COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Hump hreys and Senior Judge Overton

JAMES CHARLTON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2448-03-3 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 23, 2003 TAZEWELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY Michael L. Moore, Judge (Kelly Combs Necessary; Dudley, Galumbeck, Neces sary & Dennis, on brief), for appellant. (Stephen E. Arey; F. Bradley Pyott, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; Stephen E. Arey, P.C.; Gillespie, Hart, Altizer & Whitesell, on brief), for appellee.

The trial court terminated th e parental rights of James Ch arlton to his daughter pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii). On appeal, Charlton contends (1) the evidence failed to establish he was convicted of a felony involving serious bodily injury to his daughter as re quired by the statute, and (2) the Tazewell County Department of SocialServices failed to provide him with required services. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. S ee Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1- 413, this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - proved that Charlton and his daughter’s mother ne ver resided together. After she was subjected to physical and mental abuse while living with her mother and grandmother, Charlton’s daughter began residing with Charlton and his girlfriend. She lived with them for approximately five years until Charlton was convicted of child abuse for beating his son and then incarcerated for violating the terms of a previously suspended sentence. The Department later removed the daughter from the home where she resided with Charlton’s girlfriend and placed her in foster care after allegations of abuse.
ANALYSIS
I. Code § 16.1-283(E) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child who is in the custody of a loca l board or licensed child-placing agency may be terminated by the court if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and . . . (iii) the parent has been convicted of an offense under the laws of this Commonwealth or a substantially similar law of any other state, the United States or any foreign jurisdiction that constitutes fe lony assault resu lting in serious bodily injury or felony bodily w ounding resulting in serious bodily injury or felony sexual assault, if the victim of the offense was a child of the parent or a child withwhom the parent resided at the time of such offense . . . . Charlton acknowledges he pled guilty to felony child abuse involving the beating of his son. Although he argues on ap peal that the evidence failed to prove the abuse resulted in “serious bodily injury,” Charlton fa iled to raise this argument before the trial court. This Court will not consider an argument on appeal that was not presented to the trial court. Rule 5A:18; Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). Rule 5A:18 requires that objections to a trial court’ s action or ruling be made with specificity in order to preserve an issue fo r appeal. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 480, 405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) ( en banc ). Thus, we have held that a trial court must be alerted- 3 - to the precise “issue” to whic h a party objects. Neal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 416, 422-23, 425 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1992). In his argument at the conc lusion of the hearing and in his written objection on the termination order, Charlton asserted only that heobjected “on the grounds that no services have been provided to [him] in order to give him the op portunity to regain custod y of his daughter.” He did not argue that the Department did not pr ove his son suffered a se rious bodily injury. Accordingly, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of these specific issues on appeal. Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18.
II. Charlton also contends the trial court erred by terminating his residual parental rights because the Department did not provide hi m “reasonable and ap propriate services.” Code § 16.1-283(E) does not requi re that the Department pr ovide a parent with any services. To terminate a pare nt’s residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii) the Department need only prove that the termination is in the child’s best interests and that the parent has been convicted of an offense that constitute s felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child in question or to another of the parent’s children. The trial court found that the Department presented clear and convincing evid ence that termination of Charlton’s parental rights was in the best intere st of his daughter. The evidence supports that ruling. Accordingly, we summarily af firm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.