2017 WI 64

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2015AP1877-CR

COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 v.

Lazaro Ozuna,

 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 224, 880 N.W.2d 183

(2016 – Unpublished)

OPINION FILED: June 22, 2017

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: January 11, 2017

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit

COUNTY: Walworth

JUDGE: Kristine E. Drettwan

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED: A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 

J.

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs

and oral argument by Alisha McKay, assistant state public 

defender, with whom on the briefs was Colleen Marion, assistant 

state public defender.

For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral 

argument by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, with 

whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.

An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Action 

of Wisconsin, Inc. by Kori L. Ashley, Christine Donahoe, Susan 
2

Lund, Sheila Sullivan, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., 

Milwaukee.
2017 WI 64

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2015AP1877-CR

(L.C. No. 2013CM458)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 v.

Lazaro Ozuna,

 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

FILED

JUN 22, 2017

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

¶1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. We review an unpublished 

decision of the court of appeals, State v. Ozuna, No. 

2015AP1877-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 13, 

2016), affirming the Walworth County circuit court's order1

denying expungement of the defendant's misdemeanor convictions.

¶2 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 

hold that the circuit court properly concluded that the 

defendant was not entitled to expungement. We do so because the 

 

1 The Honorable Kristine E. Drettwan, presiding.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

2

defendant did not meet the statutory requirements for

expungement. Specifically, in order to be entitled to 

expungement, a probationer must "satisf[y] the conditions of 

probation." Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) (2013-14).2 In this 

case, when the Department of Corrections ("DOC") notified the 

circuit court that the defendant had completed probationary 

supervision, it simultaneously notified the court that the 

defendant had violated the court's expressly ordered condition 

that he neither possess nor consume alcohol. Consequently, the 

circuit court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to 

expungement, and the court of appeals affirmed. We affirm the 

decision of the court of appeals. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 On November 20, 2013, the Walworth County district 

attorney's office charged Lazaro Ozuna with one count of 

criminal damage to property contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1) 

(2011-2012) and one count of disorderly conduct contrary to Wis. 

Stat. § 947.01(1) (2011-2012), both misdemeanors. Ozuna was 17 

years old at the time these charges were filed.

¶4 On May 27, 2014, the circuit court held a plea and 

sentencing hearing,3 at which Ozuna pled guilty to both counts. 

The court accepted Ozuna's guilty plea and imposed a sentence of 

120 days' incarceration, but the court stayed the sentence and 

 

2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

3 The Honorable James L. Carlson, presiding.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

3

placed Ozuna on a period of probationary supervision for 12 

months. As one of the conditions of his probation, the court 

ordered Ozuna "[n]ot to possess or consume alcohol, illegal 

drugs or paraphernalia."

¶5 The court further determined that Ozuna's conviction 

was eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 so long 

as Ozuna satisfied the conditions of probation. The court 

stated, "I will allow expungement if there is no violation of 

probation . . . ." The court asked Ozuna if he understood that 

he would have to comply with the conditions of probation and 

that the convictions "could be on your record unless you 

complete the sentence[4] successfully and get it expunged; do you 

understand that?" Ozuna answered, "Yes, sir."

¶6 Ozuna was placed on probation under the supervision of 

DOC for a term of 12 months. After Ozuna was discharged from 

probation, DOC filed a form with the circuit court on June 5, 

2015, entitled "Verification of Satisfaction of Probation 

Conditions for Expungement." On that form, the probation agent 

had marked a box labeled "The offender has successfully 

completed his/her probation." Further down on the form, 

 

4 We note that probationary supervision, commonly referred 

to as "probation," is not itself a sentence; rather, it is an 

alternative to sentencing. State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 

594 N.W.2d 772 (1999). However, the expungement statute defines 

the "successful completion of the sentence" so as to encompass 

probation. See Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). Probation is 

therefore considered a "sentence" for purposes of the 

expungement statute. State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶36, 353 

Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

4

however, the agent had marked the box labeled, "All court 

ordered conditions have not been met." The agent inserted the 

following explanation: "[Ozuna] [f]ailed to comply with the no 

alcohol condition. Lake Geneva PD went to Harbor Shores Hotel 

for noise complaint. Mr. Ozaro [sic] cited for underage 

drinking (102 pbt [sic]) and marijuana odor in the halls."

¶7 On June 12, 2015, the circuit court entered an order 

denying expungement of Ozuna's record. The order noted that 

Ozuna had failed to fulfill the obligations of his probation. 

Ozuna appealed the circuit court's order, and the court of 

appeals affirmed the circuit court. The court of appeals 

concluded that "Ozuna was entitled to expungement only if he 

successfully completed his sentence. Ozuna did not do so 

because he did not satisfy the conditions of probation." Ozuna, 

unpublished slip op., ¶11. The court of appeals noted that the 

"State claims——and the DOC form confirms——that Ozuna violated 

the no alcohol condition of his probation. Nowhere in the 

briefs does Ozuna contest this crucial fact." Id., ¶9. For 

these reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 

order denying expungement.

¶8 Ozuna petitioned this court for review, which we 

granted on September 15, 2016.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 This case requires us to interpret the expungement 

statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015, which is a question of statutory 

interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 

129, ¶12, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811. The application of a 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

5

statute to undisputed facts is also a question of law for our 

independent review, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit 

court and court of appeals. State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 

¶32, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.

III. DISCUSSION

¶10 We begin by setting forth the relevant statutory 

requirements for expungement and discussing the circuit court's 

authority to deny expungement. We then apply these principles 

to the facts of this case, and we hold that, because Ozuna did 

not satisfy the conditions of probation, the circuit court 

properly denied expungement of his conviction. Finally, we 

address Ozuna's procedural due process argument, and we conclude 

that Ozuna's rights were not violated in this case.

A. A Probationer Must Satisfy the Conditions of Probation In

Order To Be Entitled to Expungement

¶11 The Wisconsin statutes empower a circuit court to 

order certain criminal offenses to be expunged from a person's 

record, if the offender was younger than 25 at the time of the 

commission of the offense.5 The overarching legislative purpose 

 

5 Section 973.015(1m)(a)1. provides, in relevant part, that

when a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 

the commission of an offense . . . for which the 

maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less, the 

court may order at the time of sentencing that the 

record be expunged upon successful completion of the 

sentence if the court determines the person will 

benefit and society will not be harmed by this 

disposition.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

6

of the expungement statute is to provide "a break to young 

offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply with the law."

Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 

77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). A circuit court may 

order expungement "if the court determines the person will 

benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition." 

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)1. Under the statutory scheme, the 

determination of a defendant's eligibility for expungement must 

be made at the time of sentencing. State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 

27, ¶45, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.

¶12 If the circuit court determines that the defendant is 

eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a), "the 

plain language of the statute indicates that once the defendant 

successfully completes his sentence, he has earned, and is 

automatically entitled to, expungement." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 

¶23.6 The statute provides a three-part definition of what it 

means to "successfully complete the sentence" for purposes of 

earning expungement: "A person has successfully completed the 

 

6 The statute provides, in relevant part, that

A person has successfully completed the sentence if 

the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 

offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 

been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 

conditions of probation. Upon successful completion 

of the sentence the detaining or probationary 

authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which 

shall be forwarded to the court of record and which 

shall have the effect of expunging the record.

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).
No. 2015AP1877-CR

7

sentence if [1] the person has not been convicted of a 

subsequent offense and, if on probation, [2] the probation has 

not been revoked and [3] the probationer has satisfied the 

conditions of probation." § 973.015(1m)(b) (emphasis added). 

"If a probationer satisfies these three criteria, he has earned 

expungement, and is automatically entitled to expungement of the 

underlying charge." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶23.

¶13 We emphasize that, in order to be entitled to 

expungement, the probationer must meet all three of the 

statutory criteria, including satisfying "all the conditions of 

probation." Id., ¶22. Because the three criteria are distinct, 

we reject Ozuna's notion that a probationer has "satisfied the 

conditions of probation" under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) 

simply because his probation was not revoked. Whether a 

probationer's conduct was adequate to avoid revocation is a 

question separate and distinct from whether the probationer "has 

satisfied all the conditions of probation."7 Hemp, 359 

Wis. 2d 320, ¶22. To "satisfy" a condition or obligation is to 

meet or fulfill it, not merely to avoid the penalty for 

violating it. See Satisfy, Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 2017 (2002) ("to conform to (accepted criteria or 

requirements): fulfill, meet"). Therefore, the mere fact that a 

 

7 Revocation is a discretionary decision. When a violation 

of probation occurs, DOC regulations permit the agent to counsel 

the probationer, issue a warning, or choose another alternative 

to revocation. See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 331.03(2)(b) (July 

2013).
No. 2015AP1877-CR

8

probationer has completed the term of probationary supervision 

without revocation does not necessarily establish that the 

probationer has also satisfied the conditions of probation.

B. The Court May Deny Expungement if a Probationer Does Not 

Satisfy the Conditions of Probation

¶14 Although the expungement statute puts the onus on DOC 

to determine whether a probationer has satisfied the conditions 

of probation and to notify the court when that occurs,8 a court 

has no duty to expunge a probationer's record if the probationer 

has not satisfied the conditions of probation. This is so 

because a person's statutory entitlement to expungement depends 

not on whether the court receives a particular notice from DOC, 

but on whether the probationer meets all of the statutory 

criteria for the "successful completion of the sentence." See

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) (providing that only "[u]pon 

successful completion of the sentence" shall a DOC-forwarded 

certificate of discharge "have the effect of expunging the 

 

8 As we recognized in State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359 

Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, a probationer who has met all the 

requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) and is therefore 

entitled to expungement has no duty to notify the court of that 

fact; that duty rests with DOC as the probationary authority. 

See id., ¶30. DOC policy is in accord with this understanding. 

Its Electronic Case Reference Manual requires that, "[w]ithin 10 

days following the discharge date, the agent shall forward 

information to the court indicating whether or not the eligible 

offender has successfully completed probation." Wisconsin DOC 

Electronic Case Reference Manual, Procedures Prior to Discharge: 

Expungement, § .04 (effective May 1, 2015) (available at 

http://doc.helpdocsonline.com/case-closing/transition/statuschange).
No. 2015AP1877-CR

9

record"). In Hemp, we held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) 

provides for a "self-executing" expungement process, in which 

"the detaining or probationary authority must forward the 

certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the 

individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and

at that point the process of expungement is self-executing." 

Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶25 (emphasis added). The terms of the 

statute provide that this self-executing process is triggered 

only "[u]pon successful completion of the sentence," as the 

statute defines that term in § 973.015(1m)(b). "In construing 

or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to 

disregard the plain, clear words of the statute." State v. 

Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, under the expungement 

statute, it is proper for the circuit court to deny expungement 

if a defendant has not met all three criteria for the 

"successful completion of the sentence" under Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b), including satisfying the conditions of 

probation.9

 

9 We note that, in this instance, Ozuna does not contest the 

factual determination that he consumed alcohol while on 

probation, thereby violating one of the conditions of his 

probation. This case is therefore not the proper vehicle in 

which to set forth the procedures a court is to follow when such 

factual matters are disputed. See State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, 

¶62 n.19, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 (noting that this 

court "does not issue advisory opinions or address hypothetical 

facts"). We note our confidence in the ability of our circuit 

courts to resolve such matters fairly, a confidence informed by 

our knowledge that they routinely do just that.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

10

¶15 This conclusion is not in conflict with our holding in 

Hemp. Although we stated in Hemp that expungement occurs

automatically when DOC "forwards a certificate of discharge to 

the court of record," Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶36, we were 

resting on the premise that satisfaction of the conditions of 

probation is an indispensable prerequisite to a defendant's 

entitlement to expungement. Id., ¶¶22-23. It was because "Hemp 

satisfied all the conditions of probation," we explained, that 

his "successful completion of probation automatically entitled 

him to expungement of his conviction." Id., ¶24. Therefore, 

Hemp reinforces our understanding that a probationer's 

entitlement to expungement turns on whether the probationer "has 

satisfied the conditions of probation," as is required by Wis. 

Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).

¶16 In Hemp, DOC forwarded Hemp's certificate of discharge 

to the court, and there was no dispute that Hemp had 

successfully completed probation as defined in Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b). "The record clearly indicates Hemp 

successfully completed probation," we concluded, because Hemp 

was not convicted of any subsequent offense while on probation, 

his probation was not revoked, and "Hemp satisfied all the 

conditions of probation." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶24. In such 

a scenario, expungement was "required by statute" and the clerk 

of the circuit court accordingly had a duty to expunge the 

record upon receiving a copy of the certificate of discharge 

from DOC. Id., ¶33 n.11 (quoting SCR 72.06). But Hemp does not 

control a case where DOC informs the circuit court that the 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

11

probationer violated the court-ordered conditions of probation. 

In such a case, where one of the statutory requirements for the

"successful completion of the sentence" under § 973.015(1m)(b) 

has not been met, the probationer has no entitlement to 

expungement and the self-executing process we described in Hemp

does not occur.

¶17 Our emphasis on the language of the statute is also in 

accord with our interpretation of the probation statutes in an 

analogous context. In State ex rel. Greer v. Wiedenhoeft, 2014 

WI 19, 353 Wis. 2d 307, 845 N.W.2d 373, where DOC issued a 

certificate of discharge from probation before the term of 

probation had expired, we held that such certificate did not 

have the effect of discharging the probationer. Id., ¶¶41, 51. 

The statutes provide that a certificate of discharge is issued 

"[w]hen the period of probation for a probationer has expired," 

Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5), but the defendant relied on two court of 

appeals decisions which suggested that the issuance of a 

certificate was the controlling event that effectuated 

discharge. Id., ¶42. We rejected this argument, explaining 

that "[n]either decision stands for the proposition that an 

erroneously issued discharge certificate can defeat a valid 

sentence imposed by a circuit court." Id. The certificate 

could not trump the statute. Similarly, in the expungement 

context, the simple fact that DOC forwards a certificate of 

discharge or other form to the circuit court does not, by 

itself, establish an entitlement to expungement if the record 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

12

demonstrates that the probationer has not met the prerequisites 

under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).

C. The Circuit Court Properly Denied Expungement

¶18 Here, there was never any dispute about the underlying 

facts in the record. DOC submitted a form to the court which 

showed that Ozuna had violated one of the court-ordered 

conditions of his probation. On the form, the probation agent 

checked a box marked "All court ordered conditions have not been 

met." The agent noted the nature of the violation, namely, that 

Ozuna "[f]ailed to comply with the no alcohol condition," 

because he was "cited for underage drinking." Ozuna has never 

made any suggestion that that he did not, in fact, engage in 

this conduct during the term of probation.

¶19 These facts demonstrate that Ozuna did not meet the 

criteria for expungement, because he did not "satisf[y] the 

conditions of probation." Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). 

According to his probation agent, Ozuna engaged in underage 

drinking in spite of the circuit court's command to refrain from 

consuming alcohol. Based on this clear violation of one of the 

court-ordered conditions of probation, Ozuna did not satisfy the 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

13

conditions of probation. Therefore, the circuit court properly 

denied expungement of Ozuna's record.10

¶20 Ozuna disagrees, arguing that the "fact that [his] 

agent forwarded the Verification Form to the circuit court 

communicates her determination that [he] met the requirements" 

for expungement. However, looking beyond the title of the form 

("Verification of Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for 

Expungement") to its substance reveals that DOC determined Ozuna 

had violated one of the court-ordered conditions of probation. 

Although we held in Hemp that a court has no discretion to deny 

expungement if a probationer "successfully completed probation 

and his probationary authority forwarded his certificate to the 

court of record," Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶41 (emphasis added), 

there was no dispute in Hemp that the probationer had, in fact, 

met the statutory requirements for the successful completion of 

probation, including satisfying all the conditions of probation, 

id., ¶24. Nothing in Hemp dictates that the mere receipt of a 

form from DOC stating that the probationer "successfully 

completed" probation automatically entitles the probationer to 

expungement where, as here, the very same form contains a 

contradictory determination by DOC that the probationer violated 

 

10 It appears that Ozuna also failed to satisfy the monetary 

conditions of probation, and he argues that it would violate 

equal protection "to deny expungement to probationers who cannot 

afford to satisfy monetary conditions during supervision." We 

need not reach this argument, because we conclude that Ozuna's 

undisputed violation of the no-alcohol condition was sufficient 

to establish that he was not entitled to expungement.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

14

one of the court-ordered conditions of probation. Because Ozuna 

did not satisfy the court-ordered condition that he abstain from 

alcohol while on probation, his reliance on Hemp is unavailing.

D. Ozuna's Due Process Rights Were Not Violated

¶21 Finally, we turn to Ozuna's argument that the circuit 

court deprived him of his constitutional right to procedural due 

process by denying expungement without notice and an opportunity 

to be heard. We conclude that Ozuna's due process rights were 

not violated.

¶22 "The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 

prohibit government actions that deprive any person of life, 

liberty, or property without due process of law." Aicher ex 

rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶80, 237 

Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. The first step in a procedural due 

process analysis is to "examine whether the person has 

established that a constitutionally protected property or 

liberty interest is at issue." Id. 

¶23 Where a liberty interest has been "initially 

recognized and protected by state law, . . . the procedural 

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State 

seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status." 

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11 (1976). We note that 

"[r]eputation by itself is neither liberty nor property within 

the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth 

amendment." Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 73, 384 

N.W.2d 333 (1986). Rather, "a person's reputation is protected 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

15

by procedural due process only when damage to the reputation is 

accompanied by the alteration or elimination of a right or 

status previously recognized by state law." Stipetich v. 

Grosshans, 2000 WI App 100, ¶24, 235 Wis. 2d 69, 612 N.W.2d 346. 

"In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to 

refute the charge . . . ." Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. 

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). "The purpose of such notice and 

hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his 

name." Id. at 573 n.12.

¶24 Here, Ozuna argues that he had a protected liberty 

interest in expungement of his record because the circuit court 

ordered, at the time of Ozuna's sentencing, that his conviction 

was eligible for expungement. The expungement statute, Ozuna 

argues, "creates a substantive right under state law" to have 

the stigma of a criminal conviction removed. He relies on our 

statement in Hemp that "once the defendant successfully 

completes his sentence, he has earned, and is automatically 

entitled to, expungement." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶23. Ozuna

further argues that he was deprived of this right without due 

process of law, because the circuit court did not provide him 

with notice and an opportunity to be heard before it denied 

expungement. Ozuna analogizes a denial of expungement to a 

revocation of probation. This court has recognized that due 

process requires an evidentiary hearing before the State may 

revoke probation, State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 

548, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971), and Ozuna argues that the same rule 

should apply to a denial of expungement.
No. 2015AP1877-CR

16

¶25 We disagree with Ozuna and hold that he did not have a 

protected liberty interest in expungement in this case. The 

reason that a probationer has a protected liberty interest in 

remaining on probation is because the probationer has already 

been granted a conditional right to freedom. See Johnson, 50 

Wis. 2d at 548 ("After one has gained the conditional freedom of 

a probationer . . . the state cannot summarily revoke such 

status . . . .") (emphasis added). By contrast, Ozuna cannot 

claim that he gained any entitlement to expungement, because the 

record shows that he did not meet the statutory criteria for 

"successful completion of the sentence" under Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b), which include satisfying all the conditions of 

probation. See Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22.

¶26 Ozuna suggests that the circuit court should have held 

a hearing before denying expungement, but he has not pointed us 

to any relevant factual dispute that such a hearing could have 

resolved. He has never questioned DOC's determination that he 

violated the no-alcohol condition by engaging in underage 

drinking during his period of probation. Because Ozuna was not 

entitled to expungement based on his failure to satisfy the noalcohol condition, we also conclude that there was no violation 

of due process in this case, because Ozuna does not challenge 

the underlying facts. See Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 

538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) ("Plaintiffs who assert a right to a 

hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts 

they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the 

statutory scheme."); Stipetich, 235 Wis. 2d 69, ¶25 (affirming 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

17

dismissal of a due process claim on summary judgment where the 

petitioner "did not produce sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to conclude that she had been deprived of a 

constitutionally protected property or liberty interest").

¶27 Because Ozuna did not satisfy the conditions of his 

probation, he never earned the expungement for which he was 

otherwise eligible. Therefore, Ozuna was not deprived of any 

right or status which he previously possessed under state law. 

Absent facts permitting a conclusion that Ozuna was entitled to 

expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b), his reputational 

interest in hoping to obtain expungement is not, by itself, a 

protected liberty interest. See Weber, 129 Wis. 2d at 73.

¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Ozuna's due 

process rights were not violated.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶29 We hold that the circuit court properly denied

expungement in this case, because Ozuna did not meet the 

statutory requirements to be entitled to expungement. The 

statutory requirements for expungement include the requirement 

that the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation. 

Here, DOC notified the circuit court that Ozuna did not meet all 

the conditions of probation because Ozuna violated the circuit 

court's expressly ordered condition to not possess or consume 

alcohol during the term of probation. Therefore, based on this 

notification from DOC, the circuit court properly denied 

expungement. Further, because Ozuna never met the requirements 

to be entitled to expungement, the circuit court's denial of 
No. 2015AP1877-CR

18

expungement did not violate his right to the due process of law. 

We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed.
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

1

¶30 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The majority 

bends over backwards to reach its conclusion. Not only does its 

analysis undermine the purpose of the expunction statute, it 

also sub silencio overrules recent precedent. Ultimately, 

because the implications of its holding are yet unclear, it sows 

the seeds of confusion for circuit courts and litigants alike. 

And for what?

¶31 Since the circumstances leading to this case arose, 

the form in question has been modified to eliminate the 

potential for confusion.1 Due to these revisions, those

circumstances will not again be presented. Thus, it is hard to 

imagine what benefit can be gained by the uncertainties and 

problems that inevitably will be wrought by the majority's sub 

silencio overruling of our clear precedent. 

¶32 I determine that the more prudent course is to take an 

approach that is consistent with the purpose of the statute and 

 

1 This case arose because of an unclear form utilized by the 

Department of Corrections to notify the circuit court that the 

defendant had completed his probation. The form had multiple 

boxes for the probation agent to choose from—boxes indicating 

whether the offender had or had not successfully completed his 

probation and boxes indicating whether certain terms of 

probation had been met.

Here, the probation agent checked the boxes labeled "The 

offender has successfully completed his/her probation" and "All 

court-ordered conditions have not been met." Based on those 

seemingly inconsistent markings, the circuit court determined 

that the defendant had not satisfied the terms of his probation 

and denied expunction. The old form has now been modified to 

include only two boxes: one indicating that the offender has 

successfully completed probation and one indicating that the 

offender was not successful.
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

2

our recent precedent. Under that approach, youthful offenders 

can be deemed to have successfully completed their sentences 

when they sufficiently comply with the terms of probation.

¶33 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

I

¶34 The focus of this case is Wisconsin's expunction 

statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015. It permits the expunction of an 

offender's criminal record if the offender meets various 

criteria, including successful completion of probation:

. . . when a person is under the age of 25 at the 

time of the commission of an offense for which the 

person has been found guilty in a court for violation 

of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment 

is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of 

sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 

completion of the sentence if the court determines the 

person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 

this disposition.

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)(1).

¶35 "[S]uccessful completion" is defined in Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b). It requires an offender to have "satisfied 

the conditions of probation":

A person has successfully completed the sentence if 

the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 

offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 

been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 

conditions of probation.

¶36 Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) anticipates that a 

certificate of discharge will issue upon successful completion 

of probation and that the certificate "shall have the effect of 

expunging the record":
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Upon successful completion of the sentence the 

detaining or probationary authority shall issue a 

certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to 

the court of record and which shall have the effect of 

expunging the record . . . .

¶37 The majority reads this language in a manner that 

severely limits an offender's ability to utilize the statute. 

In doing so, it undermines the statute's purpose, overrules

recent precedent sub silencio, and creates confusion. I address 

each in turn.

A

¶38 It is well established that the purpose of Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015 is "'to provide a break to young offenders who 

demonstrate the ability to comply with the law' and to 

'provide[] a means by which trial courts may, in appropriate 

cases, shield youthful offenders from some of the harsh 

consequences of criminal convictions.'" State v. Matasek, 2014 

WI 27, ¶42, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 (quoting State v. 

Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341).

¶39 This is a laudable purpose given the extreme 

consequences a criminal conviction can have on an individual. 

As Legal Action of Wisconsin's amicus brief observes, the 

consequences of a criminal conviction are both wide-ranging and 

long lasting:

The American Bar Association (ABA) has identified over 

38,000 statutes and regulations that impose collateral 

consequences on people convicted of crimes. Over half 

of these laws deny employment opportunities . . . .An 

offense history that once would have languished in the 

practical obscurity of an old court file, has now 

become a permanent and highly part of an individual’s 

public history.
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Amicus Br. 2. The negative impact a criminal record can have on 

employment is particularly troubling as "[r]esearch consistently 

shows that finding quality steady employment is one of the 

strongest predictors of desistance from crime." Devah Pager, 

Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 Wis. L. 

Rev. 617, 647.2

¶40 Thus, expunction offers not only a substantial benefit 

to an offender and society, it also "offers young offenders a 

fresh start without the burden of a criminal record and a second 

chance at becoming law-abiding and productive members of the 

community." State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 

856 N.W.2d 811. It comes as no surprise then that the history 

of the expunction statute "show[s] a consistent legislative 

effort to expand the availability of expungement to include a 

broader category of youthful offenders." Id., ¶20. 

¶41 With this background, Wis. Stat. § 973.015 should be 

liberally construed to provide expunction. See Marquez v. 

Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶23 n.19, 341 

Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314 (citing Hughes v. Chrysler Motors 

Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 983, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996)) ("remedial 

 

2 Other collateral consequences stemming from a criminal 

record include the denial of government issued licenses or 

permits, ineligibility for public services and public programs, 

and the elimination or impairment of civil rights. See

http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Collateral%20Co

nsequences%20of%20Conviction%20Act ("the numbers and complexity 

of these consequences have mushroomed and the U.S. prison 

population has grown . . . There is a real concern on a societal 

level that collateral consequences may impose such harsh burdens 

on convicted persons that they will be unable to reintegrate 

into society.").
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statutes should be liberally construed to advance the remedy the 

legislature intended to provide.").

¶42 Yet, the majority interprets the expunction statute in 

a manner that severely limits an offender's ability to utilize 

it. Although it correctly states that an offender must "satisfy 

all the conditions of probation," it seemingly adopts the 

State's position that the offender's perfect compliance is 

required in order to be entitled to expunction. Majority Op., 

¶13. In doing so, the majority completely ignores Ozuna's 

argument that the word "satisfy" has been defined to mean "[t]o 

meet or be sufficient for (a requirement)." See Satisfy, The 

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (5th ed.

2017)..

¶43 The majority's approach undermines the statute's 

purpose and the legislature's intent to reach a broader category 

of youthful offenders. Probationers must adhere to such a 

myriad of conditions that requiring perfection effectively 

removes the possibility of expunction. For example, there are 

the standard rules of community supervision that probationers 

must follow.3 These rules range from obtaining approval prior to 

borrowing money or making a purchase on credit, to reporting for 

scheduled and unscheduled appointments.

¶44 Under the majority approach, an offender would be 

denied expunction for missing a single unscheduled appointment 

due to such unavoidable circumstances as an inability to find a 

 

3 See http://doc.wi.gov/community-resources/Rules-ofCommunity-Supervision/standard-rules-of-supervision-english.
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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babysitter, getting stuck in traffic, or being unable to leave 

work. That result is unreasonable and completely at odds with 

the purpose of the expunction statute.

B

¶45 In addition to undermining the statute's purpose, the 

majority's opinion also sub silencio overturns recent precedent.

¶46 A scant three years ago, this court considered how an 

offender obtains expunction. Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320. In Hemp, 

the circuit court had determined at sentencing that the 

defendant was eligible for expunction conditioned upon 

successful completion of probation. Id., ¶5. After the 

defendant completed probation he received a certificate of 

discharge from the Department of Corrections. Id., ¶6. The 

circuit court, however, denied his petition for expunction 

because it was "tardy". Id., ¶9.

¶47 This court examined whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 

placed any burden on the defendant to petition the circuit court 

for expunction within a specific timeframe and concluded that 

the duty rested on the detaining or probationary authority, not 

the defendant. Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶25. We further 

concluded that "once the detaining or probationary authority 

forwards the certificate of discharge to the court of record, 

expungement has been effectuated." Id., ¶29; see also id., ¶25 

("the detaining or probationary authority must forward the 

certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the 

individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and 

at that point the process of expungement is self-executing."); 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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id., ¶32 ("the forwarding of the certificate of discharge to the 

circuit court is what triggers expungement").

¶48 In explaining the holding, this court specifically 

rejected the notion that a certificate of discharge must be 

approved by the circuit court prior to a grant of expunction. 

Id., ¶36. We recognized that any inference necessitating 

circuit court approval would be "impos[ing] additional 

requirements that are contrary to the statute's plain language." 

Id. We repeatedly emphasized that the circuit court's role with 

respect to expunction was limited to its decision at sentencing. 

Id., ¶¶39, 40, 42. Thereafter, the determination of whether a 

probationer had successfully completed probation was effectively 

left to those in the best position to evaluate it: the probation 

agents.

¶49 The majority now reinserts the circuit court into the 

process of effectuating expunction. It declares that "a 

person's statutory entitlement to expungement depends not on 

whether the court receives a particular notice from the DOC 

. . . " and that "it is proper for a circuit court to deny 

expungement if a defendant has not met all three criteria for 

the 'successful completion of the sentence . . . .'" Majority 

Op., ¶14. 

¶50 These declarations cannot be squared with the holdings 

in Hemp. A certificate of discharge cannot be the trigger for 

automatically effectuating expunction if the circuit court has 

the option to review it and make an independent determination on 

the matter. Under the majority's analysis, expunction is no 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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longer automatic or self-executing as Hemp mandated. Further, 

no longer is it the probation agent that exclusively determines 

whether an offender has successfully completed probation. By 

reintroducing the circuit court into the expunction process 

after the DOC has issued its certificate of discharge, the 

majority unequivocally, yet sub silencio, overrules Hemp, 359 

Wis. 2d 320.

4

C

¶51 In overruling Hemp, the majority creates confusion for 

circuit courts and litigants alike. 

¶52 It is now unclear what will happen when a certificate 

of discharge is issued. Will it trigger expunction——as the 

plain language of the statute requires? See Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b) ("a certificate of discharge which shall be 

forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect 

of expunging the record . . . ." (emphasis added)).

¶53 Or will the court opt to review it——in clear violation 

of the Hemp holding? See Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶32 ("the 

forwarding of the certificate of discharge to the circuit court 

 

4 Recently, 2017 A.B. 331 was introduced in the Wisconsin 

Legislature to amend Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m). The proposed 

legislation would allow for the filing of a petition for 

expunction with the sentencing court after completion of the 

sentence. The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) analysis 

explains: "Current law specifies that the expungement order 

must be made only at sentencing and then the record is expunged 

when the person completes his or her sentence." The LRB's 

description of current law is in accord with the plain meaning 

interpretation set forth in this dissent and underscores that 

the majority is indeed sub silencio overruling Hemp.
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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is what triggers expungement"); id., ¶29 ("once the detaining or 

probationary authority forwards the certificate of discharge to 

the court of record, expungement has been effectuated."); id., 

¶25 ("the detaining or probationary authority must forward the 

certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the 

individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and 

at that point the process of expungement is self-executing.").

¶54 What criteria will the court use to decide whether to 

review the certificate of discharge? What procedures will a 

court follow if it decides to review a certificate of discharge? 

¶55 Also left unanswered is what happens if there is a 

factual debate over whether the offender has satisfied the terms 

of probation. Must the court hold a hearing? Will the offender 

have a chance to appear and argue the case? What is the impact 

of this disarray?

¶56 Rather than providing guidance, the majority leaves a 

void. It suggests that because Ozuna is not contesting the 

facts, this case "is not the proper vehicle in which to set 

forth the procedures a court is to follow when such factual 

matters are disputed." Majority op., ¶14 n.9. It further 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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expresses its "confidence" in the circuit court's ability "to 

resolve such matters fairly." Id.5

¶57 The majority's confidence provides cold comfort for a 

youthful offender hoping to get a second chance through 

expunction.

¶58 Because the most likely result of the majority's 

decision is that circuit courts will adopt ad hoc procedures, an 

offender's chance at expunction could come down to which court 

receives the offender's certificate of discharge. This poses a 

whole host of future due process concerns. By creating an 

opportunity for circuit courts to review whether the terms of 

probation have been met, and failing to provide any guidance on 

how to do so, the majority creates more problems than it has 

solved, leaving confusion in its wake.

II

 

5 We previously declined the opportunity to revamp our 

supreme court rule on expunction. On June 30, 2009, the Board of 

Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin filed a rules petition 

seeking changes to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) Ch. 72 (Retention 

and Maintenance of Court Record). The petition also asked this 

court to amend SCR 72.06 (Expunction). After public hearing and 

further discussion the court took no action on the petition, in 

part because it was aware that the Wisconsin State Legislature 

was then planning to establish a committee to study the issue of 

expunction. In ensuing years, a number of legislative proposals 

have been introduced to address the issue, but none has advanced 

to fruition. Ultimately, this court voted to dismiss the 

petition and await further legislative action. For a more 

detailed history of the petition, see S.Ct. Order 09-07 (issued 

July 19, 2016).
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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¶59 Contrary to the majority, I would interpret the 

expunction statute in a manner consistent with its remedial 

purpose. See State v. Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 470, 646 

N.W.2d 341 (2002). ("A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is 

that an interpretation supporting the purpose of the statute is 

favored over an interpretation that will defeat the manifest 

objective of the statute.").

¶60 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 

the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cty., 

2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Where the 

language is ambiguous, a court may consult extrinsic sources, 

such as the statute's purpose and legislative history, to 

discern a statute's meaning. Id., ¶48.

¶61 Here, both litigants present reasonable meanings for 

the words "satisfied the conditions of probation." The State 

contends that it means perfect compliance with the terms of 

probation, while Ozuna pointed to a dictionary definition of 

"satisfy" that reads "[t]o meet or be sufficient for (a 

requirement)". Satisfy, The American Heritage Dictionary of the 

English Language, (5th ed. 2017) (emphasis added). Thus, the 

statute is ambiguous. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 ("a statute 

is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably 

well-informed persons in two or more senses.").6

 

6 This court has previously recognized statutory ambiguity 

created by use of the word "satisfy". Abitz v. Abitz, 155 

Wis. 2d 161, 172 455 N.W.2d 609 (1990) (referring to "the 

ambiguous word 'satisfy' in sec. 766.55(2)(c), Stats.").
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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¶62 As discussed above, the purpose of the expunction 

statute is well established. It is a remedial statute meant "to 

provide a break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability 

to comply with the law," which the legislature has consistently 

sought to expand. Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38; see also Hemp, 

359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20. Accordingly, using the definition of 

"satisfy" that permits expunction when an offender has 

"sufficiently" complied with the terms of probation is more 

consistent with the purpose of the statute than using a 

definition that would limit expunction to offenders with have 

"perfect" compliance.

¶63 A definition of "satisfy" that is based on sufficiency 

instead of perfection is also supported by the statute's 

legislative history.

¶64 In 1983 the legislature amended the definition for 

"successful completion of a sentence" provided in Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b). The initial draft of the amendment stated 

that in order for a probationer to successfully complete a 

sentence, the probationer "must not violate any conditions of 

probation." Drafting file for 1983 Wis. Act 519, Legislative 

Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. This language was replaced with 

the current language stating that to successfully complete a 

sentence, a probationer "must also satisfy the conditions of 

probation." It appears the legislature expressly considered 

requiring perfect compliance with the terms of probation and 

rejected it.
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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¶65 I turn now to apply the definition of "satisfy" based 

on sufficiency to the case at hand. Although the form from the 

Department of Corrections indicates that Ozuna violated the term 

of probation prohibiting any alcohol use (it noted a single 

citation for underage drinking), no significant violations were 

reported. Indeed, the Department of Corrections indicated that 

Ozuna's compliance with the terms of probation was sufficient by 

checking the box labeled "the offender has successfully 

completed his/her probation." Accordingly, I conclude that 

Ozuna successfully completed his sentence.

¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 provides that when an 

offender has successfully completed his sentence, and the 

probation authority has forwarded a certificate of discharge to 

the court, it shall have the effect of expunging the offender's 

record.7 Here, because Ozuna successfully completed probation, 

expunction should have been granted automatically when the DOC's 

verification was received by the court. Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 

¶29. Therefore, the court of appeals should be reversed.

III

¶67 In sum, the majority opinion makes no sense to me. 

It defies:

 

7 In this case the Department of Corrections (DOC) issued a 

Verification Form, rather than a certificate of discharge. That 

is because the DOC does not issue certificates of discharge to 

misdemeanants. See Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 328.16(2). 

Nevertheless, the DOC is required to notify the court of a 

probationer's successful completion of sentence. Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.09(5)(c). It does so through the Verification Form, which 

serves as the functional equivalent of a certificate of 

discharge for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.015.
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

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 the purpose of the statue;

 the statutory directive that where a certificate 

of discharge has issued it "shall have the effect 

of expunging the record . . . ." Wis. Stat. 

§ 973.015(1m)(b);

 a reasonable interpretation of the word 

"satisfies" that is more consistent with the 

statute's purpose and legislative history;

 our clear and recent precedent; and

 reality (the majority's apparent demand for 

absolute perfection is unmoored from the reality 

of the lives of many youthful offenders).

¶68 It is unclear to me why the majority has bent over 

backwards to reach its confusing conclusion. What is clear, 

however, is just how devastating the majority opinion is to the 

health of our justice system and to the lives of many youthful 

offenders. 

¶69 With the stroke of a pen, the majority has inexorably 

altered the trajectory of those lives. They will forever wear 

the scarlet letter of convicted criminal and, together with 

their families, face a future of collateral consequences for 

their youthful convictions. 

¶70 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 

dissent.

¶71 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 

ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.
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