[Cite as State v. Brown, 2016-Ohio-310.] 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Sentence Vacated in Part, and Cause 

Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 29, 2016 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 

Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

MARQUES BROWN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-130120 

TRIAL NO. B-1201362 

O P I N I O N.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} In this reopened appeal, defendant-appellant Marques Brown presents 

three assignments of error, challenging the trial court’s authority to limit his 

participation in the earned-credits program, the transitional-control program, and 

the judicial-release program as part of his sentence, which was jointly recommended 

by the parties. Because we conclude that the trial court may not limit Brown’s 

participation in the earned-credits program as a part of the sentence, even though 

that condition was agreed upon, we vacate the offending portion of Brown’s sentence 

and remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the 

judgment entry. 

Background Facts and Procedure 

{¶2} Brown was convicted in January 2013 upon his guilty plea to voluntary 

manslaughter with a firearm specification. As part of his plea agreement, Brown and 

the state agreed to a recommended nine-year prison term for the voluntary 

manslaughter and a three-year prison term for the firearm specification, and that as 

conditions of this aggregate 12-year term, nine years of which was nonmandatory, 

Brown would not be eligible for earned days of credit, transitional control, or judicial 

release, or any other sentence reduction or modification programs in prison. 

{¶3} The trial court imposed the jointly-recommended aggregate 12-year 

sentence and, consistent with the plea agreement, stated on the record that Brown 

would be ineligible for earned days of credit, transitional control, judicial release, 

and any other sentence reduction or modification programs in prison, and inserted 

language to that effect into its judgment entry. 

{¶4} Brown unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in a direct appeal to 

this court. See State v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130120 (Nov. 5, 2014). But 

in April 2015, we granted Brown’s App.R. 26(B) application to reopen his appeal. 

We reopened the appeal upon our determination that Brown’s appellate counsel had 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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been ineffective in failing to present an assignment of error, based upon State v. 

Livington, 2014-Ohio-1637, 9 N.E.3d 1117 (1st Dist.), challenging the trial court’s 

statutory authority to limit his eligibility to earn days of credit under R.C. 2967.193 

as a part of its sentence. 

{¶5} Brown advances that assignment of error in his reopened appeal. In 

addition, he advances two others, challenging the trial court’s authority to limit his 

eligibility for transitional control under R.C. 2967.26, and his eligibility for judicial 

release under R.C. 2929.20, as a part of its sentence. 

Standard of Review 

{¶6} This case involves the review of an agreed-upon sentence as 

contemplated by R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), because the trial court imposed the sentence 

with the now challenged conditions after both Brown and the state had 

recommended it. R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) bars appellate review of a sentence that was 

jointly recommended by the state and defendant unless the sentence is not 

“authorized by law.” See Livingston at ¶ 4, citing State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio 

St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14-16. 

{¶7} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) bars appeals that challenge the trial court’s 

discretion in imposing sentence, and sentences that are merely “contrary to law.” 

Underwood at ¶ 21-22. Such sentences are protected from appellate review 

“ ‘precisely because the parties agreed that the sentence is appropriate.’ ” 

Underwood at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-Ohio-3095, 

829 N.E.2d 690, ¶ 25. 

{¶8} But “[j]udges have no inherent power to create sentences,” State v. 

Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 22, cited in State v. 

Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 12. Therefore, a court 

may only impose a sentence that is provided for by the legislature—by statute. Id. 

An agreed sentence is not authorized by law, and thus exempt from the restriction of 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), if “no statute instructs or permits it,” Livingston, 2014-Ohio1637, 9 N.E.3d 1117, at ¶ 6, or if it fails to “comport[] with all mandatory sentencing 

provisions.” Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, at 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶9} The issue in this appeal is whether the now challenged but jointly 

recommended provisions in Brown’s sentence were permitted or instructed by 

statute, and thus, authorized by law. 

Earned-Credits Program 

{¶10} Ohio’s earned-credits program, governed by R.C. 2967.193, allows 

eligible offenders as defined by statute to participate in Department of Rehabilitation 

and Correction (“DRC”) programs so that they can earn days of credit “towards 

satisfaction of their stated prison term.” The legislature vested DRC with the 

authority to deny eligible offenders the right to earn credits. See R.C. 2967.193; 

Livingston at ¶ 7. Brown would be eligible for consideration with respect to the 

prison term imposed for voluntary manslaughter. 

{¶11} In State v. Livingston, this court recognized that the statutory scheme 

of R.C. 2967.193 does not provide the trial court with any discretion to determine 

eligible offenders or to limit an eligible offender’s ability to earn days of credit. 

Livingston, 2014-Ohio-1637, 9 N.E.3d 1117 at ¶ 8-10. We held that the trial court’s 

lack of sentencing power over Livingston’s participation in the earned-credits 

program rendered that part of the sentence unauthorized, even though the 

restriction was part of an agreed sentence. Id. at ¶ 9. As a result, we entertained 

Livingston’s challenge and vacated that part of his sentence prohibiting his 

participation in the earned-credits program. Id. at ¶ 9-10. 

{¶12} The relevant facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in 

Livingston, and the state concedes that appellate counsel’s representation was 

deficient for failing to raise this issue in Brown’s direct appeal. Based upon 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Livingston, we hold that the trial court lacked authority to impose the part of the 

sentence limiting Brown’s ability to earn days of credit, and sustain Brown’s first 

assignment of error. 

Transitional-Control Program 

{¶13} The legislature authorized DRC under R.C. 2967.26 to create a 

transitional-control program for eligible prisoners nearing the end of their prison 

terms to “closely monitor[]” the prisoners’ “adjustment to community supervision.” 

Under this program, DRC selects the eligible offenders for participation. R.C. 

2967.26(A)(1). But the trial court has the ultimate control over which eligible 

offenders participate in the program. 

{¶14} Specifically, by statute, DRC must notify the trial court of a prisoner’s 

impending transfer to the program. At that time, the court has full discretion to 

disapprove the transfer. R.C. 2967.26(A)(2). Thus, unlike with participation in the 

earned-credits program, the legislature has expressly conferred authority on the 

judiciary to disallow a prisoner’s participation in the transitional-control program. 

{¶15} Brown takes issue with the timing of the trial court’s disapproval. He 

contends that the court must wait to disapprove of his participation in the program, 

which could only occur with respect to his imprisonment for voluntary 

manslaughter, until it receives a notification from the DRC that he is to be 

transferred to the program based upon his conduct in prison. He suggests that 

allowing the trial court to deny transitional control in advance defeats the purpose of 

the statute. In support, he cites State v. Spears, 5th Dist. Licking No. 10-CA-95, 

2011-Ohio-1538. That court held that denying transitional control in the sentencing 

entry “clearly thwarts the design and purpose of the statute,” which is “to promote 

prisoner rehabilitation effort and good behavior while incarcerated.” Id. at ¶ 37. 

And Brown claims that no statutory provision specifically authorizes a trial court to 

deny access to transitional control as a part of the sentence. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶16} But it is undisputed that the trial court has the statutory authority and 

wide discretion to disapprove and ultimately block Brown’s participation in the 

program as part of its sentencing powers. And, unlike the defendant in Spears, 

Brown agreed that he would not be able to participate in this program as a condition 

of his 12-year prison term. We conclude that R.C. 2967.26 permits the restriction as 

part of the sentence under these circumstances. We hold, therefore, that this part of 

Brown’s sentence was authorized by law. Accordingly, we overrule the second 

assignment of error. 

Judicial Release 

{¶17} R.C. 2929.20 permits the trial court to “reduce” the “stated prison 

term” of an “eligible offender” through judicial release. If judicial release is granted, 

the court “shall order the release of the []offender,” “shall place the []offender under 

an appropriate community control sanction” and shall reserve the right to reimpose 

the reduced sentence if the offender violates the conditions of community control. 

R.C. 2929.20(K). Although eligibility for judicial release in the first instance is set by 

statute, see R.C. 2929.20(A), the trial court determines which eligible offenders may 

have their stated prison terms modified. See R.C. 2929.20(B). 

{¶18} Brown contends that he would have been eligible for judicial release at 

some point during his incarceration based on the statutory requirements, and notes 

that R.C. 2929.20 grants the court the authority to deny judicial release only after a 

motion has been filed. He argues, therefore, that his sentence was unauthorized by 

law because the trial court declared him ineligible for judicial release as a part of its 

sentence, before he had an opportunity to prove the appropriateness of judicial 

release. 

{¶19} As recognized by Brown, however, the legislature has vested the trial 

court by statute with the authority to deny Brown judicial release. Thus, we hold that 

the trial court has sentencing powers with respect to judicial release, like with 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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transitional control, but unlike with earned days of credit. In addition, Brown agreed 

that he would not be eligible to partake in judicial release as a condition of his 12-

year prison term. Given the trial court’s authority and broad discretion in this area, 

we conclude that R.C. 2929.20 permits the restriction as part of the sentence under 

these circumstances. We hold, therefore, that this portion of the sentence was 

authorized by law. Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error. 

Conclusion 

{¶20} The portion of the sentence prohibiting Brown from earning days of 

credit in prison was not authorized by law, and appellate counsel was deficient for 

not raising this issue in Brown’s direct appeal. To remedy the defect in Brown’s 

sentence, we apply the remedy set forth in Livingston, 2014-Ohio-1637, 9 N.E.3d 

1117 at ¶ 10. Thus, we vacate that portion of Brown’s sentence and remand this 

matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment. The trial 

court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. 

Affirmed in part, sentence vacated in part, and cause remanded. 

FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.