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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

WILLIAM KIRK RILEY, PRO SE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 3280 Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge

No. M2002-02302-CCA-OT-CO - Filed October 5, 2004

The Petitioner, William Kirk Riley, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus

relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief

pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a

cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion

is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the

Court of Criminal Appeals

DAVID H. WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which, JERRY L. SMITH, J. and,

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER J. joined.

William Kirk Riley, pro se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Jennifer Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General, for

the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On April 15, 1998, a Hamilton County jury found petitioner guilty of first degree murder, for

which he received a life sentence. On June 7, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus

relief, alleging that the criminal indictment against him is defective and void on its face and that, as

a result, he is being unlawfully restrained. Specifically, petitioner contended that the indictment did

not set forth the statutory authority for which he was being indicted, failed to name the twelve grand

jurors, failed to adequately set forth the offense for which he was being charged, gave an inadequate

description of the crime or elements of the crime for which he was charged, did not state the time,

name of the victim or the county in which the crime occurred, was not properly filed by the clerk of

the circuit court, and was not concluded by the phrase “against the peace and dignity of the state of
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Tennessee.” The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim and failure

to attach a copy of the trial court judgment. 

Article I, Section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right to seek habeas

corpus relief and Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 29-21-101 et seq. codify the applicable

procedures for seeking a writ. However, the grounds upon which our law provides relief are very

narrow. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). A writ of habeas corpus may be

granted only when the petitioner has established lack of jurisdiction for the order of confinement

or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate release because of the expiration of his sentence. 

See Ussery v. Avery, 222 Tenn. 50, 432 S.W.2d 656 (1968); State ex rel. Wade v. Norvell, 1

Tenn. Crim. App. 447, 443 S.W.2d 839 (1969). Moreover, habeas corpus relief is available in

this state only when it appears on the face of the judgment or the record that the trial court was

without jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant or that the sentence of imprisonment has

otherwise expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State, 833

S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). There is no contention that Petitioner’s sentence has expired.

Initially, we note that the petitioner has not complied with the statutory requirements for

pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner failed to attach a copy of his underlying

judgment or to address his failure to do so, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107(2).

"Without question, the procedural provisions of the habeas corpus statutes are mandatory and

must be followed scrupulously." Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d at 165 (citing Bateman v. Smith,

194 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tenn. 1946)). In view of the petitioner's failure to comply with the

mandatory statutory provisions for seeking habeas corpus relief, the court concludes that

summary dismissal of the petition was proper. State ex rel. Allen v. Johnson, 394 S.W.2d 652,

653 (Tenn. 1965); State ex rel. Wood v. Johnson, 393 S.W.2d 135, 136 (Tenn. 1965). 

Notwithstanding the fact that the court could end its analysis at this point, the court will address

the merits of the petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner has alleged that his conviction for first degree murder is fatally defective,

causing the trial court to be without subject matter jurisdiction to convict him. The indictment in

the appellate record reads as follows:

THE GRAND JURORS for the State aforesaid, being duly summoned, elected,

impaneled, sworn and charged to inquire for the body of the County Aforesaid,

upon their oaths present:

That William/Kirk/Riley heretofore on the 13 day of September 1986, in the th

County aforesaid, did unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, deliberately, maliciously,

premeditatedly and of malice aforethought assault, kill and murder Douglas Gass,

against the peace and dignity of the State.
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Our state Supreme Court has held that an indictment is valid for constitutional purposes if

it “provides sufficient information (1) to enable the accused to know the accusation to which

answer is required, (2) to furnish the court adequate basis for the entry of a proper judgment, and

(3) to protect the accused from double jeopardy.” State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn.

1997). Moreover, the form of an indictment must meet the statutory requirements set forth in

Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 40-13-202, which provides:

The indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and

concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner as to enable a

person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with that degree

of certainty which will enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper

judgment; and in no case are such words as “force and arms” or “contrary to the

form of the statute necessary.” 

In reviewing the indictment in this case, it meets both the constitutional and statutory

requirements. The indictment sets forth the accusation to which an answer was required, and it

does so in ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, so that a person of

common understanding knows what is intended. Therefore, petitioner’s arguments that the

indictment failed to adequately set forth or describe the crime for which he was charged must

fail. As for petitioner’s remaining claims, a review of the indictment shows that it was in fact

filed by the clerk of the court; stated the date, county, and name of the victim; concluded with the

phrase “against the peace and dignity of the state of Tennessee; and was signed by the grand jury

foreman. Moreover, petitioner’s remaining claims relate to procedural, rather than substantive,

safeguards, and an objection to these types of defects must be made pre-trial, and not in a

collateral, post-trial habeas corpus petition. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); Marvin Anthony

Matthews v. State, No. W2003-00106-CCA-R3-CO, 2003 WL 23100812, *2 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Jackson, Dec. 31, 2003); Nelson B. Graves v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No. 03C01-9705-CR00171, 1998 WL 133840, *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Mar. 25, 1998), perm. app. denied,

(Tenn. 1998). Petitioner’s claims as to the defectiveness of the indictment are without merit.

Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that his sentence has expired or that his

conviction for first degree murder is void. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted. The

judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal

Appeals. 

 

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DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE 
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