Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

September 1994

OTA-ISS-605

NTIS order #PB94-209897

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Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation

and the Former Soviet Union, OTA-ISS-605 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, September 1994).

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -045160-4
Foreword

T

he end of the Cold War dramatically lowered the direct threat that

the Soviet Union’s nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction posed to the United States. As the Soviet Union has collapsed, however, fears have arisen concerning the spread of nuclear materials, technology, expertise, or actual weapons to other

countries or to subnational groups.

This report, the fifth publication from OTA’S assessment on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, examines the whole range of

consequences for proliferation of the Soviet Union’s breakup. ] One effect may be the erosion of international nonproliferation treaty regimes.

In spite of the continuing desire of most of the newly independent states

of the former Soviet Union to support nonproliferation goals, these

states face severe internal challenges: social and economic disruption are

rampant and the degree of central governmental control over activities

nominally within their jurisdictions is often questionable. Of particular

concern are economic hardship and low morale among many individuals

with access to vital weapon information or sensitive facilities—a situation aggravated by as-yet inadequate national systems to account for and

secure nuclear materials, to control exports, and to police borders.

Given the severity of the problems facing Russia and the other newly

independent states, the United States and other Western powers may

have only marginal ability to influence the overall course of events there.

This study describes how U.S. assistance may reduce specific proliferation risks in the former Soviet Union. The consequences of failure to

stem these risks provide a strong incentive for the United States to help

the newly independent states address them.

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director

1 Previous publications include: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,

OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), The Chemical

Weapons Convention: Effects on the U.S. Chemical Industry, OTA-BP-ISC-106 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destrucrion, OTA-BP-ISC- 11 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993),

and Export Contols and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994),
Advisory Panel

James F. Leonard1

Chairman

Executive Director

Washington Council on

Non-Proliferation

James E. Goodby2

Distinguished Service Professor

Carnegie-MellonUniversity

George Anzelon

Associate Division Leader

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

Will D. Carpenter

Chemical Industry Consultant

Lewis A. Dunn

Asst. Vice President

Science Applications International

Corp.

Randall Forsberg

Executive Director

Institute for Defense and

Disarmament Studies

Thomas R. Fox

Director

Office of National Security

Technology

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Alan R. Goldhammer

Director of Technical Affairs

Industrial Biotechnology

Association

John M. Googin

Senior Staff Consultant

Martin Marietta Energy Systems,

Inc.

Robert G. Gough

Senior Member Technical Staff

Sandia National Laboratories

Ellsa D. Harris3

Senior Research Analyst

The Brookings Institution

Geoffrey Kemp

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Joshua Lederberg4

Rockefeller University

Lee W. Mercer

Corporate Export Manager

Digital Equipment Corp.

Matthew S. Meselson

Department of Biochemistry and

Molecular Biology

Harvard University

Stephen M. Meyer

Center for International Studies

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Gary Milhollin

Director

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear

Arms Control

Marvin M. Miller

Senior Research Scientist

Department of Nuclear

Engineering

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

John W. Lewis

Center for International Security

and Arms Control

Stanford University

1 Panel member until June 1, 1993; panel

chair after June 1, 1993.

2 Resigned Mar. 22, 1993 to become Chief

U.S. Negotiator for Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons.

3 Reaigned Jan. 29, 1993 to join National Security Council staff.

4 Ex-officio; Member of Technology Assessment Advisory Council.

iv
Janne E. Nolan

Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy

The Brookings Institution

William C. Potter

Director

Center for Russian and Eurasian

Studies

Monterey Institute of International

Studies

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

Division of Natural Sciences

State University of New York at

Purchase

Lawrence Scheinman5

Associate Director

Peace Studies Program

Cornell University

Leonard S. Spector

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Sergio C. Trindade

President

SE2T International, Ltd.

5 Resigned Aug. 13, 1993 to become Counselor for Nonproliferation in the U.S. Department of Energy.

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members.

The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report

and the accuracy of its contents.

v
Project Staff

Peter Blair PROJECT STAFF

Assistant Director Gerald L. Epstein

Industry, Commerce, and Project Director

International Security Division

ANTHONY FAINBERG

Alan Shaw

Program Director Thomas H. Karas

International Security and Space

Program

CONTRACTOR

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Jacqueline Robinson Boykin

Office Administrator

N. Ellis Lewis

Administrative Secretary

Dan Fenstermacher

vi
Gary Bertsch

Center for East-West Trade Policy

University of Georgia

Athens, GA

Catherine Cosman

AFL-CIO Free Trade Union

Institute

Washington, DC

Zachary Davis

Congressional Research Service

Washington, DC

Alex Gliksman

Consultant

Washington, DC

Additional Reviewers

James Goodby

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC

Anne Barrington

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC

Igor Khripunov

Center for East-West Trade Policy

University of Georgia

Athens, GA

Nancy Lubin

Consultant

Washington, DC

Vladimir Minkov

Argonne National Laboratory

Argonne, IL

Henry Sokolski

Aletheia Enterprises

Washington, DC

Jonathan B. Tucker

U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency

Washington, DC

Patricia Woodring

U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency

Washington, DC

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers

do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

vii
contents

1 Part 1: Executive Summary 1

Findings and Policy Options 3

Summary Finding 9

Organization of This Report 9

Part II: Proliferation Threats

and Responses 11

2 Threats to International Nonproliferation

Regimes 13

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 13

The Chemical Weapons Convention 15

The Biological Weapons Convention 17

Summary 18

3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons,

Materials, and Expertise 19

Political Control Over Nuclear Weapons 20

Security over Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear

Materials 21

U.S. Assistance for Weapon and Material Management

in the FSU 23

Nonproliferation Export Controls 28

Missile Technology 31

“Brain Drain” 32

Part Ill: The Individual Nuclear

Inheritor States 35

Overview 35

4 Belarus 39

U.S. Policy Options Regarding Bela-us 41

Policy Options Summarized 45

ix
5 Kazakhstan 47

The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site 50

“Brain Drain” 50

Other Sensitive Facilities 52

U.S. Policy Options Regarding Kazakhstan 53

Policy Options Summarized 56

6 Russia 59

“Brain Drain” 62

The China Connection 66

U. S. Policy Options Regarding Russia 67

Policy Options Summarized 67

7 Ukraine 75

Ukraine and the International Nonproliferation

Regime 77

The Role of Relations with Russia 78

Cost Issues 79

Incentives to Ukraine to Maintain Non-Nuclear

Status 81

U. S. Policy Options Regarding Ukraine 83

Policy Options Summarized 86

x
Executive

T

he collapse of the Soviet Union has led both to freedom

and to the construction of democratic institutions for

many of its former citizens. However, in many of the new

republics that have emerged from the former Soviet

Union (FSU; see figure 1), the collapse of the center has also led

to economic deterioration and political chaos. In most, if not all of

them, central political and administrative authority have markedly weakened. Part of this weakening is a devolution of power to

democratic institutions on local and regional levels and could be

considered a healthy development. But this reduction in central

authority has also lead to the buildup of local fiefdoms, as individuals and local authorities seek to assure their own futures. Other

manifestations of this phenomenon have been increased disorder

and crime, including corruption at all levels of government.

The outlook for many of these new nations is uncertain. Any

instability in this large area of the world is regarded with apprehension, not only by neighbors, but also by nations that are continents and oceans removed. A major reason for this long-distance

concern is the presence in the territory of the former Soviet Union

of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tonnes of

nuclear material suitable for nuclear weapon manufacture.

Another concern is the resident expertise in nuclear, chemical,

and biological weapons and missile systems. Severe economic

disruptions in the FSU and the decrease in central authority of

many of the new governments increase the chances that weapons

of mass destruction, their components, or related expertise could

be transferred to foreign parties. Such transfers would greatly

aggravate the threat that proliferation of these capabilities alSummary 1

“All the nuclear inheritor

states have difficulties in

managing nuclear

materials and nuclear

weapon-related

components on their

territories. ”
2 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

A
ready poses to U.S. interests and to international peace and security.1

This study examines the implications of the

current situation in the FSU for the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction and their delivery

systems. It concentrates on the nuclear component of this broad issue, which has thus far been

foremost in the views of most western observers.

However, it also addresses threats that the Soviet

Union breakup has posed to the chemical and biological weapon nonproliferation regimes.

FINDINGS AND POLICY OPTIONS

The following is a set of general findings and

policy options regarding proliferation and the

FSU. All points are discussed in detail in the body

of the report. In addition, there are further findings

and options specific to each of the four nuclear inheritor republics of the Soviet Union (e.g., those

with strategic nuclear weapons on their territories

when the Soviet Union ceased to exist) that may

be found in the chapters on each of these nations

(Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine).

The situation in the FSU has been fluid since

the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The analysis in this study, including findings and options, is current as of July 1994. Major political

or economic changes since that date could render

some of the analysis obsolete. While this caveat

holds in any analysis of current international politics, events in the former Soviet Union have

moved particularly rapidly in the past three years

and are likely to continue to do so.

1 Nonproliferation Policies and

Agreements

From the perspective of adherence to international arms control agreements, the positions of

the four nuclear inheritor states of the FSU have much

improved since mid-1992. This shift constitutes a major

Chapter 1 Part l: Executive Summary I 3

success in strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

In the first months following the end of the Soviet Union, Russia was the only one of the states

with Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory that

had agreed to ratify both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the START I arms reduction agreement. Its START ratification was (and

still is) contingent on ratification of both agreements by the other three. Since then, due in part to

major efforts by two U.S. administrations, all four

inheritor states have ratified START I, and all but

Ukraine have acceded to the NPT. Ukraine is believed likely to accede to the NPT shortly and, in

any case, has agreed to return all strategic nuclear

weapons on its territory to Russia within seven

years. According to many statements from officials from both Russia and other FSU republics

that are apparently accepted by the U.S. government, all tactical nuclear weapons had already

been returned to Russia from the other republics of

the FSU by mid-1992. These agreements and actions have removed a major threat to achievement

of a long-term extension to the NPT at that treat y’s

Extension Conference in 1995, and are an important gain for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The recent agreement by the United

States and Russia to verify mutually their nuclear weapon dismantlement will strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime by Instituting an international arrangement to protect and monitor the nuclear material from

the weapons.

Under the so-called Nunn-Lugar program, the

United States is providing assistance to the FSU

for dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons and reducing the threat that these and other Soviet weapons of mass destruction pose to the United States

and the rest of the world. In implementing this

program, the United States must decide what de-

‘ See U.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), an earlier publication of this OTA study, for a description of the dangers that

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose to the United States and the world.
4 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

gree of assurance it needs that such dismantlement

is indeed being conducted. Monitoring nuclear

weapon dismantlement could be carried out in

several ways:

1.

2.

3.

4.

through bilateral inspections at the facilities

where nuclear material from weapons is

blended and stored;

through inspection by the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) at blending and storage

facilities;

through bilateral inspection at the dismantlement facilities themselves, in addition to the

blending and storage facilities, and;

through inspection by the IAEA at blending,

storage, and dismantlement facilities.

At present, the first of these options has been

agreed to, and discussions are now underway regarding the second and third. In earlier informal

discussions, Russian officials refused to consider

verification of dismantlement in the absence of

U.S. willingness to permit reciprocal verification

of its own dismantlement activities. The United

States government had previously resisted such

verification for reasons of secrecy, but has recently become more flexible. As a result, the United

States and Russia have agreed to institute mutual

verification procedures at each other’s facilities.

The two countries have so far agreed only to permit monitoring of their storage areas, which in the

United States include parts of the Pantex facility

near Amarillo, Texas, where weapons are dismantled and nuclear components stored. However, it has not yet been settled whether there will

be inspections at the actual buildings where dismantlement takes place. Even if only storage sites

are inspected, procedures may still need to be implemented to protect classified weapon design information on each side.

Since only U.S. and Russian inspectors would

be involved, there maybe somewhat less concern

about protecting weapon-related information than

there would be if other nationals participated.

Both the United States and Russia have sophisticated nuclear arsenals and would not likely gain

significant advantage from whatever information

on weapons might be revealed despite the confidentiality measures. Moreover, implementation

agreements and inspection protocols should be

easier to negotiate bilaterally than they would be if

three or more parties were involved, which would

be the case if the IAEA were to participate. The

negative aspect of a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Russia is that it excludes the rest of the world. In particular, it excludes the three other declared weapon

states—the United Kingdom, France, and China—that have direct interests in nuclear disarmament, and that may need to be involved in future

nuclear arms reduction agreements.

Involving the IAEA in these inspections would

give the world community an active role and stake

in the disarmament process, setting an important

precedent for future nuclear disarmament. Indeed,

the U.S. government has committed itself unilaterally to submit to IAEA monitoring of nuclear

material from weapons determined to be in “excess” of U.S. military requirements. The multilateral approach, however, has several disadvantages. First, inspectors from many countries,

including possible would-be proliferants, would

be routinely touring nuclear weapon facilities.

Even basic weapon information would have to be

protected during the process by which material inputs and outputs were to be quantitatively verified. This may be technically possible, but-even

if the actual dismantlement process were not under international observation-IAEA involvement would probably cause ongoing concerns

about the possible leakage of nuclear design information to non-nuclear-weapon states.

9 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons

and Materials

All the nuclear inheritor states have difficulties in managing nuclear materials and nuclear

weapon-related components on their territories.

These difficulties range from inadequate means

of controlling, accounting for, and protecting the

nuclear material on their territories (including a

lack of international safeguards providing for external audits and technical verification of the na-
Chapter 1 Part l: Executive Summary I 5

tional systems of accounting for the material) to

inadequate border controls, customs, and export

controls. These difficulties also extend to controls

over dual-use items: objects having innocent,

commercial applications but that also have uses

related to nuclear weapons.

External aid is vital to bringing control

over such materials and goods up to international/ standards in the shortest possible time.

Belarus, Kazakhstan$ and Ukraine do not have

adequate export control systems or national systems to control nuclear materials. Neither do they

have nuclear safeguards agreements in place with

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

For example, one or two years will be needed to

put a national nuclear material accounting and

control system in place in Kazakhstan and to implement a nuclear safeguards agreement with the

IAEA, according to current estimates. Even in

Russia, improvements in nuclear safeguards and

export controls are essential. The sooner international safeguards are in place, the sooner one window for diversion will be closed.

-

The United States could expedite its assistance for improving material control and accountancy and export control to all the nuclear inheritor states in

an effort to close quickly any windows of opportunity

that may now exist to divert nuclear materia/ or information.

The process of dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons in the United States and in Russia,

as outlined in the parallel initiatives of Presidents

Gorbachev and Bush in 1991, is still in its early

stages in both countries. In 1991, the United

States also began a large-scale aid program referred to as the Nunn-Lugar or Cooperative Threat

Reduction program. Through this program, four

hundred million dollars have been provided in

each of fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994 to assist

Russia and the other nuclear inheritor states in the

dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons

and to fund related projects. In addition to weapon

dismantlement, these funds may also be used to

convert defense facilities to non-military use, as

well as to help prevent proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction through means such as developing export control systems, improving nuclear

safeguards, and preventing the diffusion of related

expertise from the FSU. As of March 22, 1994,

about $75 million have been proposed for obligations to improve nuclear safeguards and to

develop export control systems. However, less

than one million dollars have actually been obligated for these purposes and even less actually spent.

I The “Brain Drain”

-

Any assistance that the United States and

the West could provide to assure a minimal living standard for weapon scientists and custodians of nuclear

weapons in the FSU would help protect those weapons

and their nuclear material from unauthorized uses.

Moreover, spending some U.S. Nunn-Lugar funds on

contractors in Russia and the other inheritor states, as

well as speeding implementation of U.S. assistance,

could help dispel hostility towards the United States

and help dissuade weapon scientists and engineers

from contributing to the development of weapons of

mass destruction by other states,

More efficient delivery of U.S. and Western assistance could work to counter the impression,

now prevalent among Russian scientists and politicians, that the U.S. program is mainly aimed at

aiding U.S. industry and at disarming the Russian

military. Such an impression, which has been

strengthened by the slow progress made thus far in

implementing the programs for U.S. assistance to

the FSU, is not conducive to increased U. S.- Russian cooperation in nonproliferation and other

areas. Of the $1.2 billion authorized in fiscal

years 1992-1994, only $117 million had been

obligated as of March 22,1994 (table 1). Indeed,

Congress refused to roll over $208 million in fiscal year 1992 funds that had not been obligated by

late 1993. In order to implement the projects

planned for those funds, money was taken from

the $400 million appropriated in fiscal year 1994.
6 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

Notifications to

Country Congress Obligations

Belarus 76,06 5.17

Kazakhstan 99.96 0.12

Russia 492.96 108,63

Ukraine 277.06 0.18

Total 946.04 114.10

SOURCE. U.S. Department of Defense, 1994.

Part of the delay in spending these funds had

been due to difficulties in negotiating agreements

with the FSU republics, but part of the problem

was also the glacial rate at which the U.S. government approved projects and obligated and transferred funds. In addition to time-consuming review within the executive branch, Congress,

represented by the Appropriations and Armed

Services Committees in each house, must be notified by the Department of Defense (DOD) of the

intent to obligate funds for each program. In practice, this means that individual programs may be

blocked by objections from the Committees.

Thus, in a sense, programs need to receive tacit approval from these committees before funds can be

obligated. 2

The Defense Department has announced its intent to obligate an additional $420 million by the

end of fiscal year 1994 and $430 million by the

end of fiscal year 1995, having reached agreement

with the receiver nations for over $900 million in

future projects.

3 These expenditures will come

mostly from fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 1994

funds. However, the successful expenditure of this

amount by that time will require that Congress and

the executive branch proceed more expeditiously

on this matter than they have in the past.

In addition to providing specific help for weapon dismantlement, U.S. assistance could also help

stabilize the economic situation in the Russian nuclear weapon complex. There are indications that

housing and other conditions for officers in charge

of manning and protecting strategic nuclear weapons in the FSU are poor, as it reportedly is among

many elements of the Russian military. Improving

the living conditions for personnel with control

over nuclear weapons and nuclear materials

could significantly improve their morale and

substantially increase security over the nuclear

arsenal.4

Moreover, legislative restrictions on Nunn-Lugar spending that require the use of U.S. technology and experience “where feasible” could be relaxed, so that more than the current minimal level

could be spent on local contractors in the FSU.

Easing such restrictions could be done either in future legislation reauthorizing the Cooperative

Threat Reduction Program, or by a less restrictive

interpretation of the word “feasible” by the Department of Defense in the implementation of the

program.

Another serious problem that Western assistance might ameliorate is the so-called “brain

drain”: the possibility that technical personnel

with expertise in weapons of mass destruction

might emigrate to would-be proliferant countries

or otherwise provide relevant material, expertise,

technology, or information to unauthorized parties outside the FSU. Severe economic stresses in

Russia and other republics of the FSU could tempt

2 N~.Lugar funding obligations must be reported to Congress at least 15 days before such obligation takes place. This requkement has

been in the authorizing legislation since fiscal year 1992. In the fiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Act, section 1206 addresses the prior

notice to Congress of obligation of funds and section 1208 defines the relevant committees.

3 Te]efax from tie office Of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Apr. *5, 1994.

4A somewhat different ~mFctlve on aid s~ategies for stabilizing FSU republics may be found in “A New Stitegy for United States Assistance to Russia and the Newly Independent States” (Washington, DC: The Fund for Democracy and Development, January 1994). While not

focused on the nonproliferation issue, the report stresses providing housing and job training for military persomel and increasing the use of the

private sector for distributing humanitarian aid. It also emphasizes accelerating implementation of Nunn-Lugar assistance and expanding technical exchanges.
Chapter 1 Part l: Executive Summary I 7

such individuals to sell knowledge or material to

which they have access. Aggravating this problem

is the fact that funding for science in general, and

for nuclear weapon institutions in particular, has

become severely restricted in Russia. The two major nuclear weapon design laboratories, at Arzamas and Chelyabinsk, have had problems supplying their employees with minimal salaries, let

alone the comfortable living standards that had

been their due as honored and vital workers in the

Soviet Union. As a result, scientific workers at

these establishments have engaged in public demonstrations and protests. U.S. visitors to one of

these sites report even a lack of basic medicines

and anesthetics at hospitals. Although there is no

evidence that deprivation has yet resulted in anyone emigrating beyond the FSU to perform weapon-related research, concern remains that such

may occur if conditions continue to deteriorate.

The United States, along with allies in Western

Europe and Japan, has set up an International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia for

the FSU. A smaller, separate center (including Canadian participation as well) is planned for Ukraine. The goal of these centers is to provide nonmilitary research opportunities for former Soviet

scientists, in collaboration with colleagues from

the West. These efforts have proceeded very slowly. The Ukraine Science and Technology Center is

still blocked by political problems in Kiev. The

ISTC, however, finally began operation in March

1994, broadening its original membership to include Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Georgia.

-

The United States could consider the establishment of independent science and technology

centers in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Both Belarus and Kazakhstan have acceded to

the ISTC agreement, and the installation of ISTC

branch offices in their respective capital cities in

under review. However, no independent centers

focused on weapon scientists in these two countries are now being considered. This somewhat

offhand treatment might be viewed as making Belarus and Kazakhstan appear to be unimportant

nations with whom the United States will deal

only through the former imperial power, Russia.

The lack of a separate center is of concern especially in Kazakhstan, which contains the original

Soviet nuclear test facility and which has become

the new home of a large number of its weapon scientists and technicians. Kazakhstan also has former Soviet chemical and biological weapon facilities on its territory.

Separate science and technology centers could

be established either under the auspices of recently signed science and technology umbrella agreements with the two countries, or under the NunnLugar program. Such arrangements would have

the effect of providing research possibilities for

weapon and civilian scientists, furnishing them

with much desired contacts with Western colleagues. They would also assist these countries in

the development of a scientific and technical base,

essential to economic recovery in a time of difficult transition. Both results are important to preventing proliferation, since they would help in stabilizing economic conditions and promoting

political calm.

mm Expand the scope of the science and

technology centers and laboratory-level collaborations

and assure contlnuing funding for the Laboratory-Industry Partnership Program (LIPP). In addition, Institute

procedures to speed up operations and render the collaborations more efficient.

It is in the vital interests of the United States

that former Soviet nuclear weapon scientists have

some means other than selling nuclear secrets to

provide minimal living standards for their families. The more effort expended on helping such

scientists maintain both their professional activities-directed to peaceful research—and a decent

standard of living, the better protected will be the

information to which they have access. Furthermore, applying their skills to the production of

commercially viable products could help stabilize

the shaky economies of the FSU republics. Such

stabilization, in turn, would improve the general

prospects for an orderly society, vital for maintaining an effective nonproliferation regime in
8 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

those nations. This last point argues for also involving scientists who are not weapon researchers

in these assistance programs, as in fact is being

done in the ISTC and other collaborative projects.

In addition to the ISTC, numerous laboratoryto-laboratory contacts and joint research projects

have been organized between scientists at U.S. national laboratories and their colleagues in Russia

and Ukraine. Some of these are aimed at basic research and others have the goal of developing

commercially viable products, in collaboration

with a third party: private industry in the United

States. These activities, often initiated on a personal level, have resulted in a multimillion dollar

effort that has provided support for a (still) relatively small number of former Soviet nuclear scientists and also provided them much desired contact with science and scientists in the West.

The Laboratory-Industrial Partnership Program (LIPP)—a formalized effort to fund industrial partnerships with scientists in the FSU—has

been developed by the Department of Energy in

cooperation with the Department of State. Funding at the level of $35 million is currently specifically earmarked in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1994. However, no

funding beyond fiscal year 1994 has yet been assured. A more regularized funding arrangement

than the current one could be instituted. One possibility would be to include LIPP and, possibly,

other laboratory-to-laboratory projects as a line

item in the Department of Energy appropriations.

Finally, joint projects with FSU scientists have

been impeded in the past by difficulties in obtaining multiple-entry visas for FSU scientists to visit

the United States and by frequent lack of timeliness by the Department of Energy in granting its

scientists’ travel requests to the FSU. Expediting

these processes would contribute to the efficiency

of collaborative efforts between the United States

and republics of the FSU.

H The China Connection

A further problem connected with limited employment opportunities among weapon scientists

in Russia is the apparent increase in military research collaboration between Russia and China.

Many Russian experts are reported to be working

on Chinese military projects in the nuclear and

missile areas. 5 Although China already has advanced nuclear weapon and rocket technology, the

transfer of additional capability is not in the interest of the United States for two reasons. First, China could thereby pose a greater military threat to

other nations in the region and even to the United

States itself. Second, China might sell some of its

newly acquired technology to third parties that do

not currently possess nuclear or long-range rocket

capability, possibly threatening regional and even

global stability. On the other hand, if the United

States were to press this issue, Russia might expect the United States to increase its assistance to

make up for any resources that would be forgone

if this alleged collaboration with China were discontinued.

-

The United States could make strong efforts to verify whether the reports of Russian/Chinese

collaboration in nuclear weapon and missile research

are true. /f those reports are confirmed, the United

States should consider taking up this issue in contacts

with the Russian government, asking for assurances

that nuclear weapon and rocket technology not be

transferred to China,

5 we John J. Fi~lk~, ‘4U.S. Fc~ china’s success in Skirnrning Cream of Weapons Experts from Russia,” The wall Srreei JOUr~l, wt. 14!

1993, p.12, and T.M. Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eustern Economic Review, July 8, 1993, p. 24, in which a Russian Ministry of Defense oflicial is cited as confirming that over 1,000 scientists and technicians have traveled to China on exchanges and 300 are permanently

based there. In addition, the article refers to “scores” who have been recruited by the Chinese government. It is not clear how many of these are

nuclear or missile scientists, however.
Chapter 1 Part I: Executive Summary I 9

SUMMARY FINDING

Russia and Ukraine are large countries with immense and complex problems. The United States

and other external forces have only limited abilities to affect the course of events in those countries

or in the rest of the FSU. Nevertheless, the United

States can take some actions to counter the threat

that the breakup of the Soviet Union poses to international nonproliferation regimes. Many such

actions have been and are being assiduously pursued by the U.S. government. However, further

steps can be taken, as suggested in the options just

presented as well as in further options presented

in later chapters that are specific to each of the nuclear inheritor states.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report analyzes proliferation issues

associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union

and presents options for dealing with them. Chapter 2 considers the threat posed by the breakup to

the multilateral nonproliferation treaty regimes

and addresses the importance of buttressing those

regimes. Chapter 3 examines perhaps the most

acute concern: the need to block proliferants from

acquiring nuclear weapons, weapon materials, or

associated expertise and technology from former

Soviet republics. Together, these chapters comprise Part 2.

Since the United States has no direct control

over activities in the former Soviet Union that

might contribute to proliferation, it can exert influence only through the incentives or disincentives it offers the people, institutions, and governments of the FSU’S newly independent states.

Chapters 4 through 7 examine each of the four nuclear inheritor states in turn, discussing individual

problems and analyzing solutions for each of

them. These chapters, comprising Part 3 of the report, elaborate on the general findings and options

summarized here and go on to develop countryspecific findings and options.
—

Part II:

Proliferation

Threats

and

Responses

T

he Soviet Union ceased to exist at the end of 1991. The

collapse of this monolithic political structure, able to impose its will on a large part of the world, was greeted with

relief by many, both within and without its territory.

However, in the wake of its demise, many doubts emerged about

the stability of its successor political structures. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), issues of border

definition, rampant criminal activity, ethnic rights, and ethnically

based domination have not been resolved and, in some cases, are

even becoming more acute. Even more worrying to the rest of the

world is the possibility that the residual chaotic situation in the

FSU might lead to loss of responsible state control over:

● nuclear material;

■ facilities used to produce nuclear material;

■ expertise, information, and technology that could be used in

the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass

destruction, or, in the worst case;

= nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, themselves.

Such lack of control could result in nations (and perhaps even

subnational groups) outside the FSU achieving nuclear weapon

capability. Alternatively, nuclear inheritor states (i.e., those with

strategic nuclear weapons on their territory when the Soviet

Union ceased to exist) within the FSU might retain control of

their nuclear infrastructure, and may make deliberate efforts to ac-

“A proliferant state able

to acquire nuclear

weapons or weapon

materials from the FSU

would gain a tremendous

head start for its own nuclear weapon program. ”

I 11
12 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

quire the ability to produce or use nuclear weapons themselves. ’ The net result in either case

could be an increase in the number of nuclear

weapon states, either within the borders of the

FSU or beyond them.

Besides increasing the chances of nuclear proliferation, the Soviet Union’s demise may also

contribute to chemical and biological weapon proliferation. However, the increased proliferation

risk attributable specifically to the collapse of the

Soviet Union is somewhat less in the chemical and

biological case than it is for nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear weapons—and in particular, the enriched

uranium or plutonium required to make them—

are much harder to produce than chemical or biological weapons. Therefore, a proliferant state

able to acquire nuclear weapons or weapon materials from the FSU would gain a tremendous head

start for its own nuclear weapon program, whereas

its acquisition of Soviet chemical and biological

agents would provide comparatively less assistance to its chemical or biological weapon program. Moreover, the necessary expertise and materials to produce chemical and biological weapon

agents are available from many sources besides

the FSU. Hence, any leakage of chemical or biological weapon technology from the FSU (except,

possibly, in the area of weaponization) would not

make such a dramatic difference in potential

sources of supply.2

Russia’s compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention is, however, vital for the success of those

treaties. Accordingly, this report addresses possible effects of the breakup of the Soviet Union

on chemical and biological nonproliferation.

On balance, however, this report concentrates

on nuclear proliferation issues. Of primary concern are Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, the nuclear inheritor states of the Soviet

Union that could serve as sources for nuclear

weapons or weapon materials.3

1 The Soviet Union had ken one Of the five countries (along with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China) whose nuclear

arsenals were recognized and permitted-at least in the near term- by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Russia is considered by the world

community to be the nuclear successor state of the Soviet Union, inheriting its nuclear arsenal and its status as a nuclear-weapon state under the

NPT. The other former Soviet republics with strategic nuclear weapons on their territories-Belams, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine-do not have

control over or undisputed ownership of those weapons and are not recognized as nuclear weapon states. Together with Russia, these states are

termed “nuclear inheritor states” in this report.

2 ~is ~W~ does not address the relative tireats posed by various weapons of mass destruction, but rather the effects on proliferation Of the

breakup of the Soviet Union. For a discussion of the relative effects and military significance of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, see

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Rinting OffIce, August 1993), especially ch. 2. For an analysis of the relative technical requirements to produce

these weapons, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlyin~ Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BPISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, December 1993).

3 ~is d(Es not imp]y hat n. o~er republics we a cause for worry. Estonia and Lithuania, forexarnple, have been conduits for manY tYPes of

contraband. Armenia has large unsafeguarded nuclear power reactors (currently shut down) and considerable technical expertise. Many other

republics have civilian nuclear power or research facilities or uranium mining and milling operations (e.g., Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,

Turkmenistan, Georgia), but none other than the four nuclear inheritor states is thought to possess nuclear weapons or means of producing the

material essential for nuclear weapons (that is, highly enriched uranium or plutonium).
Threats to

International

Nonproliferation

Regimes 2

A

ctions taken by Russia and other former Soviet republics

will have a significant influence on the implementation

of the major international treaties banning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the

Biological Weapons Convention.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Emergence of more than one nuclear power among the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union would seriously

damage the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Such an action,

which would signal that the political and diplomatic costs of rejecting the nuclear nonproliferation regime were tolerable, would

threaten to derail the extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) in 1995. It would also significantly upset the security relationships in a newly unsettled part of the world, possibly

leading other states in the region to reconsider their own commitments to nuclear nonproliferation. States with the incentive and

the ability to seek nuclear weapons (e.g., Iran, Taiwan, North Korea) might either openly renounce the Treaty or work to kill it. A

chain of events might well culminate in the termination of the

Treaty as an effective arms control regime, producing an arms

race in which tens of nuclear powers could emerge. While such a

catastrophe would not be inevitable if Belarus, Kazakhstan, or

Ukraine pursued nuclear weapons, such an outcome would be

conceivable. Therefore, Russia and the West share a common interest in persuading these three countries to accede to the NPT as

soon as possible.

Belarus was the first to do so, ratifying the NPT in 1993. It had

hesitated primarily for economic reasons, clearly having at least

113
14 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

considered whether there was some way of using

the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory to

gain economic benefits in a time of difficulty. Kazakhstan hesitated for these reasons as well, but

also was concerned about obtaining security assurances in return forgiving up the weapons. Nevertheless, the government of Kazakhstan followed

Belarus’ example and signed the NPT, submitting

it to parliament during a 1993 visit of U.S. Vice

President Al Gore and ratifying it by a near-unanimous vote on December 13, 1993.

In Ukraine, where the Treaty has faced the

greatest opposition, its fate is still uncertain. Resistance to giving up the nuclear weapons on its

territory was driven principally by security concerns--Ukraine being the most worried of the

three states about perceived Russian designs on its

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and very existence—but economic considerations were an issue there, too.

On the positive side, Ukrainian leaders have

stated that Ukraine will become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat y as soon as practicable, joining the regime as a non-nuclear-weapon

state. ] They have already succeeded in securing

ratification of the START I nuclear arms control

treaty by the parliament (or Rada), overturning a

previous action that had placed crippling conditions on that Treaty’s ratification.

However, Ukraine has failed to deliver on similar commitments in the past. In May 1992, Ukraine, along with the other nuclear inheritor states

of the FSU, signed the Lisbon Protocol to START

I, promising to ratify START I and to join the NPT

as a non-nuclear-weapon state.2 Indeed, since

1991, President Kravchuk has often stated that

Ukraine would eventually accede to the NPT.3

Many other politicians, however, were ambivalent on the issue. In May 1993, many urged the

Rada to keep at least some strategic nuclear rockets (all 46 of the SS-24s then on their territory) for

the near future. Around the same time, 162 members of the Rada (about 40 percent) signed a petition asserting that Ukraine was already a nuclearweapon state, since the Lisbon Protocol considers

the four inheritor states to be successor states for

the purpose of START I arms reductions. The petition further declared that Ukraine should remain a

nuclear-weapon state. This novel legalistic position, presented by Yuri Kostenko, head of the

Rada parliamentary working group on START I

ratification and disarmament, has not been accepted by any of the other former Soviet signatories of the Lisbon Protocol, nor by any Western

states.

In Ukraine, parliamentary debate on START I

began fitfully in June 1993. Postponing its consideration until the fall, the Rada “ratified” START I

on November 18, 1993 with a large number of

conditions attached, rendering the situation even

more ambiguous than before. To the consternation

of the international community, the conditions included a demand for additional international security guarantees, for foreign aid of at least $2.8 billion to cover the cost of weapon dismantlement,

and, most disturbingly, for the destruction of only

a fraction of the SS-19 and SS-24 missiles on its

territory. 4 The West had expected that all of the

SS- 19s and SS-24s would be destroyed, pursuant

to the Lisbon Protocol. The Rada specifically

‘ All signatories to the NPT other than five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states agree to forego nuclear weapons and are designated as

“non-nuclear-weapon states” by the Treaty. See f~x~mote 1, p. 3.

z Russia has made its own ratification Of START I (and START 11) contingent on Bela-us, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine honoring this pledge: that

is, to ratify START I and accede to the NPT.

3 See, for example, T. Bemauer et al., “Strategic Arms Control and the NIT: Status and Implementation,” G. Allison, et al., eds., “’Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds” (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and lntemational Affairs, Harvard University, January

1993), p. 48 and several press articles in FBIS, JPRS-TAC-93-O03, Feb. 25, 1993, pp. 30-34.

4 me Rada agreed t. the dismantlement of 36 percent of the launchers and 42 percent of the warheads in Ukraine. This fraction was determined by taking the fraction of launchers and warheads of the entire Soviet arsenal to be removed and applying it to those on Ukrainian territory.
Chapter 2 Threats to International Nonproliferation Regimes I 15

withheld ratification of Article V of the Lisbon

Protocol, which contained the commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon states

Considerable progress was made on January

14, 1994, when Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and

Kravchuk signed a trilateral declaration concerning the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The deal includes the agreement by Ukraine to transfer all nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia by the year

2000, as agreed under the Lisbon Protocols. In return, Russia will compensate Ukraine for the uranium in the warheads, valued at about $1 billion,

through some combination of cash, nuclear fuel

for Ukraine’s reactors, and partial relief of the substantial debt owed by Ukraine to Russia for previously shipped energy supplies. The uranium itself will be blended from high enrichment

(required for weapons) to much lower levels, characteristic of nuclear fuel for power reactors. In

addition, further security guarantees from Russia

and the United States, including recognition of

current borders, were given Ukraine, contingent

on accession to the NPT. The United States also

promised financial aid, including $175 million for

dismantlement costs and $155 million for economic development that it had earlier offered. After this agreement was reached, the Rada withdrew its earlier reservations about Article V of the

Lisbon Protocol and ratified the START I treaty

unconditionally on February 3, 1994.

The Rada also endorsed the trilateral presidential declaration on February 3, 1994, removing

considerable uncertainty as to whether the declaration would, in the end, be implemented. Even

so, many of the nationalist voices for a nuclear

Ukraine violently attacked the agreement and

President Kravchuk as well, some going so far as

to accuse him of “high treason.”6 In addition, the

Rada refused to ratify the NPT. It is likely that the

new Rada, elected on March 27, 1994, will consider the NPT after a resubmittal by President

Kravchuk.

The final outcome of the NPT in Ukraine will

depend on many political factors, including economic developments, the composition of the new

Rada, and the relationship between the president

and the Rada. Given, however, that Ukraine has

already committed to remove all Soviet nuclear

weapons from its territory, refusal to accede to the

NPT at this point appears to have lost any political

or strategic advantage, while the negative repercussions of a refusal would be considerable. The

logical outcome is, therefore, that Ukraine will

soon accede to the NPT, which would allow the

START process to continue, remove considerable

political uncertainty in eastern Europe, and eliminate a major threat to the long-term extension of

the NPT at the extension conference in 1995.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

As the possessor of the world’s largest chemical

weapon arsenal, Russia’s participation in the international chemical nonproliferation regime is

essential to its viability.7 Failure of the Russian

government to ratify and comply with the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, or to implement existing bilateral chemical disarmament

agreements with the United States, could therefore have serious consequences.

The United States and the Soviet Union arrived

at a number of chemical arms control agreements

in 1989 and 1990. On September 23, 1989, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister

Shevardnadze signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, that

s See J. Lepingwell, “The Ukrainian Parliament’s Resolution On START I Ratification,” Nov. 19, 1993, RFE/RL Research Institute FAX,

and S. Erlanger, “Ukraine’s Hedging on A-Arms Angers Russia,” The New York i’imes, Nov. 22, 1993.

6 See, for example, “UNA Accuses Kravchuk of ‘High Treason’ Over Nuclear Issue, “ Demokratychna Ukrqyina, Jan. 25, 1994 in FBISSOV-94-018, Jan. 27, 1994, p. 34, and’’Rukh Leader Terms Treaty Signing ‘National Betray al’,” UNIAN, Jan. 14, 1994, FBI S- SOV-94-1OI , p.

71.

T Of the republics of tie FSU, only Russia had significant capability in chemical and biological weapon research, although some pr(~ducti~~n

facilities and a test range were in what are now Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
16 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

provided for a two-phase process. The first phase

included bilateral facility visits and the exchange

of general data on each side’s chemical weapons.

Later, in a second phase, more detailed data would

be exchanged, with more rigorous bilateral inspections of chemical weapon production and

storage facilities for the purpose of verification of

the data. This agreement was carried further by the

Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production

of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning

Chemical Weapons (also known as the Bilateral

Destruction Agreement or BDA), signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on June 1, 1990. The

original version of this accord provided for the actual destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles

down to the level of 5,000 tonnes of agent on both

sides by the year 2002;8 the latest proposal is to revise the deadline to 9 years after the BDA enters

into force (which it has not yet done, pending

additional negotiations). In addition, both parties

agreed to stop producing chemical weapons and to

institute onsite inspections that would verify the

stockpile destruction.

In July 1992, the United States and Russia

signed an agreement to cooperate in the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. Under this

cooperation agreement, distinct from the BDA,

the United States promised about $25 million to

help Russia destroy its stockpile; there are ongoing discussions about possible further help. One

recent concrete result has been the decision to

fund the construction of a chemical demilitarization laboratory in Russia. U.S. aid is important because Russia currently lacks the funding and,

possibly, the technical infrastructure to dispose of

its stockpile in time to satisfy the requirements of

the Chemical Weapons Convention (assuming

that treaty’s entry into force).

An important first step was taken on January

10, 1994, when the United States and Russia

signed the 1994 Plan of Work for the U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Office in Moscow. This agreement paves the way for the release

of up to $55 million in so-called Nunn-Lugar

funding (see section in chapter 3 on U.S. assistance to the FSU)-including the $25 million referred to above-to initiate the program. U.S. help

will certainly speed up the process of chemical demilitarization, although it may not guarantee

achievement of the timetable.

The bilateral chemical weapon accords with the

United States had been intended to pave the way

for the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (e.g., by helping to persuade other nations to

accede and by providing a bilateral template for

inspections that would be overseen by multilateral

efforts later). However, the bilateral accords are

being overtaken by the progress of the Convention, which was opened for signature on January

13, 1993. Meanwhile, there have been many delays in the implementation of the two bilateral accords, in part caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent upheaval in Russia.

So far, there have been a general exchange of data

and some visits. Implementation of the second

phase of the MOU regarding inspections and detailed exchanges of data was delayed for some

time. Phase 11 was finally agreed to and implementation documents signed on January 14, 1994

in Moscow, and reciprocal inspections will begin

soon. In April 1994, the first of the information

exchanges actually occurred.

The United States has a number of concerns regarding Russian chemical weapons. First, the Soviet/Russian declaration of the total amount of

stockpiled chemical weapons (equivalent to

40,000 tons of agent) has aroused skepticism

8 me soviet union had dal~d ~,~ tomes of ~hemica] weapon agents in i~ st~kpile; the united States has approximately 31,~

tonnes. United States General Accounting Off@ “Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” GAO/

NSIAD-94-136, March 1994, pp. 10-11.
Chapter 2 Threats to International Nonproliferation Regimes I 17

among some observers in the United States and

even in Russia, who feel this number is too l0W.

9

Second, allegations of continued Russian chemical weapon development have attracted international attention. In the best known instance, one

scientist previously working in the Soviet chemical weapon complex, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, has

claimed in the Russian and American press that

Russia was developing new, highly potent binary

agents, at least on a laboratory scale. 10 While not

yet a violation of the letter of the BDA (which

would restrict the production, rather than the development, of chemical weapons), such activity

would certainly violate the spirit and the norms of

the evolving international regime on the banning

of chemical weapons. Moreover, if this development were to continue after the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force, it would violate

that treaty. Official Russian statements have been

evasive as to whether Dr. Mirzayanov’s allegations are true, but his prosecution for revealing

state secrets (only recently halted) lends some

credibility to his testimony.

A third concern has been the lack of progress in

implementing the two bilateral accords. Although

agreement has been reached on Phase II of the

MOU, the BDA remains deadlocked. After delays, talks were finally held in March 1993, but

Russia failed to follow up on the agreement, despite several requests by the United States. In September 1993, the Russians still had not agreed to

follow up and instead asked for additional

changes to the text.

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

CONVENTION

Recently, concerns have arisen in the United

States about the delayed Russian compliance with

the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

If these concerns are not satisfactorily addressed,

that treaty regime could be threatened.

For some time, the United States had suspected

the Soviet Union of conducting biological warfare

activity despite Soviet ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Soviet Union’s

status as a depository government of that treaty. In

1979, scores of people died of respiratory anthrax

in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), caused by

what the United States suspected—and the Russian press and politicians have since confirmed—

was an accidental release from a military research

facility. Further revelations concerning the Soviet/Russian biological weapon program have appeared in the Russian and international press. On

April 11, 1992, Russian President Yeltsin issued a

decree securing Russian fulfillment of its international obligations and confirming the termination

9 U.S. Director Of central Intelligence R. James Woolsey, elaborating on his testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in February 1993, stated for the record that “We cannot confirm that the Russian declaration of 40,000 metric tons is accurate. In addition,

we cannot confirm that the total stockpile is stored only at the seven sites declared by the Soviets—all of which are in Russia. Some other republics maintain that Russia still has CW [chemical weapon] materials on their territories.” In fact, according to a press report, some Russian officials have conceded the number is too low. See M. Gordon, “Moscow Is Making Little Progress In Disposal of Chemical Weapons,” The Newp

York Times, Dec. 1, 1993. Further, on Mar. 10, 1994, Aleksei Yablokov, Chairman of the Russian Security Council’s Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, claimed that up to a factor of 10 more chemical weapon stocks had been manufactured in the Soviet Union. Reportedly, the excess over 40,000 tons had been dumped. See, for example, Radio Rossii, Mar. 10, 1994 in FBIS-SOV-94-048, Mar. 11, 1994, p. 28.

A report of the House Committee on Armed Services, “Countenng the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat in the Post-Soviet World”

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 23, 1993), refers to a report in The Washington 7imes alleging that the U.S. Defense

Intelligence Agency put the Soviet stockpile at 75,000 tons, whereas the Central Intelligence Agency estimated the total hto be under 50,000

tons.

10 See W. Eng]und, The Ba/timore Sun, Sept. 17, 1992, and V. Miryazanov and L. Fedorov, “A Poisoned Policy,” Moskokovskiye Novosti,

Sept. 20, 1992 and more details in an interview with Miryazanov, Moskovskiye Novosri, May 30,1993, from FBIS, JPRS-TND-93-016, June 1,

1993. Binary agents consist of two relatively harmless substances that, when mixed together, react to form the nerve agent.
18 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

of offensive biological weapon research. 11 Nevertheless, reports persist in the press that allege continuing biological warfare research activity on the

part of the military, possibly without the knowledge or consent of political leaders.l2

In September 1992, the United States, the

United Kingdom, and Russia agreed to allow

mutual visits to biological facilities and to exchange data in order to address concerns regarding

compliance with the BWC. Under the provisions

of the agreement, visits will be allowed at anytime

(and by either side—some U.S. visits have triggered Russian requests for visits to U.S. facilities)

to any nonmilitary biological research site in order

to remove ambiguities. Visits to military facilities

are envisioned in the second phase of the agreement. This provision is subject to the need to respect proprietary information on the basis of

agreed principles. Except for that constraint, such

visits will permit unrestricted access, sampling,

interviews with personnel, and audio and video

taping. As of December 1993, some visits and

data exchanges had been carried out, but more

work along these lines is needed to satisfy U.S. officials that Russian former biological weapon facilities do not constitute “an active or short-term

standby illegal program.”13

SUMMARY

If Ukraine, following Belarus and Kazakhstan, accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

two major proliferation threats will have been successfully averted: as NPT parties, these states will

have committed themselves not to seek possession or control over the Soviet nuclear weapons on

their territories, and they will have agreed not to

“mine” the materials in the weapons or in civilian

nuclear facilities to manufacture their own devices.

The slow pace of implementation of Russia’s

chemical and biological nonproliferation obligations, on the other hand, has given the United

States cause for some concern over Russia’s commitment to these regimes. Russian noncompliance could have serious consequences. However, the United States and Russia are in

frequent contact on these matters. Russian officials seem to be striving towards eventual implementation, but there is still concern over the

possibility that the military may be continuing

its chemical and biological weapon activities

beyond control of the political leadership. Finally, an indication of Russian government concern with its progress towards chemical and biological weapon dismantlement might be found in

the fact that on April 8, 1994, Anatoly Kuntsevich

was dismissed from his post as chief of the office

for dismantling chemical and biological weapons.

This official had been responsible for building

much of the Soviet Union’s chemical weapon capabilities, and his commitment to dismantling

these weapons was widely mistrusted by Western

diplomats as well as by Russians.14

I I of tie repub]ics of tic FSI_J, only Russia had significant biological wiUfme capability; s= footnote 7.

12 Sa J. A~ms, “me Red Death,” The London 7imes, Mar. 27, 1994.

13 An America offlci~ quoted in M. Gordon, The New York ~mes, Op. Cit., fooblok 9.

14 ITAR.TASS, MOSCOW, Apr. 8, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-068, Apr. 8, 1994, p. 32. See also J. Adams, footnote 13.
.

Blocking

Access to

Nuclear Weapons,

Materials, and

Expertise 3

E

ven if Russia and the other newly independent states meet

their obligations under international nonproliferation

treaties, considerable dangers will still remain. Nuclear

weapons or weapon materials might find their way into

the hands of foreign governments or nongovernmental groups.

Experts on nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction

might assist foreign weapon programs by working directly for

them, or by transferring vital information or sensitive technology

that would help proliferants produce their own weapons. To forestall these threats, the newly independent states must strengthen

controls over nuclear weapons and weapon materials, implement

international safeguards at nuclear facilities, institute effective

export control and customs procedures, and provide alternate employment for technical professionals.

None of the measures mentioned above can be carried out if the

central government authorities in these states do not have effective control over legal, administrative, and other vital activities

on their territories. At present, such control cannot always be assumed to exist in Russia or any of the other newly independent

states. An obvious indication of this state of affairs was the violent showdown between the president and the parliament in Moscow in September 1993. But beyond the battle among reformers

and democrats, nationalists, old communists, and various lesser

groupings, central authority appears to have broken down from

several points of view. Of particular importance are criminal activity, endemic corruption, and strong, semi-autonomous local

authorities which have, to various degrees, taken certain adminI 19
20 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

istrative powers from Moscow.1 Levels of disorganization and anarchy in other former Soviet republics vary, but in all cases, central authority

over important matters-for example, customs

services or physical security over nuclear installations-cannot be assumed. Until the situation stabilizes and improves, this reality must set the

framework for the policies discussed in the rest of

this study.2

POLITICAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, the first concern of the West was who

had control over Soviet nuclear weapons while the

political situation was in flux. The world saw a

news photograph of a military technician handing

Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, what was

purported to be the box for transmitting nuclear

launch release codes. A few months earlier, during

the aborted coup of the old-line apparatchiks in

August, it had not been clear who had effectively

controlled the “football” during the four critical

days of turmoil.3

The situation was more complicated than this

might indicate: under the new political structure

of the successor republics to the former Soviet

Union (FSU), emerging leaders of several of the

former Soviet republics formed an entity called

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

It comprised the states of the former Soviet Union

except for the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), Georgia, and Azerbaijan.4 As

part of CIS military cooperation, the former Soviet strategic nuclear forces were placed under

nominal CIS command, headed by the last Soviet

Defense Minister, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. In conjunction with Shaposhnikov, control

over these nuclear forces was supposed to be exercised by the heads of state of the four former Soviet republics that were left with strategic nuclear

weapons on their soil: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,

and Kazakhstan. This temporary resolution mollified concerned policymakers around the world,

but only somewhat.

In addition to the strategic nuclear forces, now

apparently under control of what appeared to be

reasonably stable new nations, there were tens of

thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia insisted from January 1992 onwards that these

weapons—more portable than their strategic

counterparts, and possibly usable by local military

commanders—should be returned to its territory

forthwith.

In fact, the Soviet Union had in 1990 already

begun to withdraw some nuclear weapons from

regions where near-civil war had reigned, such as

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. By exerting

1 In some respects, this devolution of power may be considered positive because it would tend to result in greater home rule. However, often

the local authorities are not democratically oriented oflicials but, rather, authoritarian figures who resist Moscow to maximize their own power

and wealth.’rhe extreme example of this is in Chechnya, a small republic in the north Caucasus, where a former Soviet Army General, Dzhokar

Dudayev, has installed himself as President of a self-declared independent republic. (No other area in the Russian Federation has asserted full

independence.) Constant turmoil has resulted, and there is little evidence that Dudayev’s government is engaged in carrying out the popular

will. The opposition to Dudayev, although strong, is kept in check by military means, and, even within Chechnya, local areas have established

varying allegiances.

2 Fore xample, see Robert Seely, “NuclearTheft Found at Chernobyl,” The Washirz~ron Posf, Nw. 12, 1993, p. A44, and “Nuclear Fuel Rods

Stolen From Murmansk Naval Base,” Moscow Ostankino Television, Dec. 2, 1993, FBIS, JPRS-TND-93-001, Jan. 6, 1994, p. 24. The latter

case is of particular concern, as the stolen material was probably highly enriched uranium, suitable for weapons. Some press reports later described the missing quantity as only a few kilograms, far short of the amount needed for a nuclear weapon. Later reports asserted that the material

had been recovered. Nevertheless, the fact that this extremely sensitive material could be stolen from a military facility in the first place is worrisome.

3 Explanations were later given that the~ were actually three “footballs” which all had to be in agreement for a nuclear launch to occur,

possessed by the President, the Defense Minister, and the military Chief of Staff. The explanation was not particularly reassuring, since it was

not certain who was acting in these positions during the coup. It was clear that President Gorbachev’s “football” was not under his effective

control.

4 Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the CIS in 1993.

8
Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 21

strong pressure, the Russian government was apparently successful in transferring all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to its territory by July 1992,

as it had earlier promised. This accomplishment

was achieved in spite of a temporary halt in the

transfers by Ukraine in April.5 Worldwide interest

in the situation, together with Russian economic

threats, resulted in a rescission of the Ukrainian

effort to freeze the shipment of the tactical nuclear

weapons to Russia.

By July 1992, therefore, some of the most immediate nuclear proliferation issues resulting from

the end of the Soviet Union—those concerning

operational control over the Soviet nuclear stockpile—had been at least partially resolved.6 Moreover, the discussion of NPT issues in chapter 2

also shows that the ultimate status of the strategic

nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may be close to resolution as well. Nevertheless, many other issues, only slightly less pressing, remain on the agenda, as described below.

SECURITY OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS

The question of which governments will assert

political control over Soviet nuclear weapons appears nearly settled. However, serious questions

remain concerning the security and operational

control of weapons and nuclear materials in their

current locations, particularly given the questionable degree of societal control exercised by central

governments in the newly independent states.

Aside from Russia, the newly independent republics have all had to constitute armed forces and

local security personnel more or less from what

was left of the Soviet Army after Russia (and, to a

lesser extent, Ukraine) appropriated the lion’s

share. Most Soviet Army officers were Russian or

Ukrainian, leaving a leadership vacuum in most of

the other republics. For example, in Belarus, most

of the officers are still Russian. One of the last of

the former Soviet republics to establish its own

armed forces was Kazakhstan, one of the four nuclear inheritor states. If the quality and cohesiveness of newly constituted security forces is not of

the highest level, the ability of these forces to provide adequate physical protection of nuclear

weapons and materials necessarily suffers.7

This issue is even more acute considering that

some Middle Eastern states (notably Iran), apparently interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, are

reportedly actively engaged in efforts to establish

strong ties with central Asian states that possess

parts of the defunct U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons

complex. Again, Kazakhstan, an attractive target

due to its nuclear facilities, is a region of concern.

A government seeking to prevent nuclear proliferation must prevent the diversion not only of

nuclear weapons, but also of nuclear material useful to weapon manufacture. The two materials of

primary concern are highly enriched uranium

(consisting of at least 20 percent of the fissionable

uranium-235 isotope) and plutonium.8 There is

also some concern about low-enriched uranium,

5 See, e.g., TASS report Mar. 12, 1992, from FBIS JPRS-TAC-92-012, Apr. 9, 1992 on the halt in transfers, and TASS report Apr. 16, 1992,

from FBIS-SOV-92-075, Apr. 17, 1992, on the agreement, later carried out, to move the weapons from Ukraine to Russia by July 1, 1992.

6 In June 1993, the military organization of the CIS was dissolved at a meeting of the CIS heads of state. At this point, the nuclear rocket

forces came under unambiguous Russian control. (Previously, the control was ambiguously Russian: the heads of state of the four nuclear inheritor states allegedly held the right of veto over a launch, but except for Russia, this right was exercised only by consultation.)

7 Protection of nuclear weapons in the non-Russian nuclear inheritor states is accomplished by Russian forces, except in Ukraine, where

military forces securing nuclear weapons have been pressured to swear allegiance to Ukraine, However, civilian nuclear materials are protected

by the security forces of the country in which the facilities are located.

8 Both weapon-grade plutonium (composed of more than 90 percent of the plutonium-239 isotope most useful for nuclear weapons) and

reactor-grade plutonium (that is, with more than 20 percent of the plutonium isotopes other than plutonium-239) pose serious proliferation

concerns, since either can be used to make nuclear weapons. See ch. 4 of U.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Desfruclion, OTA-BP-ISC-1 15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993).
22 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

which might be enriched to weapon grade with

substantially less effort than needed to enrich natural uranium; heavy water and ultra-pure graphite,

either of which can be used as a moderator with

natural uranium fuel to operate a plutonium-producing reactor; and tritium, a radioactive isotope

of hydrogen that can be used to increase greatly

the explosive power of so-called “boosted” nuclear weapons.

Nearly all nations with nuclear power or research reactors have accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, designed to

verify—through inspections and technical analyses—that nuclear material destined for civilian

use at declared nuclear facilities has not been diverted to weapon applications. The five declared

nuclear-weapon states—the United States, Russia

(formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China—are exempt from these

inspections, but all have agreed, at least in principle, to inspections of some civilian facilities. In

practice, very few sites in the Soviet Union were

ever submitted to these international safeguards.

Due both to the lack of international safeguards

requirements on the Soviet Union and to the political power of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), which has long been successful in protecting its turf against other bureaucracies, most

nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union have

never had to meet IAEA standards for material

control and accountancy (MC&A). Until early

1992, there was no nuclear energy regulatory

authority, analogous to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in any of the former Soviet

states. Therefore, none of these republics had an

agency with the practical political power and technical expertise to conduct independent assessments of system safety and of safeguards against

material diversion. Most of the republics have

minimal expertise in these matters; in fact, up to

90 percent of the technical nuclear expertise of the

former Soviet Union resides in Russia.9

In Russia, an independent nuclear oversight organization, GOSATOMNADZOR, was created in

1992. In an April 1993 decree, President Boris

Yeltsin reaffirmed GOSATOMNADZOR’S authority to inspect all nuclear facilities, including

those of both the Ministry of Defense and MINATOM.10 Nevertheless, MINATOM and the Ministry of Defense have resisted GOSATOMNADZOR’S efforts to inspect their facilities.11 Some

other republics, notably Belarus, have moved to

set up similar oversight bodies, and Ukraine and

Kazakhstan, along with others, have set up atomic

energy authorities that at least may begin to monitor, control, or operate nuclear facilities on their

territory.

There are potential problems, therefore, not

only in Russia, but even more so in other republics

with significant nuclear facilities. Lithuania has a

nuclear power station with two RBMK (Chernobyl-type) reactors. Ukraine has many reactors of

several types. Armenia has a two-reactor power

station located in a seismically unstable zone. The

Armenian reactors—although undamaged—were

shut down following a major earthquake in 1989.

9 see w. pOtt~r, •~NuC]~M Ex~rts From the Former Soviet Union: What’s New, What’s True, ’’Arms COnWO/ T~ay, J~./Feb. 1993, PP. 3- 10”

Note especially the statement, “A problem common to all of the non-Russian states is the absence of virtually any expoti control structure or

cadre of personnel trained in matters of export controls, material accounting, physical protection and international safeguards. ’’The fact that the

great majority of the Soviet Union’s nuclear expertise resides in Russia is supported by the American Physical Scwiety’s discovery, in providing

grants to aid physicists from the former Soviet Union, that 90 percent of the physicists were in Russia. Moreover, an analysis of surnames of

known staff at the Arzamas- 16 nuclear weapon laboratory, prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, shows the great majority of

them to be of ethnic Russian origin. This test is, of course, not definitive, but supports the conclusion that an overwhelming fraction of nuclear

expertise in the Soviet Union was Russian.

10 Cumn[ly, even though GOSATOMFJADZOR” has been given authority, it has not yet implemented oversight and control over safety md

safeguards.

I I ‘*Russlm Energy, &fen~ Ministries OPPOSC Nuclear IWectiOn$ “ INTERFAX, Apr. 28, 1993, cited in FBIS, JPRS-TAC-93-O04-L,

May 3, 1993, p. 2.
Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 23

With Russian help, however, the government is

trying to restart them. Several republics have research reactors, some with highly enriched uranium fuel. Most importantly, Kazakhstan has a

large (350 megawatt thermal) breeder reactor,

which is designed to produce plutonium for a civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Some experimental nuclear fuel, containing a large fraction of relatively

easily separable plutonium mixed with uranium,

may still be located near the site. This fuel was not

heavily irradiated and therefore may be relatively

easily transported, and its plutonium removed,

without the severe radiation hazard that would

face anyone seeking to recover plutonium from

more heavily irradiated fuel. For that reason, it

might prove especially attractive to a nuclear proliferant.

Although the Baltic States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,

and Kazakhstan have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and other newly independent states

have indicated that they will do so, only Lithuania

has thus far implemented the agreements with the

IAEA that would put international safeguards into

practice.

12 Most of the facilities in these states do

not have highly enriched uranium or plutonium

directly suitable for weapons, but a few—as mentioned above--do. Therefore, until safeguards are

put in place, civilian nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union could, in principle, lose nuclear

material suitable for weapons to the black market,

or such material could fall into the hands of states

seeking nuclear weapons, without the world being

any the wiser. The situation is aggravated by:

m

●

the lack of nuclear safeguards expertise in many

of the republics;

the inefficiency of border controls, as new

states are just beginning to set up effective customs services;

■

■

■

the nascent state of export control legislation

and implementation in most of the new republics;

the state of civil turmoil in some of them; and

near-universal economic hardship.

In the resulting situation, the susceptibility of

officials, technicians, and people at all levels of

society to bribery and subornation is an inviting

factor for those parties seeking to obtain nuclear

materials illicitly.

U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR WEAPON AND

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE FSU

It is in the United States’ interest to ensure that nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in the former

Soviet Union are kept under tight governmental

control. A number of different programs have

been instituted by the United States for this purpose.

The first involves weapons to be dismantled

under parallel arms reduction initiatives announced in fall, 1991, by Presidents Bush and

Gorbachev. Formally separate from the START

arms control treaties, these initiatives called for

thousands of nuclear weapons in the United States

and the Soviet Union to be dismantled, including

some now in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

(START I and START II call for reductions in

deployed weapons, including missile, submarine,

and aircraft delivery systems, but they do not address the disposition of the warheads themselves.)

The security of the nuclear material removed from

the weapons and placed into storage is a paramount issue.

On December 12, 1991, the Nunn-Lugar

Amendment (sponsored by the Senators from

Georgia and Indiana, respectively) to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Support Act be12 me IAEA is asslstlng may of tie former soviet republics in both nuclear safety and safeguards, trying to hasten the process Of puming the

appropriate agreements and safeguards into place. The list of NIT parties is current as of July 31, 1994. In addition, Moldova ratified the NFT on

April 24, 1994 but has not yet deposited its instrument of ratification, which is necessary for it to formally join the treaty.

13 me u s inltlatlve, announced in Resident Bush’s speech to the nation on Sept. 27, 1991, encouraged the .%viet Union to fallow suit. . .

President Gorbachev then announced his initiative in a speech delivered on Oct. 5, 1991.
24 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

came law (Public Law 102-228). This authorizing

legislation provided for the transfer of $400 million of Department of Defense (DOD) funds in fiscal year 1992 to help accomplish the safe destruction and secure storage of weapons of mass

destruction in the Soviet Union and its inheritor

states. In addition, the legislation provided for

programs to establish verifiable safeguards

against the proliferation of these weapons, create

an International Science and Technology Center

to provide research opportunities for Soviet weapon scientists, and increase military contacts between the United States and the Soviet nuclear inheritor states. On the same day, legislation

actually appropriating these funds also became

law (Public Law 102-229). Equal amounts were

authorized in DOD authorization and appropriation bills in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, providing, in all, up to $1.2 billion in available funds. 14

In the fiscal year 1993 legislation, the mandate

was broadened to include defense conversion.

Moreover, for fiscal year 1994, the Nunn-Lugar

funding has become an additional line item, not a

reprogramming of existing DOD funds.

The program based on these funds has become

known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). Legislation requires that the funded

programs:

should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United

States technology and United States technicians.15

This language was inserted since many Members of Congress were reluctant to spend money

on foreign aid to a former adversary at the same

time that domestic programs faced tight fiscal limitations. Nearly all of the funds that have so far

been obligated will be used to purchase material

support and equipment from U.S. firms or will be

used to finance assistance by the U.S. government

and its experts, as opposed to purchasing local

equipment or funding local experts.

One problem with the program has been the extremely slow pace of implementation, leading

many in the FSU to doubt the sincerity of the

United States’ commitment to assistance (see

table 2). For example, of the $1.2 billion authorized for the CTR program, less than 10 percent—$1 17 million—had been obligated as of

March 22, 1994.16 Some of the delays had been

due to difficulties in reaching agreements on implementation with the recipient states, but this aspect of the problem has now been generally resolved. An additional source of delay has been the

slowness of the U.S. government to implement

the program. Decisions by the Department of Defense on funding given projects have sometimes

been slow. In fact, about $208 million in fiscal

year 1992 Nunn-Lugar funds were lost (until replaced by fiscal year 1994 line item funds) because they were not spent in time. In addition to

delays in the executive branch, the four congressional Appropriations and Armed Services committees must be notified 15 days in advance of any

obligation of funds. The Department of Defense is

reluctant to proceed with obligations against the

preference of these committees.

The relative share of Nunn-Lugar funds spent

in the FSU, compared to that share spent on U.S.

consultants, is another topic of ongoing concern.

Defense officials have been quoted as taking the

14 An ~xce]lent ~ummw of tie legislative hi~t~ry ~d its implementation may be found in The{tior Ga]di, congressional Research Service,

“The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement: Background and Implementation,” 93- 1057F

(Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Dec. 29, 1993). The related discussion in the text relies heavily on this repon.

15 ~blic ~w 102-’2Z8, Sec.z 12 (b), ~c. 12, 1991. section 1203 (c) of the Defense Authorization Act of 1993 later added kmguage emphasizing the use of the U.S. private sector. Congressional Record, p. H9252, Nov. 10, 1993.

16 Telef~ co~unlcatlo~” from the office of the ASSISt~t to the secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Apr. 25, 1994.
Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 25

Country Program Notifications Obligations

Kazakhstan

Russia

Ukraine

Belarus

Emergency response

Export control

Communications link

Defense contacts

Site restoration

Defense conversion

Propellant elimination

Subtotal

Material control and accounting

Communication link

Export control

Emergency response

Defense contacts

Defense conversion

Strategic arms elimination

Subtotal

Emergency response

Armored blankets

Fissile material containers

Railcar conversion

International Science and Technology Center

Material control and accounting

Chemical demilitarization

Pu storage facility design

Export control

Storage facility equipment

Strategic arms elimination

Arctic waste

Defense contacts

Chemical weapon destruction laboratory

Defense conversion

Subtotal

Science and Technology Center

Material control and accounting

Emergency response

Communication link

Export control

Defense contacts

Strategic arms elimination

Reactor safety

Defense conversion

Subtotal

Other

Total

5.00 3.70

16.26 0.44

2.30 0.30

1.50

25.00 0.21

20.00 0.52

6.00

76.06 5.17

5.00

2.30 0.01

2.26

5.00

0.40

15.00

70.00

99.96

15.00

5.00

50.00

21.50

25.00

30.00

25.00

15.00

2.26

75.00

130.00

20.00

9.20

30.00

40.00

492.96

10.00

12,50

5.00

2.40 0.01

7.26 0.01

3.90

185.00 0.16

11.00 0.00

40.00

277.06 0.18

3.35

946.04 117.44

0.11

0.12

11.34

3.24

42.90

20.00

1.42

0.42

0.05

14.95

4.20

7.37

2.66

0.07

108.62

SOURCE Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, April 1994
26 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

word “feasible” in the authorizing legislation to

provide a “guiding tenet” to spend Nunn-Lugar

funds in the United States.17 However, direct assistance would provide more of a boost to stabilize

the local economy. Moreover, it would also generate far more good will in the recipient nation,

which now sees U.S. funds going mainly to U.S.

firms. Finally, in many cases, given the relative

costs of goods and services procured in the FSU

as opposed to the United States, the cost to the

United States for a given project could be substantially cheaper if purchases were made locally.

The entire program of U.S. assistance in the

area of dismantling weapons and safeguarding nuclear material in the FSU is known as the Safe and

Secure Dismantlement (SSD) program. This program is directed by the Department of State, but

funded by the Department of Defense, which is responsible for the details of its implementation.

The chief issues related to the dismantlement

effort are whether and how to monitor the dismantlement process, how to monitor the amount and

location of the nuclear material removed from

weapons, and the ultimate disposition of the

weapon plutonium. The United States would like

to be sure that the weapons really are dismantled,

and that the resulting nuclear material is placed in

storage rather than diverted or recycled into other

weapons. The Russians, however, refuse to accept verification of dismantlement in Russia in

the absence of reciprocity regarding monitoring and verification of similar dismantlement

in the United States. This matter is being addressed by the agreement between MINATOM

and the U.S. Department of Energy, reached on

March 16, 1994, which provides for reciprocal inspection of storage and, possibly, dismantlement

facilities. However, many specific issues await

resolution through discussions between the

United States and the Russian governments.

There is also a question of whether the IAEA

should have a role in monitoring the dismantlement or storage of the nuclear material from U.S.

and Russian weapons. As an international organization, the IAEA might be considered a neutral

and trustworthy third party, and therefore a logical

partner in helping put into place a major arms control agreement. On the other hand, both the United

States and Russia might feel more comfortable

dealing only with inspectors from the other party,

rather than with an inspectorate drawn from many

different countries. Furthermore, the IAEA has

experience in nuclear safeguards, not in verifying

and monitoring arms control agreements. New expertise and perspectives would have to be attained

by this agency for such a regime to work well.

More importantly, if some of the stored nuclear

material were in its original weapon form, IAEA

involvement would give rise to concerns about

keeping nuclear weapon design information secret from the inspectors, who might be nationals

of would-be proliferant states. Finally, involving

the IAEA would also considerably complicate the

political issue, requiring a third party in implementation negotiations.

Another cooperative project between the

United States and the nuclear inheritor states of

the Soviet Union involves the purchase by the

United States of 500 tonnes of highly enriched

uranium (HEU) to be recovered from dismantled

Soviet weapons, which will be diluted to low-enrichment levels and transferred to the United

States.’* The Russians and the other inheritor

states will receive much needed hard currency

IT A &~Cripti(Jn of the Sima(ion regarding both U.S. Agency for international Development projects and those under Nunn-1.mgar (~)

may be found in J. Fialka, “Helping Ourselves: U.S. Aid to Russia is Quite a Windfall—For U.S. Consultants,” The Wa//Streer Journal, Feb. 24,

1994, p. Al.

18 Transfernng this fuel t. the United States serves the purpose of getting it out of the FSU and removes the ~)ssibility Of diversion. The

United States preferred this optim to having the Russians sell this fuel on the world market because such a large new supply of uranium would

disrupt the market and make it more difficult for the United States, with its much higher-cost enrichment facilities, to compete. With this agreement, the United States can exert some control over the entry of this material into the market.
.

Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 27

($11.9 billion over 20 years) .19 The distribution of

the revenue among the four inheritor states has not

yet been finally worked out, but there appears to

bean understanding to that effect among the four

states, reflected in the decisions by the three nonRussian governments to return all nuclear weapons on their soil to Russia for dismantlement and

removal of the HEU. The purchase is meant to be

revenue-neutral in the United States: the material

would be resold to electric utilities to fuel their

power reactors.

Even less tractable than dealing with HEU is

the question of ultimate disposition of plutonium.

The United States has yet to decide what to do

with its own stores of plutonium recovered from

weapons, and it is not in a position to urge any particular long-term solution upon the Russians. The

United States is, however, helping design and pay

for a plutonium storage facility in Russia.

The U.S. Department of Energy, through its

newly created Office of Fissile Material Disposition, is currently examining various means of plutonium disposal, ranging from burning the material in various types of reactors to burial after

vitrification with high-level nuclear waste. Proliferation resistance is but one of the criteria that will

be used to select an ultimate disposition mechanism-others include health, safety, and environmental considerations. Regardless of the approach selected for ultimate disposition of

plutonium, the bulk of the plutonium will be

placed into storage for at least the next 10 years

and probably longer.20

Besides the Nunn-Lugar legislation and the

HEU purchase agreement, another vehicle for providing funds to the FSU is the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-51 1), with its

follow-on authorizing legislation for fiscal year

1994. 21 This law provides for technical and humanitarian assistance through the foreign aid budget

to promote reform, democratization, and trade;

help attract foreign investment to the FSU; and

improve civilian nuclear reactor safety. Although

this law does not directly affect DOD funds, it is

linked to the Nunn-Lugar legislation: Title V of

this act restates the Nunn-Lugar legislation as then

pending before the armed services committees.

Moreover, section 1441 of the fiscal year 1993

Defense Authorization Act authorizes DOD to

participate in joint civilian R&D programs with

the FSU states through a non-governmental

foundation established by the FREEDOM Support Act.

Section 511 of the FREEDOM Support Act authorizes the establishment of a nongovernmental

foundation intended to foster joint research projects between scientists from the United States and

republics of the FSU. Unlike the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), the project is

not aimed at weapon scientists, but civilian ones.

But like the ISTC, goals include defense conversion, stabilizing the economy of the states of the

FSU, and providing R&D opportunities for scientists there. The director of the National Science

Foundation is authorized to establish this foundation in consultation with the director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Further, within the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, reprogramming of up to $25 million was permitted for

this purpose. Until recently, the Defense Department had not moved ahead with this program.

However, in April 1994, there were indications

19 ~e~s Re]ea~e (Jnl(ed states Enrlchmen[ c(~m., J~. ] 4 ]994. ‘rhis publicly owned co~~ration is acting as the ‘“executive agent” for the

United States in the’transaction. The government intends to privatize it eventually.

Zo A num~r of smdies have I(x)ked at tie dism~tlement of nuclear weapons and the disposition of the resuhing nUCleM materials. See, for

example, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Disbanding the Bomb and Managing (he Nuclear Mareria/s, OTA-O-572 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993), B. Chow and K. .%lomon, Limiting ~he Spread of Weapon-Usable Fissile Materials (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), and National Academy of Sciences, “Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium”

(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994).

21 FREEDOM is an acronym for Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets.
28 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

that at least $10 million would be made available,

thus starting a new mechanism for providing assistance to FSU scientists. 22

A final major program of U.S. government

scientific and technical cooperation with the FSU

is contained in the fiscal year 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Public Law 103-87),

which appropriates $35 million for partnerships

among U.S. industry, universities, Department of

Energy (DOE) national laboratories, and major

FSU institutes. The purpose of this program—

known as the Laboratory-Industry Partnership

Program (LIPP)—is to “stabilize the technology

base in the cooperating [FSU] states” and “prevent

and reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction.”

Ten national laboratories proposed joint projects involving themselves, U.S. industry, and U.S.

universities, together with partners in the FSU.23

Private industry is represented by a group of corporations (the membership is still open) called the

United States Industry Coalition (USIC). The Department of Energy, working with the Department

of State, set up LIPP to select which projects will

be funded. The scope of projects is similar to those

under Nunn-Lugar funding. At present, funding is

only available for fiscal year 1994, and the funding mechanism is highly unusual in that money

for DOE projects at DOE laboratories is taken

from the Department of State’s budget ($5.3 billion in fiscal year 1993), rather than DOE’s budget

(which, for comparison, was over three times larger than State’s, at $17.7 billion in fiscal year

1993).

The LIPP is aimed at commercialization of

products in collaboration with the private sector

and does not emphasize basic research, presumzz Science SCOW, Science, Apr. 29, 1994, P. 647.

ably since such research is meant to be funded

through the International Science and Technology

Center. Some current lab-to-lab projects that are

focused on basic research, including several run

out of Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories,

might thus not receive LIPP funding. This situation could be resolved by providing separate

line items in the DOE budget for lab-to-lab

projects (selected and run by each laboratory

individually) and for the LIPP program, or one

line item for joint projects both within LIPP

and outside it. The amount of funding for such

possible line items would have to be determined

both by the demonstrated need of promising projects (which could be gleaned from the proposals

already submitted to the ISTC and to be submitted

to LIPP) and by a decision on the general availability of funds for joint research projects with scientists of the FSU.

NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT

CONTROLS

9 Russia

Of all the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, only Russia has established a

meaningful export control system. Nearly all the

Soviet expertise, capability, databases, and other

elements essential to export controls remain in

MOSCOW.

24 Since the export control systems in all

the republics are only in early stages of creation,

the legal bases for these systems lie largely in

presidential decrees, not legal statutes, with the

exception of a single law passed in late May 1993

by the Russian parliament.25 The United States

has offered all four nuclear inheritor states techniZJ me U.S. la~)ratories are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratov, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the

National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories.

24 This conclusion Cm be drawn from statements made by several wpresentatives of former Soviet republics at a symposium on expoti

control, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and held at Airlie House, Warrenton, VA on June 14-16, 1993.

25 mls law defines exwn control violations as criminal acts, punishable by three to eight years in detention.
Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 29

cal aid in establishing export control systems,

consisting of conferences for experts from those

countries, training of officials, help in drafting

legislation, and the transfer of technical equipment for border controls. These offers were contingent on reaching “umbrella” agreements for the

Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) program

between the United States and each state. As noted

in the previous chapter, the SSD program is designed to help the former Soviet republics dismantle those nuclear weapons to be eliminated under

the Russian unilateral initiative of October 1991.

By the end of 1993, all four nuclear inheritor states

had signed those agreements and several subsidiary implementing accords. The only exception is

the implementation agreement with Russia on export control assistance. Corresponding accords in

this area have been signed with the other three.

In Russia, the most important presidential decree relating to export controls is Decree 388

(April 11, 1992) creating an interministerial commission to handle approvals for export licenses.

Corresponding to U.S. practice, the relevant Russian Ministries (e.g., Defense, Foreign Economic

Relations, and Foreign Affairs) participate in decisionmaking. Decisions on granting licenses are

based in part on a set of developed lists, which the

Russian government claims are consistent with

the lists formulated by existing multilateral export

control regimes: COCOM guidelines for hightechnology conventional weapons,26 the Nuclear

Suppliers Group Guidelines for nuclear dual-use

items, and the Australia Group guidelines restricting transfers of chemical and biological materials

and equipment. The Russians also claim to adhere

to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, even though Russia is not formally a member of that regime (see section below on Missile

Technology). In summary, the Russian government has a mechanism in place for regulating exports of weapons of mass destruction and means

of their delivery, and it has declared that it will

comply with international norms in this area.

However, the Russian system does not yet have an

adequate legislative basis.

Even with an adequate set of export control

laws, however, there is still the matter of implementation. Under the Soviet Union, the flow of

goods had been controlled by highly intrusive and

restrictive border police actions, and more directly

by the fact that foreign trade was a state monopoly

and that all major vendors were state owned. Customs services, as they are known in Western countries, did not really exist. Since the dissolution of

the Soviet empire, the role of the border police in

controlling flows of commodities and people has

become considerably less draconian. At the same

time, corruption has increased in all segments of

society, including border control personnel. It is

therefore essential for Russia to establish, train,

motivate, and equip an effective customs service

that is both competent and resistant to corruptibility. This latter requirement is difficult, given the

current parlous state of economic affairs.

I Other Newly Independent States

In Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the state of

export controls is considerably more rudimentary

than in Russia. Presidential decrees have set up

governmental commissions to make policy and

handle export licenses. Belarus and Kazakhstan

apparently intend to follow the Russian model

closely. The Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control

Coordination, seeking to coordinate policies, facilitate communication, and establish common

elements of an export control regime, was agreed

to by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia plus five

other republics of the FSU (but not including Ukraine) on June 26, 1992. On February 9, 1993,

these three states and three other CIS republics

agreed to cooperate on controlling exports of

items that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. On August 10, 1993, an agreement to

lb CmOM stands for tie Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, an informal association of Western nations onginaliy created to

control the spread of Western high technology to the Eastern bloc With the end of the Cold War, COCOM expired on Mar. 31, 1994.
30 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

deepen economic integration among Belarus,

Russia, and Ukraine was reached in Moscow. The

Belarusian government reportedly continues to

advocate a single customs control system among

the three countries.27 Some level of coordination

of export control systems among at least these nuclear inheritor participants is highly likely. All

three republics plan to use export control lists similar to those indicated by Russian policymakers.

In Belarus, export licenses had been required

since 1991 under Soviet law, and they continue to

be required after independence. Licenses are controlled by the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Economic Relations. In August 1992, the

Committee promulgated a decree that set procedures for obtaining export licenses for dual-use,

advanced weapon technologies and for nuclear

weapon-related items. The decree requires that

importing countries be politically stable, that they

have no known clandestine programs for developing weapons of mass destruction, and that they allow end-use inspections on the goods exported—

criteria that are intended to be consistent with

multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes. License decisions are made by the appropriate government agency (e.g., the Ministry

of Defense for items related to conventional arms)

and an export commission. Lists of controlled

items are being developed in all areas, including

dual-use technologies and nuclear, biological,

chemical, missile, and advanced conventional

weapon systems. The Belarusian government has

asked for advice from the United States, Germany,

Poland, and Sweden as well as from Russia on formulating laws and procedures for export control

systems, and it intends to present a proposed law

to parliament by the end of summer 1994. If

adopted, it would be the first law of this kind

passed by a parliament in any of the newly independent states of the FSU.

In Kazakhstan, a January 1992 presidential decree set the basis for an export-import licensing

system. In the nuclear area, export control decisions apparently rest with the Atomic Energy

Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and an

export control committee. Licenses are provided

by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The government has asked for help from Russia in

setting up the rest of its system. It is interested in

close export control coordination with Russia and

other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Kazakhstan has not progressed very

far beyond these initial steps.

In Ukraine, political instability provides an

additional impediment to rapid establishment of

controls and policies. A detailed export control

list has been started, but has still not been completed. In January 1993, a presidential decree established an export control commission with representatives from six government agencies. The

commission, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, is a consultative body. It has an attached, larger

working group of about 40 technically qualified

personnel. The commission’s decisions can be

overruled by the Cabinet.

Recently, Major General Volodymyr I. Tsimbalyuk was appointed as head of the Expert Technical Committee that advises the Ukrainian parliamentary consultative commission on export

control. Earlier, General Tsimbalyuk had been

Deputy Head of Armaments in the Ministry of Defense.28 His appointment indicated that the Ukrainian export control system is likely to adopt policies that reflect Defense Ministry views and

presumably will support arms exports.

In March 1993, a preliminary, incomplete list

of items controlled for export was developed, including the usual categories of items (e.g., those

included in the various international export con27 Radio Minsk, Aug. 11, 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-154, Aug. 12, 1993.

28 William potter, Director, Center for Russi~ and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, personal communication,

January 1994.
—

Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 31

trol regimes mentioned above), plus strategic raw

materials. Only two organizations (both governmental) are currently able even to apply for licenses to export items on the list. When an export

control system is in place, it is likely that more organizations will be allowed to apply for licenses.

Ukraine has asked for international help in setting

up its system because of its lack of expertise.

In conclusion, outside Russia, export control

systems in the FSU are, at best, emerging. Moreover, implementation is an even worse problem in

the non-Russian states than it is in Russia, due to

lack of expertise.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

Equipment or technology transfers from the former Soviet Union could promote the proliferation

of systems to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in addition to fostering the spread of the

weapons themselves. For example, Russia and

Ukraine have well-developed missile systems and

production facilities that, in some categories, are

the most advanced in the world. They also possess

extremely able rocket scientists and engineers.

Several recent events typify worries about this

category of proliferation. The first, and best

known, is the Russian-Indian agreement, concluded in 1992, which would have transferred

cryogenic propellant technology and a number of

liquid-fueled rockets from Russia to India. The

agreement would have provided Russia with

hundreds of millions of dollars. The United States

interpreted this sale as violating the Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by transferring proscribed technologies. Some Russians apparently also believed the sale violated the

MTCR.

29 Russia, while not a member of the

MTCR, had pledged to abide by its terms. More-

~

The Soviet SS-13 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over 5,000 miles.

29 see ~ommen(w by Sergey G~ychev on the a~eernen( ~tween the. united states ~d Russia to modify the accord on rocket assistance

to India on Moscow Ostankino Television, 1700 GMT, July 19, 1993: “F~ra year Russian spokesmen persistently argued that the contract with

India did not contravene international rules. It is fortunate that in the end common sense got the upper hand...” This, and other articles in FBISSOV-93-1 37, July, 20, 1993, show a division of opinion in Russia on the outcome of the affair. Those sympathetic to the government’s eventual

decision to modify the agreement with India argued that it was, after all, in Russia’s own interest m help prevent the spread of long-range missile

technology that could have strategic implications.
32 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

over, U.S. law requires the imposition of sanctions for transfers that violate MTCR restrictions,

even when the state involved had not agreed to

abide by the MTCR.

The United States did not strongly object to the

sale of the rockets themselves, but for several

months it had pressured Russia to limit sharply the

associated transfer of technology. U.S. efforts finally succeeded on July 17, 1993, when Russia

agreed to modify its accord with India unilaterally,

giving up a substantial part of its envisioned profits. Under the revised agreement, the Russians

would transfer the missiles and engines, but not

the technology and production facilities.30 Apparently in return, the United States is inviting Russia

to compete in the U.S. space launch market, and it

is attempting to arrange a marriage between the

Soviet/Russian MIR space station and the projected United States space station Freedom, being

built in conjunction with Europe and Japan. This

collaboration was later formalized in the accords

reached by Vice President Gore and Russian

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin during the former’s

trip to Moscow, in December 1993. Russia has also

renewed its pledge to adhere to the MTCR. Given

the Indian deal, the United States may be expected

to monitor such adherence closely.

The second incident involves not Russia, but

Ukraine. Last May, the London Observer reported

British intelligence claims that Iran had purchased

eight SS-N-22 “Sunburn” supersonic cruise missiles from Ukraine for deployment at the mouth of

the Persian Gulf. Within a short time, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the reports.

However, a report in Defense Week, several

months later, indirectly cited U.S. Navy sources in

31 At this writing, it is support of the allegations.

unclear what the truth of the matter is.

“BRAIN DRAIN”

Scientists, engineers, and technicians who had

worked in Soviet programs to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction could pose a

significant proliferation risk if they sold their services or supplied vital information or technology

to proliferant states seeking such weapons. The

greater the economic stresses facing these workers, the more dangerous this threat becomes. Given the lack of analogous civilian applications,

those working on nuclear weapons or ballistic

missiles probably offer the greatest concerns.

Chemical and biological weapon scientists might

also be useful to a proliferant, but their skills also

have more obvious civilian utility.

As is the case with smuggling nuclear materials, the unsuccessful attempts to smuggle missile

expertise are more visible than the successful

ones. One such case showed that this problem is

not purely hypothetical. In December, 1992, over

50 Russian rocket scientists from the leading

Makeyev Design Bureau were arrested at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport en route to North

Korea, where they had been offered astronomical

(to the Russians) salaries. The fact that the individuals had all been granted the necessary visas,

and that they were apprehended just as they were

30 several ~lc]e~ ~lvlng different Russian ~nPctives on the agreement with the United States on this issue are M. ponomarev, “Moscow

Yields to Unconcealed Pressure, ’’Krusnuya Zvezda, July 21, 1993; and commentaries on Moscow Mayak Radio, July 18, 1993 and on Moscow

Radio, Moscow World Service, July 20, 1993, all three from FBIS, SOV-93-I 38, July 21, 1993; and V. Nadein, “First Serious Dispute Between

Russia and the United States Ends in Beneficial Compromise,” lsvesriya, July 20, 1993, from FBIS-SOV-93-137, July 20, 1993.

31 see Def~~~e week, wt. 4, 1993, ~ea~icleclaimed hat an American defense contractor had been offered the same missiles in 1991. and

had turned them down in a botched bargaining ploy. The same arms dealer reported that the Iranians had later told him of their purchase; he

further claimed that U.S. Navy intelligence sources confirmed deployment of these missiles on the ground in Iran, although they were designed

as sea- or air-launched cruise missiles.
Chapter 3 Blocking Access to Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise I 33

about to leave, gives rise to some suspicion that

the whole event may have been a “sting” operation. 32 In spite of the fact that the arrest has a positive aspect, reinforcing the belief that Russian authorities are alert to foreign efforts to recruit or

corrupt their specialists, there is also a negative aspect: the event demonstrates an active, advanced

effort by a state to gain technologies controlled by

an international nonproliferation regime. Previously, there had only been rumors and vague statements

by Russian officials that such efforts were being

made, notably to gain nuclear information.

One potential solution to this “brain drain”

problem being pursued with support from the

United States and other countries is to provide

weapon scientists and engineers with meaningful

opportunities outside the realm of developing

weapons of mass destruction. This would reduce

any incentive that might exist for them to help proliferant states and at the same time permit Russia

(where most of these professionals now live) to retain its valuable stock of human capital. This issue

and some of the options available to address it are

further discussed in chapter 6.

32 A long a~lcle on the epis(tie, including interviews with several of the scientists, appeared in MOSCOW Neu’s, Apr. 2, 199S, from ~ls,

JPRS-TND-9S-OIS, May 10, 199S.
Part III:

The Individual

Nuclear

Inheritor

States

T

he following chapters examine each of the nuclear inheritor republics in turn, discussing their backgrounds, the

nuclear material on the territory of each, and the unique

problems each poses. The discussion focuses on nuclear

proliferation. Each chapter presents findings and a series of options for U.S. policy makers regarding the individual state.

OVERVIEW

At a Lisbon conference in 1992, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and

Kazakhstan, with the concurrence of the United States, designated themselves as the successor states to the former Soviet

Union for the purposes of the START I arms reduction agreement

that the United States and the Soviet Union had signed prior to the

Soviet Union’s demise in December 1991. Those four new republics had strategic nuclear weapons on their territory when the Soviet Union ceased to exist and are referred to in this report as nuclear inheritor states.1 The great majority of these weapons are in

Russia. Relatively few remain in Belarus (54 warheads on SS-25

missiles); about 1,400 are in Kazakhstan, and about 1,400 remain

in Ukraine, mostly on intercontinental missiles but some

deployed on cruise missiles. In a protocol signed at the Lisbon

Conference on May 23, 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan

agreed to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear-weapon states within the shortest possible time. Table 3

shows the number and type of strategic nuclear weapons on the

“Significant advances

have been made over

the past two years in

arranging programs of

assistance to the inheritor

states. ”

1 Some additional republics arising from the former Soviet Union had tactical nuclear

weapons (short-range missiles, field artillery shells, nuclear mines, etc.) on their terntones in December 1991, but by July 1992, all those weapons had&en relocated to Russia.I 35
36 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

Country Intercontinental missiles Cruise missiles and gravity bombs

Belarus Maximum (since MOU) was 81 SS-25s; now 54

(all single warhead missiles).

Kazakhstan 104 SS-18s (1 ,040 warheads) at MOU; now 92

missiles (920 warheads). All 1,040 warheads still

in Kazakhstan.

Russia 1,064 ICBMS with 4,278 warheads at MOU. Now

844-1112 ICBMS with 4,010-4,276 warheads. 940

SLBMS with 2,804 warheads at MOU; now

780-864 SLBMS with 2,640-2,728 warheads.

Ukraine 176 ICBMS at MOU (130 SS-19s and 46 SS-24s).

Now 126 (110 SS-19s and about 16 SS-24s).

1,240 warheads at MOU, now about 818.

—

370 air-launched cruise missiles

(bombers returned to Russia, missiles

and warheads still in Kazakhstan).

176+ at MOU; now 459.

324 declared in MOU; now 564. All

probably in storage.

NOTE: Numbers are either as of START I memorandum of understanding (MOU) of September 1990, which provided declarations of numbers, or as of

May 1994 Cruise missiles and gravity bombs are tabulated according to the counting rules in the START I treaty, under which a single weapon can

represent more than one actual warhead

ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; MOU = Memorandum of Understandmg; SLBM = Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile.

SOURCES Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1994

territory of each, according to a recent analysis by

nongovernmental experts.

If the four nuclear inheritor states are to reassure the rest of the world that their custody over

nuclear material is adequate, they need to improve

their export control systems and establish effective safeguards over nuclear materials. Further,

the states need to stabilize their economic, social,

and political situations and establish cohesive social structures that would lessen the temptations to

sell sensitive information, technology, or nuclear

material.

The United States has a strong interest in helping these states address their problems. However,

there are clearly limitations on what external

forces may accomplish. In particular, for countries such as Russia and Ukraine, internal difficulties are so great and complex that U.S. efforts to

improve the overall situation there may be expected to succeed only at the margins. As one example, converting defense to civilian production

is proving difficult enough for the United States to

accomplish at home. In the former Soviet Union

(FSU), the problem is far more complicated. Not

only had a far larger share of the economy there

been devoted to defense, but converting it to civil

production will require simultaneously reconstructing the nation’s social, political, and economic infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the United States can make an

important contribution in providing advice, targeted assistance, training programs, and political

discussions. Indeed, significant advances have

been made over the past two years in arranging programs of assistance to the inheritor

states. The Safe and Secure Dismantlement program, for example, has made considerable progress helping control and protect nuclear materials and offering nonmilitary opportunities to

former nuclear weapon scientists. Its extension to

the area of defense conversion shows an awareness of the importance of this problem in stabilizing the economic situations in the nuclear inheritor states.

United States diplomacy has had a remarkable

series of successes in obtaining ratifications of the

two principal arms control agreements of concern

to nuclear proliferation in the FSU: START I and
Part 3 The Individual Nuclear Inheritor States I 37

Date Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine

February 1993 Neither START Neither

February 1994 NPT, START NPT, START START

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994

the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In February 1993, lem was well on the way to solution (table 4); of

Russia was the only nuclear inheritor state to have the three non-Russian nuclear inheritor states of

reaffirmed the ratifications of these treaties, and the Soviet Union, only Ukraine’s ratification of

its ratification of START I was conditional on the NPT remains, and this may be accomplished

each of the other three states ratifying both. One soon.

year later, what had appeared to be a difficult prob-
u

ntil the break-up of the Soviet Union, Belarus, formerly

the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, had (with a

brief exception just after the Russian Revolution) never

before existed as an independent entity. In the past, it had

been part of Poland, Lithuania, Russia, or Ukraine. It now borders

on all these states as well as on Latvia. Belarus is known as White

Russia (the translation of Belarus) because it is geographically situated beyond the influence of Mongol invasion and suzerainty

from the 13th to the 15th centuries. Belarus has a relatively small

population of about ten million, and a territory roughly the size of

England and Scotland together. Figure 2 shows relevant facilities

in Belarus.

Former Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich,

Chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet (parliament) since

independence in late 1991, struggled for two years to promote

political and economic reforms in the face of conservative inertia

in the parliament. However, he was removed from office by a vote

of the Soviet—which is dominated by conservative holdovers

from the Communist era-on January 26, 1994. His successor,

Mechyslaw Hryb, was also a reformer, but a more cautious and

compromising one. Little economic or political reform has yet

occurred in Belarus, although democratic forces have the freedom

and capacity to argue actively for it.l Nevertheless, Belarus is

calmer politically and less turbulent economically than many other of the former Soviet republics.

Belarus 4

‘ However, the overwhelming election of a conservative pro-Russian figure, Alexander Lukashenka, as president in July 1994 has made economic reform less likely.

I 39
40 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

GERMANY

\

POLAND

Y

2’-

r’

.

UKRAINE
On February 4, 1993, the Belarus Supreme Soviet recommended accession to both START I and

the NPT, making Belarus the first of the three nonRussian nuclear inheritor states to do so. On October 26, 1992, Belarus, on instructions from Chairman Shushkevich, approved a schedule that

would remove strategic nuclear weapons from its

soil by the end of 1994; however, later indications

are that the government will require until the end

of 1996 to accomplish this.2

Belarus has a few civilian nuclear facilities

with a small amount of nuclear material useful for

weapons. 3 Belarusian and Western Officials worry

more about the transit through the country of contraband nuclear material from sources in Russia

than they do about diversion from Belarusian nuclear facilities. Some cases of nuclear contraband

passing through Belarus have been reported, but

none of these involved plutonium or HEU.

The United States, after a few months delay,

has begun to reward Belarus for its forthcoming

behavior on the nuclear issue. In total, some $76

million were in the process of being obligated under the Nunn-Lugar program as of March 1994.4

The money will go for purposes related to the nuclear weapon reductions, such as dismantling missiles, shipping nuclear warheads to Russia, and remediating environmental damage associated with

missile deployment. In addition, some funds will

go to training export control experts and providing

assistance to improve Belarusian export control

and customs capabilities.

Belarus has since requested an additional $210

million for aid related to nuclear disarmament. In

a detailed memorandum to the State Department,

‘ the Belarusian government sought these funds for

Chapter 4 Belarus I 41

purposes such as establishing an effective customs system and providing housing for military

personnel who will be retired once the nucleararmed SS-25 missiles on Belarus’ territory are

dismantled.

The U.S. government has been interested in

supporting Belarus to the maximum degree possible, both to encourage and reward its behavior

thus far and also to indicate to Ukraine (and, until

its ratification of the NPT, Kazakhstan) that significant benefits may follow the renunciation of

nuclear weapons. U.S. Ambassador James Goodby, in charge of the Safe and Secure Dismantlement program, made it clear during a trip to Minsk

and other parts of the former Soviet Union in April

1993 that Belarusian requests for aid related to the

nuclear disarmament process would be looked

upon favorably by the U .S. government. President

Clinton made the same points during his January

15, 1994 visit to Belarus and announced the provision of an additional $50 million in assistance programs.

5

Further, two non-governmental organizations,

the Monterey Institute for International Studies

and the Center for East-West Trade Policy at the

University of Georgia, recently helped Belarusian

counterparts establish the Center for Nonproliferation and Export Control in Minsk, Belarus,

which provides training and advice for government officials in these fields.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS REGARDING

BELARUS

Since Belarus was the first of the non-Russian nuclear inheritor states to accede to the NPT and to

z On the first point, see, forexample, G. Allison et & “Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds” (Cam&midge, MA: Center for

Science and lntemational Affairs, Harvard University, January 1993), p. 46, and, on the second point, “Twenty-seven Belarusian SS-25 Missiles

to be Dismantled in Russia,” Agence France Press, Dec. 22, 1993, in FBIS, JPRS-TND-93-003, Jan. 31, 1994, p. 18.

3 Belarus has two so-called critical assemblies in addition to two small experimental research reactors in Minsk, and a store of spent fuel, all

of which contain HEU; see W. Potter, “Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States” (Monterey, CA: Program for Nonproliferation Studies,

Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993), pp. 7-8.

4 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Jan. 3, 1994, p. 6.

5 Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Promises Help for Belarus Before Changing Focus to Mideast,” The New York Times, Jan. 16, 1994, p. Al.
42 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

● Belarus has been the most forthcoming of the three non-Russian nuclear inheritor states of the FSU in

terms of fulfilling its commitments to the international community in arms control and nonproliferation.

■ Belarus presents the lowest proliferation threat of any of the nuclear inheritor states of the FSU because

of the relatively small number of nuclear weapons on its territory, because of the small amount of other

nuclear material there, and because the political situation is relatively calm, However, some smuggling

has occurred through its territory.

● Belarus has asked the United States for a moderate amount of economic aid related to nuclear dismantlement and arms reductions. These requests appear intended to improve control over nuclear material

on its territory, The United States government has begun to respond positively to these requests.

START I, and since it has relatively few warheads

and little nuclear material apart from those warheads on its territory, Belarus is the least problematic of the nuclear inheritor states of the FSU.

However, the United States could take steps that

would further improve control over nuclear material in Belarus.

One option is to increase Nunn-Lugar assistance by granting all or part of the additional $210

million requested by the government of Belarus.

Admittedly, arguing for increased expenditures

on the FSU is difficult at a time when domestic

budget constraints are severe. Moreover, the funds

are no longer necessary to induce Belarus to accede to START I or the NPT, since it has already

done so. Nevertheless, additional assistance

might be desirable for several reasons. First, Belarus does not yet have adequate control over its borders, especially over the frontier with Russia.6

The porosity of this border has permitted the

smuggling of many commodities, including lowenriched uranium. Additional customs capability

would be beneficial not only for Belarus, but also

for Russia and the international community. U.S.

assistance in this area, both in training and in helping fund the establishment of an effective customs

system, could be productive. For example, Belarus currently lacks sufficient quantities of simple

radiation detectors for customs use, which would

be of great assistance. Further, Belarus also needs

advice on setting up the institutional aspects of its

export control system, as do all the other former

Soviet republics.7

The material well-being of those in the FSU

charged with the custody of nuclear weapons is

very important, and not sufficiently appreciated in

the West. The morale of the former Soviet Army is

currently low, according to press reports and to

academic and government experts who have traveled to the FSU. Part of the cause is a lack of housing for personnel, arising from the sudden return

of hundreds of thousands of troops to Russia from

the Soviet Union’s former Warsaw Pact allies. In

fact, beyond housing, there are problems of inadequate medical services, scant consumer goods,

and other infrastructure deficiencies that render

the quality of life poor. The request by Belarus for

housing for the Russian (no longer Soviet) military nuclear custodians on its territory-included

in its $210 million request for additional U.S. nuclear-related aid----confirms that the lack of amenities for these critical personnel is a serious concern in the FSU. It should be a serious concern for

the United States as well.

A relatively small investment here would go a

long way to restore morale among people in

s If a customs union with Russia is achieved, this border will not need to be controlled to the same degree as Belarus’ external borders.

7 As noted above, the United States has, in fact, begun talks with many of the former Soviet states to this end. Through nongovernmental

organizations, it has helped establish training in various ways, including a conference at Airlie House, Warrenton, VA, June 14-16, 1993, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy. Most of the republics were represented there, including all four of the nuclear inheritor states.
Chapter 4 Belarus I 43

charge of a vital commodity, thereby serving to increase the integrity of the guard force. It would

also allay the suspicions, widespread among the

Russian military, that the United States is still acting as an enemy, trying to disarm and destroy it

and, therefore, all of Russia.

In addition to assisting Belarus with housing

for retired Russian officers, one possible option

would be to provide some housing for active officers as well. However, it would be difficult politically and morally to justify paying for the maintenance of soldiers manning missiles that could be

aimed at the United States.

The United States could provide advice in the

area of privatization, which in Belarus has lagged

behind Russia and some other FSU republics. It

could also expand its assistance—beyond the $20

million or so that has already been obligated and

earmarked for two factories in Lida—for converting Belarus’s defense industry to peaceful purposes. For example, Belarus has large truck

manufacturing facilities, some of which had been

used to build mobile launchers for the SS-25

ICBM. It also has microelectronics manufacturing capabilities that might be modified for the civilian sector. Improving Belarus’s economic performance, in part through successful defense

conversion, would reduce economic stress and

lessen the risk of widespread corruption that could

threaten nuclear security and safeguards. Defense

conversion assistance could also be used as a lever

to persuade local authorities to implement economic reforms more rapidly. If the defense industry were shut down without civilian replacement,

unemployment would increase considerably,

stressing society still further and adding to proliferation dangers.

Improving Belarus’s economic performance

also has an importance for European stability that

goes beyond nuclear proliferation, since instability in any of the former Soviet republics would

have negative repercussions in Russia and in

nearby parts of eastern Europe.

The question is, however, how useful more

U.S. aid would be. As noted above, the Belarusian

economy and political structure have remained

largely in the hands of an old guard that has not, as

yet, taken major steps in the direction of economic

reform, decentralization, and privatization. The

economic situation in Belarus is not much better

than in Russia, although it is substantially better

than in Ukraine. Giving large amounts of aid now

would not be useful if it would tend to entrench the

old guard, lend itself to corrupt and wasteful activities, or disappear into a system that has demonstrated considerable resistance to change.8

Another option, suggested by Allison et al. and

by Potter,9 is to establish a center for scientific and

technical research similar to those being set up in

Russia and Ukraine. Since there are not many

weapon scientists in Belarus, such a center should

not necessarily be focused on individuals with

weapon expertise. 10 A1lison et al. suggested a center devoted to energy research, since Belarus is energy-poor, has no nuclear power (its two reactors

are small and used only for research, not electricity production), and imports nearly all its fossil

fuels. (Energy costs for Belarus have risen considerably now that Russia demands payment for its

energy exports in hard currency.) In fact, despite

the Chernobyl trauma, which actually affected

more land in Belarus than in Ukraine, current governmental thinking is to reactivate plans for nuclear plants in the Minsk area.

8 one ~ugge~tion for dealing with this issue, but not in a nonproliferation context, is to target assistance to those institutions or agencies that

have demonstrated a commitment to reform. See U.S. Congress, Oftlce of Technology Assessment, Fue/ing Reform: Energy Technologies for

the Former EUSI Bloc, OTA-ETI-599 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, July 1994), esp. ch. 8.

g G. Allison, et a]., “~nuclearization,” op. cit., footnote 2 and W. Potter, “Nuclear Export Controls From the Former Soviet Union: what’s

New, What’s True,” Arms Control Today, Jan./Feb. 1993, pp. 3-10.

10 While the Intematlona] Science and Technology Center is aimed at weapon scientists, it is not restrictive: civilian scientists may also

participate. See chapter 6.
44 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

Another focus for such a center, suggested by a

Belarusian official, would be to study the effects

of the Chernobyl disaster on the people, animals,

and plants in the southeast part of the country that

was most affected by the fallout.11 Such studies,

including epidemiological ones, would be of interest to the rest of the world as well, where better

information on the effects of radiation would be

helpful in formulating civilian nuclear policy and

in developing and revising nuclear safety standards. An additional variation of this option

would be to research technologies for cleaning up,

as well as monitoring, some of the consequences

of the Chernobyl accident.

Either of these options could be accomplished

within or outside the Nunn-Lugar framework. In

January 1994, an umbrella agreement on scientific

and technical cooperation was signed between the

United States and Belarus. While no funds have

yet been specifically identified for projects under

this agreement, it provides a legal structure under

which an international research center could be established.

Although political problems delayed agreements establishing such a center in Moscow and

still impede one in Kiev, such difficulties are less

likely to occur in Minsk. In both Russia and Ukraine, the centers became part of wider power

struggles between the president and the parliament. Such tensions are far milder in Belarus. Further, both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists fear

that the purpose of the centers is to steal Soviet nuclear secrets and to help dismantle research abilities by co-opting individual scientists. In Belarus,

since there are few weapon scientists, this would

be less of an issue. Moreover, even in the case of

the weapon scientists, the purpose would not simply be to keep them occupied and “off the streets”

so that their expertise would not be exported: it

would be to keep many other technologies and

scientific capabilities alive, since they are vital

components of any strategy for economic revival.

Joint research projects with Western scientists to

this end could be a major component of a Belarus

center. Such a strategy would be valid not only

in Belarus but in any of the other nuclear inheritor states, since a long-term solution to the

danger of nuclear proliferation in the FSU

must include economic development and political stability.

Arguing against such a broader mandate for

these research centers, however, is the fact that

saving Belarusian science as a whole (and, by extension, science in the other former Soviet republics) is far beyond their limited capabilities. Such

a wide mandate would absorb funds that might arguably better be targeted to the specific task of

preventing weapon scientists and engineers from

working for proliferant states.

A dedicated center for Belarusian scientists is

not the only possibility. Plans are now being considered to establish a Minsk branch office of the

Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center, which is now operational (see chapter 6

for details). If this does not come to fruition, an alternate proposal would be for the Moscow center

to set aside some money for Belarus. Belarus has

become a member of the International Science and

Technology Center, although it is not clear what

this will mean in terms of funding projects involving Belarus scientists. Either option might satisfy

the needs of Belarus without giving rise to the administrative and political delays that a new center

and new agreement might entail.

A different approach to expanding scientific

cooperation with the FSU would be a civilian research and development foundation, such as is being proposed for Russia under the FREEDOM

Support Act of 1992. As noted, since there are not

so many weapon scientists in Belarus, this type of

mechanism might be more appropriate than funds

under the Nunn-Lugar amendment, which is

aimed at weapon scientists. Another approach

would be to rely on laboratory-to-laboratory projects among U.S. government laboratories, private

industry, and their counterparts in Belarus as a

I I y @ntch~n&, Embassy of Belarus, personal communication, May 1993.
mechanism for assisting in the scientific development of the country. Department of Energy laboratories have proposed to use the funding allocated

in the fiscal year 1994 Department of State appropriations, among other funds, for this purpose

(see discussion in chapter 3 on U.S. cooperative

programs).

POLICY OPTIONS SUMMARIZED

●

1.

2.

3.

4.

Provide further funding (up to $210 million)

for assistance to Belarus in nuclear-related

areas:

Export control

Customs equipment and training

Housing and possibly other infrastructure improvements for military custodians of nuclear

weapons

Environmental research and cleanup related to

the Chernobyl disaster and to the removal of

nuclear weapons

Rationale For: Provides additional security for

protection of nuclear material and discourages nuclear trafficking; strengthens morale, loyalty, integrity of units in charge of nuclear forces; aids in

financing compliance with arms reduction agreements and initiatives; gives positive example of

potential rewards for NPT accession to Ukraine.

Arguments Against: Such assistance would be

expensive at a time of limited U.S. resources and

unnecessary for exerting political leverage on Belarus, which has already acceded to START I and

the NPT. Questions might be raised about the ability of the Belarusian government and economy to

absorb such aid effectively. Assistance to active

nuclear officers would be difficult to justify politically and otherwise. Money spent on environmental cleanup activities might be better spent to remedy inadequacies in Belarusian export control and

customs systems or to help bolster the economy.

■ Provide Defense Conversion Assistance

Rationale For: Helps establish economic stability, resulting in less pressure to export weapon

technologies; gives positive example of potential

Chapter 4 Belarus I 45

rewards for NPT accession to recalcitrant states;

has potential to help hasten reform process.

Arguments Against: Would help conservative

elements who still control economy and actually

might act as a brake on decentralization, privatization, and reform.

■ Establish formal program of cooperation in

science and technology focused on the following areas:

1. Energy research

2. Chernobyl-related epidemiology

3. Environmental research

Rationale For: This might be done either under

the science and technology agreement or under the

Nunn-Lugar program. It would help Belarusian

science and technology survive a difficult transition period, give a positive example of potential

rewards for NPT accession to recalcitrant states,

and create goodwill with the government of Belarus; if targeted properly, it could provide work for

weapon scientists. A key issue, however, would

be how broadly to target assistance beyond the scientists and engineers with direct weapon expertise.

Arguments Against: As in the above cases, this

policy would require funds in a time of fiscal

constraint in the United States. Such a policy might

aid a conservative regime that is slow to reform;

moreover, funds are not needed to placate Belarus,

since the country has already acceded to the NPT.

Further, such aid might be more effective in the

long run if focused on economic development

rather than on energy or environmental topics.

Alternative possibilities to achieve similar

goals:

1.

2.

Establish a Belarus center for joint scientific

and technical research in Minsk (under NunnLugar), analogous to the one in Moscow, to

fund joint research projects between weapon

scientists in Belarus and the United States.

Open a branch of the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center in

Minsk, which would be easier and cheaper than
46 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

creating an independent center for Belarus, although possibly less pleasing to Belarusians

anxious to preserve their own identity.

3. Use FREEDOM Support Act funding for an

R&D center aimed at civilians, under auspices

of the umbrella science and technology agreement between the United States and Belarus.

4. Rely on laboratory-to-laboratory interactions,

together with the participation of U.S. industry,

for cooperative science R&D with Belarus.

The last two mechanisms may be used together

and may be more appropriate than Nunn-Lugar

funds because there are relatively fewer weapon

scientists in Belarus than in other states eligible to

receive Nunn-Lugar support. However, if U.S. officials decide to concentrate on weapon scientists,

an international science center (under Nunn-Lugar funding) or a branch office of the Moscow center could be established as well.
K

azakhstan is located south of central Russia on the northern tier of Central Asia. Its territory includes the eastern

shore of the Caspian Sea and half the Aral Sea. Its population of about 15 million is nearly evenly divided between

ethnic Slavs and central Asians. The breakdown is 40 percent Kazakh, 38 percent Russian, 6 percent ethnic German, and 5 percent

Ukrainian, with the rest mostly Uzbeks, Tatars, Uighurs, and Belarusians. 1 Kazakhstan is a large country, with an area only slightly smaller than western Europe, but a far lower population density. Figure 3 shows relevant installations in Kazakhstan.

When the Soviet Union dissolved, some 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads were present in Kazakhstan, including 108 nuclear-armed SS-18 ICBMS having 10 warheads each.2 Twelve of

the missiles and some 40 Bear H bombers capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles were withdrawn in early 1994, but the

associated warheads are thought to remain in Kazakhstan, stored

near the city of Semipalatinsk.3

Kazakhstan is also the location of the Semipalatinsk nuclear

test site, one of only two nuclear test sites in the former Soviet

Union (the other is on the remote Russian island of Novaya Zem1 FBIS-USR-92-016L, NOV. 27, 1992.

Z W. potter, “Nucle~ profiles of the Soviet Successor States” (Monterey, CA: Prograrn

for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993), p.

16.

J “Last Strategic Bomkrs Leave Kazakhstan,” Radio h-bcow,Mar. 1, 19% ~~lsSOV-94-041, Mar. 2, 1994. Also, see “Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union:

Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report” (Washington, DC; Monterey, CA; and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1994).

Kazakhstan

147
48 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

ml

KAZAKHSTAN

\

RUSSIA

MONGOLIA

CHINA
Chapter 5 Kazakhstan I 49

Nuclear explosion at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan before 1963, when atmospheric testing ended,

lya, located in the Arctic Ocean). There is considerable concern in Kazakhstan over radiological

pollution at and near the Semipalatinsk site, following over 100 atmospheric tests in the 1950s

and early 1960s, and hundreds more underground

tests. The situation is somewhat analogous to that

near the U.S. Nevada Test Site, although contamination is probably much worse in Semipalatinsk.

Aggravating the situation is that while the nuclear

testing program was run by Russians, much of the

surrounding population—which suffered the effects of the radiological releases—is Kazakh.

Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a

contemporary and long-time colleague of former

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, is a reformer

in the Gorbachev mold (although the two had serious differences) who has permitted some opposition parties and movements to arise in the country.

However, he has not yet designed a liberal democracy such as would be recognized in the West.

President Nazarbayev has thus far managed to balance the various ethnic and political currents in

Kazakhstan, resulting in a considerably greater

degree of stability and political comity than exists

in most of the other former Soviet republics. The

political relations between the president and the

opposition in parliament are relatively calm, certainly in comparison with Russia and Ukraine. In

fact, unlike the case in those two countries, the

president dominates the parliament.

I

Cow roaming the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1993.

Maintaining a relatively tranquil political order

while permitting some opposition activity is particularly difficult in Kazakhstan because of the

nearly even ethnic division between Slavs and

central Asians. There is also the complication of

strong environmental movements, many of which

focus on the consequences of nuclear, chemical,

and biological weapon testing or manufacture by

the Soviet Union in what is now Kazakhstan. One

such group-- ’Nevada-Semei,” formerly “Nevada-Semipalatinsk’’—is dedicated to achieving a

universal nuclear test ban, and it succeeded in persuading President Nazarbayev to ban nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk on August 29, 1991, when
50 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

Kazakhstan was still part of the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev has called for a massive international aid

program to cleanup the mess left from decades of

activity by the Soviet military-industrial complex.

Kazakhstan ratified the START I arms control

treaty in 1992, but Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) ratification came more than a year later despite various statements that it would follow soon

behind START. It was not until December 13,

1993, during a visit by Vice President Gore, that

the NPT was ratified, garnering a near-unanimous

vote. During President Nazarbayev’s visit to

Washington in February 1994, when he deposited

the instruments of ratification of the NPT with the

U.S. government, President Clinton announced

the provision of $311 million in aid to Kazakhstan. The money will be expended in programs including defense conversion, the dismantlement of

the nuclear delivery systems eliminated by

START I, and some other areas.

THE SEMIPALATINSK NUCLEAR TEST

SITE

In addition to the strategic nuclear weapons located there, Kazakhstan has several facilities containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. On the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site

are three relatively small research reactors fueled

with HEU. The reactors’ fuel loadings vary from

2 kg to 9 kg. Including old loadings, which are not

highly radioactive, up to 300 kg of HEU are located at the site.

Additionally, the test site contains a small nuclear explosive device, currently buried several

hundred meters underground. It was apparently

about to be detonated when the site was closed to

nuclear weapon testing by the government of Kazakhstan in 1991. For reasons that are unclear

(perhaps financial, safety-related, or both), it has

not yet been removed. Although the device is said

to be of very low yield, it still contains, by definition, enough nuclear material to make a nuclear

explosion. 4

In November 1993, during a period of particularly cold weather, public utilities (including heat

and hot water) failed at Kurchatov City, the residential and administrative center of the test site.

This problem was eventually repaired, but, for a

while, Russian press reports discussed the possibility of abandoning the site-a rather disturbing option, given the presence of a nuclear

weapon there.5 Although the site has not been

abandoned, the Russian military detachment that

had provided security there was withdrawn in May

1994, leaving the security situation unsettled.

“BRAIN DRAIN”

Overshadowing the need to safeguard Kazakhstan reactors is the problem of what to do with Kurchatov City, located within the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. Named for the first director of the

Soviet nuclear weapon program, Kurchatov City

Kurchatov City a nuclear research city within the boundaries

of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan.

4 For a report on the unexploded device, see, for exarnple, “Unexploded Nuclear Device Left Under Semipalatinsk Site,” Krasnayu Zvezdu,

Jan. 14,1994, p. 3, in FBIS, JPRS-TND-94-004, Feb. 11,1994, p. 22. An earlier report may be found in W. Potter, “NuclearProfiles...” op. cit.,

footnote 2, p. 16.

5 For information on he uti]i~ fai]um at he Semipalatinsk site, see “Semipalatinsk Accident Makes Future Uncertain,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Nov. 24, 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-226, Nov. 26, 1993, p. 58.
Chapter 5 Kazakhstan I 51

was part of the Soviet nuclear weapon complex.

Reports currently indicate that the scientists and

technicians there, nearly all of whom are ethnic

Russians, are receiving minimal financial support

(10 percent of their funding) from Moscow. The

rest of their funding comes from Kazakhstan,

which has very limited financial resources.

Scientists at Kurchatov City are trying hard to

interest Western nations in joint research projects

just to keep themselves employed. Although

workers receive subsistence salaries, there is no

funding at all for any new research projects, and

current projects appear to be proceeding very

slowly for lack of funds. Like the scientists at the

Arzamas and Chelyabinsk laboratories and elsewhere in the Russian nuclear weapon complex,

Kurchatov City residents spend a considerable

amount of time raising crops in the summer to

feed themselves in the winter.

In early 1993, President Nazarbayev announced the establishment of a Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center with one branch at Kurchatov City and the other at the Institute for Nuclear

Physics in Almaty, the capital. This briefly raised

hopes at Semipalatinsk. However, the government then could not find funds to pay for the enterprise. Following this, the scientific workers there

threatened strikes. One recent press report states

that only 20 percent of the original maintenance

personnel remain on site, causing maintenance

and security problems.6

One possible solution for dealing with the unsettled situation there would be to arrange joint research projects with Western scientists. However,

it is not clear how appropriate most of the facilities

at Semipalatinsk are for such joint work. One of

three reactors there, built to produce high neutron

intensities for material testing, can produce severe

transients (rapid surges of activity, resulting in

enormous bursts of neutrons and heat production).

Such transients are useful for reactor safety studies. There is also a mothballed nuclear rocket propulsion facility which includes the other two reactors, now also used for material testing.

However, there is not much Western interest in

pursuing nuclear rocket propulsion. A recent effort by two groups in the United States to revive

such work at the Nevada Test Site was put on hold

in 1992. Barring renewed interest in a joint U. S./

Russia manned flight to Mars, nuclear rocket propulsion at present seems an unpromising area for

collaboration. In addition, local environmentalists might oppose such a project in Kazakhstan,

even if scientists promise to contain the radioactive effluent from the nuclear rockets.

Another suggestion, made by local scientists to

visiting counterparts from the West, was to build

an underground cavity at Mt. Degelen, an area of

the test site where many underground nuclear explosions have taken place. Western clients would

be invited to construct scale models of nuclear

reactors in this cavity and force them to fail, creating catastrophic accidents for diagnosis. Understanding how the models failed could lead to improved techniques for preventing and mitigating

nuclear accidents. However, even if interested clients from abroad could be found, this proposal is

also likely to be regarded unfavorably by local environmentalists.

The Soviet nuclear testing program released a

considerable amount of radioactivity in the region

near Semipalatinsk. Apart from the atmospheric

tests, many of the hundreds of underground explosions vented radiation (as has also occurred at the

Nevada site, but, apparently, to a lesser extent than

at Semipalatinsk). A possibly fertile field would

be cooperative U.S.-Russian-Kazakh research

aimed at devising effective methods for cleanup.7

Such work could also have applications in dealing

6 Moscow Television, Apr. 28, 1994, Vesti newscast. FBIS-SOV-94-090, May 10, 1994, p.25.

7 There is interest in Kazakhstan not only in cleaning up nuclear sites, but also sites that handled chemical or biological weapon work. For

example, a biological agent test range was located on Vozrozhdenya Island in the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan, very close to Kazakhstan terntmy, and

a facility existed in Aksu (Stepnogorsk) in northern Kazakhstan.
52 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

with high- and low-level waste disposal from civilian nuclear power industries.

An additional incentive for the United States to

engage in joint work with experts at the Semipalatinsk site is that its own nuclear testing infrastructure and expertise (at the Nevada Test Site) is also

likely to remain inactive given the current moratorium on nuclear testing, which may become permanent. Like their Kazakhstani counterparts,

managers of the Nevada Test Site have been looking for alternate missions for their facility and its

8,000 employees.

OTHER SENSITIVE FACILITIES

Kazakhstan has several sensitive nuclear facilities

outside the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. One is

the 350 MW civilian breeder reactor in Aqtau (formerly Shevchenko). By irradiating an unenriched

uranium “blanket” around the core, a breeder reactor produces more nuclear fuel (plutonium) than

it consumes. Some experimental core fuel loadings containing over 30 percent plutonium were

produced and briefly irradiated in tests. There may

be other experimental fuel at the site with similarly high plutonium content. The breeder blanket

also contains plutonium, although its plutonium

content is less than 1 percent.

The plutonium in these fuel loadings can, in

principle, be relatively easily separated from the

uranium that constitutes the rest of the material—

particularly since, unlike usual spent reactor fuel,

neither the blanket nor the test fuelings in the reactor have been irradiated enough to reach very high

levels of radioactivity. Therefore, they are more

vulnerable to unauthorized removal than they

would be if they were highly radioactive. It is essential to maintain control over and keep precise

accounting of such nuclear material, since it can

be used to manufacture weapons. However, although the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) and several countries, including the

United States, are helping Kazakhstan establish

its own system of material control and accountancy, no IAEA safeguards agreement was concluded

with Kazakhstan until July 1994. Further, there is

a lack of qualified nuclear safeguards experts

there.8

Another unique site in Kazakhstan is the Ulba

(formerly Ulbinsky) Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk in the northeastern comer of the country. This large complex fabricates nearly all the

fuel elements for the civilian nuclear reactors of

the former Soviet Union (FSU). It is also the only

major site in the FSU that produces beryllium, a

light metal with unique neutron reflecting characteristics that make it a useful component in nuclear weapons as well as in nuclear reactors. Lowenriched uranium arrives from Russia in the form

of UF6 and is fabricated at the plant into pellets of

U02, used in reactor fuel rods.

The NPT requires international safeguards to

be placed on low-enriched uranium (LEU). Lowenriched uranium cannot be directly used to fabricate nuclear weapons. However, it can be used to

fuel a plutonium-production reactor. Moreover, if

a would-be proliferant already possessing some

enrichment capability were to feed an enrichment

process with low-enriched uranium, the amount

of effort required to produce a given amount of

weapon-grade HEU from it would be considerably reduced.

Since LEU would be of considerable use to a

proliferant, press reports that Iranian representatives had purchased large quantities of both LEU

and beryllium from the Ulba Plant in August 1992

would, if true, cause concern.9 Had Kazakhstan

been subject to IAEA safeguards at the time, any

LEU sold from the Ulba plant would have to have

been placed under safeguards as a condition of

sale. Since no such safeguards were in place, the

g W, potter, “Nucle~ Expotis From the Former Soviet Union: What’s New, What’s True,” Arms Conmol 7bday, Jan./Feb. 19%, pp. 3-10.

9 BBC.panorama rep~ on FRONTL]NE, public Broadcast Service Television, Apr. 13, 1993. Although, according to the BBC, government of?lcials in Kazakhstan denied that the Iranians had even been present, factory ofticials conceded that Iranians had visited the facility but

denied that they had been sold any LEU or beryllium. The difference in the two stories gives rise to some concern.
material (if indeed it was actually sold to Iran)

could be used for purposes not known to or approved by the IAEA. Even if the reports of the sale

of LEU are not accurate, the fact that the uncertainty exists (due to the absence of international

safeguards) means that there may be real occurrences of this sort that have not been reported.

Further, Iran’s presence and interest in Kazakhstan has been obvious and widely reported, both

by journalists and by U.S. scientists visiting Kazakhstan. Iran has an understandable interest in

cultivating relations with its neighbors, particularly states with Muslim populations, on all levels: commercial, cultural, and other. However, its

interest in Kazakhstan may also have a nuclear

component.

There are, as yet, no international safeguards on

any nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan. There have,

however, been many contacts between the IAEA

and Kazakhstan, and IAEA officials have visited

nuclear sites in Kazakhstan on several occasions

with a view to preparing and concluding such

agreements. In addition, a workshop was held in

Kazakhstan during June 1993 with participants

Chapter 5 Kazakhstan I 53

from the IAEA, Japan, the United States, the

United Kingdom, and Sweden to help prepare Kazakhstan officials to apply safeguards to their nuclear facilities.

It would be wise, from the U.S. perspective and

from the perspective of the international nuclear

nonproliferation regime in general, to apply international safeguards to the Ulba Plant and to Kazakhstan’s other nuclear facilities as soon as possible. In addition to applying safeguards,

international standards of physical security

recommended by the IAEA should also be applied to these facilities as soon as possible.10

Any assistance that the United States can provide

to the Kazakhstan government in these areas

would be extremely useful.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS REGARDING

KAZAKHSTAN

It is not clear why Kazakhstan took so long to

comply with its frequently stated intent to ratify

the Lisbon Protocols and the NPT. Perhaps the

Kazakhstan leadership decided to let Ukraine do

Kazakhstan has over 1,000 nuclear warheads on its territory, as well as considerable amounts of nuclear

material that could be used in nuclear weapons

After some delay, Kazakhstan ratified the NPT,

Kazakhstan urgently needs to develop expertise in nuclear safeguards and physical security.

None of Kazakhstan’s nuclear facilities are yet under IAEA safeguards; this fact may be a threat to the

international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Ethnic Russian scientists at the Semipalatinsk test site are in some economic distress, raising concerns

about “brain drain” and about the security of the nuclear material at that site

Kazakhstan is very interested in developing cooperative research aimed at cleaning up the environmental insults to its territory caused by years of various Soviet weapon programs,

Due to its possession of a variety of nuclear materials under insufficient international controls, Kazakhstan poses significant proliferation risks There is at least the appearance of vulnerability to theft, diversion, or sale of nuclear material to foreign parties. However, Kazakhstani authorities appear eager to

expand ties with industrialized states and are willing to improve their nuclear safeguards capacity

Of the four nuclear inheritor states to the FSU, Kazakhstan is probably the one in which U.S. efforts

have the best chance of improving the situation significantly Several of the most acute proliferation

concerns seem amenable to outside assistance

10 IAEA safeguards we intended to detect the diversion or misappropriation of nuclear materials; they do not deal with threats to capture

such material through use of force. That possibility is addressed by physical security measures such as guards.
54 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

the fighting for it on the issue of whether to become a nuclear weapon-free state. More likely,

Kazakhstan wanted to extract further economic

benefits, rewards, and security guarantees before

a final commitment was made to go non-nuclear.

Kazakhstani officials have stated that the president’s national security advisors debated at length

the advisability of renouncing the nuclear option,

given that the country borders directly on two declared nuclear powers: Russia and China.11 Kazakhstan is also located near India and Pakistan,

both widely thought to possess nuclear weapon

capability.

Kazakhstani officials also made clear that they

would like to see a universal norm of “no-firstuse” established; that is, a commitment from each

nuclear power never to be the first to use nuclear

weapons.

12 In fact, the government may have held

out on the NPT for this reason, among others. Current U.S. policy hedges this issue by offering its

no-first-use pledge only to members of the Nonproliferation Treaty (or equivalent agreement)

that are not nuclear powers or allies of nuclear

powers. The Russian Federation recently changed

its policy from the declared (although not necessarily believed) Soviet no-first-use pledge to one

that mirrors the U.S. position.

On the one hand, since Kazakhstan-like Belarus—has now ratified the NPT, any further concessions, whether financial, policy, or aid-related,

are unnecessary for persuasion on this issue. The

policy approach of providing no further “carrots”

to Kazakhstan has the attraction of not requiring

any further action. It also would save money in a

time of fiscal limitations. However, dealing in bad

faith with Kazakhstan, after it had satisfied U.S.

requests in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation,

would make it more difficult to persuade other

countries to comply with such requests in the future. The signal that such an act would send to Ukraine is obvious. Further, such behavior would increase world cynicism towards U.S. nonproliferation policy, seriously damaging the credibility

of subsequent U.S. offers of assistance. Such a

policy could also make it more difficult to achieve

international consensus on related issues in the future (e.g., in dealing with North Korean intransigence on fulfilling its international obligations

under the NPT). It could also poison the relationship between the United States and Kazakhstan, a

nation where there are considerable U.S. commercial interests and which is located in a strategically

important region.

It is useful to consider what other policy approaches towards Kazakhstan might address that

state’s legitimate concerns. For example, Kazakhstan would like financial help in dismantling the

nuclear missile silos on its territory pursuant to

U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. It would

like help in characterizing and dealing with the environmental insults due to former military programs on its territory and in monitoring health

problems among populations exposed to effluents

from the military programs. From the nonproliferation perspective, the United States would like

Kazakhstan to exert improved control over nuclear material in the country.

Now that the Nunn-Lugar “umbrella” agreement with Kazakhstan has been completed, some

of the promised money could be transferred as

soon as possible, earmarked, for example, for aid

in setting up an export control system, for cleaning up dismantled nuclear (or chemical or biological) weapon sites, or for monitoring the health of

local populations. Nunn-Lugar assistance is being

obligated, here and elsewhere, although imple11 E.g., 0. K~enOv ad K. Abu@tOv,”~ Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Kazakb Republic’s National Security,” (MckuI, VA: me

Potomac Foundation, February 1993). Kasenov is a senior advisor to President Nazarbayev on national security issues and director of Kazakhstan’s International Institute of Strategic Studies.

120. Kasenov and K. Abuseitov, ibid.
Chapter 5 Kazakhstan I 55

mentation in general has been sl0W.

13 This assistance includes help in export control and nuclear

material control and accountancy, but little is being done in terms of environmental cleanup or

health monitoring beyond a quick initial survey of

the Semipalatinsk site.

The establishment of an international research

center, possibly at Kurchatov City, might be a viable option.14 The political problems faced by

similar projects in Moscow and Kiev would probably not impede such an agreement here. But the

same arguments as in the Belarus case (see chapter

4) could be made against establishment of a new

center—increased cost and less need to placate

Kazakhstan, since it has already ratified the NPT.

It might be easier either to set aside a certain fraction of funds from the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) for use

in Kazakhstan, or to establish a branch ISTC office in Almaty. Kazakhstan has become a member

of the ISTC, along with Belarus, Armenia, and

Georgia, and it may receive some funding for

ISTC projects. However, it is not clear how much

funding from such an arrangement would go to

Kazakhstani scientists. In addition, Kazakhstani

sensitivity to being treated by the United States as

an appendage of Russia would argue for an independent center there. 15

Also, the research perspective of a center in Kazakhstan would likely be quite different from one

in Russia: Kazakhstani interests would probably

be mostly focused on environmental cleanup of

past military programs, and secondarily on energy

research: the country, in spite of large fossil fuel

resources, imports large amounts of electricity

from its neighbors, Russia and Tadjikistan.

Another argument against working with the

scientists at Kurchatov City is that the United

States may be reluctant to spend resources to help

preserve a former Soviet nuclear test site that

could one day again be used for developing nuclear weapons to target the United States. However, this type of argument also applies to the Russian weapon design centers of Arzamas and

Chelyabinsk, where it is generally thought that the

greater danger would be of weapon scientists there

contributing their expertise to states seeking

weapons of mass destruction, thereby promoting

proliferation.

The decision on whether to aid such facilities

and personnel depends on several factors. It is not

clear how valuable the facilities and resident expertise at the test site actually are. Once there is assurance that the nuclear material on the site is being properly protected, perhaps U.S. experts will

decide that there are insufficient technical grounds

to work on projects there. However, there is still

the problem of potential “brain drain” from the

personnel stranded at the site. Decisions on cooperation will depend, ultimately, on whether the

United States feels that the risk of nuclear proliferation from these sites, where personnel are under

severe economic and political stress, is greater

than the risk that the laboratories—particularly

Kazakhstani laboratories—will turn again to nuclear weapon development as part of a possibly resurgent imperialist power.

Joint research projects with Kazakhstani scientists, however structured, would address at least

two concerns simultaneously: first, by involving

scientists from all over Kazakhstan, such projects

would assist the survival of science and technology in that nation and aid its transition to a marketbased economy; second, they could bring much

needed financial support to the nearly abandoned

nuclear scientists at Kurchatov City. In addition, if

it at least partially focused on environmental

cleanup of military programs, it would address

1 J The(dor Ga]di, Congressional Research Service (CRS), “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction pfOgram for Soviet Weapons

Dismantlement: Background and Implementation,” CRS Report 93- 1057F(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Dec. 29, 1993).

14 ~is has ken suggested by W. potter in Arms Contro/ Today, op. cit., footnote 8, for both Belarus and Kazakhstan.

15 see Fred Hlatt, ‘&Kaza~ ~ader Wam5 the West NO( t. concentrate Aid on Russia,” The WasfiingfonPos/, Feb. 8, 1994, p. Al 1.
56 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

one of the major political issues in Kazakhstan,

likely winning the support of both the president

and the parliamentary opposition. 16

Another option is for the United States to exercise its influence with the IAEA and Kazakhstan

to hasten the establishment of safeguards agreements over that country’s nuclear facilities. In

addition, the U.S. could help Kazakhstan improve

its nuclear safeguards and export control expertise

by training Kazakhstani scientists, technicians,

regulators, and customs agents, and by transferring nuclear detection equipment there. Moreover, the United States could transfer physical security technology and related systems analyses for

use at sensitive Kazakhstani nuclear facilities.

The U.S. “no-first-use” pledge, with its reservations about non-nuclear-weapon states, is not

likely to be the decisive factor in motivating major

strategic decisions by Kazakhstan. However, the

matter is an irritant, both for Kazakhstan and, for

other reasons, for Ukraine. One option would be

for the United States to consider strengthening its

pledge not to use nuclear weapons first against any

nonweapon state, even those aligned with a weapon state. At any rate, the rationale underlying the

current version of the U.S. “no-first-use” pledge

needs to be revisited, given the absence of the bipolar world that gave rise to it. A recent redefinition of Russian military doctrine took a “no-firstuse” position that closely parallels U.S. policy.

This will make it more difficult to implement a

change in policy in the United States.

Finally, as in Belarus, aid could be used to

house Russian forces maintaining custody of nuclear weapons on Kazakh territory, if it is determined that those personnel are in need of such

help. The same issues apply as did to Belarus (see

chapter 4): it would be difficult to help Russian

forces who were aiming missiles at the United

States. However, housing aid for those being retired because of arms control agreements may be

more feasible.

POLICY OPTIONS SUMMARIZED

● Accelerate transfer of Nunn-Lugar funds to

Kazakhstan to aid compliance with arms

control agreements and initiatives.

Rationale For: Many urgent problems need addressing, especially the development of local expertise in safeguards and export control. This action would help reduce an immediate threat to the

United States by aiding nuclear weapon dismantlement. It would also be a positive signal to Ukraine in trying to persuade it to accede to the NPT.

Arguments Against: In order to spend U.S.

funds wisely, it is necessary to review programs

carefully, which requires effort and time. Fraud

may be of particular concern in a country undergoing major economic and political transitions and

suffering economic difficulties.

● Establish a formal program for science and

technology cooperation with Kazakhstan by

assisting in creation of a center for joint

scientific and technical research, possibly at

Kurchatov City. Focus could be on environmental cleanup of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon facilities.

Rationale For: This would satisfy various

needs for Kazakhstan, including employment of

scientists and technicians at Kurchatov City, aiding President Nazarbaev's initiative to create a research center there (as well as in Almaty), and

bringing international help to the environmental

problems of Kazakhstan. It would also aid in preserving the scientific and technological expertise

of Kazakhstan during a difficult transition period,

since a high level of technological capability and a

good part of the technical expertise in Kazakhstan

16 Joint research on environmental cleanup of the Soviet nuclear weapon complex was suggested by G. Perkovich and W. Potter in “Cleaning Up Russia’s Future: Scientists Could Deal With Its Nuclear Mess,” The Washington Post, Jan. 5, 1992, p. C2.
Chapter 5 Kazakhstan I 57

is there. The economic stresses on the scientists

and the availability of nuclear material at the site

may threaten the international nonproliferation regime. In addition, programs focused on Kurchatov City might usefully employ U.S. counterparts from the Nevada Test Site.

Arguments Against: There is now less need to

placate Kazakhstan, since it has already acceded

to NPT. Further, the United States may not want to

help scientific staff at Kurchatov City, since it is

connected with the old Soviet nuclear weapon

program. Finally, resources might be more productively focused on aiding economic development, rather than on finding work for scientists.

Other possibilities:

1.

2.

3.

Open a branch of the Moscow International

Science and Technology Center in Almaty,

which would be easier and cheaper than founding an independent center. However, this approach would probably be less pleasing to Kazakhstan leadership, who are annoyed at

dealing with the United States through Russia.

Pursuing this option implies support for the

principle of working with Kurchatov City scientists.

Use the FREEDOM Support Act mechanism to

establish a purely civilian R&D center (see

chapter 3).

Rely on laboratory-to-laboratory interactions,

together with the participation of U.S. industry,

for cooperative science R&D with Kazakhstan.

The last two mechanisms could be used together. They would still be viable options, whether or

not the United States decided to work with Kurchatov City scientists. A broad umbrella agreement between the U.S. and Kazakhstan has been

reached for the general purpose of scientific collaboration.

= Work with Kazakhstan and the IAEA to apply international safeguards to Kazakhstan

nuclear facilities as soon as possible.

Rationale For: The absence of nuclear safeguards and physical security measures at sensitive

Kazakhstan sites constitutes a serious proliferation risk. The government of Kazakhstan appears

to support the application of safeguards and is

working with the IAEA to this end.

Arguments Against: None.

■ Offer U.S. aid insetting up and training personnel for application of nuclear safeguards, customs, and export control regimes.

Rationale For: Kazakhstan urgently needs

such aid to maintain proper control over nuclear

material on its territory. Note that pending export

control legislation creates the authority to help

other states establish and implement their own export controls. 17 Since the IAEA is far more

pressed financially than the U.S. government, it

may not be feasible for the IAEA to fund these activities. Moreover, asking other countries, individually or though their IAEA assessments, to

shoulder the responsibility for financing such efforts would be tantamount to abandoning U.S.

leadership in nonproliferation.

Arguments Against: Because of fiscal limitations in the United States, the government should

let the IAEA or other countries perform these

tasks, notwithstanding the above arguments.

● Apply U.S. Nunn-Lugar funds to housing

and, possibly, other support for Russian

personnel having custody of those nuclear

weapons stationed in Kazakhstan.

Rationale For: If such personnel are seriously

stressed economically, they may become vulnerable to subornation by foreign or subnational

groups attempting to gain access to nuclear materials or weapons.

Arguments Against: Assistance given to active

nuclear officers would be difficult to justify, politically and otherwise.

17 omnibl(s E.rp~r[ AdminiSlrali~n Act of 1994, H.R. 3937, sec. 114 (i); Export Administration Ac~ Of 1$’94, S. 2203, Sec. 10S (b) (9).
58 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

● Provide Defense Conversion Assistance has potential to help hasten reform process. KaRationale For: Helps establish economic sta- zakhstan provides a better climate than most other

bility, resulting in less pressure to export weapon FSU states for foreign investment.

technologies; gives positive example of potential Arguments Against: Problem maybe too large

rewards for NPT accession to recalcitrant states; to be addressed by any realistic amount of U.S. aid.
F

ew nations (possibly excepting Ukraine) dispute Russia’s

claim to be the legitimate heir of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal. Russian possession of nuclear weapons,

therefore, does not derail the Non-Proliferation Treaty or

give added impetus to possible would-be proliferants. Nor do the

Russians lack the technical and military expertise needed to exercise control over the weapons—the great majority of scientific

and technical workers in the Soviet weapon complex were ethnic

Russians and citizens of Russia, as were nearly all the Soviet experts who worked on nuclear doctrine and policy.

However, the problems of the Russian central government in

maintaining control over all nuclear weapons, nuclear material,

nuclear technology, and nuclear design information within its

borders gives rise to serious proliferation concerns. A related issue is the degree of technical assistance that Russian missile and

nuclear experts—apparently with the cognizance of the government-are believed to be providing China (see discussion below). A major goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to

Russia is to prevent the transfer of any weapons or material toother states or subnational groups, and to prevent the export of vital

nuclear expertise or information, through emigration for this purpose or otherwise.

Existing proliferation concerns would be tremendously aggravated if the Russian Federation itself were to fracture, with several local entities declaring independence. The ensuing disorder

would present a strong challenge to the maintenance of administrative control of nuclear material and nuclear weapons (especialRussia 6
60 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

ly tactical ones). The wide dispersion of nuclear

material and weapons in Russia would make it

very difficult to assure control over all such items

under such circumstances. Figure 4 shows the distribution of relevant facilities in Russia.

Under the ancien regime, control over the Soviet nuclear weapon arsenal and infrastructure

was assumed to be unassailable because of the Soviet government’s tight centralized authority, particularly over internal security and exports. Following the sobering consequences of its uranium

enrichment technology transfer to China in the

1950s, which led to the production of Chinese nuclear weapons, some of which were ultimately targeted on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has

generally maintained a good record in supporting

and enforcing world nonproliferation objectives.

Since central control is now nowhere near as effective, achievement of nonproliferation objectives is less certain than before.

Russia contains the great majority of the Soviet

Union’s strategic nuclear warheads, including

strategic land-based missiles, submarinelaunched missiles, and most of the bombs and

cruise missiles; it now contains all the tactical

weapons of the former Soviet Union (FSU) as

well. The total number of nuclear weapons has

usually been publicly described as on the order of

30,000, although occasional reports have placed

the number as high as 45,000.’ Nearly 8,000 are

strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, nearly all

the elements of the nuclear weapon complex of the

FSU are on Russian territory, including the two

main research laboratories, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. According to the Russians, all the

uranium enrichment, plutonium processing, warhead component, and weapon assembly facilities

are located in Russia as well. In addition, there are

at least 20 research reactors, most fueled by highly

enriched uranium (HEU), and 28 civilian nuclear

power reactors (with 18 more under construction). 2,3

There have been numerous minor diversions of

material, including tiny amounts of plutonium

and small amounts of uranium of various degrees

of enrichment, from former Soviet nuclear (although probably not military) facilities. In one of

these cases, about 100 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) were reportedly removed from a MINATOM (Ministry of Atomic Energy) plant in

Glazov, Russia, and recovered in Poland.4 There

have as yet been no verified reports of the diversion of more than a few kilograms of former Soviet highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium.5 However, the persistence of many cases of

smuggling of lesser amounts or of low-enriched

‘ See, for example, testimony by R. James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Senate Cornmhtee on Governmental

Affairs, Feb. 24, 1993, S. Hrg. 103-208, p. 12, forthe former figure. For the latter, see statement by ViktorMikhailov, Minister of Atomic Energy

of Russia, in W. Broad, “Russian Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Larger Than West Estimated,” The New York 7imes, Sept. 26, 1993, p. 1. This statement has not been confirmed by other Russian officials.

2 W. potter, “Nucle~ ~ofiles Of tie Soviet Successor States” (Monterey, CA: Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of

International Studies, May 1993).

3 S& U.S. C(}ngress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction, OTA-lSC-559 (wa+ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), p. 182.

4 See Literaturnaya Gazeta, Jan. 20, 1993, p. 13, FBIS, TND-93-006, Mar. 5, 1993, p. 21.

5 Several kilograms of fresh nuclear submarine fuel containing highly enriched uranium were reportedly stolen from a nuclear submarine

facility at Murmansk; see “Nuclear Fuel Rods Stolen From Murmansk Naval Base,“ Moscow Ostankino Television, Dec. 2,1993, FBIS, JPRSTND-93-001, Jan. 6, 1994, p. 24. The fuel was reportedly recovered onJune 30, 1994, and three naval officers arrested. Segodnya, July 2,1994,

p.7, FB1S-SOV-94-128, July 5, 1994, p.27.
.

Chapter 6 Russia I 61
62 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

uranium indicates some laxity in control over nuclear materials; more serious breakdowns in control, leading to the removal of material directly usable for nuclear weapons, cannot be excluded.6

The lion’s share of Soviet expertise and experience in protecting, safeguarding, and handling nuclear weapons and materials remains in Russia.

However, the reliability and integrity of some of

those in charge of nuclear weapons and nuclear

weapon materials is no longer beyond question,

particularly as living conditions worsen. The individuals who are in a position to divert materials

from their authorized uses may also know how to

circumvent what protections do exist.

Even the elite Strategic Rocket Forces are apparently not immune to problems of maintaining

minimal living standards. Russian TV reported in

July 1993 on a strategic rocket installation at Ivanovo, not far from Moscow. While asserting that

there were no serious problems in maintaining

proper control over the nuclear weapons, the reporter stated that the soldiers had not been paid in

two months and that many officers were without

housing. 7 If such problems exist at rocket bases

near Moscow, it is conceivable that the situation

may be even worse at sites thousands of miles

away and further from the center of authority.

Further, experts in safeguarding nuclear materials have alleged that material control and accountancy (MC&A) practices in Russia today are

inadequate. Under the Soviet Union, control over

materials had been exercised primarily by controlling physical access to relevant facilities; accurate

accountancy methods for keeping track of material inventories were never instituted.8 Only a few

facilities were ever offered by the Soviet Union to

be placed under international safeguards (the Soviet Union, as a nuclear-weapon state, was not

bound under the NPT to apply safeguards to its

own nuclear facilities), and a consistent nationwide safeguards system was never developed. Efforts by the United States (under the Nunn-Lugar

program) are under way to help establish better

MC&A systems there, as in other republics of the

FSU.

“BRAIN DRAIN”

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, scientific establishments there have been restructuring themselves. Laboratories of the military establishment,

the Ministry of Atomic Energy (including the 10

closed cities of the nuclear weapon complex, such

as Arzamas and Chelyabinsk), the Russian Academy of Sciences, and independent and universitybased institutions have been competing intensely

for funds. The nuclear weapon laboratories are of

particular concern from the proliferation point of

view, both because the laboratory scientists could

transfer vital nuclear weapon expertise to foreign

parties, and because they have been greatly neglected by Moscow in the course of the political

chaos of late 1992 and 1993.

6 A long ~icle in fj(erafur~ya Ga:e(a, Ju]y 21, 1993, p. 13, FBIS, USR 93-107, Aug. 18, 1993, p. 49, ~lates how a shady network of black

marketeers advertised HEU or plutonium for sale at enormous prices, apparently only delivering either tiny quantities or else low-enriched

uranium. The article does refer to an International Atomic Energy Agency report listing 21 incidents of stolen radioactive materials, including

the Glazov theft and other cases at different institutions, including Arzamas and Cheiyabinsk. The black market networks allegedly have participants from the closed cities of the nuclear weapon complex. These stories maybe alarmist and may only indicate a network of criminals who are

able to bilk foreigners, rather than divert significant quantities of nuclear material. However, the persistent number of incidents shows at least

some smuggling of LEU and other radioactive materials.

7 ITOGI TV, July 18, 1993, 1800 GMT; FBIS videotape, Arms Proliferation and Nuclear Issues 93-018.

8 Forexample, see O. Bukharin, S. Rodionov, V. Shmelev, “Period of Transition--Proliferation Hazards in the CIS” (Heidelberg, Germany:

Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, March 1993). The same has been reported by many foreign observers, including W. Potter,

“Nuclear Exports From the FormerSoviet Union: What’s New, What’s True, ’’Arms Conrro/ Today, JanJFeb. 1993, pp. 3-10, and, more recently,

in “Russian Weapons Plutonium Storage Termed Unsafe by MINATOM Official,’’fVuc/eonics Week, Apr. 28, 1994, where Aleksei Lebedev of

MINA’IOM is quoted assaying that Russia’s interim plutonium storage facilities are not safe and not well guarded. He also mentioned problems

with accurate accounting. He complained that the delays in Num-Lugar aid were to blame. Naturally, his comments might be construed as

self-sewing.
Chapter 6 Russia I 63

Conditions at the weapon laboratories have deteriorated to the point where scientists there have

been told to supplement their food by growing

vegetables in their own gardens. Staff at the Arzamas and Chelyabinsk laboratories (roughly the

equivalent of the U.S. Los Alamos and Livermore

nuclear weapon laboratories, respectively) were

not paid for two months in late spring of 1993,

leading to protest rallies in late June at both institutions. Following the rallies, payments were resumed, relieving tensions for at least a time. As of

June 1993, the pay scale for a Doctor of Sciences

(the Russian equivalent of several years of research beyond the Ph. D.) was less than that of a

railroad conductor; earlier reports had noted that a

mid-level scientist received half the salary of a bus

driver. 9 Previously, the inhabitants of the closed

cities were kept in somewhat splendid isolation,

with their material wants very well catered to by

Soviet standards. The radical deterioration in their

economic situation over the past three years is due

not only to the ongoing economic and political

crises in Russia, but also to the fact that their principal expertise—the development and design of

nuclear weapons—is apparently no longer highly

prized by the government. The result has been extreme demoralization, especially among the younger staff, who have not experienced the close camaraderie and patriotic purpose that were

hallmarks of the early days at these laboratories.

Two active Russian nuclear physicists appearing on a French television program in March 1993

announced that they saw nothing wrong with aiding nuclear aspirants such as Iraq and Libya in

their efforts to get the bomb. The fact that these

scientists did not seem to fear any reprisals for

their remarks might indicate either that the Russian authorities are not seriously concerned about

such activities, or, more likely, that the government has problems instilling and enforcing an ethic against proliferation. Even so, no instances of

such migration of expertise have yet been confirmed.

Following the rally at Arzamas, on June 24,

1993, Scientific Director Vladimir Belugin remarked that it was risky to let such a nuclear facility “suffer.” He noted that, unlike conventional

arms, which can be openly exported, “Our products cannot become a commodity sold on the market because of the nonproliferation agreement”-- implying that the laboratory was thereby

disadvantaged relative to other enterprises in Russia. He added that Iraq had offered Arzamas $2 billion for a warhead.ll Attacking the lack of U.S.

aid, which, he said, had been more talked about

than forthcoming for the past two years, he stated

that U.S. policy was to “destroy us as soon as possible.” 12 This sentiment may have been expressed

for propagandistic reasons, to scare the United

States into providing more aid. It also is consistent

with long-standing attitudes toward the West on

the part of Soviet officials. Nevertheless, the statement was particularly upsetting to Los Alamos

scientists who had been working closely with Dr.

Belugin and had thought they had developed a

good working relationship. Even if this declaration was self-serving and exaggerated, it does reflect a general sentiment in Russia.

In a similar vein, V. Gorshkov, deputy head of

the trade union committee at Chelyabinsk, was

quoted on Russian television as saying that if the

“critical” situation continued, the laboratory

would have to halt work on programs “connected

with international treaties on arms control, destruction and nonproliferation of nuclear armaments.”13 On August 19, 1993, the Russian news9 See T. Beardsley, “Selling to Survive,” Scientific American, February 1993, pp. 92-100.

10 Antenne 2, pans, “F Comme Fiction,” Mtich 1993.

I I He did not provide any independent confirmation of this statement.

12 UpI, July 13, 1993, A. Kacherov, Moscow.

13 Vesti Newscast, Ju])J 4, 1993.
64 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

paper Izvestiya reported that Chelyabinsk was on

the verge of bankruptcy. Evoking the financial

problems there, the article referred to the December 1992 attempt of some 50 Russian rocket specialists to emigrate for jobs in North Korea, implying that similar problems might arise at

Chelyabinsk if Moscow authorities did not heed

the desperate pleas for economic aid and attention

by members of the laboratory.14

Official statements regarding the possibility of

nuclear theft or transfer of technology changed

. radically in tone over the spring and summer of

1993. For example, as recently as March 1993,

Arzamas Scientific Director Belugin had remarked that no workers from Arzamas had been

“lost” in spite of the economic difficulties and in

spite of many “proposals” from “Middle East

countries in particular.”l5 In the same period, Nikolai Yegorov, Deputy Minister of MINATOM,

likewise denied such problems.l6

By the summer, however, the tenor of these official statements changed, as can be seen in the

statements quoted previously. Thus, comments

from Russian officials have gone from high confidence in the winter of 1992-1993 to caution and

trepidation the following summer. This shift may

indicate concern over an apparent growing susceptibility of Russian nuclear scientists and technicians to foreign subornation. Because of the

enormous quantities of nuclear materials and

weapons in Russia, and because of the large number of employees of the nuclear complex (up to 1

million, although fewer have vital technical

knowledge or direct access to nuclear materials

that would be very useful to a would-be proliferant), one might expect an effort on the part of the

world’s proliferants to seek either personnel or

material there. As noted above, Russian officials

have reported attempts by various parties to do

just that. Given the many potential targets for

this activity and the economic strains under

which many of them operate, the threat of a diversion of nuclear expertise or material from

Russia cannot be discounted.

In 1992, the United States, with its allies, had

already become concerned about economic difficulties at the weapon cities of the FSU. Reports

that agents from several Middle Eastern countries

were in Moscow attempting to recruit Soviet personnel fueled fears of nuclear proliferation. In

response, the United States and Germany led an

international effort to fund an International Science and Technology Center to be headquartered

in Moscow. Originally intended to encompass all

interested states of the FSU, political pressure

resulted in a proposal for a second center in Ukraine. These institutions were to provide funding for research projects that would support sc scientists at the weapon laboratories so they would

be able to work in peaceful areas that interested

them, producing valuable science. However, the

project took many months to arrange, requiring

detailed negotiations among the United States,

European governments, and Japan over issues of

funding, project selection procedures, and programmatic control.

By the time the agreement among the donors to

establish the center was in place—with the European Community, United States, and Japan each

contributing about $25 million-other difficulties

arose. Scientists at the Russian weapon laboratories suspected that a Moscow bureaucracy was being installed that would milk most of the funds,

leaving little to find its way to the institutions,

much less to the scientists themselves. Worse still,

conservative elements in the Russian parliament

14 Aflicle ~ /zve$/fya, Aug. 19, 1993, I steal., p. 2, FBIS-SOV-93-I 62, Aug. 24, 1993, p. 32. The attempted emigration of missile specialists

is described in the “Brain Drain” section at the end of chapter 3.

15 fiNouve/ Obsemateur, Mar. 18-24, 1993, p. 8. FBIS, JPRS-TND-93-003-L, Apr. 22, 1993. Again, such StiNeInt?ntS InuSt be Vkw?d Wh.h

caution unless independently substantiated because they may be intended to stimulate attention and concern in the West.

16 Yegorov WaS quoted as saying, “... not a single one of our fellow countrymen has sold even one gram of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. And he will not sell. This is virtually impossible. [emphasis added]” De/ovoy Mir, Feb. 16, 1993, JPRS-TND-93-006, Mar. 5, 1993.
Chapter 6 Russia I 65

began to regard the centers as fronts for western

efforts to steal scientific expertise from the highly

respected and advanced technical institutions involved. Further, the foreign oversight of Russian

scientific work was galling, particularly to nationalist factions in the Russian parliament. By early

1993, the issue had become embroiled in the power struggle between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament.

These delays—both within the FSU and among

the Western participants—may have been nearly

fatal for the centers. By July 1993, the proposal to

establish the center in Moscow was stalled in parliament and some Russian scientists were reporting to U.S. collaborators at Sandia National Laboratories that they considered the concept dead.

This assessment was premature, preceding President Yeltsin’s dissolution of the old parliament in

September 1993 and the new parliamentary elections in December. The center was resurrected at

the end of December by presidential decree and

began operation in early 1994, without waiting for

the new parliament to take action. The project is

finally off the ground and it now includes participation by Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, as well as Canada, Finland, and Sweden.

At this writing, it is not clear what effect the

greatly strengthened extreme right-wing nationalist faction in the lower house of the new parliament will have on the ISTC. An article by a newlyelected member attacked the center, but, in the

welter of issues facing the government, his complaints did not appear to find a resonance.17,]8

To circumvent the bureaucratic delays that

have stalled the International Centers so far, the

U.S. nuclear weapon laboratories have, under the

oversight of the Departments of Energy and State,

begun joint research projects directly with the

weapon laboratories in Russia and some institutes

in Ukraine. At the behest of the Department of Energy, the three U.S. nuclear weapon laboratories

(Los Alamos, Livermore, Sandia) established an

interlaboratory coordinating group that has since

been expanded to 10 U.S. national laboratories.

This group has been especially useful in forestalling interlaboratory rivalry and duplication on the

U.S. side. As of summer 1993, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had transferred about

$1 million for work in peaceful areas of laser research to colleagues in Chelyabinsk; Los Alamos

had engaged in joint research projects totaling

some $500,000 with scientists from Arzamas; and

Sandia had entered into some hundreds of thousands of dollars in contracts for cooperative research with institutes in Tomsk, Yekaterinburg,

and other cities in Russia, as well as with various

metallurgical institutes in Ukraine. Given the value of the Russian ruble, estimates now (May

1994) are that about $300 to $400 per month

would be sufficient to provide a livable salary for a

scientist in the FSU.

These efforts have succeeded in aiding many

former Soviet researchers, and plans are under

way to expand the program. This is an excellent

example of how efforts by working-level officials and scientists on both sides can be effective where higher profile attempts bog down in

bureaucracy and international politics. However, all these efforts have so far been financed out

of U.S. laboratory discretionary funds and are thus

limited in scope.19

17 v. Trofimov” in Ne:a\,isirnqa Ga:era, Dec. 29, 1993.

18 A slml]ar Siluatlon has ~sen in ~aine, where nationalist pressure in the Rada (parliament) provided a political obstacle even to tie

signing of an agreement by the president. This resistance was finally overcome in October 1993, when President Kravchuk signed an agreement

that the Rada does not need to ratify.

19 In addition t. governmental efforts, private professional organizations such as the American Astronomical Union, the American Mathematical Association, and the American Physical Society have transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to former Soviet counterparts in an

effort to keep science and research alive in the FSU. The efforts of the Soros Foundation and its founder, George Soros, who has expressed the

intention of distributing up to $100 million for such purposes, will have ma~r beneficial effects on the state of former Soviet science and scientists. However, these efforts are aimed at civilian basic research only, and so have only indirect effects on nonproliferation.
66 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

Some relatively minor bureaucratic changes in

procedure could significantly improve efforts to

work with the Russian scientists. For one thing,

U.S. scientists universally report great difficulties

in receiving permission from the Department of

Energy to travel overseas. Approval frequently

comes at the last minute or later, severely disrupting travel planning and occasionally forcing trips

to be cancelled. Moreover, when minor trip details

are changed by the Russian side, the whole approval process must begin again.

On the other hand, U.S. policy has been that,

for security reasons, Russian scientists cannot obtain multiple-entry visas from the United States,

even though Russian businessmen can. This

policy complicates the scheduling of trips, since

each visa requires a month for approval, even if

the individual has traveled several times previously to the United States. Flexibility on this issue by

the U.S. government would facilitate a number of

joint U.S.-Russian research projects.

Russian scientists and scientific organizations

have let their U.S. counterparts know what they

need to continue their professional activities effectively. First, they need to maintain contacts

with the world’s scientific communities, through

receipt of professional journals (which are becoming prohibitive in cost due to the rapid inflation

over the past three years) and through participation in international conferences (both in Russia

and elsewhere) and topical schools. In addition,

joint research projects are essential because they

provide contact with foreign science and scientists, because they sometimes allow the transfer of

funds to Russian scientists and institutions (helping keep the Russian scientific community afloat),

and because they sometimes allow limited term

exchanges of scientists between western countries

and Russia.

Many U.S. and European professional societies have provided large numbers of scientific

journals to satisfy the first of these requirements.

Further, they also have instituted international

conferences and schools in collaboration with

Russian institutes. Joint research projects—generally aimed at civilian scientists—have been carried out between individual university researchers

and their partners in Russia. The relevance of most

such programs to proliferation is indirect: by helping stabilize the Russian civilian industrial and research bases, they may help promote the eventual

economic stabilization and recovery of the country. More directly, they provide civilian scientific

employment opportunities. Such stabilization

may play a role in reducing the risks of some avenues of proliferation—those that arise from severe

economic stresses that pressure individuals and

reduce the ability of the government to maintain

custody and control over nuclear material.

There are also joint projects, both proposed and

under way, between weapon scientists at U.S. national laboratories and those in Russia. These bear

directly on “brain drain” proliferation problems.

An institutionalized program of laboratory-tolaboratory exchanges, the Laboratory-Industry

Partnership Program (LIPP, discussed in chapter

3), involves U.S. private industry as well as U.S.

laboratories. It will make use of funds appropriated in the fiscal year 1994 Foreign Operations

Appropriations Act. While such a program would

be highly useful, it suffers from two drawbacks.

First, funds for this program so far have been appropriated for only one year. If not renewed for

several additional years, the program is unlikely

to be productive, since the partnerships it envisages involve projects that will require support for

two years or more. Second, the funds are taken

from the appropriation for the Department of State

and given to government laboratories in the Department of Energy. In the future, it may be

more efficient to add a line item within the Department of Energy budget specifically for

such joint research projects involving U.S. national laboratories and Russian scientists (as

well as those from other FSU republics). Such a

mechanism would allow past fruitful collaborations to continue without requiring that the funds

come out of the State Department operating budget or other national laboratory research efforts.

THE CHINA CONNECTION

The government of China has apparently successfully recruited Russian missile (and, possibly, nu-
clear) experts on a large scale. Russian scientists

are said to be working for China, both onsite and

via electronic mail, for salaries in the range of

$24,000 per year plus perquisites—some five or

more times what they would otherwise earn at

home. The Chinese media have reportedly

claimed that up to 3,000 scientists have been recruited .

20 -

It might appear at first glance that concerns

based on these reports are minor, since China already possesses both nuclear weapons and relatively advanced missile technology. However, the

transfer of this sort of technology to China presents two serious dangers. First, transfer of advanced Soviet nuclear weapon designs to China

would greatly assist the development, manufacture, and deployment of multiple independently

targetable reentry vehicles—a means of dispensing several nuclear warheads from a single missile. Implementation of this technology would

permit China to increase its nuclear weapon stockpile and capability substantially, presenting an increased threat to its Asian neighbors and to the

United States. Transfer of advanced Soviet nuclear weapon designs to China would greatly assist such developments. Second, Chinese transfers of Russian technology to other nations

could seriously exacerbate regional proliferation concerns.

Past Chinese actions give cause for worry. China was reported in the 1980s to have transferred

nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan.** More

recently, in summer 1993, the United States government imposed sanctions on China for the transfer of M-11 missiles to the same nation.22 It cannot be assumed that China would not retransfer

advanced technologies related to weapons of mass

destruction and means of delivery. Such actions

Chapter 6 Russia I 67

could be taken for either strategic or financial reasons.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS REGARDING

RUSSIA

Russia is still a great power, but it is undergoing

sustained political and economic turmoil. Therefore, U.S. attempts to influence the course of

events there may have only a marginal effect. On

the positive side, most Russian political factions-despite their disagreements in other policy

areas-agree that control of weapons of mass destruction and related materials should be as strong

as possible. However, civil disorder, chaos, or

anarchy would make it difficult or impossible to

maintain such control.

Maintaining stability in Russia not only supports the world’s nonproliferation regime; it may

be essential to that regime’s survival. While the

United States cannot determine the overall course

of events in Russia, U.S. actions can improve the

current situation relative to nonproliferation. The

issue of nuclear nonproliferation is of great importance to the national security of the United States

and to global stability. Therefore, the consequences of failure provide a strong incentive to

help, despite possible limitations on the ability of

outside forces to solve Russia’s internal problems.

POLICY OPTIONS SUMMARIZED

● Continue to pursue negotiations with Russia

to implement reciprocal monitoring of nuclear weapon facilities in order to gain the

right to inspect Russian facilities. Such monitoring would permit verification of weapon

dismantlement under the Gorbachev and

Bush initiatives.

Zo see J, Fia]ka, “U.S. Fe~s china’s success in Skimming Cream of Weapons Experts from Russia,” ~he wU// StreerJournal, @t. 14, ~ 993,

p. 12, and T.M. Cheung , “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993, p. 24.

21 See L. Spector, Nuc/ear Ambirions (Boulder, CO: Westview R55, 1~), pp. 93 ~d 33*.

22 For a brief discussion and citations to several press reports, see T. Halevy, “Chinese Compliance with the Missile Technology Control

Regime: A Case Study, ’’Nationa/ Security Quarrerly, vol. 1, No. 3, 1993, published by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC.
68 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

■

●

●

●

●

m

●

There is a possibility that nuclear material, technology, or expertise maybe diverted from Russia to foreign parties. Similarly, expertise in areas such as biological weapons or chemical technology may also

be diverted. The likelihood of such occurrences is difficult to assess,

Many in the nuclear weapon complex, in other weapon development programs, and in the armed forces

are under severe economic strain. This pressure saps morale and renders some individuals susceptible

to bribery and other forms of coercion.

The International Science and Technology Center, funded by the West and intended to help former Soviet weapon scientists with funding and with international joint research projects, was delayed for about

a year and as of this writing is only beginning to function.

There have been numerous cases of smuggling of nuclear and other materials. More effective control

of commodity flows across borders is needed.

Until the economic and political situations stabilize, adequate control over nuclear material in Russia will

likely be difficult to maintain, This situation can be mitigated by improving material control and accountancy methods. The IAEA is currently providing some assistance to this end, but this effort, constrained

by the limited resources of the IAEA and the political weakness of the Russian nuclear regulatory agency,

GOSATOMNADZOR, needs to be supplemented if the Russian system is to be improved rapidly,

U.S. efforts to verify Russian weapon dismantlement or storage, or to examine the effectiveness of Russian material accountancy and control, are likely to be frustrated unless the United States offers some

reciprocity of access to Russian officials at analogous U.S. facilities, This may be eventually be accomplished under the recent agreement between MINATOM and the U.S. Department of Energy, which

constituted a major step toward implementation of reciprocal inspections,

Reports that Russian missile and nuclear scientists are working in or for China, if true, could lead to greatly improved Chinese nuclear capability and also to the spread of nuclear and missile technology to other

countries.

Rationale For: In verifying that the dismantlement initiatives are being carried out properly, it

would be desirable for the United States to assure

itself that the quantities of plutonium and HEU declared to come from dismantled weapons actually

do, rather than from some other source in the

stockpile. Providing such assurance would require monitoring inflows and outflows at the dismantlement site, the plutonium storage facility,

and the HEU blending facility. Unless the United

States provides reciprocal access to the Russians,

the Russians are not likely to grant such access to

the United States.

The United States and Russia achieved an

agreement on mutual inspections on March 16,

1994. At this writing, it is clear that inspections

will take place at storage facilities, probably at the

Pantex weapon assembly plant in the United

States and at the Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk plants in

Russia. However, the question of access to the actual dismantlement facilities has not yet been decided. Negotiations are under way, and both parties hope to reach detailed agreements on

implementation by the end of the year.

The United States is committed to negotiate

such “transparency” measures with Russia under

the terms of the agreement by which the United

States is buying uranium from Russian weapons.

U.S. national laboratories have been examining

how to permit such access without revealing

weapon design or other sensitive information. Defense Department officials have presented technical possibilities for accomplishing this.23

Arguments Against: It might be judged too difficult to prevent Russian inspectors from acquiring vital information about U.S. weapon designs.

Given that it is in the United States’ interest to

draw down Russian stockpiles of weapon-usable

23 M. @r&Jn, “pentagon Offers New Way to Verify Disarmament,” The New York Times, Mar. 10, 1994, p. A6.
materials, even if those materials do not actually

come from dismantled weapons, the added benefit

gained from verifying that the materials did indeed come from weapons might not be deemed

sufficiently worthwhile. Moreover, the time needed to negotiate and implement such a verification

agreement might delay the actual dismantlement

of nuclear weapons.

Additional Comment: Some observers have

suggested that the IAEA become involved in

monitoring material removed from nuclear weapons, and, indeed, IAEA officials have indicated an

interest in this possibility. IAEA involvement has

not yet been agreed to by the Russians, and the issue is under discussion.

The United States has already offered to make

its own “excess” nuclear weapon material-that

is, material in excess of that determined necessary

for U.S. security needs—available for inspection

by the IAEA. At this writing, this proposal is in an

early stage, and policies to implement it are being

discussed.

Monitoring compliance with a nuclear weapon

arms control agreement would be a completely

new task for the IAEA, which to date has not had

any involvement with nuclear weapons. Some of

the techniques and methodologies required for

this new mission would be similar to those used in

its past activities with nuclear materials, but others would not. The IAEA would need to develop

new expertise and procedures, which could take

some time. Furthermore, unless additional resources were explicitly provided, this additional

mission would further stress the Agency’s seriously constrained budget.

It is even more critical to prevent members of

the international inspectorate from obtaining

weapon design information than it is to protect

U.S. information from Russia, which has had nuclear weapons for nearly half a century. Therefore, IAEA involvement in monitoring materials from weapons would not be appropriate

unless protocols can be developed that make it

possible to verify the non-diversion of stored

materials without revealing critical design information. If the range of procedures and the resChapter 6 Russia I 69

olution of equipment used to monitor the materials is suitably limited, it may well be possible to

meet both of these goals.

An advantage to IAEA participation would be

the involvement of the international community

as a participant and, thus, a stakeholder in a major

arms control agreement, and to provide neutral

third-party regulation of disagreements that may

arise. IAEA involvement could be particularly

important if the process of verified nuclear weapon dismantlement and management of military

material stockpiles were extended to other nations. However, the participation of an additional

party inevitably would complicate the negotiation

of implementing agreements between the United

States and Russia.

● Increase funding to U.S. DOE national laboratories and to industrial partners for joint

unclassified research projects with Russian

and other former Soviet weapon scientists.

Consider a separate line item for this purpose within the Department of Energy

budget. Also, move to establish the nongovernmental foundation provided for in the

FREEDOM Support Act, providing for civilian joint research projects between FSU

and United States scientists.

Rationale For: Scientists and technicians at

Russian nuclear facilities are in extremely difficult straits, with salaries sometimes not paid and

standards of living dropping. Without direct foreign support, they are largely unable to travel to

the West to establish or maintain scientific contact. Direct laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation

and the ISTC have had some positive results, but

they only affect limited numbers of individuals.

Further, these lab-to-lab contacts are funded out of

existing U.S. laboratory budgets, without explicit

Department of Energy support. The LIPP program

does provide a specific earmark for such projects,

but it is currently only envisioned for one year.

Moreover, the funds come from the State Department budget, not DOE’S.

Providing hard currency support to collaborating Russian institutions (as is now being done in
70 I

the

can

Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

laboratory-to-laboratory research projects)

strengthen the resolve of individuals

employed there not to transfer weapon-related information abroad. Moreover, since the level of

Russian science is very high in many fields, the

United States could benefit from access to these

laboratories. Further, possible commercialization

of products resulting from such joint projects

eventually could benefit the Russian economy and

thereby stabilize the political and economic situations there. Such commercialization would be one

aspect of defense conversion, also suggested in

other options. Finally, laboratory contacts are a

useful source of information about conditions in

the weapon facilities of the former Soviet Union.

Language in new national laboratory mission

statements, currently being drafted within the Department of Energy, could endorse major activities in this area. In addition, the nongovernmental

foundation authorized in the FREEDOM Support

Act (see chapter 3) could provide another mechanism for joint research that would, perhaps more

clearly than the LIPP program, include basic research as well as applied science.

Arguments Against: It may not be in the interests of the United States to help fund former Soviet weapon scientists, given the possibility of a

resurgent nationalist Russia. Fiscal pressures and

economic difficulties in the United States might

argue for spending fewer funds overseas. Finally,

continuing to require individual laboratories to

pay for collaborative work out of their own budgets would impose the discipline of restricting joint

projects to areas that are of significant interest to

the United States.

■ Expedite travel requests by U.S. scientists

engaged in joint research projects in the former Soviet Union and grant multiple-entry

visas to former Soviet scientists engaged

similarly.

Rationale For: Difficulties with travel approvals and visa requests have disrupted joint research

efforts in the past and could be eliminated at no

cost to the United States. The Department of Energy could simplify and streamline its procedures

for approving trips by U.S. national laboratory

personnel to the FSU to carry out cooperative research projects, thereby greatly facilitating such

work. Russian businessmen receive multipleentry visas to the United States; scientists should

not be treated differently.

Arguments Against: Security reasons may still

argue for increased scrutiny of Russian weapon

scientists when they request entry into the United

States.

● Use Nunn-Lugar funds to aid in housing and

providing other amenities for nuclear weapon custodians in Russia, especially for military forces.

Rationale For: As indicated by the Belarusian

request for assistance (see chapter 4) and by press

reports, the living standard of the military units in

charge of nuclear weapon in the FSU is a major

concern. The lower that morale and living standards become among the weapon custodians, the

greater U.S. concern over their performance

should be. Some housing aid is now being provided for military personnel who are retiring from

active duty in these areas, but not for those still in

the armed forces. Aid could also include funding

for hospitals, day care centers, assurance of adequate food supply, etc. Such a pattern of aid also

would furnish an incentive to downsize Russian

military forces more rapidly.

Arguments Against: Assistance given to active

nuclear officers would be difficult to justify, politically and otherwise.

■ Relax restrictions on Nunn-Lugar funding

that make it difficult to transfer Safe and Secure Dismantlement program funds to Russian agencies and manufacturers.

Rationale For: One example where U.S. funds

could make a major impact would be at MINATOM, which is the cognizant Russian agency for

many of the projects proposed under the NunnLugar program. One of the main concerns of MINATOM is maintaining its staff. There are already

problems in paying them and keeping them busy.

As with soldiers who have custody of nuclear

weapons, MINATOM employees, particularly the

technical staff of the laboratories and institutes of
the nuclear weapon complex, play a vital role in

protecting nuclear material. Attempts could be

made to reduce those economic difficulties that

may tempt personnel to transfer material or

technology abroad.

In addition, MINATOM is engaged in nuclear

cooperative programs with countries such as Iran,

largely for financial reasons. Given the serious

economic difficulties facing MINATOM, U.S. leverage to prevent these agreements, as well as future ones with other countries that the United

States would rather not see obtain Russian nuclear

expertise and training, is limited. If the United

States were to provide some support to MINATOM staff, it might have more influence over

Russia’s nuclear cooperation with other states.

Making some U.S. funding available to MINATOM workers involved in the Safe and Secure

Dismantlement program would reduce, to a degree, the economic pressure on the workers in the

system, build good will toward the United States

in a vital segment of the Russian population, and

improve morale among many of those directly involved in developing and implementing Russian

nuclear safeguards.

However, the United States would need to ensure that its funds reached the intended recipients:

the rank-and-file scientists and technicians working in the Russian nuclear complex. There are frequent reports of massive corruption in Russian society due to the sudden removal of strict police

oversight of the population and to economic upheaval. Strict accounting procedures would be vital to assure that funds are not funneled, for example, to foreign bank accounts. Currently, funding

mechanisms for the cooperative projects between

U.S. weapon laboratories and Russian institutes

appear to have been reasonably successful, in part

because funds were transferred only after receipt

of contractual deliverables. The ISTC also has a

system that is intended to apply strict accountability.

Arguments Against: The United States has no

direct interest in helping MINATOM pay its own

Chapter 6 Russia I 71

employees. It might be argued that this is a problem for MINATOM and the Russian government,

and that the United States should not get involved

in attempting to bribe a Russian Ministry to follow policies that the United States wishes. According to this line of argument, the appropriate

avenue for informing Russia of U.S. concerns

about official transfer of material and technology

is through discussions with the Russian Foreign

Ministry. Moreover, if MINATOM continues to

engage in cooperative programs with states whom

the United States considers to pose proliferation

threats, U.S. support to MINATOM might be considered as indirect support for these programs. As

a practical matter, the possibilities of misappropriating U.S. funds provided to MINATOM are

not negligible, and such funding would require

careful oversight.

● Broaden permitted use of Nunn-Lugar

funding to include the reduction of Soviet

nuclear material stockpiles even if the material cannot be proven to originate from dismantled weapons.

Rationale For: It is in the security interests of

the United States to deplete stockpiles of nuclear

weapon materials in the former Soviet Union that

might be diverted to the black market, or that

might at a later time be reconstituted into nuclear

weapons. Therefore, the United States may wish

to purchase such materials from Russia whether or

not it can be verified that they came from dismantled weapons. This eventuality could arise if

there are technical difficulties in determining the

origin of the nuclear material.

Arguments Against: Nunn-Lugar funds were

appropriated by Congress for the purpose of reducing the nuclear threat to the United States

posed by Soviet nuclear weapons. Dangers posed

by the possible diversion or reconstitution of other

nuclear materials might be considered to be less

pressing. Moreover, purchasing Russian nuclear

materials without any assurance that they came

from weapons might put the United States in the
72 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

position of being a paying customer of the Russian

nuclear weapon material production complex.

● Explore with the Russian government improved ways to transfer funds directly to recipient institutions and scientists.

Rationale For: Because of difficulties in working through the Russian banking system, some

private organizations in the West have felt compelled to transport cash directly to Russian recipients. Although laboratory-to-laboratory money

transfers have been successful, there are some

problems. First, taxes and currency exchange fees

in such institutional interactions amount to nearly

50 percent. Transfers from professional organizations directly to Russian scientists, on the other

hand, are not subject to this overhead, thanks to

specific legislation passed by the last parliament.

The Russians could be asked to confer the same

benefits on laboratory-to-laboratory transfers,

doubling the economic efficiency of joint cooperative research efforts. Secondly, Russian banks

occasionally have been unreliable and sometimes

have delayed transfers during inflationary periods

to take advantage of changing exchange rates. Direct dollar transfers to recipients through United

States banks with branches in Russia would be

preferable, if such could be arranged. The ISTC

and non-governmental organizations have made

some progress in establishing reliable direct payment systems.

Arguments Against: The Russian government

might object to this mechanism to avoid taxes, especially if other institutions and individuals in

Russia seek equal treatment.

● Provide help for improving material control

and accountancy systems in Russia.

Rationale For: While better than in the other republics, the nuclear material control and accountancy system in Russia is still rudimentary and

piecemeal. It is in the interests of both Russia and

the United States to improve it. Even the provision

of simple office equipment (fax machines, personal computers, better e-mail communications)

would help. Agreements have been reached with

Russia toward this end; they should be implemented as rapidly as possible.

A specific option in this area would be to provide support directly to GOSATOMNADZOR,

the organization charged with overseeing nuclear

activities in Russia. Such help would give it greater political strength and technical ability to overcome bureaucratic resistance within MINATOM

to needed improvements in Russian MC&A systems. For example, GOSATOMNADZOR’S research laboratory at present is nearly moribund,

due to a lack of funds.

Arguments Against Some elements in the Russian government could consider this effort an interference in their internal affairs.

● Provide help to establish a more effective export control system in Russia; expedite

Nunn-Lugar implementation to the degree

possible, taking into account the fact that

much of the delay is due to internal Russian

problems.

Rationale For: The same arguments apply to

export controls as to the material control and accountancy systems. Better control of commodity

flows across borders is urgently needed not only to

stem smuggling of nuclear materials and technologies, but also to prevent smuggling of valuable

metals and other products—many such cases already have occurred. Internal Russian politics

have slowed the process of reaching detailed

agreements to implement U.S. assistance to various parts of the bureaucracy. These disputes may

have been due to turf battles within Russian ministries, between ministries, or between the president

and the parliament. This last source of delay may

not be as serious as in the past, given the dissolution of parliament in September 1993 and the

adoption of a new Constitution on December 12,

1993, that gives greatly expanded powers to the

president. Although some of these problems may

be beyond the ability of the United States to influence, the United States could push for rapid implementation of accords aiding in the establishment

of an effective export control system. Ineffective
Russian export controls increase the chances for

illegitimate export of nuclear materials or dualuse items, not only contributing to proliferation

but negating the effectiveness of U.S. and other

nations’ controls as well.

Arguments Against: Given the magnitude of

Russia’s internal problems, the likelihood that

these funds would contribute significantly to their

solution might be judged too small to be worth it,

particularly in a time of fiscal constraint.

= Offer increased aid for defense conversion.

Rationale For: Programs along these lines

have, in fact, been initiated, although little funds

have thus far been expended. Economic stability

will be increased by successful transition of defense industries to civilian uses. The economic situation in Russia is very serious and, if not radically improved soon, could lead to the emergence of a

government much less friendly to the United

States and much less likely to cooperate with it in

the nonproliferation area. Therefore, the economic issue is vital to nonproliferation efforts. Increased economic stability will also reduce

stresses that could tempt some with access to nuclear material or information to sell them to foreign parties.

Arguments Against: The economic problems in

Russia may be so enormous and complex that U.S.

efforts to help have only marginal effects at best.

s Raise with the Russian and Chinese governments the reported cases of Russian nuclear

and missile experts working for China.

Rationale For: The United States could attempt to ascertain the accuracy of these reports. If

it finds them to be true, the United States could inChapter 6 Russia I 73

sist that Russia abide by its commitment not to

transfer technologies whose export is proscribed

by the multilateral Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR, see chapter 3). Exports of missile technology to China would violate this commitment. Even though transfers of nuclear weapon technology to China would not violate the NPT

(since only transfers to non-nuclear-weapon states

are prohibited), the United States could also press

the Russians to control the transfer of nuclear information to China anyway.

If requests for Russian restraint are not heeded,

the United States could pressure China at least not

to reexport nuclear technologies to non-nuclearweapon states. China is bound by the NPT not to do

so; in principle, it should have no problem agreeing to abide by its existing NPT commitments.

China in the past also had stated its readiness to

adhere to the MTCR, but it has not renewed this

commitment following the tightening of MTCR

guidelines in 1993. Moreover, questions about

China’s behavior in the past may make simple assurances insufficient to address U.S. concerns.

Arguments Against: If the reports concerning

Russian-Chinese collaboration are inaccurate, the

United States should protect its credibility and not

raise the issue. Diplomacy is an important tool by

which the United States will address proliferation

problems in the future; if the United States is perceived as acting on the basis of poor information,

it will lose influence. Even if its information is

good, the United States may choose not to pursue

this issue with the Russians or Chinese to avoid

antagonizing those states and losing their cooperation on other issues judged to be of greater importance.
T

he Ukrainian component of the nonproliferation problem

has two parts. The first is the contribution that exports of

material, information, technology, or people from Ukraine might make to proliferation on the part of other

countries. The second is whether Ukraine will seek its own nuclear weapon capability.

The first set of issues is shared with the other nuclear inheritor

states: the need to apply safeguards to nuclear materials on Ukranian territory, to protect nuclear materials and weapons there, and

to prevent the transfer of technology and expertise from Ukraine

to non-nuclear-weapon states. Because of the severe economic

stresses in Ukraine, the temptation to sell anything for hard currency is understandably strong. Economic disruption in Ukraine

is, if anything, worse than in Russia and Kazakhstan; the Ukrainian currency (the carbovanets) is one of the few in the world that is

losing value with respect to the Russian ruble. Further, Ukraine

no longer has the strong central police control over commercial

and other activities that it had had as part of the Soviet Union, and

since much of the Soviet expertise in customs and export control

is now in Russia, Ukraine does not yet have an effective export

control system. Therefore, it is particularly vulnerable to loss of

nuclear-related items as well as goods associated with other

weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Figure 5

shows the locations of relevant facilities in Ukraine.

The second issue of concern is the reluctance of Ukraine to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In February 1994,

the Ukrainian parliament endorsed the tripartite declaration that

the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States signed on

January 14, 1994, committing Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory within seven years. The nuclear situation

Ukraine
—

76 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

= ICBM base

4. Airbase with heavy bombers

‘r

RUSSIA

b——w——J LA-----(

UKRAINE

fKiev

+~

0

4

UKRAINE

I —
Chapter 7 Ukraine I 77

Former Soviet Bear H intercontinental nuclear bombers such

as this one are based in Ukraine.

there is still problematic, however, because many

politicians-despite this decision—want Ukraine

to seize the Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory

and declare itself a nuclear-weapon state. This

sentiment appears to have the support of a large

segment, although probably still a minority, of the

public, as well as of a significant proportion of the

parliament. The parliament refused to ratify the

NPT on the same day it finally ratified START I.

Ukraine is a relatively large European country

with a size and population similar to France. At

the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it

had on its territory 46 SS-24 ICBMS ( 10 warheads

each, in silos), 130 older SS-19s (six warheads,

silo-based), and about 30 Bear H and Blackjack

bombers with air-launched nuclear cruise missiles

(perhaps about 500 in total). ] If these 1,700 to

1,800 warheads were to come under Ukrainian

control, they would make Ukraine the world’s

third-largest nuclear power. In addition, in the civilian sector, Ukraine has 14 active nuclear power

plants (including three remaining at the Chernobyl complex) with large inventories of spent fuel

Former Soviet Blackjack intercontinental bomber now displaying Ukranian Air Force markings.

containing plutonium. At present, Ukraine does

not possess a reprocessing capability for extracting the plutonium from the spent fuel, nor does it

have means of enriching uranium. There are also

some small research reactors with small quantities

of highly enriched uranium. Beyond this, Ukraine

has facilities that produce heavy water in large

quantities. 2

UKRAINE AND THE INTERNATIONAL

NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

As of this writing, the Ukrainian parliament (or

Rada) has not ratified the NPT, although on February 3, 1994, it ratified START I without the crippling reservations that it had attached the previous

November. Over the past several years, government officials and politicians have retreated from

an October 1991 statement by the Rada—predating the dissolution of the Soviet Union—that Ukraine would become a “nuclear-free zone” by

1995. Most of the recent revisionist pronouncements alleged that the 1991 statement was somehow coerced by the Soviet government and was

‘ The nuclear bombs for these planes are thought to have been returned to Russia.

z G. Allison et al,, “C(~(~Prative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds” (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affaim

Harvard University, January 1993), and W. Potter, “Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States” (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute for

international Studies, May 1993). Heavy water is used in a class of nuclear reactors that is fueled with natural uranium, rather than low-enriched

uranium. Such reactors can be used to produce plutonium.
—

78 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

not freely made. However, the October 1991 Rada

statement was far from an isolated event. Other

commitments by Ukraine to achieve non-nuclear

status include:

m

●

m

the Minsk statement, made during the organization of the Commonwealth of Independent

States in December 1991, which promised that

Ukraine would remove its strategic nuclear

weapons by July 1994;

President Kravchuk’s signing of the Lisbon

Protocol to START I on May 23, 1992, which

committed Ukraine to accede to the NPT and to

ratify START I, and

statements by Kravchuk (May 7, 1992), Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov (April 14,

1992), and other high-ranking government officials.

Despite these positions, Ukraine did not ratify

the Lisbon Protocol and START I until February

1994. The political reality is that, although the

government of Ukraine appeared to want to see

the NPT ratified, much of the parliament did not.3

The issue has thus become inextricably intertwined in the power struggle between the president and the Rada.

While it is now likely that the newly-elected

Rada will, in fact, finally ratify the NPT, that outcome is not yet certain. 4 It is, therefore, useful to

outline some of the arguments in the Ukrainian debate to understand better the motivations of Ukrainians skeptical towards the NPT, and to review

possible arguments that may make them more receptive.

THE ROLE OF RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Many arguments presented within Ukraine for becoming a nuclear-weapon state and for rejecting

the NPT appeal to prevalent nationalist sentiments. Even some who do not necessarily advocate becoming a nuclear-weapon state are quite

hesitant to ratify the NPT. Many Ukrainians feel

that nuclear weapons are essential to national survival and that they have a vital role in deterring the

Russians from reclaiming Ukraine as part of a

new, greater Russia.

In fact, various nationalist Russian parliamentarians, and not only the most extreme among

them, have made irredentist statements regarding

much of the former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine. Ukraine is a special target of Russian nationalism because of the unique historical, ethnic,

and linguistic links between Russia and Ukraine,

because of Ukraine’s size (50 million people), because of its agricultural and industrial wealth, and

because of conflicting claims to the Crimea and

the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

The Crimean issue is a particularly thorny one.

The Crimean peninsula, on the northern shore of

the Black Sea, had never belonged to Ukraine before 1954, when Soviet Prime Minister Nikita

Khrushchev made a gift of it to Ukraine for internal Soviet political reasons. At that time, it was

part of Russia, having been annexed from the Ottoman Empire by Russian Empress Catherine the

Great in the eighteenth century. A majority of the

Crimean population (nearly 70 percent) is ethnic

Russian.

Sevastopol, the Crimean home port of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, is a powerful symbol for

countless Russian nationalists, including the former vice president of Russia, Alexander Rutskoi.

In July 1993, the Russian parliament, against the

wishes of President Yeltsin, declared the city of

Sevastopol to be under Russian jurisdiction. Both

Yeltsin and Kravchuk denounced this action as

J In septem~r 193, the ArnefiCan Association for the Advancement of Science held a seminar in Kiev that included U.S. experts h nuclear

weapons and nuclear strategy. Many mid-level oftlcials from the Ukrainian Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries participated. It is possible

that, after learning some of the negative aspects of maintaining a nuclear arsensal, these participants were able to affect positively the Rada’s

decision on START I and the tripartite accord.

4~e election ~lf ~onid Kuchma ~ president on July 10, 1994 may have changed the prospects slightly. Kuchma is somewhat less wedded

to NPT ratification than was Kravchuk, and he has expressed the wish to proceed slowly, pending more financial aid from the West for dismantling weapons.
Chapter 7 Ukraine I 79

null and void, but this behavior, demonstrating the

depth of feeling in Russia on the matter, greatly

aggravated tensions between the two states.

The election of Yuri Meshkov as president of

the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (within Ukraine) in January 1994 may further strain relations

between Russia and Ukraine. Meshkov, a nationalist Russian candidate for president of Ukraine,

had argued during the campaign for closer integration of Crimea with Russia. After his election,

however, he softened this point of view and now

argues for economic integration—rather than

political assimilation—with Russia.

Most Russian politicians advocate closer cooperation with Ukraine, particularly economic cooperation, rather than annexation. However, the

most extreme elements in Russia (such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic

Party) would like to reabsorb Ukraine. Ukrainians

fear that these elements may one day rise to power,

or that events in a flashpoint such as Crimea could

run out of control, causing open hostilities that

neither side desires.

Given the mutual suspicions between Ukraine

and Russia, the arrogation by Ukraine of the Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory could prove

to be an exceptionally dangerous act. If Ukraine

were on the threshold of seizing all the nuclear

weapons on its soil, Russia could be strongly

tempted to preempt this threat to its own security

by launching a conventional attack upon Ukraine,

attempting to disarm Ukraine’s nascent nuclear

capability. This would precipitate a major conflict

in an already unstable region: several minor conflicts are now under way in Central Eurasia (Armenia-Azerbaijan, Abkhazia-Georgia, Tadjikistan) and several potential civil wars are still

sputtering (Moldova-TransDniester, Chechnya).

A major war in the area would have the potential

for creating or widening other, related conflicts in

its wake. Moreover, maintaining secure control of

nuclear weapons in the midst of armed conflict

would be difficult, increasing the chances of their

diversion.

The disposal of the weapons to be removed

from Ukrainian territory as part of the START I reductions also affects Ukraine’s security concerns.

START does not require any weapons to be removed specifically from Ukraine. However, Russia and the West wanted to take some of the

START reductions from Ukrainian-based forces,

with the eventual goal of reducing those forces to

zero.

5

Ukraine claimed it was worried that the weapons might really not be dismantled, as announced

by Russia, but rather be kept for possible future

use or threats against Ukraine. Attempting to defuse this issue, then-U.S. Ambassador-at-Large

Strobe Talbott (whose portfolio included the

broad scope of relations with the former Soviet republics) and then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

suggested in May 1993 that Russia, Ukraine, and a

third party (probably the United States, by implication) share custody of the weapons until their

verified dismantlement in Russia. Ukraine was receptive to this suggestion (although the pro-nuclear element in the Rada was not satisfied, preferring dismantlement in Ukraine). However,

Russian officials were distinctly negative on the

idea of sharing custody over Soviet weapons with

a party outside the FSU.

COST ISSUES

Another argument presented by advocates of nuclear-weapon status and opponents of the NPT

(and even START I) is economic. Environment

Minister Yuri Kostenko, in charge of the parliamentary committee considering nuclear arms control issues, has frequently argued that the cost to

Ukraine of maintaining the nuclear weapons on its

territory as a deterrent force is less than the cost of

developing the conventional forces that Ukraine

would otherwise require. Further, while initial

5 ]n fact, thlS ~i]] ~~ccomp]ished under the presidential tripartite declaration of Jan. 1A, l~A.
—

80 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

Ukrainian cost estimates for complying with

START I’s rocket and silo dismantlement provisions totaled about $175 million, which the

United States soon offered to supply as an incentive for START I ratification, recent Ukrainian estimates have increased by a factor of 20 to $3.5 billion. This number may not be a realistic estimate;

some observers consider such a high figure to be

tantamount to blackmail and others note it includes the cost of a large amount of infrastructure

only peripherally associated with dismantlement.

Nevertheless, the initial estimates were almost

certainly too low.

Ambassador Talbott indicated U.S. willingness to be more forthcoming financially during his

May 1993 visit to Kiev, and President Clinton announced in February 1994 that he would double

the $175 million to $350 million.6 In October

1993, the United States offered an additional $155

million for economic aid as part of a larger package of assistance to Ukraine, and in March 1994,

during a visit to Washington by President Kravchuk, the total amount of aid for the current year

was raised to $700 million.

The negotiations between Washington and

Kiev over dollar figures probably can be resolved,

and they are not central to the issue of whether Ukraine becomes a nuclear-weapon state. The other

financial dispute, over the cost to Ukraine of

maintaining adequate conventional armed forces

versus that of making operational and maintaining

the nuclear weapons on its territory, is still an issue

in the minds of some Ukrainian political figures.7

A convincing economic analysis by a respected

outside party might usefully affect the debate

within Ukraine. The experience of the United

States is relevant. During the 1950s and later, the

United States hoped that reliance on nuclear

forces could permit substantial savings on conventional forces. However, the reduction in its

conventional forces due to the presence of nuclear

weapons was not as large as some originally

claimed, and in the end, considerable forces of

both types were developed.

Related to this issue is the ownership of the nuclear material in both the tactical weapons that

Ukraine transferred to Russia in 1992 and the strategic weapons still on Ukrainian soil. Russia and

the United States have agreed to the purchase by

the United States of the highly enriched uranium

(HEU) in Soviet weapons dismantled under the

parallel Bush-Gorbachev dismantlement initiatives.8 Arguments among the former Soviet republics regarding the distribution of profits from

the sale of the HEU were a major roadblock holding up the finalization of the U.S.-Russia purchase

agreement, but at least in the case of Ukraine these

issues appear to be on the way to resolution. According to the January 14, 1994 agreement between Russia and the United States, up to 500

tonnes of HEU from Russian weapons will be sold

to the United States over the course of 20 years, as

well as up to 50 more tonnes of HEU originating in

Ukrainian-based weapons.9 This purchase will

net the Russians roughly $12 billion and the

Ukrainians some one-tenth that.

In addition to participating in the HEU deal,

Ukraine originally sought reimbursement for the

plutonium in the weapons and for nuclear material

in the tactical weapons already removed from

Ukrainian territory. The Russian position is that

they would be willing to share the proceeds from

6 He also repeated that security guarantees would be given Ukraine after accession to the NW, although the nature of these assurances has

not been publicly specified. R~RL Military Notes, Feb. 11, 1994.

7 Just what would be adequate in terms of size is sub&ctive. Ukrainian nationalists would like to have a large standing army of several

hundred thousand, due both to their suspicion of Russia and to the feeling that their miiitary capabilities should be commensurate with those of

other nations in Europe with similar sized populations (e.g., My, France, the United Kingdom). Other observers, both inside and outside Ukraine, consider that an army of that size is not necessary.

8 Press Release, United States Enrichment Corp., Jan. 14, 1994.

9 RFE/RL Notes, Feb. 11, 1994.
Chapter 7 Ukraine I 81

the uranium in strategic weapons, but that the tactical weapons’ nuclear material is no longer an issue. Moreover, they assert that the market value of

the plutonium is zero under current conditions.

This last point is consistent with the valuation

placed on plutonium by U.S. analysts (who, in

fact, assign it considerable negative economic value

l0), but it conflicts with the Russian attitude expressed in other fora that plutonium recovered

from weapons is a valuable resource to be stored

for future use in energy generation.

INCENTIVES TO UKRAINE TO MAINTAIN

NON-NUCLEAR STATUS

What might induce Ukrainian advocates of nuclear-weapon status to forgo this ambition? The

foremost motive for keeping the weapons, as

noted above, lies in Ukraine’s concern for its survival as an independent state. Its desire for nationhood, having been suppressed by other powers

and peoples (except for very brief intervals) for so

long, is presently a major political imperative

there. Following 300 years of Russian domination

and a genocidal famine induced by Stalin in the

1930s, Ukraine’s confidence in Russian security

guarantees is understandably limited. The position consistently enunciated by President Kravchuk since 1992 has been that, as part of any agreement to get rid of the nuclear weapons on its

territory, Ukraine must receive firm security guarantees from Russia and the other major powers.

But it is still not clear what guarantees would

satisfy Ukrainian needs. Russia, the United

States, Britain, and France provided letters containing guarantees to Ukraine during the course of

1992. The contents have not been made public,

but reaction across the political spectrum in Ukraine indicates they were not satisfactory to any

major faction. Reportedly, the U.S. guarantees

only included a recognition of Ukraine’s borders

as guaranteed by the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); given the current

situation in CSCE member Bosnia, it is understandable that Ukraine might question the effectiveness of such support. In 1993, the United

States offered further assurances that included

military cooperation agreements and, apparently,

more specific security guarantees. Additional security guarantees are said to have been given

(conditional upon Ukrainian accession to the

NPT) as part of the tripartite declaration of January 14, 1994, but their details are not yet clear and

the issue is still a major focus of debate in Ukraine.

In summary, many in Ukraine consider nuclear

weapons to be a vital deterrent to any possible

Russian attempt to reassert sovereignty over any

part of Ukrainian territory. Nevertheless, other

elements might be satisfied with some form of security guarantees or assurances from the West.

Ukraine would welcome a bilateral mutual defense treaty with the United States. This is very

unlikely to happen, as Ukrainian officials understand, since the United States would be extremely

reluctant to risk nuclear war with Russia over a

dispute in Russia’s backyard. Further, any U.S. attempt to wage a conventional war in defense of

Ukrainian sovereignty would be strongly disadvantaged by the obvious geographical and logistic

considerations, as well as the low likelihood of

achieving NATO agreement for military intervention. At most, a cutoff of economic aid and an attempt to organize a worldwide economic boycott

might be expected.

Another possibility would be for Ukraine to

join NATO, making it an integral military part of

the Atlantic alliance. This poses several problems,

not the least of which is Ukraine’s professed intention to become a “neutral” state.

11 Further, NATO

is undergoing its own identity crisis, and there is

considerable ambiguity on its part regarding an

10 pluton;U~~~ “~~~tlv~ ~C[)~O~iC “~lu~ d~.iv~~ from tie fact hat, even if the plutonium itself were free, processing it for use in nuc]ear

reactors would cost more than purchasing and prwessing an equivalent amount of uranium fuel.

1 I me Pnnclples ~fnon.nuclew sta~s, nonaliwment, and nonmembership in military blocs are presented in the l.Jkrainian Rada’s Declaration of State Sovereignty of July 16, 1990.
82 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

expansion of membership at this stage. Even if

NATO were to decide to admit members from the

East, several Eastern European states contiguous

to NATO members would have a prior claim to

membership (e.g., the Czech Republic, Hungary,

Poland).

Russia would consider extension of NATO

membership to Ukraine to be a provocative, if not

hostile, act. Furthermore, by accepting Ukraine as

a member, NATO might put itself in a position

where a Russian-Ukrainian conflict could force

NATO either to wage war on Russia or to dissolve

in embarrassment and confusion. NATO membership for Ukraine does not appear to be a realistic

near-term option.

A policy issue for Ukraine and the West is

whether there is any set of security arrangements,

agreements, or assurances, short of NATO membership, that would persuade a majority of the

Rada to ratify the NPT. Attempting to satisfy the

desire of many Eastern European states, including

Ukraine, to join NATO, while at the same time trying not to inflame Russian nationalists or give rise

to Russian fears of military encirclement, NATO

has created the “Partnership for Peace.” This

mechanism allows for military contacts and coordination with NATO states, with the possibility of

full NATO membership at some point in the future, but does not guarantee military intervention

on NATO’s part in the event of external aggression. Ukraine, along with Russia and many other

Eastern European states, has already joined the

Partnership. ]2

In addition to offering Ukraine some sort of security assurances, the United States could emphasize the costs and uncertainties to Ukraine of attempting to establish a nuclear deterrent,

especially one that Ukraine had not created and

probably could not adequately maintain, control,

or operate for many years. Already mentioned is

the risk that Russia may decide to preempt Ukrainian seizure of Soviet nuclear weapons by a military strike. Barring such an action, Ukraine also

would have to consider the possibility that a very

few nuclear weapons may not deter a Russian conventional attack. Even one nuclear weapon

launched at Russia could stimulate a retaliatory

strike, using only a small fraction of the Russian

arsenal, that would destroy the entire Ukrainian

nation. Even if Ukraine could break the launch

codes on the strategic nuclear weapons on its soil

(its Kharkov Institute, according to some reports,

had a role in devising the Soviet weapon release

codes* 3), it may not be possible to direct either the

intercontinental ballistic missiles or the cruise

missiles in its possession to most targets in Russia. The ballistic missiles have intercontinental

range and could not be aimed at nearby targets

without much revamping and testing. The guidance systems for the cruise missiles reportedly

have been removed by the Russians. 14

The United States could remind Ukraine that it

would have to spend considerable sums to maintain the weapons and their delivery systems in safe

12 AII Ofthe fomer Warsaw pact countries of central and Eastern Europe have announced their intention to participate, as have Russia ~d

most other states of the former Soviet Union. Seethe White House Fact Sheet on Partnership for Peace, Mar. 2, 1994. Most of these states, including Russia, have since joined.

13 see, for example, W. ‘oner~ “Nuclear Profiles...,”op. cit., footnote 2, p. 84, and W. Kincade, “Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow

Threat, Wasting Asset,” Arms Control Twiay, July/August 1993, p. 16. Further references are found in the latter work.

14 w. Kincade, ibid, p. 15, and T. Kuzio, “Nuclear Weapons and Military Policy in Inde~ndent Ukraine,” The Harriman /nsfifufe Forum,

vol. 6, No. 9, May 1993.
Chapter 7 Ukraine I 83

operating condition. 15 Although Ukraine has

many rocket and nuclear weapon experts who participated in Soviet strategic weapon production

and operation, it lacks the infrastructure for maintaining and operating the strategic nuclear weapon

systems on its territory. In fact, a major argument

made by President Kravchuk in urging the Rada

to endorse the tripartite declaration was that the

lack of maintenance was creating danger of an explosion that would scatter radioactive debris over

a wide area.

The disadvantages of becoming a nuclear state

could be, and presumably have been, explained to

senior Ukrainian officials in detail, but such arguments have not yet been effectively brought to the

attention of the Ukrainian public and many members of parliament. Support for declaring Ukraine

a nuclear-weapon state appeared to rise during

1993, with different polls indicating different results. The Ukrainian government is still attempting to deal with the issue by floating various ideas

and suggestions to mollify a majority of the

Rada without alienating the international community.

On July 2, 1993, the Rada declared ownership

over nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, but

forswore their use operationally or as a deterrent.

Although Ukrainian officials denied that they had

plans to bring the weapons under their operational

control, Russia still reacted negatively. 16 Later

that same month, then-Defense Minister Morozov

suggested that Ukraine might accede to the NPT,

neither as a weapon state nor as a non-weapon

state, but as one in transition (presumably to the

latter) .17 However, the NPT makes no such distinction. The United States has not supported this

viewpoint, both because of the precedent it would

set and because it would allow future Ukrainian

governments to reverse or freeze the direction of

transition. But this proposal at least indicates that

the Ukrainian government realizes that failure to

resolve the nuclear weapon issue will isolate Ukraine from those international quarters it needs

most for economic survival: Western Europe and

the United States. Officials from both have noted

frequently, sometimes in a heavy-handed and

possibly counterproductive fashion, that largescale economic aid is contingent upon accession

to the NPT.

More recent U.S. statements and policies have

been rather more flexible, emphasizing carrots

rather than sticks. For example, Ukraine has begun to dismantle 10 of the 130 old SS-19s on its

territory; in response, the United States agreed to

obligate the $175 million of Nunn-Lugar money

intended for this purpose. These funds previously

had been declared to be contingent on Ukraine’s

accession to START I and the NPT. 18 In November 1993, Ukraine began to dismantle some

SS-24s as well, in part because of safety concerns

related to maintenance and storage of the missiles,

as well as the refusal of Russian experts to provide

all necessary assistance subsequent to Ukraine’s

assertion of administrative control over the weapons.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS REGARDING

UKRAINE

The Ukrainian case is more difficult for U.S.

policy to affect than those of Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine is the only state of the three that still

15 ofcoume, &aine could simply seize the nuclear weapons, disassemble them, mine them for plutonium and highly enriched ur~ium,

and embark on its own independent weapon program. Such a strategy, however, would also entail significant cost, as well as a long period

during which Ukraine would not have a nuclear deterrent against any Russian military attempt to neutralize the seizure of the weapons (assureing, as appears to be the case and as Ukrainian officials repeat, that Ukraine does not now have operational control over the nuclear weapons on

its territory).

lb Intemlew with fime Minister Kuchma in INTERFAX, Aug. 10, 1993, cited in FBIS-SOV-93-153-A, Aug. 11, 1993.

17 See J. Perlez, “&ajne May Ask !jPecia] Status in Atom Pact,” The New York ~l?lt?S, July 26, 1993, p. A8.

18 Sm M Gordc)n, ● *u.S. Says Utiine Hm Been Dism~t]ing Nucle~ Missiles,” The New Y,,rk ~mes, July 28, 1993, p. A8. Colltlll~ellCifX

on $200 million for economic aid have similarly been relaxed by the United States.
+’

84 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

There are about 1,800 nuclear warheads in Ukraine, making it potentially the world’s third-largest nuclear

power. Many elements within Ukraine advocated retaining these weapons. However, the president and

senior cabinet officials resisted this position, and the tripartite declaration apparently has decided the

issue in favor of getting rid of the weapons. The final decision on the NPT probably will be made by the

new Rada.

Many civilian nuclear facilities are located in Ukraine, as well as a heavy water production facility

Economic stresses in Ukraine are even more severe than in Russia.

In addition to the contribution to proliferation that Ukrainian weapons, nuclear materials, information,

technology, and expertise might make if transferred elsewhere in the world, Ukraine’s failure to ratify the

NPT makes it a proliferation risk in its own right

No Ukrainian nuclear facilities are yet under international safeguards, although Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have negotiated a draft agreement to place all Ukrainian nuclear

facilities under safegaurds.

The Ukrainian export control system is rudimentary and in need of effective development and implementation.

has not ratified the NPT, and the Ukrainian political and economic situation is more chaotic than

that of the other states. Even so, some policies

introduced in the chapters on Belarus and Kazakhstan could also apply here. Such policies are restated at the end of this chapter, along with policies specific to Ukraine.

Outlined below are four approaches to dealing

with Ukraine’s hesitation to give up nuclear weapons. They are intended for consideration if the

Rada does not ratify the NPT.

# Balanced Policy

One U.S. strategy to promote Ukrainian accession

to the NPT as a non-weapon state would employ

both carrots and sticks. This approach is essentially the one the United States has pursued since

mid- 1993. Through it, the United States would assure Ukraine that NPT adherence would bring the

maximum possible in the way of security guarantees, economic aid for implementing START I,

and other economic help.

Even without NPT accession, however, under

this approach the United States would develop

political relations and contacts on many different

issues of interest to both governments, promising

to develop them further and to increase economic

aid and cooperation upon accession to the NPT.

Maintaining some contact with Ukraine even in

the absence of NPT accession would have the effect of diminishing the apparent importance of the

nuclear issue, removing the impetus on Ukrainian

politicians to become more obdurate on the matter

in order to attract the attention of the United

States. Fully developed economic relations, on

the other hand, would be contingent upon NPT adherence. The United States could make it clear to

Ukraine that refusal to accede to the NPT would .

be met by U.S. and Western refusal to give any security assurances or economic aid.

Under this approach, the United States would

continue and intensify current diplomatic and other pressures on Ukraine to give up ownership of

the nuclear weapons. The United States would

also continue its diplomatic efforts to foster a

more positive relationship between Russia and

Ukraine, as it already has done in helping

mediate the tripartite presidential declaration

of January 14, 1994. It is unlikely that any other

state is as well positioned as the United States to

mediate between the two. The largely unanticipated achievement of the tripartite agreement is a

measure of the usefulness of these efforts.

In light of Ukraine’s economic difficulties, it is

possible, although by no means certain, that diplomatic and economic pressure could carry the day.

However, they could also cause a strong backlash.

In addition to these promises and pressures, the
United States could continue to try to persuade the

Ukrainian government, legislature, and public in

general of the disadvantages of Ukrainian nuclear

possession. Finally, under this approach, the

United States would continue its current policy of

helping Ukraine to meet international standards of

material control and accountancy over its nuclear

materials and to augment its body of expertise in

nuclear safeguards.

Aid to this end, provided under the Nunn-Lugar

Amendment, would be expanded. The United

States would work to assure that nuclear safeguards agreements with the International Atomic

Energy Agency are expedited and implemented as

soon as possible to prevent diversion of nuclear

materials from Ukraine. In addition, the United

States could work to persuade Ukraine to ratify the

agreement to open the Ukraine Science and

Technology Center, which has been formally

agreed to by the Ukrainian government but lacks

formal executive authorization. The center could

be made more attractive for Ukraine by broadening its scope, allowing for involvement of more

civilian scientists, and including topics of immediate interest to Ukraine. Some of these might

be securing the safety of the Chernobyl site, monitoring and dealing with the radioactive pollution

in the region, and engaging in epidemiological research among the victims of Chernobyl, both to

improve dose-response knowledge of the effects

of radioactive exposure on humans and to assist in

providing clinical help to those exposed.

The United States participated in an international extension of this “balanced policy,” combining it with cooperation with Russia on the issue. The policy appears to have had a measure of

success, resulting in the presidential tripartite

agreement on nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The

advantage of this policy is that it has apparently

succeeded in eliciting reasonable compromises

from all parties involved, and it appears to be on

the verge of securing Ukraine’s accession to the

NPT. However, if the Rada fails to ratify the NPT

within a reasonable period of time, other options

may need to be considered.

Chapter 7 Ukraine I 85

Confrontational Policy

A second, much different policy line would be for

the United States to eschew persuasion by no

longer overtly pressing Ukraine on the nuclear

weapon issue. However, no further aid of any sort

(except humanitarian, if needed) would be offered

until Ukraine acceeded to the NPT. The United

States would rely on internal economic disincentives and external (chiefly Russian) pressure to

prevent the Ukrainian seizure of the nuclear weapons. Under this approach, the United States would

make clear to Ukraine that the United States

chooses not to bargain for Ukrainian NPT accession and is unimpressed by Ukrainian attempts to

assert itself as a nuclear power.

The primary drawback of this approach is that

much of the assistance that would be denied by the

United States would address issues such as the establishment of a nuclear material accounting and

control system and the implementation of export

controls. Helping Ukraine in these areas is in the

direct self-interest of the United States and the

global nonproliferation regime, and it should not

be considered as a gift or reward to Ukraine.

9 Conciliatory Policy

A third option would be for the United States to

accept Ukrainian nuclear armament, despite the

adverse consequences that such an action would

have for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and

for the prospects of gaining an indefinite continuation of the NPT at the NPT Extension Conference in 1995. The United States, for example,

could offer to install a hot line from the White

House to Kiev, like the one to Moscow. It could attempt to bring Ukraine into the European community of nations as an active member (although not

as a member of the European Union or NATO). It

could attempt to prop up the Ukrainian economy

in order to keep the internal social and political situation stable.

If Ukraine’s emergence as a nuclear power were

deemed inevitable, this approach might permit

such a transition to occur more smoothly that it
86 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

would if one of the other approaches had been pursued. On the other hand, it could alienate Russia to

the degree of possibly risking a major realignment

of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the United

States, and it would risk a preemptive Russian attack to prevent the nuclearization of Ukraine.

Moreover, it would seriously endanger the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. As an

added complication, the NPT prohibits the United

States (and the other nuclear-weapon states) from

assisting, encouraging, or inducing “any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise

acquire” nuclear weapons. Even if Ukraine declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state, it would

remain a non-nuclear-weapon state under the

NPT’s definition of that term (i.e., a state that had

not exploded a nuclear device before January 1,

1967). Therefore, any U.S. assistance that might

be interpreted as supporting Ukraine’s nuclear

weapon capacity would be questionable.

I Develop Good Relations

This approach would be to treat Ukraine as a normal state with which the United States wishes to

maintain good relations. Concern over the nuclear

weapon issue would remain, but would constitute

only one matter of discussion between the countries. The United States would focus instead on

developing economic and political relations; easing the transitions from a centrally planned to a

market economy and from an authoritarian regime

to a democratic one; assisting in defense conversion; and the like.

The emphasis on developing relations on several planes with Ukraine would be aimed at a general improvement in political relations and at

making Ukraine more receptive to U.S. suggestions in the nuclear field. Those suggestions, in

turn, would be presented in a more restrained fashion than they would be under some of the other approaches. This approach would make Ukrainian

leaders and parliamentarians feel that the interests

of the United States in Ukraine are not dependent

on Ukraine’s nuclear weapon status, thereby devaluing the importance of nuclear weapons as a

path to political power. The impression would be

fostered that good relations with Ukraine are a

fundamental part of U.S. policy, one that would

not disappear shortly after a resolution of the nuclear issue.

This policy approach would be politically positioned between the “Balanced” and the “Conciliatory” approaches listed above. The disadvantage

would be that the Ukrainian reaction might be to

take the improved relations with the United States

but to ignore minor U.S. carping about nuclear

weapons.

POLICY OPTIONS SUMMARIZED

In addition to following one of the above approaches to promote Ukrainian ratification of the

NPT, a number of additional policies might be

pursued.

● Work intensively with Ukraine and the

IAEA to apply IAEA safeguards to Ukrainian nuclear facilities as soon as possible.

Rationale For: The absence of international

nuclear safeguards and international standards for

physical security at the many Ukrainian nuclear

sites constitutes a proliferation risk. Ukraine and

the IAEA have negotiated a draft agreement that

would place all Ukrainian nuclear facilities under

safeguards, 19 but implementing this agreement

will require resources and time.

Arguments Against: None.

● Offer increased U.S. aid in setting up and

training personnel for application of nuclear safeguards, customs, and export control regimes. Expedite Nunn-Lugar assistance to these ends.

Rationale For: Ukraine urgently needs such aid

to maintain proper control over nuclear material

19 IAEA Division of Pub]ic Info~ation, Media Talking Points 94/ 11, “Ukraine Negotiates Safeguards Agreement With the IAEA,” June

28, 1994.
—

on its territory. Such aid already has been extended under Safe and Secure Dismantlement

(SSD) agreements. Because of the urgency of the

problem, the effort needs to be applied as soon as

possible.

Arguments Against Because of fiscal limitations in the United States, the government might

choose to let the IAEA or other countries provide

such support.

● Apply U.S. Nunn-Lugar funds to housing

and perhaps other aid for personnel having

custody of those nuclear weapons located in

Ukraine.

Rationale For: If such personnel are seriously

stressed economically, they may become vulnerable to subornation by foreign or subnational parties attempting to gain access to nuclear weapons

or materials.

Arguments Against: Assistance given to active

nuclear officers would be difficult to justify, politically and otherwise.

Chapter 7 Ukraine I 87

● Offer aid in defense conversion, as in the other nuclear successor republics.

Rationale For: Economic stability will be increased by successful transition of defense industries to civilian uses. The economic situation in

Ukraine is even more serious than in many other

FSU republics, and the issue is therefore more

acute here. Increased economic stability also will

reduce stresses that could tempt some with access

to nuclear material or information to sell them to

foreign parties.

Arguments Against: The economic problems in

Ukraine are so enormous and complex that U.S.

efforts to help may only have marginal effects at

best. Further, thus far, minimal efforts at economic reform have occurred. Opponents of this policy

would argue that aiding Ukraine in the economic

area should come only after more positive actions

by the government there.
I ndex

A

Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of

Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate

the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical

Weapons. See Bilateral Destruction Agreement

Aqtau breeder reactor, 52

Arms reduction initiatives of 1991,23

Arzamas laboratory, 7,62-65

B

BDA. See Bilateral Destruction Agreement

Belarus

background, 39-41

nonproliferation export controls, 29-30

NPT ratification, 13-14,37,41

policy options described, 41-45

policy options summarized, 5,7,45-46

START I ratification, accession, 37,41-42

Belugin, Vladimir, 63,64

Bilateral Destruction Agreement (for chemical

weapons), 16-17

Biological Weapons Convention, 12, 17-18

Blocking access to nuclear weapons, materials, and

expertise

brain drain, 32-33

executive summary, 4-5

introduction, 19-20

missile technology, 31-32

nonproliferation export controls, 28-31

political control over nuclear weapons, 20-21

security over nuclear weapons and materials,

21-23

U.S. assistance for weapon and material management in the FSU, 23-28

Brain drain

blocking access to nuclear weapons, materials,

and expertise, 32-33

executive summary, 5-8

in Kazakhstan, 50-52, 55

in Russia, 5-8, 32-33,62-66

BWC. See Biological Weapons Convention

c

Chelyabinsk laboratory, 7,62-65

Chernobyl, 44-45

Chemical Weapons Convention, 12, 15-17

The China connection, 8,66-67,73

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States

COCOM. See Coordinating Committee on Export

Controls

Commonwealth of Independent States, 20

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 81

Conventional Forces in Europe-Treaty Support-Act,

23-24

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 5-6,24-26.

See also Nunn-Lugar Amendment; Nunn-Lugar

program

Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, 29

Cost issues in Ukraine, 79-81

CSCE. See Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe

CTR. See Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

D

Defense Authorization Act of 1993,27

Defense conversion assistance

for Belarus, 43,45

for Kazakhstan, 58

for Russia, 70,73

for Ukraine, 87

Department of Defense, 6,24-26,27-28

Department of Energy

approval of overseas travel, 8,66,70

funding of laboratories, 66,69

interlaboratory coordinating group establishment,

65

LIPP development, 8

U.S. assistance for weapons and materials management, 26,27, 28, 45

Department of State

funding of DOE laboratories, 66,69

LIPP development, 8

U.S. assistance for weapons and materials management, 26

8 9
90 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

E

Executive summary

findings and policy options, 3-9

introduction, 1-3

organization of this report, 9

summary finding, 9

Export controls, 5,28-31,72-73

F

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1994,8,

28,66

FREEDOM Support Act of 1992,27

Belarus policy options and, 44,46

Kazakhstan R&D center option and, 57

Russian-U.S. research projects and, 69

G

Gorshkov, V., 63

GOSATOMNADZOR (Russian nuclear regulatory

agency), 22, 72

H

Hryb, Mechyslaw, 39

I

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency

Incentives to Ukraine to maintain non-nuclear status, 81-83

India

Russian-Indian agreement, 31-32

International Atomic Energy Agency

Kazakhstan safeguards agreements, 52,56,57

monitoring nuclear weapon dismantlement, 4,26

Russia MC&A assistance, 69

safeguards acceptance by various nations, 22

safeguards agreement implementation, 5

Ukraine safeguards assistance, 86

International nonproliferation regimes. See specific

regimes by name; Threats to international nonproIiferation regimes

International Science and Technology Center

Almaty branch option, 54,57

background, 7-8,64-65

Minsk branch plans, 44,45-46

Iran

alleged purchase of cruise missiles from Ukraine,

32

alleged purchase of nuclear materials from Kazakhstan, 52-53

apparent interest in acquiring nuclear weapons,

21

Iraq

alleged Arzamas laboratory contact with, 64

ISTC. See International Science and Technology

Center

K

Kazakhstan

background, 47-50

brain drain, 50-52,55

nonproliferation export controls, 29-30

NPT ratification, 14,37,50,53-54

policy options described, 53-56

policy options summarized, 5,7,56-58

security over nuclear weapons and materials, 21,

23

Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, 50

sensitive facilities other than Semipalatinsk,

52-53

START I ratification, 37,50

Kostenko, Yuri, 14,79

Kravchuk, President, 14-15

Kuntsevich, Anatoly, 18

Kurchatov City, 50-51,55,56-57

L

Laboratory-Industry Partnership Program, 7-8,28,

66

Laboratory-to-laboratory money transfers, 72

LIPP. See Laboratory-Industry Partnership Program

Lisbon Protocol, 14-15,36,78

M

Material control and accountancy systems. See also

Nunn-Lugar program; Safe and Secure Dismantlement program

executive summary, 5

in Russia, 72

U.S. assistance for weapon and material management in the FSU, 23-28

Memorandum of Understanding on chemical arms

control, 15-17

Meshkov, Yuri, 79

MINATOM. See Ministry of Atomic Energy

Ministry of Atomic Energy, 22,26,70-71

Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination,

29

Mirzayanov, Vii, 17

Missile technology, 8,31-32

Missile Technology Control Regime, 3-4,29,31-32,

73

Monitoring of U.S.-Russian nuclear weapon facilities, 3-4, 26,67-69. See also International Atomic

Energy Agency

MTCR. See Missile Technology Control Regime

Multiple-entry visas for FSU scientists, 8,66,70
Index I 91

N

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 49-51

1994 Plan of Work for the U.S. Chemical Weapons

Destruction Support Office, 16

“No-first-use” pledges, 54,56

Nonproliferation export controls, 5,28-31,72-73

Nonproliferation policies and agreements. See also

specific regimes by name

executive summary, 3-4

threats to international nonproliferation regimes,

13-18

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 81-82

North Korea

attempts to smuggle missile expertise, 32-33

NPT. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear inheritor states, 3-8,35-37. See also Belarus; Kazakhstan; Russia; Ukraine

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Belarus ratification of, 13-14,37,41

China connection and, 73

Kazakhstan ratification of, 14,37,50,53-54

LEU requirements, 52-53

nuclear inheritor states and, 35-37

Russia ratification of, 3,37

threats to nonproliferation regimes, 13-15

Ukraine and, 3, 14-15,75,77-78,83-87

Number and type of nuclear weapons on territories

of nuclear inheritor states, 35-36

Nunn-Lugar Amendment, 23-28

Nunn-Lugar program

background, 3-4,5, 16,24-26

Belarus funding under, 7,41-43,45-46

Kazakhstan funding under, 7,54-57

Russia funding under, 70-73

Ukraine funding under, 83,86-87

P

Pakistan

China connection and, 67

Political control over nuclear weapons, 20-21

R

Reciprocal monitoring of U.S.-Russian nuclear

weapon facilities, 3-4, 26, 67-69. See also International Atomic Energy Agency

Russia

background, 59-62

brain drain, 5-8,32-33,62-66

BWC compliance, 12, 17-18

the China connection, 8,66-67,73

CWC and, 12, 15-17

nonproliferation export controls, 28-29, 72-73

NPT ratification, 3,37

policy options described, 67

policy options summarized, 4-8,67-73

reciprocal monitoring of U.S.-Russian nuclear

weapon facilities, 3-4,26,67-69

Russian-Indian agreement, 31-32

START I ratification, 3

Ukraine incentives to maintain non-nuclear status

and, 81-83

Ukraine relations with, 78-79

s

Safe and Secure Dismantlement program, 26,29,

36,70-71

Scientific and technical cooperation

executive summary, 7-8

FREEDOM Support Act and, 27-28

in Belarus, 43-46

in Kazakhstan, 55-57

in Russia, 64-66, 69-70

in Ukraine, 85

Security over nuclear weapons and materials, 21-23.

See also International Atomic Energy Agency

Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, 47,49,50

Sensitive facilities in Kazakhstan, 50,52-53

Shaposhnikov, Yevgeny, 20

SSD. See Safe and Secure Dismantlement program

START I nuclear arms control treaty

Belarus accession to, 41-42

Kazakhstan ratification of, 50

nuclear inheritor states and, 35-36

Russia ratification of, 3

Ukraine ratification of, 14-15,77-80

T

Threats to international nonproliferation regimes

Biological Weapons Convention, 17-18

Chemical Weapons Convention, 15-17

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 13-15

summary, 3-4, 18

Travel requests of U.S. scientists, 8,66,70

Tsimbalyuk, Volodymyr I., 30

u

Ukraine

alleged sale of cruise missiles to Iran, 32

background, 75-77

balanced policy option, 84-85

conciliatory policy option, 85-86

cost issues, 79-81

developing good relations with, 86

incentives to maintain non-nuclear status, 81-83

international nonproliferation regime and, 77-78

Lisbon Protocol, 14

nonproliferation export controls, 29-31
92 I Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union

NPT and, 3, 14-15,37,75,77-78,83-87

policy options background, 83-84

policy options summarized, 5,7,86-87

political control over nuclear weapons, 21

relations with Russia, 78-79

START I ratification, 14-15,37,77-78

Ukraine Science and Technology Center, 7,85

Ulba Metallurgy Plant, 52

U.S. assistance for weapon and material management in the FSU, 23-28, 45. See also Nunn-Lugar

program; Safe and Secure Dismantlement program

Y

Yegorov, Nikolai, 64

* U.S. Government Printing OFFICE: 1994 - 301-804 - 814/27401