Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction: Assessing the Risks

August 1993

OTA-ISC-559

NTIS order #PB94-107612

GPO stock #052-003-01335-5
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of “kchnology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, August 1993).
Foreword

T

hroughout history, human beings have been able to annihilate each other without

weapons of mass destruction. However, the development of such weapons has

greatly reduced the time and effort needed to kill, giving small nations and even

subnational groups the ability to destroy lives on a scale that few nations could

otherwise manage. Such mass killing does not require state-of-the-art technology; the basic

technologies underlying chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons date back to World

Wars I and II. Now, modern technologies—and the ever-increasing flow of goods,

information, and people across national borders-can place these deadly capabilities in

many more hands.

Occasionally, the United States may directly influence another state’s decision to

pursue weapons of mass destruction. More often, nonproliferation efforts of the United

States-together with other countries and international institutions such as the United

Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency—must operate indirectly. By

establishing a system of obstacles, disincentives, rewards, and international norms or rules

of behavior, nonproliferation measures are intended to lessen the desire for and increase the

costs of acquiring these weapons. The challenge is to accomplish this objective in a world

where states still threaten one another, and where military power is still viewed as the

ultimate guarantor of national survival. Even so, several recent international trends offer us

hope that proliferation might be slowed or even reversed.

OTA has been asked by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs, with the endorsement of the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, to assist Congress in its efforts to

strengthen and broaden U.S. policies to control the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. This report describes what nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons can do,

analyzes the consequences of their spread for the United States and the world, and

summarizes technical aspects of monitoring and controlling their production. (A separate

background paper analyzes the technologies underlying nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons and delivery systems in greater depth.) This report also explains the array of policy

tools that can be used to combat proliferation, identifying tradeoffs and choices that

confront policymakers. A forthcoming report will analyze specific sets of nonproliferation

policy options in detail.

OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of many individuals, firms, and

government agencies who assisted its research and writing for this report.

Roger C. Herdman, Director
Advisory Panel

James E. Goodby, chairl

Distinguished Service Professor

Carnegie-Mellon University

James F. Leonard, chair2

Executive Director

Washington Council on

Non-Proliferation

George Anzelon

Associate Division Leader

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

Will D. Carpenter

chemical Industry Consultant

Lewis A. Dunn

Assistant Vice President

Science Applications

International Corp.

Randall Forsberg

Executive Director

Institute for Defense and

Disarmament Studies

Thomas R. Fox

Director

Office of National Security

Technology

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Alan R. Goldhammer

Director of Technical Affairs

Industrial Biotechnology

Association

John M. Googin

Senior Staff Consultant

Martin Marietta Energy

Systems, Inc.

Robert G. Gough

Senior Member, Technical Staff

Sandia National Laboratories

Elisa D. Harris3

Senior Research Analyst

The Brookings Institution

Geoffrey Kemp

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Joshua Lederberg4

Rockefeller University

John W. Lewis

Center for International

Security and Arms Control

Stanford University

Lee W. Mercer

Corporate Export Manager

Digital Equipment Corp.

Matthew S. Meselson

Department of Biochemistry

and Molecular Biology

Harvard University

Stephen M. Meyer

Center for International Studies

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Gary Milhollin

Director

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear

Arms Control

Marvin M. Miller

Senior Research Scientist

Department of Nuclear Engineering

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Janne E. Nolan

Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy

The Brookings Institution

William C. Potter

Director

Center for Russian and Soviet Studies

Monterey Institute of

International Studies

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

Division of Natural Sciences

State University of

New York at Purchase

Lawrence Scheinman

Associate Director

Peace Studies Program

Cornell University

Leonard S. Spector

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Sergio C. Trindade

President

SE2T International, Ltd.

1 Resigned Max. 22, 1993. 2 P=l mem~r ~tiJ- 1 ~ 193;

Panel chair after June 1, 1993.

3 Resigned Jan. 29, 1S93.” 4 ~-officio; Ivkmbr of ~olo~

Assessment Advisory Council.

NOTE: OTA appciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel

members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility

for the report ~d the accuracy of its contents. - --

Iv
—

Preject Staff

Peter Blair

Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International

Security Division

Alan Shaw

Program Manager

International Security and

Commerce Program

Gerald L. Epstein

Project Director

Thomas H. Karas

Jonathan B. Tucker

CONTRACTORS

Dan Fenstermacher

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Jacqueline Robinson Boykin

Office Administrator

Louise Staley

Administrative Secretary

v
Additional Reviewers

Steve Fetter Joseph Pilat

University of Maryland Center for National Security

College Park, MD Studies

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Thomas W. Graham Los Alamos, NM

International Security program,

Rockefeller Foundation Lawrence Sequist

New York, NY Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, DC

John Steinbruner

Director, Foreign Policy Studies

Program

The Brookings Institution

Washington, DC

Victor A. Utgoff

Deputy Director-Strategy, Forces,

and Resources Division

Institute for Defense Analyses

Alexandria, VA

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. l%e panel

does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and

the accuracy of its contents.

vi 1
contents

1 Introduction and Summary 1

Introduction 2

Major Findings 4

Weapon Characteristics and Comparisons 7

Implications of Proliferation 11

Proliferation Threats and Prospects 12

The Nonproliferation Policy Context 19

Conflicting Objectives 25

Conflicting Approaches 29

Technical Basis for Monitoring and

Controlling Proliferation 32

2 Assessing the Risks 45

Weapons of Mass Destruction 46

Weapon Effects Compared 52

Near-Term Proliferation Threats:

Suspected Proliferant Nations 63

Implications of Proliferation 69

A New Dimension to Proliferation:

Risks From the Breakup of the Soviet Union 75

Appendix 2-A-Sources on Tables Listing

Countries of Chemical and Biological

Weapon Concern 79

3 Policy Background 83

Imposing Obstacles to Proliferation 84

Disincentives to Proliferants 93

Rewards for Abstention 98

When Nonproliferation Fails 109

Special and Urgent: Limiting Proliferation

From the Former Soviet Union 111

Appendix 3-A-Costs and Benefits of Onsite

Inspections for Nonproliferation Regimes 113

Index 117

vii
Introduction

and

Summary

s

ince the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction has become much more

prominent in U.S. national security and foreign policy

planning. Revelations about Iraqi, North Korean, South

African, and Israeli nuclear weapon programs, the possibility of

a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and the multidimensional

conflicts in the Middle East all point to the immediacy of this

problem. Adding a dangerous new twist is the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, a superpower armed with nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons whose successor states are wracked by

economic crises and political instability.

At least three main factors underlie this renewed emphasis on

proliferation. First, the reduced military threat from the former

Soviet Union has increased the relative importance of lesser

powers, especially if armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Second, certain international political and technological trends

are increasing the threat to international security from proliferation. Third, new opportunities are opening for enhancing the

current international regimes designed to stem proliferation.

Since at least as far back as the 1960s, when it sponsored the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States has recognized that proliferation is a global problem and combating

it requires high levels of international cooperation. This country

has also exerted unilateral influence, successfully in several

cases, to discourage proliferation; it will no doubt continue to do

so. Nevertheless, placing priority on nonproliferation will

1

require the further development and enforcement of international norms and behavior supporting that objective. International conditions today offer significant opportunities for

such cooperation.
2 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

INTRODUCTION

Frightening as they are, weapons of mass

destruction-taken here to be nuclear, chemical,

and biological weapons—represent only part of

the world’s post-Cold War security problems.

Diffusion of militarily useful advanced technology, continuing conventional arms sales, and the

resurgence of hitherto suppressed regional and

ethnic rivalries are spurring a broader problem:

the growth of advanced military capability among

states and sub-national groups that are potentially

hostile toward each other. Not only are weapons

of mass destruction and their delivery systems

spreading, but so are advanced conventional

weapons (e.g., those other than nuclear, chemical,

and biological), along with equipment needed to

build a command, control, communication, and

intelligence infrastructure. Even “low-technology’ weapons can produce massive casualties, as

shown by the Allied fire bomb attacks in World

War II that caused up to 100,000 deaths in Tokyo

and 200,000 in Dresden. Nevertheless, proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

is of particular concern for at least two reasons:

The large-scale and indiscriminate nature of

their effects—particularly against unprotected civilians—differentiates massdestruction from conventional weapons. Massdestruction weapons make it possible for a

single missile or airplane to kill as many

people as thousands of planeloads of conventional weaponry. These weapons can

give small states or subnational groups the

ability to inflict damage that is wholly

disproportionate to their conventional military capabilities or to the nature of the

conflict in which they are used.

Unlike most categories of conventional weapons, which will likely be considered legitimate instruments of national self-defense for

the foreseeable future, weapons of mass

destruction engender widespread revulsion.

Some 150 nations have renounced nuclear

weapons, formalizing their commitment by

joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

as non-nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, the

United States and many other nations have

forsworn chemical and biological weapons

completely, even in retaliation for in-kind

attack, by joining the Biological Weapons

Convention (with 125 parties) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (with more than

140 signatories). These three treaties codify

strong, if not yet universal, international

norms against weapons of mass destruction.

The states seeking these weapons today are

generally pursuing them covertly, attesting

to the reluctance states have to admit to such

developments. Thus, controlling weapons of

mass destruction may well be feasible despite

the dubious track record of past attempts to

regulate or ban other weapons of war.

This is the first report of OTA’s project on the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It

describes the various weapons of mass destruction, reviews the status of their proliferation

worldwide, and discusses possible consequences

of their spread. It also surveys the range of

nonproliferation policy measures, offering a menu

of tools from which a coherent nonproliferation

policy could be constructed.

A separate background paper examines the

technical bases for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with their delivery systems,

and seeks to identify opportunities to control or to

monitor their production. A forthcoming report

will provide a more complete specification and

analysis of selected nonproliferation policy options.

1 Weapons Described

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are

commonly lumped together under the term weapons of mass destruction, ’ yet their effects,

relative lethalities, and military applications are

very different. Nuclear weapons, which can be

more than a million times more powerful than the

same weight of conventional explosives, create
Chapter 1-–Introduction and Summary 3

shock waves, high pressures, flying debris, and

extreme heat—the same mechanisms by which

conventional explosives injure and kill, albeit at

vastly increased scale. Unlike conventional explosives, however, nuclear blasts also create

neutron and gamma radiation, which can kill or

harm those exposed at the instant of detonation.1

In addition, they can generate long-term radioactivity in the form offallout, which can spread over

an area much greater than that affected by the

bomb’s immediate effects. In addition to producing acute illness or death at considerable distances from the detonation, fallout can also lead

to delayed medical problems such as cancer or

genetic abnormalities.2

Chemical agents are poisons that incapacitate,

injure, or kill through their toxic effects on the

skin, eyes, lungs, blood, nerves, or other organs.

Some chemical warfare agents can be lethal when

vaporized and inhaled in amounts as small as a

few milligrams. As potent as chemical agents are,

however, biological agents-disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsia, and

viruses-can be many times deadlier, pound-forpound. Laboratory tests on animals indicate that,

if effectively disseminated and inhaled, 10 grams

of anthrax spores (a form of disease-inducing

bacteria) could produce as many casualties as a

ton (one million grams) of nerve agent. Toxins--

defined as toxic substances made by biological

organisms, or their synthetically produced versions—are banned by both the Biological and the

Chemical Weapons Conventions.

9 Delivery Systems

To do their deadly work, agents

destruction have to be integrated into

(e.g., an aerial bomb, a ballistic missile

of mass

weapons

warhead,

or even a suitcase) and delivered to their targets.

Such weapons can be highly threatening without

sophisticated delivery systems. A nuclear device

planted by a terrorist or commando squad, or

delivered by a disguised cargo ship, civil aircraft,

or even a small pleasure boat, can kill just as many

people as one delivered by intercontinental ballistic missile; a given quantity of certain lethal

microorganisms would probably kill even more

people if spread effectively by human agents than

if by a missile. In the cases of rival states

bordering each other, weapons of mass destruction

mounted on even short-range means of delivery

can pose a major threat. Nevertheless, states able

to couple weapons of mass destruction to delivery

systems with longer range or greater ability to

penetrate defenses can threaten more nations with

higher levels of destruction, and with greater

likelihood of success. At the same time, since

such delivery systems—taken here to be ballistic

missiles, cruise missiles, and combat aircraft—

generally pose greater technical challenges, they

are more amenable to international controls than

are less sophisticated delivery systems.

Of these three delivery systems, ballistic missiles have attracted the most attention, both

because they are difficult to defend against and

because they appear to be particularly suited for

weapons of mass destruction. (They generally do

not have much military value in proportion to

* Nuclear weapons detonated at high attitude can also generate powerful radio waves (catled ‘electromagnetic pulse’ that canwreakhavoc

with electronic equipmen~ but do not pose a direct human health risk.

2 In principle, nations or groups could develop rudiofogicaf weapons whose effects are similar to those of fallout from a nuclear wezpon

(albeit over a far smaller area) without any of the blast effects or extreme temperatures that make nuclear weapons so devastating. Radiological

weapons disseminate highly radioactive material over an area using mechanical means or conventional explosives. They resemble chemical

weapons much more than nuclear weapons in their effects, since they contaminate territory and poison living organisms but do not destroy

physical structures. Conventional attacks on nuclear power plants could be tantamount to radiological warfare, as the accident at Chernobyl

suggests. ‘Ihe amount of fallout from such an attack could be massive, far greater than that from a “traditional’ radiological weapon that

disperses radioactive material directly.

Although there are as yet no documented cases of anyone trying to acquire radiological wmpons, the Geneva-based Conference on

Disarmarn ent has an ad hoc committee charged with concluding a convention on them. Sweden has proposed that attacks on nuclear facilities

be included, while the United States, France, and Germany favor dealing only with traditional radiological weapons.
4 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

their cost when armed with conventional warheads, although they can have considerable political significance.) Combat aircraft also pose a

potent threat for delivery of mass-destruction

weapons. They are much more widely available

than missiles, and efforts to control their spread

are greatly complicated by the multiple roles that

aircraft play. Cruise missiles and other unmanned

aerial vehicles could also be used as delivery

methods, although such vehicles with the range

and payload of typical combat aircraft or ballistic

missiles are not yet widely available.

MAJOR FINDINGS

I The Proliferation Threat

Those states most actively working to develop weapons of mass destruction, although

limited in number, are for the most part

located in unstable regions of the world—the

Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean

peninsula. For at least the next decade, few if any

of these states will be able to deliver such

weapons more than a thousand kilometers or so in

a reliable and timely manner. Therefore, the

greatest threat posed by these states is to their

neighbors and to regional stability. Despite their

current limitations in long-range military delivery

systems, however, proliferant states-at least in

principle--can threaten any country on earth

using unconventional means (e.g., covert or

disguised delivery systems such as a ship or

truck).

Proliferation poses dangers to all nations. It

poses particular problems for the United

States. As a global power, the United States will

almost certainly retain allies and vital interests

overseas that might be threatened by states

possessing weapons of mass destruction. Should

the United States need to defend its interests with

military force--whether acting unilaterally or

under multilateral auspices such as those of the

United Nations--U.S. armed forces, and possibly

U.S. territory, might become targets for weapons

of mass destruction.

The breakup of the Soviet Union presents

immediate threats to the global nonproliferation regimes. One possibility is that Ukraine,

Kazakhstan, or Belarus will renege on their

commitments to return the nuclear weapons

stationed within their borders to Russia and, in the

case of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, to join the

Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon

states. (Belarus has already ratified the WT.)

Such actions would seriously undermine the

nonproliferation regime. Another danger is the

leakage of nuclear weapon materials or actual

weapons to potential proliferants elsewhere in the

world if the nuclear custodial system in Russia

itself were to break down. Yet another concern is

the export from former Soviet republics of

equipment, technology or expertise relevant to

producing weapons of mass destruction.

I Prerequisites to Effective

Nonproliferation Policy

If nonproliferation policy is to succeed, it

must receive substantial international cooperation. Cooperation is necessary because no nation

or small group of nations by themselves can

prevent proliferation or contain its consequences.

Cooperation is possible because many countries

have come to recognize that the proliferation of

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses

a genuine threat to all nations. However, since

states will not always agree on nonproliferation

measures, maintaining and acting on an effective

consensus will require each participating country

to give up some freedom to act independently.

Some analysts argue that containing proliferation in the long run will require a far deeper level

of international cooperation than has been achieved

to date, one that builds international institutions

for a much more cooperative global security

regime. Others argue that the international political system is inevitably anarchic and that as a
Chapter 1–Introduction and Summary 5

result, the degree of cooperation needed to

contain proliferation cannot be achieved.

Whether or not either of these views proves

correct, the end of the Cold War has opened up

new opportunities for cooperative nonproliferation policies. One promising sign is the revitalization of the United Nations Security Council.

Progress has also been made with the signing of

the Chemical Weapons Convention and the strengthening of various multilateral groups that have

formed for the purpose of controlling the spread

of proliferation-sensitive technology: the Nuclear

Suppliers Group, to control exports of nuclear

technology; the Australia Group, to control materials useful for chemical and biological weapons; and the Missile Technology Control Regime,

to restrict traffic in missile systems and missile

technology.

If U.S. nonproliferation policy is to succeed,

the United States must give it high priority.

With its leadership role in the world community,

the United States has the opportunity and the

ability to mobilize international nonproliferation

efforts. Free of previously overriding Cold War

security concerns, the United States can now

attach greater priority to nonproliferation. Doing

so, however, is not without costs. Nonproliferation may conflict with economic goals, as export

promotion is balanced against export controls.

Promoting openness, transparency, and verification of nonproliferation commitments, on the one

hand, conflicts with maintaining the secrecy of

national-security or proprietary information, on

the other. Nonproliferation will also likely conflict with other foreign policy objectives such as

maintaining relations with individual states. For

example, would the United States be willing to

sacrifice its relationship with Israel-and possibly risk Israeli national survival-to pressure that

state to give up a nuclear arsenal it believes

essential to its security? How prominently should

nonproliferation figure in U.S. relations with

China, a regional power whose cooperation the

United States seeks in other diplomatic or economic arenas?

Strategies for inhibiting proliferation have

four broad elements, all of which contribute to

existing nonproliferation regimes and form the

basis for future ones. For the most part, these

elements are mutually supportive, although as

described later in this chapter, tensions between

them can arise. By emphasizing these elements in

different proportion, nonproliferation policies can

be tailored to particular situations. These elements include:

●

●

●

●

obstacles to impede those working to acquire weapons of mass destruction, ranging

from protection of weapon-related information, to export controls, possibly all the way

to preemptive military attack against production or storage facilities;

punitive measures to deter or punish proliferants, including economic sanctions or

diplomatic isolation imposed on countries

developing these weapons, and on states,

firms, or individuals who assist in such

developments;

rewards to increase the attractiveness of

voluntarily forgoing these weapons, such as

development assistance (financial or technical) that is tied to nonproliferation; and

global or regional security improvements

to reduce the perceived needs for the weapons.

The increasing international flow of technical knowledge, high-technology goods, and

trained specialists is eroding the ability of the

United States and its allies to withhold technologies relevant to producing weapons of mass

destruction from states of proliferation concern. Nevertheless, although technical capability

is necessary to develop weapons of mass destruction, it is not sufficient, and it is certainly not

causal. A host of nontechnical factors such as the

diplomatic, political, organizational, and economic costs and benefits bear on a state’s decision

to pursue such weapons.

In the long run, the most effective nonproliferation measure is to convince states that it is
6 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

in their own best interest to forgo weapons of

mass destruction. Reducing the incentives for

seeking such weapons and raising the costs of

doing so are both important. External obstacles

and disincentives can play an important role in

raising the costs of proliferation to a state

considering it, possibly tipping the balance towards nonproliferation. Such coercive measures

can also buy time for other diplomatic or political

measures to forestall the development of weapons

of mass destruction. However, they may not

always be sufficient to stop states determined to

acquire weapons of mass destruction.

H Technical Aspects of Nonproliferation

Policy

Trying to control proliferation through controlling exports or placing other obstacles in the way

of potential proliferants requires technical analysis of the production pathways for making these

weapons. Controls will not work if the target state

can readily make controlled items indigenously,

find uncontrolled sources of supply, or develop

alternatives. Technical analysis also underpins

measures to monitor the production of weapons of

mass destruction, measures that are needed to

evaluate potential threats as well as to formulate

verification regimes by which states can assure

each other that they are not pursuing such

weapons.

ISSUES FOR CONTROLLING PROLIFERATION

. Obtaining fissionable nuclear weapon material (enriched uranium or plutonium)

today remains the greatest single obstacle

most countries would face in the pursuit

of nuclear weapons. For this reason, theft or

black market purchase of nuclear material or

warheads from the former Soviet arsenal—

or collaboration between potential proliferants whereby one provides nuclear materials

to another-would be extremely troubling.

Although nuclear material production, weapon

fabrication, and testing require specialized

equipment, in many cases this equipment

can be fabricated indigenously by proliferants using equipment (e.g., machine tools)

that also has civilian applications.

● Most of the equipment needed to produce

chemical weapons has civilian applications. Moreover, most of the same chemicals, or precursors, used to make chemicalwarfare (CW) agents are also used in commercial products. Some agents (e.g., sulfur

mustard and the nerve agent tabun) could be

produced with widely available chemicalindustry equipment. The most potent nerve

agents (e.g., sarin, soman, VX) involve a

process step--the alkylation of phosphorous—

that is less common, but that nevertheless is

used in a handful of commercial products

such as some pesticides and fire retardants.

. Virtually all the equipment underlying

production of biological and toxin agents

has civil applications and has become

widely available as fermentation technology, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries more generally, have

spread worldwide. Since militarily significant quantities of biological agents could be

produced in a short time in small facilities,

they could be used offensively without the

need for long-term stockpiles. Crude dissemination of biological agents in an aerosol

cloud can be performed with commercially

available equipment, such as an agricultural

sprayer mounted on a truck, ship, or airplane.

However, developing reliable, efficient projectile or missile warheads for precision

delivery of organisms over a target requires

surmounting major technical hurdles. Even

so, the United States overcame these hurdles

by the 1960s.

MONITORING PROLIFERATION AND VERIFYING

COMPLIANCE WITH NON PROLIFERATION

AGREEMENTS

● All facilities for producing weapon-grade

nuclear material have unique features

amenable to detection by intrusive onsite
Chapter 1–Introduction and Summary 7

●

●

inspection. Many have distinctive signatures that are detectable remotely, although

facilities needed for some approaches to

material production might not be readily

detectable.

Production of chemical-warfare agents

can be detected through analysis of samples taken during an onsite inspection.

However, considerable access to production

facilities is required to collect appropriate

samples. Moreover, highly sensitive analytical chemistry techniques that are decisive

under laboratory conditions might be less so

under some circumstances in the field, particularly if the proliferant has been producing related legitimate chemicals (e.g., pesticides) in the same facility and is willing to

expend time, effort, and resources to mask,

obscure, or otherwise explain away chemical

agent production activities. Such efforts,

while not likely to eliminate grounds for

suspicion, could create ambiguities or otherwise complicate detection of chemical agent

production during an inspection.

Identifying where to look for evidence of

covert production is probably the greatest

challenge for monitoring chemical weapon

proliferation, since highly reliable technologies to detect chemical agent production

from outside a facility are not currently

available. Information on plant design and

purchase of precursor chemicals may suggest a chemical agent production capability,

and may therefore lead to challenge inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Detection of biological and toxin agent

production is particularly challenging because clandestine production sites need

not be large or distinctive, because the

equipment involved has legitimate civilian applications, and because offensive

work can be conducted under the guise of

defensive preparations. Identifying where

to look for evidence of biological agent

production is even harder than for chemical

agents. Several suggestive signatures of

biological weapon production do exist, and,

if integrated effectively with each other and

with other sources of intelligence, they

might make it possible to infer a weapon

production capability. However, the evidence supporting such an inference may not

be sufficient to justify claims of treaty

violation before the international community, either because it cannot be publicly

released or because public allegations of

treaty violation typically require a substantially higher burden of proof than intelligence assessments. Sensitive techniques exist

to identify biological or toxin agents if

access to a suspect site is made available.

However, such techniques alone do not

ensure that an effective onsite inspection

regime can be established to detect production of biological or toxin weapons.

WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS AND

COMPARISONS

1 Lethality and Military Utility

One motivation for developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is their ability to

destroy or interfere with military targets. More

generally, however, these weapons may also be

sought for symbolic, deterrent, intimidating,

or terrorist purposes that may not be simply

related to their value from a purely military

perspective.

Nuclear weapons, particularly at large yields

(hundreds of kilotons or higher) are the most

potent means of mass destruction.3 In addition to

killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people or

more, a nuclear weapon can obliterate the entire

3 One kiloton is the explosive blast generated by 1,000 tons of high explosive.
8 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

physical infrastructure of a large city and contaminate a much larger area with radioactive fallout.

Given this destructive power, nuclear weapons

have been developed for strategic use against a

nation’s military infrastructure, its economic

base, and even its population. In addition, the

nuclear powers have developed many tactical

nuclear weapons for a variety of battlefield

missions. These weapons are particularly threatening to concentrations of military force such as

tightly clustered naval groups, port or depot

facilities, troop concentrations, or massed forces

of tanks and other armored vehicles.

Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents-if detected-can be defended

against through use of gas masks, protective

Gas masks and protective clothing can shield against

chemical and biological weapons, but they impair

military @activeness.

clothing, shelters, and decontamination procedures. Although these weapons can contaminate

territory, they do not destroy infrastructure. If

protective measures are taken in time-which

requires adequate warning-they can dramatically reduce casualties, and hence the military and

political implications, of a chemical or biological

attack. Nevertheless, such weapons can still have

military value against protected troops, since

forcing troops to don protective gear impairs their

ability to function on the battlefield and lowers

their military effectiveness. Means for penetrating protective gear would have serious implications for the military utility of chemical or

biological weapons. Although such means have

been examined, they have operational shortcomings; moreover, defensive equipment is being

improved to mitigate that threat.

Biological weapons are so potent that under

conditions favorable to the attacker, they can kill

as many people as comparably sized nuclear

weapons, potentially making them extremely

dangerous as a strategic or terrorist weapon

against dense population centers. However, their

characteristics make them particularly difficult to

use on the battlefield. Except for some toxins,

biological agents act more slowly than chemical

or nuclear weapons, taking days or weeks to

achieve full effect. In addition, their effects are

much harder to control or predict than those of

nuclear weapons, since 1) individuals differ

markedly in their sensitivity to biological agents;

2) the lethal areas created by such agents, which

depend on wind and other weather conditions, are

hard to predict (indeed, such agents may even be

blown back upon the attacker by an unexpected

shift in wind direction during a battlefield engagement); and 3) biological agents must be kept alive

through the dissemination process and long

enough afterward to infect the target personnel,

but not so long as to impede future use of the area.

On a pound-for-pound basis, chemical weapons are much less lethal than either nuclear or

biological weapons, and correspondingly greater

amounts would have to be delivered to have
Chapter 1–Introduction and Summary 9

comparable results. Indeed, it may not even be

appropriate to consider them to be weapons of

‘‘mass destruction. ’ Yet they can still induce

terror, particularly among troops or civilians

without protective gear.

In some battlefield scenarios, chemical weapons might be no more effective than the same

weight of conventional high-explosive munitions, even when used against unprotected people.

Like biological weapons, their effects depend on

variable factors such as weather and terrain,

limiting their predictability. Nevertheless, chemical weapons do have tactical applications. Persistent chemical agents cart create local “no-man’ slands’ in which restrictions would be imposed on

military operations of either side. Attacks using

nonpersistent agents could disrupt enemy defenses but still permit attacking troops to overrun

the territory soon afterwards. Some chemical

agents can be used as incapacitants, either in lieu

of lethal force or in conjunction with it.

~ Ease of Acquisition

Barring a shortcut, such as the direct acquisition of nuclear materials usable in weapons, the

infrastructure required to produce nuclear weapons is considerably more difficult and expensive

to develop than that for either biological or

chemical weapons. It is also the most amenable to

limitation through control of international technology transfers. Mass production of lethal chemical agents requires a greater investment than that

of biological weapons, but is not nearly as

expensive or challenging as production of nuclear

materials.

Table 1-1, drawn from the technical analyses in

a separate OTA background paper, compares the

relative difficulties involved in trying to produce

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in

several categories.4 Note that the table differentiates between producing materials (nuclear materials, chemical warfare agents, and biological

pathogens) and building the munitions and delivery systems needed to make those materials

militarily functional.

Since international norms remain and are being

strengthened against proliferation of these weapons, proliferants may very likely try to acquire

them secretly. Concealing potential indicators of

the necessary activities adds to the expense and

difficulty of acquisition. With enough effort and

resources, the magnitude and scope-and possibly even the existence-of a covert weapon

program might well be successfully concealed;

the burden will be on the suspecting parties to

detect relevant indicators and to interpret their

meaning accurately. The background paper exties various ‘‘signatures’ that might indicate

the presence of a clandestine weapon program.

1 Probability of Use

Nuclear weapons have been detonated on

adversaries only twice-against Hiroshima and

Nagasaki in World War II. Biological weapons,

despite their apparent ease of manufacture and

their devastating effects, have not played a

Kurdish victims of an Iraqi chemical attack on

the Iraqi town of Halabja during the Iran-Iraq

war.

4 OTA background paper on tccbnologies underlying weapons of mass destruction in press.
10 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table l-l—Technical Hurdles for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon Programs

Nuclear Biological Chemical

Nuclear materials or lethal

agents production

Feed materials

Scientific and technical

personnel

Design and engineering

knowledge

Uranium ore, oxide widely

available; plutonium and

partly enriched uranium dispersed through nuclear power

programs, mostly under international safeguards.

Requires wide variety of expertise and skillful systems

integration.

Varies with process, but specific designs for producing

Equipment

either of the two bomb-grade

nuclear materials can be difficult to develop:

. Separation of uranium

isotopes to-highIy enriched uranium;

. Reactor production and

chemical processing to

produce plutonium.

Varies with different processes,

but difficulties can include fabrication, power consumption,

large size, and operational

complexity:

● Electromagnetic separation equipment can

be constructed from available, multiple-use parts;

● Equipment for other processes is more specialized and difficult to buy

or build.

Potential biological warfare agents are readily available locally or internationally from natural sources or commercial suppliers.

Sophisticated research and development unnecessary to produce commonly known agents.

Industrial microbiological personnel widely available.

Widely published; basic techniques to produce known agents

not difficult.

Widely available for commercial uses.

Special containment and wastetreatment equipment may be

more difficult to assemble, but

are not essential to production.

Many basic chemicals available for commercial purposes;

only some nerve gas precursors available for purchase,

but ability to manufacture them

is spreading.

Organic chemists and chemical engineers widely available.

Widely published.

Some processes tricky (Iraq

had difficulty with tabun cyanation, succeeded at sarin alkylation; however, sarin quality was

poor).

Most has legitimate industrial

applications.

Alkylation process is somewhat

difficult and is unusual in civilian applications.

Special containment and waste

treatment equipment may be

more difficult to assemble, but

are not essential to production.

prominent role in wartime.5 Chemical weapons, in kind.6 Iraq also used chemical weapons against

on the other hand, were heavily used in World its own Kurdish population. Although the threat

War I and have been employed several times of Iraqi chemical weapons loomed large over

since then in regional conflicts. Most recently, coalition military forces and civilians in surIraq used chemical weapons during the 1980- rounding countries during Operation Desert Storm,

1988 war with Iran, resulting in some 50,000 they were not in fact used during that conflict.

Iranian casualties, with Iran belatedly retaliating Nevertheless, if the past is any guide, chemical

S ~ world war II, Japan used biological agents including bubonic plague on an experimermd bk in occupied ~ reportedly MU

some hundreda of Chinese civilians but also causing thousands of illnesses among its own troops (see ch. 2). Biological weapons were not used

in any other theater of the war.

6

‘R@mony of R. James Wocdsey, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Committee on Govemrnental Affairs, Feb. 25, 1993.
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary I 11

Table I-l-( Continued)

Nuclear Biological Chemical

Plant construction and Costly and challenging.

operation Research reactors or electric power reactors might be

converted to plutonium production.

Overall cost Cheapest overt production

route for one bomb per year,

with no international controls, is about $200 million;

larger scale clandestine

program could cost 10 to 50

times more, and even then

not be assured of success

or of remaining hidden.

Black-market purchase of

ready-to-use fissile materials or of complete weapons

could be many times cheaper.

Weaponization

Design and engineering Heavier, less efficient, loweryield designs easier, but all

pose significant technical

challenges.

Production equipment Much (e.g., machine tools)

dual-use and widely available.

Some overlap with conventional munitions production

equipment.

With advent of biotechnology,

small-scale facilities now capable of large-scale production.

Enough for large arsenal may

cost less than $10 million.

Principal challenge is maintaining the agent’s potency

through weapon storage, delivery, and dissemination.

Broad-area dissemination not

difficult; design of weapons that

effectively aerosolize agents for

precision delivery challenging

(but developed by U.S. by ’60s).

Must be tightly contained to

prevent spread of infection, but

the necessary equipment is not

hard to build.

Dedicated plant not difficult.

Conversion of existing commercial chemical plants feasible but not trivial.

Arsenal for substantial military

capability (hundreds of tons of

agent) likely to cost tens of

millions of dollars.

Advanced weapons somewhat

difficult r but workable munition

designs (e.g., bursting smoke

device) widely published.

Relatively simple, closely related to standard munitions production equipment.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

weapons are considerably more likely to be used

in the future than either nuclear or biological

weapons.

IMPLICATIONS OF PROLIFERATION

Mass killing of human beings is not new to

warfare, or even to this century. Nevertheless,

weapons of mass destruction compress the time

and the effort needed to kill. Wars lasting only a

few days could now devastate populations, cities,

or entire countries in ways that previously took

months or years. Particularly ominous is the fact

that the states now working hardest to develop

weapons of mass destruction (see following

section) are for the most part located in unstable

regions of the world, where bitter and unresolved

rivalries have erupted into war in the recent past

and hold the prospect of doing so again. Not only

might future wars lead to the actual use of

weapons of mass destruction, but the deployment

of such weapons in these regions could increase

tensions still further.

Even if these weapons are not used, they cast

shadows that can affect interstate relations and
12 I Proliferation of Weapons of

international balances of power.

Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

A few analysts,

pointing to the role that nuclear weapons seem to

have played in preventing war between the United

States and the Soviet Union, argue that their

spread will actually increase international stability. Most, however, consider such a view to be

dangerously misguided. The Cold War was not

without serious crises and close calls, such as the

Cuban Missile Crisis. In the Middle East, South

Asia, and the Korean peninsula, hostile powers

share common borders, contest core values

and vital national interests, and lack both the

mutual learning experience and the technical

safeguards that have helped the superpowers

come to live with the mortal threat each poses

the other.

Proliferation, therefore, poses real dangers

from the point of view of international security

and human welfare. Moreover, in addition to its

global consequences, it poses particular problems

for the United States. As a global power, the

United States will almost certainly retain allies

and vital interests overseas that might be threatened by states possessing weapons of mass

destruction. Should the United States need to

defend its interests and principles with military

force—whether acting unilaterally or under multilateral auspices such as those of the United

Nations—U.S. armed forces or territory might

become targets for weapons of mass destruction.

The threat of nuclear attack is nothing new to

the United States. Having faced a massive Soviet

nuclear arsenal for decades, the United States has

shown itself willing at least to contemplate the

loss of many U.S. cities, and millions of American lives, to ensure its own survival and the

survival of the states under its nuclear umbrella.

(Granted, this posture has always posed problems

for many who questioned what “national survival’ means in the context of tens, let alone

hundreds or thousands, of nuclear weapons detonating on U.S. territory.) At the same time,

however, the existence of the Soviet nuclear

arsenal strongly tempered U.S. views of which

‘‘vital national interests’ were worth risking

nuclear war to defend. If additional countries

acquire the means to threaten U.S. allies, U.S.

forces overseas, or even U.S. territory with

nuclear weapons, the United States will be forced

to reevaluate the conditions under which it is

willing to risk nuclear attack. Even though it

might retaliate with its own nuclear arsenal, U.S.

retaliation may not compensate for U.S. or allied

losses.

Plausible scenarios for the current set of

suspected proliferants to threaten U.S. territory

with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction

are difficult to devise. None possess missiles or

aircraft with sufficient range to reach the United

States, nor are potentially hostile powers likely to

develop such systems in the next 10 years (see

next section). Nevertheless, a state that badly

wanted to wreak destruction on a U.S. city

could probably do so, whether it had advanced

delivery systems or not—and whether the

United States had effective defenses against

such advanced delivery systems or not.

PROLIFERATION THREATS AND

PROSPECTS

Only five countries (the United States, Russia,

the United Kingdom, France, and China) acknowledge possessing nuclear weapon stockpiles. 7 Three more-Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and

Belarus--have former Soviet strategic nuclear

weapons located within their borders (although as

yet they do not control them), and it is not yet

certain that they will give them up. Only three

states (United States, Russia, and Iraq) say they

have chemical weapon arsenals, and all of these

weapons are in the process of, or are slated for,

destruction. No countries admit to active offen7 South Africa has acknowledged having assembled six nuclear weapons but says it has since destroyed them.
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary I 13

sive biological weapon programs.8 Few countries,

therefore, are overtly deploying or preparing to

deploy weapons of mass destruction. The difficulty in assessing the extent of the proliferation

threat lies in determining which states are doing

so secretly. Merely counting the states that today

are capable of mounting a program to produce

weapons of mass destruction inflates the proliferation threat considerably, just as counting only

the states acknowledging such production errs in

the opposite direction.

This report names countries commonly cited in

the public literature as having nuclear, chemical,

or biological weapons, or as having programs to

acquire them. Consistent with the unclassified

nature of this report, the estimates given here

are not based on classified sources and should

in no way be considered authoritative or

indicative of official U.S. Government assessments. Therefore, the tables in this report may

well disagree in some respects with the best

intelligence information available to the U.S.

Government, which itself can be uncertain and

incomplete. If an incomplete public understanding of the current extent of proliferation poses

problems for U.S. nonproliferation policy, it

behooves U.S. policymakers to ensure that the

open literature better reflects the actual state of

affairs.

1 Keeping Score

Besides the five acknowledged nuclear powers

and the three non-Russian former Soviet republics that still have nuclear weapons on their

territory, only three “threshold states” appear to

possess nuclear weapons or have the ability to

deploy them on short notice: Israel, which is

widely believed to have a clandestine arsenal;

India, which tested a nuclear device in 1974 and

probably has stockpiles of nuclear weapon material available, but has made no overt moves to

develop a nuclear arsenal; and Pakistan, which is

cut off from U.S. military aid because the

President cannot certify that it does not possess a

nuclear explosive device.9 None of these countries is a member of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. South Africa has admitted

to mounting a nuclear weapon program that

culminated in the construction of six nuclear

weapons, confirming suspicions that had included it in this threshold category. However,

stating that it has destroyed those weapons, it has

since joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

as a non-nuclear-weapon state and opened up its

nuclear facilities to international inspection. Little information has been released so far on the

results of those inspections, but to date (June

1993) they have not resolved ‘serious questions’

that the United States has concerning South

Africa’s compliance with its NPT obligations.10

A few other states reputed to have nuclear

weapon programs are apparently not as far

advanced as the above four: Iran and Libya, both

NPT members; North Korea, which has given

and then retracted notice of its intent to withdraw

from the NPT, and possibly Algeria, which is not

an NPT member. North Korea appeared to have

taken steps to back away from its nuclear weapon

program, permitting inspection (after years of

delay) of facilities that clearly seem to have been

intended for nuclear weapon production. However, after having been caught attempting to

mislead international inspectors as to the extent of

its nuclear program, it refused to open other

suspicious facilities for inspection. Rather than

comply with its commitment under the NPT to

8 Ru~~ia ~~~~titthe Soviet Ution’s Offmive biologic~ w~pon prog~ pe~isf~ titer the U.S.S.R. signed the Biological

Weapon Convention banning such work but insists that this program has since been halted.

9 ~ 1~, p~~>s FOr~@ s~~~ W= quoted u d~lm tit P~SW ~ w the p@ for a nuclw weapon. He subst!quen~y

retraeted this statement, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claiming he had been misquoted.

1° “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements and the President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noneomplianee with

Arms Control Agreements,” prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jan. 14, 1993, p. 18.
14 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

cooperate with such inspections, it gave notice of

its intent to withdraw from the NPT, becoming

the first nation ever to do so. To many observers,

such actions confirm that North Korea not only

had been pursuing nuclear weapons all along, but

seeks to preserve the capability to do so.

Iraq is a special case. Although the 1991 Gulf

War and its aftermath arrested and reversed Iraq’s

nuclear weapon program before it could come to

fruition, United Nations inspections showed the

program to have been much broader and more

advanced than Western intelligence agencies had

suspected. Few observers doubt that the program

will resume in the absence of the extraordinarily

international monitoring efforts imposed upon

Iraq by the United Nations Security Council.

Argentina and Brazil in the past had been

thought to be pursuing nuclear programs, albeit

ones that were less advanced than those of the

threshold states. In recent years, however, they

have agreed to open up their nuclear facilities to

bilateral and international inspection to assure

each other and the rest of the world that they are

not developing nuclear weapons.

Public reports of the extent of chemical and

biological proliferation differ with each other more

than do assessments of nuclear proliferation. OTA

has reviewed several compilations of states suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons; those states appearing in a preponderance of

these lists are identified in figure 1-1, together

with the states mentioned above as still suspected

of pursuing nuclear weapons. (See ch. 2.)

In all, 14 countries are listed in figure 1-1 as

widely believed to possess or to be pursuing

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Given

official U.S. Government statements that ‘‘more

than 25 countries . . . may have or may be

developing” weapons of mass destruction and

their delivery systems, figure 1-1 may understate

the number of countries pursuing such systems.11

Part of the discrepancy may be states that are

pursuing delivery systems but not nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, which would not be

included in figure 1-1; the remainder might

indicate countries suspected by U.S. intelligence

of pursuing such weapons but not yet identified in

open sources.

Most of the states listed in figure 1-1 have

bought or developed simple ballistic missiles

with at least the capability of Scud missiles. All

have combat aircraft with characteristics that

make them candidates for delivering weapons of

mass destruction. None seems to have cruise

missiles adapted to this purpose, but the spread of

applicable technologies makes cruise missiles a

threat to be concerned about in the future.

Three features stand out in the combined

perspective offered by figure 1-1. First, the

estimate for the current number of states

actively pursuing nuclear weapons is small,

and smaller than it might have been a few

years ago. Second, the set of countries trying to

acquire nuclear weapons overlaps considerably with the set suspected of having chemical

and biological weapon programs. Third, the

most immediate and serious threats (beyond

the potential threat posed by former Soviet

republics) are concentrated in three regions of

international rivalry: the Koreas, IndiaPakistan, and the Middle East.

Longer term assessments of the extent of

proliferation are harder to make, although some

trends are clear. For example, for ‘at least another

decade,” only China, Russia, and possibly Ukraine,

Kazakhstan, and Belarus--all possessing weapons that have long been capable of being targeted

at the United States—will pose a ballistic missile

11 ~~ony Of R. J-es WOOlsey, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Committee on Gvernmmtd M*S, Feb. w, 1993.

Although he gave some information on the activities of some countries, his testimony did not identify all of the states believed by the United

States to be pursuing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, much less specify which ones are pursuing which weapons.
Chapter I-Introduction and Summary 15

threat to the territory of the United States.12

Projections of the future number of nuclear,

chemical, or biological powers are more elusive.

It is hard to determine even the present status and

anticipated progress of existing programs. Even

with the wealth of information that has been

uncovered about the Iraqi nuclear weapon program, for example, experts disagree over how

long it would have taken the Iraqis to assemble a

working weapon. Moreover, extrapolating from

current trends can be misleading. We have

already noted several examples of apparent ‘rollback” in nuclear weapon programs. Further

changes in the world situation, including those

that nonproliferation policies seek to bring about,

will affect

1 Trends

the extent of future proliferation.

Fostering Proliferation

RISKS FROM THE BREAKUP OF THE SOVIET

UNION

The breakup of the Soviet Union-and the

shakiness of governmental authority in its successor republics-could contribute to proliferation

problems. The threat is potentially great, but hard

to predict. One set of problems could arise from

the emergence of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Belarus as new nuclear powers and the ramifications

such actions would have on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Another concerns the future

integrity of Russia itself, or at least of the system

of controls over Russian nuclear weapons and

nuclear weapon materials. A third issue, perhaps

the most immediate risk posed by the Soviet

breakup, is the possible leakage to potential

proliferants of people, critical information, equipment, materials, or even complete weapons. Such

assistance could be of great value not only to

nuclear but also to chemical or biological weapon

programs. Finally, in the longer term, various

former Soviet republics may choose to develop

Figure l-l-Suspected Weapon of Mass

Destruction Programs

Prolifera;t 1

nuclear Algeria?

weapon India

pr~gram Pakistan \

Myanmar (Burma)

\

Vietnam

\ Chinal ‘/ /

Chemical Biological

arsenal weapon

(probable or development

possible) ‘(possible)

Shaded area: also has

Scud-type or longer

range ballistic missile

1 The Unitd fjtateg, Ru.sda, United Kingdom, France, and China are

nueiear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

and therefore are not considered nuclear “proliferants.” However,

China is suspected of pursuing chemical and biolo@al weapons and

is included in this figure for that reason.

2 lmqi ~mgrms have ken reversed under UN SWuritY ~uncil

Resolution 687.

SOURCE: Tables 2-6, 2-7, 2-8; Office of Technology Assessment,

1993.

weapons of mass destruction indigenously, perhaps drawing on facilities that had once contributed to Soviet weapon programs.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Apart from the acute crises posed by the

collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold

War has the potential for weakening restraints

against proliferation. Countries that had formerly

enjoyed Soviet or U.S. security guarantees may

now feel more exposed and insecure, increasing

12 Row M. ~tcS, D~tO~ of c~~~ ~te]lig~e, wore tie Semte Gove~en~ ~~ COtitt&, J~. 15, 1992. Sti “W~pO~

Proliferation in the New World Order,” S. Hrg. 102-720, 102d Cong., 2d Sessiou Jan. 15, 1992, p. 7. Britain and France, with

submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, are not considered to pose a threat.
16 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

the motivation to develop their own weapons of

mass destruction. Moreover, controls that the

Soviet Union had formerly exerted over its allies

no longer exist, or at least have been considerably

weakened given the reduced role that Russia is

playing in international affairs. As the United

States reshapes its own security relationships in

recognition of the Cold War’s end, in particular

by withdrawing overseas forces, it too may lose

some leverage over its allies.

PERSISTENCE OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Outside the sphere of the former Soviet Union,

the most serious drivers for proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction remain the seemingly intractable regional conflicts in South Asia

and the Middle East, where most of the current

proliferants are located. In South Asia, India and

Pakistan are unable to resolve their ethnic and

territorial dispute over Kashmir, while India

also--or perhaps even primarily--feels threatened by China, the nuclear power to the northeast.

In the Middle East, the current peace process does

not promise early resolution of the Arab-Israeli

conflict. In addition, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

illustrates that, even independent of Israel, the

Arab and other Islamic countries (e.g., Iran)

would probably continue to arm against one

another.13

Proliferation of conventional arms, fueled by

these regional conflicts as well as by the glut of

military industrial capacity and weapon stockpiles in the wake of the Cold War, can stimulate

the quest for weapons of mass destruction as

‘‘equalizers. ‘‘14At the same time, continued sales

of high-performance combat aircraft and the

spread of missile technology bolster states’ ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

SPREADING TECHNOLOGY AND

INDUSTRIALIZATION

Economic and technological development will,

in general, enhance national wealth, technical

skill, and industrial capabilities useful for indigenous production of weapons of mass destruction

and their delivery systems. It will also increase

the number of potential foreign suppliers of skill

and technology to proliferant nations. Consequently, it will be increasingly difficult for a small

number of industrially advanced countries to

control weapon proliferation by denying access to

key technologies or materials.

Indeed, the dissemination of technologies

that have at least some relevance to producing

weapons of mass destruction might need to be

not only tolerated but encouraged if populations in developing nations are to improve

their health, environment, and standards of

living. This is especially true for chemical and

biological technologies. Technologies that can

contribute both to military and civil objectives,

often referred to as ‘‘dual-use” technologies, are

actually multi-use, providing basic capabilities

that can be used in a host of applications (e.g.,

computing, metal-forming, and diagnostic testing). Controls on some dual-use technologies will

prove to be infeasible (if the technologies involved have already disseminated too widely) or

undesirable (if too many non-weapons-related

activities would be constrained as well).

These difficulties notwithstanding, export controls will remain an important nonproliferation

tool. For example, although Iraq’s indigenous

industrial base was more capable than most

outsiders realized, it still had to import much of

the equipment used in its weapon facilities. This

level of importation was made feasible only by

Iraqi oil revenues.

13 fib ~~- disputes with ‘lhrkey, a NATO member, bave the potential to involve the United States directly.

14 For &~uSSiO~ of be spread of conventio~ fi~~~ology, see TJ,S. Co-ss, ~lce of khoIo~ Assessmen~ G/oh/ /h2.f

Trude, O’IA-ISC+60 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov ernment Frinting Office, June 1991).
RESISTANCE TO DISCRIMINATORY REGIMES

A few developing countries, most notably

India, object to external attempts to deny them

nuclear and missile-related technologies that are

accepted as legitimate for certain other countries,

Nevertheless, most nations of the world have

been willing to live with the two-tiered, nuclear/nonnuclear structure of the NPT. This factor is not an

issue with the Chemical Weapons Convention or

the Biological Weapons Convention, both of

which apply to all states without distinction.

WEAKENED TABOO AGAINST CHEMICAL

WEAPON USE

The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of

chemical and biological agents in warfare. This

ban was observed in most of the conflicts

following its entry into force, including World

War II (except the use by Japan, then a non-party,

of chemical and biological weapons in China).

However, more recent instances of chemical

weapon use have weakened this international

norm. In particular, Iraqi use against Iran in the

1980s may have demonstrated to some defense

planners that chemical weapons can be a useful

military tool.

I Trends Favoring Nonproliferation Efforts

GENERALLY RISING NORM AGAINST

PROLIFERATION

An international consensus seems to be growing that further proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction should be stopped, and that chemical

and biological weapons should be eliminated

completely. Governments around the world have

declared renewed commitments to nonproliferation. Strengthened nonproliferation norms might

help deter potential proliferants. More importantly, they also improve the prospects of

strong, coordinated world action to deter and

punish violators.

The past few years have brought a significant

increase in the number of signatories to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, rising from

Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary I 17

138 at the end of 1989 to 157 by January 1, 1993.

Two of the nuclear weapon states that did not

originally join the NPT (China and France) have

joined in the last two years, as did a hold-out state

that has admitted having produced nuclear weapons outside the NPT (South Africa). Although

three non-signatories are believed to have actual

or potential nuclear weapon capabilities (Israel,

India, and Pakistan), no states have declared

themselves to be nuclear powers since China in

1964. No non-nuclear members of the NPT have

‘‘gone nuclear,’ although a few have been trying.

The deep reductions in nuclear forces undertaken by the United States and Russia mean that

both countries are finally making visible progress

on their NPT obligation to ‘‘pursue negotiations

in good faith on effective measures relating to

cessation of the nuclear arms race, ’ even though

they seem unlikely to seriously pursue the NPT

goal of “general and complete disarmament. ”

Progress in superpower nuclear arms reductions

could undermine longstanding complaints about

the discriminatory nature of the NPT that might

otherwise have hurt the treaty’s chances for

renewal when it comes up for extension in 1995.

On the other hand, North Korea would deal the

nonproliferation regime a serious blow if it

proceeds to withdraw from the NPT

END OF THE COLD WAR

In part, the end of the Cold War has allowed the

strengthening of this norm against proliferation.

Besides fostering a new level of cooperation

between the United States and Russia (as successor to the Soviet Union in the U.N. Security

Council), the cessation of the U.S.-Soviet conflict

has also made possible changes in national

priorities and policy emphases. Although nonproliferation policies may continue to conflict with

other policy goals, they need no longer be

subordinated to Cold War objectives. In addition,

foreign policy and intelligence resources are

being redirected from Cold War efforts to deal

with proliferation.
18 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Should Russia revert to a foreign policy that is

seriously threatening to Western interests, nonproliferation will be set back. Granted, even

during the Cold War, the Soviet Union took a

strong stance against nuclear proliferation, and an

anti-Western Russia would likely do the same.

But future efforts to contain the spread of all types

of weapons of mass destruction will require

significant Russian-United States cooperation in

support of nonproliferation norms, not just parallel policies in limited areas (see ch. 3).

RECENT REVERSALS OF NATIONAL POLICIES

Reversals in the nuclear weapon programs of

Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and (albeit involuntarily) Iraq follow decisions in earlier decades

by Sweden, South Korea, and Taiwan to halt

programs that had seemed directed at nuclear

acquisition. Such reversals, however, are themselves reversible: despite some moves by North

Korea to open up to international inspection, its

subsequent actions have given rise to serious

doubts.

GROWING COOPERATION IN EXPORT

CONTROL REGIMES

Several multilateral groups have formed to

control the export of equipment or materials that

might be used in the production of weapons of

mass destruction or of missiles. These control

regimes have been strengthened in the past few

years, both by covering additional items and by

expanding their membership. Particularly notable

is the April 1992 decision of the 27-member

Nuclear Suppliers Group to require importers of

nuclear technology to accept international monitoring (through the International Atomic Energy

Agency’s system of safeguards) over their entire

nuclear programs, not just over the particular

facilities built with imported technology. This

action leaves China as the only supplier of nuclear

technology that does not require such ‘full-scope

safeguards’ as a condition of sale. By requiring

full-scope safeguards, exporters prevent states

from acquiring expertise in safeguarded facilities

and using it to build and operate other facilities

that are not open to international inspection or

controls.

U.N. ACTIONS IN IRAQ

Besides reversing Iraqi mass destruction weapon

programs, recent U.N. Security Council resolutions make approving references to international

nonproliferation and disarmament treaties, setting useful precedents in demonstrating international resolve against weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council has also taken on both

short- and long-term onsite monitoring tasks to

assure that its decisions mandating elimination of

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are carried out.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISARMAMENT AND

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The two largest chemical weapon powers, the

United States and Russia, have committed themselves to the destruction of their chemical arsenals, together with their development and production facilities. The Iraqi chemical arsenal is being

dismantled under U.N. supervision. Most significantly, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),

signed by more than 140 states in early 1993, bans

for the first time the development, production,

and possession of chemical weapons (in addition

to their use) and reinforces the international norm

against chemical weapons. Regardless of any

doubts that may remain as to whether the CWC’s

verification regime is adequate to the task and

whether it will be stringently implemented, the

Convention strengthens the international consensus that chemical weapons are illegitimate. If

some nation were to use chemical weapons in the

future, the international community may feel

committed to react more strongly than it did

against Iraq’s use in the 1980s.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

VERIFICATION

In the wake of the Russian admission that the

Soviet Union had violated the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States, the United
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 19

Kingdom, and Russia have agreed on a program

to inspect each other’s biological facilities.15

Although states that have joined the Convention

disagree over the feasibility or desirability of a

formal verification regime, an international Ad

Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Verification (VEREX) is considering potential verification measures.

In sum, despite some dangerous trends and

many uncertainties, the world community has

significant new opportunities to curtail, and

perhaps roll back, the spread of weapons of mass

destruction.

THE NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

CONTEXT

The United States and other countries concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction have instituted measures seeking to

impose obstacles to the acquisition of weapons of

mass destruction; to create disincentives in order

to deter states from developing such weapons or

to persuade them to reverse course; to offer

benefits to states that agree to forgo such

attempts; and to develop security improvements

to reduce the perceived needs for the weapons.

These measures have been implemented to date

through three primary mechanisms: national

policies and laws governing states’ actions with

respect to others that are developing or assisting

in the development of weapons of mass destruction; multinational agreements to restrict exports of certain technologies or to take action

against those states found to be violating international nonproliferation norms; and international

treaties and institutions open to all states who

agree to subscribe to their principles.

I Imposing Obstacles to Proliferation

Obstacles that can be put in the way of states

trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction

include using secrecy to restrict the flow of

knowledge; adopting export controls; taking diplomatic or other action to stop exports by third

parties; and acting to stop or discourage experts

from providing assistance. Since the United

States is not the only source of technology,

knowledge, or other support that might be

useful to a proliferant, such measures must be

imposed multilaterally to be effective. At the

same time, however, U.S. leadership is necessary to mobilize effective international cooperation.

If, despite these barriers, a proliferant nation

manages to acquire facilities for a weapon program that another country or countries deem to

pose an intolerable security threat, the ultimate

recourse might be to impose another kind of

obstacle: destroying the facilities by military

attack. However, such an approach is fraught with

legal, political, and operational difficulties, and

must be considered at most as a last resort.

EXPORT CONTROLS

Export controls are intended to block the most

straightforward paths to developing weapons of

mass destruction and to raise the price and the

time required for alternate approaches. They can

also provide information valuable for monitoring

programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Export controls will remain an important

component of nonproliferation policy for years,

especially in the nuclear area. However, control

regimes can be defeated if their targets can

“invent around” restricted technologies or products, if controls are attempted on goods that are

too widely available, or if some potential suppliers are not included. Moreover, it is very difficult

to control the education of scientists and engineers in one country who may later return or

migrate to another to develop weapons of mass

destruction.

In the United States, export controls are established by a number of public laws and regulations

15 ‘CJOint u.s.~.K,~USSi~ Statement on Biological weapons,’ Sept. 14, 1992, reproduced in The Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge,

MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1992), vol. 11 (1992), p. 701 .D.l
20 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

(see ch. 3), and they are also formally or informally coordinated with those of other states. They

now cover a range of technologies related to

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well

as ballistic missiles and conventional armaments.

SANCTIONS AGAINST SUPPLIERS

The United States can impede weapon programs in proliferant states by helping foreign

governments block aid that their own citizens or

corporations may be providing such programs. If

U.S. intelligence uncovers foreign plans to provide such assistance, the United States can

request the government having jurisdiction over

such activities to stop them. In addition, U.S. laws

can impose sanctions directly against foreign

individuals or companies, including criminal

penalties, debarment from U.S. Government procurement, and denial of access to the U.S. market

(see ch. 3). Should a foreign government itself be

aiding proliferation, the United States can take

diplomatic measures against it such as denial of

trade preferences, arms transfers, or financial

assistance.

MILITARY ACTION

In extreme cases, the United States, another

nation, or a multinational coalition might feel

compelled to attack facilities, equipment, or

materials believed to be connected to weapons of

mass destruction. However, if not authorized by

the United Nations Security Council, such an

action would generally be viewed as contrary to

international law unless it could be shown to be

required for national self-defense, and unless

other means short of attack had been exhausted.

(Although they made precisely those arguments,

the Israelis were unable to convince the world

community that their 1981 raid against Iraq’s

Osirak nuclear reactor was justified.)

Military action involves very high risk. Operationally, the attacking country or group of countries must contend with questions about the

quality of its intelligence, how well the attack can

be executed, and how badly the attack will

damage the proliferant state’s weapon program.

As the Israeli raid showed, military attack is not

a permanent solution. Strategically, a potential

attacker must consider the degree of international

backing it is likely to expect and the prospect of

retaliation (military, diplomatic, or terrorist).

Military action that is not explicitly sanctioned by

the international community risks damaging consensus on future cooperative nonproliferation

policies and might even build sympathy for the

victim of the attack.

B Disincentives and Sanctions Against

Proliferants

Mechanisms exist in U.S. law—but are not laid

out in international law—to punish states found to

have used weapons of mass destruction or to have

engaged in activities related to their development

(see ch. 3). At the international level, enforcement

of international nonproliferation commitments

falls to the United Nations Security Council,

which has the authority to respond to ‘‘threats to

international peace and security” by imposing

measures such as sanctions, severance of travel

and communication links, diplomatic isolation, or

even military action under Chapter VII of the

United Nations charter.16 Actions of the Security

Council are binding upon all U.N. members.

Security Council enforcement of existing nonproliferation commitments such as the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1925 Geneva

Protocol could deter further proliferation and

16 BY ~emelves, ~~~tio~ org~~tions involved with nonproliferation such as the hNerrMtiOnd Atomic mewAFcy, ~i~Y~

take no punitive action stronger than expelling members found to have violated their commitments to the organization. However, the IAEA

can refer evidence of violations to the United Nations Security Council for further action. It did so for the first time in APIN 1993, when it found

North Korea in violation of its safeguards agreement.
.—

Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 21

strengthen global nonproliferation norms.17 Conversely, inaction in such cases will weaken the

nonproliferation regime.

Any United Nations efforts to enforce treaty

commitments will not directly affect those states

that have not acceded to these commitments in the

frost place. However, in January 1992, the Security Council declared the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction to be a threat to international

peace and security, opening up at least the possibility of taking action even against proliferants

who are not party to global nonproliferation

regimes.

Within the United States, current laws and

regulations to deter or punish proliferants stress

economic sanctions. However, other measures

could be taken, many of which serve not only to

deter further proliferation but to help address the

consequences of proliferation if it occurs. These

measures include:

●

●

●

●

●

embarrassment by disseminating intelligence or other information exposing illicit

activities;

provision of technical or military assistance

to states threatened by weapons of mass

destruction;

development and deployment of active defenses (e.g., missile or air defenses) or passive

measures (e.g., gas masks and protective

clothing) to protect against the weapons;

diplomatic isolation of proliferants or formation of countervailing military alliances; and

withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees.

The effectiveness of these measures will

depend, like other nonproliferation measures,

on the degree of international cooperation

behind them. The presence of strong international

norms against acquisition and use of these weapons will be important to getting that cooperation.

The United Nations Security Council, which has

primary responsibility for the enforcement of

international nonproliferation obligations,

1 Benefits for Forgoing Weapons of Mass

Destruction

Coercive measures by themselves may not

always be sufficient to stop states from acquiring

weapons of mass destruction. The best hope for

nonproliferation in the long term lies in building a consensus among potential proliferants

that they should jointly refrain from acquiring

these weapons. However, several factors make

such a consensus difficult to achieve. States

seeking weapons of mass destruction may want

them for military purposes (including intimidation or deterrence), for political influence, for

national pride, or for international status. The

presence of nearby nuclear powers is a powerful

incentive to develop nuclear weapons, and a

cascading one. (China acquired them because of

the United States and the Soviet Union; India

because of China; Pakistan worries about India,

etc.) To forgo weapons of mass destruction,

potential proliferants must come to see that their

IT me 1925 ~nev~ Protwol bans use, but not development, production or stockpiling, of chtictd ~d ‘ ‘b=teriolo@d” w~om. my

states ratifying it reserved the right to retaliate in kind against chemical or biological attack or considered it binding only with respect to other

signatories. ‘Iherefore, it effectively became a ‘‘no fwst use” agreement. Moreover, no attempts have ever been made to enforce it against

violators. Signatones who have since acceded to the Chemical and the Biological Weapons Conventions, which unconditionally ban those

weapons, have rescinded their reservations to the Geneva Protocol.
.-

22 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

political or military needs can be met in some

other way.

Although it is not likely to sway a determined

proliferant, financial, technical, and other development assistance can be offered to states forgoing the development of weapons of mass destruction.18 Exemptions from export controls on dualuse items, or preferential access to international

aid organizations, might also be offered. The

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for instance, promises technical assistance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including medical and

agricultural applications. Note, however, that

such assistance can be a double-edged sword,

since familiarity with nuclear technology can

contribute to military as well as peaceful goals.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers more in the way of incentives than the NPT,

promising not only access to chemical technology

but also various assurances to parties who find

themselves threatened or attacked with chemical

weapons. Members of the CWC envisage that

chemical weapon-related export controls will be

relaxed against member-states judged to be in

compliance. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) makes similar provisions for promoting transfers of biotechnology to member-states,

although these have never been implemented.

1 Security Benefits To Reduce the Demand

for Proliferation

Technical assistance notwithstanding, the central bargain of consensual nonproliferation agreements is that states give up their own rights to

acquire weapons of mass destruction on the

condition that they will not be needed to deter the

weapons of others. This deal underlies regional or

global arms control arrangements such as the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical

Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons

Convention, the Latin American Nuclear-Free

Zone (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the South Pacific

Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga). These

treaties codify the international norms against

weapons of mass destruction and have value for

that reason alone. Beyond that, however, most of

them are also associated with verification regimes

intended to permit parties to assure each other that

they are in compliance (see box l-A).

Nonproliferation treaties involve a “freerider” problem: states that remain outside the

regime can sometimes enjoy the benefit of

reducing the threat to themselves without having

to pay the price of giving up their own weapon

options.

19 Moreover, the NPT—which permits

the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and

China to retain their nuclear arsenals--does not

eliminate the potential nuclear threat that memberstates may believe these nations to pose. (It does,

however, commit the nuclear weapons states to

pursue nuclear disarmament and to assist nonnuclear states in their peaceful nuclear programs.)

The long-run success of nonproliferation policy is likely to depend, at least in part, on the

reduction of the security threats used to just@

acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The

security problems in each region of proliferation

concern are different; each will require specially

tailored arrangements if parties are to trust one

another enough to halt or reverse their military

competitions. Such arrangements may consist of

combinations of political accommodations, eco18 ~tead ofs--yas an ~centive to adopt other nonproliferation policies, development assistance could itself be a

nonproliferation measure to the extent that lack of developmen~ economic deprivation, and competition for economic resources are a source

of conflict. Similarly, policies that alleviate international tensions resulting from demographic trends, differing political systems, ideology, and

resource pressures can also be considered nonproliferation measures. Analysis of such policies, however, goes outside the scope of this

assessment.

19 For this r~o% tie Treaty of ‘rlatelolco contains a provision that keeps it ~rn coming into force until all states ill the region beCOme

members. Twenty-three of the Treaty’s parties have waived this provision accepting the Treaty’s obligations. Brazil and Chile, which had not

previously waived the provisioq and Argentina and Cub% which had not entered the TrtXy at all, have recently said they will join the Treaty

or permit it to enter into force for them.
. . .

Chapter I-Introduction and Summary 23

Box 1-A-International Nonproliferation Treaties and Their Verification Regimes

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT prohibits all member-states except the five acknowledged nuclear powers from acquiring nuclear

weapons. It also requires ail non-nuclear-weapon member-states to implement a safeguards agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) covering ail nuclear materials that might be useful for weapons. IAEA

safeguards are intended to detect, and therefore to deter, the diversion of materials from peaceful nuclear

programs to military use, although they cannot by themselves prevent such diversion.

Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon member-states must declare to the IAEA all facilitiesthat handle nuclear

materials, and these facilities then become subject to safeguards. But the IAEA has had little ability to monitor

whether states were conducting nuclear weapon activities in undeclaredfacilities. The limitations of this approach

became clearafterthe 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq was revealedto have mounted a major nuclear weapon program

outside of its declared nuclear program. Although monitoring declared nuclear facilities will continue to be

crucial to verifying compliance with the NPT, it addresses only half the problem. Some means must also

be found to allay suspicions that nuclear weapon activities might be undertaken in covert or undeclared

facilities.

The IAEA has always had the formal abilityto undertake “special inspections” of undeclared fadiities if it had

reason to suspect illicit activities there. However, it did not exercise this authority until February 1993, when it

attempted to inspect suspicious sites in North Korea. (in response, North Korea refused access to IAEA inspectors

and announced its withdrawal from the NPT.) To carry out such inspections, the IAEA must be able to receive and

act on information identifying suspect facilities, and it must have the backing of the U.N. Security Council in case

the target state refuses to cooperate.

Since the NPT entered into force in 1970 for a 25-year period, a review conference will be held in 1995 at

which member-states must decide whether to extend the treaty, and for how long. consequently, successful

extension of the NPT, preferably for an indefinite term, is one of the most important issues facing the nuclear

nonproliferation regime.

Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga

Both of these nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties create regional organizations to monitor compliance and

also require that member states submit to IAEA safeguards.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The newly signed Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production, possession, and use

of chemical weapons and establishes the most comprehensive verification scheme yet formulated in an

international treaty. When it comes into force, it will create a new international institution-the Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--that will receive routine declarations from member states and conduct

routine inspections of declared chemical facilities. More significantly, it will also have the ability to conduct

“challenge inspections” at any site--government or private-suspected of illegal activity. Far more facilities

produce, ship, or use chemicals than are involved in peaceful nuclear activities, making the routine notification and

inspection activities of the OPCW much more complicatedthan those of the IAEA. Moreover, the CWC’s challenge

inspection provisions are much more rigorous than the IAEA’s provisions for ’’special inspections.’’ The final treaty

text--and the implementation procedures now being negotiated among treaty signatories-are based on the

principal of “managed access,” in which the state being searched has the right to limit the access of treaty

inspectors in order to protect information not germane to the treaty. An important challenge in implementing

the CWC’s inspection provisions will be balancing the need to monitor treaty compliance with the need

to protect proprietary and national-security information unrelated to the CWC.l

1 S* office of T~nology Assessment, The Chernlca/ Wbapons ConventIon: Effecfs on the U.S. Cht?mM

/ndustry, OTA-BP-ISC-1O6 (Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).

(Continued on nextpag8)
24 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

z TIW ~r~ IMNW Of ttw aioiogld Wapons Convention k the “Convention on the Prohibition of the

i)eveioprnm~ Production and $tookpiiing of Bactedoiogkai (Bioiogioai) and Toxin Weapons and on Their

Destruction.”

nomic measures, military confidence-building a potential threat to their neighbors that will make

measures, and arms control. They may also

involve security guarantees provided to regional

states by powers outside the region (positive

security assurances), or assurances from extraregional powers that military force-or weapons

of mass destruction-will not be used against

regional states (negative security assurances).

Regional security measures and nonproliferation policies have to proceed in tandem.

States lacking confidence in regional security

arrangements may be unwilling to forgo development of weapons of mass destruction, thus posing

it harder to resolve the regional security situation.

Some analysts go so far as to assert that a

transformation of the whole basis of global

security will be required to have any chance of

inducing restraint among many of the states that

might otherwise turn to weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation cannot be controlled, they

argue, unless the international political system is

fundamentally changed from one in which states

assure their own security through their military

forces and alliances, to a “cooperative security”

regime in which states do not maintain forces
sufficient to conduct aggression in the first place.

With the Cold War over, these analysts believe it

is now possible to move towards such a world.

~ When Nonproliferation Fails

The United States cannot assume that all those

states now acquiring or possessing weapons of

mass destruction will soon renounce them, nor

that future nonproliferation policies will be 100

percent effective. It must therefore consider

measures to mitigate the consequences of proliferation for U.S. and international security.

Modifying U.S. military force structure and

operational planning to cope with proliferation is unquestionably an important task for

U.S. policy makers. If they prove technically

feasible, actions such as improving intelligence

capabilities or adopting passive and active defenses might improve U.S. military capabilities

without interfering with nonproliferation objectives. Indeed, by lessening the military value of an

opponent’s weapons of mass destruction, such

actions can simultaneously serve to deter an

opponent from acquiring such weapons, and to

deter or militarily counter their use if acquired

anyway.

Other preparations to mitigate the consequences of proliferation, however, might exacerbate the process of proliferation. For example, the existing nuclear powers might wish to

deter or even to prevent chemical or biological

attack by holding out the prospect of using

nuclear weapons. Giving nuclear weapons this

mission, however, could increase their perceived

utility and status, weakening nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Moreover, advertising a willingness

to use even conventional force to preempt or to

respond to proliferation may persuade some

countries not to forgo weapons of mass destruction, but instead to seek them as a counterdeterrent.

Other measures short of military force might

lessen the chances that proliferation will lead to

use of nuclear weapons, but these pose serious

Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 25

dilemmas. The established nuclear powers may

conclude that if additional states are going to

develop and deploy nuclear weapons anyway, it

would be prudent to minimize the risk that those

weapons might actually be used. Therefore, they

might wish to help the emerging nuclear powers

develop stabilizing doctrines of deployment and

deterrence, and implement appropriate technical

safeguards against accidental or unauthorized

use. However, this would be tantamount to

admitting these states into the nuclear club,

showing that proliferation can lead not to international condemnation but to legitimacy and even

enhanced status.

CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES

Many of the choices to be made in designing

and implementing nonproliferation policies are

between potentially conflicting objectives; that is,

the extent to which nonproliferation should take

precedence over other objectives of U.S. policy

when they cannot both be pursued simultaneously. Certainly the end of the Cold War has

removed one such conflict, eliminating what had

been an overriding concern and permitting nonproliferation to take much greater priority. Yet

tensions between nonproliferation and other policy objectives continue to force tradeoffs.

Many conflicts between competing goals are

mirrored in the organizational structure of the

U.S. Government, with particular agencies pursuing missions that at times conflict with each other.

With the possible exception of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, whose complete agenda in the post-Cold War organization of the U.S. Government is still evolving, no

single agency has nonproliferation as its primary mission. The other agencies that have the

greatest roles in nonproliferation policy-the

Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Commerce—are all charged with pursuing other goals

that can compete with nonproliferation, some of

which are described below.
26 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Figure 1-2—Potentially Conflicting Objectives

[

Nonproliferation <“ ‘-- “

–—--- - — — >

Exporl controls G- ‘-

‘

-- -’~

Monitoring of others <-- —~

Nuclear nonproliferation +–––-—-—--- ●

Preventing proliferation <—-–- ‘

——-- -

– — >

I

Other foreign policy objectives

Export promotion

Avoidance of monitoring by others

Nuclear deterrence

Preventing use

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

The pairings depicted in figure 1-2 and summarized below are not discrete alternatives, but

rather opposite poles of a continuum. Intermediate positions are certainly possible, but seeking

one goal will generally imply lessening emphasis

on the other. These choices must be made on a

case-by-case basis, since the appropriate balance

between conflicting objectives varies depending

on the individual situation.

9 Nonproliferation v. Other Foreign

Policy Objectives

U.S. relationships with other states involve a

host of objectives, both generic and countryspecific. For example, the U.S. Government may

wish to maintain favorable relations with other

states, encourage them to support U.S. positions

in international fora, restrain their conventional

arms buildups, promote exports, support human

rights, and work towards common environmental

goals. Expending limited U.S. influence to stress

nonproliferation goals may mean losing a target

state’s cooperation on other matters, or even

provoking its hostility.

Consider the cases of Israel and China. Israel

has a very strong, longstanding relationship with

the United States, one in which nonproliferation

has never figured prominently. Ensuring the

security of a democratic ally threatened by hostile

neighbors has outweighed whatever concern the

United States has had over Israel’s apparent

nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal.

Israeli weapons of mass destruction

Even if

are not

themselves deemed to threaten the United States

or U.S. interests, however, their implicit acceptance complicates nonproliferation policy. Other

states condemn U.S. policy as reflecting one

standard for friends and another for all other

countries, hampering attempts to build international consensus behind nonproliferation policies.

U.S. policy towards China also illustrates

tensions among conflicting objectives. U.S. policymakers have sought to stop Chinese sales of

nuclear and missile technology. At the same time,

they must also take note of China’s overall

strategic importance in the Pacific region, its

growing economic clout, the need to gain China’s

agreement (or at least its acquiescence) in U.N.

Security Council actions, and the desire to promote human rights and democratization within

China. Threatening to revoke China’s “most-favorednation” (MFN) status potentially provides the

United States considerable leverage over China,

just as threatening to withhold the U.S. commitment to Israeli security provides leverage over

Israel. In both cases, however, other factors that

outweighed nonproliferation have so far kept

these threats from being executed.

# Export Controls v. Export Promotion

The push to improve U.S. economic performance, increase jobs, and rectify the trade imbal-
_

Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary ! 27

ance makes it a major national priority to increase

exports. Tightening the export-control system for

nonproliferation purposes may sometimes conflict with this goal. No respectable exporter

deliberately seeks the business of those developing weapons of mass destruction, although too

many disreputable ones apparently do. However,

some exporters may unwittingly assist proliferants if they do not know by whom and for what

purpose their products will be used, or if their

goods are diverted after sale.

Tightening export controls and applying sanctions against foreign violators have economic and

political costs that must be weighed against their

return in international security. These costs may

be deemed worth paying, but they should be

acknowledged. First, controls can somewhat restrict international trade. Although the number of

export denials is a small fraction of all international transactions, many transactions must be

screened in order to detect those that ultimately

are denied. Consequently, a wide range of businesses must keep informed about and comply

with complex regulations and licensing procedures. Individual companies may find themselves

losing legitimate sales and the other business

opportunities that might have followed those

sales. More seriously in terms of U.S. jobs and

exports, U.S. firms may also find that foreign

competitors under less stringent controls are

moving in to take over their markets. Although

U.S. policymakers may be willing to hold U.S.

firms to a higher standard, such a policy would

interfere with U.S. export performance without

generating any nonproliferation benefits if other

countries do not follow suit.

In addition to their costs to exporters, controls

also impose costs on legitimate foreign users of

advanced technology. During the Cold War,

damage to the Soviet civil sector resulting from

Western export controls was seen as a “fringe

benefit” of a policy already justified on security

Dual-use electronic equipment seized by the U.S.

Commerce Department’s Office of Export

Enforcement while in the process of being exported

illegally to Iran. The equipment was intended for

Iran’s Ministry of Defense and its Atomic Energy

Organization.

grounds. In a nonproliferation context, however,

exporting states may seek to restrict the spread of

weapon-related technology without placing unnecessary obstacles in the way of an importing

state’s legitimate economic and technological

development—a much tougher assignment.20 By

the same token, however, the greater the dependence of a developing country’s civil economy on

imported technology, the more leverage would be

provided by making access to that technology

contingent upon acceptable nonproliferation behavior.

Policies governing export controls must address two sets of issues. The frost involves the

internal structure, implementation, and enforcement of U.S. export controls. U.S. export-control

procedures have been the source of bureaucratic

and political controversy for decades, a situation

that is likely to be aggravated as nonproliferation

replaces the Cold War as the primary driver of

export control policy. The second set of issues

involves the coordination of export control policies among different nations, and the role that

m M. Grmger Morg~ ad ~tchel B. w~erste~ ‘‘controlling the I-I@ Technology Militarization of the D=elopti worlds” J~es

Goodby, cd., Bipolarity Revisited: Problems in North-south Security Relations Ajier the Cold War, (Oxford University Press, in press).
28 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

unilateral initiatives play in shaping multilateral

consenses. Multilateral control regimes aimed at

different weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems have evolved separately; they have

differing memberships, procedures, and objectives. Participating governments may wish to

examine the existing structure of these multilateral regimes to see if tighter coordination, or

consolidation, is desirable or feasible.

1 Monitoring Others v. Avoiding the

Costs of Being Monitoring

Nonproliferation regimes are strengthened by

empowering international nonproliferation organizations to make intrusive onsite inspections

of suspect activities (see box l-A). Yet states will

not easily accept such inspections unless other

states do likewise.21 If the United States expects

other states to provide access to outside inspectors, it may have to open itself up to inspection as

well. Such inspections have costs that must be

weighed against their nonproliferation benefits.

In addition to the disruption of normal activities,

U.S. Government or industrial facilities exposed

to foreign inspections must incur costs to protect

classified or proprietary information unrelated to

the purpose of the inspection. Even greater costs

might be incurred by failing to protect such

information, or by inadvertently disclosing secrets that might actually aid a proliferant’s own

weapon programs.

1 Nuclear Nonproliferation v. Nuclear

Deterrence

One way to reduce the appeal of nuclear

weapons is to reemphasize the role they play in

international relations. But to do so would mean

that the nuclear powers must rely on them less,

weakening the credibility and utility of U.S.

nuclear deterrent threats--especially those intended to deter military actions short of nuclear

attack. Conversely, to the extent that nuclear

weapons are given a prominent role in ensuring

the security of the United States and its allies--

particularly against threats from non-nuclear

powers-it becomes harder to make the case that

other countries should not be able to address their

security concerns in similar ways. Granted, retention by the United States of its nuclear arsenal is

very unlikely to be the sole factor inducing

another state to pursue nuclear weapons. However, U.S. decisions involving continued nuclear

weapon development and testing, continued production of nuclear weapon materials, or reliance

on nuclear threats against nonnuclear attack, will

certainly influence nuclear nonproliferation norms.

Some argue that in the long run, there is no way

to sustain a stable world order in which some

states possess nuclear weapons but all others are

forbidden to acquire them. In such a view,

stopping nuclear proliferation is impossible without a universal prohibition against national nuclear arsenals, with all nuclear weapons either

placed in the hands of a supranational organization or banned entirely. However, such a world

still seems remote.

1 Preventing Proliferation. Preventing Use

As discussed above, some measures to reduce

the risk that nuclear weapons might be used—

measures that would require the acknowledgement of new nuclear powers—would actually

conflict with controlling proliferation by other

states in the longer term.

This conflict arises only in the case of nuclear

weapons, since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty prohibits not their existence but their

spread beyond the five acknowledged nuclear

powers. Although it would be extremely controversial, one could imagine a change to the nuclear

nonproliferation regime that legitimized nuclear

arsenals in additional states. The challenge would

be to assure that such a change would not lead to

further proliferation, and further admissions to the

21 ~unit~ Nations inspwtioxIs of Iraq, which have the right to go anywhere at any time, are part of a regime @Kxed upon a defeated

power and cannot be considered a precedent for inspection provisions that states would accept voluntarily.
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 29

Figure 1-3—Potentially Conflicting Approaches

I

IL

Controlling spread of <-—-–”--— -–—–—> Controlling WMD plu s

weapons of mass conventional weapon

destruction (WMD) systems

Unilateral approach 4- —––-—-—–—–-–—+ International approach

Coercive policies < ‘“- ‘–--— -- ‘-———-—> Consensual policies

Targeted approach +—”– ‘-–– – ‘–-----– ~ Universal approach

Collecting information <––--—---— + Using information

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

nuclear club, in future years. In the case of the

Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions,

which impose global bans, exceptions that legitimized the chemical or biological arsenals of one

or more countries would be totally incompatible

with the treaties themselves.

CONFLICTING APPROACHES

In addition to choices between nonproliferation

and other policy objectives, balances must also be

struck between conflicting approaches to nonproliferation policy. Like the preceding set, these

approaches--summarized in figure 1-3--do not

represent diametrically opposed positions, but

rather indicate opposing tensions that must be

balanced against each other.

B Scope of Control Efforts

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

takes place within the context of the proliferation

of military capability more generally. Lowtechnology weapons, advanced conventional weapons, and the command, control, communications,

and intelligence infrastructure needed to use these

weapons most effectively are all spreading around

the world. From the point of view of a military

planner, all such weapons in the hands of potential adversaries-mass destruction or conventional-make it more difficult to deter war or to

prevail should war erupt. Elements within the

Pentagon now define proliferation as “the destabilizing spread, especially to countries of concern

in key regions, of a wide array of dangerous

military capabilities, supporting capabilities, allied technologies, or know-how,” placing weapons of mass destruction at one end of a considerably broader spectrum of concerns.22 Such a view

argues for an integrated strategy in response.

Other linkages between weapons of mass

destruction and conventional weapons also exist.

A given delivery system might be adapted to carry

either class of weapon, linking a state’s conventional military power with its capability to deliver

weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, one

state’s conventional forces can motivate an opponent to seek nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons in response, linking a state’s conventional military forces with its opponent’s massdestruction weapons. As stated earlier, some

analysts go so far as to argue that weapons of mass

destruction cannot be controlled in the long run

without effective limitations on other aspects of

military power as well.

22 Under s~re~ of Defense for Policy-Transition Worhg pap% “Spezial Transition Ropotiounterproliferation Strategy, ”

Counterproliferation Initiative, Feb. 2, 1993.
30 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

A contrasting view notes that weapons of mass

destruction differ markedly from other military

systems in terms of international legitimacy.

Whereas the pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons can be deemed violations of

international norms, conventional arms have long

been accepted as legitimate and necessary to a

state’s self-defense. No objective standards exist

to differentiate acceptable levels of conventional

military capability from levels that pose threats to

“international peace and security. ” Therefore,

those extending nonproliferation policy to include conventional armed forces cannot avoid

basing their decisions at least in part on their

individual national interests-interests that may

not be shared by other nations. Mobilizing

effective international nonproliferation efforts

will therefore become that much harder. Moreover, those who see the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction as far more dangerous than

the spread of conventional, or even advanced

conventional, weapons, would not wish to divert

effort away from the more serious threat.

The linkages between conventional arms and

weapons of mass destruction can give rise to

paradoxes. In the past, one policy measure

employed by the United States to reduce a state’s

(e.g., Pakistan’s) motivation to acquire nuclear

weapons had been to provide it with conventional

arms (e.g., F-16 aircraft) in order to address its

security needs. However, such planes can serve

multiple roles, conceivably including the delivery

of Pakistan’s purported nuclear weapons. Thus,

conventional arms transfers intended to reduce a

state’s demand for weapons of mass destruction

may actually have the effect of increasing its

capability to deliver them.

1 Balancing Unilateral and International

Approaches

International cooperation is necessary for nonproliferation to be successful. However, other

nations will not always agree with the United

States on either the problem or the solution. In

such cases, the United States will have to decide

whether to preserve consensus, at the risk of not

taking what it sees to be appropriate action, or to

proceed unilaterally, at the risk of disrupting

international consensus.

Those analysts emphasizing consensus typically stress that proliferation should be treated as

a violation of international norms of behavior.

They argue that nonproliferation policies with

widespread international legitimacy will be much

more effective than ones viewed primarily as

furthering the objectives of the United States or

any other single power. This approach emphasizes the role of international institutions, as

opposed to individual states, because such institutions provide a greater degree of international

support. However, a drawback of this approach is

that unless each nation places high priority on

nonproliferation, each will have reason to

downplay it at times (see above discussion on

conflicting objectives). Therefore, the cases in

which consensus for international action can be

reached might be considerably fewer than many

states individually might wish. At the same

time-and largely for the same reason-nations

have traditionally been reluctant to cede authority

to international bodies that might later act in

opposition to their own interests. Thus, even

when an international institution is able to identify a consensus position, it may not be able to do

much.

Proponents of an ‘‘internationalist’ approach

envision a world in which civilized nations agree

on strong norms against the development, acquisition, production, threat, or use of weapons of

mass destruction, possibly excepting some residual nuclear capability in the nuclear weapon

states. States unwilling to subscribe to these

norms, or found to be violating them, would be

considered by the others as pariahs. Such norms

can come about if-and only if-a very large

number of individual nations see them as compatible with their own national interests. In that case,

states may be willing to use international institutions for real enforcement, based on information
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 31

submitted by individual states or acquired directly.

Proponents of a more unilateral approach see

proliferation as a threat to U.S. national interests

against which the United States must take its own

steps, whatever other nations may think or do.

Although they would agree that nonproliferation

policies are more effective if implemented multilaterally, they argue that the United States should

not restrict its actions to cases where consensus

can be reached. In this view, international regimes

strong enough to implement a consistent multilateral approach are unlikely to emerge; at any rate,

the United States should not put itself in the

position of having to rely on them. Through the

use of ad hoc coalitions, such as that assembled

for the Gulf War, the United States could gain the

benefit of a group response while still preserving

some freedom of independent action. The drawback of U.S. action in the absence of international

backing, however, is that it may antagonize other

states whose cooperation will be needed to

implement a more effective multilateral policy.

Moreover, if a proliferant state can portray itself

not as an international pariah but instead as a

victim of superpower bullying, it can encourage

other countries to withhold support from--or

even to undermine--U.S. nonproliferation policy.

1 Balancing Coercive and Consensual

Policies

Nonproliferation policies include both coercive measures, imposed to frustrate efforts by

states to develop weapons of mass destruction,

and consensual ones that invite states to voluntarily forgo such developments. Coercive measures

tend to be directed against particular states.

Consensual ones, on the other hand, typically

involve actions—such as joining treaty regimes—

that any state is free to take, and they therefore

avoid the need to single out targets. In the near

term, coercive measures can impede progress

towards developing weapons of mass destruction;

in the long run, they can help raise the costs of

such programs and so discourage states from

pursuing them. In the near term, consensual

policies may not be accepted by those states most

likely to develop or deploy weapons of mass

destruction. In the long run, however, the most

effective nonproliferation measures are those in

which states decide that it is in their own best

interest to forgo weapons of mass destruction.

Like the case of unilateral and multilateral

approaches, coercive and consensual measures

can be mutually supportive. Yet states may

respond to coercion with defiance, refusing to

join nonproliferation regimes. Conflicts between

coercive and consensual measures may become

particularly relevant in cases where potential

proliferants are in a position to export proliferationsensitive technology. Punitive measures aimed at

discouraging the development of weapons of

mass destruction in such states may make it

difficult to elicit their cooperation in forgoing

proliferation-sensitive exports.

9 Balancing Targeted and Universal

Approaches

The targets of coercive U.S. nonproliferation

policies such as export controls and sanctions can

be chosen in one of two ways. In a targeted

approach, the United States applies these measures to specific countries determined to be of

particular proliferation concern. In a universal

approach, the target countries are not specified by

name, but rather consist of all states that meet

given criteria such as violation of, or refusal to

join, international nonproliferation treaty regimes.

Given that the motivations for and the consequences of developing weapons of mass destruction vary greatly from country to country, the

targeted approach provides greater flexibility and

discretion for tailoring nonproliferation policy. In

particular, it permits the United States to treat

states not considered security threats differently

from states judged to be particularly dangerous to

their neighbors or hostile towards U.S. interests.
32 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

For exactly this reason, however, targeted policies are harder than universal ones to justify and

implement multilaterally. Identifying some states

and not others as causes for concern unavoidably

leads to charges of discrimination and double

standards.23 Moreover, the states implementing

multilateral nonproliferation policies will probably not agree on who the problem countries are.

1 Balancing Collection and Use of

Intelligence

Much of the information available to the U.S.

Government pe rtaining to proliferation is classified. Acting on classified information+. g., by

exposing a state’s actions to international attention, or by shutting down a covert supplier

network-risks compromising the sources and

methods by which the information was originally

collected, possibly shutting off access to such

information in the future. Therefore, tensions

exist between collecting intelligence information

and making effective use of it.

A related problem is that to the extent that

relevant information must remain classified, public debate and discussion—and to some extent,

international negotiations and actions-will be

conducted on the basis of incomplete information.

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR MONITORING AND

CONTROLLING PROLIFERATION

The various weapons of mass destruction

addressed in this report are based on very

different technical principles and require distinct

sets of industrial capabilities. A separate background paper explores the technical pathways by

which states might acquire nuclear weapons,

chemical weapons, biological weapons, and delivery systems. Those analyses are intended to

identify opportunities for monitoring and, if

possible, controlling proliferation, as well as to

note the potential implications of certain old and

new technologies. They also describe the level of

effort, commitment, and resources required for

any state to mount such developments, thereby

indicating the relative effects of increasing these

costs, for example, by export controls. Nevertheless, a country-by-country analysis of potential

proliferants’ indigenous technical expertise and

industrial infrastructure is beyond the scope of

this study. So, too, is a political assessment of the

incentives facing each of these states, or a

thorough discussion of the many other nontechnical factors that would influence their ability to

pursue weapons of mass destruction.

The bottlenecks or ‘chokepoints’ identified in

the background paper—steps that are particularly

time-consuming or difficult for proliferants to

master without outside assistance-might be

exploited to control proliferation. Conversely,

steps that are relatively easy, or that make use of

widely available know-how and equipment, make

poor candidates for control efforts. It is important

to understand the extent to which “dual-use”

technologies or products, which also have legitimate civil applications, are involved in the

development of weapons of mass destruction,

since both the feasibility of controlling dual-use

items and the implications of doing so depend on

the extent of their other applications.

Monitoring the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, or conversely monitoring compliance with nonproliferation agreements, depends on detecting and identifying various indicators or signatures associated with the development, production, deployment, or use of weapons

of mass destruction. Unilateral intelligence collection efforts can seek to exploit these signatures

with the use of remote or covertly placed instruments; multilateral verification regimes—

typically operating within the framework of a

negotiated treaty-can make provision for states

to voluntarily open their facilities to cooperative

23 TJM u.S. State Dep~ent’S list of states supporting ttzrori!nq for example, is often WCUSd Of refkthg pditkd tdts, rabr - firm

intelligence analysis.
— .

Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary ! 33

onsite inspection in addition to sanctioning the

use of remote instrumentation.24

Both unilateral and cooperative approaches

have their strengths. A cooperative regime might

offer direct access to facilities that would be

difficult to inspect in any other way. However,

strict limitations may be put on that access.

Moreover, since the inspected party knows the

type of instrumentation and procedures to be used

by inspecting parties, it may be able to defeat

those inspections. Intelligence collection efforts

conducted outside the framework of a negotiated

agreement would probably not have the degree of

access to any specific site that would be provided

by a cooperative onsite inspection regime, but

they might have other advantages such as breadth

of coverage. Moreover, they would not be constrained by prenegotiated procedures, and they

might be able to gather information about sites

where onsite inspection would be denied. However, if unilateral intelligence efforts involved

covert placement of sensors in the territory of the

inspected party, such efforts would probably be

viewed as a violation of sovereignty, creating

political tensions if detected.

Unilateral and multilateral approaches are not

mutually exclusive. Indeed, they will be most

effective if used synergistically: unilateral intelligence efforts might trigger a challenge inspection. However, many of the signatures discussed below are likely to be ambiguous, if they

are detected at all. Deciding on appropriate

responses in the face of incomplete or ambiguous

information will pose great challenges for nonproliferation policy, as will mobilizing effective

domestic and international support for those

responses.

1 Nuclear Weapons

MATERIAL PRODUCTION

In terms of costs, resources required, and

possibility of discovery, the difficulty of obtaining nuclear weapon materials—plutonium

or highly enriched uranium—today remains

the greatest single obstacle most countries

would face in pursuing nuclear weapons. Even

straightforward methods of producing such material indigenously (such as building a small

reactor and a primitive reprocessing facility to

produce plutonium and recover it from irradiated

reactor fuel) would require at least a modest

technological infrastructure and hundreds of millions of dollars to carry out. Moreover, once such

a facility became known, it could generate

considerable pressure from regional rivals or the

international community. The costs of a full-scale

indigenous nuclear weapon program-especially

if clandestine--can be substantially higher than

for a program largely aimed at producing just one

or two bombs and carried out in the open. Iraq

spent 10 to 20 times the cost of such a minimal

program-many billions of dollars-to pursue

multiple uranium enrichment technologies, to

build complex and sometimes redundant facilities, to keep its efforts secret, and to seek a fairly

substantial nuclear capability. Few countries of

proliferation concern can match the resources that

Iraq devoted to its nuclear weapon program. (Iran,

however, probably could.)

Since production of nuclear materials is

generally the most difficult and expensive part

of producing a nuclear weapon, the leakage of

significant amounts of weapon-grade material

from the former Soviet Union would provide a

great advantage to potential proliferants. In24 ~ tie .s~at%ic~~on~~l ~r~=~ ~~=n the United stat~ ~d the Soviet Union, e~h side agr~ not to impede the otk side’s

‘‘national technical means of verii7cation, “ in effect legitimizing the collection of intelligence pertinent to the treaty.
. -. .

34 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

deed, the possibility of black-market sales of

weapon-usable materials may represent one of the

greatest proliferation dangers now being faced.

Even the covert acquisition of low-enriched

uranium, which can fuel nuclear reactors but is

not directly usable for nuclear weapons, could be

advantageous to a proliferant by enhancing the

capacity of its isotope separation plants.

This ominous prospect notwithstanding, nuclear materials suitable for weapon purposes

have to date been extremely difficult to obtain

from countries that already possess them.

There is no reliable evidence that any militarily

significant quantities of nuclear weapon material

have been smuggled out of the former Soviet

Union. The vast majority of nuclear material in

nonnuclear weapon states is safeguarded by a

comprehensive system of material accountancy

and control administered by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These safeguards are not perfect, but they provide high

levels of confidence that significant quantities of

nuclear material have not been diverted from

safeguarded nuclear reactors. Diversion would be

more difficult to detect from facilities such as fuel

fabrication plants, uranium enrichment plants,

and plutonium reprocessing facilities that process

large quantities of nuclear material in bulk form,

as opposed to handling it only in discrete units

such as fuel rods or reactor cores. At present,

however, there are no large facilities of this type

under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in countries of particular proliferation concern.25 At least

in the short run, the diversion of safeguarded

materials poses less of a threat to the nonproliferation regime than the black-market purchase or covert indigenous production of nuclear materials.

Under current European and Japanese plans for

reprocessing and limited reuse of plutonium from

commercial reactor fuel, the current worldwide

surplus of some 70 tomes of safeguarded, separated reactor-grade plutonium-the type produced by commercial nuclear reactors in normal

operation-will likely continue to grow through

the 1990s by more than 10 tonnes per year.

Reactor-grade plutonium is more radioactive and

more difficult to handle than weapon-grade

plutonium, which is produced specifically for use

in nuclear weapons, but it can still be used to

make a crude nuclear weapon of significant

(though probably less predictable) yield. Nevertheless, the states that have sought nuclear

weapons have gone to great lengths to produce

weapon-grade materials--either highly enriched

uranium or weapon-grade plutonium-rather than

reactor-grade plutonium. (Note that some types of

nuclear power reactors, including ones in India,

South Korea, and North Korea, can produce either

reactor-grade or weapon-grade plutonium, depending on how they are operated.)

OTHER TECHNICAL BARRIERS

Unlike chemical and biological weapons, whose

lethality is roughly proportional to the amount of

agent dispersed, nuclear weapons will not produce any yield at all unless certain conditions are

met: a minimum ‘‘critical mass’ of nuclear

materials must be present, and that material must

be brought together with sufficient speed and

precision for a nuclear chain reaction to take

place. A proliferant must master a series of

technical hurdles in order to produce even a single

working weapon.

Nuclear weapons are so destructive that they

place few requirements on the accuracy of delivery systems for any but the most protected targets.

Most proliferants would likely be able to design

first-generation nuclear weapons that were small

and light enough to be carried by Scud-class

missiles or small aircraft. Given additional technical refinement, they might be able to reduce

u Br~l has a m~i~-sized fiel fabrication facility under IAEA safeguards, and South African enrichment facilities are CO- Waler

safeguards with South Africa’s announced destruction of its nuclar weapons and its accession to the IWPT Neither state is considered an active

proliferation threat at present.
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 35

warhead weights to the point where the 500 kg

(l,100 pound) delivery threshold originally established by the Missile Technology Control Regime

no longer provides a reliable barrier to nuclearcapable ballistic or cruise missiles.26

Although nuclear weapons were first developed 50 years ago and the basic mechanisms are

widely known, much of the detailed design

information, and particularly the knowledge

gleaned by the nuclear weapons states from

decades of design and testing, remains classified.

Much of this information can be reconstructed by

a dedicated proliferant, but it will take time and

money. Moreover, “weaponizing” a nuclear

warhead for reliable missile delivery or long

shelf-life creates additional hurdles that could

significantly increase the required development

effort. Therefore, having access to key individuals--

such as those from the former Soviet nuclear

weapon program--could significantly accelerate

a nuclear program, primarily by steering it away

from unworkable designs. Specific individuals

could fill critical gaps in a given country’s

knowledge or experience, adding greatly to the

likelihood that a program would succeed.

High-performance computers (so-called “supercomputers‘‘ in the 1980s) are not required to

design first-generation fission weapons. Thus,

placing strict limits on their exports would be of

minimal importance compared with limiting technologies for nuclear materials production.

MONITORING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Production of nuclear materials provides many

signatures and the greatest opportunity for detecting a clandestine nuclear weapon program. Even

so, a large part of the Iraqi program was missed.

Since members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

,

H

. .

.

Iraqi electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS)

equipment, uncovered after having been buried in the

desert to hide it from United Nations inspectors. Iraq’s

EMIS program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons

had not been detected by Western intelligence agencies

prior to the Gulf War.

Treaty (other than the acknowledged nuclearweapon states) are not permitted to operate

unsafeguarded facilities handling nuclear materials, the existence of any such facilities would

probably indicate an illegal weapon program.27

Nuclear tests at kiloton yields or above would

probably be detectable by various means, especially if multiple tests were conducted. However,

such tests are not necessary to field a workable

weapon with reasonably assured yield. Similarly, the deployment of a small number of

nuclear weapons might not be easily detected.

IMPLICATIONS OF OLD AND NEW

TECHNOLOGIES

Low- and medium-level gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium may become increasingly attractive to potential proliferants for a

variety of reasons, including availability of information about early designs, difficulty of detec26 B~~~&.fig is fmu~, tie ~ssile ~c~ology con~l Regime IIOW covers XI&NflCS capable of delivering chfical ~d biological WtXipOllS

as well aa those that could be used (o deliver nuclear weapons. Consequently, the payload threshold of 500 kg has been removed.

27 me excqtion t. ~ss~tement would ~ unsafe~d~ facilities dedi~ted to military purposes unrelated to nuclear weapons, such m

naval nuclear propulsion. Such uses are not prohibited by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They fall outside IAEA jurisdiction however,

since IAEA safeguards pertain only to peaceful-e. g., nonmilitary-applications of nuclear power. See Ben Sanders and John SimpsoQ

Nucfear Submarines and Non-Proliferation: Cause for Concern, PPNN Occasional Paper Two (Southampton England: Centre for

International Policy Studies, University of Southampton for the Prograrnme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1988).
—

36 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

tion, ease of producing highly enriched uranium,

and potential availability of equipment from the

former Soviet Union. Modem, state-of-the-art

centrifuges could lead to even smaller, more

efficient, and relatively inexpensive facilities that

would be most difficult to detect remotely.

In the longer run, laser isotope separation

techniques and aerodynamic separation may

have serious proliferation potential as means of

producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear

weapons. Openly pursued by more than a dozen

non-nuclear-weapon states, laser enrichment technologies use precisely tuned laser beams to

selectively energize the uranium-235 isotope

most useful for nuclear weapons and separate it

from the more common uranium-238 isotope.

Laser facilities would be small in size and could

enrich uranium to high levels in only a few stages.

They could therefore prove to be difficult to

detect and control if successfully developed as

part of a clandestine program. Nevertheless,

considerable development work remains to be

done before this method can be made viable or

can compete with existing enrichment technologies. Even for the advanced industrialized countries, constructing operational facilities will remain very difficult. Some aerodynamic techniques—

which use carefully designed gas flows to separate the lighter uranium-235 from the heavier

uranium-238-require fairly sophisticated technology to manufacture large numbers of precision

small-scale components, but they do not otherwise pose technical challenges beyond those of

other enrichment approaches.

B Chemical Weapons

The technology used to produce chemical

weapons is much harder to identify unambiguously

as weapons-related than is that for nuclear materials production technology, and relevant knowhow is much more widely available. Although

production techniques for major chemical weapon

agents involve some specialized process steps,

detailed examples can be found in the open

literature and follow from standard chemical

engineering principles. Unlike nuclear proliferation, where the mere existence of an unsafeguarded nuclear facility in an NPT member state

is often sufficient evidence of intent to produce

weapons, many legitimate chemical facilities

could have the ability to produce chemical agent.

Intent cannot be inferred directly from capability.

AGENT AND WEAPON PRODUCTION

Certain chemical agents such as mustard gas

are very simple to produce. Synthesis of nerve

agents, however, includes some difficult process

steps involving highly corrosive or reactive materials. A sophisticated production facility to

make militarily significant quantities of one class

of nerve agents might cost between $30 and $50

million, although dispensing with modem wastehandling facilities might cut the cost in half. Some

of the equipment needed may have distinctive

features, such as corrosion-resistant reactors and

pipes and special ventilation and waste-handling

equipment, but these can be dispensed with by

relaxing worker safety and environmental standards and by replacing hardware as it corrodes.

Moreover, production is easier if a proliferant

country is willing to cut comers on shelf-life,

seeking only to produce low-quality agent for

immediate use.

Chemical-warfare agents can be produced

through a wide variety of alternative routes, but

relatively few routes are well suited for largescale production. Just because the United States

used a particular production pathway in the past,

however, does not mean that proliferant countries

would necessarily choose the same process.

In general, commercial pesticide plants lack

the precursor chemicals (materials from which

chemical agents are synthesized), equipment,

facilities, and safety procedures required for

nerve-agent production. Nevertheless, multipurpose chemical plants capable of manufacturing

organo-phosphorus pesticides or flame retardants

could be converted in a matter of weeks or months
to the production of nerve agents. The choice

between converting a commercial plant in this

manner and building a clandestine production

facility would depend on the urgency of a

country’s military requirement for a chemical

weapon stockpile, its desire to keep the program

secret, its level of concern over worker safety and

environmental protection, and the existence of

embargoes on precursor materials and production

equipment.

Agent production, however, is several steps

removed from an operational chemical weapon

capability. The latter requires design and development of effective munitions, filling the munitions before use, and mating them with a suitable

delivery system.

MONITORING CHEMICAL WEAPON

PROLIFERATION

Direct detection of chemical warfare agents in

samples taken from a production facility would be

a clear indicator of weapon activity, since these

agents have almost no civil applications.28 However, considerable access to production facilities

is required to ensure that appropriate samples

have been collected. Moreover, some of the

substances produced when chemical agents break

down in the environment are also produced when

legitimate commercial chemicals break down, so

detection of final degradation products does not

necessarily indicate agent production. Nevertheless, the suite of degradation products associated

with a given chemical agent production process

would provide a clear signature.

Other than the agent itself, or an ensemble of

degradation products, chemical agent production

has few unequivocal signatures. Moreover, highly

reliable technologies to detect chemical agent

production from outside the site are not currently

available. Unlike nuclear weapon facilities, which

generally exhibit fairly clear signatures, civilian

chemical plants have multiple uses, are hundreds

of times more numerous than nuclear facilities,

—

Chapter 1--Introduction and Summary 37

Portable gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/

MS) developed to support onsite analysis for the

Chemical Weapons Convention. This equipment can

detect and identify minute quantities of organic

chemicals controlled by the CWC.

and are configured in different ways depending

on the process involved. Moreover, many of the

same chemicals used to make chemical agents are

also used to make pharmaceuticals, pesticides,

and other commercial products. Since many

different types of equipment are suitable for

chemical agent production, plant equipment per

se does not provide a reliable means of distinguishing between legitimate and illicit activities.

Nevertheless, some potential signatures of chemical weapon development and production exist,

and a set of multiple indicators taken from many

sources may be highly suggestive of a production

capability.

Indicators at suspect locations that may contribute to such an overall assessment include:

visual signatures such as testing munitions and

delivery systems; distinctive aspects of plant

design and layout, including the use of corrosionresistant materials and air-purification systems;

presence of chemical agents, precursors, or degradation products in the facility’s production line or

waste stream; and biochemical evidence of chemZ8 Ni@ogen musmds have some use in cancer chemotherapy, and phosgene and hydrogen cyanide have industiid applications.
38 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

ical agent exposure (including that due to accidental leaks) in plant workers or in plants and

animals living in the vicinity of a suspect facility.

Nevertheless, the utility of specific signatures

depends on how a given weapon program operates, including the choice of production process

and the extent of investment in emission-control

technologies. Detection capabilities that are decisive under laboratory conditions may be rather

inconclusive in the field—particularly if the

proliferant has been producing related legitimate

chemicals (e.g., organophosphorus pesticides) in

the same facility and is willing to expend time,

effort, and resources to mask, obscure, or otherwise explain away chemical agent production

activities. Testing of chemical agents and training

troops in their use might be masked by experiments with or training for the use of smoke

screens. A robust inspection regime must therefore comprise an interlocking web of inspections,

declarations, notifications, and data fusion and

analysis, all of which a cheater must defeat in

order to conceal his violations. Focusing monitoring efforts at a single point--even one thought to

be a crucial chokepoint--would allow the cheater

to focus his efforts on defeating them.

Keeping a production program covert forces

other tradeoffs. Some of the simplest production

pathways might have to be avoided since they use

known precursors or involve known production

processes. Purchasing equipment from multiple

suppliers to avoid detection, or jury-rigging

facilities from used equipment, might increase

hazards to the workforce and nearby populations.

I Biological Weapons

Biological-warfare agents are easier to produce

than either nuclear materials or chemical-warfare

agents because they require a much smaller and

cheaper industrial infrastructure and because the

necessary technology and know-how is widely

available. Moreover, it would not be difficult to

spread biological agents indiscrimin ately to produce large numbers of casualties, although it is

much more difficult to develop munitions that

have a predictable or controllable military effect.

AGENT AND WEAPON PRODUCTION

The global biotechnology industry is informationintensive rather than capital-intensive. Much of

the data relevant to producing biological agents is

widely available in the published literature and

virtually impossible for industrialized states to

withhold from potential proliferants. A widespread support infrastructure of equipment manufacturers has also arisen to serve the industry.

Therefore, producing biological agents would

be relatively easy and inexpensive for any

nation that has a modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, nearly all the

equipment needed for large-scale production of

pathogens and toxins is dual-use and widely

available on the international market.

United Nations inspectors assessing the biological

weapon potential of Iraqi fermenters and other

bioprocess equipment.
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 39

One technical hurdle to the production of

biological weapons is ensuring adequate containment and worker safety during agent production

and weapons handling, although the difficulty of

doing so depends on the level of safety and

environmental standards. A government that

placed little value on the safety of plant workers

or the civilian population might well take minimal precautions, so that a biological weapon

production facility would not necessarily be

equipped with sophisticated high-containment

measures. Another challenge is ‘‘weaponizing’

the agents for successful delivery. Since microbial pathogens and toxins are susceptible to

environmental stresses such as heat, oxidation,

and dessication, to be effective they must maintain their potency during weapon storage, delivery, and dissemination.

A supply of standard biological agents for

covert sabotage or attacks against broad-area

targets would be relatively easy to produce and

disseminate using commercially available equipment, such as agricultural sprayers. In contrast,

the integration of biological agents into precise,

reliable, and effective delivery systems such as

missile warheads and cluster bombs poses complex engineering problems. Nevertheless, the

United States had overcome these problems by

the 1960s and had stockpiled biological warfare

agents.

MONITORING BIOLOGICAL WEAPON

PRODUCTION

Detection and monitoring of biological and

toxin agent production is a particularly challenging task. Even use of biological weapons

could in some cases be difficult to verify unambiguously, since outbreaks of disease also take

place naturally. Thanks to advances in biotechnology, including improved fermentation equipment as well as genetic engineering techniques,

biological and toxin agents could be made in

facilities that are much smaller and less conspicuous than in the past. Moreover, the extreme

potency of such agents means that as little as a few

kilograms can be militarily significant. Since

large amounts of agent can be grown up from a

freeze-dried seed culture in a period of days to

weeks, large stockpiles of agent are not required,

although some stocks of the munitions to be filled

with these agents would be.

There are no signatures that distinguish clearly

between the development of offensive biological

agents and work on defensive vaccines, since

both activities require the same basic know-how

and laboratory techniques at the R&D stage.

Moreover, almost all the equipment involved in

biological and toxin weapon development and

production is dual-use and hence will not typically indicate weapons activity. Indeed, the

capacity to engage in illegal military activities

is inherent in certain nominally civilian facilities. Some legitimate biological facilities can also

convert rapidly to the production of biological

warfare agents, depending on the degree of

sophistication of the plant and on the required

scale of production, level of worker safety, and

environmental containment. At the same time,

however, legitimate applications of biological or

toxin agents (e.g., vaccine production and the

clinical use of toxins) are relatively few at

present. With the exception of a few vaccine

production plants, such activities are largely

confined to sophisticated biomedical facilities not

normally found in developing countries, and

these facilities generally do not engage in production except on a small scale. Moreover, given that

the global biotechnology industry is still in its

infancy, the number of legitimate activities--

from which the illegitimate ones would have to be

distinguished-is still relatively small.

Sensitive analytical techniques such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis or use of

monoclinal antibodies can identify trace quantities of biological agents and might be able to do

so even after the termination of illicit activities.

However, the existence of such sensitive laboratory techniques does not necessarily translate into

a negotiated verification regime that might be

instituted to monitor compliance with the Biolog-
40 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

ical Weapons Convention. Other factors that must

be assessed in establishing such a regime include

the likelihood of detecting clandestine production

sites, the ability to distinguish prohibited offensive activities from permitted defensive efforts,

and the risk of divulging sensitive nationalsecurity or proprietary information during inspections of U.S. facilities.29

Because of the difficulty of detecting clandestine biological and toxin weapon development

and production, effective tracking of such programs will require integrating data from many

sources, with a particular emphasis on human

intelligence (agents, defectors, and whistleblowers). Some weaponization signatures (storage of bulk agents, preparation of aerosol dispensers, field testing, etc.) would probably be easier to

detect than production signatures, but many such

signatures could be concealed or masked by

legitimate activities such as biopesticide R&D or

use. Production and storage of components for

BW munitions might also be masked by activities

associated with conventional weapons, such as

production of high explosives, bomb casings, or

artillery shells. Since excessive secrecy might

itself be indicative of offensive intent, greater

transparency would tend to build confidence in a

country’s lack of offensive intentions.

IMPLICATIONS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY

Genetic engineering is unlikely to result in

‘‘supergerms" significantly more lethal than the

wide variety of potentially effective biological

agents that already exist, nor is it likely to

eliminate the fundamental uncertainties associated with the use of microbial pathogens in

warfare. However, gene-splicing techniques might

facilitate weaponization by rendering microorganisms more stable during dissemination (e.g.,

resistant to high temperatures and ultraviolet

radiation). Biological agents might also be genetically modified to make them more difficult to

detect by immunological means and insusceptible

to standard vaccines or antibiotics. At the same

time, genetic engineering techniques could be

used to develop and produce protective vaccines

more safely and rapidly.

Cloning toxin genes in bacteria makes it

possible to produce formerly rare toxins in

kilogram quantities. Moreover, molecular engineering techniques could lead to the development

of more stable toxins. Even so, for the foreseeable

future, toxin-warfare agents are unlikely to provide dramatic military advantages over existing

chemical weapons. It is possible that bioregulators and other natural body chemicals (or synthetic analogues thereof) might be developed into

powerful incapacitants, but means of delivering

such agents in a militarily effective manner would

first have to be devised. Moreover, if warning o f

their use were provided, chemical weapon protective gear would blunt their impact.

1 Delivery Systems

Although military delivery systems such as

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and combat

aircraft are not essential to deliver weapons of

mass destruction, they can do so more rapidly,

more controllably, and more reliably than rudimentary means such as suitcases, car bombs, or

civilian ships or planes. Controlling the spread of

advanced delivery systems by no means would

eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass

destruction, particularly in terrorist applications.

However, limiting the availability of these delivery systems would make it harder for states to use

weapons of mass destruction for military purposes, particularly against well-defended, forewarned adversaries.

29 mmited stiws m akidy determined that inspection procedures under the Chernieal Weapons Convention which allow the inspected

party to negotiate the level of access to be provided to international inspectom, are sufilcient to proteet national-security information and trade

secrets. However, it is not necessarily the case that the same inspection procedures would be suitable for the Biologicsl Weapons Convention

should a formal verifkation regime be instituted.
Chapter 1-Introduction and Summary 41

Unlike nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons themselves, which are not traded openly due

to treaty constraints or international norms, delivery systems such as aircraft and short-range

antiship cruise missiles are widely available on

international arms markets, Since the late 1980s,

the United States and other Western industrialized countries have had some success at delegitimizing the sale of longer range ballistic and

cruise missiles by creating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the participants in

which refrain from selling ballistic or cruise

missiles with ranges over 300 kilometers, or with

any range if the seller has reason to believe that

they may be used to carry weapons of mass

destruction. However, missiles with ranges up to

300 km-and to a lesser extent, up to 600-1,000

km-are already deployed in many Third-World

countries. Combat aircraft are possessed by almost all countries of proliferation concern. Cruise

missiles or other unmanned aerial vehicles with

ranges much over 100 km are not yet widespread

outside the acknowledged nuclear weapon states,

but large numbers of cruise missiles, including

antiship missiles, are available at lesser ranges.

In terms of payloads that can be carried to

specified ranges, the combat aircraft of virtually

all countries of proliferation concern far surpass

their missile capabilities. However, aircraft and

missiles have different relative strengths—

particularly in their ability to penetrate defenses—

and the two systems are not fully interchangeable.

Piloted aircraft have significant advantages over

other delivery systems in terms of range, payload,

accuracy, damage-assessment capability, and dispersal of chemical or biological agents. They can

be used many times, usually even in the presence

of significant air defenses. Missiles, however, are

harder to defend against, and they offer distinct

advantages for a country wishing to deliver a

single nuclear weapon to a heavily defended area.

Since missiles are not restricted to operating from

airfields, they are also easier to hide from

opposing forces. The wide range of motivations

for acquiring ballistic missiles-prestige, diversifying one’s forces, their psychological value as

terror weapons, lack of trained pilots, and technology transfer and export opportunities-will

continue to make missile technology very attractive for several countries of proliferation concern.

BARRIERS TO MISSILE AND AIRCRAFT

PROLIFERATION

The spread of ballistic missiles around the

world was greatly facilitated by the export in the

1970s and 1980s of Scud-B missiles from the

former Soviet Union. With an increasing number

of countries abiding by the MTCR, the number of

potential missile suppliers has declined dramatically. Of the principal missile exporters, only

North Korea has not agreed to comply. However,

Ukraine poses future export concerns, since it

contains much of the former Soviet missile

production infrastructure, yet has not agreed to

comply with the MTCR. Moreover, additional

countries have learned to copy, modify, extend

the range of, and produce their own missiles, and

a small number have developed long-range systems-often in conjunction with space-launch

programs and foreign technical assistance. Even

so, MTCR constraints can slow the acquisition by

developing countries of technologies associated

with more advanced missiles-those having ranges

s

United Nations inspector measuring an Iraqi AlHusayn (modified Scud) missile in Baghdad.
42 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

in excess of 1,000 km or guidance errors of less

than roughly 0.3 percent of their range.

Given the complex set of technologies and

expertise used in advanced aircraft, especially

high-performance jet engines, it remains virtually

impossible for developing countries to acquire

these systems without assistance. However, no

internationally binding restrictions limit trade in

combat aircraft, and such arms transfers continue

to be used as an instrument of foreign policy.

Moreover, overcapacity in Western defense industries, and the economic difficulties facing

newly independent Soviet republics and Eastern

European states, provide great incentive to develop arms export markets. Therefore, states can

and probably will continue to acquire highperformance aircraft easily without having to

build them. Moreover, other options short of

buying aircraft or building them from scratch are

available to states wishing to acquire or modify

combat aircraft, such as engaging in licensed

production.30

If they have sufficient payload and range-and

if they can be procured despite export controls—

commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles

can be adapted to deliver weapons of mass

destruction without much difficulty. Developing

cruise missiles requires greater technical capability. Even so, technologies for guidance, propulsion, and airframes are becoming increasingly

accessible, particularly with the spread of licensed aircraft production arrangements to many

parts of the world. The most difficult technical

challenges to developing cruise missiles—

propulsion and guidance--do not pose much of a

hurdle today. The highest performance engines

are not required for simple cruise missiles, and

many sources are available for suitable engines.

Guidance requirements can be met by satellite

navigation services such as the U.S. Global

Positioning System (GPS), possibly the Russian

Glonass system, or commercial equivalents. Inexpensive, commercially available GPS receivers

are becoming available to provide unprecedented

navigational accuracy anywhere in the world.

Although GPS receivers would have only limited

utility to emerging missile powers for ballistic

missile guidance, they could be used to reduce

uncertainty in the launch location of mobile

missiles.

MONITORING DELlVERY VEHICLES

Although individual missiles can be very

difficult to detect, a program to develop ballistic

missiles is much more visible. Test firing and

launching ballistic missiles can be readily seen.

Development of intermediate and long-range

ballistic missiles requires extensive flight testing,

making it particularly noticeable. Although states

pursuing both military and civil space technology

may wish to hide their military programs, civilian

space-launch programs are usually considered a

source of national prestige and proudly advertised.

Even a purely civilian space-launch program

provides technology and know-how useful for

ballistic missiles. The most important aspects of

a missile capability for weapons of mass destruction—range and payload-can usually be inferred from a civil program. (A civil space-launch

booster does not need to have high accuracy, but

neither does a missile carrying weapons of mass

destruction for use against populations.) On the

other hand, certain attributes desired for military

applications, such as reliable reentry vehicles,

mobility, and ease of operation in the field,

suggest distinct technical approaches for military

and civil applications. Although solid-fueled

boosters are in some ways more difficult to

develop and build than liquid-fueled boosters,

they are easier to use in mobile and time-urgent

applications. Liquid-fueled boosters were the first

30 me ~outti “~ou~ ~~te~ ~o~d tie world ~ve ~en to develop defe~e ~dustri~, inclutig aircraft industries, ~diSCUSSd h U.S.

Congress, OffIce of ‘Ikchnology Assessment, Global Anns Trude, OTA-ISC-460 (T%.shingtou DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June

1991).
Chapter 1--Introduction and Summary 43

used in military applications and are still more

common. (The seemingly ubiquitous Scud missile and its modifications, such as were launched

by Iraq against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia,

are liquid-fueled.)

Since combat aircraft are widely accepted as

integral to the military forces even of developing

countries, there is no reason to hide their existence. Individual planes, however, can be hidden.

Moreover, modifications made to aircraft to carry

weapons of mass destruction, or training given to

pilots for their delivery, might be difficult to

detect without intrusive inspections.

Of the three delivery systems, cruise missile

development and testing will be the hardest to

detect. Several types of unmanned aerial vehicles

are being developed and marketed for civil

purposes, and without inspection rights it will be

difficult to discern whether such vehicles have

been converted to military purposes. Therefore,

monitoring of delivery systems capable of

carrying weapons of mass destruction will

continue to be an uncertain exercise, having

most success with missiles and highly capable

aircraft. Nevertheless, the risk posed by other

delivery systems cannot be dismissed. The full

range of delivery technology must be taken

into account when evaluating a country’s

overall proliferation capabilities and behavior.
—— —-

Assessing

the

Risks 2

A

11 weapons kill and maim, but those commonly referred

to as “weapons of mass destruction ’’-nuclear, chemical, and biological-an do so on an especially large

scale. What is more, many of these weapons can cause

not just instant death or mutilation, but lingering disease and

suffering. This chapter begins with a review of the basic

characteristics of the devices of mass destruction. It also

identities various ways these weapons might be delivered. The

next section of the chapter then compares the destructive effects

and possible military uses of these weapons. This overview of the

weapons, their effects, and their uses serves two purposes. First,

it illustrates why the weapons have been singled out for particular

opprobrium and special efforts at control. Second, it indicates

why states (and sometimes nonstate organizations) might come

to believe that the weapons would be useful additions to their

arsenals.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is both a

general and a particular problem. In the long term, dealing with

the problem will require strengthening international norms

against the weapons and fostering a political order that makes

them unattractive. In the nearer term, however, proliferation

problems are particular: the weapons are spreading to specific

nations that have decided, for one reason or another, that the

existing international norms against further proliferation should

not apply to them. The third part of this chapter identifies states

suspected of trying to acquire one or more types of weapon of

mass destruction. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the

immediate proliferation threats, as now understood, are serious

but still limited in scope. Many more nations are economically

and technically capable of building weapons of mass destruction

than are actually trying to do so. All this is not to suggest

c

:@

45
46 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

complacency about the dangers of proliferation:

rather, it suggests that national and international

nonproliferation policies actually have some prospect of containing the problem.

The fourth part of ch. 2 discusses what differences it may make to the international community

in general, and to the United States in particular,

when weapons of mass destruction spread. This

analysis underscores the strong interest in containing the threat of proliferation that the United

States shares with all civilized nations.

With ch. 1 having reviewed trends in the

international arena that nonproliferation policies

must take into account, the final section of this

chapter calls special attention to the multifarious problems posed by the breakup of Soviet

Union.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

“Mass destruction” is a relative term. Allied

fire bomb attacks on Dresden during World War

II killed between 130,000 and 200,000 people

with 1,400 aircraft sorties over 2 days.1 A single

atomic bomb killed about 68,000 people and

injured another 76,000 in Hiroshima.2 A 1-

megaton hydrogen bomb exploding over Detroit

might kill 470,000 and injure 630,000 more.3

Thus, a single weapon of mass destruction can do

damage equivalent to that of hundreds or thousands of ‘conventional’ high explosive or incendiary weapons. This report addresses the spread

of three broad types of weapon meeting that

criterion of killing more with less: nuclear,

biological, and chemical. How do these weapons

injure and kill?

Table 2-1 surveys the destructive agents discussed in this report. Table 2-2 identifies factors

that can affect just how lethal these agents may be

when used. To do their deadly work, these agents

of mass destruction have to be incorporated into

weapons (e.g., an aerial bomb, a ballistic missile

warhead, an artillery shell, or a even a suitcase)

and then delivered. Table 2-3 lists the kinds of

weapons that have been, or in principle could be,

designed for nuclear explosives or chemical or

biological agents. During the Cold War, the

United States and the Soviet Union developed

every type of nuclear weapon listed in the

chart. 4

The easiest course for nuclear proliferant

nations would be to try to build aerial bombs first,

because these need not be as light or compact as

other weapon types. The bomb dropped on

Hiroshima weighed about 4,400 kg (9,700 lb), but

proliferants should be able to do much better than

that on their first try.5 The countries currently

suspected of nuclear weapon ambitions also have

ballistic missile programs; even if they succeed in

developing heavier aerial bombs sooner, they

seem likely to pursue missile-capable nuclear

explosives in the longer run. Iraq appears to have

been trying to make its first nuclear weapon light

enough for a missile warhead.

Chemical weapons were frost used extensively

in World War I. Initially, gaseous agents, such as

chlorine and phosgene, were released from groundbased tanks as airborne clouds; later, liquids such

as sulfur mustard were delivered in artillery

shells. Aerial bombing and spraying methods

appeared between the two World Wars. During

the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet

1 Science Applications Inc., EvaZuatims of CoZZareraJ Damuge (La Jolla, CA: SAIC, Nov. 15, 1976), p. 131,

2 Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. DoIan, (eds.), The Eflects of NucZear Weapons, Third Ed”tion (Washington DC: U.S. Department of

Defense and U.S. Department of Energy, 1977), p. 544.

3 U.S. Congress, Offke of ‘Rdmology Assessment The Eflects ofNuclear War (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov ernment Printing office, 1979),

p. 37.

4 In the aftermath of the Cold War (and even before), both superpowers begsn to withdraw from service most of their so-called tactical

nuclear weapons.

S The United States and the Soviet Union had already deployed much lighter weapons by the 1950s.
— .

Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 47

Table 2-l—Weapon Agents of Mass Destruction

Type of weapon agent Examples Mechanism Effects on human beings

Nuclear:

fission and fusion Hiroshima fission bomb= 12.5 Blast (overpressure)

kt (1 kt = 1,000 tons TNT) ;

fusion bomb, e.g., largest U.S. Thermal radiation

test = 17 Mt (1 Mt = 1,000,000

tons TNT) Nuclear radiation (immediate)

Nuclear radiation (delayed

effects and fallout effects)

Biological:

viruses

bacteria

rickettsiae

Toxins:2

Venezuelan equine encephalitis

Anthrax, brucellosis, plague

Q fever, typhus

Botulin, ricin, animal venoms

Chemical:

Blistering (Vesicants) Mustard, Iewisite

Choking Chlorine, Phosgene, PFIB

Blood Cyanogen chloride, hydrogen

cyanide

Nerve Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman

(GD), GF, VX

Inhaled or ingested infectious

diseases

(same)

(same)

Inhaled or ingested poisons

Skin and tissue destruction on

contact or inhalation

Lung damage on inhalation

Blocking of blood oxygen on

inhalation

Nervous system disruption on

contact or inhalation

Bleeding and rupture; violent

displacement; blows or crushing by debris

flash burns, blinding, burning

or suffocation from building fires

Vomiting, diarrhea fever, bleeding, infection, circulatory failure, respiratory failure, brain

swelling

Above effects at high doses;

contact burns, cataracts, leukemia, other cancers, birth defects at lower doses

A variety of debilitating or potentially fatal illnesses

(same)

(same)

A variety of toxic effects, often

fatal

Skin blistering, blindness, potentially fatal lung damage

Fluid build-up leading to fatal

choking

Anoxia (severe oxygen starvation of body tissues)

Convulsions, paralysis leading

to death

1 Somechemical and biological agents maycauseirritation, illness, or behavior changes, butmaynotnormally be fatal; weapons using th=eagents

may incapacitate people for hours, days or weeks, but cannot be accurately said to inflict mass destruction. Other agents can destroy livestock

or crops, having great potential for economic warfare but (except for the possibility of causing mass starvation) not leading immediately to

widespread human injury.

2 Toxins are nonliving, ~ionous ~hemica~, first produ~d in biological proc~ses. k w= therefore r~onable to cxmsider them to& biological

weapons, and they are covered in the international treaty banning biological weapons. However, as toxic chemical (nonliving) substances, they

are also categorized as “chemical’ ’weapon agents-andthey are so considered in the Chemical Weapons Convention banning chemical weapons.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
48 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 2-2—Factors Affecting Lethality of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

Factor Nuclear Biological Chemical

Delivery modes Higher altitude burst increases

lethal area, decreases fallout;

Lower altitude increases central blast and fallout

Terrain

Open, flat

Hilly

City

Weather

Increases exposure to thermal

and ionizing radiation

Decreases injuries from debris,

collapsing structures

Redirects blast effects

May shield from thermal and

ionizing radiation

Supplies material for injurious

debris

Masonry may shield from blast,

debris, and radiation

Building collapses increase injuries

Wood buildings and petrochemicals burn, may produce lethal

firestorm

Wind, rain patterns may either

increase or decrease lethal distribution of radioactive fallout

Aerial spraying produces wider

lethal area than explosive bomb

or missile warhead

Explosive dispersion may also

kill agent organisms

Maximizes lethal dispersion of

agent

Atmospheric turbulence impedes even distribution and

increases vertical dilution of

agent, reducing casualties

Atmospheric turbulence impedes even distribution and

increases vertical dilution of

agent, reducing casualties

Buildings partially shelter from

agent

Wind may blow agent away

from or toward targets

Air temperature and temperature gradient affect dispersal

Aerial spraying produces wider

lethal area than explosive bomb

or missile warhead

Persistent agents can injure or

kill additional victims as they

pass through a contaminated

area

Maximizes lethal dispersion of

agent

Atmospheric turbulence impedes even distribution and

increases vertical dilution of

agent, reducing casualties

Atmospheric turbulence impedes even distribution and

increases vertical dilution of

agent, reducing casualties

Buildings partially shelter from

agent

Wind may blow agent away

from or toward targets

Air temperature and temperature gradient affect dispersal

Union deployed the gamut of chemical delivery

systems from spray tanks6 to chemical warheads

for short-range ballistic missiles, rockets, land

mines, bombs, and artillery. The Iraqi chemical

arsenal included artillery shells, bombs, and some

ballistic missile warheads.

If any live biological weapons have been used

in the twentieth century, their characteristics for

the most part have been well concealed.7 But

apparently weapon designs have included spraytanks, bombs, cluster bombs, and bomblet dispensers.

8 Like chemical weapons, biological agents

are best dispersed as low-altitude aerosol clouds.

(Moreover, explosive methods of dispersion may

destroy the organisms.) Ballistic missile warheads that can effectively generate aerosols are

s Chemical agent is most efficiently delivered as a spray at low altitudes.

7 As noted in table 2-1, from the delivery and effects standpoints, toxins are closer to being chemical than biological weapons. Japan seems

to have attempted limited biological agent attacks in China during World War II-apparently with inconclusive effeets. See below,

footnote 23.

s World Health Organization Hea(th Aspects of Chemical andBiological Weapons (Geneva: World Health Organii@ioq 1970), p. 84. See

also Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chem”cal and Biological Wa#are: Vol II, CB Weapons Ted@ (New

Yorlq NY: Humam‘ties Press, 1975), pp. 83-89.
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 49

Table 2-2--(Continued)

Factor Nuclear Biological Chemical

Weather (continued)

Defensive measures Shelters offer varying degrees

of protection outside central

destructive area of bomb

With ample preparation and

warning, evacuation the best

protection

High winds disperse farther,

but may dilute lethal concentrations sooner

Rains may clear air, wash away

deposited agent

Sunlight or drying rapidly destroys some agents

Immunization possible if agents

known in advance, but massive exposures can overwhelm

immunity

Depending on agent, early medical treatment can reduce mortality rate

With adequate detection and

warning, special masks and

clothing or buildings or vehicles with filtered, positive internal air pressure can protect

effectively

Surfaces can be decontaminated

With ample preparation and

warning, evacuation the best

protection

High winds disseminate farther, but may dilute Iethal concentrations sooner

Rains may dear air, wash

away some types of deposited

agent

Cold weather prevents evaporation, reducing concentrations

in air but lengthening period of

ground contamination

Antidotes for some agents can

be effective if administered soon

enough after exposure; limited

preventive treatment also possible for nerve agents

Early decontamination and medical treatment can reduce mortality

With adequate detection and

warning, special masks and

clothing or sealed buildings or

vehicles with filtered, positive

internal air pressure can protect effectively

Surfaces can be decontaminated

With ample preparation and

warning, evacuation the best

protection

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

technically challenging to design, although the

United States had done so by the 1960s. Longterm storage of missile or artillery warheads filled

with live or freeze-dried biological or toxin agent

is difficult (except for anthrax spores); even if

refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited

lifetime. Small, unmanned aerial vehicles carrying spray tanks might become an appealing

option for third-world countries seeking inexpensive weapons of mass destruction.9

The biological agents usually considered for

warfare have been infectious (multiplying within

the infected person) but not contagious (spreading

from one person to another). A nation contemplating the military use of contagious agents would

have to consider the following problems:

● the spread of the disease might be so slow as

to dilute the military impact;

● there would be a risk that the disease would

spread back to the attacker; thorough vacci9 See W. Seth Carus, “ ‘The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?’ Biological Weapons in the Middle East” (Washington DC: The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Papers No. 23, 1991), p. 11.
50 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 2-3--Weaponizing Agents of Mass Destruction: Actual and Possible Methods of Delivery

Weapon Nuclear Biological Chemical

Aerial bomb J d d

Bomb subminitions d 4

Aerial spray tank d d

Ballistic missile warhead, nonseparating d d d

Ballistic missile warhead, separating d (poss.) (poss.)

Reentry vehical

Artillery Shell d d d

Rocket Shell d d d

Mortar shell d d

Cruise missile warhead 4 (poss.) (poss.)

Mine (land) d d

Mine (sea) d

Antiaircraft missile warhead d

Torpedo d

Transportable Clandestine Bomb 4 (P0ss ) (poss.)

Actual Cases d

Theoretical possibility (poss.)

SOURCE: SIPRI, 1975 and Office of Tec+mology Assessment, 1993.

nation of one’s own troops and population

would be very difficult; and

. many nations not at war with, and perhaps

even allied to, the attacker might also suffer

from the epidemic, exposing the attacker to

unnecessary sanctions or retaliation.

A clandestine terrorist might not care about these

problems. A nation with an advanced biotechnology program might try to create a contagious

organism that was both difficult to treat and

susceptible to a vaccine uniquely available to the

nation’s own population. These conditions would

be difficult to achieve, as well as to implement

covertly on a nationwide scale, but cannot be

dismissed as impossible (see the OTA background paper on technologies underlying weapons of mass destruction, in press).

9 Means of delivery

How nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons

are incorporated into weapons will depend both

on their purposes and on the available means of

delivery. This section introduces the primary

kinds of vehicles by which these weapons might

be delivered. Following sections address possible

uses. As table 2-2 illustrates, properly configured

weapons of mass destruction can be delivered by

many kinds of military delivery systems, and at

ranges from a few to thousands of kilometers.

Depending on the scenario, such weapons can be

highly threatening even without sophisticated

military delivery systems. A nuclear device

planted by terrorists or commando squads, or

delivered by disguised cargo ships, aircraft, or

even small pleasure craft, could kill just as many

people as one delivered by an ICBM; a given

quantity of lethal microorganisms effectively

spread by human agents might kill even more than

one delivered by missile.

Thus, the absence of advanced delivery systems does not mean that states or sub-national

groups could not use weapons of mass destruction. Even though few proliferant states (with the
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 51

possible exceptions of India, Israel, and China)10

have---or are likely soon to acquire-military

delivery systems capable of directly reaching the

United States, unconventional delivery methods

could still put U.S. territory at risk. U.S. allies

abroad or deployed U.S. forces are already

threatened by shorter range systems. In the cases

of rival states bordering one another, nuclear,

biological, or chemical weapons mounted on

even very short-range means of delivery can pose

a major threat.

Nevertheless, states possessing considerable

numbers of advanced longer range systems equipped

with these weapons can more reliably threaten

more nations with higher levels of destruction

than those only possessing short-range systems.

Every state currently of proliferation concern has

combat aircraft in principle capable of delivering

weapons of mass destruction; most of those states

also own or have programs to acquire ballistic

missiles.

Partly for these reasons, the discussions of

delivery systems in this OTA report and its

associated background paper deal primarily with

advanced systems.

11 Another reason is a more

practical one: because advanced systems designed to penetrate enemy defenses are in many

cases technically more demanding, there is greater

hope (than there is for short-range systems) of

imposing international controls on their further

proliferation.

The three principal types of advanced delivery

vehicle are aircraft, ballistic missile, and cruise

missile. Aircraft (in the sense used here) are

piloted, air-breathing (usually jet) airplanes; the

combat aircraft of many of the world’s air forces

can deliver payloads of several thousand pounds

to distances of hundreds of kilometers (or more,

if they are equipped for aerial refueling) 12; they

may fly at speeds of 1,000 to 2,000 km/hr or

more.

Ballistic missiles carry both fuel and oxidizer

and (except for very short-range systems) fly part

of their trajectory outside the atmosphere. They

usually reenter the atmosphere hypersonically, at

speeds of thousands of km/hr, and carry smaller

payloads than aircraft. They are likely to delivery

weapons less accurately than aircraft, but high

accuracy is unnecessary for delivering nuclear

weapons on many kinds of missions.

Cruise missiles or other unpiloted aerial vehicles share some characteristics with piloted aircraft and some with ballistic missiles. Like

airplanes, these missiles fly nonballistic trajectories within the atmosphere and are powered

throughout their flight. (Ballistic missiles, in

contrast, are powered only at the beginning o f

their trajectories, coasting to their targets once

their final rocket motor stages burn out.) Unpiloted aerial vehicles range from simple, unmanned drone aircraft used for target practice, to

short- and medium-range (10 to 100 km) antiship

missiles widely available around the world, to

highly sophisticated, longer range, autonomously

guided missiles such as the U.S. Tomahawk. Like

ballistic missiles, they do not require as extensive

a training and support infrastructure as do piloted

aircraft.

Since cruise missiles can be launched from air,

sea, and underwater as well as from land, their

own range is extended by that of their carrier

(airplane, ship, or submarine). Like other aircraft,

they can be shot down once detected and identified. However, small size (and radar crosssection), low-altitude flight, and circuitous courses

can make them hard to find. Like ballistic

missiles, they are expendable, eliminating the

need to risk a pilot (and avoiding the possibility

10 DW~~ nuclW.weaPn states are not considered nUCleW ‘Profimants. ‘‘ China, although a declared nuclear-weapon state, is suspected

of being a chemical and biological weapon proliferant.

11 Backgomd Pqa on technologies underlying weapons of mass deswctio~ in press.

12 conve~~ ~ago ~m~t or long-rmge bomber ~c~t (if avai~ble) cmfly ~ousands of kilometers without refhe~g.
52 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

of pilot error while forfeiting the potential for

pilot improvisation if something goes wrong).

With the worldwide availability of highprecision navigation services such as that provided by the U.S. Global Positioning System

(GPS), a simple cruise missile can in principle be

made more accurate than even a sophisticated

ballistic missile. A piloted aircraft, on the other

hand, has abetter chance than a cruise or ballistic

missile of delivering chemical or biological

weapons onto mobile military targets and of

adjusting bombing or spraying patterns to the

weather.

An analysis comparing the relative advantages

of aircraft and ballistic missiles for nuclear

weapon delivery concludes:

Ballistic missiles are of principal concern to

the degree they are coupled to the delivery of

nuclear and, to a somewhat lesser extent, chemical weapons. But advanced-strike aircraft can be

effective in delivering nuclear weapons and can

be more effective than ballistic missiles for

delivering conventional or chemical ordnance.13

On the other hand, to deliver weapons at intercontinental range, developing and building intercontinental ballistic missiles may be easier than acquiring

long-range bombers and refueling capabilities.14

Since biological warfare agents are, like chemical ordnance, best disseminated in an aerosol

over a wide area, aircraft and cruise missiles are

better for delivering them than are ballistic

missiles. In addition, it is more difficult (but not

impossible) to develop ballistic missile warheads

in which live biological agents can survive the

stresses of space flight and atmospheric reentry.

WEAPON EFFECTS COMPARED

1 Destructive Effects

Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate some rough

estimates for the effects of comparable amounts

of chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons.

These are based on somewhat arbitrary assumptions, but they do give a basis for relative

comparison of the weapon types.

These comparisons suggest the following generalizations:

●

●

●

●

nuclear weapons remain the most massively

destructive weapons that can be built: unlike

chemical and biological weapons, nuclear

weapons also threaten massive destruction

of property (civilian or military);

in principle, biological weapons efficiently

delivered under the right conditions against

unprotected populations would, pound for

pound of weapon, exceed the killing power

of nuclear weapons; on the other hand, if

warning is provided, effective civil defense

measures are considerably easier to take

against chemical and biological weapons

than against nuclear weapons;

for maximum physical effect, chemical and

biological weapons are more efficiently delivered by aircraft or artillery barrages than

by high-speed missiles; missile attacks, however, may be useful as instruments of terror;

chemical weapons must be delivered in great

quantities to approach the potential lethality

of nuclear and biological weapons; against

well-protected troops or civilians, they will

be less lethal than even conventional explosives; and

13 ~nta for ~tmtio~ sec~~ md Arrns Control, Stanford University, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its COnPOl

(Stanford, CA: CISAC, November 1991), p. 7.

14 See ~wad ~~~ foreword to Seti Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict (hkw York NY: ~eger, 1~1) P. vii
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 53

Figure 2-l-Comparing Lethal Areas of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons:

Missile Delivery on an Overcast Day or Night, With Moderate Wind (Neither Best nor Worst Case)

(All diagrams in Figures 2-1 and 2-2 are to

same scale)

Sarin nerve gas, 300 kg, 70 mg-min/m 3

- :, ,. 022 km 2

xii 60-200

Iii = Approx no of deaths, assuming

3,000 to 10,000 unprotected people/km2

Scale & - -— — — - ——— j

10 km

Anthrax spores, 30 kg, O 1 mg-min/m 3

Atomic bomb, 125 kt TNT-equiv (Hlroshlma-size), area

of 5 lb/in overpressure

..9”” ‘“’” ;. :..

78 k m

2

..,:,

,, ..,,. .<,.:”

x

23,000-80,000

..-!4 xiii 570,000-1,900,00

Figure shows the lethal areas of the agents delivered by a Scud-like missile with a maximum payload of 1,000 kg (note that the

amount of biological weapon agent assumed would weigh considerably less than this; since the lethality per unit weight is great,

the smaller amount considered here would still more than cover a large urban area). The estimates of lethal areas for chemical

and biological weapons were prepared using a model that takes account of postulated release height, wind velocity, deposition

velocity, height of temperature inversion layer, urban air currents, and residence time in air of the agent. The diagrams show

approximate outer contours of areas with sufficient concentrations of agent that 50 percent to 100 percent of the unprotected

people would receive fatal doses. Although some people within the defined area would survive, about the same number in the

outer, less lethal areas, would die; therefore, the defined areas give approximations of the total number of unprotected people who

could be expected to die in each scenario, With ideal (forlethalit y) population densities and weather, the chemical and biological

agents could kill more people than shown here; under worse conditions, they might kill many fewer. The atomic weapons (fission

and fusion) are assumed to be ah burst for optimum blast and radiation effects, producing little lethal fallout. The lethal area is

assumed to be that receiving 5 lb/in2 of overpressure--enough to level wood or unreinforced brick houses.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
54 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Figure 2-2-Comparing Lethal Areas of Chemical and Biological Weapons:

Delivery by Aircraft as Aerosol Line Source

x = Approx. no. of deaths,

assuming 3,000-10,000

people / km 2

Scale ~.— - — - _-— j

10 km

Clear, sunny day,

light breeze

Sarin nerve “gas”

~ 74 km2

H

300-700

Anthrax spores

xii 130,00-460,000

Overcast day or

night, moderate wind Clear, calm night

-V 8 k m 2

R

400-800

‘“:.:::

/;:” 78 k m

2

A:

H

3,000-8,000

,..

\

140 km 2

c )

/

/

,..,

,,.

km2

la 420,000-1,400,000 xii 1,000,000-

3,000,000

Figure shows the lethal areas of single airplane-loads of chemical and biological weapons, assuming a highly efficientf line-source

delivery of the killing agents. The figure also assumes that the aircraft has a greater payload than the missile in figure 2-1, delivering

1,000 kg of sarin nerve agent or 100 kg of anthrax spores. (More anthrax would be inefficient in a city attack.) Given these two

factors, a single airplane delivering chemical or biological weapons can be considerably more lethal than a single

missile. For an anthrax attack, the diagram shows how fatalities could vary greatly under three different weather scenarios. In one

case, that of an overcast day or night with moderate wind, maximizing the lethal area would require distributing the agent in a 4.5

km by 34 km area, which would not be appropriate for most cities; therefore, the figure assumes a more rectangular distribution,

which would still generate a comparable number of casualties.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
●

——..———

Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 55

because they are so dependent on weather

and the degree of defensive protection, the

consequences of chemical and biological

weapons are much less predictable than

those of nuclear weapons; nevertheless, even

when military utility is questionable, chemical and biological weapons may terrorize

civilian populations (and, particularly for

terror uses, the attacker may be able to wait

for optimal weather).

I Military Utility

A principal-but by no means exclusive—

motive for developing countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction is for their potential

military utility. The symbolic, deterrent, or intimidating uses of these weapons may be disproportionate to their actual effects on opposing military

forces. 15 On the other hand, political inhibitions

on using the weapons may render moot their

purely military effectiveness. These cautions

noted, table 2-4 compares general military uses of

the weapons (along with conventional explosive

weapons, for comparison).

The nuclear age has generated special meanings for the terms strategic and tactical as applied

to weapons of mass destruction. The general

meaning of strategic military action in this

context is the attempted destruction of the military infrastructure, economic base, and even the

population that enables the enemy nation to make

war. Tactical attacks, on the other hand, are those

more directly engaging the enemy’s frontline

military forces, immediate reinforcements, or

supply lines. As table 2-4 indicates, nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons can each be

applied tactically or strategically. From a strictly

military viewpoint, though, their utilities are not

equivalent because the consequences of using

each are different.

TACTICAL USES

The tactical uses of weapons of mass destruction may have both direct and indirect purposes.

The direct purpose would be to destroy or disable

specific military targets-bases, equipment, or

personnel. The indirect purpose would be to

compel the enemy to change his operations to

cope with extraordinary threats. For example, the

threat of nuclear attack might force the dispersal

of large troop or armor concentrations. Chemical

weapon threats might require troop dispersals and

protective measures that reduce combat effectiveness, while perhaps overburdening medical services with injured personnel. Biological weapon

threats would impose similar burdens.

During the Cold War, the United States and the

Soviet Union each deployed thousands of ‘tactical’ ‘ nuclear weapons (e.g., artillery, rockets,

short-range ballistic missiles, aerial bombs). For

the most part, these weapons would have been

aimed at military forces and installations more or

less directly involved in battle. Their explosive

yields reportedly ranged from less than 1 kiloton

(kt) of TNT to several hundred kt.16 Limited use

of these weapons in Europe would, at the very

least, have forced armies on both sides to alter

their tactics to avoid presenting large concentrations of troops and armor as targets. Used en

masse, these tactical weapons might have produced damage to the population and the civilian

infrastructure resembling that to be expected from

15 III some unuti cases, the uses may intend provocation, as opposed to deterrence or intimidation. The apparent intent Of kW’S use of

Scud missiles against Israel during the Gulf War was to lure Israel into military retaliation. Iraq might then have persuaded the Arab members

of the Coalition to change sides to avoid fighting on the same side as Israel. Thus, even though the Iraqi attack would probably have had little

direct military effect its political effect might have been enormous. (Iraq might have increased the chances of Israeli military action had it used

chemical warheads on its missiles; on the other hand, Iraq also had to consider the possibility that Israel would respond to such an attack with

nuclear weapons, an escalation Saddam Hussein probably wanted to avoid,)

16 See william M. &kin and RiCharci W. FiddhOUse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Lirk in the Arms Race (Cambridge, m: Ball@r,

1985), pp. 57-58. By way of comparison the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of 12.5 kt,
Table 2-4-Applications of Weapons of Mass Destruction Compared

Conventional explosives

Characteristics (for comparison with WMD) Nuclear Chemical Biological

Destructive effects Blast, shrapnel, fire

(See table 2-1)

Typical militarytargets Military bases and equipment;

Command-and-control installations (e.g. command posts, radars); troop concentrations;

ships2

Typical missions against

military targets

Drawbacks as military

instrument

Destruction of targets, personnel casualties

Small lethal radius requires either many weapons or great

accuracy for most military missions

Blast, fire, thermal radiation,

prompt ionizing radiation, radioactive fallout1

Similar to targets for conventional munitions (esp. targets

hardened against blast)

Enemy nuclear or other WMD

facilities

Destruction of targets

Personnel casualties

intimidation of personnel

Disruption of operations by requiring dispersal of units. Disruption of communications by

electromagnetic pulse effects

Potential for great "collateral

damage”

Risk of retaliation and escalation

in kind

Radioactive contamination of

ground that user may wish to

cross or occupy

Poisoning: skin, lungs, nervous system, or blood

infantry concentrations, towed

artillery, air bases, ships, ports,

staging areas, command centers

Unprotected personnel casualties; disruption of operations by

requiring protective measures

or decontamination

Demoralization or panic of personnel

Relatively large quantities required

Protective measures may greatly

reduce casualties

Leave buildings and equipment

reusable by enemy (but persistent agents may require

decontamination)

With persistent agents, chemical contamination of ground

that user may wish to cross or

occupy

infectious disease or biochemical poisoning

infantry concentrations, air bases,

ships, ports, staging areas, command centers

Unprotected personnel casualties; disruption of operations by

requiring protective measures

or decontamination

Demoralization or panic of personnel

Protective measures may reduce casualties

Most agents degrade quickly

With persistent spores, contamination of ground that user may

wish to cross or occupy

Leave buildings and equipment

reusable by enemy (but persisent spores may require decontamination)

Effects depend on weather and

time of day; are delayed, unpredictable, or uncontrollable

0

o

=

mCmu)
Table 2-4-Applications of Weapons of Mass Destruction Compared

Conventional explosives

Characteristics (for comparison with WMD) Nuclear Chemical Biological

Destructive effects Blast, shrapnel, fire

(See table 2-1)

Typical military targets Military bases and equipment;

Command-and-control installations (e.g. command posts, radars); troop concentrations;

ships2

Typical missions against

military targets

Drawbacks as military

instrument

Destruction of targets, personnel casualties

Small lethal radius requires either many weapons or great

accuracy for most military missions

Blast fire, thermal radiation,

prompt ionizing radiation, radioactive fallout1

Similar to targets for conventional munitions (esp. targets

hardened against blast)

Enemy nuclear or other WMD

facilities

Destruction of targets

Personnel casualties

Intimidation of personnel

Disruption of operations by requiring dispersal of units. Disruption of communications by

electromagnetic pulse effects

Potential for great “collateral

damage”

Risk of retaliation and escalation

in kind

Radioactive contamination of

ground that user may wish to

cross or occupy

Poisoning: skin, lungs, nervous system, or Mood

Infantry concentrations, towed

artillery, air bases, ships, ports,

staging areas, command centers

Unprotected personnel casualties; disruption of operations by

requiring protective measures

or decontamination

Demoralization or panic of personnel

Relatively large quantities required

Protective measures may greatly

reduce casualties

Leave buildings and equipment

reusable by enemy (but persisent agents may require

decontamination)

With persistent agents, chemical contamination of ground

that user may wish to cross or

occupy

Infectious disease or biochemical poisoning

Infantry concentrations, air bases,

ships, ports, staging areas, command centers

Unprotected personnel casualties; disruption of operations by

requiring protective measures

or decontamination

Demoralization or panic of personnel

Protective measures may reduce casualties

Most agents degrade quickly;

with persistent spores, contamination of ground that user may

wish to cross or occupy

Leave buildings and equipment

reusable by enemy (but persisent spores may require decontamination)

Effects depend on weather and

time of day; are delayed, unpredictable, or uncontrollable

WI -1
58 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

a‘ ‘strategic” nuclear war.17 Moreover, they were

deployed in the context of superpower arsenals

containing thousands more strategic nuclear weapons aimed at each other’s homeland.

New nuclear powers are likely to have anywhere from one to a few hundred nuclear weapons, most likely of explosive yields equivalent to

a few tens of kilotons of TNT. These new nuclear

powers might intend to use their limited numbers

of weapons against isolated military targets for

tactical purposes, or they might seek to achieve

maximum economic damage and psychological

effects by directly attacking cities. The decision

would probably depend on the military and

political context, including whether the adversary

or its allies also had nuclear arms, and, if so, how

many.

During World War I, both sides used large

amounts of chemical weapons. Japan used chemical and biological weapons against China in

World War II. Since then, the world has had some

further experience with use of chemical weapons:

Egypt (reportedly) in Yemen in 1967 and 1968;

Iraq against Iran during the 1981-1988 war, Iran

against Iraq, and Iraq against some of its own

Kurdish population. During its war with Iran, Iraq

used aerial bombardment and artillery to deliver

mustard and nerve agents against Iranian infantry

and ‘‘human wave’ attacks and against support

troops and staging areas.

18 Iranian troops were

poorly protected throughout, but apparently only

by 1986 did the Iraqis learn to use their chemical

weapons in coordinated and effective ways,

preventing Iranian troops from massing and

counterattacking with conventional forces. In

1988, Iraq used chemical weapons in an offensive

mode, weakening Iranian forward positions and

limiting rear operations. Iraq reportedly also used

a combination of mustard and nerve agents on

Kurdish civilian villages and rebel encampments. 19

Pelletiere and Johnson point out that, as was the

case in World War I, the ratio of deaths to injuries

from chemicals seems to have been low in the

Iran-Iraq war, and that therefore chemical weapons should not be thought of as ‘‘a poor man’s

nuclear weapon. ’20 Anthony Cordesman concludes that although the contribution of chemical

weapons to Iraqi success in any one battle is hard

to estimate, and although they produced less than

5 percent of the more than 1 million Iran-Iraq war

casualties,

Nevertheless, [they] had a critical effect on

Iranian military and civilian morale by late 1987,

and during the Iraqi counter-offensives and ‘‘war

of the cities” in 1988. Sheer killing power is not

the key measure of success: it is rather the

strategic, tactical, and psycho-political impact of

the use of such weapons. Even when troops are

equipped with defensive gear, they often feel they

17 rnd~, full application of the conventional f~epower deployed in Europe might have had consequences nearly as ternbk+which -Y

be one reason why NATO allies were willing to rely so heavily on nuclear deterrence against a Soviet attack.

18 See Steven C. Pefletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II, femons Learned: The lnm-lra~ JVar (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Smdies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991), “Appendix B: chemical Weapons,” pp. 97-101; and Anthony H. Cordesq Weapons of Muss

Destruction in the Midde East (Ixmdon: Brassey’s (UK), 1991), pp. 85-93. The following discussion is drawn primarily from these sources.

19 Si@ of mW@d, Deme, ~blood agents were reported found in Kurdish areas in statements of Ro~rt Cook-Deg~ ad of Debo~

Lief-Dienstag and supporting documents (given in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations, Global Spread of Chen”calandBiological Weapons, Hearings, IOlst Cong,, 1st sess., S. Hrg, 101-744 (WashingtorL DC: U.S.

Government Printing OffiIce, 1990), pp. 242-266). There is geneml agreement that Iraq used the mustard and nerve agents. Some authors argue

that Iraqis also delivered cyanide on the village of Halabjalq but Corde_ ibid., concludes that Iranians were the likelier source.

Gordon Burck argues that the cyanide could have come from ill-manufactured Iraqi nerve agent (“The Geneva Protocol: Selective

Enforcement” in Lessons of the Guf War: Me&”ation and Conflict Resolution, AAAS, Proceedingsfiom an Annual Meeting Symposium, Feb,

17, 1990, New Orleans, Louisian& p. 17). Kenneth Timrne- on the other hand, charges that Iraqis were using purposely developed

hydrogen cyanide bombs; see The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (New Yom NY: Houghton Miffl@ 1991) p. 293. The UN Special

Commissio% however, did not report finding hydrogen cyanide weapons in the Iraqi arsenat.

m S= Pelletiere ~d Johnsoq op. Cit., footnote 18, p. 100, T@J ~port tit ~though 27.3 ~r~nt of ~ American cmlldti~ ill World W~

I were gas-generated, and 31,4 percent of wounds were gas-related, the death rate among gas victims was only 2 percent.
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 59

Even if chemical weapons did not inflict large-scale casualties, they could seriously interfere with military

operations. These pictures were taken during a 1988 exercise at Eglin Air Force base. On the left, an airman dons

.

cumbersome protective gear. Top right, a simulated casualty is carried away from the airfield. On the bottom

right, an aircraft is decontaminated by spraying and scrubbing with neutralizing chemicals.

are defenseless and break and run after limited

losses. Populations which fear chemical attacks

may well cease to support a conflict.21

On the other hand, chemical weapons used

against troops in World War I did not appear to

damage civilian morale. Nor can it be shown that

chemical weapons clearly affected civilian morale in the Iran-Iraq war.

Chemical weapons may be used in tactical

warfare either to kill or terrorize instantly, or to

impose operational difficulties on the enemy by

contaminating key areas or equipment for hours

or days. Thus, an attack on an infantry position

might use a volatile agent like GB, while a

viscous, persistent agent like VX might be

applied to an airbase or a strip of territory. Table

2-5 indicates approximate quantities of those two

types of agent that might be needed for some

representative military missions. Although a few

drops of nerve agent can kill, the fact that

chemical agents are usually disseminated as a

wind-borne aerosol or spray means that many

tons may be needed to produce many battlefield

casualties. The military utility of attacks on troops

21 Cordesw OD. cit.. foomote 18. D. ~.

,’ , ,.
60 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 2-5-Quantities of Chemical Weapons for Various Missions

Mission Quantity

Attack an Infantry position:

Cover 1.3 km2 of territory with a “surprise dosage” attack of GB

(Sarin) to kill approximately 50% of unprotected troops

Prevent launch of enemy mobile missiles:

Contaminate a 25 km2 missile unit operating area with 0.3 tons

of VX per sq. km

Immobilize an air base

Contaminate a 2 km2 air base with 0.3 tons of VX twice a day for

three days

Defend a broad front against large-scale attack:

Maintain a 300-m deep strip of VX contamination in front of a

position defending a 60-km wide area for 3 days

Terrorize population:

Kill approximately 125,000 unprotected civilians in a densely

populated (10,000/km2

) city

216 240-mm rockets (e.g.,

delivered by 18, 12-tube

Soviet BM-24 rocket launchers) each carrying 8 kg agent

(totalling 1728 kg)

8 F-16 bombers each delivering 0.9 ton of VX (totalling

7.2 tons)

1 F-16 bomber, 6 sorties

65 metric tons of agent delivered by approximately

13,000 155-mm artillery

rounds

8 F-16 bombers each delivering 0.9 ton of VX (totalling

7.2 tons) under optimum

conditions

SOURCE: Adapted from Victor A, Utgoff, The Cha//enge of Chemlca/ W-pens (New York NY: St. Martin’s

Press, 1991), pp. 23S-242.

would depend greatly on how effectively they

were protected with gas masks, clothing, and

shelters .22

For biological weapons, there is little documented experience with military use.23 One

analyst speculates that, for surprise attacks or for

repelling immediate attacks by others, biological

weapons would be too slow and unpredictable to

be militarily attractive. He argues, however, that

they might be useful on the front lines against

freed defensive positions in long wars of attrition.24 Another analyst argues that suitable tactical targets for biological weapons might include

reserve combat units, formations massing in

preparation for an offensive, air force squadrons,

and rear area support units:

Thus, it would appear that biological weapons

could be militarily useful in situations when

immediate results are not required and where the

danger to friendly forces is minimal. Thus, even

~acm.icaI w~orl researchers very likely have in the past studied methods of penetratingas maaks with chemi~ w~~ agm~.

23 Japmrepo~y ~biologi~ w~~e ag~t China&fore and during World War II, with konchsive reSUltS. Although ~ J~~e

Army performed field trials in which bombs canying plague-infested fleas were dropped on at least 11 Chinese cities, the weapons wcxe not

reliable and had little military impact-although they claimed an estimated 700 civilian lives. Conlamination of Chinese territory with plague o

also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops. See “Japan’s Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-Up of a War Crime,”

BuZletin of Concerned Asian Schofars, vol. 12, October-December 1980, pp. 2-17; John W, Powell “A HiddaI Chapter in History,” Bdletin

of the Atmi”c Sciem”sts, vol. 37, No. 8, October 1981, pp. 44-52; and Peter Williams and David Wallace, UnJ”t 73J: Japan’s Secret BioZogicaf

Warfare in Worfd Wur H (New York NY: Free Ress, 1989).

u ~~ond A, ~~~, “Biologic~ wiu-fm~d tie Third World,” Politics andthe Li~e Sciences, vO1. 9, No. 1, A-t 1990, PP. 59-76.
if biological warfare has only slight immediate

value on the battlefield, it could have considerable utility when directed at rear units.25

Note that even if not many troops were killed, a

sudden epidemic of incapacitating disease could

at least temporarily paralyze both logistic and

fighting units.

It is feasible—if the right weather occurs and

can be utilized-for a single aircraft to disseminate high dosages of biological agent over hundreds, or even thousands, of square kilometers by

spraying a long line upwind from the target

region. This was one nightmare scenario for

coalition forces facing Iraq in northern Saudi

Arabia during the Gulf War. For comparison of

the relative lethalities of biological, nuclear, and

chemical weapons under somewhat different

scenarios, see figures 2-1 and 2-2.

Defending against biological weapons may be

difficult. Currently there is no reliable way of

quickly detecting their presence or identifying

them, so soldiers may not take shelter or don

protective clothing in time. Vaccination requires

advance knowledge of the infective agents the

troops will encounter, the availability of effective

vaccines, and sufficient time for the soldiers to

develop immunity. High concentrations of agent

may overcome the immunity even of vaccinated

personnel.

According to the commander of the recently

created U.S. Army Chemical and Biological

Defense Agency (CBDA),

. . . the biological threat has been recently singled

out as the one major threat that still poses the

ability for catastrophic effects on a theaterdeployed force. Desert Storm solidified the perception in our country-in the Congress and

among our military leadership--that [biological

warfare] was something that third-world nations

considered a potential equalizer.26

—

Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 61

. --

With adequate warning, troops can be protected from

biological weapon attack by means of protective

suits. Soldiers in Saudi Arabia during Operation

Desert Shield (prior to Desert Storm) sometimes

trained wearing chemical/biological protective gear.

STRATEGIC USE

Nuclear—Between World Wars I and II, the

military theorist Giulio Douhet and others developed an idea of strategic bombing in which aerial

attacks on key military and economic targets in

the enemy’s homeland would severely diminish

his ability to make war. During World War II, .

strategic bombing evolved in practice into efforts

not only to inflict crippling damage on the

enemy’s infrastructure, but to cripple his war

effort by demoralizing the population. Although

the strictly military and economic effects of the

two atom bombs dropped on Japan did not

directly affect Japan’s armed forces, the shock of

the attacks (combined with the fear that more

might follow) led to an unconditional surrender

that might otherwise not have come so soon.

During the Cold War, the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union was

sometimes called the ‘‘balance of terror." Although both superpowers integrated nuclear weapZ5 CaIUs, op. cit., foomote 9, p. 37.

26 Brig. Gen. George Friel, CO mrnanding General, U.S. Army CBDA, quoted in John G. Roos, ‘‘Chem-Bio Defense Agency Will lhckle

‘Last Major Threat to a Deployed Force,’ ‘‘ Armed Forces Journal International, December 1992, p. 10.
62 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

ons into their military forces, the primary role of

the weapons was not to win wars but to back

threats.

This terroristic component to strategic warfare

with weapons of mass destruction makes it

difficult to analyze just what would constitute

‘‘rational’ or ‘‘irrational’ use by proliferant

states. When leaders threaten to use the weapons

(whether in an initial or a retaliatory attack), they

must decide what level of threat will be sufficiently intimidating. In some cases, conveying

the impression that one could assemble a nuclear

bomb in 2 weeks might seem enough; in other

cases, the threat to launch a nuclear missile attack

in 1 hour might not.

A leader actually ordering a strategic attack

must subjectively predict its psychological impact on the other side’s population and government, not just calculate the physical effects of the

weapons on the other side’s war machine. The

attacker must also estimate what kind of retaliation to expect, and whether he would be willing

to accept it. Alternatively, the leader may be

ordering a retaliatory attack, either in pure revenge or to warn against further escalation of the

conflict. In sum, this section’s discussion of the

physical suitability of the weapons for strategic

warfare is only part of the story.

Threatening both population and property,

nuclear weapons are the most dangerous strategic

weapons. While civil defense measures can mitigate their effects somewhat, within a certain

radius (dependent on the explosive yield) they

promise certain destruction of all but deeply

buried blast shelters. Despite the great uncertainties in calculating the precise consequences of

nuclear war, the impact of even a ‘‘small’ or

“limited” nuclear attack would be enormous.27

Chemical—Medium- to large-scale attacks

with chemical weapons (e.g., tens of tons) on

civilians may kill many more unprotected people

(e.g., thousands) than would equivalent amounts

of high explosives. On the other hand, the many

uncertainties involved in dispersing chemical

agents efficiently-as well as the effectiveness of

relatively simple civil defense measures (e.g.,

wearing gas masks and remaining inside living

spaces that are sealed off during attack)--could

keep casualties relatively low. Contamination of

certain areas by persistent chemical agents might

slow down industrial activities for days or weeks,

but for the most part chemical weapons would

leave the economic infrastructure of cities intact.

Enclosed military facilities are even more likely

to be protected and to continue functioning.

Biological—Like chemical weapons, biological weapons would leave the material (as opposed to human) economic and military infrastructure relatively untouched.28 Like nuclear

weapons, they have the potential in modest

amounts (e.g., a few kilograms of agent), properly

delivered, to kill and disable many thousands of

urban residents and to seriously impair warsupporting activities. On the other hand, biological weapons (except for some toxins) act more

slowly than chemical or nuclear weapons, taking

days or weeks to achieve full effect. Moreover,

their effects are much harder to predict than those

of nuclear weapons: weather, time of day, local

terrain, and civil defense measures could all act to

reduce casualties (as with chemical weapons).

Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, the use

of biological weapons might not be attributed to

enemy attack, since outbreaks of disease can

occur naturally. The problems of protecting

civilian populations against biological attack are

similar to those cited above for protecting troops:

immediate detection and protection are likely to

be difficult, and effective advance vaccination

may be infeasible.

27 See Om, The Efiects of Nuclear War, Op. Cit., fOOmOte 3, p. 4.

28 wl~ fie exception tit &OIO@c~ w~~~ can ~d ~ve ~n developed for apphcation to target fd IXOp$ tith tie aim Of Strate@C

reductions of the enemy’s food supply. Moreover, spore-forming organisms such anthrax might require major decontamination efforts, and

therefore interfere seriously with normal economic or military activities.
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 63

NEAR-TERM PROLIFERATION THREATS:

SUSPECTED PROLIFERANT NATIONS

B Weapons

At the U.S. State Department’s last count

published in 1992, there were 188 countries in the

world. Five of the world’s nations (United States,

Russia, United Kingdom, France, China) have

acknowledged owning nuclear weapons. Three

other states—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—

have on their territory former Soviet strategic

nuclear weapons, nominally under control of the

Commonwealth of Independent States,29 and it is

not yet fully certain that all will give them up.

Since the end of World War II, three states have

admitted having chemical weapons (United

States, Russia, and Iraq). None say they have

deployed biological weapons, although five (United

States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and

Canada) admit having had offensive weapon

munition supplies or development programs in

the past. Additional countries are suspected either

of possessing some of these weapons of mass

destruction or of trying to acquire them, but many

more are not. In sum, the scope of the problem of

proliferation is worrisome but still limited enough

to encourage hope that it can be contained.

This section presents data intended to convey

a sense of the general character of the near-term

proliferation problem. It names countries cited in

the public literature as having either the weapons,

or programs to acquire the weapons, of concern to

this report. The arbitrary criteria for including

countries are explained in the footnotes to each

list. These lists should be treated with caution

and should in no way be considered authoritative or as representing official U.S. Government assessments. To have included such assessments in this report would have resulted in its

classification as a secret document, since the U.S.

Government has released few of its estimates

about the activities of specific countries.

Intelligence information might tend to confirm

or undermine some of the estimates in the public

literature, These details, however, are more important for the implementation of U.S. unilateral

policies (particularly those involving covert action or certain bilateral international arrangements) than for the formulation of the broader

policies to be addressed in this report and its

sequel.30 In any case, the broader policies must be

formulated in the context of publicly available

information. First, although Congress can authorize classified activities that may be subject to

some oversight, it cannot pass secret legislation.

Second, Congress responds to public pressure,

which in turn derives from publicly available

information. Third, achieving international consensus and collective action on proliferation will

require openness. Fourth, multilateral agreements

such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NIT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),31

and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

were not negotiated or implemented in secrecy.

The United States will have to choose and carry

out its national policies toward specific countries

on the basis of the best information available,

classified and unclassified. Nevertheless, it

should be understood that both classified and

unclassified assessments of foreign weapon programs will be subject to uncertainties, incompleteness, lack of integration of available data, or

inadequate interpretation-as the case of the Iraqi

nuclear program well illustrates.

Table 2-6 summarizes a published estimate of

what countries (beyond the five self-acknowledged nuclear powers) are pursuing nuclear

weapon programs. Note that some of the countries

29 me wee non-Russian s~tes have at ]east a political veto over launch of the weapons on their territory, but apparently hey do not cmntlY

have the technical means to launch them independently.

JO OTA repofl on nonproliferation pOllCitX, in prepmation.

31 convention on the PrOhlbltiOn of the Dey,elopment, p~od~~fi~n and stockpiling ofBacterio[og;Cal (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and

on Their Destruction.
64 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 2-6--Countries Reportedly Trying to Acquire Nuclear Weapons

Region Country Comment

Middle East/ Algeria Possibly interested in nuclear weapons, but currently lacks facilities; has agreed

North Africa to IAEA inspection of formerly secret, Chinese-supplied nuclear reactor; not a

party to the NPT.

South Asia

East Asia

Iran

Iraq

Israel

India

Pakistan

North Korea

Latin America Argentina

Brazil

Africa South Africa

Reportedly pursuing nuclear weapons, but little public evidence of progress; CIA

testimony estimated production unlikely before the end of the decade without

foreign assistance.

Massive program uncovered after Gulf War; United Nations has required

destruction of most infrastructure, but knowledgeable personnel still in country.

Widely believed to have a clandestine nuclear arsenal of approximately 100

weapons.

Exploded a nuclear device in 1974; probably has sufficient materials for several

weapons.

Undoubtedly has nuclear weapon program, probably successful. U.S. President

no longer certifies to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device,

suggesting high likelihood that it does.

Suspicious reactor and reprocessing laboratory; submitted to some IAEA

inspections in 1992 and 1993, but refused others; in March 1993, denied IAEA

access to suspected reprocessing waste sites and declared its intention to

withdraw from NPT (since rescinded).

in agreement with Brazil, seems to have ceased weapons program. No disclosure

of progress towards weapons, but suspected of having developed clandestine

enrichment plant, a key step towards weapons.

In agreement with Argentina, has apparently ceased weapons program. in 1987,

revealed it had developed the ability to enrich uranium. (Brazil has also had a

nuclear power submarine program requiring highly enriched uranium fuel.)

Widely suspected to be very near nuclear-weapon capability, South Africa

declared in March 1993 that it had in fact constructed 6 nuclear weapons, but

dlsmantledthem in 1990. The South African president promised that South Africa

would cooperate fully with the IAEA to assure the world that it was complying with

the NPT. Joined NPT in 1991, placed declared weapons grade uranium under

IAEA inspection, and presumably dropped nuclear weapon ambitions,

SOURCE: Leonard S. Speotor and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nucfear AmbWons: 7he Spread of Nuc/ear Wapons 1989-19SW (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1990) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, “Nuclear Proliferation Status Report July 1992,” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, July 1, 1992). The latter report aiso: names Libya as “presumed to be seeidng N-weapons,” but does not cite evidence of

indigenous nuclear weapon facilities; and names Synia as identified by a U.S. officiai as having a “nuckar program with suspicious intentions,” but

no suspicious facilities have been publicly cited.

on this list now appear to have halted, or even Independent States. Each of the three governreversed, their programs. In a class by them- ments has pledged to abide by the START I

selves are three republics of the former Soviet agreement and to join the NPT as a non-nuclearUnion—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. weapon state (so far, Belarus has ratified both

On the territory of each are former Soviet strategic treaties, Kazakhstan the START I Treaty). Should

nuclear weapons. These weapons are nominally any of them fail to abide by that promise, it would

under the joint control of the Commonwealth of become a de facto nuclear-weapon state, although
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 65

Table 2-7-Countries Generally Reported

as Having Undeclared Offensive

Chemical Warfare Capabilities

Table 2-8-Countries Generally Reported as

Having Undeclared Offensive

Biological Warfare Programs

Region CW Capability Region BW Program

Middle East Egypt

Iran

lraqa

Israel

Libya

Syria

East Asia China

North Korea

Taiwan

Southeast Asia Myanmar (Burma)

Vietnam

SOURCE: Gordon Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, /nternationa/

Handbook on Chemiml Weapons Proliferation (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 164-171, cite 19 published repofls, from 1985

to 1989, that identify nations suspected by various sources as having

chemical weapon programs. In addition, a later publication, Elisa D.

Harris, “Towards a Comprehensive Strategy for Halting Chemical and

Biological Weapons Proliferation,” Arms Contro/: Contemporary Sacurity%ky, vol. 12, No, 2, September 1991, p. 129, cites statements of

U.S. Government officials listing suspect countries; also added is

Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service R+ort: A New

Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction, JPRS-TND-93-O07. OTA hes listed here the nations

mentioned in two-thirds or more of t hese sources publlshed since

1989. See app. 2-A for the table compiled from these sources,

a U.N, insp=tions of Iraq found a considerable chemical arsenal; that

which has been found is being destroyed. Quiescence of Iraqi

programs probably depends on continued U.N. monitonng.

it might face technical difficulties in operating

and maintaining the weapons.32 As of this writing, Ukrainian delays in ratifying START and the

NPT have caused the most international concern.

Table 2-7 names countries appearing in at least

two-thirds of 11 published lists of countries

suspected of covertly developing or producing

offensive chemical weapon capabilities. OTA has

made no effort to assess the scale of each

countrys program, the precise meaning of capability,’ or the evidence on which the allegations

are based.

Middle East Iran

Iraqa

Israel

Libya

Syria

East Asia China

North Korea

Taiwan

SOURCE: Mentioned in at least four of the following six (i.e., twothirds): David Fair%all, “Eleven countries Defying Ban on Germ

Weapons,” The Guardian (London), Sept. 5, 1991, p. 1.; Elisa Harris,

‘Towards a Comprehensive Strategy. . .,’’ op. cit., p. 129; Seth Carus,

“ ‘The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb’?’ . . .,” op. cit., p. 25; and Harvey J,

MeGeorge, “Chemical Addiction,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, April

1989, p. 17; Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence service, op. cit.,

and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Adherence to and

Compliance~’th Arms Control Agreements and The President’s Report

to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control” (Washington, DC: ACDA, January 14, 1993). See app. 2-A for the ta~e derived

from these sources.

a IJ.N. ingpctio~ of Iraq found some evidence of offensive biological

weapon research, but no stocks of agent. Quiescence of Iraqi

programs probably depends on continued U.N. monitoring.

Table 2-8 summarizes 6 published lists of

nations suspected of having undeclared biological weapon programs (which may include anything from research on offensive biological weapons to actual stockpiles of munitions). Like the

list of chemical weapon suspects, this one arbitrarily identifies those appearing in two-thirds of

the published reports. (The former Soviet Union

had an undeclared offensive biological weapon

program that violated its obligations under the

1972 BWC. The Russian Republic has ostensibly

ended this program, but, since doubts remain

about whether the program has been totally

eliminated, it could be argued that Russia should

be on the list.)

Figure 2-3 combines the data in the previous

three tables to provide a combined perspective on
.

66 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Figure 2-3-Suspected Weapon of

Mass Destruction Programs

Prolifera<t 1

nuclear Algeria?

weapon India

program

1

Pakistan

1

Myanmar (Burma)

Vietnam

\ \ Chinal

‘/ /

Chemical Biological

arsenal weapon

(probable or development

possible) ‘(possible)

Shaded area: also has

Scud-type or longer

range ballistic missile

This figure shows the considerable overlap among countries

of chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile proliferation

concern. The countries named In the figure are those in Tables

2-6,2-7, and 2-8; as the notes to those tables indicate, the lists

are compiled from unclassified sources and should not be

considered either authoritative or complete.

SOURCE: Off&e of Technology Assessment, 1993.

the states suspected of having or trying to develop

or produce weapons of mass destruction. Three

features of the problem stand out. First, the

estimate for the current number of potential

nuclear proliferants is relatively small--and smaller

than it might have been a few years ago. Second,

the set of countries trying to acquire nuclear

weapons overlaps considerably with the set suspected of having chemical and biological weapon

programs. Third, the most immediate and serious

threats (beyond the potential threat posed by

former Soviet republics) are concentrated in three

regions of international rivalry: the Koreas, IndiaPakistan, and the Middle East. Thus, on the one

hand, proliferation is still limited enough to

encourage hope that it can be contained. On

the other hand, it is occurring in places where

political conflicts pose a major complication to

nonproliferation efforts.

9 Delivery Systems

The countries in shaded areas in figure 2-3 also

have Scud-range or better ballistic missiles. In

addition, all the nations in the figure except

Burma have fighter-bomber aircraft, most with

ranges of 1,000 km or more and with payloads

between 3,000 and 8,800 kg.

Over a dozen countries outside of the five

declared nuclear powers possess or are developing ballistic missiles with ranges from 300-600

km.

33 Soviet export of Scud-B missiles in the

1970s and 1980s played a major role in the spread

of these missiles. The Missile Technology Control Regime has reduced the potential number of

suppliers of missiles. However, additional countries have learned to copy, modify, extend the

range of, and produce their own versions of

previously imported missiles; a few have developed their own long-range systems-often in

conjunction with space-launch programs and

foreign technical assistance.

Those emerging missile powers that might

have the intent to strike at the United States (e.g.,

Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya) will not be able to

field long-range missiles or ICBMs over the next

10 years, and those that could develop the

capability (e.g., Israel, India, Taiwan) are not

likely to have the intent. It is therefore unlikely

that any country (other than China and the former

Soviet republics that already possess intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs) would

pose a direct ballistic missile threat to the U.S.

within the next 10 years.

The only developing country that in the next

decade is likely to be able to threaten U.S.

territory with ballistic missiles is China, which

33 SM CYrA, op. cit., footnote 11.
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 167

Table 2-9-Classification of Indigenous Production Capabilities of Ballistic Missiles

Country None lncipient a

Intermediatea Advanceda

Middle East

Libya

Egypt

Israel

Syria

Iraq

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Yemen

South Asia

India

Pakistan

East Asia

Taiwan

North Korea

South Korea

Southern Africa

South Africa

Latin America

Argentina

Brazil

x

—

x

—

x

x

—

—

—

—

—

x > — —

x

x >

x

— — x

x >?

— — )@?

— x >?

— )(b >

— )(? >?

— )(? — >

— * >

NOTES:

a ‘t[n~pient” means some capability to modify existing Scuds, but little else. “Intermediate” means the capability to

reverse-engineer Scud-like missiles, to introduce changes, and to make solid-propellant short-range missiles.

“Advanced” means capable of making missiles comparable to those producact by the United States in the mid-1960s

(including intercontinental ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles).

b South Korea COUM be characterized as “Advanced” although it has only demonstrated capabilities for reverseengineering. Largely because of diplomatic efforts by the United States since the 1970s, Taiwan and South Korea do not

appear to be aggressively pursuing either ballistic or space-launch missile programs at the present time, although they

would have the technological capability to do so if they chose. Brazil’s space-launch rocket program is in abeyance for

financial reasons, but its technological capability gives it missile-making potential.

—> Indicates estimated potential for progress over next 10 years.

? Indicates greater uncertainty.

SOURCE: Adapted by OTA from Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ba//istjc Missi/e

Proliferation and ks Control, November 1991, pp. 153, 15. See OTA background paper on technologies underlying

weapons of mass destruction, in press.

has long had that capability. Israel and India, both

suspected nuclear powers, have space launch

vehicles in principle adaptable as missiles that

could deliver weapons to intercontinental ranges.

Both have also tested ballistic missiles that could

reach the territory of other nuclear powers (e.g.,

Russia, in the case of Israel, and China, in the case

of India), posing an implicit nuclear threat and

possibly provoking counter-threats in return.

As shown in table 2-9, countries of proliferation concern vary widely in their ability to

produce missiles, extend their capabilities, or

design new types. Whereas several developing

nations have essentially no indigenous capability,

others match that of the United States in the

mid-to-late 1960s. Practically all, however, depend on assistance or at least purchases of

supplies from abroad; outside the most industri-
. .

68 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Figure 2-4--Proliferants’ Delivery Systems: Selected Aircraft and Missiles

Note: Range, payload, and flight profile

trade off can vary greatly. SU-24

+

Iran

Iraq

A Ballistic missiles + attack aircraft . Syria

F-4

Egypt +

Iran F-16

Israel +

, - S. Korea Israel

Egypt

Pakistan

Mirage F-1 ~ S. Korea

+

Iraq

prithvi Scud B

A A.... .

Scud C “ ‘

India Iran

Syria 4 Iran

Egypt N. Korea 1 [

200 Libya

N Korea 600 800

Mig-29

+

Iran

Syria

Egypt

Libya

N. Korea

Mirage-5 Mirage 200 )

+- ‘“ ---.--1 .+.

Egypt Egypt

Libya India

~Pakistan

1,000 1,200 1,400

. . -— Maximum range (km)

This figure shows nominal ranges and payloads of selected aircraft and missile systems of countries (beyond the 5

nuclear-weapon states) suspected of having or trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, The graph is not Intended to be

exhaustive, but only to indicate that each country already possesses aircraft or missile systems of one kind or another that could

be adapted to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

ally advanced countries, only Israel, India, and using foreign-licensed technology, but many

China might be argued to be independent in have been able to import them. Figure 2-4 shows

missile design and production.34 For a more some of the types of combat aircraft owned by

detailed breakdown of missile possessions and proliferate countries listed in figure 2-3. Scud

programs, see the background paper to this report. missiles, the Iraqi-modified Scud, and the Indian

Few nations can produce advanced fighter Prithvi missile are included for comparison.

aircraft indigenously; some produce them locally

—

~ J-e E. Nolaq Trappings Of power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (WSshingtom DC: Brookings ~timtio~ 1991), P. 18. me

rewewer of the literature on ballistic missile proliferation has concluded:

. . . it is possible to show that the rmssile programs of almost all countries have been exaggerated in the literature. A careful

scmtiny of the data shows that as of early 1992, only six or seven countries of the [author’s] list of twenty-two had a meanin@d

ballistic missile program or capability. That includes India and Israel, the countries with the most developed programs; Brazil,

Argen@ and possibly South Africaj which have meaningfd indigenous launcher development programs but not yet

operational ballistic missiles; and North Korea and Iraq which possess (in the case of Iraq did possess) the indigenous capability

to produce Scuds. All of the other countries have either purchased missiles (mostly Frogs or Scuds or have indigenous efforts

which does [sic] not look promising.)

Matthias Dembinski, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the New World Order: A Critical Survey of the Literature, ” CSIA Discussion paper

92-07, Kennedy School of Oovernmeng Harvard University, July 1992, p. 6.
More than 40 developing countries possess

antiship cruise missiles, with ranges typically

under 150 km.35 So far, there have been n o

publicly identified programs among proliferant

nations to develop cruise missiles for delivering

weapons of mass destruction. Rather than buy or

indigenously develop long-range cruise missiles,

proliferant states seeking them will most likely

attempt either to attach warheads to nonmilitary

systems (such as small aircraft) or to retrofit

missiles originally equipped with conventional

warheads (see delivery systems chapter of the

background paper on technologies underlying

weapons of mass destruction).

Since both nuclear and biological weapons

carry so much destructive potential in such small

packages, they are both suitable for small scale

attacks by unconventional methods-e. g., smuggling and secret emplacement, or delivery by

small boat or light aircraft. Politically and technically plausible scenarios for the current set of

suspected proliferants to threaten U.S. territory

with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, however, are difficult to devise. None have

missiles or combat aircraft with sufficient range

to reach the United States. But since strategic

warfare with these weapons would be so much a

matter of psychology, it is also difficult to rule it

out. A state that badly wanted to wreak

destruction on a U.S. city could probably do so,

whether it had advanced delivery systems or

not (and whether the United States had effective antiaircraft or antimissile defenses or not).

IMPLICATIONS OF PROLIFERATION

If more nations do acquire nuclear, chemical, or

biological weapons, what will be the effect on

international security? Since there are important

differences in the effects and the military utilities

of each of the three types of weapons, the

consequences of their proliferation will not be the

same. They may, however, be interrelated.

Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 169

The following sections explore the consequences of proliferation from two perspectives.

First, considering the broader concerns of the

global political system and human welfare, what

might be the consequences for the world? Second,

from the narrower Perspective of U.S. deterrence

and potential uses of force, what might be the

consequences for U.S. foreign and military policies?

1 The International Community

NATURE OF WARFARE

Destruction of human beings on a large scale is

not new to warfare, or even to this century.

Nevertheless, weapons of mass destruction compress the amount of time and effort needed to kill.

Wars lasting a few hours could now devastate

populations, cities, or entire countries in ways

that previously took months or years. Nuclear or

biological wars among proliferant nations may

not match the scope of a U.S.-Soviet exchange of

thousands of thermonuclear weapons, but the

damage to their people could still be catastrophic.

Even in a conventional war, high-explosive or

incendiary bombing attacks on nuclear, chemical,

or biological facilities could release harmful

substances into the environment. In this way, a

countrys own weapons of mass destruction could

be turned against it. In a war in which only one

side had and used weapons of mass destruction,

the other might retaliate by attacking nuclear

reactors, possibly causing mass casualties (from

radioactive fallout) and economic disruption comparable to those it had suffered.

CHANCES OF WAR

Some scholars have argued that, at least under

the right circumstances, further nuclear prolifera35 w. se~ cm~, cm~~e ~i~~ile proliferation in rhe 1990$ (w~~gto~ X: Center for Smategic and International Studies, 1992), p. 2;

and Eric Arnett, Sea-bunched Cruise Missiles and U.S. Secun-ry (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), p. 28.
70 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

tion could be a good thing.36 One of these authors

argues that well-managed proliferation could

produce a stable order in Europe, but that

“Unfortunately, however, any proliferation is

likely to be mismanaged. ’ He cites four principal

dangers:

●

●

●

●

The

existing nuclear powers might use force to

prevent others from getting nuclear weapons

(as Israel tried against Iraq);

new nuclear powers might only be able to

afford nuclear forces vulnerable to destruction by preemptive first strikes, leading to

instabilities;

those controlling nuclear weapons might

believe they could fight and win nuclear

wars; and

increasing the number of fingers on the

nuclear trigger would increase the probability that some would use them accidentally or

irrationally, or that terrorists would steal

them. 37

same principles would probably apply, in

varying degrees, to chemical and biological

weapons. The predominant view amongst most

scholars-and national governments-is that these

dangers are not controllable and that proliferation

should be avoided, not accepted.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Massively destructive weapons can alter

international balances of power in both positive

and negative ways. A relatively small nation may

gain useful leverage against larger or more

numerous adversaries. France’s primary argument for acquiring its nuclear force de frappe was

that although a French nuclear blow would be

limited in comparison to the damage that the

Soviet Union could inflict, it might still impose a

higher price on aggression than the Soviets would

find worthwhile. Israel seems to believe that its

undeclared nuclear weapons give it an ultimate

deterrent against invasion from its more numerous Arab neighbors. But, while some nations

might use nuclear weapons to deter aggression,

aggressor nations might use them to deter resistance.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY OPERATIONS

The spread of weapons of mass destruction

may make it more difficult to organize groups of

nations (whether under U.N. aegis or within

regional security groupings) to respond to acts of

aggression. For example, we do not know, if the

Iraqi Scuds had been known to carry nuclear

warheads,

36 See Kenneth N, Waltz-, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More my Be Better,’ Adelphi Paper 17Z (_I.mdon: International Institute for

S@ategic Studies, 1981) and John J. Weltmaq “Nuclear Devolution and World Order,” World Politics, vol. 32, January 1980, pp. 169-193,

arguing although that considerable nuclear proliferation is inevitable, regional balances of nuclear power could emerge and be no less stable

than the superpower balance; the latter author was only slightly less optimistic in “Managing Nuclear Multipolarity,’ International Secun”ty,

winter 1981/82, vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 182-194. See also John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, ”

International Security, summer 1990 (vol. 15, No. 1), pp. 5-56. Mearsheimer advocates that

. . . the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The best

hope for avoiding war in post-Cold-War Europe is nuclear deterrence; hence some nuclear proliferation is necessary to

compensate for the withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals tiom Centrat Europe. Idealty, as I have argued,

nuclear weapons would spread to Germany, but to no other state. (p, 54)

He does not explain how proliferation can be “carhlly managed” and confined only to GermanY, or, indeed, only to Europe.

Another author argues not so much that nuclear proliferation will be stabilizing, but that it is inevitable, He therefore concludes that

the U.S. must learn to adjust to the situation. While it may be possible to focus some policy efforts on temporarily delaying proliferation to

some “unstable or brutal anti-American dictatorships,’ for the most part the U.S. should give up ‘a non-proli.kation system that is becoming

less and less viable.” TM Galen Carpenter, “A New proliferation Policy,” The National Interest, summer 1992, pp. 63-72,

ST pmap~u~ from Mearsheimer, Op cit., footnote 36, pp. 37-38.
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 71

●

●

●

●

whether Saudi Arabia would have agreed to

participate in a coalition to drive Iraq from

Kuwait,

whether other Arab states within range of

Iraqi missiles or aircraft would have joined,

whether the United States and European

nations would have been willing to send

their troops into the region, or

what role U.S. nuclear capabilities might

have played in building coalition consensus.

Nor do we know what coalition reactions would

have been if Iraq had threatened to respond with

nuclear or biological attacks on European cities.

A more dangerous Iraqi threat might have caused

coalition participants to think twice. On the other

hand, they may have come to feel all the more

strongly that it was better to stop Iraqi aggression

sooner, rather than later when its ambitions and

power had grown even larger. The United States,

for its part, might have considered additional

long-range bomber or cruise missile attacks as

alternatives to large ground-troop concentrations.

FALLING DOMINOES

Arms races

One likely result of proliferation is more

proliferation. India justifies its nuclear weapon

program by pointing to China’s. Pakistan has

tried to keep up with India. Iran may have decided

it must match Iraq’s chemical weapons, as well as

try to develop nuclear weapons. Some Arab

nations have sought nuclear weapons to counter

those of Israel; or, they may have pursued

biological weapons as the “poor man’s atomic

bomb. ” If proliferation proceeds, more nations

that until now have forgone the nuclear option

may reconsider. For example, if North Korea got

nuclear weapons, South Korea would be strongly

tempted to follow suit, particularly if it perceived

U.S. security guarantees and involvement in

Pacific affairs to weakening. Japan also might

question its own renunciation of the weapons.

Erosion of norms

Iraq’s use of chemical weapons has already

weakened the international taboo attached to

them. The frost large-scale use of biological

weapons would be shocking, the next less so, and

so on. Moreover, a single successful application

of a biological weapon might inspire non-state

terrorists to try the same thing. Although a small

nuclear war might mobilize the international

community into action to prevent a recurrence, it

might instead show that outside powers will try to

keep their distance.

Increase of supply

More states in the business of making nuclear,

chemical, or biological weapons could also mean

more potential suppliers of means of production

or actual weapons to still other parties-perhaps

states, perhaps terrorist groups. Even if proliferant states did not intentionally transfer these

goods, they might become targets for illicit

foreign purchasers and smugglers.

SHORT OF WAR...

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

exact a toll, whether possessing states ever use

them or not. Experiences in both the United States

and the former Soviet Union show some of the

costs and risks.

Increased chances of terrorist theft

This report does not address the non-state

terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction.38

But any state building these weapons must erect

and maintain a formidable security apparatus,

both to protect the secrets of the weapons and to

prevent their falling into unauthorized hands.

Ineffective or inexperienced governments, especially those with relatively unstable regimes, may

38 See U.S. con~ess, offke of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: Sfrucwing Securify, OTA-lsC-s 11 ~~~to~

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992).
. —- -

72 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

not be as successful as the owners of nuclear,

chemical, or biological weapon facilities have

been so far. Indeed, it is still too early to be certain

that Russia will successfully gain and keep stable,

central control over all the weapons of the former

Soviet Union.

Increased risk from political fragmentation

Disintegration of national political authority,

regional secession, or civil war could deliver

weapons of mass destruction into the hands of

groups that, at best, would be poorly equipped to

manage the weapons safely, or at worst, would

use them irresponsibly. Again, the republics of

the former Soviet Union, perhaps including

Russia, seem vulnerable to this risk.

Diversion of economic resources

The start-up costs of a nuclear weapon program

are great. Iraq probably spent about $10 billion

before its efforts were interrupted. A narrower

program than Iraq’s might cost less, but could still

cost billions. Acquisition programs for chemical

and biological weapons cost much less. Despite

the expense, some countries may see weapons of

mass destruction as substitutes for larger, even

more expensive, conventional forces (the United

States decided in the 1960s that nuclear weapons

were a way of getting ‘‘more bang for the buck’ ‘).

At the same time, those in charge of conventional

forces may feel that spending on weapons of mass

destruction diverts resources from more usable

military instruments. Nevertheless, in most cases

the quest for weapons of mass destruction is

usually embedded in an across-the-board arms

competition. Each country’s possession of such a

weapon will inevitably increase the stakes of the

competition for its adversaries, feeding regional

arms races. Nations pay for these arms races at the

cost of their peoples’ welfare.

Safety and environmental effects on proliferants’

and their neighbors’ populations

The United States and the former Soviet Union

face monstrous clean-up operations: radioactive

elements and hazardous chemicals contaminate

the soil, sediments, surface water, and groundwater at most or all of the sites where nuclear

weapons were manufactured.39 To complete the

U.S. cleanup could cost hundreds of billions of

dollars. Little is known about the public health

consequences if this mess is not cleaned up-as,

in the former Soviet Union, it seems unlikely to

be. Production-and destruction--of chemical

weapons also poses environmental risks. Neither

the United States nor Russia has developed

politically acceptable plans (let alone built the

facilities) to destroy their chemical weapon stockpiles according to the 10-year schedule specified

in the CWC.40

There is little reason to think that developing

nations manufacturing weapons of mass destruction will allocate much of their scarce resources

to environmental health and safety. One might

take as an indicator the recklessness with which

the Iraqi chemical weapon program handled toxic

chemicals (as reported by U.N. Special Commission inspectors).

Infectious biological agents eventually die, and

toxins are biodegradable. But some sporeforming microorganisms, in particular anthrax

bacteria, can persist in the environment for many

years. Moreover, biological weapon programs

themselves can pose a threat to public health, as

apparently happened when anthrax spores were

accidentally released in 1979 from a biological

39 Se. U.S. conge~~, ~lce of ~c~olo~ Assessment, compl~ cleanup: The Environmental kgacy of Nuclear Weapons Production,

OTA-O-484 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, February 1991) for an assessment of the scope of the U.S. problem; the

situation in the former Soviet Union is unquestionably fm worse.

m See us, ConPess, Offlce of ~holon Ass~sment, Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technol+vlw backgro~d PaWrS

OTA-BP-O-95 (Washington, DC: OffIce of lk.chnology Assessment June 1992).
——

weapon research facility in the Soviet city of

Sverdlovsk, triggering a deadly epidemic.41

I U.S. Political-Military Policies

U.S. military forces are likely to continue to be

called to deter or combat military actions abroad,

whether unilaterally or as a member of an

international coalition. Future aggressor states

having weapons of mass destruction will change

the context for

how to threaten

DETERRENCE

U.S. decisions about when and

or use force.

Deterrence oft he United States

The United States acted to protect its national

interests against challenges from a Soviet Union

heavily armed with nuclear, chemical, and possibly biological weapons aimed at U.S. territory,

U.S. forces abroad, and U.S. allies. Nevertheless,

the risk of direct conflict with the Soviet Union

clearly constrained U.S. definitions of its national

interests, its policies for defending those interests,

and its strategies and tactics for managing clashes

with Soviet international policies.

Would other, though vastly smaller, nuclear (or

biological or chemical) powers be able to deter

the United States from regional interventions to

protect its interests? Possibly, depending on

whether U.S. leaders perceived the stakes to be

worth the risks. In the case of Iraq, for example,

the United States was concerned about, but not

deterred by, the known Iraqi chemical arsenal and

the possibility of a biological weapon threat. The

United States would have had a different problem

if Iraq had had nuclear weapons. If Iraq could

have credibly threatened to use a few nuclear

weapons against U.S. cities or those of U.S. allies,

—

Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 73

the calculus of U.S. intervention would have been

even more different.

The nature of U.S. decisions might have

depended in part on whether U.S. leaders believed

that the Iraqi rulers would have themselves been

deterred from escalating to the use of nuclear

weapons by U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities.

(To the extent that U.S. military forces will be

used in conjunction of those of other states, the

dynamics of building and sustaining coalitions in

the face of threats from weapons of mass destruction will also be important; this topic is discussed

below.)

We now know of one historical case in which

the proliferant country hoped to use its nuclear

weapon not to deter U.S. military intervention,

but to cause it. Although South Africa kept its

nuclear weapon program secret,

The strategy was that if the situation in

southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a

confidential indication of the [nuclear] deterrent

capability would be given to one or more of the

major powers, for example the United States, in

an attempt to persuade them to intervene.42

Thus, South Africa hoped to engage in a kind of

reverse nuclear blackmail.

Deterrence by the United States

To some extent, the U.S. and Soviet nuclear

arsenals neutralized each other; the two nuclear

superpowers never engaged in direct military

conflict with one another at least in part because

of the risk of escalation to mutual annihilation.

Even in much more one-sided confrontations, the

availability of nuclear weapons to the greater

power did not deter, for example, the North

Vietnamese from engaging the United States or

the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan from taking on the

41 U.S. ~iciom abut u event WCre _ Officially confirmed by the RUSSkUM in 1992. !k R. Jefiy smith “Ycltsti B1=CS “79

Anthrax On GeMI Warfare Efforts, ’ Washington Post, June 16, 1992, pp. Al, A2. For a Russian Komsomolskaya Pravah report with details

on the inciden~ see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRSReport: Prolz~eration, JPRS-TND-92-022, July 10, 1992, pp. 19-24. See also

Milton Leitenberg, “Anttuax in Sverdlovsk: New Pieces to the Puzzle,” Arms ControZ Today, April 1992, pp. l&13.

AZ presideylt F.W. deWer~ speech to joint session of South Afrkanparliamen4 h- bed from JoharmedmrgRadio South AfiicaNetworlq

Mar. 24, 1993 (JPRS-TND-93-009, Mar. 29, 1993, p. 2).
74 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Soviet Union. Nor did the nuclear stand-off deter

the superpowers from arming each other’s enemies in those two conflicts. In these cases, the

lesser powers had good reason to believe that the

nuclear superpowers were very unlikely to use

their nuclear weapons-both because of the

opprobrium that would come from such a disproportionate use of violence and because of the risk

of escalation of conflict with the victim’s nucleararmed ally.

Emerging nuclear powers that avoid direct

attacks on the United States may justifiably doubt

whether the United States would unleash nuclear

weapons on them for conventionally armed acts

of aggression elsewhere. Thus, U.S. nuclear

deterrence, already a small factor in such situations, might not be much affected by nuclear

proliferation.

U.S. conventional military threats may have

deterred less industrialized countries from attacking U.S. interests abroad. Would further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction weaken such

deterrence in the future? The issue in this case is

not just whether U.S. leaders decide that U.S.

interests at stake justify deploying conventional

forces in the face of the risks to them posed by

weapons of mass destruction: it is also whether

the nation to be deterred would believe that its

own threats would counter-deter the United

States, leaving itself free to act without fear of

U.S. intervention. For the next several years, such

a counter-deterrent threat might take the form of

either limited unconventional attacks on U.S.

cities, or somewhat larger, but still limited,

attacks on U.S. forces intervening abroad.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

In preparing for war in Central Europe, U.S.

forces had to take account of the possibility that

they would confront Warsaw Pact nuclear or

chemical weapons. They could probably learn to

prepare to operate under such threats elsewhere in

the world. Even so, having to cope with weapons

of mass destruction would make U.S. foreign

interventions costlier and more difficult. Nuclear

or biologica143 weapons (to a greater extent than

chemical) would increase the risk of casualties.

For Operation Desert Shield (preceding Desert

Storm), the U.S. had to move in large quantities

of troops and supplies through a few ports and

airfields. An effective nuclear, chemical, or biological threat against vital transportation nodes or

staging areas would have caused great difficulty

for the Coalition. (An alternative strategy might

have been to rely on still more intensive longrange cruise-missile and bombing attacks than

were used in Desert Storm; this strategy, however, would still leave the problem of occupying

territory on the ground.)

During the Cold War, part of U.S. preparedness

in the European theater was based on the assumption that the United States would retaliate in kind

against Soviet nuclear (and possibly against

chemical) attacks; tither, the United States did

not foreclose the possibility that it would initiate

the use of nuclear weapons if it were losing a

conventional battle. On the other hand, much of

the world would probably see U.S. first use of

nuclear weapons in the developing world as

grossly disproportionate to any conceivable U.S.

interests there.44

43 ~ me a- of ~=tivem- of detection that would allow soldiers to don PI’OteCtivt? g= soon emllgh.

44 U.S. decisionmakers may have already internalid such concerns. Ixwis Dunn notes that

. . . war games on this subject have fiquently revealed a reluctance of players from the Washington national security elite to

use nuclear weapons against third-world countries, even in nxaliation for nuclear use.

Contairu”ng Nuclear Proliferation, A&lphi Papers 263 @mdorx Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 73,

note 1-4S.
—— .—— —

Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks ! 75

ALLIANCES OR COALITIONS

A continuing theme of the Cold War was the

West European fear that the superpowers would

fight a ‘‘tactical’ nuclear war in Europe-with

consequences for them similar to those of a

‘‘strategic’ nuclear exchange for the United

States. In the case of the U.S.-Soviet contest,

however, the United States shared at least some

risk of nuclear devastation with its allies. In

confrontations with proliferant nuclear powers

lacking the means to attack the United States,

U.S. allies abroad would bear heavier relative

risks and may be reluctant to participate.

On the other hand, some states facing a nuclear

adversary might welcome an alliance with a

nuclear power—if they believed that the adversary would be deterred by the possibility of U.S.

nuclear retaliation. As noted above, though, such

a deterrent threat might not be fully credible.

A NEW DIMENSION TO PROLIFERATION:

RISKS FROM THE BREAKUP OF THE

SOVIET UNION

The breakup of the Soviet Union—and the

shakiness of governmental authority in the

splintered republics--could contribute to all

categories of the proliferation problem.45 The

threat is potentially great, but just how great it

will be is hard to predict at this writing. The major

dangers include the following.

I Seizure of Soviet Weapons by NonRussian Authorities

Ukraine and Kazakhstan have agreed in principle to ultimate elimination of the strategic nuclear

weapons on their territories. Even so, the missiles

and warheads are still in place. In the case of

Ukraine, as of this writing the government

continues to place various conditions (such as

monetary compensation and regional security

guarantees) on its progress toward non-nuclear

status. Even if the various republics comply fully

with their commitment-in the Lisbon Protocol

to the START agreement-to forswear nuclear

weapons, actual removal would take several

years. Should they choose in the meantime to

become nuclear powers themselves, they could

seize these weapons and adapt them to that

purpose. Alternatively, they might dismantle the

weapons for their fissile materials and then fail to

control those materials properly.

Emergence of Ukraine or Kazakhstan (Belarus

has ratified the NPT) as new nuclear powers

would seriously undermine the nonproliferation

regime in several ways. First, depending on world

reaction, other potential nuclear powers may

conclude that the political and diplomatic costs of

joining the nuclear club are tolerable. Second, the

retention of former Soviet nuclear weapons outside Russia would likely torpedo the ongoing

nuclear arms reductions between the United

States and Russia. Russian ratification of the

START I Treaty was contingent on the other

republics ratifying the Treaty, agreeing to implementation measures, and joining the NPT Since

the NPT links renunciation of nuclear weapons on

the part of the nonnuclear powers with ‘‘effective

measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms

race,‘‘ interrupting the U.S./Russian arms reductions process could have serious repercussions

when a conference to renew the NPT convenes in

1995. Finally, the de facto creation of new nuclear

states in Europe would affect regional security

issues and balances of power, possibly triggering

other European states to reevaluate their nonnuclear status.

It appears that all Soviet tactical nuclear

weapons have been pulled into the Russian

45 For ~m &U~~ion of ~esoWces from the former Sotiet Ufion tit co~d ~d nucl~ prol~~tio~ ~ ZhCky Davis ~d JOXE@UI

Medal~ Nuclear Proliferation From Russia: Options for Control, Report 92-310 INR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Semice,

Mar. 30, 1992). See also Kurt M. CarnpbeL Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A. ZrakeL Soviet Nuclear Fission: Conrrol of

the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for Science & International Affairs, Studies

in International Security, No. 1, November 1991); and Graham Allison et al., Cooperative Denuclearizan”on: From Pledges to Deed

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for Science & International Affairs, Studies in International Security, No. 2, January 1993).
. . . .

76 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Federation. The question of whether the Russian

Federation itself will fragment, or whether the

custodial system for the thousands of former

Soviet nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of

nuclear weapon materials (enriched uranium and

plutonium) will break down, still seems unsettled.

One can imagine either successor states attempting to become nuclear powers, or non-state

groups seizing and exploiting weapons or materials.

1 Export of Weapons or of Weapon

Components

Press reports indicate the smuggling of all

kinds from the former Soviet Union is a growing

problem. Despite some rumors, there is as yet no

serious evidence that Soviet nuclear weapons

have been sold to other countries. There have

been no reports of the export of chemical or

biological weapons, but the possibility that it

might happen cannot yet be entirely excluded.

Much will depend on the continued integrity of

the Russian nuclear weapon custodial system

under conditions of economic hardship and political confusion.

1 Emigration of Technical Personnel

There is also no clear evidence yet that former

Soviet technical personnel with knowledge of

how to build weapons of mass destruction have

emigrated to other countries. There have been

reports of some attempts at recruitment. Although

such scientists or technicians might not be essential to a third-world country’s weapon program,

they might be able to provide useful guidance

about what works and what doesn’t work, thus

speeding the development of weapons.

9 Export of Critical Information, Equipment

or Materials

The most immediate risk may lie here. The

major areas of concern are dual-use technologies,

critical dual-use materials, and fissile materials.

Russia and the other former Soviet republics face

severe shortages of hard currency. They are trying

to establish market systems of production and

trade, but the legal infrastructure to regulate those

activities is not yet fully developed. It is possible

that some exporting enterprises may be unaware

of the proliferation risks of particular goods;

others may intentionally take advantage of poorly

enforced or corruptly administered export control

laws. A Ukrainian firm reportedly has already

exported tens of tons of hafnium and zirconium,

metals on the Nuclear Suppliers Group list of

restricted dual-use items.46

In its need for foreign trade, a government itself

may disagree with other nations’ judgments about

which exports constitute a proliferation risk. For

example, Russia has declared its intent to proceed, over U.S. objections, with sale to India of

cryogenic rocket motor technology for space

launch vehicles. The United States, declaring the

sale to be in violation of the Missile Technology

Control Regime constraints that the Russians had

voluntarily adopted, has suspended U.S. trade

with both the Russian and Indian organizations

involved.

Fissile materials might in one way or another

be diverted from former Soviet weapon stockpiles

or from production facilities. The possibility of a

breakdown in the Russian custodial system for

weapons is mentioned above. A similar breakdown in the control of material production

facilities, leading to theft and export of fissile

46 S* William c. Potter, “Nuclear Exports From the Former Soviet Uniom What’s New, What’s T?ue,’ Arms Control T*,

January/February 1993, p. 3.
Chapter 2–Assessing the Risks 77

materials, is also conceivable. Outside Russia,

some important former Soviet production facilities remain; of particular concern is a fast breeder

reactor, capable of producing over 100 kg of

weapon-grade plutonium per year, at Aktau,

Kazakhstan. 47

I Indigenous Weapon Development

A longer term possibility is that some former

Soviet republics might utilize their own expertise,

equipment, or materials to develop indigenous

weapon programs.

48 Unlike other new proliferants, such countries might inherit, rather than

have to import, some critical weapon technologies. Given the current economic conditions

throughout the former Soviet Union, new nuclear

weapon programs do not seem to be an immediate

threat. Chemical or biological weapons would be

easier to develop. Kazakhstan has inherited chemical and biological weapon facilities from the

former Soviet military complex; Uzbekistan has

inherited test ranges for both types of weapons.

47 rbid., p. S. StX dso wilti C. Potter, Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States (Monterey, CA: CIS Nonpmli.femtion ~oJ~4

Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 1993) for more detailed listings of former Soviet nuclear-related facilities.

48 sw CenMhtelfigen~ Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, The Dgfense Indusm”es of the Newly Independent States of Eurasia, ~

publication number OSE-93-10001, January 1993.
Appendix 2-A

Sources on Tables

Listing Countries of

Chemical and Biological

Weapon Concern

T

ables 2-7 and 2-8 list countries reported in various published sources to have, or to be trying

to acquire, chemical or biological warfare capabilities. As indicated in the chapter text, the lists

provided there are in no way to be considered authoritative or comprehensive. OTA has merely

recorded the countries listed in two-thirds or more of the cited publications. The following

tables show not only the countries making this arbitrary cut-off line, but also the other countries

mentioned in fewer than two-thirds of the sources. In the case of the chemical warfare program list, this

appendix also details the sources cited in the International Handbook on Chemical Weapons

Proliferation and utilized in the OTA table.

79
— —

80 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

777777 7 >7-7

7-777 >77777 >

777777777 7

777-777 7 7

777777 7777 7

777777 77>77

77777-7 77777 7

77777 777-777 *.+.

77

v

7

*

7 7

-?
.—

Appendix 2-A-Sources on Tables Listing Countries of Chemical and Biological Weapon Concern 81

Sources Cited in Table 2-A-1, Proliferation Risks: Chemical Weapon Programs

Sources and Commentary from Gordon Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical

Weapons Proliferation (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 164-171:

DNI( 1989:

Harris 1989/1 990:

NY Times 1989:

Time 1989:

USN 1989:

Knight 1989:

Chi Trib 1989:

McGeorge 1989:

McCain 1989:

Additional sources:

Harris 1991:

FiS 1993:

Director of Naval intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, prepared testimony for the

Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, House Armed Services

Committee, Feb. 22, 1989, pp. 38-39.

Elisa Harris, “Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Developing World,” WSLBrassey’s

Yearbook 1989 (kndon: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989), p. 74.

Stephen Engelberg, “Chemical Arms: Third V@rld Trend,” /Vew York Thnes, Jan. 7,1989 (not

a complete listing). (Source given as U.S. administration officials; ?—France is not

mentioned in the article).

Jill Smolowe, ‘The Search for a Poison Antidote,” Tjme, Jan. 16, 1989, p. 22 (source given

as SiPRi).

Joseph L. Gailoway et al., “Bad Chemical Reactions,” U.S. News & Wfx/cf Report, Jan. 16,

1989, p. 30 (sources for a table that also contains other information are given as Arms Contmi

Associaiton, Federation of American Scientists, and Senate Armed Services Committee).

Knight-Ridder news services, James McCartney, “U.S. Sees Threat of Chemicals,”

Phi/ade/phia /nquirer, Jan. 8,1989, p. F1 (also named Japan, Netherlands and Switzerlanda historical possessor and two states that probably have never possessed CW weapons,

making this list unusually unreliable).

Thoma Shanker, “West Underwrites Third VWrld’s Chemical Arms,” Chicago Tribune, Apr.

3, 1989, pp. 1,6; and “Lack of Candor Blocks Chemical Arms Treaty,” Apr. 4, 1989, pp. 1,

6 (source given as U.S. Government officials).

Harvy J. McGeorge, “Chem ical Addict ion,” Defense& Fore/gn Affairs, April 1989, pp. 16-19,

32-33.

Senator John S. McCain, “Proliferation in the 1990s: implications for U.S. Policy and Force

Planning,” table 1, Congressional Record, Nov. 1, 1989, p. S14605; “Estimates are Based

on a Variet y of Sources, including unclassif ied testimony by CiA Director William H. WWster,

Seth Carus, David Goldberg, Elisa D. Harris and others and donot reflect the estimates of the

U.S. Government.” Also published as “Proliferation in the 1990s: implications for U.S. Poiicy

and Force Planning,” Strategjc Review, summer 1989, p. 11.

Elisa D. Harris, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Strategy for Haiting Chemical and Biological

Weapons Proliferation,” Arms Control: Contemporary Security Po/icy, vol. 12, No. 2,

September 1991, p. 129, which cites statements of U.S. Government officials listing suspect

countries.

Russian Federation Forejgn Inkdh’gence Serv/ce Report: A New Cha~~enge After the Cold

War: Pru/iferation of 14bapons of Mass Destruction, JPRS-TND-93-O07.
— ——

82 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 2-B-l—Proliferation Risks: Biological Weapon Programs Suspected

Carus Harris Guardian McGeorge FIS ACDA Total %

Countries (Policy Paper) (USG officials) (London) Def. & FA 1993 1993

Libya

Korea, North

Iraq

Taiwan

Syria

Soviet Union

Israel

Iran

China

Egypt

Vietnam

Laos

Cuba

Bulgaria

India

SOURCE: Compiled by Office of Ttinology Assessment, 1993, from various source. See text below.

Detailed listing of sources for table 2-A-1: David Fairhall, “Eleven Countries Defying Ban on Germ

Weapons,” The Guardian (London), Sept. 5, 1991, p. 1.; Elisa Harris, “Towards a Comprehensive

Strategy. . .,” op. cit., p. 129; Seth Carus, “ ‘The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb’?’. . .,” op. cit., p. 25; and

Harvey J. McGeorge, “Chemical Addiction,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, April 1989, p. 17; Russian

Federation Foreign Intelligence service, op. cit., and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmamentt Agency,

“Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements and The President’s Report to Congress

on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control” (Washington, DC: ACDA, January 14, 1993).
-——

Policy

Background 3

T

his chapter surveys the range of policy measures,

present and possible, that can be applied to the problem

of limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The chapter will also show that if these measures are to

have a chance of success, meeting two conditions will be

increasingly important. First, policymakers must engage the

greatest possible international cooperation for nonproliferation.

Second, as a prerequisite to obtaining that cooperation, they must

act to strengthen international norms, or rules of acceptable

behavior, against the acquisition and use of weapons of mass

destruction. To meet those two conditions, policymakers must

give the goal of nonproliferation higher priority than they did

during the Cold War.

It is by no means certain that the levels of international

cooperation needed to contain proliferation can be achieved.

Indeed, some analysts have argued that the inherently anarchic

nature of the international political arena will make nonproliferation efforts futile.1 Others agree that the levels of cooperation

needed to stop proliferation entail a transformation of international politics, but they believe that with the end of the Cold War,

such a transformation has become feasible.2

1 For example, one argued in 1980 that:

. . ,unless the system of states undergoes a revolutionary transformatio~ any

suggestion that further proliferation can be stopped borders on the absurd. . .In

a world of independent states, some proliferation will be inevitable, much as will

some war and the threat of it.

John J. Weltxnaq “Nuclear Devolution and World Order,” World Politics, vol. 32,

January 1980, p. 192-193. Ted Galen Carpenter, “A New Proliferation Policy,” The

National Interest, summer 1991, pp. 63-72, argues that nonproliferation policies were not

only futile, but even counterproductive.

2 See Randa.LI Forsberg et al., “After the Cold War: A Debate on Cooperative

Security,” Boston Review, vol. 17, No. 6, November/December 1992, pp. 7-19. For

further analysis of the linkages between nonproliferation policy and global security

policy, see Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept

of Cooperative Security (_W%shingtonj DC: Brookings Institution 1992).

83
84 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

What follows is a menu from which the

components of a coherent nonproliferation

strategy are likely to be chosen. The menu does

not attempt to organize the policy measures

discussed into such a strategy, nor to assess

their feasibility y or promise. The second report of

this study will specify and analyze selected

options in greater detail.

Table 3-1 lists the primary international agreements and U.S. national laws that underpin the

current nonproliferation regimes. The sections

below summarize the measures already in effect

in these regimes and identify measures that could

intensify or broaden them. The measures are

discussed under four broad categories:

●

●

●

●

An

imposing obstacles to those trying to acquire

the weapons,

imposing disincentives to deter proliferants,

offering rewards to increase the attractiveness of voluntarily forgoing the weapons, and

offering global or regional security improvements to reduce perceived needs for the

weapons.

additional section addresses the special,

urgent problems posed by the breakup of the

Soviet Union.

IMPOSING OBSTACLES TO

PROLIFERATION

Proliferant nations, particularly the less industrialized ones, generally need materials, equipment, and knowledge from abroad to acquire

weapons of mass destruction.3 Therefore, blocking their access to such supplies can hinder their

progress. Methods of blocking access might

include:

● use of secrecy to restrict the flow of knowledge;

. export controls adopted by supplier nations;

. diplomatic, military, or other actions to stop

exports by third parties; or

. actions to stop or discourage experts from

giving assistance.

If a proliferant nation nevertheless manages to

acquire or build facilities for a weapon program,

another kind of obstacle is still possible, although

fraught with legal, political, and operational

difficulties: taking military or other actions to

disrupt or destroy the facilities.

9 Secrecy

Limiting the spread of nuclear-weapon knowledge through secrecy has been a tool of U.S.

policy since the first weapons were created during

World War II. Today, although the basic principles of nuclear materials production and nuclear

weapon design and manufacture are well known

throughout the world, important engineering details and technical shortcuts are still classified by

the current nuclear powers. (Despite this secrecy

policy, nuclear-weapon states have at various

times helped other states develop the weapons:

the United States cooperated in the development

of the British nuclear weapon program; the Soviet

Union helped China before the Sine-Soviet split

in 1959; French nuclear assistance may have

advanced the Israeli weapon program; China

reportedly helped Pakistan; Israel reportedly

helped South Africa, although in admitting its

past nuclear weapon program, South Africa has

denied this.)

The basic knowledge needed to produce chemical and biological weapon agents is much more

accessible than that for nuclear weapons. Secrecy

may help protect important details of incorporating the agents into more effective delivery

systems, but will not be of much use in blocking

proliferation of simpler weapons.

E National and Multilateral Export Controls

The potency of export controls as an obstacle

to proliferation depends on the degrees of:

s Assuming, of course, that they cannot simply buy complete weapona outright. No state yet is known to have bought a complete nuclear

weapo~ but with the breakup of the Soviet Union, this possibility has become a more pressing concern.
Chapter 3-Policy Background 85

Table 3-l—Primary Institutional Bases of Current Nonproliferation Regimes

Regime U.S. Legislation Supplier Groups Consensual Treaties

Nuclear

Chemical

Biological

Missiles

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Act, 1978 (NNPA)

Foreign Assistance Act, 1961

Export Administration Act

(EAA), 1979 (1990 version vetoed, provisions then sustained

by Executive Order, Act later

reinstated as interim measure)

Atomic Energy Act, 1954

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Control Act of 1992

Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of

1992

Freedom Support Act of 1992 (aid

to former Soviet republics)

EAA

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Control and Warfare Elimination Act, 1991

Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992

Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of

1992

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Control and Warfare Elimination Act, 1991

Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992

Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of

1992

Arms Export Control Act, 1976

EAA

Missile Technology Control Act,

1990

Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992

Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of

1992

Zangger Committee (Nuclear Ex- lnternational Atomic Energy Agency

porters Committee), 1971 Statute, 1957

London Club (adherents to Nu- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

clear Suppliers Guidelines), 1976 (NPT), 1970

Coordinating Committee on Multi- Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1968 (Latin

lateral Export Controls (CoCom), American nuclear-free zone)

1949 Treaty of Rarotonga, 1986a (South

Pacific nuclear-free zone)

Australia Group, 1984

CoCom

Australia Group

CoCom

Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,

and of Bacteriological Methods

of Warfare, 1925

Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC), 1993

Geneva Protocol, 1925

Convention on the Prohibition of

Bacteriological (Biological) and

Toxin Weapons (BiologicalWeapons Convention, or BWC), 1975

Missile Technology Control None

Regime (MTCR), 1987

a The IJn/t~ States is not party to this treaty.

SOURCE: Congressional Research Service and OTA. For a more comprehensive listing of relevant U.S. legislation, see Zachary S. Davis and

Warren H. Donnelly, Non-Proliferation: A Compilation of Basic Dowments on the International, U.S. Statutory, and U.S. Executive Branch

components ofNon-Pro/iferat/on Po//cy(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research service, Dec. 18, 1990), CRS Report 91-85

RCO. See also Zachary S. Davis, Non-Pro//ferat/on Regimes: Po/&ies To Contro/ the Spread of Nuclear, Chem/ca/, and Bio/og/ca/ Wsapons and

A.f/ssi/es(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 18, 1993), CRS Report 93-237-ENR. See also Leonard S.

Spectorand Virginie Foran, Preventing kVeapons/+o/iferation; Shoukfthe Regimes be Combhwd?(Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, 1992).
8 6

●

●

●

●

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

proliferants’ dependence on outside resources

(and their ability to work around blockages

of those resources);

controllability of supplies having valid civil

applications, but also usable for producing

weapons of mass destruction;

participation in controls by all suppliers; and

effectiveness of each nation’s monitoring

and enforcement of controls.

As more nations advance technologically, the

frost three of these factors are likely to decay. This

is especially the case for chemical and biological

technologies, which are already widely available.

In the case of nuclear technologies, although the

number of potential suppliers has been growing,

many states have also been strengthening and

broadening their export control policies. Therefore, changes in the net availability of technology

useful for nuclear weapon programs are hard to

assess.

Despite the global spread of technology, export

controls will remain an important nonproliferation policy tool for many years, especially in the

nuclear area. In addition to impeding proliferation, export controls also supply information

important for detecting and monitoring it. Nevertheless, both tightening export controls and applying sanctions against foreign violators can

have economic as well as political costs. These

costs may be deemed worth the return in international security, but they should be acknowledged.

First, controls can somewhat restrict international

trade. Although the number of export denials is a

small fraction of all international transactions,

many transactions must be screened in order to

detect those that ultimately are denied. Consequently, a wide range of businesses must keep

informed about and comply with complex regulations and licensing procedures. Individual companies may find themselves losing significant

legitimate sales and the other business opportunities that might have followed those sales. More

seriously in terms of U.S. jobs and exports, U.S.

firms may also find themselves losing market

share to foreign competitors under less stringent

controls. In such cases, not only do the U.S. firms

lose business, but other suppliers obviate any

nonproliferation benefits that the blockage or

delay of sales might have had.

Another cost of controls may be imposed on

international development policy: tighter control

on dual-use technologies may not only hinder

weapons proliferation, but it may also stunt the

peaceful technological advancement of the importing countries. On the other hand, if controls

are narrowly targeted to countries of serious

proliferation concern, countries that cooperate

with nonproliferation regimes should not find

their peaceful development hindered.

NATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS

Export controls have been a major tool of U.S.

nonproliferation policy since the Atomic Energy

Act of 1946 (superseded by the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, itself amended several times since

then). Table 3-2 summarizes U.S. laws and

regulations directed at restricting exports from the

United States (or re-export of U.S.-originated

items) that could contribute to the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction or of missiles. Other

legislation, likely to be introduced in the 103rd

Congress, would further restrict proliferationrelated exports. A later table (3-4) describes

sanctions established under U.S. law against

countries or companies that violate export laws

and regulations.

MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS

The United States can help limit proliferation

by controlling its own exports and by trying to

block aid from other countries to proliferants.

Nevertheless, there are too many possible foreign

sources of materials, equipment, and knowledge

for unilateral U.S. policies to control the problem

alone. Imposing restraints on proliferants requires multilateral cooperation to have a

chance of being effective. The United States has
—. —— ..

Chapter 3–Policy Background 187

Table 3-2—U.S. Unilateral Proliferation-Related Export Control Legislation

Legislation, Regulation, or Executive Order Description or Comment

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) Sets guidelines for dissemination and restriction of data relating to nuclear

weapons.

Provides statutory framework for export controls on nuclear trade.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 Tightens export controls by requiring IAEA full-scope safeguards as a condition

for exports of nuclear fuel and reactors.

Seeks to establish U.S. as reliable supplier for nuclear reactors and fuels to

nations adhering to nonproliferation policies.

Seeks to strengthen international controls over transfer and use of nuclear

materials and technology.

Directs the President to seek agreement from all exporting nations to require

recipients of nuclear technology and materials to accept lnternational Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) “full-scope” safeguards on all peaceful nuclear

activities.

Further specifies legal guidelines for regulation of nuclear commerce and

technical assistance.

Directs the President to publish procedures for the Commerce Department to

control U.S. exports of “dual-use” items that could be used for nuclear

explosives.

Defines jurisdiction of Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency over nuclear exports.

Export Administration Act of 1979 and Commerce Department, after insulting with State and Defense, issues Export

Executive Order 12735 (Nov. 16, 1990) on Administration Regulations; its Bureau of Export Administration administers

Chemical and Biological Weapons Prolif- export licenses on controlled commodities (including nuclear, chemical, or

eration biological weapons-related or missile-related, as well as other items controlled for national security or foreign policy purposes). Authority extends

primarily over dual-use goods.

EAA of 1979, the primary authority for U.S. export controls, expired Sept. 30,

1990; President Bush vetoed successor act but extended export control

authority by executive order under emergency power (conferred by the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977). In 1992 Congress

passed an interim renewal of the 1979 Act.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Con- Amended EAA to require Secretary of Commerce to establish and maintain “a

trol and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 list of goods and technology that would directly and substantially assist a

foreign government or group in acquiring the capability to develop, produce,

stockpile, or deliver chemical or biological weapons” if licensing them would

be effective, and then keep a list of countries for which exporters must obtain

validated export licenses.

Arms Export Control Act of 1976 Authorizes State Department (through its Center for Defense Trade) to control

by licenses items (including chemical and biological warfare agents and

missiles) covered by International Traffic in Arms Regulations and U.S.

Munitions List. In contrast to Export Administration Regulations (above),

authority of this act extends mainly over sales of conventional weapons and

weapon components.

1 Many other IaWS ~r~s nonproliferation issues; this list only covers the m@r OneS.

SOURCE: OTA and Congressional Research Service (see table 3-1.)
88 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 3-3-Current Multilateral Proliferation-Related Export Control Agreements

Agreement Provisions or Comment

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (entered Into force Mar. 5, 1970)

Nuclear Suppliers’ Guidelines:

Nuclear Exporters Committee

(Zangger Committee) and London Suppliers Group (London

Club)

Australia Group

Nuclear weapon state parties (now Including China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and

United States) agree not to transfer nuclear devices to any recipient, nor to assist any

non-nuclear-weapon State to make or acquire them,

All state parties agree not to transfer nuclear materials or related equipment to any

non-nuclear-weapon state unless the latter will accept International Atomic Energy

Agency safeguards (monitoring) over the materials.

To strengthen and better implement NPT export restrictions, seven NPT members who

were major nuclear suppliers (the Zangger Committee) agreed Informally in 1971 on a

list of nuclear technology items, the transfer of which would trigger application of IAEA

safeguards to ensure that the items were not used to develop nuclear explosives.

Forming the “London Club,” in 1976,8 more nuclear supplier nations (including France,

not then an NPT member) joined those on the Zangger Committee and agreed on a set

of Nuclear Suppliers’ Guidelines, under which “trigger list” exports would further require

physical security for transferred items, acceptance of safeguards on facilities replicated

from London Club member designs, and prohibitions against retransfer of Items to third

parties; suppliers also agreed to “exercise restraint” in transfer of nuclear-sensitive

facilities, technologies, and weapons-usable materials.

Total of 27 nuclear suppliers agreed In April 1992 to an additional list of 65 categories of

dual-use items to be controlled.

Participating nations have adapted these controls voluntarily. There is no international

mechanism for monitoring and enforcement, but a Japanese-administered secretariat

in Vienna is now overseeing the application of the dual-use guidelines.

Group of Industrialized nations agreed in 1984 to establish national controls on chemical

weapon agents and precursor chemicals that could be used to make them.

Group, then with 22 members, agreed in March 1992 to add to the control list organisms,

toxins, and equipment that might be used to make biological weapons.

Has no formal coordination, monitoring, or enforcement, but does have informal

agreements to share intelligence and notice of export denials.

Eleven other states apply some or all Australia group standards.

attempted to enlist other supplier countries in

nonproliferation export controls. Table 3-3 summarizes the results of these efforts.

1 Blocking Exports From Third Countries

The purpose of sanctions against suppliers to

proliferant nations is primarily deterrence, not

revenge. The hope of the policymakers is that

potential suppliers will not want to risk U.S.

sanctions just to get the business of the proliferants.

United States laws and regulations provide for

sanctions (e.g., criminal penalties or government

procurement embargoes) against U.S. and foreign

companies that violate U.S. export regulations.

Short of criminal indictments, the United States

may also impose trade sanctions on foreign firms

that it believes are violating internationally agreed

export controls.4 Some of the laws also provide

for trade sanctions against foreign individuals or

companies that export items of types restricted by

the United States (whether they are U.S. goods or

not) when the parties know that their exports

4 For example, the United States det ermined in 1992 that the Russian company Glavkosmos was violating the terms of the Missile

‘Ikehnology Control Regime by agreeing to sell cryogenic rocket motors to IndiIx it then imposed U.S. export and import sanctions both on

Glavkosmos and on the Indian Space Research Organhtion.
Chapter 3-Policy Background 89

Table 3-3-( Continued)

Agreement Provisions or Comment

Missile Technology Control Group of supplier nations agreed in 1987 not to transfer complete rocket systems or

Regime (MTCR) subsystems, or production facilities for them. Group now consists of 23 states, plus 2

“partners”; other states, including Argentina, Israel, Russia, and China, have separately

promised United States that they will abide by MTCR constraints.

Members also agree to restrain exports of other components, material, or technology that

would be useful in missile production.

Applies to missiles of range over 300 km; also applies to any missiles which the member

government judges to be intended for use with weapons of mass destruction.

Agreement is subject to no formal coordination, monitoring, or enforcement.

Coordinating Committee on Group of U.S. allies in 1949 agreed not to export listed items (including some related to

Multilateral Export Controls, missiles and weapons of mass destruction) to Communist countries.

(CoCom) Controls have been relaxed after collapse of the Soviet bloc.

CoCom is unique among supplier agreements in attempting to establish common

standards of enforcement of national export controls among the members; however, it

is ill-suited to control proliferation-sensitive technology because the very states that

were its targets-Communist and former-Communist states—would have to be

members of any nonproliferation export control regime.

CoCom might serve as model for other agreements.1

U.S.-foreign bilateral As noted above, in some cases the United States obtains bilateral agreement with

arrangements individual nations to abide by supplier group restraints.

State Department also issues diplomatic demarches, urging individual foreign governments to impose controls on specific exports of concern discovered by the United

States.

~ ~ IJnit~ States General A~unting Office, Export Corrtrok: rnu/ti/atera/ efforts to improve WIfOfCWXWf: /?e/10rf tO the sUbCO/?7~itkW ofl

/nterrrafiona/ Economic Policy and Trade, Committee orI Foreign /7e/ations (Washington, DC: GAO/NSlAD-92-167, May 18, 1992).

SOURCE: OTA and Congressional Research Service (see tabie 3-1 ).

contribute to proliferation. Some other supplier

nations have legal sanctions comparable to those

of the United States.

In some cases, the U.S. laws provide for aid or

trade sanctions (e.g., cutoffs of economic aid,

military aid, or nuclear cooperation) against

countries, rather than just companies or persons,

that supply the wherewithal for proliferation to

other countries. Finally, the President may also

take diplomatic actions to try to punish countries

that defy U.S. nonproliferation policies. Table 3-4

surveys U.S. laws that authorize or require

sanctions against foreign suppliers.

Other sanctions against suppliers-including

nations, not just “persons’ ’-contained in legislation proposed in the 102nd Congress and likely

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

T he

denial of most-favored nation trade status,

forfeiture of property and assets,

denial of assistance from international institutions in which the United States participates,

denial of arms transfers from the United

States,

denial of U.S. Export-Import Bank credits,

termination of codevelopment and coproduction agreements,

blocking of international financial transactions,

suspension of aircraft landing rights, and

prohibition of loading and unloading of cargo

from sanctioned countries in U.S. ports.

President can already take several of these

to be reintroduced in the 103rd ares: actions at his own discretion under his powers to

5 See U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Divisiou Weapons Nonproliferation Policy

and Legislation: Z02nd Congress, 92-429 F (Washingto% DC: Congressional Research Service, July 3, 1991, Updated May 5, 1992).
90 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 3-4--Legislative Bases of U.S. Sanctions Against Suppliers

Law Description or Comment

Atomic Energy Act

Glenn (1977) and Symington (1977) amendments (sections 669 and 670) to Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA)

Chemical and Biological Weapons

trol and Warfare Elimination Act of

Con1991

MissileTechnology Control Act, 1990 (Title

XVII of the FY 1991 National Defense

Authorization Act, which added a chapter

to the Arms Export Control Act and sections to the Export Administration Act of

1979)

Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (A

section of the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act )

Requires cutoff of nuclear cooperation with states that transfer U.S.-supplied

nuclear materials or technology without U.S. permission.

Requires cutoff of nuclear cooperation with nuclear-weapon states that assist,

encourage, or induce a non-nuclear-weapon state to engage in activities that

involve nuclear materials and are significant for the making or acquisition of

a nuclear explosive device.

Require President (unless he issues waiver) to cut off economic and military aid

to countries that supply the wherewithal for enriching uranium or extracting

plutonium from spent nuclear fuel when all the recipient’s nuclear facilities are

not under IAEA safeguards.

Requires President (unless he issues waiver) to deny U.S. Government

procurement or any U.S. imports from ‘foreign persons’ (individuals or firms)

knowingly and materially contributing to chemical or biological weapons

proliferation through the export of goods or technologies either covered by the

Act, or that would be covered by the Act if they were produced in the United

States.

Denies U.S. Government contracts or export licenses to U.S. or foreign persons

who improperly export missiles or major components;

Denies U.S. Government missile-related contracts or export licenses to those

who improperly export missile components, materials, or test and production

equipment;

Provides for Presidential waivers of sanctions.

Extends sanctions to Iran that already apply to Iraq: a variety of sanctions

against individuals, companies, and countries who knowingly assist Iran or

Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

SOURCE: Adapted by OTA from Congressional Research Service, 1992 (See table 3-l),

conduct foreign policy. In November 1990, President Bush vetoed the revised Export Administration Act (since reinstated on an interim basis) that

would have mandated sanctions in some circumstances. He nevertheless announced, in an Executive Order dealing with chemical and biological

weapon proliferation, that the United States

would implement trade sanctions against violators of U.S. law. In December 1990, the Bush

administration issued its Enhanced Proliferation

Control Initiative, which (among other things)

formalized the President’s commitment to impose

sanctions without a statutory requirement to do

so.

E Hampering Transfer of Expertise

Exports of equipment and blueprints are one

way to transfer weapon technologies; export of

experts is another. Proliferants may hire the

services of foreign experts to work directly on

their weapon programs, to advise their own

personnel, or to train their own experts. Alternatively they may send their own scientists and

engineers abroad for education and training

applicable to weapon programs.

Supplier nations have some possibilities for

control over such transfers of expertise. They can

enforce secrecy laws that make it illegal for those

with classified knowledge to transfer the information. They can make it illegal to aid or abet

proliferants (e.g., only since the Foreign Trade

and Payments Act of 1992 have German courts

been able to impose prison sentences on German

engineers abroad whose activities promote the

development or manufacture of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; the U.S. Atomic
Chapter 3-Policy Background 91

Energy Act has long prohibited U.S. nationals

from sharing nuclear technology with others.)

Another way to restrict the outflow of experts

is not to punish, but to reward. For example,

Western nations are attempting to establish science and technology centers to employ some of

the unemployed or underemployed former Soviet

weapon scientists who might otherwise be tempted

to emigrate to proliferant countries to work on

weapons of mass destruction.

It is much more difficult to limit education of

foreigners in disciplines that could in principle be

applied to weapon development. For example,

nuclear physics, chemical engineering, and biochemistry may be useful for nuclear, chemical, or

biological weapon programs, but they also have

fully legitimate civilian applications. Indeed, the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological

Weapons Convention (BWC) all stress the obligation of advanced countries to extend peaceful

technical training to less developed countries.

Brains are multiuse instruments. To bar foreign

nationals from educational institutions on the

grounds that they might someday work on weapons would exact a high cost: it would damage the

openness in which scholarship thrives, and it

would deprive developing countries of legitimate

technical advancement.6 On the other hand,

somewhat less draconian policies might be considered. First, governments could record and

analyze the subjects of research and study of

foreigners to see if suspicious patterns emerge for

particular countries. Such a measure might yield

additional information about proliferation activities, even if it did not itself serve as a means of

control. Second, the citizens of specific countries

could be singled out for denial of educational

services if their countries were suspected of

developing weapons of mass destruction, or if

their countries failed certain criteria, such as

joining and adhering to the NPT or the CWC.

Such a policy, however, would require putting

nonproliferation above other concerns about relations with those countries-it would amount to

treating those states as international pariahs.

9 Forcible Interference

Perhaps the first clear example of a military

response to a proliferation threat was the Israeli

bombing of the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in

1981. This step set back the Iraqi nuclear weapon

program but did not end it. The bombing did

cause Iraq do a better job of concealing it. In 1991,

as part of Operation Desert Storm, the U. N.-

backed coalition against Iraq attacked and destroyed facilities believed to be connected to Iraqi

mass-destruction weapon programs. The U.N.

Security Council, as part of the cease-free it

imposed on Iraq, required elimination of all such

facilities (see below).

Other types of forcible interference besides

direct military attack might include:

In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the U.N.

Security Council ordered the destruction of Iraqi

facilities connected with weapons of mass destruction.

A nuclear facility at Al-Atheer was demolished on May

31, 1992.

s Since a sigrifkant proportion of U.S. college engineering teachers are of foreign origiQ U.S. education might also pay a price for such

a policy.
92 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

●

●

●

●

sabotage of equipment or materials before

transfer, either on the territory of its supplier

or in transit;

military interdiction of equipment or material;

sabotage of equipment or materials after

import; or

assassination of key personnel (explicitly

forsworn by the United States).

While the latter measure is not appropriate for the

United States, it is not unheard-of in international

affairs. Canadian ballistics expert Gerald Bull,

who helped Iraq design its ‘‘supergun," was

murdered in Brussels in 1990. Later, when U.N.

inspectors requested the names of people in the

Iraqi nuclear program, Iraqi officials refused,

saying they feared these people might be targeted

for assassination.

The U.N. Security Council declared in January

1992 that the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction “. ., constitutes a threat to international peace and security. ” This phrasing, referring to a key clause in the United Nations Charter,

makes it conceivable that sometime the Council

might approve the use of military force to destroy

facilities for producing or storing weapons of

mass destruction. Even so, such authority is likely

to be highly circumscribed, lest states interpret it

as license to attack others with impunity. Moreover the necessary steps of deliberation, approval,

and preparation would likely give considerable

advance notice to the targeted state. Such an

internationally sanctioned strike would therefore

be poorly suited for missions requiring surprise.

As a result, states believing their vital interests

to be at stake may decide to take unilateral

military action against some cases of proliferation. However, if such actions are not sanctioned

by the international community-at least after the

fact—they risk damaging the international consensus on cooperative nonproliferation efforts.

Nations committing the action may find themselves accused of violating international law.

Moreover, an attack may even build sympathy for

the victim, ultimately lessening the obstacles to

his weapon program.

Whether such an attack were internationally

sanctioned or not, it would also risk retaliation or

even full-scale war by the target country against

either the attacking nations or their allies.

It seems unlikely that international authorities

will ever sanction covert activities like sabotage,

let alone assassination, as means of nonproliferation. Almost by definition, covert actions are ones

that states are unable or unwilling to defend

before the international community. Countries

may decide to take such measures for the same

compelling reasons they would use military force

unilaterally. In doing so, however, they risk

exposure and loss of credibility as members of an

international community that opposes proliferation on grounds of the common good.

1 Imposing Obstacles: The Special Case of

Iraq

Export controls and other nonproliferation

measures-at least as administered in the 1980s—

failed to prevent Iraq from deploying and using

chemical weapons or from trying to develop

nuclear and biological weapons as well as indigenously produced ballistic missiles. In the wake

of the war to liberate Kuwait, the United Nations

Security Council undertook to reverse the proliferation of these weapons to Iraq. As a condition

of cease-free, the Security Council decided that

Iraq should:

●

●

●

give up all chemical and biological weapons,

all stocks of agents, and all related subcomponents, as well as all related research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

give up all ballistic missiles with a range

greater than 150 km as well as related major

parts and repair and production facilities;

agree not to acquire or develop nuclear

weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material

or any subsystems or components or any
—

Chapter 3–Policy Background 93

●

●

●

research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to them;

declare the locations, amounts, and types of

all the banned items;

submit to unrestricted U.N. inspections and

supervision of the elimination of the banned

items; and

submit to future ongoing monitoring of

verification of its compliance with the U.N.

conditions.

7

The sanctions for noncompliance with the

cease-fire agreement are discussed below. The

United Nations Special Commission established

to oversee Iraqi compliance, along with the

International Atomic Energy Agency, appears to

have exposed and seen to the elimination of most

of the Iraqi facilities and items covered by the

resolution. Throughout, Iraq has tried to conceal

what it could and in other ways obstruct the U.N.

inspections; it has also refused to acknowledge its

obligation to submit to long-term monitoring of

its continued compliance with the cease-fire

terms. For its part, Iraq has made it clear that it

sees the United Nations as a tool of United States

policy to hamstring Iraq, not as a legitimate

international authority. Few doubt that, given the

opportunity, Iraq will attempt to rebuild its

programs for weapons of mass destruction. More -

over, elimination of such programs based on

military conquest probably does not bear

much promise as a global nonproliferation

measure.

Nevertheless, United Nations Resolution 687

did establish Security Council positions that

conceivably could set precedents for future international cooperation to limit proliferation. In

imposing the cease-fire conditions on Iraq, the

Council:

● noted ‘‘. . . the importance of all States

adhering to . . . [the Biological Weapons

Convention] and encouraged the forthcoming review conference’ . . . to reinforce the

-.

In a situation unlikely to be repeated in the case of

other potential proliferants, the U.N. Security Council

required Iraq to submit unilaterally to inspections of

facilities relating to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq

has frequently attempted to obstruct such inspection.

Here IAEA inspector David Kay talks with Iraqi

military authorities after they denied access to sites at

Falluja in June 1991.

●

●

authority, efficiency and universal scope of

the convention. . .“;

stressed ‘‘. . . the importance of. . . work on

a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons and universal adherence

thereto”; and

declared its awareness of”. . . the threat that

all weapons of mass destruction pose to

peace and security in the area and of the need

to work towards the establishment in the

Middle East of a zone free of such weapons.

DISINCENTIVES TO PROLIFERANTS

I Economic Sanctions

Related to the sanctions against suppliers (see

table 3-4) is a set of sanctions aimed at deterring

potential proliferants. Sanctions are one form of

disincentive intended to make acquiring weapons

7 U.N. Security Councit, Resolution 687 (S/RES/687 (1991), Apr. 3, 1991),
94 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

of mass destruction seem less than worthwhile.

Should a country move toward acquiring the

weapons, or violate provisions of agreements not

to acquire them, other countries may apply

sanctions in an attempt to enforce compliance

with nonproliferation norms.8

Current U.S. laws and regulations stress economic, rather than other, sanctions toward potential proliferants. The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT) implies a mild form

of economic sanction by tying cooperation in

civilian nuclear technology for non-nuclear nations to membership in the Treaty. In general, the

multilateral agreements attempting to limit proliferation do not contain enforcement mechanisms,

except for referral to the U.N. Security Council.

In the case of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,

however, the United States and the United Nations have gone well beyond the provisions of the

multilateral nonproliferation regimes in which

abstinence is voluntary.

Table 3-5 summarizes legislative bases for

U.S. sanction policies against proliferant nations.

Although the above discussions center on

the legislative bases for sanctions against suppliers and proliferants, the executive branch

has wide latitude for discretion and leadership

(or default) on those matters. In addition, the

President can act to mobilize international cooperation on nonproliferation. For example, only

one (the NPT) of the international, proliferation

related agreements listed in table 3-3 is a formal

treaty subject to Senate advice and consent; the

others are essentially executive agreements.

Through executive branch powers to conduct

foreign aid and trade policies, the President can

selectively apply what amounts to export controls

to specific countries. Through bilateral diplomatic exchanges, he can encourage other nations

to restrain their exports. Likewise, he can threaten

potential proliferants with economic or other

sanctions under his foreign policy powers. For

example, U.S. diplomatic initiatives played a

major role in the 1970s in persuading South Korea

and Taiwan to reverse what seemed to be nascent

nuclear weapon programs. On the other hand, the

effectiveness of legislated export controls and

sanctions depends on conscientious executive

branch enforcement; moreover, the laws usually

allow the President to waive sanctions at his

discretion.9

In addition to his diplomatic responsibilities,

the President also manages the U.S. intelligence

agencies. Intelligence plays a key role in identifying which nations should be subject to

special export limitations, in discovering the

actual end uses of exported goods, and in

monitoring the exports of other nations to

potential proliferants. Along with Presidential

management, congressional oversight can help

set U.S. intelligence priorities in these areas. (See

box 3-A for discussion of the implications of

using intelligence in nonproliferation policy.)

9 Stronger Diplomatic and Military

Responses

Beyond the economic sanctions listed above

(which could be applied to proliferant nations as

well as to suppliers), disincentives might include

a variety of threatened responses that would make

owning and using weapons of mass destruction

seem less attractive. The effectiveness of many

of these threatened actions will depend, like

other nonproliferation measures, on the degree of international cooperation behind them.

The presence of a strong international norm

against acquiring or using the weapons will be

8 The IAEA Statute, the CWC, and the BWC all explicitly invite members to bring treaty violations to the attention of the U.N. Security

council.

9 See Carroll J. Doherty, “Foreign Policy Rules Riddled With Presidential Loopholes, ” Congressional Quarterly, Dec. 5, 1992, pp.

3753-3758. Presidents have frequently vetoed legislation that they believed infringed on their foreign policy prerogatives by limiting their

discretion.
— — — .

Chapter 3-Policy Background I 95

Table 3-5--Legislative Bases for U.S. Sanctions Against Proliferant Countries

Law Description or Comment

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act

Glenn-Symington amendments to Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 1976 and 1977

Solarz Amendment to FAA, 1985

Pressler Amendment to the FAA, 1985

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991

Termination of nuclear exports if nation:

. detonates a nuclear explosive device,

. terminates or abrogates IAEA safeguards,

. violates an IAEA safeguards agreement,

. engages in activities involving nuclear materials and having direct significance for manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear explosive device.

Prohibits sales of nuclear reactors and fuel to non-nuclear-weapon states that

do not accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on all their nuclear installations.

Cutoff of military and economic assistance to nations:

● receiving wherewithal for enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium,

unless all such facilities and materials are placed under IAEA safeguards,

. receiving a nuclear explosive device, or

. detonating a nuclear explosive device.

Requires President (unless he issues waiver) to cut off aid to any country that

illegally exports, or attempts to export, from the United States nuclear

wherewithal that would “contribute significantly” to the ability of a country to

construct a nuclear device.

In the 1980s, Presidents Reagan and Bush waived (as allowed by congressional amendments to the Act) the requirements of the Foreign Assistance

Act to cut off aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons program;

In 1985, Congress added an amendment requiring the President to cut off aid

to Pakistan unless he declared in writing that “Pakistan does not possess a

nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S. assistance program will

reduce significantly the risk that . . . [it will]”; in 1990, the President stopped

such certifications, and aid stopped (although commercial military sales

continued).

Requires President, on request of Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee or Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to report whether a specified

government has used chemical or biological weapons;

If use determined, mandates sanctions including: foreign aid cutoff, arms sales

and military financing cutoff, cutoff of U.S. Government credit or other

financial aid, cutoff of exports of any controlled national security goods and

technology;

If, within 3 months, President does not certify that country has ceased using the

weapons, provided assurance that it will refrain in the future, and allowed

outside inspections, additional sanctions are at least three of the following:

U.S. opposition to multilateral financial or technical aid, prohibition of U.S.

bank loans, ban on all exports (except agricultural), ban on imports originating

in the country, downgrading of diplomatic relations, suspension of aviation

rights;

Presidential waivers of the sanctions are possible.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

especially important to getting that cooperation in ●

the cases of those more severe measures.

Preparations to carry out such measures maybe

seen as efforts not only to deter further prolifera- ●

●

tion, but to manage the consequences of prolifera-

●

tion when it occurs (see section below, ‘‘When

●

Nonproliferation Fails”). Coercive--or threatened—responses to proliferant states include:

adversaries equipping themselves with comparable weapons or with effective defenses

against them,

countervailing military alliances,

diplomatic isolation,

trade embargoes,

bilateral or multilateral promises to defend

or assist victims of aggression or use of

weapons of mass destruction,
-—

96 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

>

Box 3-A-intelligence Dilemma

Acquiring weapons of mass destruction is usually a clandestine activity. National intelligence agencies,

particularly those of the United States, are Iikely to have the most complete information on who is trying to get what

and who is selling what. However, publicly revealing this information increases the chances that the sources

supplying it will be shut off. This principle has several implications for formulating nonproliferation policy:

● it increases the temptation to emphasize unilateral or bilateral steps to block specific U.S. exports or foreign

transfers, as opposed to multilateral action, which requires broad sharing of information;

. it challenges intelligence agencies and policy makers to find ways to share findings with multilateral

organizations that monitor proliferation (e.g., the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq and the International

Atomic Energy Agency);

● it places a premium on increasing the transparency of international transactions and national weapons

programs by means of agreements among nations to report their actions to international bodies;

● it requires establishing the ability of international bodies to synthesize and act upon the data coming from

transparency reports, unclassified sources, and individual national intelligence agencies;

● it forces intelligence agencies constantly to develop new sources of information when old sources are

compromised by the overt use of their product; and

● it necessitates the development of unclassified sources of information that can be used in international fora.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

Under some circumstances, the international

community may impose economic sanctions on a

proliferant nation. The United Nations imposed an

embargo on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Here, the

Navy’s U.S.S. Pratt (in distance) has stopped a Turkish

cargo ship bound for Iraq. The ship was found to

contain only foodstuff and was allowed to proceed,

● collective international assistance to victims

of aggression or use of weapons of mass

destruction, and

● military response to acquisition or use of the

weapons.

In 1991, U. S., Coalition, and U.N. actions

toward Iraq illustrated a range of possible military

responses to proliferation. (Although eliminating

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was not a direct

cause of the Coalition military intervention, that

goal did become an objective of the war and a

condition of cease-fire.) As noted in the section

above on imposing obstacles, one military response to proliferation is to attempt to destroy the

means of production of the weapons before they

can be fabricated and deployed. A second is to

attempt to destroy weapons already built before

they can be used. A third is to employ defensive

measures to try to neutralize the weapons (either
Chapter 3-Policy Background I 97

One military response to proliferation is that taken by

coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm:

destruction of potential weapon facilities. Here, IAEA

inspectors examine the bomb damage to the IRT-5000

research reactor at Al-Tuwaitha.

passive measures, e.g., gas masks and protective

suits, or active defenses, such as antiballistic

missiles). A fourth approach, embodied in Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions, is to use or threaten military force to coerce

the proliferant into surrendering the weapons and

their means of destruction. Finally, in a step not

yet (July 1993) taken in Iraq, one might force a

change of governmental regime to one that would

voluntarily forswear the weapons of concern.

E Benefits and Limits of Coercion

Imposed nonproliferation measures--obstacles

and disincentives—may be necessary, and perhaps effective, in the short run. In the near term,

the proliferation problem seems limited to a

handful of countries in Northeast Asia (North

Korea), South Asia (India and Pakistan), and the

Middle East. Continuing and strengthening externally imposed obstacles may slow the movement

of these countries toward visible arsenals of mass

destruction weapons. It seems unlikely, however,

that there will be more imposed reversals like that

of Iraq, which was the byproduct of Iraq’s

overwhelming defeat in a war fought for other

reasons.

Supplier-imposed obstacles and disincentives

can significantly raise the costs of acquiring

weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear

weapons. In so doing, they can buy valuable time

during which an aspiring proliferant may undergo

changes of wealth, policy, or political regime that

might arrest its weapon programs. Regional

security environments can improve. States can

reassess the cost and worth of weapon programs.

The international community can strengthen the

consensual nonproliferation regimes--the NPT,

the CWC, and the BWC. Even so, in the longer

term, states that remain determined to acquire

these weapons will likely be able to do so. The

technical knowledge and skills enabling their

development will continue to spread through

international education, communication, and emigration. Industrial technologies and equipment

useful for military research, development, and

production frequently have reasonable civil applications: preventing their spread even to countries

of proliferation concern will not always be

feasible.10

For the longer run, imposed obstacles to

proliferation may turn out to be surmountable

hurdles, not impenetrable walls, In the case of

India, one analyst argues that although a policy of

technology denial did create problems for Indian

nuclear work,

. . . the long-term effects of the policy have been

to promote the indigenous development of nuclear and fuel-cycle technologies in the Third

World. Technical constraints can buy time but

they cannot resolve the proliferation problem or

10 N@~e]ess, tie rates of spread of, and the potential effectiveness of export controls OIL necessary technolozesfor nucleti, che~~,

and biological weapons, and for ballistic missiles vary. See Aaron Karp, Controlling Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s: The Role of Export

Conrrols (3%enhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und PolitK Forschungsinstitut Fuer Internatiomde Politik und Sicherheit, September

1992). See OTA background paper on technologies umicrlying weapons of mass destruction for discussions of the relevant technologies.
98 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

contain the indigenous forces of technology in the

Third World.ll

Moreover, coercive attempts to block proliferation maybe perceived as unfair challenges, not as

programs to promote international peace and

stability. A Pakistani diplomat has complained

that U.S. sanctions against Pakistan unfairly

single out his country but bring no pressure to

bear on India. He went on to threaten that

sanctions could have the opposite of their intended effect:

To add insult to injury, some elements in

Congress are focusing on the perfectly legitimate

commercial sale of military spare parts to Pakistan. Achieving this short-sighted objective would

cripple the operational functioning of the Pakistan

armed forces and might impel the government of

Pakistan to pursue other military purchases and

resume development of its nuclear program.12

(It should be noted that there are no indications

that Pakistan has suspended its nuclear program,

which has very likely already produced weapons,

so this threat to “resume development’ is disingenuous.)

Insofar as domestic support for nuclear weapon

programs is based on sentiments of national pride

and autonomy, coercive measures may actually

reinforce motivations to persevere.

Both Indians and Pakistanis have argued that

export-control regimes are mainly an attempt to

deny Third World countries access to nuclear and

other technology needed for peaceful purposes.

For example, the President of Pakistan, speaking

at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and

Technology:

. . . we believe that the cherished and noble goal

of non- proliferation must not degenerate into an

essay in evolving a technical fix or a ploy to

eternise technological imperialism, denying the

fruits of science to those who genuinely want to

use them for peaceful purposes.13

The best chance for nonproliferation in the

long term lies in building a consensus among

potential proliferants that it is in their interests

to refrain jointly from acquiring the weapons.

REWARDS FOR ABSTENTION

Imposing obstacles to proliferation and threatening to punish potential proliferants are essentially coercive strategies. Another strategy is

consensual: offer benefits in exchange for self-

-restraint. One such trade-support of peaceful

applications of atomic energy in exchange for

forgoing nuclear weapons-was promised in the

NPT. Benefits offered in return for consent not to

acquire weapons of mass destruction might include economic inducements, such as:

● financial assistance,

. technical assistance, and

● exemptions from nonproliferation export

controls on dual-use items.

Another set of benefits could be broadly categorized as improvements in security that reduce the

perceived need for or appeal of the weapons.

Security benefits might include:

●

●

●

●

agreement by potential adversaries not yet

owning weapons of mass destruction that

they also will forgo them,

assurances by existing owners of weapons of

mass destruction that they will not threaten

to use them,

reduction of the role of weapons of mass

destruction in international relations,

monitoring or confidence-buildi.ng measures

to help verify that potential adversaries are

forgoing the weapons,

1 I Brahma Chelaney, ‘‘South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power, “ International Security, vol. 16, No. 1, summer 1991, p. 53.

12 MS=U N~~ &pUty chief of mission of Embassy of PakistaQ letter to the Washington Post, July 16, 1992, p. A-23.

13 Gh~~@~ tat of s~hof ~y25, 1~, ~m theP&~tun Ti~s of ~y26, 192, pp. 1-2, u mpfited fiJPRS-TND-92-017,

June 3, 1992, p. 12.
Chapter 3–Policy Background 99

●

●

●

●

broader regional or global arms control

arrangements that reduce conventional weapon

threats,

foreign commitments to come to the defense

of or otherwise assist a nation if it is attacked

(with or without weapons of mass destruction),

regional security arrangements that more

broadly reduce the chances of war with local

adversaries, or

global security arrangements that reduce the

chances of attack from regional or extraregional adversaries.

Following a general discussion of the question

of addressing motivations for proliferation, this

chapter section addresses each of these measures

in turn.

fl Addressing Motivations

Persuading potential proliferants of the benefits of going without weapons of mass destruction

has been partially successful in the past. More

than 150 non-nuclear countries have ratified or

acceded to the NPT, many of which are technically capable of building nuclear weapons; most

that are capable are refraining. The CWC has been

signed by numerous nations that could, but almost

certainly will not, acquire chemical weapons. On

the other hand, a few countries have refused to

deny themselves the nuclear option, while one or

two others (Iraq and possibly North Korea) have

violated their agreement to abstain. Several have

declined initially to join the CWC, although hope

remains that they can be brought in. Several are

suspected of violating their BWC obligations.

in its 1977 report, Nuclear Proliferation and

Safeguards, OTA found that

The technical and economic barriers to proliferation are declining as accessibility to nuclear

weapon material becomes more widespread. Consequently, the decision whether or not to acquire

a nuclear weapon capability has become increasingly a political one. The choice will turn on

whether a nation views the possession of such a

capability as being, on balance, in its national

interest.14

The conclusion that, in the long run, motivations

are key still holds true. It applies even more

strongly to chemical and biological weapons than

to nuclear weapons, because technologies for the

former are so much more accessible. Ultimately,

nonproliferation policies will have to find ways

of showing leaders still desiring weapons of

mass destruction either that their goals can be

met in other ways or that the price of the

weapons route is too high.

Factors that make it difficult to persuade some

nations to forgo weapons of mass destruction

include:

●

●

●

●

T he

the perceived value of the weapons,

double standards applied to those who already have nuclear weapons and ballistic

missiles and those who do not,

domino effects, and

the entrenchment of proliferation in conventional military rivalries.

subsections below discuss these factors.

PERCEIVED VALUE OF WEAPONS

For different countries, the appeal of weapons

of mass destruction may lie in the national pride

or international status they seem to confer, their

deterrent value, or their military utility. Nuclear

weapons in particular have been associated with

great power status (see table 3-6 for summary of

nuclear proliferation motives). That the five

permanent members of the U.N. Security Council

are all nuclear powers, and show no signs of

wanting to renounce that status, must enhance the

perceived value of the weapons. Nuclear weapons

played multiple deterrent roles during the Cold

War. Their sheer destructive power makes them

attractive to military planners. Even so, the

apparent commitment of the two largest nuclear

powers, the United States and the Soviet Union

14 U.S. Cowess, Oftlce of lkchnology Assessment (Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 1977), P. 11.
100 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Table 3-6-Possible Motivations for

Nuclear Proliferation

Category Motive

Military power Deter nuclear attack

Redress conventional arms

asymmetries with rivals

Seek military superiority over rivals

Anticipate or match nuclear

weapons of rivals

Intimidate neighbors or rivals

Deter intervention by extraregional powers

International Enhance regional political status

political status Enhance global status

Enhance image of technical

prowess

Domestic politics National pride or morale

Satisfy military groups

Economic improve- Scientific, technological or

ment industrial spinoffs

SOURCE: Adapted from Stephen Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear

Pro/iteration (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp.

46-74.

(and now Russia), to dramatic reductions in their

nuclear forces is at least a step in the direction of

lowering the prominence of nuclear weapons in

international relations.

As noted in chapter 2, South Africa added a

reverse twist to the motive of deterring outside

intervention: it hoped that its threat to use nuclear

weapons in a southern African conflict would

induce the United States to intervene in its favor

to forestall that use.

Chemical and biological weapons programs

are more likely to be influenced by military power

motives than by the other factors cited in table

3-6. These weapons do not seem to hold much

attraction as symbols of international status or

national pride. Indeed, their possession is usually

kept secret because of the stigma associated with

them. 15 Nor do leaders of developing nations

argue that they must pursue these weapons to

enhance technical or industrial development.

On the other hand, Iraq used chemical weapons

in the Iran-Iraq war with impunity and with some

military success, albeit against poorly defended

troops and undefended civilians. In addition, in

1990 Saddam Hussein attempted to invoke the

deterrent value of chemical weapons by threatening to use them in response to Israeli nuclear

threats or other (undefined) acts of Israeli aggression.16 Many in the Arab world defended the Iraqi

threat against Western criticism. It remains to be

seen what lessons potential chemical weapon

proliferants will draw from the ultimate inability

of chemical weapons to save Iraq from catastrophic military defeat.

Some nations may seek chemical or biological

weapons to deter the use of comparable weapons

by other nations. Some may see one of those types

of weapon as a “poor man’s atomic bomb,”

deterring nuclear neighbors, conventionally superior neighbors, or intervening powers. 17 The y

may also simply seek these weapons as instru15 Rwmt n~cle~ prol~er~(s ~Ve alSO found it prudent to remain secretive about their weapon prO~u, Wtile Cle@ @@ pfide ~ tie

nuclear technology underlying those programs.

lb h a spech on Apr. 2, 1990, Hussein declared:

Whoever threatens us with the atomic bomb, we will annihilate him witlh the binary chemical. . .we will make the fire eat up

half of Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq.

Baghdad INA, translation in FBIS-NEW-9M64, Apr. 3, 1990, p. 36.

When Western countries criticized this threa~ many Arab spokesmen came to Hussein’s defense, saying that Britain and the United States

were trying to deny Iraq legitimate means of seLf-defense. For example, the Kuwaiti foreign ministry was quoted as saying:

Kuwait while deploring this campaign and its exposed intentions, sides with brotherly Iraq in the right to defend its safety and

security of its people using all available means.

Kuwait KUNA quoting Kuwait News Agency, FBIS-NES-9M69, Apr. 10, 1990, p. 21.

17 see w. se~ c~$ “ ‘The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?’ Biological Weapons in the Middle East” (Washington, DC: The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Papers No. 23, 1991), p. 11.
Chapter 3-Policy Background I 101

ments of military advantage for dominating

military rivals.

Among delivery systems, ballistic missiles are

perceived as another symbol of technological and

military prowess. The chances seem slim o f

building an international consensus that the status

of current ballistic missile powers should be

‘‘grandfathered’ like that of nuclear-weapon

states but that further missile proliferation should

be illegitimate, More likely, although not a

near-term prospect today, would be a global ban

on these delivery systems.

18 If they are instituted

at all, voluntary agreements to forgo or reduce

ballistic missiles will probably be in the context

of regional security and arms control arrangements rather than in a global nonproliferation

regime.

DOUBLE STANDARDS

One problem in persuading aspiring ballistic

missile owners to forgo them is that they are being

asked to accept an international double standard:

the advanced powers now deploying ballistic

missiles have the right to do so, but newcomers to

the club are not welcome. 19 Nuclear nonproliferation efforts suffer to some extent from the same

problem. India has complained the most vigorously that it is hypocritical of the United States

and the other nuclear powers to deny the rights of

non-nuclear nations to acquire the weapons without giving up their own. Although Argentina and

Brazil are moving toward participation in the

Treaty of Tlatelolco (making Latin America a

nuclear-free zone) and have accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

on all their nuclear facilities (fill-scope safeguards), both have refused to join the NPT

because it is discriminatory. On the other hand,

the overwhelming majority of the world’s nations

have been willing to accede to the NPT as

non-nuclear-weapon states.

The international community reached an unusual consensus on the unfitness of Iraq to own

nuclear weapons. But neither Iraq nor India nor

most other nations accept what they see as the

implication that all but the five acknowledged

nuclear powers are immature nations unqualified

to handle the responsibilities of nuclear guardianship.20 Thus, the nuclear aspirants are not likely

to be persuaded by arguments to the effect that

only grown-ups should have nuclear weapons.

A second perception of double standards stems

from the variability of past U.S. nonproliferation

policies. From the U.S. point of view, failing to

make serious efforts to block Israeli acquisition of

nuclear weapons or to enforce sanctions against

Pakistan in the 1980s in response to its nuclear

program reflect the dilemmas of conflicting

policy objectives. From the point of view of some

other countries, however, it reflects a willingness

to look the other way when the proliferant is a

friend of the United States—to select wha t

proliferation is acceptable.

The history of double standards, real or perceived, will in some cases be an obstacle to

international consensus on nonproliferation. Furthermore, enhancement of the nuclear nonproliferation regime may see the emergence of a

triple standard: a way must be found to deal

with the three undeclared nuclear powers,

18 For a detail~ propos~ of such a b~ see FA.S. Public Intere$t Report, vol. 45, No. 3, May/June 1992, pp. 1-18. SW dso Wton Frye.

“Zero Ballistic Missiles,” Foreign Policy, fall 1992, pp. 3-20.

19 in addition, curbs on missile technology are complicated by its relationship to space technology. India, fOr example, tis boti space-launch

and ballistic missile programs. It has expressed strong resentment at U.S, attempts to block foreign exports to its space program that might also

be useful to its missile program.

ZO ~ a Speech to P&ktani nuclw scientists and engineers, the President of pakistiuI noted tit

The bombs that devastated Hiroshima and flattened Nagasaki were not hatched by the “unstable countries” and the

“irresponsible minds’ of the Third World. .

From text of speech by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in The Pakisrtzn Times, May 26, 19!92, pp. 1-2, reprinted in JPRS-TND-92-017, June

3, 1992, p. 11.
102 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

India, Pakistan, and Israel. Will they be

treated as de facto nuclear states, or will they

be asked to disarm themselves of weapons they

do not admit having?

DOMINO EFFECTS

Proliferation occurs in the context of international conflict. China wanted nuclear weapons

because the United States and the Soviet Union

had them. India pursued them because China had

them. Pakistan, aided by China, developed them

to counter the Indian threat. Israel’s adversaries

want to catch up with Israel. In the latter case,

Israel’s adversaries also have pursued chemical,

and probably biological, weapons in part to try

counter the Israeli nuclear advantage-as illustrated by Saddam Hussein’s April 1990 threats to

use his “binary” weapon. Iran sought chemical

weapons in response to Iraqi attacks during their

war, and it may be seeking nuclear weapons.

In short, some countries might not be talked out

of pursuing one kind of weapon of mass destruction unless they are convinced that their enemies

will verifiably renounce not only that kind, but

others as well. (In some cases, even that may not

suffice: even if Israel’s adversaries were to

renounce chemical and biological weapons, it

seems unlikely that Israel will give up its nuclear

weapons unless its general military security is

assured.)

CONVENTIONAL MILITARY RIVALRIES

Weapons of mass destruction are frequently

seen as potential compensation for inferior conventional military firepower or personnel. This

was the case for the United States and NATO

during most of the Cold War.21 Some vulnerable

countries-such as Germany, Japan, and South

Korea--clearly found it easier to forgo the

nuclear option themselves because they enjoyed

the nuclear protection of the United States. Not

enjoying such an explicit commitment, Israel

developed its own nuclear deterrent against its

vastly more numerous (and Soviet-armed) Arab

adversaries. North Korean nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, stalled as of this writing, had

been taking place in the context of a broader

political and military modus vivendi between

North and South Korea.

Considering the special dangers that weapons

of mass destruction present, it might be desirable

to treat their proliferation separately from other

political and security issues. In the current regions

of proliferation concern, this compartmentalization may not be possible. Agreements to forgo

weapons of mass destruction may depend on

complementary agreements to reduce perceived

conventional military threats.

1 Economic Incentives To Forgo Weapons

of Mass Destruction

FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Linking technical or financial assistance to

nonproliferation began with President Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace Plan. That plan

proposed the creation of the International Atomic

Energy Agency, whose mission would be to make

peaceful applications of atomic energy globally

available while ensuring that nuclear materials

were not diverted to weapons. In the NPT, parties

agree to foster peaceful applications of nuclear

energy for peaceful purposes, “especially in the

territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to

the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of

the developing areas of the world”; they also

undertake to ensure availability of the benefits of

peaceful nuclear explosions to non-nuclearZI me idea that w~tem superiority in conventional military technology-rather than U.S. nuclear w~pom+odd counter W-W Wt

numerical advantage was emphasized mainly in the later years of the Cold War, especially as discomfort with the idea of extended nuclear

deterrence grew. Until the very end, the United States declined to follow the Soviet example (however disingenuous it might have been) of

declaring that it would not be the fiist to use nuclear weapons.
Chapter 3-Policy Background 103

weapon states .22 The U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 also links assistance to

nonproliferation, while recognizing that disseminating peaceful applications of nuclear technology cannot avoid the potential of contributing to

weapon applications as well. The Act provides

that the United States “. . . shall seek to cooperate

with and aid developing countries in meeting

their energy needs through the development of

[nonnuclear energy] resources and the application

of nonnuclear technologies . . .’ and shall seek to

encourage other industrialized nations to do the

same.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

calls for parties to facilitate exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological

information for the use of biological agents and

toxins for peaceful purposes; parties able to do so

also are to cooperate in contributing to the further

development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of biology for prevention of

disease or for other peaceful purposes.23

Article XI of the CWC specifies that its

provisions will be carried out “. . in a manner

which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties. ” It also

provides that the states “. . undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest

possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and

scientific and technical information relating to the

development and application of chemistry for

purposes not prohibited under this Convention. ”

A more comprehensive nonproliferation measure would be to tie a large portion of international

development assistance to nonproliferation goals.

(There is a precedent: during the Cold War, U.S.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was

created to help make peaceful applications of nuclear

energy globally available while ensuring that nuclear

materials were not diverted to nuclear weapons. IAEA

headquarters are located in the Vienna International

Centre, pictured here,

foreign aid policies were keyed closely to blocking Communist influence in the Third World.)

One way to do this is to deny aid to countries that

do not participate fully in the nonproliferation

regimes (e.g., refusing to join and adhere to the

NPT, the CWC, or the BWC). Another would be

to offer increased aid to induce states to end the

regional arms races that stimulate desires for

weapons of mass destruction and to convert

military efforts to peaceful development programs. (In the case of the former Soviet Union,

discussed in a separate section below, foreign aid

may be directed at stabilizing polities where the

weapons already exist and at reducing incentives

to export proliferation-sensitive goods and services.)

22 pea=~ nuclew explosiom (PNE) were once a major bone of contention in nonproliferation debates, since there is no difference iII

principle between a device that could create a peaceful nuclear explosion and one that would create a destructive one. There now appears to

be little political support in the world for maintaining the PNE option.

23 me BWC Second Review Conference in 1986 recommended measures for increasing such cooperation. However, the aUthOr of a 1991

book on the BWC asserts that no concrete results have been obtained:

The recommendations [of the Second Review Conference] have served only as a formal recognition of the preoccupations of

developing countries at the review conference.

Barend ter Haar, The Future of Biological Weapons (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), p. 37
— —

104 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

The opening ceremony of the Signing of the Chemical

Weapons Treaty at UNESCO headquarters in Paris

was attended by (from left to right) the Foreign

Minister of Germany, the Secretary-General of the

United Nations, the President of France, the Foreign

Minister of France, and the Director-General of

UNESCO.

EXEMPTIONS FROM EXPORT CONTROLS

U.S. export controls on items that might

contribute to nuclear, chemical, biological, or

missile programs require licenses for export to

specific lists of countries of concern; countries

not listed as proliferation risks are more likely to

be eligible to receive goods and technology they

want.

1 Security Benefits

MUTUAL AGREEMENTS NOT TO ACQUIRE

WEAPONS

The central bargain of consensual nonproliferation agreements is that states give up their own

rights to acquire weapons of mass destruction on

the condition that such weapons will not be

needed to deter the weapons of others. The

non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT

assure one another that they will not acquire

nuclear weapons. Parties to the Treaty for the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

(Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, also

known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) agree not to

acquire or to permit the presence on their territory

of nuclear weapons. 24 States have agreed to forgo

biological weapons under the BWC of 1975. All

parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

agree to abjure chemical weapons.

Bringing the undeclared nuclear weapon

states—India, Pakistan, and Israel-into the

nuclear nonproliferation regime will be a

delicate task. In these cases, the first steps may

have to be measures to cap or freeze nuclear

weapon programs where they are-to keep the

bombs in the basement, so to speak. Regional

confidence-building measures might eventually

persuade these nations to roll their nuclear

weapon programs back, while assuring their

neighbors that matching weapon programs of

their own are unnecessary.

25 One delicate question is whether rollback will be possible without

prior formalization of nuclear status. In other

words, the bombs might have to come out of the

basements before they can be eliminated. If

declarations of nuclear weapon possession and

steps to eliminate the weapons are not closely

linked, the nuclear nonproliferation norm might

be weakened. One way of handling this problem

was recently demonstrated by South Africa,

which dismantled its nuclear weapons first, then

afterwards admitted their existence and promised

steps to verify that it no longer had them.

Without addressing this question, Pakistan has

for several years proposed a South Asian nuclear24 ‘f’he T~~~ of R~~t~nga creates a nuclem.free zone in tie Souti Pacific. ~ 1993, Waler I-J.N. auspices, a groUp Of eXpWtS k tO Chft a

treaty for the ‘denuclearization’ of Africa. This effort seems to have a better chance of success than proposals, previously studied by the United

Nations, for a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. See Jon Brook Wolfsthal, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Coming of Age?,” Arms

Control To&y, vol. 23, No. 2, March 1993, pp. 3-9.

25 For discussion of confidence-building measures and roll-back, see Gregory F. Gk “Nuclear Proliferation Contingency Planning:

Ensuring Global Ordedr In a More Proliferated World,” CNSN Paper, vol. 4, No. 2 (McLeaxL VA: The Center for National Security

Negotiations (SAID)).
Chapter 3-Policy Background 105

free zone; in November 1992 the U.N. General

Assembly again overwhelmingly endorsed this

proposal, but India voted against it.26 India has

repeatedly stated that it will consent to limits on

its own nuclear weapon program only in the

context of global nuclear disarmament.

Onsite verification measures, such as those

provided for under the CWC, maybe necessary to

build sufficient confidence in compliance among

the participants in mutual nonproliferation regimes.

27 Efforts to strengthen verification of

compliance with the NPT or the BWC will have

to take into account the difficulties of balancing

costs and possible benefits from onsite inspections. For further discussion of the issues, see the

appendix to this chapter.

ASSURANCES FROM EXISTING OWNERS

In 1968 the U.N. Security Council passed a

resolution recognizing that nuclear aggression or

the threat of nuclear aggression would create a

situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, notably its permanent members. In

addition, the United States, the Soviet Union, and

the United Kingdom declared that they each

intended to seek immediate Security Council

action to assist any non-nuclear-weapon state

party to the NPT that was the object of nuclear

aggression or threats. Such positive security

assurances could be strengthened in various

ways. For example, the permanent members of

the Security Council could each promise to seek

Security Council action not only in cases of

nuclear aggression, but also in cases involving

chemical or biological weapons. Or, the Security

Council could formally promise in advance to

come to the aid of victims of such aggression.

In 1978 the United States issued a policy

statement providing negative security assurances:

that it would not use nuclear weapons against any

non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT (or a

comparably binding international agreement) except in the case of an attack on the United States

or its forces or allies by such a state allied to a

nuclear-weapon state or associated with one in the

attack.

In the NPT, the parties (including nuclearweapon states) agreed to ‘‘. . pursue negotiations

in good faith on effective measures relating to

cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date

and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on

general and complete disarmament . . .’ The

United States and Russia have each declared that

they have removed most tactical nuclear weapons

from deployment and that they will destroy most

of those; they have also agreed to deep reductions

in their strategic nuclear forces; they have continued a moratorium on nuclear testing; the United

States has ceased production of new nuclearweapon material and Russia has indicated it will

do likewise. Other proposed measures for cutting

back the weapon programs of the nuclear-weapon

states have included a comprehensive nuclear test

ban and formal, verified cessation of production

of nuclear weapon fissile materials.

If the spirit of cooperation between the two

nuclear superpowers continues, even more dramatic steps are conceivable. The United States

and Russia might engage in yet another round of

nuclear force reductions, this time bringing

France, Britain, and China into the process. All

the nuclear powers might put even their weapons

into “trust’ for the United Nations, pledging

never to use them except in a case approved by the

Security Council. Although the nuclear genie

may never be fully rebottled, radically new

institutions for containing it are no longer unthinkable.

26 For fimssion of a r~e of South Asian nuclear arms control proposals that would address situations anywhere from denuclti=tion

to ambiguity to declared nuclem weapon status, see Steven Philip Coheu “Policy Implications, ‘‘ in Cohe% cd., Nuclear Proliferation in South

Asia: the Prospects for Arms Conrrol (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 339-371.

27 Such m~ms might also build over-cotildence: successful concealment of violations at (or away from) inspected sites co~d mislmd

states to conclude that others are complying with an agreement when they are not.
106 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

There are other examples of assurances from

owners. The United States in 1969 voluntarily

eliminated its own biological weapons; several

other nations followed suit. The Convention on

the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)

and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC) became

effective in 1975. Parties to the Geneva Protocol

of 1925 agreed not to use ‘‘asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases” or ‘‘bacteriological methods” in warfare. (The United States ratified the

Protocol in 1975, at that time reserving the right

to retaliate with chemical weapons against states

not observing the Protocol; it has rescinded that

reservation, effective with the signing of the

CWC in January 1993.) The United States and

Russia have agreed to destroy their stocks of

chemical weapons and, under the CWC, agree to

forgo such weapons permanently.

REDUCING THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Nuclear nonproliferation policy entails persuading non-nuclear countries that they do not

need nuclear weapons. One way to reduce the

appeal of nuclear weapons is to retire them to the

background of international relations, to dissociate them from perceptions of power and status.

This is likely to be a difficult task for those who

already possess the weapons. In the U.S. case,

de-emphasizing the international role of nuclear

weapons would logically mean weakening the

credibility and utility of U.S. nuclear deterrence.

That result might in turn prompt calls in some

nations to reconsider their decisions to rely on

U.S. deterrence rather than acquire their own

nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in a world of

generally lower perceived nuclear threat, such

nations may now feel less dependent on U.S.

nuclear deterrence for their security. In the long

run, the nuclear deterrence paradox could be

resolved by placing all nuclear weapons in the

hands of a supranational organization and establishing a universal prohibition against national

nuclear arsenals. However, such a world order

still seems remote. Some argue the nuclear

proliferation problem cannot be solved unless

nuclear disarmament is taken even further-to

total elimination of all nuclear weapons.28

Threatening to respond to chemical weapon

attacks with nuclear retaliation would foster the

idea that nuclear weapons are legitimate instruments of war, and that those lacking them are less

than full players in the international arena.

Attempting such deterrence would also have the

effect of elevating the perceived significance of

chemical weapons, implying that they are in some

way equivalent to nuclear weapons as instruments

of mass destruction. At the same time, a nation

contemplating the use of chemical weapons might

not believe that the United States would actually

resort to so disproportionate a response as nuclear

retaliation.

Biological weapons, effectively administered,

could turn out to kill as many people as nuclear

weapons. Nevertheless, retaining a nuclear retaliatory option against their use could have effects

akin to those of trying to use nuclear weapons to

deter chemical weapon use: that is, trying to apply

nuclear deterrence to biological weapons could

reinforce the idea that they are the ‘‘poor man’s

atomic bomb,” and it might just as well stimulate

as discourage some countries from trying to

acquire them.

BROADER ARMS CONTROL

As noted in ch. 2 and earlier in this discussion

of nonproliferation incentives, nations now suspected of seeking one type of weapon of mass

destruction are engaged in arms competitions

with neighbors seeking not just the same type of

weapon, but sometimes other types and sometimes conventional weapons; this is true in the

28 s=, for ~~ple, Jowph Rotblat, et al., (eds.), A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Dem”rable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO: %’estview mss,

1993).
Chapter 3-Policy Background 107

Middle East, South Asia, and the Koreas. Limiting external threats of whatever character may

reduce incentives for acquiring weapons of mass

destruction. For example, North and South Korea

have discussed verification of non-nuclear status

in the context of wider arms control arrangements

between the two sides.

The choices are among trying to negotiate

regimes that limit various combinations of:

● a single type of weapon of mass destructions,

● all types,

● delivery systems, and

● conventional armaments and troop levels.

Casting the arms control net more narrowly may

simplify negotiations. Argentina and Brazil seem

to be an example of two nations arriving at

reciprocal decisions not to develop nuclear weapons and to agree to some verification measures for

mutual reassurance. Elsewhere—for example the

Middle East—the pursuit of weapons of mass

destruction may be too deeply embedded in the

regional security problem and consequent acrossthe-board arms competition: renunciation of nuclear or chemical arms may not come without

reductions in conventional military threats.

An important stimulus for limiting regional

arms races could be collective agreements by

the major suppliers of conventional weapons

to restrain their exports. The United Nations has

established an international registry of arms

transfers, in the hope that greater transparency

will lead to greater restraint. The five permanent

members of the U.N. Security Council, who also

account for the great majority of global m

sales, have held talks to discuss the possibility of

limiting sales to the Middle East, but have

reached no agreement. (In the fall of 1992, China

withdrew from these talks to protest the U.S. sale

of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan.)

DEFENSE COMMITMENTS

U.S. alliance commitments to Germany and

other NATO countries technically capable of

building nuclear weapons, as well as to Japan and

South Korea, probably contributed to their decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons. In the

future, the United States, alone or in concert with

other nuclear powers, might continue to offer a

conventional or a nuclear deterrent umbrella to

help persuade some countries to forgo the nuclear

option. Offering a credible conventional deterrent, however, may be complicated by the worldwide reduction and return to the United States of

U.S. military forces due to the Cold War’s end.

Offering a nuclear umbrella implies maintaining

deployed nuclear forces that could credibly be

used in retaliation for a nuclear attack on a third

party .29 It also would expose the United States to

the risk that the state it retaliated against would

escalate to a nuclear attack against the United

States. Another problem with the maintenance of

such forces is that doing so would underscore the

special status that nuclear weapons confer, and

may contradict efforts to lower the profile of

nuclear weapons in international politics. The

existence of either conventional or nuclear defense commitments by the United States also

risks persuading some countries of the need to

develop their own nuclear forces as a counterdeterrent to external intervention in regional

affairs. 30

REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARRANGEMENTS

The long-run success of nonproliferation efforts is likely to depend in part on the reduction of

security threats used to justify acquisition of

weapons of mass destruction. Some analysts

argue that regional conflicts are the ‘‘root cause’

of proliferation, and therefore that settling regional security problems is a sine qua non for

29 Some analysts arWe that START-reduced U.S. strategic nuclear forces will more than suffke fOr this purpose, while otiers believe tit

smaller yield tactical nucleax weapons would be more credible.

30 some ~ve ~W~ tit~ Ufited States sho~d develop nucl~ w~po~ spec~y ~or~ for limited rnilitaly pUpOSeS h OthelWiSC3

conventional conflicts; however, arguments that the United States is entitled to special, advanced nuclear weapons, while others should have

none at all, are not likely to have wide international appeal.
108 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

containing it. The security problems in each

region of proliferation concern are different; each

will require specially tailored arrangements if the

parties are to trust one another enough to halt or

reverse their military competitions. Such arrangements may consist of combinations of political

agreements, economic steps, military confidencebuilding measures, and arms controls.

Middle East—Achieving a nuclear-weaponsfree zone in the Middle East would probably

entail extensive peace arrangements between

Israel and its Arab neighbors. The current Middle

East peace process aims in this direction. Israelis

may see their undeclared nuclear weapons as the

ultimate guarantor of Israeli deterrence against

elimination of their vulnerably small nation by its

more populous neighbors. At least some Arab

states may see Israeli nuclear and other weapons

of mass destruction as fully sufficient justification for obtaining the same.31 As the Iran-Iraq war

and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait show, disputes

among several Middle East states go beyond the

Arab-Israeli conflict.

South Asia—Pakistan and India have both

ethnic and territorial disagreements with one

another. China and India, beyond their own

territorial disputes, rival one another as regional

great powers. As noted above, Pakistan has

proposed a South Asian nuclear-free zone, but

India insists not only that China would have to

participate, but that all nuclear powers would

have to complete nuclear disarmament.

Northeast Asia—Until recently North and

South Korea seemed to be making some progress

toward reconciliation between their deeply hostile regimes. At the end of 1991, they signed a

“Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean

Peninsula.” In that context, North Korea (a 1985

signatory of the NPT) finally concluded an

overdue agreement with the IAEA for nuclear

safeguards in 1992. It allowed some inspections

in 1992, but in March 1993 it denied further IAEA

access and announced its withdrawal from the

NPT. After discussions with the United States in

June 1993, North Korea agreed to postpone its

NPT withdrawal, but at that time had not yet

agreed to the special inspections requested by the

IAEA.

Former Soviet Union and Europe—

Ukrainian officials have promised in principle to

give up the former Soviet nuclear weapons on

their territory. But recently they have tied implementing that promise to, among other things, the

kinds of security guarantees they have from (or

against) their neighbors (chiefly Russia). See

chapter 2 for discussions of concerns surrounding

the breakup of the Soviet Union and see below in

this chapter for a range of policies for limiting

proliferation from that region. Several European

states are technically capable of producing nuclear weapons, but have renounced the right to do

so. In the long run, their adherence to their

decisions may depend on their trust in regional

security arrangements in a post-Cold-War world.

GLOBAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

In many cases, regional groupings have been

unable to establish workable security arrangements on their own. The United Nations could

step in either instead of, or in support of, regional

organizations-as it has recently in the Middle

East, Cambodia, and Africa. Realization of lasting security arrangements in the other regions

mentioned above will depend on cooperation

from extraregional nations. In some cases, agreement not to interfere might be enough; in others,

agreement to provide collective security32 

assurances may be necessary. Such cooperation will

require that the world’s great powers—

particularly the permanent members of the U.N.

31 For discussion of the ~d~e &t nuclm problem, see United Nations, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free ~ne in the Region

of the Middle East, Report of the Secretary-General A/45/435, Oetober 1990.

32 ~ ~~ontm~ c ~m~wtive security” implies the response of the international eannmnity to aggression by one of its members, not simply

an allianm of some states against other states.
Chapter 3-Policy Background I 109

Security Counci133--work together. For example,

recent progress in regional security negotiations,

particularly in the Middle East, is partly related to

the end of the Cold War and the loss of Soviet

patronage for some Arab states.

Some analysts argue that the only way to

contain proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other advanced weapons is to change

dramatically not only regional security arrangements, but the whole basis of global security.

They propose a concept of “cooperative security,” the purpose of which is

. . .to prevent war. . . primarily by preventing the

means for successful aggression from being

assembled, thus also obviating the need for states

so threatened to make their own counterpreparations. 34

These authors argue that proliferation is closely

connected to cooperative security:

In order to have any reasonable hope of

inducing restraint among the many countries that

have the inherent capacity and potential incentive

to acquire advanced weapons, the major military

establishments would not only have to subordinate their own national forces to international

coalitions. . but also would undoubtedly have to

shrink reciprocally their own forces, levels, and

defense industries and would probably have to

adopt deployment restrictions embodying the

principles of defensive configuration. They would

also have to radically de- emphasize weapons of

mass destruction in their defense planning. Fortunately, historic contractions in military forces and

investment of just this sort are taking place

throughout North America, Europe, and the

former Soviet Union. If carried out cooperatively,

this contraction can set the standard for reduced

international security arrangements may reduce

national incentives to acquire weapons of mass

destruction. To succeed, both regional and global

security arrangements will require cooperation among

the world’s great powers, particularly the members of

the U.N. Security Council, pictured here deliberating

in March 1992 over Iraqi violations of its cease-fire

obligations.

military spending and for force and investment

cuts in other regions. Contractions in defense

industries and control of export sales should be

transformed from politically charged national

burdens into internationally shared obligations in

pursuit of the benefit of lower levels of militarization everywhere.35

WI-EN NONPROLIFERATION FAILS

Some analysts argue that further proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction is inevitable and

that nonproliferation policy is, if anything, counterproductive. 36 Others say that although nonproliferation policies should continue, it is prudent to

plan for at least some further proliferation, and to

be prepared to try to mitigate its consequences for

33 some IE3VC propoaed that the ~tm~“p of the Security Council be enlarged to include other great pow~ecially

~Y,JapU ad Nti. On the one hanL such an expanded membership would add legitimacy to Seeurity Council actions; on the other,

the larger the Council beeomcs, the more unwieldy will be its opcratiom impairing its ability to respond rapidly to emerging crises Should

the veto rights now held by the current pcamanent members be extended to new permanent membera, the Council might be less able to achieve

the unanimity of its permanent members requked for Council action.

~ ~ton B. ~, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, op. cit., footnote 2, p.7.

35 Ibid., pp. 3&37.

36 ~~m c~ter, op. cit., foomote 1.
110 ! Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

U.S. and international security .37 Modifying U.S.

force plans and structures to cope with the

possible further proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction is unquestionably an important task for U.S. policymakers. Recognizing

this fact, the Department of Defense has plans to

create a new office of Nuclear Security and

Counterproliferation to be headed by an Assistant

Secretary of Defense.

As noted above in the section on creating

disincentives for proliferants, some policies can

simultaneously serve the purposes of deterring

acquisition of the weapons in the first place and

of deterring or militarily countering their use

when nonproliferation fails. It is important to

note, however, that some preparations to mitigate

the consequences of proliferation might also

exacerbate the process of proliferation.

One can make deterrent counter-threats to

dissuade the proliferant from using his weapons.

Analysts have variously hypothesized that Iraq

failed to use its chemical weapons against coalition troops because it feared U.S. retaliation in

kind, U.S. resort to nuclear weapons, or escalation

of the conventional attack to the point of eliminating the Hussein regime; others suggest Iraq just

calculated that there was no useful application

available for chemical weapons. Some argue that

the possibility of Israeli nuclear retaliation deterred Iraq from using Scud missiles with chemical warheads against Israel.

Noncoercive measures to try to manage the

consequences of proliferation are also conceivable. Given a case in which weapons of mass

destruction are deployed despite U.S. wishes to

the contrary, it would be in U.S. interests to

minimize the resulting dangers.

For example, the current nuclear states could

implicitly or explicitly acquiesce in the deployment of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan,

Israel, or Ukraine. They could then offer the

newcomers to the nuclear club help in developing

stabilizing doctrines of deployment and deterrence. The help might be technical assistance to

reduce the vulnerability of their nuclear forces to

a disarming first-strike from others. Or, it might

take the form of technology for tightening centralized control over the weapons themselves and

for preventing unauthorized use, theft, or accidents. Promoting safer deployment of weapons of

mass destruction would be inconsistent with a

stated goal of a global ban on possession-as in

the cases of chemical and biological weapons.

But in the case of nuclear weapons, the policy

might ‘‘grandfather’ nuclear arms deemed to be

irreversibly deployed, as the NPT does those of

the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and

China.

A policy of acceptance might mitigate postproliferation risks, but it would also tend to encourage further proliferation by showing that successful evasion of the obstacles to proliferation can

eventually lead to legitimacy as a member of the

nuclear club.38 Technical assistance on safety

and security measures could also lead the new

nuclear power to integrate its weapons more

tightly into its military forces, keep them at higher

levels of alert, and think of them as more usable

instruments of force. And making the weapons

more secure from preemptive first strikes from

their neighbors would also make them more

secure from a U.S. or multinational preemptive

strike.

37 For discussion of boti nonprowe~tion measures and proliferation mitigation m&WIR s, see Giles, op. cit., foomote 25.

36 @mer @ ~e problem of encouraging further proliferation would be to permit a one-time-only expansion of the nucl= club. ‘f’he

U.N. Security Council could set a deadline for states to declare themselves nuclear-weapon states, after which it would treat all further nuclear

proliferation--including any existing but undeclared programs-to be a threat to international peacs jus@ing a Council inspection and

eliminau“on program. See David Kay, ‘‘The IAEA-How Can It Be Strengthened?, ’ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

Conference, “Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: Challenges and Opportunities,” Dec. 1-2, 1992.
—.

SPECIAL AND URGENT: LIMITING

PROLIFERATION FROM THE FORMER

SOVIET UNION

Most of the policy tools described so far in this

chapter will be relevant to the republics of the

former Soviet Union. But, as indicated in ch. 2,

the breakup of the Soviet Union has led to new

kinds of proliferation risks. The extent to which

the former Soviet republics will disseminate

technology, materials, and expertise for producing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (as

well as ballistic missiles) is still far from certain.

Nor is it certain that the former Soviet weapons

themselves will remain under firm and responsible central control, or that the three non-Russian

republics having some of the weapons within

their borders will yield all of them up for

elimination.

The situation in the former Soviet Union is

only partially amenable to outside influences.

Nevertheless, the United States and other nations

can take steps to encourage favorable outcomes.

In 1991 and 1992, Congress and the administration attempted to help limit these risks by

budgeting $400 million each year (beginning

with the Nunn-Lugar Soviet Threat Reduction

Act of 1991) to assist former Soviet demilitarization. Listed below is a range of policy measures

for addressing the risks identified in ch. 2. Some

of these measures are already supported by the

Nunn-Lugar and Freedom Support Act funds;

others are possible future steps.39

Chapter 3-Policy Background I 111

9 Maintaining Central Control of Former

Soviet Weapons and Materials

●

●

●

●

●

The United States could lead in the creation

of an international forum to coordinate

efforts to help denuclearize the former Soviet republics.

The United States and other nations can

continue to insist (along with appropriate

carrots and sticks) that Ukraine and Kazakhstan ratify the START agreement and

the NPT, confirming their non-nuclear status.

Belarus, which has done so, could be rewarded, and the countries providing economic assistance to the former Soviet republics could condition all types of aid on

continued progress in promised denuclearization.

Nunn-Lugar funds are supplying equipment

for the secure transport of nuclear weapons

to central locations. The money is also to be

used to help build storage facilities for the

plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

The United States could also encourage use

of this money to accelerate current Russian

dismantlement schedules; the United States

could set an example by accelerating its own

dismantlement process.

The United States has agreed to purchase

highly enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons for use, once diluted to lower

levels of enrichment, as fuel in nuclear

power reactors.

39 Several of the additional steps listed below were advocated by Senators Nunn and Lugm in December 1992; s~ SmNW ad Richd

Lugar, “Still a Soviet l%rea~” Washington Post, Dec. 22, 1992, p. A-21. For a comprehensive collection of policy options for dealing with

the nuclear risks posed by the breakup of the Soviet UnioU see GTaham AllisorL Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Philip Zelikow, (eds.),

Cooperative Denuclean”zacion: From Pledges To Deeds, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University,

Center for Science and International Affairs, 1993); for discussion of U.S. nongovernmental efforts toward verified dismantlement of nuclear

weapons, see Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, Report of the Fourth lnrernafional Workshop on

Nuclear WarheadElim”nution and Nonproliferation, held in wmhingto~ D. C., Feb. 26-27, 1992 (Washington DC: Federation of American

Scientists, 1992); see also Christopher Paine and Thomas B. CochrarL “Ver@ing Dismantlement” Arms Control Today, VO1. 22, No. 1,

January/February 1992, pp. 15-17.
112 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

●

●

●

The United States could propose internationally monitored storage or disposition of

highly enriched uranium and plutonium

from dismantled nuclear weapons in both the

former Soviet Union and the United States.

The United States could urge accelerated

implementation of START strategic nuclear

arms reductions; it could ratify promptly the

START II agreement and also urge rapid

implementation of those reductions.

The United States and others can offer

diplomatic support and, where appropriate,

financial assistance to help settle ethnic and

regional conflicts and promote regional security regimes.

1 Preventing Export of Weapons or of

Weapon Components

If weapons of mass destruction remain under

effective central Russian control, their export

seems unlikely. But the same sorts of civil

disorder and governmental breakdown that could

lead to weapons or key components falling into

illegitimate hands could also foster the sale

abroad of such goods. With or without cooperation from officials in the former Soviet states,

U.S. and other foreign intelligence services may

be able to help monitor and stop illicit transactions.

H Inhibiting Emigration of Technical

Personnel

The United States and other nations have

supported creation in Moscow and Kiev (Ukraine)

of International Science and Technology Centers,

intended to help establish meaningful, nonmilitary work for scientists and engineers who might

otherwise be tempted to accept foreign weapons

work to earn a living. 40 Joint projects between

U.S. and former Soviet laboratories and firms

might be another contribution to that goal.

Efficient enforcement of laws and regulations

may help.41 Overall improvement in the economies of the states that emerged from the former

Soviet Union is probably the best hope for

discouraging this kind of emigration.

~ Controlling Export of Critical Information,

Equipment, or Materials

The Russian Government has issued specific

regulations on the export of goods that might be

used to make weapons of mass destruction.

Information about the regulations of other former

Soviet republics is still spotty .42 But former

Soviet military enterprises, new companies, and

local and regional governments are striving to

earn foreign hard currencies through exports of all

kinds. In the transition to a market economy, there

is reason to question how effectively controls on

either declared exports or smuggled goods will be

administered. Western governments with greater

experience in export regulations may be able to

offer technical assistance. U.S. and other intelligence agencies may be able to track questionable

exports and direct the attention of authorities in

the former Soviet republics to specific problems.

A private U.S. organization43 is working with

groups in the former Soviet Union on a project on

“Building Communities of Nonproliferation Specialists in the Former Soviet Union. ’ If such

communities can be established, they may contribute to more rigorous implementation of nonproliferation policies in the former Soviet Union.

40 o~er ~~IIMy dso open in MI@ (Belarus) tind MIM-AUI OQZ@S@.

41 ]zveSriVa~ ~t~ fomimrew~ titRuss~ au~orities bl~~ some nucl~pow~ specUStS from traveling to Nofi Korea. kLWhII

officials confirmed to kvestiva that border troops were instructed to detail “a certain category” of Russians thought to be “bearers of SCXXCtS. ”

Izvestiva, Dee. 22, 1992, p. 2, trans. in FBIS-SOV-%!-246. Dec. 22, 1992, pp. 15-16.

42 For w~t is publicly avti~blc, see Potter, NucZear Profiles ojthe Soviet Successor States, 10C. Cit. inch. 2, footnote 47.

43 ~as NOq~lifm~tiOn ~j~t of ~Cen@r for Russi~ ~d EHfi Smdies at tie Monte~y rnst.itute of hlt~tiolldShldh, with

grants from various U.S. foundations.
Efforts to strengthen verification of compliance with the NPT or the BWC will have to take

into account the difficulties of balancing costs

and possible benefits from onsite inspections.

Costs include the following:

Appendix 3-A

Costs and Benefits

of Onsite Inspections

for Nonproliferation

Regimes

●

●

●

Costs of inspecting: inspection teams, equipment, and operations, whether they are

nationally supplied or work for international

organizations, cost money.

Costs of being inspected: personnel of the

government or industrial facilities undergoing inspections have to spend time and

money preparing those sites to protect classified or proprietary information from exposure to foreign inspectors. The inspections

themselves may to bring site operations to a

halt, costing more time and money.

Compromise of nonpertinent information: preparations to protect information that

can properly be concealed from inspectors

may not always be successful or affordable.

Officials worry about revealing military or

industrial secrets or losing competitive advantages.

The costs in the frost category are not too difficult

to calculate; those in the second category are more

difficult to estimate; those in the third are nearly

impossible to quantify. Further complicating

judgments about how high a price to pay for

enhanced verification regimes is the fact that

increments of intrusion and expense will not

necessarily lead to correspondingly higher confidence in compliance. The United States, for

example, in negotiating the CWC, judged that

‘‘anywhere, anytime’ challenge inspections would

not bring sufficient returns in verification to

justify the costs (primarily the third category of

1 /

s

m

b

4

e’

“zigCosts of onsite inspection are one issue in assessing

the net value of verification regimes for

nonproliferation agreements. Pictured here is an x-ray

fluorescence spectrometer used to

from nuclear inspections in Iraq.

analyze samples

113
114 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

costs above: endangered military and intelligence

secrets).1

Other verification enhancements also impose

costs. For example, improved international export

reporting to monitor flows of dual-use technologies could compromise legitimate competitive

advantages for some of the companies involved.

A multilaterally conducted verification regime

carries yet another risk: that the information

collected by an international organization might

prove useful to potential proliferants within the

organization. This risk is greatest in the nuclear

field, where significant weapons know-how is

still difficult to acquire. Thus, in gathering details

about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, the

IAEA has tried to restrict the information to

members of the organization already possessing

nuclear weapons.

To be weighed against the above costs is the

question of how much verification is enough.

Beyond the issue of the symbolic or psychic

benefits of various verification measures, policymakers need to judge arms control regime

verification requirements (e.g., those for the

projected Chemical Weapons Convention) in at

least three dimensions:

● the significance of potential violations,

. the verification measures that would be

required to deter or detect significant violations, and

. the tangible and intangible costs of those

verification measures.

Inevitably, judgments on these matters will be

complex, subjective, and open to debate: no

conclusive technical criteria will be possible.

The discussion below shows why this is so.

Proponents of arms control or disarmament

agreements for weapons of mass destruction (or,

indeed any kinds of weapons) have generally

acknowledged that no verification regime will be

perfect: a nation that wants to cheat badly enough

can probably get away with it at some level.

Therefore, they suggest as a practical standard

that verification measures should be able to detect

“militarily significant” violations. The following two examples indicate how the Reagan

administration framed this concept in its support

of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Based

on Cold War strategic calculations, these example

do not directly pertain to the consequences of

violating nonproliferation commitments. But they

do illustrate issues important to any arms control

agreement.

At that time presidential arms control adviser

Paul Nitze said that the administration. . . .

. . . would consider the standard to be whether or

not the Soviet Union could covertly deploy a

force which would be militarily significant and

whether we could find that out. . .in a timely

fashion, so that we could take offsetting actions

ourselves in a timely manner.2

In written responses to questions, Secretary of

State George Schultz outlined factors that would

go into a determination of military significance:

●

●

●

●

●

the quantitative level and overall threat

presented to the United States and NATO;

qualitative factors, including kinds of weapons and their capabilities;

an assessment of the state of readiness and

training of the cheating force;

the extent to which other forces available to

the cheater make cheating forces redundant

or add significant capability;

the extent to which existing U.S. or allied

forces could permit an effective counter;

and

1 The Chemical Weapons Convention has the most extensive onsite inspection regime of any international nonproliferation cmnmitment.

For an analysis of some of the costs of implementing such a regime, see U.S. Congress, Ofilce of ‘khnology Assessment The Chenu”cal

Weapon.t Conven#”on: Effects on the U.S. Chemical hdh.rtry, OTA-BP-ISC-1O6 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing ~lce, August

1993).

z Ambassador Paul Nitze in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The fNF Treaty, Hearings, Part 1, Serial Number

100-522, Pt. 1, 1988, p. 301,
—....— ———. — . .

Appendix 3-A-Costs and Benefits of Onsite Inspections for Nonproliferation Regimes I 115

. the overall political and military situation

surrounding discovery of cheating (e.g.,

relative stability or tension).3

In other words, even in the limited case of

long-range theater nuclear forces, the actual

number of illegal missiles would be only one

factor in a judgment of the military significance

of a potential arms control violation.

In the nonproliferation context, the problem of

defining militarily significant levels of violation

is even more difficult. For example, while the

possession of 10 illicit nuclear weapons might

mean nothing between the United States and

Russia, who each have thousands more, the same

number might appear overwhelmingly decisive in

a contest between, say, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

In addition, when weapons of mass destruction

are to be employed as instruments of threat or

terror, how can one determine what is a militarily

significant capability? In the case of biological

weapons, for example, a small quantity of agent

(much less than a ton), properly delivered, could

kill hundreds of thousands of people; if used

against protected troops, the same weapons might

have little military effect.

Chemical weapons present comparable problems. One systematic attempt to assess militarily

significant quantities of agents points out that

estimates might depend on whether chemical

weapons are being used in covert sabotage

operations, mass destruction of civilian populations, or battlefield situations. The analysts in that

study settled on tactical battlefield employment

as their base case. They point out that in that

setting, military significance could

●

●

●

●

●

●

the toxicity of the agent,

the degree of incapacitation

sought,

weather conditions,

depend on:

or mortality

the degree of protection of the target troops,

the delivery systems used, and

the size of the target region.

These analysts then decided that a possibly

militarily significant attack would be one against

10 battalions in a 100 km2 area. In that case,

significant quantities might be 30 tons of VX

nerve agent or 1,000 tons of mustard gas. They

caution, however, that ‘‘these values cannot at

this point be equated with detection goal quantities associated with treaty monitoring.”4

3 Ibid., pp. 470-471.

d Mark F. Mullem Kenneth E. Apg and William D. Stanbro, Criteria jior Monitoring a Chenu”caZ Arms Treaty: Implications for the

Verification Regime (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory Center for National Security Studies, Report No. 13, December 1991),

pp. 5-7.
—.

Index

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Verification (of monitoring delivery vehicles, 42A13

Biological Weapons Convention), 19 proliferant’s delivery systems, 14,68-69

Advanced delivery systems, 34,51-52,69. See also specific proliferation motivations, 101

types by name

Aerodynamic separation techniques, 36

Africa, 64. See also specific coun~ies by name

Agents of mass destruction

biological weapons, 6,38-39

chemical weapons, 6, 36-37

lethality of, 46,48-49

surveyed, 47

Aircraft

as advanced delivery systems, 3-4,41-42, 51-52

detection of development and testing, 43

proliferant’s delive~ systems, 68-69

Algeria, 13,64,66

Approaches to nonproliferation policy

coercive v. consensurd policies, 31

intelligence collection v. use, 32

scope of control efforts, 29-30

targeted v. universal approaches, 31-32

unilateral v. international approaches, 30-31

Arab nations. See also specific countries by name

nuclear weapons in the Mideast and, 70, 71, 102, 108

regional conflicts and, 16, 109

Argentina

delivery systems in, 67-69

policy reversals, 18

nuclear weapon program in, 14, 64

and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 101

reducing incentives for weapons, 107

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 25

Arms Export Control Act, 85,87

Arms races, 71, 106-107

Atomic Energy Act, 85-87,90,95

Australia Group, 5, 85, 88

Ballistic missiles

as advanced delivery systems, 3-4, 41-42

detection of development and testing, 42A3

indigenous production capabilities for, 67

in suspected proliferant nations, 46, 66-68

Belarus. See also Former Soviet republics

control of weapons in, 111

risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4, 75

weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 63-65

Benefits offered to forgo weapons of mass destruction. See

Rewarding nonproliferation; Security improvements

as nonproliferation incentive

Biological weapons

characteristics of, 2-3, 8-9, 47-50

delivery of, 6, 39AI0, 50-52

destructive effects of, 4748,52-56

dual-use technologies and, 6,38-40

environmental effects, 72-73

implications of new technology, 40

institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85

militarily significant levels of violation for, 115

military utility of, 56-57,60-61,62-63

monitoring production, 39-40

onsite inspections and, 7

production, 9-11,38-39

proliferation motivations, 100-101

reducing international role of weapons, 106

strategic uses of, 62-63

in suspected proliferant nations, 14-15, 63-66

tactical uses of, 55-61

technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation, 38-40

unconventional delivery systems and, 69

U.S. military O~mtiOnS and, 74

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85

international norms and, 2

linking assistance to nonproliferation, 103

monitoring compliance, 40

proliferation motivations and, 99

rewarding nonproliferation, 22

security benefits as nonproliferation incentive, 104-106

117
118 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

suspected proliferant nations and, 63-66

technical training obligations and, 91

toxin bans, 3

verification regime, 18-19, 22-25, 113

Brazil

delivery systems in, 67-69

nuclear weapon program in, 14, 64

policy reversals, 18

proliferation motivations, 101

reducing incentives for weapons, 107

Burm& 65-66

Bush adrmms “ - tration, 90

BWC. See Biological Weapons Convention

Central Europe, 74. See ako specific countries by name

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare

Elimination Act, 85,87,90,95

Chemical weapons

characteristics of, 2-3, 8-9,46-50

delivery systems, 50-52

destructive effects of, 52-56

dual-use technologies and, 6,36-38

institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85

Iraqi failure to use against coalition troops, 110

militarily significant levels of violation for, 115

military utility of, 56-57,58-60,62

onsite inspections and, 7

production, 9-11,36-37

proliferation motivations, 100-101

quantities for various missions, 60

reducing international role of weapons, 17, 106

strategic uses of, 62

in suspected proliferant nations, 14-15,63-66

tactical uses of, 55-61

technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation, 36-38

Chemical Weapons Convention (cWC)

chemical weapons disarmament and, 18

institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85

international norms and, 2, 5, 18

linking assistance to nonproliferation, 103

onsite inspections and, 7

proliferation motivations and, 99

rewarding nonproltieration, 22

security benefits as nonproliferation incentive, 104-105

stockpile destruction specifications, 72

suspected proliferant nations, 63-66

technical training obligations and, 91

toxin bans, 3

verification regime, 22-25, 113

China

conflicting U.S. policy objectives with nxpct to, 5, 26

delivery systems in, 66-69

lack of requirement of ‘full-scope safeguards’ for nuclear

exports, 18

mass destruction weapon programs in, 12, 14, 17, 63-66

proliferation motivations, 102

regional security concerns and, 16, 108

Civil defense measures, 62-63

Classifkxl information

implications of, 15, 32

protection of during inspections, 23-24, 113-115

CoCorn. See Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export

Controls

Coercive policies. See Disincentives and sanctions against

proliferants

Cold War end and implications for proliferation, 15-18

Commerce, Department of, 25

Commonwealth of Independent States, 63-64. See also

Former Soviet republics

Conflicting nonproliferation policy approaches and objectives. See Approaches to nonproliferation policy;

Objectives of nonproliferation policy

Consensual treaties. See International agreements

Consequences of proliferation

characteristics of weapons of mass destruction, 2-3, 7-11,

46-50

Cold War end and implications for proliferation, 15-18

international community, implications for, 11-12, 69-73

Soviet Union breakup effects, 1,4, 15,75-77, 111-112

Summary, 45-46

U.S. political-militaxy policies, implications for, 4, 11-12,

73-75

weapon effects compared, 52-63

Contagious weapon agents, 49-50

Controlling proliferation. See Monitoring and controlling

proliferation

Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. See Biological Weapons

Convention

Conventional weapons

compared with weapons of mass destruction, 46, 56-57

motivating development of weapons of mass destruction,

29, 102

linkages to weapons of mass destruction, 29-30

Cooperative security concept, 109

Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls,

85,89

Cordesman, Anthony, 58-59

Counterproliferaton, 19-20,25,29,84,91-92, 94-97

Covert activities, 7,92. See aZso Intelligence agencies

Cruise missiles, 3-4,43,51-52,68-69

CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention

Delivery systems. See also Aircraft; Ballistic missiles;

Cruise missiles

barriers to missile and aircraft proliferation, 41-42

biological weapons and, 39

chemical weapons and, 37

comparison of aimraft and missile delivery of chemical

and biological agents, 53-54

monitoring delivery vehicles, 4243

nuclear weapons and, 34-35

in suspected proliferant nations, 14, 66-69

technical basis for monitoring and controlling, 4043
—..

Index I 119

~S of, 3-4,50-52

unconventional delivery systems, 69

Department of Defense, 25,29, 110

Destructive agents. See Agents of mass destruction

Destructive effects of weapons, 52-55

Deterrence policies, 28,73-74

Diplomatic responses to proliferation, 97-98

Disc riminatory nonproliferation regimes, 17, 32, 101

Disincentives and sanctions against proliferants

balancing coercive v, consensual policies, 31

balancing targeted v. universal approaches, 31-32

coercion benefits and limits, 97-98

diplomatic and military responses, 5,20-21,94-97

economic sanctions, 5, 93-94

Dual-use technologies

biological weapons and, 6,3840

chemical weapons and, 6, 36-38

controls on as obstacle to proliferation, 6, 86

exports from former Soviet Union and, 76-77

technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation, 32

spread of contributing to proliferation, 16

EAA. See Export Adrrum“ “stration Act

East Asia, 64-69. See also specific countries by name

Economic issues

as incentive to forgo weapons of mass destruction, 22,

102-104

costs of producing nuclear materials, 11, 33-34

onsite inspection, costs and benefits of, 28, 113-115

sanctions against proliferants and suppliers, 5, 20, 27,

88-89,93-95

Education of foreigners, transfers of expertise and, 91

Effects of weapons of mass destruction. See also Consequences of proliferation

destructive effects of weapons, 46-50,52-55

environmental effects, 39, 72-73

military utility of weapons, 55-63

strategic uses of weapons, 55, 61-63

tactical uses of weapons, 55-61

Egypt, 65-67

Energy, Department of, 25

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 90

Environmental effects of weapons of mass destruction, 39,

72-73

Europe, 108. See also specific countries by name

Executive branch discretion in nonproliferation policies,

31-32,94

Executive Order 12735,87

Export Mrmms “ “ tration Act, 85, 87,90

Export controls

barriers to missile and aircraft proliferation, 41-42

exemptions from, 104

export promotion v. export controls, 26-28

multilateral cooperation in export control regimes, 18

as information sources, 19,86

as obstacles to proliferation, 5, 16, 19-20, 84-88

Export controls groups. See Multilateral control groups

Exports. See also Export controls

Former Soviet Union, critical information, equipment, or

materials, 76-77

limiting regional arms races, 107

Soviet Union, delive~ systems, 66

Soviet Union, weapons or components, 76, 112

Failures of nonproliferation, 25, 109-111

Financial assistance andnonproliferation policy, 22,102-104

FMle materials. See Nuclear materials.

ForeQn Assistance Act, 85,90,95

Foreign trade. See Export controls; Exports

Former Soviet republics

control of weapons in, 72, 75-76, 111-112

delivery systems in, 66-67

emigration of technical personnel, 112

environmental effects of weapons of mass destruction,

72-73

export of critical information, equipment, or materials,

33-34,41-42,76-77, 111-112

export of weapons or components, 76, 112

risks from bzeakup of Soviet Union, 4, 15,75-77, 111-112

weapons in, 14, 63-65, 75-77, 111-112

France, 12, 17,63,70

Freedom Support Act, 85

Gas centrifuge technology, 35-36

Genetic engineering techniques, biological agents and, 40

Geneva Protocol, 17,85, 106

Glenn-$m.ington amendments to Foreign Assistance Act,

90,95

GPS. See U.S. Global Positioning System

Health and safety effects of producing weapons of mass

destruction, 39,72-73

Hussein, Saddam, 100, 102, 110

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency

India

coercion benefits and limits, 97-98

delivery systems programs, 66-69

difficulty of bringing into nuclear nonproliferation regime,

104

proliferation motivations, 71, 102

purchase of Russian missile technology, 76

regional security concerns and, 16, 108

weapon of mass destruction programs, 13, 17, 64-66,

104-105

Infectious weapon agents, 49-50,72-73

Intelligence agencies

collection v. use of intelligence, 32

monitoring of proliferation, 32-33, 112

role of intelligence in nonproliferation policy, 94, %

Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, 114

International agreements, 22-25, 31, 84-85, 104-105. See

also specific agreements by name

International Atomic Energy Agency

creation of, 102
120 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Iraqi facilities, monitoring of, 93, 114

nuclear safeguards, 18, 23, 34, 101, 108

international Atomic Energy Agency Statute, 85

International community

cooperation among necessary for nonproliferation, 4-5

domino effect and proliferation, 71, 102

double standards and proliferation, 101

norm against proliferation, 17

prerequisites to effective nonproliferation policy, 4-6

proliferation costs and risks, 71-73

proliferation, implications for, 11-12,69-73

reducing international role of weapons, 106

and military action against proli.ferants, 20,92

International norms

erosion of, 17, 71

importance of for nonproliferation objectives, 1-2, 17,21,

30,94-96

unilateral and international policy approaches, 30

International Science and Technology Centers, 112

International security arrangements, 22-25, 107-109

‘‘Internationalist’ approach to policy, 30-31

Iran

delivery systems in, 66-69

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 64-66

Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act, 85,90

Iran-Iraq WW, 17,58-59,64-66

w

costs of nuclear weapon program, 33, 72

delivery system programs in, 66-69

environmental effects of weapon of mass destruction

program, 72

international response to, if nuclear-armed, 70-71

militaty response to proliferation, illustration of, 91, %-97

monitoring of facilities in, 93, 114

proliferation motivations, 100

U.N. Security Council cease-fro agreement, 18,91,92-93

U.S. political-military policies and, 73

weapons of mass destruction, use by Gulf War, 10,61, 110

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 12-13, 15,63-66

Israel

conflicting U.S. policy objectives with nxpect to, 26

delivery systems in, 66-69

difficulty of bringing into nuclear nonproliferation regime,

104

proliferation motivations, 102

regional security concerns, 16, 108

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 17, 64-66,

104

Japan, 34, 107

Kazakhstan. See also Former Soviet xepublics

control of weapons in, 111

indigenous weapons production and development, 77

production facilities in, 77

risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4

seizure of Soviet weapons by non-Russian authorities,

75-76

weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 63-65

Korean peninsula, 4, 12. See also North Korea; South Korea

Laser isotope separation, 36

Latin America, 64, 67-69. See also specific countries by

name

Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. See Treaty of

Tlatelolco

Legal sanctions. See Sanctions against suppliers

Mhality of weapon agents

factors affecting, 46,48-49,53-54

nuclear weapons, 34-35

weapon characteristics and comparisons, 7-9

weapon effects, 52-55, 61

Libya, 13,65-69

London Club. See Nuclear Suppliers Group

Long-range delivery systems. See specific types of system by

name

Middle East. See also specific countries by name

delivery systems in, 67-69

reducing incentives for weapons, 107

regional security concerns, and, 16, 107-108

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 4,64-66,70-71,

102, 108

Militarily si~lcance of treaty violations, 114-115

Military delivexy systems, 50-51. See also Advanced delivery systems

Military operations

as responses to proliferation, 19-20, 25, 84, 91-92, 94-97

proliferation implications for U.S., 12,74

U.S. defense commitments as nonproliferation incentive,

107

Military rivahies, proliferation motivations and, 102

Military utility of weapons of mass destruction, 7-9,55-63.

See also Strategic uses of weapons of mass destruction; Tactical uses of weapons of mass destruction

Missile Technology Control Act, 85,90

Missile lkchnology Control Regime, 35,4142, 66,76, 85,

89

Missiles. See also Ballistic missiles; Cruise missiles

institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 85

Monitoring and controlling proliferation. See also Onsite

inspections

monitoring others v. avoiding costs of being monitored, 28

monitoring proliferation and verifying compliance with

agreements, 6-7

technical basis for, 32-43

Motivations for proliferation

domino effect and, 71, 102

international double standards and, 101-102

military rivalries and, 102

perceived value of weapons, 99-101

MTCR. See Missile ‘lkchnology Control Regime

Multi-use technologies. See Dual-use technologies
Index 1121

Multilateral export control groups, 5,18,85. See also specific

groups by name

Multilateral export controls, 86-89

Myanmar, 65-66

National export controls, 86-87

Near-term proliferation threats. See Suspected proliferant

nations

Nitze, Paul, 114

Nonproliferation policy. See also Detemence policies; Policy

choices and tradeoffs

categories of, 5, 83-84

disincentives and sanctions against proliferants, 5, 20-21,

93-98

failures of nonproliferation, 25, 109-111

former Soviet republic situation, 111-112

imposing obstacles to proliferation, 5, 19-20, 84-93

institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 84-85

rewards for abstention, 5, 21-22, 98-104

security benefits, 5, 22-25, 104-109

SUII_UTIUy, 4-6, 83-84

North AtYica, 64. See also specific countries by name

North Korea

delivery systems in, 66-69

missile exports, 41

and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 13-14, 108

policy reversals, 18

reducing incentives for weapons, 107

regional security concerns, 4, 16, 108

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13-14, 17,64-66

Northeast Asia, 97, 108, See also specific countries by name

NTPT. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear deterrence policies, 28,73-74

Nuclear Exporters Committee (Za.ngger Committee), 85,88

Nuclear materials, 6, 10,23, 33-36, 76-77

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 85,87,95, 103

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

adherence to by former Soviet republics, 4, 75-76, 111

background, 1

ban on unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, 35

central bargain of, 22, 104-106

disc rirninatoxy nonproliferation regimes issue, 17, 101

and export controls, 88

increasing membership of, 17

institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 85

and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 23

international norms and, 2, 17

linkage of technical assistance to nonproliferation, 22,98,

102-103

mo@ing to accommodate additional nuclear powers,

28-29

security improvements as nonproliferation incentive, 104-

106

technical training obligations and, 91

treaty status of suspected proliferant nations, 13-14, 64

veriilcation regime, 22-25, 113

Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, 99

Nuclear Suppliers Group, 5, 18, 76,85, 88

Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, 85, 88

Nuclear tests

detection of, 35

lack of need for, 35

Nuclear weapons

ballistic missile programs and, 46

characteristics of, 2-3, 7-8, 47-50

costs to mount weapon program, 33, 72

delivexy systems, 50-52

destructive effects of, 52-56

institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 84-85

likelihood of use, 9, 28-29,69-70, 110

militarily significant levels of violation for, 115

militaxy utility of, 55-62

noncoercive measures to manage proliferation, 110

production, 9-11, 33-35

proliferation motivations, 99-101

reducing international role of weapons, 106

regional conflicts and, 16, 108

secrecy as obstacle to proliferation, 84

strategic uses of, 61-62

in suspected proli.ferant nations, 14-15, 63-66

tactical uses of, 55-61

technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation, 33-36

unconventional delivery systems and, 69

U.S. military operations and, 74

Objectives of nonproliferation policy, conflicts among,

export controls v. export promotion, 26-28

monitoring others v. avoiding costs of being monitored, 28

nuclear deterrence v. nuclear nonproliferation, 28

preventing proliferation v. preventing use, 28-29

Obstacles to proliferation

export controls, 19-20, 84-88

forcible interference, 19-20,25,84,91-92,94-97

hampering transfers of expertise, 90-91

Iraq and, 92-93

sanctions against suppliers, 20, 88-90

StXP3Cy, 84

summary, 4-5

Onsite inspections, 105, 113-115, See also Monitoring and

controlling proliferation

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 23

Pakistan

delive~ systems in, 30,67-69

difficulty of bringing n nuclear nonproliferation regime,

104

proliferation motivations, 102

regional security concerns and, 16, 108

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 17, 64-66,

104-105

Perceived value of weapons, 99-101

Plutonium, material production and, 33-34

Policy, See Nonproliferation Policy

Policy choices and tradeoffs

conflicting approaches to policy, 29-32
122 I Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

conflicting objectives of policy, 25-29

introduction, 14

major findings, 4-6

policy background, 19-25

Political fragmentation, weapons of mass destruction and, 72

Presidential role in sanctions, 94

Pressier amendment to Foreign Assistance Act, 95

Proprietary information, protection of during inspections,

23-2$, 113-115

Regional conflicts, nuclear weapons and, 16, 108

Regional security arrangements, 24-25, 107-108

Rewarding nonproliferation, 21-22,98-99, 102-104

Risks of proliferation. See Consequences of proliferation

Russia. See also Former Soviet republics

Cold War end and, 17-18

delivery systems in, 14,66

dramatic reductions in deployed nuclear forces of, 17,75,

99-1oo

environmental effects of producing weapons of mass

destruction, 72-73

maintaining control of nuclear weapons and materials in,

72,76, 111-112

political stability of, 72,76

security assurances from, 105, 108

risks from bnmkup of Soviet Union, 4,15,75-77,111-112

weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 17, 63, 65

Russian Republic. See Russia

Sanctions against proliferants, 5,27,93-95

Sanctions against suppliers, 5,20,27, 88-90

Saudi Arabia, 67-69

Schultz, George, 114-115

Security benefits as nonproliferation incentive

arms control, 106-107

assurances from existing owners of weapons of mass

destruction, 105-106

consensual agreements, 104-105

defense commitments, 107

global security arrangements, 22-24, 108-109

reducing international role of weapon of mass destruction,

106

regional security arrangements, 24-25, 107-108

security benefit possibilities, 98-99

summary, 5

Short-range delive~ systems, 51

Signatures of weapons facilities, 9,32-33,35-40

Solarz amendment to Foreign Assistance Act, 95

South Africa

delivery systems in, 67-69

formalization of nuclear status, 104

policy reversals, 18

proliferation motives, 73, 100

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 17, 64-66

South Asia

delivery systems in, 67-69

reducing incentives for weapons, 107

regional

- security concerns ad, 16, 108

security benefits as nonproliferation incentive, 105

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 4, 64

South Korea

delivery systems in, 67-69

proliferation motivations, 102

reducing incentives for weapons, 107

reduction of security threats, 108

U.S. role in reversing nuclear weapon program, 94

weapon of mass destruction prognms in, 18

Southeast Asi% 65-66. See also specific countries by nume

Southern Afica. See akko specific countries by name

Soviet Union, former. See Belarus; Commonwealth of

Independent States; Former Soviet republics; Kazakhstan; Russia; Ukraine

ST~T I Txeaty, 64-65,75, 111-112

STMT II agreement, 112

State, Department of, 25

Strategic bombing, 61-62

Strategic uses of weapons of mass destruction, 55,61-63

Supplier groups. See Multilateral export control groups

Suppliers of weapons of mass destruction

proliferation implications, 71

sanctions against, 5, 20, 27, 88-90

Suspected proliferant nations

delivery systems in, 66-69

proliferation threat and, 4

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 12-16, 63-66

Sweden, 18

Syria, 65-69

Tactical uses of weapons of mass destruction, 55-61

Taiwan

delivery systems in, 66-67

U.S. role in reversing nuclear weapon program, 94

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 18, 65-66

Targeted v. universal policy approaches, 31-32

lkchnical aspects of nonproliferation policy. See also

Technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation

issues for controlling proliferation, 6

monitoring proliferation and ver@ng compliance, 6-7

spread of technology and industrialization, 16

technical assistance and nonproliferation policy, 102-104

Technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation.

See also Technical aspects of nonproliferation policy

biological weapons, 3840

chemical weapons, 36-38

delivery systems, 40-43

nuclear weapons, 33-36

s~v32-33

Technical persomel

emigration from former Soviet Union, 76, 112

hampering transfers of expertise, 90-91

nuclear weapon programs and, 35

Terrorist activity, 50,71-72

Toxins

barming of, 3

characteristics of weapon agents, 47
Index 1123

dual-use technologies and, 6,39-40

onsite inspections and, 7

Trade sanctions. See Sanctions against suppliers

Transfers of expertise, 76,90-91, 112

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America. See Treaty of Tlatelolco

Treaty of Rarotonga, 22-25,85

Treaty of Tlatelolco, 22-25,85, 101, 104

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. See

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Trends favoring nonproliferation, 17-19

Trends fostering proliferation, 15-17

Ukraine. See also Former Soviet republics

control of weapons in, 111

exports of critical information, equipment, or materials, 76

expoxts of missiles, 41

International Science and Technology Centers, 112

reduction of security threats, 108

risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4, 15,75-77,111-112

seizure of Soviet weapons by non-Russian authorities,

75-76

weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 63-65

U.N. General Assembly, 105

U.N. Resolution 687,93,97

U.N. Security Council

international security arrangements, 108-109

Iraq cease-fire agreement, 14, 18,91,92-93

on military response to proliferation threats, 20, 92

multilateral agreement enforcement, 20-21, 94

positive security assurances, 105

revitalization of, 5

role of permanent members in influencing the perceived

value of nuclear weapons, 99

role of permanent members in conventional arms sales,

107

U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, 93

Unilateral approach to policy v. International Approaches,

30-31

Unilateral export controls, 86-87

United Kingdom, 12,63

positive security assurances from, 105

United Nations. See U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Resolution 687, and U.N, Security Council

United States

alliances or coalitions, 75, 107

Cold War end and, 17-18

defense commitments as nonproliferation incentive, 107

deterrence, 11-12,73-74

dramatic reductions in deployed nuclear forces of, 17,

99-1oo

environmental effects of weapon of mass destruction

programs, 72-73

implications of proliferation for political-militay policies,

4, 11-12,73-75

importance of in reducing international role of weapons,

106

military operations, 11-12,74

positive security assurances, 105-106

U.S.-foreign bilateral export control agreements, 89

weapon of mass destruction programs in, 12, 17, 63

United States legislation. See also specific legislation by

name

export controls, 86-87

institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 84-85

sanctions against proliferant countries, 95

sanctions against suppliers, 90

Universal policy approaches, 31-32

Uranium, material production and, 33-34

U.S. Global Positioning System, 42, 52

Uzbekistan, 77

Verification regimes

costs and benefits of inspections for, 113-115

international treaties and, 22-25

monitoring proliferation and veri@ng compliance with

a~ements, 6-7, 28

onsite veri.ilcation measures, 105

technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation, 3243

Vietnam, 65-66

Weapons of mass destruction. See also Biological weapons;

Chemical weapons; Delivery systems; Nuclear weapcom~~ed with conventional weapons, 1, 29-30, 46

ease of acquisition, 9

exports from former Soviet Union, 76-77

military utility of, 55-61

probability of use, 9-11

Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act, 85

Yemen, 67-69

Zangger Committee. See Nuclear Exporters Committee