IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

STEVEN ERIC GOULD, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 83429 

00 1 1 2022 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

CLERK 

This is an appeal from a judgment of convic ion, pursuant to a 

jury trial, of invasion of the home while in possession of a deadly weapon; 

first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, victim 60 years of 

age or older; burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to 

commit robbery; and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, victim 60 

years of age or older. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerry 

A. Wiese, Judge. Appellant Steven Eric Gould raises seven contentions on 

appeal.' 

Speedy trial 

First, appellant argues that his speedy trial rights were 

violated. We disagree. As to the statutory right to a speedy trial under NRS 

178.556, there was good cause for the four-year delay. See Huebner v. State, 

103 Nev. 29, 31, 731 P.2d 1330, 1332 (1987) (stating that dismissal is 

mandatory under NRS 178.556 only if no good cause is shown for the delay). 

The delay in bringing appellant to trial was attributable to appellant's 

incarceration in California for over two years after his indictment, a 

conipetency evaluation upon his extradition to Nevada, issues cooperating 

with his counsel, the COVID-19 pandemic, and motion practice. As to the 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted in this appeal. 

avvsEr-, A. a Ft rYeaf?-1 

CLE -K OF EM COURT 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1947A 2 -a- Th2.015 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, the four-year delay between the 

indictment and trial was sufficient to trigger a speedy-trial analysis, State 

v. Inzunza, 135 Nev. 513, 516-17, 454 P.3d 727, 731 (2019) (holding that a 

delay approaching one year is sufficient to trigger the speedy-trial analysis), 

but the relevant factors weigh against a violation. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 

U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (identifying factors to be balanced in deciding whether 

the right to a speedy trial has been violation). Little of the delay was 

attributable to the State, and the reasons for the delay were valid and 

appropriate. See id. at 531 (explaining that deliberate attempts to delay 

the trial by the State should weigh against the government, neutral factors 

like negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily, and 

valid reasons may justify appropriate delay); cf. United States v. Olsen, 995 

F.3d 683, 693 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that "a global pandemic that has 

claimed more than half a million lives in this country . . . falls within such 

unique circumstances to permit a court to temporarily suspend jury trials 

in the interest of public health), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g 

en banc, 21 F.4th 1036 (2022); United States v. Smith, 460 F. Supp. 3d 981, 

984 (E.D. Cal. 2020) ("Almost every court faced with the question of whether 

general COVID-19 considerations justify an ends-of-justice continuance and 

exclusion of time [from speedy-trial considerations] has arrived at the same 

answer: yes."). And appellant has not demonstrated prejudice.2 See Barker, 

407 U.S. at 532 (explaining that prejudice "should be assessed in the light 

2To the extent that appellant argues that prejudice should be 

presurned, we reject the argument because the delay was less than five 

years and was not caused by bad-faith intentional misconduct or gross 

negligence on the State's part. See Inzunza, 135 Nev. at 519-20, 454 P.3d 

at 733-34 (discussing the circumstances in which the defendant may be 

relieved of showing prejudice). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2 
of the interests of the defendants which the speedy trial right was designed 

to protect"). He offered no proof that the delay impaired his defense by 

impacting the availability of witnesses, records, or other evidence. See 

Sheriff v. Berman, 99 Nev. 102, 108, 659 P.2d 298, 301 (1983) (holding that 

defendants failed to show prejudice when they offered no proof that the 

delay impacted their defense). Instead, he asserts prejudice based on the 

fact that during the delay his accomplices pleaded guilty and agreed to 

testify against hirn; however, those guilty pleas were entered while he was 

incarcerated in California, before any asserted delay by the State. He 

further claims prejudice because the State conducted confirmatory DNA 

testing shortly before the trial date. But we are not convinced that 

circumstance implicates the harms that the speedy-trial right was designed 

to protect against. In particular, in evaluating prejudice for purposes of a 

speedy-trial violation, we focus on whether the delay harmed the 

defendant's ability to gather and present evidence. See Berman, 99 Nev. at 

108, 659 P.2d at 301. The fact that the prosecution gathered additional 

inculpatory evidence during the delay did not impair appellant's ability to 

gather and present evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Rosson, 441 F.2d 

242, 247 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[W]e conclude that a reasonable delay which 

enables the government to accumulate the evidence necessary to make out 

a prima facie case does not prejudice the accused by impairing his 

'ability ... to defend himself."). And appellant did not assert that the 

timing of the DNA evidence disclosure prevented him from retaining a 

rebuttal expert or conducting an appropriate investigation. Notably in that 

respect, the State had provided notice years before the trial date that it 

intended to present expert DNA testimony. We therefore conclude that 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A 

3 
appellant has not dernonstrated a violation of his constitutional right to a 

speedy trial. 

Sufficiency of the evidence 

Appellant argues that the State did not introduce sufficient 

evidence that he was involved in the crime, that he was responsible for 

using a deadly weapon, or that the movement or restraint underlying the 

kidnapping conviction were beyond that necessary to complete the robbery. 

When it comes to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crirne beyond a reasonable doubt." McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 

P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (emphasis ornitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). A jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where 

substantial evidence supports its verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 

73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981). We conclude that appellant's contentions lack 

rnerit for the following reasons. 

First, sufficient evidence connects appellant to the crimes he 

was convicted of committing. The victim identified appellant in a 

photographic lineup roughly one month after the crime. The accomplices 

testified that they planned and engaged in the home invasion with 

appellant. And other evidence corroborated the victim's pretrial 

identification of appellant and the accomplice testimony. Appellant's DNA 

was recovered from material used to bind the victim and the victim's 

property was recovered from a home where appellant's mother and wife 

lived. Evidence also showed that appellant fied from police in California 

because he knew he was wanted in Las Vegas: his phone contained texts 

that indicated he engaged in robberies in Las Vegas, research about the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I 947A 

4 
Nevada home invasion statute, and photographs of the victim's property. 

Although there was some evidence undermining the victim's pretrial 

identification and she was unable to identify appellant at trial four years 

later, those considerations were for the jury to weigh. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 

123 Nev. 194, 202-03, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007) ("[I]t is the jury's function, 

not that of the court, to assess the weight of the evidence and determine the 

credibility of witnesses." (quoting Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 

381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998))). Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for a 

rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant planned and 

participated in the offenses for which he was convicted. 

Second, sufficient evidence supports the deadly weapon 

enhancement. The victim testified that both assailants brandished 

weapons. Police who responded to the home recovered a pellet gun and a 

live .38 special cartridge from the home. The victim did not own a gun or 

ammunition. A search of a co-conspirator's home revealed similar .38 

special ammunition and a pneumatic pistol, which is a deadly weapon under 

Nevada law. See NRS 193.165(6)(c); NRS 202.350(1)(d)(3); NRS 

202.265(5)(c). While the co-conspirator testified that the pneumatic weapon 

was not used in the crime, it was for the jury to determine the weight and 

credibility of that testimony. Rose, 123 Nev. at 202-03, 163 P.3d at 414. 

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude 

that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 

used a deadly weapon in the crime. See NRS 193.165 (providing additional 

penalty for crimes committed with the use of a deadly weapon); Harrison v. 

State, 96 Nev. 347, 351, 608 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1980) (recognizing that 

testimony of victim describing firearm is sufficient to support the deadly 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 I947A 

5 
weapon enhancement); Brooks v. State, 124 Nev. 203, 210, 180 P.3d 657, 

662 (2008) (explaining when an unarmed offender "uses" a deadly weapon 

for purposes of NRS 193.165). 

Third, substantial evidence supports the kidnapping conviction 

independent of the robbery. See NRS 200.310(1) ("A person who 

willfully . . . confines . . . a person by any means whatsoever with the intent 

to hold or detain . . . the person . . . for the purpose of . . . robbery upon or 

from the person . . . is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree[1"); Wright v. 

State, 94 Nev. 415, 417-18, 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (providing that 

incidental movement frorn one room to another during a robbery is, alone, 

insufficient to sustain a separate kidnapping charge). During the hour 

appellant and an accomplice spent in the victim's home, they demanded 

money, property, and her PIN nurnber, and repeatedly threatened her while 

ransacking her bedroom and home. They left her presence for a discussion. 

Appellant left, and his co-assailant ordered the victim into the living room 

where he tied her to a chair. Appellant returned after 15 minutes and again 

demanded the PIN number for the victim's debit card. The assailants 

ordered her to remain bound for 30 minutes and then left. Viewing this 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational 

juror, who had been properly instructed that "movement of the victim [must 

be] over and above that required to complete" the robbery as was the case 

here, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the movement and 

binding of the victim was "substantially in excess of that necessary" to 

complete the robbery or had "independent significance from the act of 

robbery" and supported the dual convictions for robbery and kidnapping. 

Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 274-75, 130 P.3d 176, 180-81 (2006). 

Evidence of flight and uncharged conduct 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

6 
Appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting 

evidence that he fled from officers in California before his arrest. He asserts 

that the State did not establish that his attempts to elude California police 

were relevant or that the probative value of the evidence was not 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He also contends that the 

district court erred in removing the word "immediately" from the flight 

instruction. We discern no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence or 

error in giving the flight instruction. See Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 

259, 129 P.3d 671, 676 (2006) (reviewing admission of uncharged conduct 

for abuse of discretion); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 

585 (2005) (reviewing decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of 

discretion or judicial error). 

After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court 

concluded that evidence of appellant's attempt to evade police in a highspeed and later foot-chase combined with his statement acknowledging that 

he fled to avoid questioning by Las Vegas police showed his consciousness 

of guilt and therefore was relevant. We agree. See Potter v. State, 96 Nev. 

875, 876, 619 P.2d 1222, 1222 (1980) ("Flight is more than merely leaving 

the scene of the crime. It embodies the idea of going away with 

consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of avoiding arrest"); Williams v. 

State, 85 Nev. 169, 175, 451 P.2d 848, 852 (1969) (considering defendant's 

flight and shooting of a police officer who stopped and questioned defendant 

to be "admissible as indicative of a guilty mind"). Further, these acts were 

supported by clear and convincing evidence through the testimony of an 

officer who pursued appellant during the vehicle chase, responded to the 

accident, and spoke with appellant in the hospital after his apprehension. 

And the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

40) 1947A GOD. 

7 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court 

(Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 933, 267 P.3d 777, 781 (2011) (recognizing that 

evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it appeals to the jurors' emotions or 

invites the jury to find guilt on a ground apart from proof of the charged 

offenses). 

We further conclude that the district court did not plainly err 

in omitting the word "immediately" frorn the flight instruction. See 

Jerernias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48-49 (2018) (reviewing unobjected to error for plain error affecting substantial rights). The given 

instruction was consistent with the evidence showing that appellant fled 

when police tried to apprehend hirn in California, not immediately after the 

crime. See Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 199, 111 P.3d 690, 699-700 (2005) 

(recognizing that district court may give flight instruction when evidence 

shows that defendant fled "with consciousness of guilt and to evade arrest"). 

Because the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that 

appellant's attempt to evade capture by California police signified 

something more than a mere going away," Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 

581-82, 119 P.3d 107, 126 (2005) (quoting State v. Rothrock, 45 Nev. 214, 

229, 200 P. 525, 529 (1921)); see also Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 770, 121 

P.3d 592, 599 (2005), we conclude that the district court did not err in giving 

the flight instruction as worded, see, e.g., Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 871, 

944 P.2d 762, 773 (1997) (approving of flight instruction without 

"immediately" qualification); Matthews v. State, 94 Nev. 179, 181, 576 P.2d 

1125, 1126 (1978) (similar). 

Appellant also contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting his post-arrest statement because it referenced 

uncharged conduct. We disagree. Appellant told police that he tried to 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I 947A 44411). 

8 
elude them because "Vegas police wanted to talk to him and that he did not 

want to go back to jail." Although appellant's statenient implied he had 

engaged in other criminal activity ("he did not want to go back to jail"), see 

Rice v. State, 108 Nev. 43, 44, 824 P.2d 281, 281 (1992) (recognizing that a 

statement references prior criminal history where a jury could reasonably 

infer from it that defendant engaged in prior criminal activity), the 

statement was relevant to show appellant's consciousness of guilt with 

respect to the charged offenses and the district court instructed the jury 

that appellant's flight and statement were to be considered only for that 

purpose. Given those circumstances, we conclude the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the statement. See Rhymes v. State, 121 

Nev. 17, 21-22, 107 P.3d 1278, 1281 (2005). 

Miranda violation 

Appellant argues that his statement to California police was 

obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We 

discern no error that is plain from a casual inspection of the record and 

affected appellant's substantial rights by "causing 'actual prejudice or a 

miscarriage of justice." Martinorellan v. State, 131 Nev. 43, 48-49, 343 P.3d 

590, 593 (2015) (quoting Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 

477 (2008)) (addressing requirements for plain-error review when there was 

no objection in district court). The totality of the circumstances indicates 

that appellant was in custody after a high-speed chase when the officer 

guarding him asked him why he fled. See Carroll v. State, 132 Nev. 269, 

281, 371 P.3d 1023, 1032 (201.6) ("Miranda warnings are required when a 

defendant is subjected to a custodial interrogation." (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). But appellant did not object below and the record is silent 

as to whether appellant was provided adequate Miranda warnings before 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A
he made the statement. We therefore cannot conclude that any error in 

admitting the statement based on a Miranda violation is plain from a casual 

inspection of the record. We also are not convinced that any error in this 

respect caused actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice given the other 

evidence presented at trial. 

Cellphone contents 

Appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting a 

seized cellphone's contents over his objections that the State did not 

establish an adequate foundation or disclose the evidence in a timely 

manner. In addition, for the first time on appeal, he asserts that messages 

on the phone referred to uncharged conduct and impermissibly informed 

the jury of the penalty for home invasion. He also asserts that the disclosure 

of the entire cellphone contents rnay have obscured potentially exculpable 

location data. 

We discern no abuse of discretion in admitting the cell phone 

contents as the State laid an adequate foundation for the admission of the 

evidence. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 266, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). 

Testimony established that the officer analyzing the phone received it from 

property taken from appellant's vehicle at the time of his arrest. See Sorce 

v. State, 88 Nev. 350, 352-53, 497 P.2d 902, 903 (1972) (providing that 

foundation need only show that it is "reasonably certain that no tampering 

or substitution took place" (citing Oliver v. State, 85 Nev. 10, 449 P.2d 252 

(1969))). Although "cellular telephones are not always exclusively used by 

the person to whom the number is assigned," Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 

A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), here other evidence indicates that 

appellant used the phone: the phone was seized from the car appellant was 

driving and contained usernames for banking and social media apps that 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

10) 1947A 

10 
indicated appellant was using it, cf. Rodriguez v. State, 128 Nev. 155, 162, 

273 P.3d 845, 849 (2012) (providing that a proponent must provide 

"sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of authorship in order to 

authenticate [a] text message as a condition precedent to its admission"). 

The record also indicates that the State timely disclosed the cell phone 

contents to the defense roughly three months before trial. See NRS 

174.285(2) (requiring a party to comply with a disclosure request "not less 

than 30 days before trial"). The State's subsequent, more focused disclosure 

merely highlighted evidence already in the defense's possession. Appellant 

has not identified any exculpatory cell tower location data that he contends 

was hidden within the disclosed data. 

To the extent that the messages contained in the cell phone 

refer to uncharged conduct and information about potential sentencing 

ranges, appellant did not object on these grounds below and we discern no 

plain error. Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 266, 182 P.3d at 109. The messages 

referring to criminal conduct were relevant to show that appellant 

participated in the charged offenses and were not unduly prejudicial. See 

id. at 270, 182 P.3d at 111 (evaluating whether evidence of prior bad acts 

would have been admissible when conducting plain error review). The 

photo depicting the home invasion statute was relevant to appellant's 

consciousness of guilt. Although the photo also depicted information that a 

jury may not consider when adjudicating guilt (the potential sentencing 

range for the offense), the photo was mentioned only briefly during 

testimony, the record indicates that it was a thumbnail image and only the 

statute's heading appeared to be readily legible, and the jury was instructed 

that it was not to consider punishment in determining guilt. In these 

circumstances, the alleged error is not plain from a casual inspection of the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

10) 1947A 

11 
record and did not cause actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. See 

Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995) ("An error 

is plain if the error is so unmistakable that it reveals itself by a casual 

inspection of the record." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 

McNamara v. State, 132 Nev. 606, 622, 377 P.3d 106, 117 (2016) ("Jurors 

are presumed to follow the instructions they are given."). 

Prosecutorial misconduct 

Appellant argues that the State impermissibly shifted the 

burden of proof by arguing that the defense failed to call a witness and 

improperly emphasized appellant's uncharged conduct. Appellant did not 

object to either argument, and we discern no plain error. Valdez, 124 Nev. 

at 1190, 196 P.3d 477. The prosecutor's comments, when considered in 

context, do not amount to an attempt to shift the burden of proof. See 

Knight v. State, 116 Nev. 140, 144-45, 993 P.2d 67, 71 (2000) (observing that 

[a] prosecutor's comments should be viewed in context" when considering 

whether a defendant should be afforded relief); Whitney v. State, 112 Nev. 

499, 502, 915 P.2d 881, 883 (1996) (recognizing that a prosecutor 

impermissibly shifts the burden of proof by commenting "on the defense's 

failure to produce evidence or call witnesses"). Instead, the argument 

responded to an assertion made in the defense's opening statement about a 

witness the defense intended to call to opine that the pretrial photographic 

lineup was unreliable. See Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 178, 931 P.2d 54, 

67 (1997) (recognizing rebuttal arguments may permissibly respond to 

issues raised by the defense's closing), receded from on other grounds by 

Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 235, 994 P.2d 700, 713 (2000). The prosecutor 

pointing out that the "defense failed to substantiate its theories with 

supporting evidence," does not amount to burden shifting. Evans v. State, 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

((1, I947A .sIEND 

12 
, C.J. 

, Sr.J. 

Herndon 

117 Nev. 609, 631, 28 P.3d 498, 513 (2001), overruled on other ground.s by 

Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356, 366 n.5, 351 P.3d 725, 732 n.5 (2015). And 

because the contents of appellant's cellphone were properly admitted into 

evidence, the prosecutor could properly quote messages. Moreover, the 

prosecutor's argument relied on the statement and its timing shortly after 

the charged offense to show that appellant acknowledged his participation 

in that offense and did not emphasize the uncharged conduct. 

Cumulative error 

Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of errors during 

trial warrants reversal. See Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481 

(providing the relevant factors to consider for a claim of cumulative error). 

Appellant has not demonstrated the existence of any error. Thus, there is 

nothing to cumulate. See Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. 131, 139 n.2, 442 P.3d 

138, 145 n.2 (2019) (concluding that errors did not cumulate as there was 

only one error). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.3

cc: Hon. Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge 

Steven S. Owens 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

101 1947A a 

13