiation safety (19). Its regional offices are

entrusted with the actual monitoring and oversight of nuclear installations and facilities. The

regional offices are intended to ensure that the

planning, construction, operation, and decommissioning of installations and facilities do not

violate established norms and to oversee safety

requirements for the treatment, storage, and disposition of radioactive wastes and radioactive

materials, as well as the management of licensing

activities as established by its headquarters.

Although GAN has the legal authority to regulate and inspect all types of nuclear activities, it

has not gained full and complete access to certain

military-nuclear sites (31,138,148). The agency’s

authority originates principally from a number of

presidential decrees and executive orders. A

decree introduced into law on January 18, 1993,

for example, gives GAN the authority to license

and inspect military nuclear operations (113). A

presidential directive enacted in December 1993

calls for GAN to oversee safety practices at

MINATOM’s nuclear fuel cycle enterprises

(114). After the accident at Tomsk-7 in April

1993, the Russian President issued presidential

directive 224 granting GAN the authority to

inspect all nuclear installations regardless of

affiliation. Despite these directives, GAN’s

access to nuclear facilities managed by MINATOM and the Ministry of Defense is reported to

be limited (138).

Overall, GAN’s activities to date have focused

primarily on establishing a set of rules and regulations for ensuring operational safety at nuclear

facilities. The actual implementation of inspection and monitoring by its regional offices has

been unsuccessful in some cases because the

Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of

Defense continue to limit GAN’s access to certain nuclear facilities.

Other Ministries and Organizations

Several other institutional structures in Russia

are involved in the regulation of nuclear power.

The Department of Radiation Safety of the Russian Navy is chiefly responsible for regulating

the use of nuclear reactors within the Russian

Navy. During the Soviet period, the Navy was

essentially self-regulatory in its nuclear activities, with its Department of Radiation Safety carrying out regulatory functions. Presently, it

appears that the Russian Navy prefers to maintain its self-regulatory nature as evidenced by its

continual refusal to allow GAN access to some

of its nuclear facilities.

Two other Russian institutions that play a role

in the development of rules and regulations for

nuclear-related matters are the Ministry of

Health and the State Committee for Hydro-Meteorology (Rosgidromet). These two organizations

do not regulate nuclear activities directly, but

they do maintain some independent responsibilities in terms of the drafting of regulations that

relate to the nuclear industry.

❚ Proposed Radioactive Waste 

Management Legislation

Russia today lacks a comprehensive set of laws

needed to effectively regulate the use of nuclear

materials and manage radioactive waste. Currently, three pieces of legislation (On the State

Policy of Radioactive Waste Management, On

the Use of Nuclear Energy, and On the Population’s Radiation Safety) are being drafted in the

Russian State Duma (Parliament) that would, in

principle, help regulate the use of nuclear energy

and waste.

If enacted, these legislative proposals would

provide a legal framework under which all Russian nuclear energy users, including MINATOM,

the Ministry of Defense, and numerous nuclear

research institutes, would be accountable. Passage of these laws, however, faces considerable

opposition. The draft law On the State Policy of

Radioactive Waste Management, for example, is

a potentially important piece of legislation

because it attempts to build the environmental
220 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

legislative framework first laid out by the 1991

Law on Environmental Protection. According to

its stated objectives, the proposed legislation

seeks to: 1) define the concept of radioactive

waste; 2) establish national and international policy and agency responsibilities regarding radioactive waste management and treatment; and 3)

develop liability guidelines to compensate for

risk and damage to health and property from

radioactive contamination. In addition to establishing that radioactive waste is “exclusively federal property,” proponents of the legislation call

for creation of an independent federal agency to

manage all radioactive wastes. However, this

piece of legislation has failed repeatedly in hearings before the State Duma and most recently in

the Federation Council in June 1995.44 Legislators have cited as weaknesses of the bill its

incompleteness in the technological policies for

handling radioactive waste and the lack of specified funding sources to finance envisioned programs (46).

In its present form, the draft law prohibits the

disposal of any radioactive material or waste,

including contaminated equipment, in soils, rivers, and oceans. In the past, MINATOM used

Lake Karachai and the Techa River as dumping

sites for radioactive waste. If passed, the proposed legislation would also place regulatory

controls on, and possibly eliminate, MINATOM’s spent fuel reprocessing activities.

Another objective considered adverse to MINATOM’s plans is the proposed creation of a independent Russian agency for management of

radioactive waste. If created, this new agency

could end MINATOM’s decades-long self-regulation in this area. Currently, in the absence of

comprehensive nuclear legislation, MINATOM

exercises coordinating and executive authority

for radioactive waste handling.45 However, even

if the law is passed, there are no guarantees that

44 A Russian draft law must pass both hearings in the State Duma and a hearing in the Federation Council before it is signed into law by

the President. 45 A situation that appears to be legitimized further by the Council of Ministers’ decree “On the Primary Measures in the Field of Handling Radioactive Wastes and Spent Nuclear Materials” of August 1993.

its implementation and enforcement would be

successful.

❚ Summary of Russia’s Institutional 

Efforts and Programs

The overall institutional framework guiding the

use of nuclear power and nuclear and radiation

safety is complex and involves elements from the

Soviet past as well as emerging trends in Russia

today. Since the disintegration of the Soviet

Union, Russia finds itself in the midst of a difficult transition having neither fully shed itself of

its Soviet legacy nor fully transformed itself into

a market-based economy.

In the past, the use of nuclear power, especially in the military sector, was shrouded in

secrecy. Secret cities, which designed and manufactured nuclear weapons, were dotted across the

Soviet Union unknown to the outside world.

These facilities (enterprises and installations

affiliated with the Ministry of Medium Machine

Building, which was responsible for the design

and production of nuclear weapons) received priority funding within the Soviet command economy. Production targets served as the primary

goal, and environmental concerns were given little to no attention throughout most of the Soviet

period. Not until perestroika in the late 1980s,

and public opinion’s increased role in national

politics, did environmental issues finally make

their way onto the Russian government’s agenda.

Since then, both the public and the government

have increasingly recognized the need to support

environmental protection efforts.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

the Russian government has made official its

intent to improve environmental protection and

nuclear safety on a number of occasions. In

1991, Russia adopted the Law of the Environment establishing, for the first time, a comprehensive framework for environmental

management (124). In 1993, Article 42 of the
Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 221

newly adopted Russian Constitution stipulated

that every citizen in Russia has the right to a

favorable environment, reliable information

about its state, and compensation in case of body

and property losses inflicted by environmental

polluting activities (27). And in 1991, GAN was

created by President Yeltsin to oversee the control of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. GAN is an independent executive

agency empowered with the authority to inspect

every nuclear facility in Russia, including military sites.

However, the management of radioactive

waste and spent nuclear materials is a complex

problem requiring many ministries and agencies.46 Despite the Russian government’s

approval of decrees to ensure interagency coordination, MINATOM and the Russian military

continue to make key decisions concerning

radioactive waste management without coordinating with regulatory agencies such as GAN. As

a result, the implementation of approaches to

solving radioactive waste contamination problems in the Arctic region continues to be determined by the military and MINATOM with little

regulatory oversight. Although considerable

progress has been made in the environmental

regulatory sector, many aspects of the old system

have yet to be fully dismantled and replaced by

more effective approaches.

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226 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

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99. Nichols, B., Scientific Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, personal

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100.Norendhal, T., Norway Royal Ministry of

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Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 227

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228 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

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Chapter 5 Institutional Framework and Policies | 229

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230 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

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176.“Vancouver Meeting,” Vital Speeches, April

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178.Ward, P., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,

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179.Washburn, Edward, U.S. Department of

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180.Waxmonski, G., Office of International

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181.Wilhelmsen, G., Science Counselor, Royal

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182.Wilson, R., Harvard University, “Nuclear

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183.Wohl, P.P., State of Alaska, Department of

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184.Wohl, P.P., State of Alaska, Department of

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185.Wohl, P.P., State of Alaska, Department of

Environmental Conservation, Anchorage,

Alaska, personal communication, Jan. 6,

1995.
| 231

A

Appendix A:

Reviewers

Thomas Armbruster

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC

Eugene Bae

U.S. Department of Defense

Washington, DC

Robert Bari

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Upton, NY

Thomas Beasley

U.S. Department of Energy

New York, NY

Don Bradley

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Richland, WA

Garrett Brass

U.S. Arctic Research Commission

Arlington, VA

Thomas Burke

The Johns Hopkins University School of 

Hygiene and Public Health

Baltimore, MD

Al Ciafre

ISAR

Washington, DC

John Diamante

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC

Mark Dinneen

Alaska Governor’s Office

Washington, DC

Sidney Draggan

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC

Robert Dyer

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC

Robert Edson

Office of Naval Research

Arlington, VA

Clyde Frank

U.S. Department of Energy

Washington, DC
232 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

Bill Freeman

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC

Jawed Hameedi

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

Silver Spring, MD

Carl Hild

Rural Alaska Community Action Program

Anchorage, AK

Burton Hurdle

Naval Research Laboratory

Washington, DC

Hugh Livingston

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Woods Hole, MA

Bruce Molnia

U.S. Geological Survey

Reston, VA

Mark Mount

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Germantown, MD

Charles Myers

National Science Foundation

Arlington, VA

Edward Myers

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

Silver Spring, MD

Charles Newstead

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC

Terri Paluszkiewicz

Battelle Marine Sciences Laboratory

Sequim, WA

D.J. Peterson

Rand Corporation 

Santa Monica, CA

Jack Ramsey

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC

James Ruttenber

University of Colorado School of Medicine

Denver, CO

Peter Schlosser

Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory

Columbia University

John Smith

Bedford Institute

Dartsmouth, Nova Scotia

Stephen Trautman

Department of the Navy

Washington, DC

Mead Treadwell

Formerly Alaskan Department of Environmental 

Conservation

Anchorage, AK

Edward Washburn

U.S. Department of Energy

Washington, DC

Gary Waxmonsky

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC

F. Ward Whicker

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, CO
| 233

B

Appendix B:

Acronyms

and Glossary

ACRONYMS

ACOPS: Advisory Committee for Protection of

the Sea (International)

AEPS: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

AID: U.S. Agency for International Development

ALARA: As low as reasonably achievable

AMAP: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (International)

ANWAP: U.S. Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program

ARCORA: U.S. Arctic Contamination Research

and Assessment Program

ARPA: U.S. Arctic Research Policy Act

BEIR: U.S. National Research Council’s Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing

Radiations

BNL: U.S. Brookhaven National Laboratory

CAFF: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna

CEPNR: Committee of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (International)

CF: Concentration factors

CIFAR: Cooperative Institute for Arctic

Research (International)

CRESP: Coordinated Research and Surveillance

Program (International)

DNA: Deoxyribonucleic acid

DOD: U.S. Department of Defense

DOE: U.S. Department of Energy

EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development

EMAP: Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program (International)

EOI: Emergency operating instructions

EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

EPP&R: Emergency Prevention, Preparedness

and Response

EU: European Union

FBR: Fast breeder reactor

fSU: former Soviet Union

G-24: Group of Twenty-four nations

G-7: Group of Seven nations

GAN (Gosatomnadzor) State Committee for

Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Russian)

GCC: Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (U.S.-

Russian)

GESAMP: Group of Experts on the Scientific

Aspects of Marine Pollution (International)

GIS: Geographical information system

GOSKOMGIDROMET: State Committee for

Hydrometerology (Russian)

GOSKOMOBORONPROM: State Committee

for the Defense Industry (Russian)

HEU: Highly enriched uranium

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
234 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

IARPC: U.S. Interagency Arctic Research Policy

Committee

IASAP: International Arctic Seas Assessment

Program

ICRP: International Commission on Radiological Protection

IEA: International Energy Agency

IGPRAD: Inter-governmental Panel of Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea

INSP: International Nuclear Safety Program

JCCCNRS: Joint Coordinating Committee for

Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety

JCCRER: Joint Coordinating Committee on

Radiation Effects Research

LET: Linear energy transfer

LMR: Liquid metal reactor

LRW: Liquid radioactive waste

MAPI: Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry

(Soviet)

MINATOM: Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russian)

MSC: Murmansk Shipping Company (Russian)

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency

NGO: Non-governmental organization

NIS: Newly Independent States

NOAA: U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

NPP: Nuclear power plants

NRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRL: U.S. Naval Research Laboratory

NSA: Nuclear Safety Account

NSC: Nuclear Safety Convention

NSF: U.S. National Science Foundation

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development

OMB: U.S. Office of Management and Budget

ONR: U.S. Office of Naval Research

OTA: Office of Technology Assessment

PAME: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment

PCB: Polychlorinated biphenyls

PNL: U.S. Pacific Northwest Laboratory

PUAEA: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Agreement

PWR: Pressurized water reactor

RADEX: Radiological Exercises

SRW: Solid radioactive waste

SSAN: Nuclear-powered auxiliary submarine

SSBN: Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

SSGN: Nuclear-powered guided missile submarine

SSN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine

START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

THORP: Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant

TTC: Technical training center

USGS: U.S. Geological Survey

VNIINM: All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials

GLOSSARY

Actinides. Radioactive elements with atomic

number larger than 88.

Alpha particle. Two neutrons and two protons

bound as a single particle emitted from the

nucleus of certain radioactive isotopes in the

process of decay or disintegration.

Bathymetry. The measurement of depths of

water.

Benthic. Dwelling at the bottom of a body of

water.

Beta emitter. A charged particle emitted from

the nucleus of certain unstable atomic nuclei

(radioactive elements), having the charge

and mass of an electron.

BN-600. A type of Soviet designed breeder reactor.

Curie. A unit of radioactivity equal to that emitted by 1 gram of pure radium.

Damaged nuclear fuel. Nuclear fuel (normally

in the shape of rods) that has been corroded,

eroded, cracked, or has had its casing

opened.

Defueling. The process of removing nuclear fuel

from a reactor after the fuel has been used

for some period of time.

Demilitarization. The process of eliminating or

reducing military weapons, materials, other

hardware and organizational structures.

Dismantlement. The process of taking apart and

disposing of submarines, ships or other military systems and equipment.
Appendix B Acronyms and Glossary | 235

Dry storage (of spent nuclear fuel). Refers to

the use of special storage containers that do

not require water or other cooling liquids.

Effective dose. Radiation dose which takes into

account the type and energy of radiation as

well as the different tissues or organs irradiated.

EPG-6. A type of Soviet designed graphite moderated and boiling water cooled nuclear reactor.

Fallout. Radioactive particles that are deposited

on the earth’s surface.

Fission products. Atoms created by the splitting

of other heavier atoms—usually in a nuclear

reactor and usually resulting in radioactive

isotopes.

Fuel assemblies. A number of individual nuclear

fuel rods grouped together with structural

support.

Furfural. A resin based compound used in Russia to solidify dumped nuclear materials in

containers.

Gamma radiation. Similar to x-rays, shortwavelength electromagnetic radiation of

nuclear origin.

Half life. The time required for a radioactive

substance to lose fifty percent of its activity

by decay.

Ionizing radiation. Any electromagnetic or particulate radiation capable of producing ions

as it passes through matter.

LGR. A type of Soviet designed light water

cooled, graphite moderated reactor.

Non-standard nuclear fuel. Nuclear fuel of a

special design or containing special materials for which special manufacturing, handling, storage, or processing systems are

required.

Nuclear fuel cycle. From mining uranium to

manufacturing fuel to use in a reactor to

reprocessing for future use again.

Plutonium. Man-made element produced when

uranium is irradiated in a reactor. Plutonium-239 is the most suitable isotope for

constructing nuclear weapons.

Rad. Radiation absorbed dose, a basic unit of

absorbed dose of ionizing radiation representing an amount of energy absorbed per

unit of absorbing material such as body tissue.

Radionuclide. Certain natural and man-made

atomic species with unstable nuclei that can

undergo spontaneous breakup or decay and,

in the process, emit alpha, beta, or gamma

radiation.

RBMK. A type of Soviet designed graphitemoderated and light water cooled nuclear

reactor.

Reactor core. The center and energy-producing

section of a nuclear reactor containing the

nuclear fuel and associated structural components.

Rem (Rad Equivalent Man). Unit of dose

equivalent. The dose equivalent in “rem” is

numerically equal to the absorbed dose in

“rad” multiplied by necessary modifying

factors.

Remediation. The process of taking actions to

remove, stabilize, contain, or make benign

hazardous or radioactive materials that have

been dumped, discharged or otherwise

released into the environment.

Reprocessing. Taking spent nuclear fuel and

separating out the specific nuclear and nonnuclear materials for re-use or disposal using

mechanical and chemical processes.

RT-1. A nuclear fuel reprocessing plant located

at Mayak.

RT-2. A nuclear fuel reprocessing plant currently being built at Krasnoyarsk-26.

Sedimentation rate. The rate of deposition of

sediment at the bottom of a body of water.

Semipalatinsk. A former Soviet nuclear weapons testing site located in Kazakhstan.

Source term. The quantities and types of

released radionuclides and their physical and

chemical conditions.

Spent nuclear fuel. Nuclear fuel that has been

irradiated in a reactor for some period of

time and thus “used-up.”

Stochastic. A process that is random and results

involve chance.

Tritium. A radioactive gas, an isotope of hydrogen, that serves as a booster for the fusion
236 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

reaction in the secondary component of a

nuclear weapon.

Vitrification. Process of immobilizing radioactive material, mixing it with molten glass,

and encapsulating it into a glasslike solid.

VVER. A type of Soviet designed pressurized

water nuclear reactor.

Weapons grade. Nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly-enriched uranium that are

of a type and purity suitable for use in

nuclear weapons.
| 237

C

Appendix C:

Excerpts from DoD Appropriations

Acts for FY1993, 1994 & 1995

Providing Funding and Authority for

the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment

Program (ANWAP)

PUBLIC LAW 103-335—SEPT. 30, 1994

103D CONGRESS

❚ An Act making appropriations for the 

Department of Defense for the fiscal year 

ending September 30, 1995, and for other 

purposes.

❚ TITLE II OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE

Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction

For assistance to the republics of the former

Soviet Union, including assistance provided by

contract or by grants, for facilitating the elimination and the safe and secure transportation and

storage of nuclear, chemical and other weapons;

for providing incentives for demilitarization; for

establishing programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components, and

weapon-related technology and expertise; for

programs relating to the training and support of

defense and military personnel for demilitarization and protection of weapons, weapons components and weapons technology and expertise; for

supporting the demilitarization of military technologies and production infrastructure;

$400,000,000 to remain available until

expended: Provided, That of the funds appropriated under this heading, $10,000,000 shall be

made available only for the continuing study,

assessment, and identification of nuclear waste

disposal by the former Soviet Union in the Arctic

and North Pacific regions.

PUBLIC LAW 103-139—NOV. 11, 1993

103D CONGRESS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1994

❚ TITLE II OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE

Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction

For assistance to the republics of the former

Soviet Union, including assistance provided by

contract or by grants, for facilitating the elimination and the safe and secure transportation and

storage of nuclear, chemical and other weapons;

for providing incentives for demilitarization; for

establishing programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components, and

weapons-related technology and expertise; for
238 | Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic

expansion of military-to-military contacts; for

supporting the conversion of military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities; and

for retraining military personnel of the former

Soviet Union; $400,000,000, to remain available

until expended: Provided, That of the funds

appropriated under this heading, $10,000,000

shall be made available only for the continuing

study, assessment, and identification of nuclear

waste disposal by the former Soviet Union in the

Arctic region: Provided further, That the transfer

authority provided in section 9110(a) of the

Department of Defense Appropriations Act,

1993, shall continue to be in effect during fiscal

year 1994: Provided further, That any transfer

made under the foregoing proviso in this paragraph shall be subject to the limitations and the

reporting requirements stipulated in section 8006

of this Act: Provided further, That the Director

of Central Intelligence shall report to the President and the Congressional defense, foreign

affairs, and intelligence committees on the current status of intercontinental ballistic missile

development and production in states eligible for

assistance under this heading: Provided further,

That none of the funds appropriated under this

heading may be expended or transferred to an

otherwise eligible recipient state if the President

concludes, and notifies the Congressional

defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence committees in a written report, that the potential recipient is currently engaged in the production of a

new road mobile or fixed-site land based intercontinental ballistic missile armed with multiple

nuclear re-entry vehicles.

PUBLIC LAW 102-396—OCT. 6, 1992

102D CONGRESS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1993

❚ TITLE IX GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 9110 (a) The Secretary of Defense may

transfer to appropriate appropriation accounts for

the Department of Defense, out of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal

year 1993, up to $400,000,000 to be available for

the purposes authorized in the Former Soviet

Union Demilitarization Act of 1992: Provided,

That amounts so transferred shall be in addition

to amounts transferred pursuant to the authority

provided in section 108 of Public Law 102-229

(105 Stat. 1708).

(b) Of the funds transferred pursuant to subsection (a):

(1) not less than $10,000,000 shall be available

only for the study, assessment, and identification of nuclear waste disposal by the former

Soviet Union in the Arctic region;

(2) not less than $25,000,000 shall be available

only for Project PEACE;

(3) not more than $50,000,000 may be made

available for the Multilateral Nuclear Safety

Initiative announced in Lisbon, Portugal on

May 23, 1992;

(4) not more than $40,000,000 may be made

available for demilitarization of defense

industries;

(5) not more than $15,000,000 may be made

available for military-to-military contacts;

(6) not more than $25,000,000 may be made

available for joint research and development

programs; and

(7) not more than $10,000,000 may be made

available for the Volunteers Investing in Peace

and Security (VIPS) program.

(c) The Secretary of Defense may transfer from

amounts appropriated to the Department of

Defense for fiscal year 1993 or from balances

in working capital funds not to exceed

$15,000,000 to the appropriate accounts

within the Department of Defense for the purposes authorized in section 109 of Public Law

102-229.

(d) The authority provided in sections 108 and

109 of Public Law 102-229 (105 Stat. 1708) to

transfer amounts appropriated for fiscal year

1992 shall continue to be in effect during fiscal year 1993.

(e) The Secretary of Defense may transfer to

appropriate appropriation accounts for the

Department of Defense, out of funds available
Appendix C Excerpts from DoD Appropriations Acts | 239

to the Department of Defense for fiscal year

1993, up to $40,000,000 to be available for

international nonproliferation activities authorized in the Weapons of Mass Destruction

Control Act of 1992: Provided, That such

transfer authority shall not be available for

payments either to the “Contributions to International Organizations” account of the

Department of State or to activities carried out

by the International Atomic Energy Agency

which have traditionally been the responsibilities of the Departments of State or Energy:

Provided further, That up to $20,000,000 of

the transfer authority provided in this section

may be used for the activities of the On-Site

Inspection Agency in support of the United

Nations Special Commission on Iraq.

(f) The transfer authority provided in this section

shall be in addition to any other transfer

authority contained in this Act.