### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 223 -CV

Ant honyAl le n Jo ne s , A ppe lla nt

v. State Board of Ed ucator C ert if ication , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-08- 0019 75 , HO NORAB LE STEP HEN Y ELENOSK Y , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Appellant Anthony

Allen J ones appeals from the t rial court’s g rant of the plea to the juri s d ic ti o n f

il e d b y th e St a te B o a r d o f E d u c a to r Ce rti f

ic a ti o n ( th e “ B o a r d ” ) in Jo n e s ’ s s u it for judicial revie w of a

n administrative disciplinary proce eding . We affir

m the trial co u rt ’s orde r g ranting the plea to the jur isdiction.
BACK GR OUND

Jone s w a s c e rt if

ie d b y the B oa

rd and ta ug ht s pe c ia l e du c a tio n in

Te xas f ro m 19 95 to 2003. I n September 2006, the Boa rd filed an admi nistrative complaint ag ainst J ones base d on
a lle g a tio ns that he ha d p hy sic a lly a ssa ult e d a sp e c ia l e du c a tio n st ud e nt a nd ha d e ng a g e d in unprofe ssio n a l c o n d

u c t to w a r d tw o o th e r s tu d e n ts
. Jo n e s d is p u te d th e c h a r g e s , a n d on Au gu s t2 3 , 2 0 0 7 , a co n t es t ed ca s e h ea ri n g wa s h el d at t h e S t at e Of fi ce o f A d m i n i s t ra t i v e H ea ri n gs (“SOAH ”). The administrative law judg e (the “A L J ”) issued a proposa l for dec ision finding thatThe AL J ’s proposal f or dec ision i n cl udes a f

ootnote stating, “ I n its amended notice of 1 hear ing, Staf

f see ks a three -y ear

suspension and continui ng education; howeve r, S taff se ems to have aban d o n e d th e th r e e - y e a r s u s p e n s io n p e n a lt y . I n it s p o s t- h e a r in g b r ie f , St a f f o n ly d is cusses the 60 hours of c ontinuing educ ation and neve r mentions the three -y ear suspension.” The B oard su bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d e xce pti on s to the pr op os a l f or de c isi on , ta

kin g e xce pti on

to the AL J’s fa ilure to g rant a suspension. The AL J declined to amend the proposa l for dec ision. 2 J ones “is wor

thy to continue to instruc t the y outh of this state,” but rec ommending that J ones take 30 classroom hours in a

ng er ma nag ement tra ining a

nd 30 classroom hours in prope r cla ssroom discipline and man age m ent of spec ial education students. The AL J also found that while Jones’s conduct in ce rtain i nstance s violated t he code of ethics for teac hers, the B oard ha d not proven that J ones exhibit ed a pa

ttern of inappr opriate be havior towa rd spec ial education students. After revie wing the AL J ’s proposal for decision, the Board issued its final dec ision and orde r. Contrary

to the proposal for

decision , t h e B oard f

ound that J ones “shows a pattern of inappropriate treatment of specia l e ducation students” and that “he is pr esently unworthy to instruct the c hil dr e n o f t

his state .” Th e B oa

rd a do pte d the AL J’s re c omm e nd a tio n that Jone s b e re qu ir e d to take 30 hour s of ang er ma nag ement tra ining a

nd 30 hours of c lassroom manag ement for specia l
e du c a tio n c la ssr oo ms, bu t a lso su sp e nd e d Jon e s’ s te a c hin g c e rt if ic a tio n for

thr e e y e a rs . The B oard

1 notified J ones of its decision by letter dated Fe bruar y 7, 2008, which wa s rec eived by J ones’s c ounsel on Fe bruar

y 11, 2008. J ones timely

filed a motion for r ehea ring of the B oard’ s decision on Fe bruar y 29, 2008. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.146(a) (West 2008) (upon rece iving notice of ag ency decision , party

has 20 day s to file motion for rehe aring ). This motion was deeme d
overr uled by operation of law on Mar ch 27, 2008. See id. § 2001.146(c) (in absenc e of a g ency3

action, motion for re hear ing is overr uled by operation of law on 45th day afte r par ty rec eives notice of dec ision). On April 21, 2008, howe ver, the Boa rd sent Jones notice that his moti on for r ehea ring would be conside red at the Boa rd’s May 9, 2008 public meeting
. The public-me eting notice fur ther informed Jones that he could appe ar at the meeting and testify befor e the Boa rd. The a g enda f

or the Boa rd’s May 9, 2008 meet i n g co n t ains an a ction item for conside ration of Jones’s motion for rehe aring , but t h e m o tion was not actua lly addre ssed at the mee ting. On Ma y 13, 2008, the Boa rd sent Jones a letter notifying him t h at h is moti on for r ehea ring had bee n overr

uled by operation of law.

On June 6, 20 08 , Jone s fi le d a pe tit ion fo r jud ic ia l re vie w of the B oa rd ’s de c isi on

in Travis County

district court. I n response , the Board filed a plea to the j urisdiction asser ting that the tr ia l c ourt la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n b e c a

us e Jones fai led to se e k ju dic ia l r e vie w o f t he de c isi on

wi thi n 30 day s afte r his motion for rehe aring was overr uled by operation of law on Mar ch 27, 2008. See id. § 2001.176(a) (West 2008) (petition for judicial revie w in c ontested case must be filed no later tha n 3 0th da y a ft e r d e c isi on

be c ome s f

ina l and appea la ble ); see also id. § 2001.144 (West 2008) (dec ision in contested case is considere d final whe n timely filed motion for re hear ing is ove rruled by operation of law). Jones arg ued that his petition was timely filed bec ause the Board’s publicmeeting notice extended the deadline f or ac tion on his m otion for re hear ing, e ither as a written orde r under se ctio n

2 0 0 1
. 1 4 6 ( e ) o r an a g ree ment betwee n the par ties under se ction 2001.147, and ther efor e extended the dea dline for f iling his petition for revie w. See id. §§ 2001.146(e) (per mitti ng ag ency to issue written order

extending dea dline for a ction on motion for rehe aring ), .147 (a llowing pa rties4

to contested c ase to a g ree to modify deadlines related to motions for r ehea ring ) (West 2008). The trial court g rante d the B oard’ s plea to the jurisdiction, and this appea l followed.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A plea to the jur isdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismiss al of a case for lac k of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Harris County v . Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). I n an appe al from a p le a

to th e ju r is d ic ti o n , w e “ r e v ie w th e f a c e o f a p p e ll a n ts ’ p le a d in g s to d e te r mi n e w h e th er they show a lac k of jurisdiction or whe th e r the pleading s, if liberally

construed, f

avore d jurisdiction.” At mo s E ne rg yCor p. v . A bb ott , 127 S.W .3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Whether
a t ri al cour

t has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we revie w de novo. W es tbrook v. Pe nley , 231 S.W .3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007)
. I f the pleading s do not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’ s jurisdiction but do not aff irmatively

demonstrate inc urable defe cts in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficie ncy and the plaintiffs should be a ffor ded the oppor tunity to amend. Texas Dep’ t of Parks & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 1 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d

2 1 7 , 2 2 6 -2 7 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ). I f t h e p l ea d i n gs aff irmatively

neg ate jurisdiction, then a ple a to the jurisdiction may be g rante d without allowing a n opportunity

to amend. Id. at 227.
DI SCU SSIO N J ones’s issues on appe al ca n be sum marized as a single issue contendingthat the trial court e rre d in gr anting the B oard’ s plea to the jurisd i ct ion beca use the public-me eting notice op e rate d to e xten d th e de a dli ne fo r t he B oa rd to a c t on his mot ion fo r re he a ri ng a nd the re fo re a lso extended the dea dline for f iling his petition for judicial re view.5 Di s ciplinary

proce eding s befor e the B oard a re g overne d by

the Administrative Procedur e Ac t (the “A PA”), Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 2001.001- .902 (West 2008). See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.041(b) (7) ( West S upp. 2009). The A PA provides that a petition for judicial review of an a g ency

decision in a c ontested ca se m ust be filed no later than 30 day s after

the date the decision bec om es fi nal. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.176(a) . I n suits aga inst gove rnmental
e nti tie s, a tim e ly fi le d p e tit ion fo r jud ic ia l r e vie w i s a statut or y pr e re qu isi te to s uit , s o th a t f a ilure to comply deprive s the trial cour

t of jurisdiction t o revie w the ag ency decision. See id. § 311.034 (We st 2 00 8) (“ Statut or

y pr e re qu isi te s to a

su it .
. . are jur isd ic tio na l r e qu ir e me nts in a ll s uit s a g a ins t a g overnme ntal entity .”).

Under the APA, if a timely

motion for rehe aring is filed, an ag ency decision bec omes f in a l an d a p p e a la b le w h e n th a t mo ti o n is o v e r r u le d , e it h e r e xp r e s s ly o r b y o p e r a tion of law. Te x. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.144( a)( 2). Thu s , t h e Board’ s decision in this case be came final and appea lable whe n J ones’s motion for re hear ing w as over ruled by operation of law on Mar ch 27, 2008,
makin g Jone s’ s pe tit ion fo r re vie w du e on Ap ri l 26 , 2 00 8, 30 da

y s a ft e r t he de c isi on

be c a me fi na l. See id. § 2001.176(a)
.

J ones ar g ues, howe ver, that when the B oard sen t i t s public-meeting notice on April 21, 2008, afte r the motion for re hear ing w as over ruled but prior to the de adline for his petition for judicial revie w, the Boa rd extended the time f

or ag ency action on his motion for rehe aringunder g ov e rnme nt c od e se c tio n 2 00 1. 14 6( e ), wh ic h s ta te s:
A state a g ency

may by written orde r extend the time f or filing a motion or reply or taking ag ency

a c ti o n u n d e r this sec tion [ g overningmotions for rehe aring ], ex cept that an extension may not e x tend the period for ag ency action beyond the 90th day afte r6

the date on w hich the part y o r t he par ty ’s attorne y

of re cord is notified . . . of the decision or or der that may become final under

Section 2001.144.
Id. § 2001.146(e)
. J ones t akes the position that the publ ic-mee ting notice constituted a written or der under se ction 2001.146(e) , which ex tended the time for ag ency action on his motion for rehe aring and pre vented the Boa

rd’s decision from becoming final until he rec eived the B oard’ s letter stating that hi s mo tio n f

or re he a ri ngha d be e n ove rr ule d by op e ratio n of law. Con se qu e ntl y , J on e s argue s, the 30-da y deadline f

or filing his petition for review did not beg in to run until May 13, 2008, making his petition t imely

filed. I n the alter

native, J o n es argues that eve n if the B oard’ s notice did not constitute a written orde r under

section 2001.146(e ), it qualifies a s an ag ree ment betwee n the par ties under
se c tio n 2 00 1. 14 7, wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t “ [t]he pa rt ie s to a c on te ste d ca se , w ithstate a g e nc y a pp ro va l, may ag ree to modify

the times presc ribed by

Section[]
. . . 2001.146.” Id. § 2001.147. The B oard
re sp on ds that it

ha d n o ju ri sd ic tio n to e xten d th e tim e fo r a c tin g on the mot ion

fo r r e he a ri ngon c e it had bee n overr

uled, and that the public-mee ting notice, issued in er ror, r epre sented ne ither a w ritten order under se ction 2001.146(e) nor an a g ree ment betwee n the par ties under se ction 2001.147. Be cause the public-mee ting notice was issued a fter Jones’s motion for re hear ing ha d been overr

uled by operation of law, the threshold issue in this case is w hether t h e B o ar d h as the power to ext end the time for

taking action on a motion for r ehearing once the motion has been
overr uled and the B oard’ s decision has be en re ndere d final and appea lable. I f t he Board ha s no such authority , then we need not rea ch the questions of whether the public-mee ting notice constituted a7

writt en o rder

to ext end the time limits under section 2001.146(e ) or a n ag ree ment to do so under
se c tio n 2 00 1. 14 7, be c a

us e the pu

bli c -m e e tin g no tic e wo uld be le g a lly

ir re le va nt. The filing of a motion for rehea ring under the APA has been ana logized to the filing of a motion for new tria l in civil practice
. See El Paso Elec. Co. v. P ublic Util. Comm’n , 715 S.W .2d 73 4, 73 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 86 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; H o u s t o n M o b i l f o n e, I n c . v . P u b l i c U

til

. Comm’n , 565 S.W .2d 323, 325-26 (Te x . Civ. App.—Eastl an d 1 9 7 8 , no writ). In Houston Mobilfone , t h e c o u rt h el d t h at wh en an age n cy i s s u ed an o rd er o v erru l i n g a m o t i o n fo r r eh ea ri n g after the motion h a d a lr e a dy b e e n o v e r r u le d b y o p e r a ti o n o f la

w , th e o r d e r w a s a n u ll it y a n d d id not
o p e r a t e t o e x t e n d

t h e d e a d l i n e f

o r f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n f

o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . 5 6 5 S
. W
. 2 d a t3 2 6
. In
rea ching this conclusion, t he court noted t hat i n the civil context, a mot ion for new t rial is overr uled by operation of law 45 d ay s afte r it is filed, and “a subsequent orde r purpor ting to over

rule the motion is a nullity .” Id. ; see also Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(c).

We note that while Rule 329b(e) gives t he trial court plena ry power to gr ant a ne w trial or to vac ate, modify , corr ect, or ref orm the judgme nt f

or an a dditional 30 day s after any motion fo r new tria l has bee n overr uled, see T e x. R. Ci v . P. 3 2 9 b ( e ) , th e A PAd o e s n o t i n c lu d e a s imilar provision expressly

g iving a n ag ency plenar y power to ex t en d d ea d lines for a g ency action on a motion for rehe aring for a specifie d time a fter the motion is overr uled. J ones takes the position t hat section 2001.146(e) g ives an ag ency plenar y power , for 90 da

y s after notice of a

decision, to issue order s ext ending the time for a ction on a motion for re hear ing, e ven if that motion has alrea dy been
overr uled by operation of law. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.146(e ). We disa g ree with this re ading of section 2001.146(e)
. As previously stated, sec tion 2001.146(e) pr ovides that a “ state ag ency may8

by writ ten ord er e xten d th e tim e fo r f ili nga mot ion or re ply or takin g a g e nc y

a c tio n und e r t

his
s e c t i o n , e x c e p t t h a t a n e x t e n s i o n m a y n o te x t e n d t h e p e r i o d

f o r a g e n c y a c t i o n b e yo n d

t h e 9 0 t h d a y” afte r the pa

rty rec eives notice of the de cision. Id. The plain langua g e of the statute indicates that the 90-da y period re prese nts the max imum amount of time that the deadline may be extended, not the m axim um time period during which the age ncy may take a ction to ext end the de adline. See id. I n other wor ds, the ag ency may issue an order ex tending the deadline for action on the motion to the 90th day , provided the motion has not y et bee n o v er ru l ed at the time the orde r is issued, but the ag ency could not wait until the 89th day , long a fter the motion has been ove rruled by operation of law, and the n issue an orde r extending the deadline f or ac tion to the nex t day . This same conc lusion
was re ache d in Houston Mobilfone , in which the cour t, apply ing the prede cessor statute to section 2001.146, deter

mined that a motio n fo r rehear ing be came final and a ppeala ble when the ag ency failed to a ct on it within 45 day s and did not “by written order within the orig inal 45 day s g rant a n extensi o no f

ti me . ” 5 6 5 S. W. 2 d

a t 3 2 5
. T h is la

n g u a g e s u

p p o rts o u r

in te r p r e tati o n o f

s e c ti on 2 0 0 1
. 1 4 6 (e ) t o mean that while a n ag ency may extend the time lim its for ac tion on a motion for rehe aring , it must do so befor e that motion is overruled.

The fa cts and issues in t he pre sent ca se ar e similar to those in Te x as Al c oh oli c Be v e rage Com mi

ssi on v . S fai r , 786 S.W .2d 26 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) . I n that
ca s e, t h e age n cy ex p re s s l y o v erru l ed t h e S fa i rs ’ m o t i o n fo r re h ea ri n g i n a c o n t es t edca s e p ro ce ed i n g, making the ag ency

decision final a

nd appea lable under

the APA. Id. at 27. Two we ek s l ater , howeve r, the a g ency

issued a sec ond order

sua sponte g ra n t ing r ehea ring
. Id. Additional admi n is tr a ti v e p r o c e e d in g s f o ll o w e d , a n d th e Sf

a ir s e v e n tu a ll y f

il e d f o r ju d ic ia l r e v ie w . Id. On9

appeal from the tria l court’s de cision in favor of the Sfairs, the a g ency

asser ted that the trial c ourt lacke d jurisdiction be cause the Sfairs’ petition wa s not f iled within 30 day s of the date their orig inal motion for rehe ari n g wa s o v err uled. Id. The c ourt of appe als ag ree d, stating that despite the ag ency ’s subsequent a ction of sua sponte g ranting rehe aring , th e d ec i s i o n beca me final whe n the motion for rehe aringwas initially overr uled, and the appellate timetable beg an runningon that date. Id. The c ourt rea soned:
The Sfair s’ t ar d i n ess was undoubtedly broug ht on by

the ac tions taken by

the Commi ssion in su a s

po nteg ranting the re hear ing a nd setting a

new he aringdate. Ho we ve r, the [APA ] is c le a r: the de c isi on be c a me fi na l and a pp e a la ble on the date that the Commiss ion overrule d the Sfairs’ motion for r ehea ring . Thus, reg ardle ss of the Commiss ion’s subsequent ac tions, the Sfa i rs ’ t i m e for appea l started on November

10, 1987. . . . The fa ct that the ag ency may have e rre d in su a s

po nte g ranting the motion for

rehe aringand eng ag ing in subseque nt proce eding s does not e xcu se the Sf

a ir s’ la te fi lin g of

the ir pe tit ion in t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Id. at 27-28 (c itations omi tted).

L ike the ag ency

in Sfa ir , the B oard in this case took actio n af t er t he motion for rehe aringwas ove rruled that was inconsistent with the finality of the de cision, leading the af fec ted party to believe that the deadline for seeking judicial revie w had been extended. Neve rtheless, the ag ency decision, both here and in Sfa ir , beca me final a nd appea lable under

the APA on the date the motion for rehe aringwas ove rr u l ed , an d the ag ency ’s subsequent a ctions had no ef fec t on the deadline f or filing a petition for judicial r eview. See id. ; see also Stat e v. Triax Oil & Gas, Inc. , 966 S.W .2d 123, 126 (Tex. A

pp.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (“[A] pa rty is c harg ed with the knowledg e that the motion for re hear ing is ove rruled by operation of law at for

ty -five da y s . . . .”).F o r t h i s r e a s o n , w e n o t e t h a ti f J o n e s h a d

f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w w i t h i n 3 0 d a ys 2 of his mot ion

be ing ov e rr

ule d by op e ratio n of law, the B oa rd wo uld no t have be e n e nti tle d to pr e va il on a plea to the j urisdiction based on failure to exhaust admini strative re medies. De spite the publicmeeting notice indi cating the Board’ s future intent to consider Jones’s motion for rehe aring , J ones’s administrative re medies we re e x hausted whe n his motion for rehea ring was ove rruled by

operation of law. I n light of this conc lusion, we do not rea ch the issues of whe ther the public- meeting notice

3 constituted either a

n order under se ction 2001.146(e) or an a g ree ment under se ction 2001.147. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (re quiring opinions to be as brief as pra cticable in addre ssing issues ne cessa ry to final dispositi on of appe al). 10

“An a ppeal f rom an a dminist rative a gen cy is not a matter of r ight, it is set out by statute and must be strictly complied with in order to ve st the district court with j urisdiction.” Sfa ir , 78 6 S. W.2 d a t 27
. Whil e Jone s wa s pe rh a ps un de rs tand a

bly mis le d by the B oa

rd ’s a c tio ns in t

his
case , the fa c t r e ma in s th a t h e f a il e d to c o mp ly w it

h th e s tatuto r

y r e qu ir e me n t th a t a p e ti ti o nfor judicial revie w be f

iled within 30 day s of t he date the Board’ s decision bec ame f inal. See Tex. Gov’t Cod e Ann. § 2 00 1. 17 6( a ); see also id. § 311.034. Fur ther, we note the importanc e of c onstruing the APA to allow parties to re ly on the finality

of ag ency decisions. As the court pointed out in Houston Mobilfone , “ With ou t a mand a tor y a dh e re nc e to t

he tim e lim its sp e c if

ie d in the [APA ], th e fi na lity of administrative a g ency decisions would be unce rtain and not in the public intere st. The L eg islature
wo uld no t so int e nd .” 56 5 S. W.2 d at 32 7. B e c a us e a party is r e qu ir e d to e xha

us t a ll ava ila

ble administrative re medies bef ore se eking judicial revie w, t he APA must be construed in a manne r that allows litigants to c lear ly rec og nize whe n those reme dies have b ee n ex h austed. See Tex. Gov’t 2 Code Ann. § 2001.171.

Ba sed on the for eg oing, w e hold that once J ones’s motion for r e h e a r in g w as over ruled by operation of law, the B oard did not have the power to ext end the de adline for action on the motion for r ehea ring under e ither sec tion 2001.146(e) or section 2001.147 of the APA. Th e 30 -d a y tim e 311

period for filing a petition for judicial re view beg an to run whe n J ones’s motion for re hear ing w as
overr uled on Marc h 27, 2008. Be cause J ones’s pe tition was not filed within 30 day s of that date, the tr ia l c ou rt h a d n o j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r h i s s u i t f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w a n d t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t e r

r in g ranting the B oard’ s plea to the jurisdiction.
CO NC LU SION We affir m the trial court’s order gr anting the pl ea to the j urisdiction and dismissing J ones’s suit for judicial r eview.

___________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: June 11, 2010