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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DAVID FINNEY, an individual,, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., a 

foreign corporation; TAKATA U.S.A. 

CORPORATION d/b/a TAKATA 

CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; 

TAKATA SEAT BELTS INC., a foreign 

corporation; TAKATA RESTRAINT 

SYSTEMS INC., a foreign corporation; 

TAKATA NORTH AMERICAN INC., a 

foreign corporation; and TAKATA INC.; a 

foreign corporation, and TAKATA 

CORPORATION; a foreign corporation 

 Defendants. 

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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 3:06-cv-622 

AMENDED ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

Takata Corporation, (“Defendant”), hereby amends its previous Answer by 

incorporating by reference, herein, its entire original Answer, and by adding the following 

defenses: 

Twenty-Seventh Defense

 Any award of punitive damages to Plaintiff in this case is prohibited by the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until Defendant has first been provided with “an 

opportunity to present every available defense.” Phillip Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 

1063 (2007). 

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Twenty-Eighth Defense

 Any claim for punitive damages, on its face and/or as applied in this case, is an 

unconstitutional taking of property from Defendant without due process, to the extent that 

Plaintiff seeks to punish Defendant for an injury inflicted upon nonparties to this litigation (e.g. 

victims whom the Plaintiff does not represent). “[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause 

forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts 

upon nonparties..., i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the 

litigation.” Phillip Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007). The Due Process Clause 

prohibits punishment of a defendant based on an injury to a nonparty because “a defendant 

threatened with punishment for such injury has no opportunity to defend against the charge.” Id.

Twenty-Ninth Defense

 Any claim for punitive damages, on its face and/or as applied in this case, is improper 

because the State lacks proper standards to “cabin the jury’s discretionary authority.” Thus, the 

punitive damage system in place in the State deprives Defendant of “fair notice...of the severity 

of the penalty that [could be] impose[d],” and subjects Defendant to an “arbitrary punishment” 

that did not reflect an “application of law” but rather “a decisionmaker’s caprice.” Phillip 

Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Thirtieth Defense

 Any claim for punitive damages, on its face and/or as applied in this case, is improper 

because the State’s law does not provide the appropriate standards for the imposition of punitive 

damages. Thus, the State’s procedure for awarding punitive damages unnecessarily deprives 

juries of proper legal guidance and subjects Defendant to arbitrariness and inadequate notice. 

“[G]iven the risks of arbitrariness, inadequate notice, and imposing one State’s policies on other 

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States, it is particularly important that States avoid procedure that unnecessarily deprives juries 

of proper legal guidance.” Phillip Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1059 (2007) (citations 

omitted). 

Thirty-First Defense

 Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against the Defendants cannot be sustained, 

because an award of punitive damages based on anything other than Defendant’s conduct toward 

actual parties imposes “one State’s (or one jury’s) “policy choice” upon “neighboring states” 

with different public policies,” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States 

Constitution. Phillip Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1059 (2007) (quoting BMW of North 

America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809). 

Thirty-Second Defense

 Any claim for punitive damages, on its face and/or as applied in this case, is improper 

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there are no standards 

provided by the State law for the imposition of punitive damages. “[I]t is constitutionally 

important for a court to provide assurance that a jury is asking the right question.” Phillip 

Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1059 (2007). 

Thirty-Third Defense

 Any claim for punitive damages, on its face and/or as applied in this case, is improper 

because the State lacks proper standards for the imposition of punitive damages. Thus, the 

punitive damage system in place in State creates an unnecessary risk of confusion and 

misunderstanding by the jury in awarding such damages. Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of 

the United States Constitution, this Court must protect Defendant. “Where the misunderstanding 

is a significant one...a court, upon request, must protect against that risk.” Phillip Morris v. 

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Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). [F]ederal constitutional law obligates [courts] to 

provide some form of protection [to defendants] in appropriate cases.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Respectfully submitted, 

s/ Angela R. Rogers 

Charles A. Stewart III (ASB-4955-a56c) 

Angela R. Rogers (ASB-0853-e60r) 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP

The Alabama Center for Commerce 

401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 

Montgomery, AL 36104 

Telephone: (334) 956-7700 

Facsimile: (334) 956-7701 

 

Attorneys for Takata Corporation 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 19, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing 

with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of 

such filing to the following: 

Joel Lee DiLorenzo 

Jackson and Tucker, PC 

Black Diamond Building 

2229 First Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Email: joel@ksjpc.com

Joseph Luther Tucker 

Jackson and Tucker, P.C. 

2229 1st Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Email: josh@jacksonandtucker.com

Kenneth S Jackson 

Jackson and Tucker, P.C. 

 

Black Diamond Building 

2229 1st Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Email: 

steve@jacksonandtucker.com

Walter B. Calton 

Calton & Rutland LLC 

PO Box 696 

Eufaula, AL 36027-0696 

Email: wcalton@bellsouth.net

Robert C Khayat, Jr. 

King & Spalding LLP 

1180 Peachtree St, NE 

Atlanta, AL 30309 

Email: rkhayat@kslaw.com

and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to 

the following non-CM/ECF participants: 

None. 

s/ Angela R. Rogers 

Angela R. Rogers (ASB-0853-e60r) 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP

The Alabama Center for Commerce 

401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 

Montgomery, AL 36104 

Telephone: (334) 956-7700 

Facsimile: (334) 956-7701 

E-mail: arogers@bradleyarant.com 

1/1598791.1

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