### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs D ec em be r 4, 200 7

MA RIO M ERRITT v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 02-05448 Jam es M. Lam m ey, Jr., Judge

No. W2007-00534-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Janu ary 22, 2008

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mario Merritt, of espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry , and the tr ia l c ourt

se nte nc e d h im t o tw e nty -f ive y e ars in p ri so n. Th e Pe tit ion e r f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os tco n v i ct i o nre l i ef

cl ai m i n g h e w as n o taf

fo rd edt h e e ff

ec t i v e as s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el

. Af t er a h ea ri n g, the post-conviction cour

t denied the pe tition, findi ng the P etitioner failed to prove that trial counsel was de ficient a

nd that any

alleg ed er rors c aused pr ejudice. A fter a thoroug h revie w of the re cord a nd applicable law, we aff

irm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., joined.

Juni S. Ga

nguli , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla

nt, Ma ri o M e rr itt

. Robert E. C ooper, J r., Att orney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; Rache l E. Willi s, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Willi a m L . G ibb on s, Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; G re g Gi lbe rt , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION I. F acts

On dir e c t a pp e a l, w e de sc ri be d th e fa c ts und e rl yingthe Pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio n a s f oll ow s:
O nt h e a f t e r n o o no f J u n e 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 , A n t e r i u s H ar d e n , a “ L o s s P r e v e n t i o nS e c u r i t y”
e mpl oy e e a t G old smi th’ s D e pa rtme nt S to re, wa s o n d

uty a t th e Southl and

Ma ll i n Memphis. Around 5:00 p.m., Har den was monitoring the store fr om a control pa nel located in the me n’s depa rtment, when he noticed two men a nd a woman e nter the men’s depa

rtment throug h the north doors. Acc ording to Harde n, the three shoppers2

c a u g h t h is a tt e n ti o nb e c a

u s e th e y b e g ans e le c ti n g c lo th in g w it h o u t c h e c k in g th e s iz e or price of the items. As Ha rden w atche d the trio, he obser ved one of the men, later identified as the appellant, take severa l items of clothi ng , walk past the cash re g ister,
and pr oc e e d to wa

rd the no rt h d oo rs

.
Ha rd e n imme diat ely

int e rc e pte d th e a

pp e lla nt a nd ide nti fi e d h ims e lf

a s a “ L os s Pr e ve nti on ” e mpl oy e e . H ard e n w a s w e ari ng“ pla in c lot he s” and a ba dg e aro un d h is neck. Upon being confr onted, the appe llant pulled out a pistol and ordere d Har den

“ to g e t ba c k, g e t on

the g ro un d. ” Ha

rd e n r e ma ine d s tand ing bu t st epp ed a sid e to al l o w t he appe llant to “g o out the door.” I nstead, the a

ppellant ra

n toward H arde n and pointed the g un in his fac e. Har den stated that when he attempted t o gra b t he g un , h e and

the a pp e lla nt “ tus sle d” and

the a pp e lla nt fe ll ba c k. Th e a

pp e lla nt, wi th the g un and merc handise in ha nd, beg an backing out of the store. Ha rden e x plained that as soon a s t h e ap p ellant pulled out the g un, the sec ond man droppe d the
merc handise he was holding and ra n from the store

. As the appe llant was bac king out of the s tore, Gary Sparks, another loss prevention employ ee, a

rrived at the north doors. Sparks held the door s to prevent the a ppellant fr om l e avin g . T he re up on , th e a pp e lla nt r e a c he d o ve r h is s ho uld e r a nd sh ot S pa rk s, striking him in the left shoulder . After war d, the appe llant ran int o the par king lot and fled in a ve hicle.

Har den took Sparks inside the store and ca lled police, par amedics, a nd the fire de pa rtme nt. Spa

rk s w a s tr ans po rt e d b y

ambu lanc e to t

he ho sp ita l. H ard e n s po k e w i th pol i ce at the sce ne and pr ovided them with two videotapes of the incident. One videotape w as take n from the podium wher e he ha d been standing , and one w as fr om a ca mera in the secur ity

office . At trial, Har den conc eded that the videotape from the
secur ity office was unc lear

and diffic ult to see.

Se ve ra l da

y s late r, a n o ff ic e r r e tur ne d to the sto re and sp ok e wi th Ha rd e n a nd Spa rk s. Har den and Spar

ks wer e asked to identify the perpetrator from a photogr aphic lineup prepa red by police. Ha

rden se lected the ap p ell ant’s photog raph f rom the lineup which showe d six individuals. Sparks was unable to identify the appe llant from the lineup, explaining t hat he saw only the back of t he appellant’s head and the left side of his f ace

. Howeve r, both H arde n and Sparks identifie d the appe llant at a pre trial he ari ngand

a t tr ia l.

At tr ia l, H ard e n te sti fi e d th a t he came fa c e -t o- fa c e wi th t he a pp e lla nt a nd wa s a ble to identify t h e appellant be cause of his close proximit y to the appellant whe n the
a pp e lla nt p ointe d th e g un

a t him

. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Ha rd e n c on c e de d th a t hi s pr io r te s ti mo n y r e g ar d in g th e a p p e ll an t’ s h e igh t w a s n o t a c c u r a te

. H o w e v er, he stated that the a

ppellant appe are d larg er at tria l , s u rm i sing that the appellant ha d “proba bly g ained a littl e . . . we ight or

whatnot.”3

Sparks testified at tria l reg arding his injuries and showed the jur y the sca r and dis fi g ur e me nt r e su lti ngfr om t he g un sh ot w ound . H e re late d th a t he c onti nue s to have pa in an d pro ble ms with his sho uld e r, e xpla ini ng that “[e ]ve ry on c e in a wh ile it swells up and hurts like whe n the wea ther star ts acting up.” Sparks admitted that he h ad i nitially

estimated that the pe rpetrator was f ive fe et, five inc hes tall, but he explained that the estimate may have be en inac curate bec ause the h at worn by the perpe trator made him appear shorter.

Sta te v

. Ma rio Me rri tt , No. W20 03 -0 28 68 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 4 WL 27 26 03 0, a t *1 -2 (T e nn . Cr im. App., at Jackson, Nov. 30, 2004) (f ootnote omitted), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. F eb. 28, 2005). The followingevidenc e wa s prese nted at the pos t-conviction hearing : the Petitioner’s trial counsel (“Counsel” ) testified that, at the time of his repre sentation, the Petitioner had thre e pending
case s: the robber

y of a Rite-Aid, the rape of two women, and the espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

at Goldsmiths. C ounsel repr esente d the Petitioner on the ra pe cha rg es and the Goldsmith’s robbery char g e. Although Counsel wa s not present at the P etitioner’s preliminary hear ing, Counsel r eviewe d a tape of that hea

ring ; however , he did not g et the tape tra nscribed due to time constraints. Counsel state d th a t he tr a dit ion a lly us e d th e te sti mony a t the pr e lim ina ry he ari ngto i mpe a c h w itn e sse s at tr ia l, but, in this case , he did not obtain the t ape until j ust prior to trial. Counsel believed, howe ver, that he su c c e ssf

ull y imp e a c he d th e wi tne sse s at th e Pe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l be c a us e he revi e we d “ pr e tty complete” discovery

. Counsel testified that he did not specific ally instruct his investigat or to work on the Goldsmith’s robbe ry case beca use there was nothing for an investigator to inve stigate. C o u n s el
re c a lle d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r’ s c on c e rn wa s n ot t

hat he did

no t c om mi t th e c ri me but th a t he on ly wished to be c harg ed with shoplifting a nd ag g ravated assault.

After a discussion with the Petitioner’s counse l on the Rite-Aid robber y , Counsel proposed to the Petitioner the possibili ty of a ple a agree ment t o addre ss all three c ases, but the Petitioner
re fu se d to ple a d guil ty

to t he ra pe c ha rg e s. Cou

ns e l st a te d th a t he wi sh e d to try the ra pe c a se fi rs t,
a s h e be lie ve d th a t c a se wa s th e Pe tit ioner’s stro ng e st, but th e e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

c a se tr ia l w a s se t fi rs t be c a

us e the wi tne sse s w e re fr om o ut- of -s tate . A lth ou g h h e sp e nt m uc h o f h is t ime pr e pa ri ng fo r the ra

pe c a se s bec a

us e the Pe tit ion e r wa s ada mant a bo ut n ot p le a din g g uil ty

to t ho se char g es, Counsel c laimed he was prepa red for the Goldsmiths robbe ry trial. Ultimat el y , t he Petitioner pled g uilty

to the Rite-Aid robber

y , a convict i o n for which he re ceive d twelve y ear s incar cer ation. The Petitioner then de cided to also plea d g uilty to the rape char g es, and he rec eived
a fi ft e e n- y e ar s e nte nc e fo r t ho se of fe ns e s.
Counsel stated that he met with the Petitioner a number of times, and at the mee tings they usually discussed the ra

pe and G oldsmit h’s robbery char g es. Counsel testified that he lea rned of a4

videotape of

the incident and a

tte m p t ed to vi ew it, but the tape w as g rainy in his VCRbeca

use of a spee d problem. Prior to trial, he “ broug ht it up int o court . . .” wher e the Petitioner a lso viewed the tape. When que stioned about whethe r he f iled a motion to suppress the photo identificat ion, Counsel admitted that he did not file such a motion because he did not feel the ide ntification pr oc e dure s w e re ina

pp ro pr iate . Co un se l st a te d, ho we ve r, th at he argue d at tr ia l th e wi tne sse s’ identifications of the pe rpetrator wer e inconsistent with the appe ara nce of the Petitioner.

On cr oss-examination, C o u n s el reiterated that the Petitioner admitted committi ng the
ro b b ery , b u t h e wi s h ed fo r C o u n s el t o fo cu s o n re d u ci n g t h e es p ec i al l y aggr av at edro b b ery ch ar ge into separate cha

rg es of shoplifting and ag g ravated assault. Ultimately , Cou n s el said that the P e t i t i o n e r ’ s m a i np r o b l e m w a s t h a th e d i d n o ti n i t i a l l y w i s ht o s e t t l e a l l h i s c h ar g e s s i m u l t an e o u s l y. Counsel opined that the piece meal proc ess re sulted in a hig her total sente nce.
Th e Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s se rv ingan e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

thi rt y -s e ve n y e ars

. I nitially , he re ceive d an off er of twenty -seve n y ear s, which he de clined. The Petitioner stated that Counsel expl ained the possible se ntence s he would fa ce if he wer e convicted of all the char g es, and that number wa s “extraordinar ily high.” The Petitioner stated that Counsel visited him “a couple of times” while he was housed at the Shelby County jail, a nd he and Counsel ma inly discussed the ra pe case . He sa id that, while littl e time was spe nt discussing the e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

case , he d id te ll Co u n s e l th a t h e d id n o t s h o o t th e s e c ur it y g u ar d o n p u r

p o s e b u t th a t th e g un discharg ed duri nga sc uf fl e . T he Pe tit ion e r s tate d h e wa s unh a pp y wi th C ouns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n, and he wr ote the B oard of

Professional Responsibility “a c ouple of times,” partly beca use Counsel did not show him any witness statements until just prior to tr ial. Howeve r, the Petitioner did admit that Counsel
cross-e x amined the witnesse s about the identity of the shooter

. On cross-e x amination, the Petitioner admitted that he wanted to take his c ase to tr ial. The State made a

“g ood offe r,” w hich Counsel s u g g ested a cce pting, but the Petitioner re fused. The Petitioner stated that he ne ver sa w the videotape prior to trial, and, if he had, he w ould ha ve take n the p le a a g r e e me n t. Co u n s e l d e s c r ib e d th e ta p e a s “ b lu

r r y , ” s o th e Pe ti ti o n e r to o k h is c h ance s at trial. The po s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u rt th e n n o te d th a t o n e o f th e d is c o v e r y p a g e s e xp la in e d tha t the Pe tit ion e r v ie we d th e vid e o ta pe in 2 00 1. Th e c ourt re a d, “ [Th e Pe tit ion e r] advis e d [tha t] th e ma le depicted w as not him. He said he w as not at the Goldsmiths at the time it was filmed.” The Petitioner then stated the investig ators we re ly ing in their

above r efe renc ed stateme nt. The post-c onviction court found the Petitioner’s testimony unbelievable and conc luded that the Petitioner did n o t p ro v e C o unsel was de ficient or that he, the Petitioner, wa s prejudice d. The court stated that it found the Petiti oner to b e untruthful when he cla imed he had not se en the videotape pr ior to trial. The post-conviction court de nied the petition for post-c onviction relief, a nd it i s f ro m th is o rd e r t

hat th e Pe tit ion e r n owa

pp e a ls.5 II. Ana lys is

On a pp e a l, t he Pe tit ion e r c la ims that he d id n ot r e c e ive the e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Specifica lly , he points to the foll owing instances: (1) Counsel made few a nd unsubstantial visit s, and he did not discuss the fac ts with the Petit ioner; (2) Counsel failed to vi ew the videotape; ( 3) Counsel failed to file a

motion to suppress a photo spr ead identification; and (4) Counsel f ailed to obtain a t ra n s cr i p to f t h e p re l i m i n ary h ea ri n g.

I n order to obtain post-c onviction r elief, a petitioner must show that his or he r convic tion or sentenc e is void or voidable be cause of the a bridg ment of a c onstitut ional rig ht. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2 00 6) . T he pe tit ion e r b e ars the burd e n o f p ro ving fac tua l a lle g a tio ns in t he pe tit ion

fo r p os tconviction re lief by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30- 110(f) (2006). Upon r eview, this Court wil l not re-we igh or re- evaluate t he evide nce be low; all questions concer ning the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses, the weig ht and value to be given their testimony and the f actua l issues raised by the evidenc e ar e to be r esolved by the trial judg e, not the appe llate cour ts. Mo mo n v . S

tate , 18 S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 2 , 1 5 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ; Hen ley v . S tate , 9 60 S.W. 2d

57 2, 57 8- 79 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . Apo stc on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s are su

bje c t to a de no vo re vie w b y

thi s Co ur t; h ow e ve r, we mus t
acc ord these f

actua l findings a

presumption of co rr ec tness, which ca n be over come only

when a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is c ontrary to the post-conviction cour t’s fac tual finding s. Fields v. Sta te , 40 S.W .3d 450, 456-57 (Te nn. 2001). A post-c onviction court’s c onclusions of law a re subject to a pure ly

de novo re view by

this Court, wit h no presumption of cor rec tness. Id. at 457.

Th e ri g ht o f a

c ri min a lly

a c c us e d to re pr e se ntatio n is g ua ra nte e d b y bo th the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constit ution and article I , section 9, of the T ennesse e Constituti on. Sta te v . W hite , 1 14 S.W. 3d

46 9, 47 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) ; Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . The followingtwo-prongtest directs a court’s
e va luatio n o f a

c la im f or ine ff e c tiv e ne ss:

F ir st, the [pe tit ion e r] mus t sh owthat c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counsel was not fu nc tio nin g a s t he “ c ouns e l” g ua ra nte e d th e [pe tit ion e r] b y

the Sixth A me ndme nt. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the def icient p er formanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This requir es showing that counsel’s error s wer e so ser ious as to deprive the [petit ioner] of a fa ir trial, a tria l whose re sult is reliable. Unless a [ petitioner] makes both showings, it ca

nnot be said that the convic tion or death sente nce r esulted fr om a bre akdown in the a dversa ry proce ss that rende rs the re sult unreliable.

Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 (1 98 4) ; State v. Me lson , 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989).

I n revie wing a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, this Court m ust determine whe ther the advice g iven or ser

vices re ndere d by

the attorne y

are within the rang e of compe tence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. Baxter , 52 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 9 3 6 . To preva il on a claim of inef fec tive6

assistance of counse l, a petitioner must show that “counse l’s repr esentation f ell below an obje ctive standard of

rea sonablene ss.” Ho us e v . S tate , 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 0 8 , 5 1 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688 (1984))

.
W h en ev al u at i n g an in ef

fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el cl ai m , t h e r ev i ew i n g co u rt s h o u l d j u d ge the attorne y ’s per formanc e withi n the contex t of t he case as a whole, taking into account a ll releva nt circ umstances. Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 0; Sta te v . M itc he ll , 75 3 S.W. 2d 14 8, 14 9 (T enn . Crim

. App. 1988). The revie wing co u rt m u s t evaluate the questionable conduct f rom the attorne y ’s perspe ctive at the time. Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 0; He lla rd v . S tate , 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

. I n doing so, the revie wing court must be hig hly defe rential a

nd “should indulge a strongpresumption that counsel’s c onduct fa lls withi n the wide rang e of rea sonable professional assistance .” Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 462. Fina lly , we n o t e t h at a defe ndant in a cr iminal case is not entitled to perf ect repr esentation, only

constitutionally

adequate re prese ntation. De nto n v . S tate , 945 S.W .2d 793, 796 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). I n o the r wo rd s, “ in c on sid e ri ngc la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, ‘we addre ss not what is prudent or a ppropriate , but only

what is constitutionally

compelled.’ ” Burger v. Kem

p , 4 8 3 U. S

. 7 7 6 , 7 9 4 (1 9 8 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . Cron ic , 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984))

. C o u nsel should not be deeme d to have be en inef fec tive mere ly

beca use a diff

ere nt proc edure or strate g y

might have produce d a diffe rent re sult. W ill iam s v . S

tate , 599 S.W .2d 276, 279-80 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1 9 8 0 ). The f act that a particula r strate g y or tac tic failed or

hurt the defe nse does not, standingalone, e stablish unreasona ble re prese ntation. Ho us e , 44 S.W .3d at 515 (c i t i n g Go ad

v . S tate , 9 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d

3 6 3 , 3 6 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ))

. Ho we v er , d ef er en ce t o m at t er s o f s t ra t egy and tac tical choices applies onl y if the choice s are informed one s based upon a dequate prepa ration. Ho us e , 44 S.W .3d at 515.

I f the pe titioner shows that counsel’s repr esentation f ell below a rea sonable standa rd, then the petitioner must satisfy the pre judice prongof the Strickland te st b y de mon str a tin g “t her e is a
rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s unpro fe s s i o n al errors, the r esult of the proc eeding would have be en diffe rent.” Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 4; Nic hols v. S ta te , 90 S.W .3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002)

. This rea sonable proba b i l i t y must be “suffic ient to undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4; Ha rri s v . S tate , 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994)

. 1. F ew and Unsub stantial Visits
First, the Petitioner complains that Counsel did not vis it with him enough and that he did not discuss the fac ts of the ca se with the Petitioner. The post-conviction court found that the testimony fr om t he hear in g d ir e c tly

c on tr a dic ts this . Co un se l vi sit e d w iththe Pe tit ion e r s e ve ra l ti me s, discussing both the r ape an d espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

char g es. The Petitioner a dmitted committing the especially ag g ravated robbery , and he only reque sted that Counsel attempt to reduce the offe nse to shoplifting a nd ag g ravated assault. As a result of this reque st , C ounsel focuse d the majority of his attention on the Petitioner’s rape char g es. As the post-conviction court found, t he testimony at the post-convic tion hearingsimply does not support t h e P et itioner’s ar g ument. The evidenc e does not pr eponder ate ag ainst those finding s. The Petitioner has not pr oven that Counsel was de ficient, a

nd he is, there fore , not entitled to relief on this issue.7 2. Vi de ot ape
The Petitioner nex t co n t ends that Counsel failed to view the videotape of the robbe ry and failed to show the Petitioner the videotape. The post-conviction court found that Counsel viewed the videotape twice. B oth times, the i m age s were somewhat blurr y . Fur ther, the post-c onviction court de termined that the Petitioner view ed the videota pe and was untruthful in his asser tions that he did no t do so . T hu s, his c la im that he woul d hav e pl ed guilty ha d h e se e n th e ta

pe is unsubstan tiated by

the evidenc e. The Petitioner has not proven that Counsel was defic ient. The Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

3. M ot ion to Suppr e ss

Ne xt, th e Pe tit ion e r a

rgue s th a t Co un se l f

a ile d to fi le a

mot ion to s up pr e ss t

he wi tne sse s’ photo identification of the Petitioner. I n order to find Counsel defic ient, we would ne ed to conc lude that the Petitioner would have w on a motion to suppress. As the post-convic tion court found, the Petitioner has not prese n t ed evidence, and the re is no evide nce in the r ecor d to support such a conclusion. The Petitioner ha s failed to prove Counsel was def icient in declini ng to file such a motion, and, theref

ore, the Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

4. Tr ans c r iptof t he P r e lim ina r y He ar ing Finally , the Petitioner complains that Counsel f ailed to obta in a transcr ipt of the pre liminary he ari ng . T his tr ans c ri pt w ou ld h ave pr e suma bly be e n u se d to imp e a c h th e State ’s wi tne sse s at tr ia l. We c o n c lu d e th a t C o u n s e l w a s n o t d e f ic ie n t i nf a il in g to o b ta in

a tr an s c r ip t. T h e p o s t- conviction court found that Counsel listene d to a tape of the hear ing and cross-e x amined the State’ s witnesses at trial af ter a revie w of evidenc e re ceive d throug h discovery . The witnesse s were cross-e x amined on the issues the Petitioner ra ises. The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst those finding s. The Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

III. Conclusi on
We conclude that the Petitioner is not entitl ed to post-conviction re lief because he has not proven that Counsel was defic ient. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the judg ment of the post-c onvi cti on c ourt

.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE