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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION’S

CAPITAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 2, 2001

Serial No. 107–112

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairman

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia,

——— ———

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

DIANE E. WATSON, California

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

RUSSELL SMITH, Staff Director

HEEA VAZIRANI-FALES, Counsel

MATTHEW BATT, Clerk

JON BOUKER, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on November 2, 2001 ........................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Cogbill, John, chairman, National Capital Planning Commission; Joseph

A. Moravec, Commissioner of the Public Building Service, GSA; and

Robert Malson, president, D.C. Hospital Association ................................ 117

Williams, Anthony, Mayor, District of Columbia; Linda Cropp, chairman,

District of Columbia City Council; Kenneth Kasprisin, Assistant Director for Readiness, Response and Recovery, FEMA; Arthur J. Lawrence,

Assistant Surgeon General/Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services; Michael Rogers,

executive director, Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments;

and Charles Ramsey, chief, Metropolitan Police Department .................. 11

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Cogbill, John, chairman, National Capital Planning Commission, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 120

Cropp, Linda, chairman, District of Columbia City Council, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 11

Kasprisin, Kenneth, Assistant Director for Readiness, Response and Recovery, FEMA, prepared statement of ........................................................ 31

Lawrence, Arthur J., Assistant Surgeon General/Acting Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 44

Malson, Robert, president, D.C. Hospital Association, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 134

Moravec, Joseph A., Commissioner of the Public Building Service, GSA,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 126

Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 4

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the District

of Columbia:

Letter dated October 31, 2001 .................................................................. 150

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 9

Ramsey, Charles, chief, Metropolitan Police Department, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 88

Rogers, Michael, executive director, Metropolitan Washington Council of

Governments, prepared statement of .......................................................... 62

Williams, Anthony, Mayor, District of Columbia, prepared statement of ... 17

(1)

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE

NATION’S CAPITAL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Constance A. Morella

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Morella, Norton, and Watson.

Staff present: Russell Smith, staff director; Heea Vazivani-Fales,

counsel; Matthew Batt, legislative assistant; Robert White, communications director; Victoria Proctor and Howie Denis, professional

staff members; Jon Bouker, minority counsel; and Earley Green,

minority assistant clerk.

Mrs. MORELLA. Good morning, the Subcommittee on the District

of Columbia welcomes you to its eighth hearing of the 107th Congress.

We have been fortunate to assemble key stakeholders on the

topic of emergency preparedness in the Nation’s Capital. They have

been very patient with us, in spite of one postponement, because

we could not get into our offices, and various restrictions on the delivery of testimony.

Today’s hearing is extremely important and timely. We have also

decided to have another hearing within a few weeks, that will focus

entirely on the topic of the economic impact of the emergency situation in the District of Columbia.

I must add that the witnesses for that topic were prepared to be

with us today, but because of the issue of economic impact and its

importance on our Nation’s Capital and a very crowded agenda this

morning, we believe that it deserves a separate hearing.

So again, I welcome all of you here today, our witnesses and

those of you who have come to hear the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.

As we all know, the events of September 11th shook the world.

But just as quickly as America was knocked down, she dusted herself off and stood tall. Americans soon began to talk about reconstructing our lost buildings, responding with force against the

attackers, and redoubling our efforts to make certain such a travesty never happens again.

Here in the Nation’s Capital, on this subcommittee, our post-September 11th responsibility is to examine how well the District of

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Columbia and the region are prepared to handle any future emergencies.

Going hand in hand with that is the matter of security coordination between the Federal and local governments, because I believe

the Federal Government needs to do a much better job of communicating and consulting with local officials before taking actions,

such as closing streets, that place an extra burden on the District

of Columbia.

These are not just academic concerns. The introduction of anthrax as a weapon has illustrated a need for comprehensive regional and inter-governmental cooperation.

Anthrax spores have been found in more than a dozen buildings

in the District of Columbia and the surrounding area, including

congressional offices and the Brentwood Postal Facility, where two

of our Postal workers died after contracting the disease.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the D.C. Department of Health are among the agencies that have responded to

this bio-terrorism, and I know some have already raised questions

about whether their combined responses were adequately coordinated.

Looking to the future, I am interested in learning how our network of hospitals are prepared to handle the outbreak of an infectious disease such as smallpox. Is there a plan to share resources

and costs, to quarantine patients? What is the surge capacity of our

hospitals?

The public needs to be assured that the various agencies of the

Government are working together to protect the public safety. Miscommunication, confusion, and a lack of coordination are unnecessary hurdles to overcome, when our focus must be on public health

and public safety. The Government must speak to the public with

one clear knowledgeable voice.

I want to return our attention to the events of September 11th.

Although the city of Washington, DC, was spared a direct hit because of the brave actions of the passengers and the crew on

United Flight 93, we did see 189 of our friends and neighbors killed

at the Pentagon.

Subsequently, there were false reports of explosions or car bombs

in various places in the Capital. Rumors abounded that Metro was

closed. The evacuation of Capital Hill office buildings was slipshod,

with employees in some offices never receiving definite word that

they could go home. In short, D.C. was gripped with confusion.

The Emergency Broadcast System, designed precisely for these

types of events, was never activated, to my knowledge, at least.

Fire fighters, paramedics, police, and other emergency personnel

responded quickly to the Pentagon, because they undergo constant

training in mutual aid response.

However, there was a lack of high level coordination across jurisdictional lines. In fact, it was not until 6 p.m. on the night of September 11th, that the chief administrative officers, police chiefs and

other top officials from across the region, talked to each other on

a conference call. By that time, 9 hours had passed, and most of

Washington was back at home, searching for news on their television sets.

3

It is evident that there was no, and there is no, regional emergency plan, at least not one that can be counted on. A plan that

exists only on paper is not enough. Employees must undergo training and testing so they will know what to do when the moment of

truth arrives.

When it snows or even when there is a threat of snow, regional

leaders talk to each other about how they are going to proceed,

whether Government and schools will be closed. The plan goes into

detail about emergency routes, getting information to the public,

and use of the Washington area warning system.

The region has a snow plan, but we do not have a comprehensive

coordinated plan to respond to emergencies, such as September

11th.

I find that astonishing and worrisome, and I hope to hear from

our witnesses today that they have taken concrete steps to correct

this glaring weakness.

As the seat of the Federal Government, Washington must be the

most prepared city and region, in the event of a terrorist attack or

other emergency. We are an obvious target. We must be prepared

to work together.

If the Federal Government decides to send its employees home

in the middle of the day, officials in the District, Maryland, and

Virginia must know what is happening, so they can prepare for the

rush of commuters.

The Federal Government cannot make decisions in a vacuum. It

is the largest employer in the region, and its actions have consequences.

Finally, this hearing was, as I mentioned earlier, originally going

to examine the economic impact of the terrorist attacks on the District and the region. Congresswoman Norton and I decided to postpone that part of the hearing until another day soon, given the already large scope of this hearing.

But I do want to state for the record that we, in Congress, do

recognize that the financial picture for the District, at least in the

short term, is not encouraging. The tourism and hospitality industries, which are so vital to the city’s economy, face severe weakness. Thousands of jobs and small businesses are in jeopardy, and

we are going to continue to closely monitor this situation.

So I thank you for being here this morning. I would now like to

yield and recognize the ranking member of this Subcommittee on

the District of Columbia, who has obviously done such a great job,

Congresswoman Norton, for an opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella follows:]

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5

6

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella. May I say in

advance that I regret that I am going to have to leave this hearing

for a few minutes around 10:30, because Mr. Gephardt is having

a press conference, of which I must be a part, on an amendment

to the Victim’s Compensation Fund, that we are announcing at

10:30.

There is a Victim’s Compensation Fund for those lost as a result

of September 11th and, of course, we had many D.C. residents lost

at the Pentagon. We had three school children and three teachers

lost.

But this fund does not cover people who have been lost out of the

anthrax deaths. That is what is being announced this morning, and

I simply have to go and come back. I go with my apologizes.

I very much appreciate the Chair’s willingness to schedule today’s hearing. The September 11th attack raised more new and

more serious issues for the District of Columbia than for any jurisdiction, except the U.S. Government, itself.

The District has had to contend with escalated local responsibilities to protect its almost 600,000 residents, and unprecedented national responsibilities to help protect the Federal presence. But for

both, this city is the first responder.

To add to the challenge, the city was uniquely handicapped in recovering from the attack, when National Airport was closed for 3

weeks, the only airport in the country to experience such a shutdown. By Thanksgiving, only 55 percent of National’s planes will

be flying.

At this hearing, we originally intended comprehensively to address the spectrum of September 11th issues facing both the D.C.

government and our business sector, particularly hospitality. The

cascading effects on tourism and other D.C. businesses of the shutdown of the airport, the drought of tourists, and the anthrax scare

have been all but lost, as events have rolled over one another since

September 11th.

I very much appreciate that because of the length of the comprehensive hearing planned for today, the Chair has agreed to a

special hearing, devoted exclusively to our private business sector

and to the effect on workers who, along with the D.C. government,

have absorbed the brunt of the attack.

Tourism’s spectacular growth and ability to fuel even unrelated

sectors and commerce in the District is one of the great stories to

emerge from the ashes of the 1990’s.

However, D.C.’s workers and businesses have been the unsung

heros of September 11th. They deserve to be featured in a hearing

of their own, and the Chair has promised to schedule a hearing

forthwith. I very much appreciate that.

Today, we look primarily at D.C. government preparedness, and

at the effects of the September 11th business slowdown on the D.C.

budget, and on the District’s economy.

Let me say that I had staff pull the unemployment figures, just

released this morning. They are extremely discouraging. What they

tell us is that D.C. must be focused on nothing, nothing like it is

focused now on its economy, on keeping its government viable.

The unemployment figures for local jurisdictions are going to be

issued only November 16th. If we look at where we were, on SepVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:12 Oct 29, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\81954.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
7

tember 2001, we were at 6 percent unemployment, spectacular for

us, and we were at 6 percent a year ago in September. That is

what we needed.

I do not know where we will be. But the analysts say that they

expected a jump in the unemployment, but they never expected a

jump, and this is what the analysts say, in the national unemployment figure of the kind they have now.

Our unemployment rate is 5.4 percent in October. It is the biggest 1 month jump in more than 21 years. To quote from this Post

article, ‘‘Economists fear that continued fallout from the attacks,

new worries about anthrax in the mail, plunging consumer confidence and rising unemployment in the months ahead will keep

consumers tight-fisted, further weakening the economy.’’ This is where the health of the District of Columbia lies in the

coming months, and this is where we must be focused, and on

other issues.

We are also concerned to know more about the level of cooperation between the Federal and D.C. governments to cope with postattack and preparedness issues.

To its credit, the House Economic Development, Public Buildings,

and Emergency Management Subcommittee, on which I serve, has

already agree to my amendment that makes the District a full

partner in Homeland preparedness, coordination, and implementation.

However, the bill is not yet on the floor, and recent actions by

Federal and congressional personnel give reason for continuing concern. That concern deepened when, as I understand it, the Sergeant at Arms and the Capital Police declined the Chair’s invitation to testify here today. That is exactly the wrong way to protect

the Nation’s Capital.

Having declined to appear publicly, I shall ask each to come to

my office for a meeting to achieve greater coordination on street

closures, barricades and other actions, that affect not only the Federal presence, but also the people who live and work here.

The District already has demonstrated that it can handle an unprecedented health crisis and bring it under control. Not only the

city, but the country, is indebted to Mayor Williams, Dr. Walks,

and their team, for the calm and informed way they have managed

and quieted the anthrax crisis, and established a workable precedent that will benefit other jurisdictions.

Today, we may hear a progress report on anthrax, but given the

saturation of the news with information and anthrax updates, that

is the one issue on which Congress has been informed since the attack.

Notwithstanding the tragic anthrax deaths, anthrax remains a

disease that is hard to get and easy to cure, if caught in time. The

District will have a more difficult time retaining its own financial

health, and calming an unaddressed economic crisis, as thousands

of businesses hang on, or are out of business, and as thousands

more workers are furloughed or laid off.

What must concern us preeminently is keeping September 11th

from taking down the economy of the District of Columbia. We

have included $16 million in the 2002 D.C. Appropriation for emergency preparedness.

8

We have also been able to get the District raised from a mere $10 million, in the President’s pending $20 billion supplemental, to $25 million; still a small fraction of the city’s request and needs.

However, our discussions with the House and Senate appropriators lead us to believe that we will be able to significantly expand

this amount. Yet, it is not likely that we will replace all of the anticipated $200 million in lost tax receipts to the District, not to

mention the $750 million in hospitality and travel losses the District estimates.

I hope that at the very least, Congress will not deny the District the full $250 million it needs to be a fully prepared first responder.

I certainly do not intend to go quietly into the night, while much

is expected of the District and little is given.

I look forward to hearing more concerning the challenges and the

appropriate remedies from today’s witnesses. Again, I very much

appreciate the work of the Chair and her staff in calling this hearing.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton follows:]

9

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton.

Now before we hear the testimony, it is the plan and the policy

of this committee and all its subcommittees to swear in all our witnesses. So I could ask you to please stand and raise your right

hand. I would also like to ask Dr. Segal and Mr. LePorte, since we

may be calling on them, and I understand they are here also, to

stand and to be sworn in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. MORELLA. Everybody has responded affirmatively and the

record will signify such.

We will start off now and we will proceed in the order that is

listed with, first of all, our great mayor, the Honorable Anthony

Williams.

STATEMENTS OF ANTHONY WILLIAMS, MAYOR, DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA; LINDA CROPP, CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL; KENNETH KASPRISIN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR READINESS, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY,

FEMA; ARTHUR J. LAWRENCE, ASSISTANT SURGEON GENERAL/ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; MICHAEL

ROGERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS; AND CHARLES RAMSEY,

CHIEF, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mayor WILLIAMS. Chairman Morella, Congresswoman Norton,

Congresswoman Watson, welcome to the proceedings, and thank

you all for being here to discuss the preparedness.

Would you like me to hold for the Congresswoman?

Mrs. MORELLA. That would be very kind of you.

Congresswoman Watson, we are just so pleased with you on the

committee. Thank you very much. I recognize we are not in session,

so it is a tremendous sacrifice and commitment for other Members

to appear on a Friday when we do not have votes. I would love to

recognize you for any opening statement you may have.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Morella.

I just wanted to echo the remarks coming from the Congresswoman. I feel that we need to be sensitive to this District in which

we operate.

Sometimes, the politics get in the way. I am hoping that all of

you representing the District will be able to bring out the facts that

will compel us to provide the resources that are going to be so necessary for us to do policy here in this area.

Under the circumstances under which we are all living, it makes

it even more and more important that we provide you with what

is needed.

Before coming here, I was talking to my staff, and I know you

have concerns about the streets that are blocked off, and you wonder how you balance between safety and the precautions you take,

and the people’s free flow.

I hope that we can think through some of these areas with Congresswoman Norton and the rest of the members, and with all of

you. It is going to take us awhile, but I hope that we can come up

with policies that would allow our freedoms to continue, but being

alert and cautious, allow us to reduce the risk.

12

I just had a hearing in Los Angeles attended by seven Members

of Congress on our preparedness in L.A. County and southern California. I am very proud to say that because we are so used to natural disasters, as we have earthquakes every day and we have fires

and other kinds, that we are prepared.

But the problem, and probably the problem here, is that we have

not connected the dots. So our problem is how do we coordinate and

how do we communicate?

I am hoping that as you give your testimony, we can kind of

focus on how we coordinate your efforts, how we communicate them

to the public, and how you communicate to the policymaking body,

so we then, in turn, can supply you with resources you need to be

able to protect your citizens.

Thank you so very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. That was well stated, Congresswoman Watson.

Again, I thank you, Mayor Williams, for the courtesy of allowing

her opening statement.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely.

Mrs. MORELLA. We recognize you, sir.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Madam Chair, for the purposes of the records,

I have submitted my entire statement. I have abbreviated it, both

in light of the limited amount of time for any one witness, and

given the scope of the hearing.

I also will focus on emergency preparedness, as opposed to the

testimony that was prepared that dealt with economic recovery,

which I understand is a subject of a later hearing. I thank you for

holding that hearing, as well as this one.

Mrs. MORELLA. Without objection, the statement you have submitted will be in the record.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Thank you, and like all of you, and like most

Americans, the leadership of the District never anticipated the evil

of using a passenger airliner as a weapon of mass destruction.

For us, like most Americans, the cowardice of the terrorist attacks on September 11th galvanized our resolve to out-think, outsmart, and out-plan any terrorism that targets the District of Columbia.

Immediately following September 11th, I convened a task force

of senior District officials to review and improve the District’s existing emergency operations plan. I gave the Task Force to primary

imperatives: No. 1, enhance critical linkages and operational relationships with our Federal, state, and regional partners; and No.

2, develop a comprehensive emergency management program capability.

As you know, there already exists a comprehensive Federal Response Plan. My task force established working groups in each of

the critical emergency support functions to mirror the Federal Response Plan including: a transportation group to review current

evacuations plans; a communications group tasked with planning

and implementing the District’s emergency communications needs;

a law enforcement group tasked with ensuring that public order is

maintained during a crisis; and a command control group to oversee and coordinate these working groups.

To ensure cross-jurisdictional coordination and effective resource

sharing, these working groups include representatives from Federal

13

agencies, as well as officials from surrounding jurisdictions in

Maryland and Virginia.

We are particularly grateful for the leadership provided by Michael Lowder from the Federal Emergency Management Agency,

who has brought resources and representation of the National Capital Response Team to the work of the District’s task force. The National Capital Response Team includes FEMA, the Environmental

Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services,

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

We now have established readiness levels that mirror the readiness levels of the Federal Government. Should disaster strikes tomorrow, God forbid, we have the communications systems in place

to provide immediate coordination.

We have comprehensive phone lists and call trees with satellite

phone numbers and text pagers, and pocket guides that we all

carry around that outline every organization’s responsibility in key

response areas.

We have created notification processes for all types of incidents

and emergencies, ranging from power outages to chemical attacks.

We have planned for where all activities will be staged, and how

we will move people and emergency equipment in and out of town.

We have outlined evacuation routes. We have developed the fundamental architecture of an effective emergency response.

The anthrax contaminations of the last few weeks tested our

emergency preparation and response plans. We are coordinating

closely with our Federal partners in the Centers for Disease Control to respond to the needs of the Postal Service and other mail

handling operations.

While I am satisfied that we are enhancing our organizational

capability to respond to emergencies, I am here to tell you that we

are not sufficiently resourced.

We do not have the sufficient resources to respond to the full

range of disasters we could face, to face responsibilities in an order

of magnitude and scope, and I will give you an example, similar in

scope to the city of New York, which has 40,000 police officers; to

meet similar responsibilities, in terms of scope and magnitude.

Certainly not in population but, again, in terms of potential targets, we have 4,000 policemen. So it is extraordinarily important

that we have coordination.

Although the District’s emergency preparedness is meeting the

current needs the city, it has taken its toll. Over the past 2 weeks,

our fire and emergency medical services department has responded

to between 30 and 70 hazardous material [hazmat] calls per day.

The MPD has been on a heightened state of alert since September 11th. I am not sure how we can get to a higher state, which

has meant greater numbers of officers deployed, using more overtime dollars.

In fact, we estimate that the additional personnel costs alone for

police for the next 6 months, in the aftermath of September 11th,

will be over $11 million.

Let me assure you that our citizens notice the diversion of officers away from their neighborhoods, and it has begun to erode the

overwhelmingly positive feeling about reduced crime in our city.

14

I am here to tell you that the men and women of the District’s

public safety units are doing what needs to be done, but we are depleting our resources.

I will give you an example. Our homicide rate in Washington,

DC, was on pace to be down 30 percent over the last year. I was

criticized because it was not down in some areas more than other

areas.

But what we often lose sight of is the good news. The good news

is that homicide was on a trend to be down 30 percent. That is a

huge decrease, following decreases over the last couple of years already.

Since September 11th, it is on pace to be down now only 15 percent. So we have lost 15 percent traction, because of the extraordinary responsibilities we are facing as a Federal international center.

We are running our hazmat response on unbudgeted overtime

dollars. If we must sustain the current operational tempo over the

long haul, we are determined to develop flexibility and depth far

beyond what anyone has done before, because, again, we have

unique responsibilities in this city. But this is not going to be fast;

it is not going to be easy; and it is not going to be without costs.

Together with our regional and Federal partners, and with the support of Congress, I am committed to seeing that our city meets and

exceeds the newly created national standards for emergency preparedness established by FEMA, the National Emergency Management Association, and International Association of Emergency

Management.

Now we have submitted a request for special appropriations in the amount of $1 billion, which includes $250 million for emergency preparedness. My testimony includes all the different areas,

both in terms of resources and equipment, as well as costs reimbursement. In addition to investing in the personnel that we depend on in an emergency, this request will allow us to better serve

the people who live and work in the District.

To give you an example, one of the critical issues in the city on

September 11th was traffic control. With the mass exodus of so

many Federal employees, and many were mothers and fathers concerned about the children, the streets downtown initially became

gridlocked.

This request includes equipment that will enable us to closely

monitor traffic patterns and quickly implement new patterns and

street light timings, to ensure a safe and orderly evacuation of the

city.

As Peter LePorte or Margaret Kellems, my deputy mayor for

public safety, or the chief will tell you, we have got to do two

things, actually. We have got to ensure an orderly evacuation; and

while we are doing that, we have to also manage the same way

Montgomery County would manage or Fairfax County or Prince

George’s.

We have to also manage for the access and accommodation for

our emergency vehicles to get to an accident. So you have to plan

two route structures or networks.

This investment that we are talking about in the National Capital, and actually in the National Capital Region, will help

15

strengthen our preparedness to the levels that the citizens of the

District expect, to the levels that the citizens of this region expect

and, indeed, to the levels that the American people should expect.

Our Nation’s Capital will always be a higher risk environment

than most cities, and responding to a major emergency, as you

have said, Madam Chair and the other members of the committee

have mentioned, requires coordination and cooperation among all of

our local jurisdictions.

One thing I have learned, it is going to require coordination not

only between the city and Maryland and Virginia States, but it is

going to require cooperation between the city and the surrounding

counties.

I am pleased that Michael Rogers from COG is here today, as

well as the city and our private industry, which we often sometimes fail to realize, and which is vitally important.

I want to mention here before the committee the pride that I

have for another kind of mutual aid and coordination. I am proud

of our Engine 23, that was one of the first responders, in support

of Arlington County at the Pentagon on September 11th.

I know that we can depend on a similar level of support from the

governments in northern Virginia and the surrounding Maryland

counties for mutual aid with fire fighting, to early detection of

symptoms in hospitals, to evacuation planning.

We are working together to prepare, prevent, and when necessary, respond. It is accomplished only through regional cooperation, the kind of regional cooperation that we have seen.

I was pleased that one of the first things I did as Mayor was to

initiate, and Michael has been a part of this and the Board of

Trade has been a part of this, a regular series of meetings with

what we call the ‘‘Big Four’’: the county executives of Montgomery,

Fairfax, Prince George’s and the District, recognizing that we are

all joined in all these activities together.

If we are to be successful in safeguarding the Capital, it will require effective communications between the Federal Government

and the District.

I am pleased that earlier this week, I had a productive meeting

with Governor Ridge, who is personally committed to working with

me toward additional improvements in District/ Federal cooperation.

I strongly urge the Congress to give positive consideration to

Congresswoman Norton’s legislation that would institutionalize a

linkage between the District and the Office of Homeland Security

on all levels of domestic preparedness.

One of the things that we talked about is the need in the area

of better planning and better preparation for the District to be able

to meet on some kind of basis with the Homeland Security folks,

and have in advance an understanding of what the plans are, for

all the Federal departments, for the U.S. Capital, and what they

plan to undertake in various levels of alert.

This is so we know ahead of time that if we go to alert status

or whatever, you know, Departments 1, 2 and 3 are going to do the

following things. Then we can, up front, discuss these issues of balancing an open city with a safe city, and not be diverted into every

instance when there is an alert, discussing whether we are going

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to have this street closed or that street closed or these parking

spaces open or those parking spaces open.

We know now that we are in a new environment. This is the

kind of planning that is called for, and I hope that the legislation

that Congresswoman Norton has introduced and I hope that the

meetings that we have had with the White House, will lead to that

kind of effort. I am confident that Governor Ridge is committed to

doing that.

I would also like to ask the support of the committee as a wrap

up for another proposal, that would give the Mayor of the District

of Columbia the same authority that the Governors of the 50 States

and the territories have; and certainly that Governor Gilmore and

Governor Glendening have. That is to have the authority to mobilize our National Guard.

Currently, in an emergency unique to the District, I go to Major

General Freeman of the D.C. National Guard who, in turn, goes to

the Secretary of the Army, and then it works up the channel to the

President.

I want everybody to understand, I appreciate President Bush’s

cooperation and partnership with the District in a number of different ways; whether they are economic development or in emergency planning. But I am sure the President has more important

things to do in an emergency of national scope and priority, than

to sit here and personally check on whether the District needs to

bring out National Guard. I would urge the committee’s attention

to that bill, as well as support for that bill.

I would again close by thanking the committee for its oversight

and diligence in a vitally important matter for not only our Nation’s Capital, not only our region, but for our country.

[The prepared statement of Mayor Williams follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mayor Williams, for your testimony.

We look forward to a discussion and questioning after we hear from

our first panel.

Chair of the Council, Linda Cropp, thank you for being here with

us. We look forward to hearing your comments.

Ms. CROPP. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Morella, Congresswoman Watson. It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here

today and testify before the subcommittee. Thank you very much

for holding this hearing.

The District of Columbia enjoys many of the benefits, but we also

bear several unique costs, because of its status in the Nation’s Capital.

I am not going to read all of my testimony. Quite a bit of it deals

with the economic development portion, so I will omit that, and

concur with a lot of what the Mayor said. I will submit my entire

testimony for the record.

While we, in the District of Columbia, are part of the Nation’s

Capital, with regard to the effects of the devastating terrorist attack of September 11th and the continuing aftermath, let me just

review a few of the costs that are being borne by the District government and its citizens, and why we need the Federal assistance

and their dollars to assist us, both directly with these costs and

also to help with our economic survival, so that the District has

sufficient revenue to pay for the vital services that we provide to

the Federal Government.

As you know, it is primarily local resources that have been used

to protect the public safety and the public health of not only the

600,000 people who live within the District; and not only the 2 million people, mostly from Maryland and Virginia, who work here

every day; but also the entire Federal establishment, which is

headquartered within the Nation’s Capital.

The reality is that the local governments everywhere are the first

responders in this new war against terrorism on our homeland. It

has been local police officers, local fire fighters, local emergency

medical technicians, local emergency management directors, and

local public health officials, who have been the first responders to

the attacks and threats against America.

Here in the Nation’s Capital, which has been and will continue

to be one of the primary targets for terrorism, it has been locally

raised revenue that has been paying, in large amounts, for the

safety and health of our Federal Government, its work force, and

our visitors.

While our fervent patriotism and responsibility demands that we

protect our Federal Government, our fervor and responsibility is

not diminished to protect our local residents and businesses.

Therefore, Congress and the President must recognize that when,

for example, our police force is deployed from our neighborhoods,

to protect Federal facilities and Federal officials more than what

was previously normal, our local residents and businesses become

less protected than previously.

When demand by the Federal Government for the District first

responders is greater than can be paid for by locally raised revenue, the Federal Government has a special responsibility to help

address these financial needs.

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Other cities have States that step up to the plate, and other cities do not have the same level of Federal presence as we do.

As Mayor Williams has indicated, the District is expected to lose

$750 million in just the first 6 months following September 11th.

At least 10,000 small businesses, the engines that generate economic growth, are at risk.

As a result of this economic disaster, the District itself is currently projected to lose $200 million in tax revenue over the next

year. Moreover, the cost to District agencies to enhance emergency

preparedness is $250 million. This amount, as I stated, does not include the substantial cost of increased protection to our Federal establishment.

To quantify our post-September 11th economic loss in human

terms, the Mayor has submitted documentation as to why we need

the $766 million in economic recovery assistance.

Let me say that this was one of those joint efforts by the executive branch and the legislative branch. The Council of the District

of Columbia, its public services, public works, government operations, judiciary, finance, and revenue committees had joint committees working with the executive branch, so that we could really

look at our true needs, scrub the numbers, and get everyone involved in a very thoughtful and comprehensive process, to very

clearly define what our needs are.

So the document that is being presented by the Mayor is a joint

document by the executive and legislative branch. Let me say that

both branches of Government also extended their hands out into

the community, to also get additional information and input on

that.

As the Mayor stated, it has not gone unnoticed by our citizens,

the people whom we represent every day, that during this national

crisis, in some PSAs, the local police units in our community, that

there may have been one or two police officers almost on duty,

where the police were diverted to Federal facilities.

My e-mail was almost jammed with outraged citizens, with regard to the fact that they felt totally unprotected, because our local

resources had been drained and diverted elsewhere.

We need to develop a process where our citizens are not left vulnerable, while at the same time, as stated earlier, we protect the

Federal Government that we all love so very much.

You are quite aware that the District is recently getting its legs

back, our strength back, from the financial instability that we have

had in the past. The reality is that during our period of instability

with regard to our finances, we had deferred maintenance in so

many areas with regard to our public safety units.

We did not purchase the equipment during the time when we

were just trying to come back from being in debt. So finally, when

we saw light at the end of the tunnel and it was not a train, we

finally could start purchasing some of the equipment that we needed.

But rest assured, our police department, our fire department, our

other emergency teams are not equipped at the level that we may

have to face with future attacks. We are equipped to just about

handle the day-to-day operations of the city and the needs of the

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city. We were starting to build the budget back up for them to do

that.

If we are going to continue to be on the high alert that will be

mandated by what the city and this Nation is facing, we need to

look very carefully at how we are equipped; our fire department,

our police department, and our other first responders.

Let me again reiterate that these individuals are the individuals

who not only protect the 600,000 people who make Washington,

DC, their home, but they are also the protectors for the Federal

presence in the District of Columbia, and the 2 million people who

come here every day to work.

The amounts that the Mayor had detailed fall short of the city’s

need. The Council joins with Mayor in asking for your support and

advocacy in obtaining the District’s full request of $1 billion in

emergency preparedness for economic assistance funding.

This is not just for the District of Columbia. Once again, this is

also for the Federal presence here in the District of Columbia. We

need to look at the funding for the District in a very unique way,

for it is also the fire department for the Federal Government, the

police department for the Federal Government, the emergency response team for the Federal Government.

So we need to have that assistance much more than any other

place; and in this instance, the Federal Government must act as

the District’s state.

These funds are crucial to the District’s survival and to the Federal Government needs, as emergencies come up. The specific purposes of each of these dollars are detailed in documents provided

by the Mayor to you.

We once again join with the Mayor in urging Congress and the

White House to support Congresswoman Norton’s legislation to

provide an annual funding source for the District of Columbia; one

that adequately compensates us for the annual cost of services provided and revenue denied as a result of the Federal presence, and

the unique congressional prohibition on taxing the income of twothirds of the income earned in the District of Columbia.

We also join with the Mayor in asking support for the bill that

will give the Mayor the ability to call out the National Guard in

times of an emergency, just as other jurisdictions and Governors

have.

Once again, we thank you so very much for your concern and

your interest in this very crucial matter that impacts all of us directly.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cropp follows:]

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Ms. WATSON. Congresswoman Morella.

Mrs. MORELLA. Yes, Congresswoman Watson.

Ms. WATSON. This is a question to the Chair to see if it would

be possible for us to recommend to Appropriations that during

emergencies, that the Mayor and the Council have the authority to

bypass and to make their requests known for the resources.

I do not know why you have to go through all that you do in an

emergency. I think if we can look at it in some way, so the resources can be obtained immediately, and then afterwards, we

could work it out. I understand that your process is that you have

to go to Appropriations, if it is supplemental to your budget?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Congresswoman Watson, I think Congresswoman Norton, in conjunction with the committee, has proposed a

plan whereby an account would be set up, that the District could

draw on, to meet these extraordinary national responsibilities,

ranging from the predictable, like inaugurations and big protests

and activities, to the unpredictable.

Ms. WATSON. Yes, that is a provision in her proposal.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, it is something that has been proposed.

I think I speak for the city, that we strongly support it.

Ms. WATSON. Well, let me suggest that if it is not in her proposal, maybe this is something the committee would want to have.

Mrs. MORELLA. We can look into it, but we do have legislation

that has been introduced.

Ms. WATSON. All right.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am a sponsor with Congresswoman Norton,

dealing will emergencies, the exigencies over which you have no

control; whether they are emergencies, inauguration, or whatever

the special burden is, it falls on the District.

I am glad you brought that up. With your consent also, we will

go to the rest of the panel, and then we will fire away at questions,

thank you.

Ms. WATSON. I just have one more question, based on the two.

Mrs. MORELLA. You are going to use up the time that I am going

to give you later, though. [Laughter.]

Ms. WATSON. Just really quickly, in your presentations, you

might talk about how you coordinate with the Federal law enforcement officers that service here.

Mrs. MORELLA. Can you let her answer that later on? Because

that is a very good question for all of them as to how are we really

coordinating.

Ms. WATSON. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, and I am now going to recognize Kenneth Kasprisin, who is the Assistant Director for Readiness, Response, and Recovery at FEMA. Thank you for being with us.

Mr. KASPRISIN. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today.

When the hijacked American Airlines flight crashed into the Pentagon on September 11th, it triggered a range of actions across the

region by Federal, State, local, and private agencies.

The challenge we faced then and continue to face today lies in

effectively coordinating the multi-jurisdictional efforts, so that all

the individual efforts are synchronized into a single, cohesive emergency response.

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The September 11th events caused a quick escalation in emergency response at all levels, from legal to the Federal. Governor

Gilmore immediately requested and the President declared a major

disaster under the Stafford Act. FEMA then implemented the Federal Response Plan to manage and coordinate the Federal assistance.

The Federal Response Plan is designed to support, not supplant,

State and local efforts. As the lead Federal agency, FEMA manages

the allocation of Federal resources to support these disaster responses.

Other Federal agencies are, in many cases, able to meet a variety

of the requirements under their own authorities and their own

funding; if not, FEMA issues a mission assignment, or reimbursable work order, to cover the cost.

The Federal Response Plan that we have works, and it works

well, because it is simple and it is understood. Over the past 5

years, we have implemented the plan over 300 times.

As you know, the Metropolitan Council of Governments includes

all the National Capital Region jurisdictions, plus other key regional players. The Council helped develop a number of regional

plans, including the planning guidance for the public health system

response to a bio-terrorism event and a unified regional snow emergency plan.

The snow plan provides a coordinated decisionmaking process

among local jurisdictions for early dismissal, emergency routing,

and snow-related closures across the region.

Decisions and coordination under the plan are accomplished

through a process that includes teleconferences, public information

dissemination, and the Washington area warning system. We can

build on that snow plan model to help coordinate aspects that we

would face in the event of another attack.

The District of Columbia lies at the heart of the region, and has

its own Emergency Response Plan. As the Mayor indicated, the

D.C. Emergency Management Agency recently updated their plan

to mirror the Federal Response Plan.

That effort was initiated as a result of lessons learned both from

the August flooding and the September 11th events. Mr. Mayor,

thank you for acknowledging Mike Lowder’s efforts in that regard.

Over the past 7 weeks, we have been working even more closely

with our national, regional, and local partners, to enhance FEMA’s

ability to respond to any future event.

To that end, and to shorten Federal response times in a weapons

of mass destruction event, in the National Capital Region, we have

[1] developed the National Capital Region contingency plan; and [2]

formed an emergency response team, dedicated to the National

Capital Region.

As part of this effort, we have established an initial operating facility that is ready to begin operations immediately to coordinate

any necessary response activities. The facility will be staffed by

personnel who can rapidly respond.

In addition, we have pre-positioned various resources at the facility, including communications equipment, which will enable us to

begin operations much more quickly and more effectively.

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At the same time, we have been working closely with the Domestic Preparedness Task Force established by Mayor Williams, as

well as with the Emergency Planning Task Force, established by

the Council of Governments. We will continue to do so, to ensure

that we maximize the expertise at all levels of Government.

Madam Chairwoman, you convened this hearing to discuss emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region. Under the circumstances, local, State, and Federal agencies in the region have

responded extraordinarily well, and we continue our work together

to improve that response.

We are coordinating with the D.C. Emergency Management

Agency, the U.S. Capital Police and others, to monitor the anthrax

testing, gather the information, provide advice and assistance

where necessary, and update our contingency plan, as appropriate.

It is our constant duty to look for improvements and, as previously indicated, the challenges lie in our ability to coordinate the

multi-jurisdictional efforts.

FEMA has a role to play. We are not a regulatory agency. We

do not approve their plans, but we constantly strive to improve the

process. At present, we are leading a national assessment of the

State’s capabilities to response to a weapons of mass destruction

event.

FEMA regional staff, along with officials from the Department of

Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency, are visiting every State and territory,

including the District, to jointly assess the capability, and to determine where they need to improve, and how we can best get there.

I appreciate your concerns and leadership during this difficult

time. I assure you that we are working shoulder to shoulder with

Governor Ridge, other Federal agencies, and the States to provide

the best preparedness and response for the American people.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for convening this important

hearing. This concludes my remarks, and I will be glad to answer

any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kasprisin follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Kasprisin. It is a pleasure to

have FEMA with us an to hear your comments.

Mr. KASPRISIN. Thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am now pleased to recognize Admiral Arthur

Lawrence, the Assistant Surgeon General/Acting Principal Deputy

Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services. That is a

long title.

Dr. LAWRENCE. That is not all of it, either. [Laughter.]

Good morning, Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee.

I am Dr. Arthur Lawrence, Assistant Surgeon General and Acting

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health of the Department

of Health and Human Services.

In this regard, I perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary for

Health, as the head of the Office of Public Health in Science, and

supervise the activities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

Recently, the emergency response capabilities of HHS have been

mobilized to assist local governments in New York, Pennsylvania,

and the Washington Metropolitan Area, to address health consequences of unprecedented terrorist attacks against the citizens of

the United States.

Our department, with our partners in the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, are in the best position at

the national level to supplement the resources of State and local

governments in mass casualty situations, regardless of their cause,

as we have done continuously since September 11th.

HHS is a signatory agency of the Federal Response Plan that

was just referred to, that provides a structure for Federal response

assistance to other levels of government, when resources are overwhelmed. In particular, our department is responsible for leading

the health and medical services emergency support function of the

plan, also known as ESF–8.

We are supported in that responsibility by 12 other departments

and agencies. The functions that we carry out through the Office

of Emergency Preparedness include medical services, mental health

services, preventive heath services, and environmental health services.

All of the agencies of HHS participate with OEP in executing the

functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the

plan.

One of our most important assets for providing emergency health

support to our citizens during disasters is the National Disaster

Medical System [NDMS]. NDMS is a partnership of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

In this partnership, more than 7,000 health professionals—doctors, nurses, pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, etc.—are

organized into approximately 80 teams around the country, to provide medical mental health and specialized services at or near the

scene of a disaster.

Furthermore, the system provides the capability to transport patients to other locations away from the disaster region, in order to

meet victims’ definitive health care needs, should that be necessary.

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Additionally, under the system, both DOD and the VA manage

approximately 2,000 private sector hospitals, which have volunteered and can be called upon to accept patients from other disaster areas, who might not otherwise be able to receive care in locally

overwhelmed facilities.

Another resource that we can access is the Public Health Service’s Commissioned Corps Readiness Force [CCRF], a group of approximately 1,400 Public Health Service Officers, that can be mobilized to respond to disasters or other public health emergencies immediately.

Immediately after the attack on the World Trade Center, the

Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson, placed these systems on

their highest state of readiness to respond, and they did.

Since September 11th, we have mobilized over 1,300 members of

the National Disaster Medical System, commissioned officers under

the Commissioned Corps Readiness Force, and Public health professionals, from the Centers from Disease Control to augment local

resources available in response to respond to these calamities.

For example, in New York City, we are still providing medical

support for the teams working at the site of the destruction of the

World Trade Center, augmenting the resources of the medical examiner to identify the victims of the attack, supplementing nursing

staff at the burn center that is taking care of some of the survivors,

assisting the Department of Health with its public health surveillance, and providing support for the immediate crisis counseling

needs that have been identified, among other activities.

In addition to continuing to support the city in response to the

World Trade Center, we have deployed over 100 NDMS and CCRF

members to assist in distribution drugs to the U.S. Postal Service

workers, to protect them from potential exposure to the anthrax

that was used to contaminate letters sent to the major television

networks, that passed through mail processing centers.

Today and tomorrow, these teams are back in New York to assist

in distributing the pharmaceuticals that will be necessary to complete the prophylaxis of more than 5,000 postal workers and contractors similarly exposed.

Similarly, we are still assisting the District Government in investigation and controlling the health risks to U.S. Postal Service and

other mail room workers, and visitors in the District and surrounding jurisdictions, that were exposed to anthrax, that was contained

in one or more letters processed through the Brentwood Postal facility or the State Department Annex 32 mail handling area.

In support of the District Government, we have provided the majority of health professionals that have staffed the anthrax prevention clinics that were set up at D.C. General Hospital to assure

that mail handlers exposed to anthrax in Washington received the

necessary pharmaceuticals; in this case, ciprofloxacin and

doxycycline.

Although we also provided these drugs to Maryland, Virginia,

and New Jersey, for their affected Postal workers, their health departments decided to make the distributions without our direct assistance.

Our department has had a long experience with both Federal,

State, and local governments in the Washington Metropolitan Area

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in preparing for terrorist attacks. For example, here in the Capital,

our teams support the attending physician during major events,

such as the State of the Union Address, assuring that the availability of health services for Members of Congress, their staffs, and

visitors, should a significant disaster occur.

In recent weeks, we have provided continuance support to the Office of the Attending Physician, in testing and providing preventive

services and pharmaceuticals to Members of Congress, their staffs,

and visitors, to areas affected by the release of anthrax in the congressional mail system.

Likewise, we have worked with all of the Washington area jurisdictions to create a National Medical Response Team that can supplement the available resources in any one of the jurisdictions of

Montgomery County, Price George’s County, Arlington County, Alexandria, Fairfax County, or the District, should there be a release

of a chemical weapon.

Sufficient antidotes are stockpiled here to treat 5,000 victims,

using a team that can respond within 90 minutes of activation.

We are now in the final stages of completion of a plan, expected

within 2 weeks, for the distribution of pharmaceuticals in the District, in the event of a biological attack that is directed against the

general population.

These most recent events have not been the initiator for our local

actions. In fact, we have been working with the governments in

Maryland, Virginia, and the District since 1995, in strengthening

public health responsibilities. We are looking forward to continuing

these close working relationships.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for the opportunity to testify

today.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lawrence follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Admiral Lawrence, for your testimony, in terms of the coordination with the entire region.

I am now pleased to recognize Michael Rogers, the executive director of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.

Welcome, it is good to see you, again.

Mr. ROGERS. Madam Chair, Ms. Norton, and Ms. Watson, I am

very pleased to be here on behalf of the Board of Directors of the

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments to discuss emergency preparedness for the Washington Region and what we, at

COG, are doing to assist in making EMS or emergency preparedness plans effective, complete, and coordinated.

As you know, the Council of Governments is the association of

17 major cities and counties in the Washington Metropolitan Region. COG provides a forum for regional cooperation. At COG,

elected officials work together to find solutions to our shared challenges, and then continue to work together to implement those solutions.

This organization also serves its members by acting as a think

tank for local governments and a regional information source on

the environment, transportation, and human services.

COG represents a partnership that provides solid research, planning, and leadership, and can ensure that this region speaks with

one voice.

As we confront the aftermath of September 11th, I believe there

is no other time in COG’s 44-year history when those services, the

services we provide, have been more valuable to the region.

In recent weeks, COG has brought together the emergency management and public safety officials from our member governments,

State and Federal officials, and local health organizations. Our purpose has been to coordinate the work that is being done by each

of these entities into an effective, complete regional plan of action,

to be used in the event of major emergencies.

COG continues to do what we do best, and that is serve as a

forum for interested parties to come together to discuss and plan

for a specific emergency. We can do this because COG’s committee

support structure provides a place and mechanism for public safety

officials to come together to address common needs and concerns.

In addition to the committee structure, the concept of a forum

has been extended to COG, serving as a moderator of regional conference calls of public officials getting together to discuss event-related topics, such as government and school closings and openings,

and the need for information hotlines and mutual aid.

COG facilities are available for emergency meetings at the time

of disaster, and have been used periodically. We have also set up

hotlines, to give information to the public regarding the nature of

the emergency, when called upon.

To give local governments the tools that they need to manage an

incident, COG has developed agreements, plans, and communication systems to aid them.

Basic to contingency planning are the police and fire mutual aid

agreements. When one jurisdiction has an emergency and has committed or foresees that it will commit all of its resources, it can request aid from its neighbors. This was ably demonstrated on September 11th at the Pentagon, as we all know. But there is work

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that remains in the emergency management area, particularly with

mutual aids.

We have been using, since the Air Florida crisis crash, an incident command system as the basis for responding to incidents.

That has been a very effective way of proceeding.

The question has been asked, if COG has a terrorism plan. The

short answer is no. The mutual aid operational plan developed

after Air Florida is an all hazards plan. At the regional level, the

planning principles contained in the Incident Command System are

applicable to a whole host of contingencies, from a simple car crash

to an aircraft incident.

Specific planning remains the responsibility of local governments,

and we work with them in doing the regional coordination.

One role that COG has played is developing a communications

system that allows and facilitates the regional leaders to talk to

each other and to the public. A variety of systems exist for police,

fire, and D.C. hospitals. This is called the Mutual Aid Radio Systems. That is tested daily and is used regularly, and was definitely

used on September 11th.

I am going to skip over some of the details about the systems,

but the testimony is submitted for the record. But I want to make

this point. COG’s role in an emergency is fairly limited, but effective where we are involved.

In the September 11th incident at the Pentagon, the city and

county administrators and schools officials talked in four COG-arranged conference calls to decide government and school closings

and openings.

For future events, a recommendation was made for emergency

management officials to confer on a regular basis by conference

call, rather than rely solely on the Washington Area Warning System.

Since September 24th, the COG Board has been very much involved in directing the staff to work with our regional governments

to produce a regional response plan and to look at that aftermath

of September 11th.

At a special meeting on September 25th, the COG Board encouraged the Mayor of the District of Columbia and chief executives

from the region’s jurisdictions to work with COG to ensure that our

regional infrastructure was prepared to respond to catastrophic

events.

At that meeting, we began the process of reviewing police and

fire mutual aid agreements that COG has had in place. The system

had worked well on September 11th, but we will be coming to you

for some assistance on legislation, to make sure that in the future,

those mutual aid agreements can work even more effectively.

On October 10th, COG Chair, Carol Schwartz, an at-large member of the District of Columbia Council, sent a letter to Secretary

Tom Ridge of the Office of Homeland Security, asking him to make

security plans for this region a model for the Nation.

On October 25th, Chair Schwartz convened the first meeting of

the COG Board Ad Hoc Task Force on Emergency Preparedness.

The Task Force will continue to meet to coordinate the Emergency

Response Plan into a unit that addresses policymaking, public safety, transportation, evacuation, communications, and public utilities.

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As I wrap up, let me simply say that we are at a point now

where we have worked with the regional governments on their mutual aid plans. We are engaged with FEMA, looking at the National Capital Region plan for mass destruction contingency. We

expect that FEMA will be involved in working with the COG Task

Force.

That National Capital Plan can serve as a framework for a regional contingency plan, which all local governments can be a part

of, so that the National Capital Region is, in fact, very secure and

we can respond to any type of emergency.

I look forward to answering any questions that you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Rogers. Your entire

testimony, of course, is in the record. I noted it is very thorough,

and we appreciate that.

I am now pleased to recognize our Police Chief, Charles Ramsey,

chief of the Metropolitan Police Department. Thank you for being

with us today, Chief.

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you and good morning Madam Chair, Congresswoman Norton, Congresswoman Watson, staff, and guests.

I appreciate the opportunity to present this statement concerning

emergency preparedness in the District of Columbia from the perspective of the local law enforcement.

As I look back on the horrific and unprecedented events of September 11th, I am very, very proud of how the members and leaders of the Metropolitan Police Department responded. Our members displayed much the same type of determination and agility,

bravery, and creativity that were so evident in New York City and

northern Virginia on that date.

Our members helped send a reassuring message to the residents,

visitors, and workers in the District of Columbia that their safety

was of paramount importance to us. Allow me to provide just a few

quick examples.

On the morning of September 11th, our department quickly recalled all officers and essential civilian personnel, canceled their

days off, and put all of our sworn members in uniform on 12 hour

shifts.

Our immediate priority was to ensure that we had all of our personnel resources available and ready to deal with any threats or attacks on the District of Columbia, while also continuing to patrol

our neighborhoods. We met that priority quickly and effectively, I

believe.

We got our state-of-the-art Joint Command and Control Center

up and running immediately after the second World Trade Center

attack. In fact, it was already operational before the hijacked plane

struck the Pentagon.

The center includes both Metropolitan Police Department members and personnel from our critical partners in the Federal and

regional governments, including the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service,

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the State Department, U.S. Marshall’s Service, Coast Guard, Amtrak, Metro, and

others.

Having this joint Command Center operational from the earliest

moments following the attacks allowed us to access, filter, verify

and disseminate critical law enforcement information in the very

hectic and confusing moments as these events were unfolding. We

have kept the center up and running, at various levels of activation, since September 11th, and we are prepared to ramp it up, as

needed, at a moment’s notice.

We put officers at critical intersections throughout the city, both

to enhance our visibility and to help direct traffic, to the extent

possible.

I think we all recognize the Herculean task the District faced in

trying to get that many people out of the city at one time. That we

did so, in a safe and mostly orderly manner, is a testament to our

police officers and other traffic safety personnel.

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Our department sent resources to assist with the Pentagon rescue and recovery efforts: mobile crime officers, search and rescue

dogs, and some of our CDU or civil disturbance unit platoons.

These members worked long hours, under very grueling conditions, to assist the FBI and local law enforcement authorities. We

continue to assist with the protection of critical Federal and local

installations here in the District.

That our department carried out these and other missions, while

continuing to provide some level of basic police services in our

neighborhoods is an illustration of our commitment and professionalism. That commitment and professionalism have continued in

the weeks following the attacks, as new developments have arisen.

I am confident that our department, working with others in local

and Federal Government, is fully prepared to address any threats

our Nation’s Capital may face in the future.

Earlier this month I, along with Deputy Mayor Margaret

Kellums and members of my command staff, traveled to New York

City to tour Ground Zero in lower Manhattan. We wanted to see

first-hand the extent of the damage and the nature of the recovery

operation, both of which are almost indescribable.

Command members and I took a similar tour of the Pentagon attack site, as well. Both sites are sober reminders of the threats we

continue to face, especially here in the Nation’s Capital, and the

need to be prepared.

We also wanted to talk face-to-face with officials from New York

City Police Department and other public safety agencies, who have

been involved with, and so deeply affected by this national tragedy.

Their stories of individual courage and organizational resolve are

not only moving, but very instructive to our efforts here in the District.

One theme we heard over and over again in New York was that

when the attacks on the World Trade Center occurred, the Police

Department and the public safety agencies did not have the luxury

of waiting to consult their emergency operation plans.

First and foremost, they did what police officers and fire fighters

and emergency medical personnel do in any incident approaching

this magnitude. They rushed headlong into danger. In doing so,

they saved countless lives, even as many of their own did not survive.

I am confident that our police officers, fire fighters, and emergency medical personnel here in D.C. would show the same courage

and selfless dedication to service, as we saw in New York and

northern Virginia.

Still, our trip to New York did reinforce the need to have a comprehensive, well thought out plan to support not only the initial responders, but also the entire range of individuals touched by events

such as these: the victims, their families, other agencies that take

part in the rescue and recovery efforts, neighbors, school children,

and the list goes on and on.

In other words, our plans need to build the type of support network that will enhance the safety and effectiveness of the initial

responders, while creating a broad safety net for those who come

in behind us. Through our local planning efforts, the Mayor has

moved the entire city government in that direction.

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For the Metropolitan Police Department, there are a few critical

areas that we are focusing on, as we work to update and improve

our Emergency Response Plan. The Mayor has placed me in charge

of what we call ESF, or Emergency Support Function No. 13, which

covers law enforcement.

These are just some of the areas that we are really focusing on,

if I may. Equipment is very, very critical, especially given the potential threat posed by biological or chemical attack.

Like police departments in major cities across the country, we

are now looking to upgrade the clothing, masks, and other protective gear that we issue to our officers, particularly those in specialized assignments that would be among the first responders to these

types of critical incidents.

Training is another critical area. In fiscal year 2000, we provided

all sworn members of the Metropolitan Police Department with a

basic 4 hour training on weapons of mass destruction as part of

their regular in-serve training, but we need to do much more.

We are now in the process of implementing a 3-year training

plan, that will build on the basic awareness course with more specifics on how to handle biochemical and related events.

I mentioned traffic earlier. As part of the Mayor’s city-wide plan,

our department is working closely with the District Division of

Transportation, first to develop an evacuation plan for the District,

should the need arise in the future.

Then we will be going to neighboring jurisdictions to ensure that

our plans are coordinated with theirs. Traffic management is a regional issue, and we must deal with it in a comprehensive regional

manner.

Coordination with our Federal partners in traffic plans and

street closures is also crucial. Our department will continue to support the Mayor and other District officials in their efforts to ensure

that security needs are balanced with the imperative to keep traffic

in our city moving smoothly and safely.

These and other changes have been incorporated into a General

Order that updates and improves our basic Emergency Response

Plan. This order establishes three different levels of emergency response to different situations, and it includes a matrix of decisions

and activities that will occur within each level.

We are also in the process of developing more detailed Standard

Operating Procedures for major operational support units. These

SOPs will put an overall plan into action. This is in addition to the

city’s overall Emergency Response Plan.

Of course, there are no rules for the type of heartless attacks

that occurred on September 11th. Because of that, there can be no

hard and fast rules for how police officers and other first responders will react.

Responding to the threats we face today will necessarily entail

a great deal of quick thinking, ingenuity and improvisation on our

part. Our Emergency Response Plans will play an important role

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in ensuring that we can respond as safely and effectively as possible, and that our officers will have all the support mechanisms

in place to carry out our unique and heroic responsibilities to the

community.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramsey follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Chief Ramsey.

You have all made us feel pretty confident and secure with the

plans and coordination and communication. I think we have

learned a lot from September 11th.

I would like to ask you a very simple question that may be somewhat complex. That is, could you walk us through what you would

do if another terrorist attack of some nature occurred; specifically

what would happen.

I mean, you can all respond, but I was thinking perhaps the

Mayor and FEMA and perhaps the police; however you see that

you should structure it. But specifically, what would happen? It all

sounds great, the coordination, but what would happen?

Would you like to start us off, Mr. Mayor? While you think about

it, too, I was thinking about what you and Councilwoman Chair

Cropp commented on the Homeland Security. I certainly do believe

that the District of Columbia should be involved with that, too.

But since the Office of Homeland Security is not in statute, it

may be difficult to create a link that it would be in statute, if it

is not. So maybe we could do a memorandum of understanding or

something to provide that kind of linkage.

But I just wanted to comment on the fact that because it is not

in statute, even though there has been some legislation that has

been submitted to do that, it has been so very difficult to delineate

specifically what the jurisdiction is.

But if you would try to walk us through what would happen if

an emergency such as we experienced or similar to what we experienced on September 11th occurred.

Mayor WILLIAMS. If I could just summarize, Madam Chair, I

think first of all, we would want to see, in advance of coordination,

that there would be the proper level of coordination with the Federal Government, and certainly, having our Emergency Response

Plan aligned with the Federal Response Plan helps with coordination.

Having an ongoing, working, organic, if you will, relationship

with the Homeland Security people, in terms of coordination, is important.

Again, I mentioned, if we knew in advance what the plans for the

different Federal agencies and the Capitol were for security at different levels, we could all plan accordingly, and know in advance

what balance we are going to strike between public safety and open

city and open transportation.

We would want to know in advance in coordination what our citizens should expect. We have handed out thousands of these disaster preparedness kits to our citizens that talk about what we expect our citizens to do in different environments and different situations.

We would expect, second, that there be better communication,

frankly, then there was on September 11th. For that purpose, as

part of our plan, which is right here, our expanded disaster plan,

we have something fancy called the District Notification Protocol.

This is a fancy way of making sure that everybody in the District

Government is notified appropriately in certain situations, and that

there be systems in place, ranging from satellite phones for key ofVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:12 Oct 29, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\81954.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ficials, to use of ‘‘1–800’’ for communication; and the use of Verizon

in certain circumstances.

We have made provisions now with Verizon so that, for example,

District agencies have bumping rights. So if one of our kids is on

the phone planning a party, that does not take precedence over

District officials and regional officials trying to plan their business

in an emergency situations; and then finally use of pagers and cell

phones.

Also in terms of communication, one lesson that I have learned

from September 11th is on a number of different levels. No. 1, you

cannot provide, I believe, too much information too soon to people,

and that you should not wait to provide information to people until

you have perfect information, or even halfway decent information.

You should not wait to get information to people until you have removed the level of uncertainty to a certain level.

There is always going to be uncertainty. You are never going to

have perfect information, and you need to get out there quickly

with that information. Under the protocols as routines that we

have established in our Emergency Response Plan, at a Level 3

emergency, which would be the highest level of emergency, we

would introduce and use the FCC-approved Emergency Broadcast

System.

Just so the record is clear, if I had to do it over again, and we

had the coordination at the level that we have now in place, I

would have used the Emergency Broadcast System back on September 11th.

You know, what you are trying to avoid, as an official in my situation, on the one hand, you want to avoid the horrible tragedy of

that guy in the World Trade Center, who was on the megaphone

telling everybody to go back to their desks. That is an example of

getting information out to people quickly that is clearly the wrong

information.

On the other hand, you do not want to have a situation where

you are waiting for hours to get some kind of information to people.

So using that system, I think, as we have done with the anthrax

crisis, with regular briefings to the press, where you are providing

open information, is important.

Having said that, I think it is critically important and another

lesson that we have learned, in terms of communication, is not to

mix our messages.

We have to avoid mixing the message of preparedness and security. In other words, these are the facts, ma’am, and only the facts,

and they may not be pretty. We cannot mix the message with a

message of reassurance. Do not try to mix the messages.

Often what the current situation is, it is not a pretty picture, and

we should not try to pretty it up. We need to reserve that time for

reassurance for another time, and that communication is vitally

important.

Finally, to wrap up, I think one area that clearly could be tightened up, I think, looking back on September 11th, again, is the coordination with the Federal Government, and we have mentioned

that. But also it is the coordination with the private sector and coordination with our regional partners.

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I believe that the steps are being put in place where, God forbid,

if we had this crisis again, there would be immediately continual

consultation and coordination with our regional partners, as is required.

Mrs. MORELLA. That is exactly what we would like to get at,

what needs to be done to do that. First of all, I have always had

the feeling that it would be great, if you were the spokesperson

every day, to get on the radio or communicate on a daily basis

what the situation is, as it is fed into you.

You have done a great job as the spokesman, but I think for the

people to expect it regularly would give them the feeling that they

are getting the accurate information from the person who knows it.

Second, you started off your statement about the fact that the

Federal agencies are somewhat derelict in not having a plan that

would coordinate with the District plan, if anyone wants to comment on that.

Because, again, we hope to come up with maybe some action

items or some things we can move forward, to make sure there is

the synchronization of the Federal Government fitting in with the

Emergency Response System in the District of Columbia, as well

as with the regions.

Ms. CROPP. Madam Chair, if I may just make one statement, as

I looked at it. It is very clear that I think that the District has to

be at the table in the form of our Mayor for any decisions that are

being made, particularly as they impact local government.

Just to show you one big example, when everyone went home on

September 11th, everyone let all of the Federal Government workers out and the private sector was going out, but then bridges were

closed. So there was no coordination along those lines. So you had

a huge traffic jam.

The Mayor must be at the table for any decision that is being

made within the District of Columbia, in order that you can have

that kind of coordination that you are talking about.

I think the recent example with the anthrax case was really wonderful. I have watched or attended quite a few of the daily briefings, where you have coordination. You have the Federal Government and the local government working together, the Post Office

working together, and the Mayor coordinated it. I think there was

a sense of calm that was sent out clearly through everyone in the

District.

If I saw a lesson learned, the Mayor has to be at the table, and

the Mayor has to be one of the major decisionmakers, as we look

at what happens in this particular area.

Mrs. MORELLA. Would you like to make any comment, Mr.

Kasprisin?

Mr. KASPRISIN. Madam Chairwoman, I think we have to look at

this in three distinct phases. One is the preparation phase. The

second is the crisis phase, when it actually occurs and the response

takes place, and then the consequence management piece toward

the end.

During the preparation phase, as the Mayor has indicated and

others, there are a number of ongoing actions. One is updating the

current plans to ensure that they are well coordinated at all levels

of government.

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The issue of multi-jurisdictional potential conflicts, I think, is

only cleared up through a series of exercises, tabletop exercises and

others, to ensure that we are past there. I think we have in place

a number of events that will help address some of that, at least at

the Federal level.

The response piece is broken down into two pieces: the crisis

management and consequence management. At the Federal level,

for the crisis management, the lead Federal agency is really the

Department of Justice and FBI.

They set up a joint operation center with representatives from

the local communities and the States, if necessary, and have in

there a joint information center that helps to coordinate the information that you are looking for.

We have a liaison at all levels during that phase, both the local

and the State, if appropriate, as well as within the strategic information operations center within the FBI, the SIOC.

At the consequence management piece, it is really how do you respond to do the recovery. The Federal Emergency Management

Agency, at that point, is the lead Federal agency.

To walk you through what would happen there, we are really designed to support the local efforts, to identify where really a gap

analysis is, the difference between what their capabilities are and

what really needs to be done.

In that regard, the Emergency Management Operation here locally with Peter LePorte really is driving the train for us, helping

to identify where those needs are. We have been working very

closely with him in their efforts. As the Mayor indicated earlier,

Mr. Mike Lowder has helped work that.

We have in place now a very specific plan to help address some

of those perceived needs. In fact, we have created what we call a

TIPFD, a time phased forced deployment list of the types of resources that would be needed in an emergency and have, in fact,

moved some of those resources into place already.

At the Federal level, we would immediately stand up a catastrophic disaster response group, with representatives from all Federal agencies, all key Federal agencies; an emergency support

team; and an emergency response team for the National Capital

Region, that would really create an office to help coordinate all the

different types of emergency responses that would be required. We

would have liaisons in all the appropriate places.

With that, the key then is to identify what can the locals do, and

what is the Federal Government needed to do, to support that.

Mrs. MORELLA. What I am doing is taking two blocks of my questions, so I will let you each have 10 minutes also to ask, because

I wanted to hear from the Council of Governments, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Madam Chair, I understand your question to be the

regional responses; if something happened today, what would be

different about our response?

Well, as I pointed out, the Council of Governments, with respect

to our Regional conference calls, usually has advance notice, you

know, from the National Weather Service, because it is involved

with the snow plan. So we have time to arrange a conference call

over a couple of hours.

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On September 11th, the conference call was initiated about 2

p.m. and took place at 6 p.m., and of course, everyone was at home,

and the focus was about the next day, whether the Government

was going to be open, whether schools were going to be open or

closed.

We will change those procedures, and if an event occurred, we

would immediately seek to set up the conference call, and engage

the appropriate local officials, so that we could start the sharing of

information.

One of the first calls that would be made would be to the Federal

Government, to the Office of Personnel Management. Because key

to this equation is what is the Federal Government is going to do

with respect to early release of the Federal work force.

Because if that release is all at the same time and that may be

necessary, someone ought to know it, so that appropriate plans can

be made for the traffic management in the city, and so that there

could be appropriate coordination with respect to bridges.

So there would be earlier engagement with appropriate decisionmakers to do that. That is a service that we perform, and that is

something that we will work with FEMA and the District and the

Regional Governments to make sure we can implement.

Mrs. MORELLA. I know that the OPM Director is working out a

system with regard to the Federal employees.

Mr. ROGERS. Right.

Mrs. MORELLA. Because that was a real difficulty on September

11th.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Did you want to make any comments on that,

Chief Ramsey?

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, ma’am, in response to your question as to what

we would do immediately, and this is presuming that it has already taken place, the first thing that we would do is, we would

activate our Joint Operations Command Center immediately, and

begin our protocol of notifying all the agencies that need to be notified, to make them aware of the situation, and get them to respond

to the Center.

Simultaneously, we would be gathering information to determine

the nature and extent of the threat. It is hard to respond to something if you do not know what it is.

If September 11th taught us anything, it is that a lot of information that comes in initially is bogus information, and you need to

filter through it to find out exactly what it is that you are up

against.

We would activate a Level 1, 2, or 3 response, depending on the

nature of the threat, and presuming it is Level 3, which it was on

September 11th, we would begin a recall of personnel.

We have recall rosters already there. We would recall all personnel with the exception, if it was like September 11th, we did not

recall midnight personnel. They had gotten off work, and you need

to start thinking about relief.

So you do not need to burn everybody out at the same time, because we automatically go to 12 hour shifts, and we put everybody

in uniform. So we need to have a group of people that we keep at

home resting, to come in to be the relief of the initial responders.

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Our on-duty personnel would automatically be in route. We have

our people already carrying all of their emergency equipment in the

trunks of their vehicles, readily accessible, so they can respond. We

immediately coordinate all of our actions through EMA, to make

sure all the other city agencies that are responding were utilizing

the plans that we have.

If, for example, the traffic plan needs to be put into effect, what

are the evacuation routes that would be determined, based on the

nature of the problem? Obviously, some sections of the city may be

closed off. There may be a need for a partial evacuation, full evacuation. What would be the emergency access routes?

As a lot of people were leaving, we have got to have some way

of getting people into the city, and that needs to be established

very, very quickly. We need to get that information out to the public.

We can get that out through the Emergency Broadcast System,

and also through the media, using traffic reporters that know the

city very, very well, and can assist in getting information out to the

public.

We will work with transportation. We are charged with determining staging areas for equipment and personnel, and getting

that particular information out. If there is a need for a field command post, we will establish that.

I would like to say that the Joint Operation Command Center is

a joint FBI/Secret Service/MPD command center. So we do have direct access to the FBI data base. We have liaisons that we send to

EMA, to the SIOC, and to various other command posts, so that

we are completely linked, and we know exactly what is going.

Those would be some of the immediate things that we do.

Mrs. MORELLA. We do not have emergency evacuation routes already?

Mr. RAMSEY. Oh, we do have emergency evacuation routes,

ma’am, but depending on the nature of the problem, you do not

want to send people toward a hot area.

So what you have to do is know exactly what is taking place, so

you know which routes to use, so we do not put people in harm’s

way unnecessarily.

Mrs. MORELLA. I want to thank you.

I now want to recognize Congresswoman Norton. I do want to

also indicate that I think our Fire Chief, Ron Few, is here, very

good. Thank you for being here.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mrs. Morella.

I am trying to find out how much of the planning is operational.

The Mayor says in his testimony that there already exists a comprehensive Federal Response Plan. All I can say is, I sure did not

see any evidence of it on September 11th.

It is interesting to note that the District was criticized for not

having a plan that was operational. But when the OPM just let

people out into the street, there was no communication with the

District. Whatever Federal plan existed was no more operational

than what the District is accused of not having.

It does seem to me that the real thing is not, do you have a plan;

but do you have an operational plan; have you practiced the plan;

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how does the plan operate? So let me just ask a few questions that

occur to me.

I know that Mayor Williams has had a meeting, or at least one

meeting, with Tom Ridge. Is that right?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. Would you tell us what occurred at that meeting,

the nature of that meeting, what was discussed at that meeting,

and has there been more than one meeting?

Mayor WILLIAMS. There has been one meeting. We talked about

the requests that we have already submitted, as you know, concurrent with the council, in coordination with you, to the White House

and the Congress, for emergency preparedness and the details of

that emergency preparedness plan.

As we all discussed, the fact that the District public safety people, as well as public health and transportation, are the first responders that need that resource to do their jobs.

We talked about not just consultation, but better planning; and

not just better coordination, which I think we are already seeing

with the Feds on emergency response, but better coordination and

planning with the Feds in the different branches of government, although you cannot speak for the Congress, obviously, but on security arrangements.

This is so that we know ahead of time, if they say we are on a

higher state of alert for Cabinet A, B, or C, what does that mean

in advance?

Ms. NORTON. What did that mean to you, when you and the Police Chief heard that, again?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, we talked about that. I mean, when you

hear a greater state of alert, what does that mean? Is it credible

or not credible, and on what source is it based? How are we supposed to plan?

Ms. NORTON. I am sorry, did I miss something? Did you all take

immediate actions that you were not taking?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, we are at a Level 1 state of preparedness

right now. This is similar to the state of preparedness we were on

or the alert we were on when we began the actual war effort.

Ms. NORTON. So you never got off of that other alert?

Mayor WILLIAMS. I think we stepped down slightly, but we are

back on Level 1, based on the alert we just heard this week.

But I guess the long and short of it was, how can we, in advance,

get some agreement on what we are going to do, in terms of security arrangements in advance, so all of us are not spending all of

our time talking about this street closing or that street closing. We

can have these arguments and discussions ahead of time.

He seemed to be in support of that, and actually generally supportive or certainly understanding of our economic recovery needs.

He was committed to working with us on an ongoing basis. I am

hoping that we will be able to build on this working relationship.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, that is certainly my impression about Mr.

Ridge who, of course, has the handicap of having to get his staff

and having to get an operation together. He is not a Cabinet official, yet.

He has come to speak to Members of Congress, and has said to

us that it may be 6 months before he gets a sense of the statute

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and what it is that it really should require; since I think he may

want to do things like put some agencies together, or ask Congress

to do that, that are not together now. He may not simply want to

work off of the grid.

But I am concerned, especially since we keep getting these alerts.

I do not want to criticize these alerts. I think that we have got to

leave it to people who are there. I am told that some of the alerts

may be because they want to throw off folks who are planning

stuff. So I have to assume that people are not just doing this for

practice or for the fun of it.

Meanwhile, of course, resources get expended at local levels and

all over the country. People are crying poor and saying they cannot

continue to operate this way. Well, here, of course, an alert would

have very special meaning.

Now if the statute is not going to lay this out for another 6

months or so, the statute that has already gotten the District in,

I have a hesitation about how operational our city agencies can be

with the Federal agencies.

I am looking at the Mayor’s testimony on page 3, in which you

talk about your own Task Force to mirror the Federal Response

Plan. Then you talk about a transportation group for evacuation

plans, a law enforcement group and the like, and a communications

group.

Then later on, you expressed your gratitude to FEMA, and I

want to express mine, as well, because obviously, FEMA is moving

to do what FEMA always does. I mean, everybody else may not be

prepared for a crisis, but FEMA is in the crisis business. Well,

FEMA has brought resources apparently from EPA, HHS, and the

Army Corps of Engineers.

Now what is wrong with this picture is that those agencies are

not directly related to evacuation. That would seem to me to be

DOT or the public order which, of course, is FBI and DOJ.

So I am seeking to find out whether or not there exists an operational plan, which means that the District of Columbia is in touch

with the Federal agencies in this town, who have an overall jurisdiction, and what we can do to put the District into operational

touch with those agencies; yes, Mr. Mayor?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, I think through FEMA and the gentleman that I spoke of, who has, I think, played a critical role in

this, we have been updating I think this is the fifth draft now of

the District’s plan that we are aligning with the Federal plan. I

consider it constantly evolving. This plan will be constantly updated as new information comes in.

In working with FEMA, we have been able to isolate a number

of different functional areas that really outline how we would respond in certain situations.

One of the functional areas is transportation. There has been coordination with the Federal Transportation Department, which is

designated as the lead Federal agency in a transportation situation.

Other Federal agencies are designated as the lead Federal agencies, in everything from public health to feeding situations. So

there is, through the FEMA route at least, coordination with the

Federal Government.

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I think what we are looking for, from Governor Ridge, is in advance of an actual emergency, just better consultation and preparation on general security, in a way that balances, as you all know,

again, the needs of a safe city and an open city. I hope that helps.

Ms. NORTON. It does.

Mr. Kasprisin, do you feel that pending whatever Congress decides to do, or whatever Mr. Ridge does, as he gets organized across

the agencies, do you feel yourself to be the central coordinating authority within the Federal Government for these functions: law enforcement, transportation?

OPM put people out in the streets. Are you the one that we go

to next time to make sure that does not happen? I mean, are you

‘‘the man?’’ [Laughter.]

Mr. KASPRISIN. I do not know if I would ever describe myself as

the man to do all that. Again, I think it is a very valid question

and very insightful. But there is really a distinct break in time between the crisis management and the consequence management.

We are the ‘‘go to’’ organization, the lead Federal agency, from

the consequence management side of the house. But from the law

enforcement side and all those activities that are rolled up on that

from the Federal side, it is really the Department of Justice and

FBI. It would be very presumptive of me to try to answer that

question for them.

I suspect the Police Chief would probably have some better insights in that regard.

Ms. NORTON. I take it the Police Chief would just do what he had

to do, and use his existing routes to the FBI and other Federal

agencies.

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, ma’am, we have had very close coordination

with the FBI. For example, just yesterday, Director Mueller actually came by and visited my office for about an hour.

We spent a great deal of time talking about these alerts and various other things that are a concern to not only myself, but police

chiefs throughout the country. He visited our Joint Command Center, and it was a very productive meeting.

We meet and we speak not with Director Mueller, but with the

FBI on a daily basis. MPD hosts a conference call at 8:45 every

morning with all the regional police chiefs in Virginia, Maryland,

the Federal agencies such as FBI, Secret Service, ATF, Capital Police, Park Police.

All these agencies participate in this conference call to talk about

the situation, to go over the latest intelligence information that we

have through our Joint Terrorism Task Force, so that we know

that we are all in sync on the same page, and that we all know

exactly, at least to the extent possible, what to expect during the

next 24 hours and what security precautions we need to be taking.

So it has improved greatly. I realize there are still some issues

in some jurisdictions. But as far as it goes here, the communication

is very strong. I am in charge of ESF–13, as we call it, which is

the law enforcement emergency support function. As part of our

plan, having that kind of coordinated response is very much a part

of that plan.

Ms. NORTON. The Chair suggested, and I think it is something

that we should get into, to see whether or not, in the interim, espeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:12 Oct 29, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\81954.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cially since there may not be any statute for some time, that there

ought to be some memorandum of understanding between the Federal Government and D.C., so that we would feel more secure about

overall coordination. That is something that I would like to discuss

with the Chair later.

Let me just give an example of regional coordination. The District of Columbia, I think wisely, left the children in school on September 11th. I think that now, after the fact, they know that was

the right decision.

The regions did not do that. I do not know what the regional

thinking was, or whether issues like that are left on a school by

school, case by case basis. But the last time I heard, people in the

suburbs had to pick their children up and somehow help them get

off to school. They may have different arrangements, because they

do have school buses that many of them ride on.

But are issues like that on the regional level discussed, or should

that all be left, as it always has been, on a case by case, region by

region, or district by district basis?

Mr. ROGERS. If I may, on September 11th, the decision about

schools was made individually, because the conference call did not

take place, you know, until 6 p.m. So schools acted on their own.

Ms. NORTON. You see, there are not going to be any conference

calls. That is the whole point.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. Nobody is ever going to be able to get a land line

again. So somebody at the school districts have got to meet and decide whether, look, we are going to have to leave this to each school

district, ahead of time; or they are going to have to decide that they

want to coordinate this kind of thing; Ms. Cropp?

Ms. CROPP. If I could use my old school teacher counselor hat,

one of the problems in schools being let out during an emergency

such as that, right now, most of the parents, where the children

are, they are working. Particularly for the elementary schools,

there is no one home to even receive them. On September 11th,

many of the parents were still trying to get home, themselves.

I would think that this is an opportunity for the schools to get

together and to talk about a process whereas if, in fact, the offices

are being let out, that there should be at least a staggered time for

the schools to be let out, so that the children will not go home to

an empty house, or that the children will not be kept on the road,

trying to get home at the same time.

So there needs to be some type of coordinated effort. There needs

to be contact with the Federal offices, with the District offices, with

the State offices, as to whether or not they are letting their work

force out. My immediate recommendation would probably be that

the schools should be kept in. At least the children are safe there.

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is my instinct, too. But has anybody met

to make those decisions? Has anybody met between OPM and D.C.

to make a decision on what will happen with Federal workers, or

how you will make that decision, and what is it, then? What is the

decision on schools, and what is the decision on Federal workers

and D.C. workers?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, Congresswoman Norton, in an emergency

situation, on a Level 3, you would have a declaration of emergency.

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The schools and every otherwise independent agency would fall

under the authority of the Mayor.

My first instinct would be to keep the schools in place while we

then, as quickly as possible using communications that we have

now put in place, get in touch with regional authorities to consult

on the matter.

I can have Peter LePorte respond to you on where we are in

terms of consultations with OPM. Can we do that?

Ms. NORTON. Yes, that would be fine, if he would be willing to

speak on the Government workers and on school.

I mean, since students cross these jurisdictional lines, if one jurisdiction has one rule and another has another rule, does that

matter?

I would think that the children, in particular, would be of the

greatest concern to us at a time like this. If we did not have a plan

for anybody else, it ought to be what to do with children, or how

to at least make a decision quickly on what to do about children.

Mr. LEPORTE. Let me first talk to you about OPM, because I

think that was one of the major challenges on the 11th. If you talk

to OPM, they will readily admit, their communications were ineffective to their other Federal workers in those other buildings, as

well as to the White House, and to the District, specifically, trying

to get in touch with this.

What we have put in place is some redundant systems. We provided them with one of our 800 megahertz radios so, in the worst

case scenario, if phones did not work and pages did not work, we

would be able to contact them through radio.

They have also met with regional partners from around the jurisdictions of OPM. The Director met and discussed some of her

thinking about dismissal of Federal workers, and how they would

go about that.

They also needed a little bit of education and understanding of

how the Metro system was to work in a crisis, because many people

take public transportation.

On the 11th, the Metro was closed down for 15 minutes, until the

system was cleared and checked. Many people went to the Metro,

thinking it was closed, and then proceeded to walk, stay out in the

street, and that can cause much confusion.

Ms. NORTON. Excuse me, they did that on their motion?

Mr. LEPORTE. In many cases, they did.

Ms. NORTON. I am talking about the Metro. The Metro decided

to close down?

Mr. LEPORTE. No, Metro has a phenomenal system, but they put

in a check, that they check their system. They go through the system for 15 minutes to make sure it is safe, and then they opened

it up.

But a lot of people were confused, when they went to the system

and it was closed for 15 minutes. Including up here on Capitol Hill,

the station was closed for 15 minutes.

So OPM has now put a better mechanism in place to consult No.

1, with the White House; No. 2, with FEMA, and with the District.

Specifically, they would send us a liaison from the Office of Personnel Management from the Federal Government into our Emergency

Operations Center, and we have a place for them in the center.

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So we would have direct contact, face to face, as well as if they

could not make it there, we would have the redundancy to be able

to communicate with them.

Regarding schools, which you are right, schools were in many

ways heros on September 11th by keeping those kids in school; but

they also have redundant systems with communication back to the

Emergency Operations Center, as well as into the Operations Center that the Police Department has.

We have met with schools several times. We talked about their

emergency planning. For each school, we have met with principals.

We have actually provided them with some sample plans and some

best practices from around the country.

The State of Georgia pretty much has the best school planning

system that I have recognized. We have shared that information

with our schools, and we have engaged them in disaster planning,

as well as introduced a curriculum called, Masters of Disaster,

from grades one through eight throughout the schools.

Ms. NORTON. You are working with the region, as well. Does

your work with the region involve schools, or is that left to each

individual school district?

Mr. LEPORTE. In an emergency situation in the local jurisdictions, the executive would be making that decision, in consultation

with those specific superintendents, similar to here. If we were at

Stage 3, with an independent agency, the decision would be made

by the Mayor, but that would be done in consultation with the superintendent.

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask that a meeting be held of superintendents of the various school districts? These children go across lines.

The children are all across lines. This is an example of where you

need regional planning. At least people need to know why they are

doing it, only on a case by case basis, if they decide to do that.

But if there is regional planning, and if we are talking about

children, I would simply like to request that those in charge of

these school districts, since we are supposed to be doing regional

planning now, have a meeting and have the District of Columbia

experience shared with them, so that we will know whether, if a

child comes from Montgomery County or if a child from D.C. is out

there, whether or not it really makes sense for us not to be doing

the same thing, or at least not to have the kind of communication

to do the same thing.

Madam Chair, I have other questions, but I may be over time.

Mrs. MORELLA. I think what we will do, we will go just one more

round after this, and then go on to our second panel. We could

spend a long time with you, asking you questions. So we will be

directing some of them to you in writing. Thank you.

Congresswoman Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I think that all of those of you who are here today

seem to have laid out your plans.

What is really bothering me is the position that the new Director

of Homeland Security is in. When he came to speak with us, it was

obvious that he needed the resources and, I guess, the authority.

What I still feel is missing is the coordination. In each one of

your units, you have that coordination figured out, or at least that

is the way it sounds.

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But I think putting it all together, connecting all the dots

through the new Director of Homeland Security, is needed. I would

think, like Congresswoman Norton, that the school districts should

be involved.

I know when we had our panel in Los Angeles, we had school

personnel there. I am very sensitive to the fact that children cannot be let go out on the streets, because their parents indeed are

working. Without that supervision, we are at higher risk.

I really feel that maybe we ought to have one of you take the

lead with sitting down with the new Director of Homeland Security, and talking about all the agencies that ought to be involved.

Certainly, your agencies are just naturals.

But somewhere, we need to feel assured that all of you are working under the direction of one person. I do not know if that is

FEMA, but I would think that Director should have the responsibility of bringing all these agencies together.

I understand there are 17 agencies that relate to the intelligent

unit or family. But we are not hearing what is happening with coordinating all of these. I think that is the missing link, the weakest

link.

So all of you, I have to commend you for coming and expressing

your plans. We have your written statements, and it seems like you

are thinking ahead. But how do we bring it all together, and maybe

that is his job?

I do not envy Governor Ridge. He said to us, when he spoke to

a combined caucus, that you ought to have caller ID. on your telephone, so you will know when to answer the phone. That was probably in reference to the fact that, you know, when the President

calls, you respond. On second thought, what are you responding to?

So I would hope that as a result of this hearing, we could have

the lead, Madam Chair, of trying to all meet together. I think I like

Congresswoman Norton’s suggestion that we bring in the superintendents of the surrounding area within the region, and all of

you meet and find out, you know, who is on the team, and do we

have plans for the team to coordinate, when needed?

That is just a general statement to whoever wants to respond. I

hope all of you will. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Madam Chair, if I may, with respect to the regional

response, the area and local governments and the District, we are

meeting together. The District has taken the lead in developing a

new response plan, in conjunction with FEMA.

I met yesterday with representatives of FEMA, and they will be

joining the Regional Task Force. Because it is my view that FEMA

National Capital plan and the District plan can very well serve as

the foundation for a regional plan, as well.

With respect to the superintendents, that is an excellent suggestion. They have not been at the regional table in a formal way

through COG, although the superintendents were on the conference

call, as I pointed out, with respect to school closings.

But I think that the suggestion that we incorporate perhaps one

of the emergency support teams; that includes an educational link,

Peter, where we look specifically at what needs to be done in the

educational area. With the superintendents, that is an excellent

suggestion.

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So we will continue our work at COG. This Task Force is moving

forward quickly, working with local jurisdictions, and working with

FEMA and the Federal partners.

Let me just say that I think that it is a positive development

that we now have the Federal Government as an entity engaged

in a regional discussion. That is a positive development, because

we are a National Capital Region. But in the past, that level of

interface has been far less than desired.

I think going forward, we can finally, with all of the stakeholders

at the table, think and plan for how we can prepare the National

Capital Region in a coordinated way, so that we respond and are

protected in a coordinated way.

Ms. WATSON. Madam Chair, if I might conclude my inquiry, can

this subcommittee ask for a meeting of all these different agencies,

with the National Director of Homeland Security, and report back

to us on the coordinated effort?

We need something to assure this Nation. Every time we meet,

we are meeting with a single unit. We tried to bring them all together in California. But we need to reassure people that we have

got plans laid out that include A, B, C, D, and so on. Everyone is

ready. Everyone is up to the task. We do not have to let them know

how it works, because we do not know, yet.

But if we can ask for a report from that meeting and who all is

included in the meeting, so that we might report back. As representatives of the Federal Government, as we go back to our respective districts. They want information, as accurate as we can

give it to them, as to what we are doing. Are we in charge? Are

we taking command?

I think that maybe this subcommittee, the Subcommittee on the

District of Columbia and Government Reform, might be the one to

actually ask for a report. It is going to be just a draft, because it

is developing. We are doing OJT with this, on-the-job training. You

know, we are making it up as we go along.

But I think what we need is some assurances to the people that

you indeed are in charge and we have a plan.

Mrs. MORELLA. You know, we will look into how we can do that

kind of coordinating. But I was thinking, I would certainly like to

have a charge from each of you, with regard to specifically what

the steps are and who the people are, who are in those particular

positions.

If we could get in touch with you about how we could do this,

it would be awfully good to see a graph and see what happens with

the emergency, who does what and where it goes. If you would consider that, I think it might be very helpful.

I want to ask, I guess this would be Mayor Williams and Councilwoman Cropp, the District has requested, from the Office of Management and Budget, and you mentioned that in your opening

statement, $250 million for emergency preparedness.

How would the requested funds be used, as OMB, at this point, is only recommending $25 million? What potential risks will not be

addressed, if only $25 million in funds are provided?

Ms. CROPP. Well, the listing that we submitted to you very clearly talks about different issues such as the types of engines and

trucks that we would need, the training that we may have to have

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with regard to chemical and biological and radioactive hazards that

we may have to have; what we would need to have with regard to

equipment for our police department, for our fire department;

crime scene investigation.

It talks about, in the report that we have asked for, the different

types of radio and transportation needs that we have for us to contact each other.

I guess the question is, which one of those things do we want to

give up? Do we give up transportation, so that we do not have the

appropriate vehicles to respond?

Do we give up the appropriate type of equipment for our fire and

police department, so that if a building was on fire or if they needed to come and rescue people, they do not have the equipment so

that they could go into the appropriate building to rescue those individuals?

So if, in fact, we do not get the dollars that the city has identified, that we need to protect the citizens here and also the Federal

presence here, which building will we not be able to respond to;

which Federal building; which local building? The Mayor can give

more specifics on that.

But the reality is that we are trying to buildup our fire and police department. While we are trying to buildup our fire and police

department, we are also trying to address new needs that none of

us had anticipated that we would need to identify.

So it means that we would have to go back to our list, eliminate

some things that we think are needed, and pick and prioritize. I

would hope that you would look at our entire list.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Just to expand on what Chairwoman Cropp

has just said, I wanted to get the exact figures for you, to really

make the case that she has already made.

That is, we have requested $250 million. If we were to get $25

million, this would be like a nightmare game show. I mean, which

door are you going to pick. No one likes this choice. We are going

to pick fire and EMS and police, because that is your first order

of public safety, security response.

But having said, it is a horrible choice, because what are you giving up? Well, for example, in case anyone has been paying attention, we have just had a major health situation in this city. We are

giving up a major expansion of our health response. That was $23

million.

We just finished talking about evacuation and the need to do a

better job in managing these intersections in our evacuation routes

and emergency access routes.

One of the things we have learned, for example, is that the best

thing to do in an emergency, in terms of an evacuation, is to use

your police personnel to allow the signalization to work.

You know, a law enforcement person may have the best intentions, but basically, if they are sitting here managing one intersection, and someone down the road is managing another intersection

and there is no coordination, no one is really helping. So we need

the signals to work.

But for the signals to work and for that traffic management plan

to work, we need the resources to put it into place.

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We have all talked about communications. How are we going to

get better communications in place without a technology investment?

As an example of communications, all the many, many law enforcement agencies need to better communicate. Right now, we do

not have any single frequency on which to communicate. We need

communication.

You talk about the emotional trauma of all this; mental health.

We talk about the schools’ involvement in all this. How are we

going to get our schools in the situation they should be in, without

a major investment in preparedness and security arrangements for

our schools? That was $76 million.

So the $25 million would force us to make some, I think, draconian and really tragic choices, in terms of our emergency preparedness. We are hoping that the Congress will see to expand this effort, at a minimum, to the order of magnitude of around $100 million.

I forgot to mention this, and this is a horrible thing to talk about.

But we are talking about the horrible situation of contingencies

here. With our Chief Medical Officer, we are trying to get our Chief

Medical Officer on his feet to begin with.

We at least ought to be able to designate $2 million for those

critical functions in these kinds of emergency situations: communication, scene investigation, supplies in terms of all the supplies

needed for, God forbid, a crisis situation as could be faced; additional vehicles. We have got vans and vehicles right now that need

replacement at incident command systems. These are just examples of where the resources are really critically needed.

Mrs. MORELLA. Does FEMA get involved with doing an assessment of the need of the various items that are on this list?

Mr. KASPRISIN. Madam Chairwoman, we do. We have a system

in place that is known as a capability assessment. It was really a

self-assessment, prior to September 11th.

Last week, we launched, from our regional teams, representatives from a number of different agencies to look at all State and

not all local plans, but certainly the District is included.

In fact, our Region 3 had just finished that with the Emergency

Management shop in the District. We are going to prepare a report

for Governor Ridge of the results of those investigations or assessments.

Within such a short period of time though, we are going to be

unable to get down to the level of detail, as the Mayor has already

articulated, that is needed.

Mrs. MORELLA. You have got the Appropriations Committee that

will be looking at this. I guess you have got a hearing next week.

So we wish you well on that.

My final question is just simply because I have HHS here. I want

to ask about whether or not there has been an assessment of the

District’s health care system, in order to determine whether or not

the health care system has the capacity to handle the various

health care risks.

I know on our next panel we have Mr. Malson, who is going to

be talking about the Hospital Association. But I wanted to get it,

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maybe from your point of view, or if anyone else wants to comment

on it.

Mr. LEPORTE. Sure, the current process has been to develop

guidelines for bio-terrorism and bio-agents.

Of course this is an interactive process, but one of the next steps

is to start to focus in on what we are calling a surge capacity. In

some senses, there is already a capability to deal with surge capacity, through the National Disaster Medical System.

This is where beds in concentric rings going out from the District

are identified as beds to which patients can be moved to allow for

space for more critical patients or more emergency patients to be

handled.

We started looking at capacities in the national area back in

1995, actually, in establishing the first National Medical Response

Team here in the District, which has now served to be the model

for not only the other NMRTs in the United States, but also the

Metropolitan response systems. We have been doing these assessments and responding by providing capacity since 1995.

We are at the stage of guidance for health response, in the event

that a bio-event has been issued. The jurisdictions around the District and in the District are using this guidance by which to formulate plans.

We now have four standing subcommittees that are working on

these issues. There is a blood subcommittee, which is headed by

the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services.

There is a communications subcommittee that is being headed by

the D.C. Hospital Association. There is a response subcommittee,

which is being headed up by the Virginia Department of Health.

Then there is a surveillance subcommittee, that is being headed up

by the D.C. Department of Health.

As we move forward, we will be integrating more and more specific planning into our ability to respond, as well as identifying the

resources that we need for a specific type of event.

What I mean is that a bio-event generates different needs than

an airplane crash, which generates different needs from other

kinds of natural disasters.

So this is an evolving process, and our next step will be looking

at the surge capacity, and how we would specifically deal with that

within, first, the National Disaster Medical System, which we are

confident will give us a robust response; but also identify if there

are any peculiar needs that have gone undetected, as yet.

Ms. CROPP. Madam Chair, in the request that the Mayor has

submitted, there are specific items with regard to health requests.

For example, chemical/bio equipment for onsite response is something that we did not have a need for in the past, that we obviously

need now; to have bio-equipped vehicles, mobile laboratories, so

that the appropriately trained personnel would be able to respond

immediately; so that we have the pharmaceuticals necessary for

treatment.

We have seen with the anthrax that there was a definite need

for certain pharmaceuticals. We need to have a sufficient supply for

our Department of Health responders and the MPD responders and

others in distribution.

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The hospitals need to have containment facilities at their local

hospitals, and for the containment facilities that they are talking

about, there is a cost that is associated with that.

As the Mayor spoke just previously, unfortunately, there will also

be a need to strengthen our Medical Examiner’s Office. Our Medical Examiner’s Office was not at a level that it should have been

in the past, and we were just trying to catch up with it. Well, now

there may be a need for us to do more things with that.

So there are specific health needs that are part of the plan that

the Mayor has submitted to you, and they are identified with the

costs associated with them.

Mrs. MORELLA. And there is the need to know what hospitals can

handle what kinds of problems, or what kinds of cases, so I will be

exploring that later on with you. But I see that this is critically important in the region, that we know who does what, how many

beds are available, etc.

Do you want to comment, Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, Madam Chair, in my testimony, I refer to a

planning guide, and it is for a bio-event in a metropolitan area.

COG has had a Bio-terrorism Task Force for the last 18 months.

They finished their report on September 6th. Mr. Malson, who is

Chair of that Task Force Committee, is on the next panel, I believe,

and will tell you more specifically about it. But that kind of information is included in that bio-event planning guide and its report.

Mrs. MORELLA. I just heard that the report has not been issued,

yet.

Mr. ROGERS. No, it has not, and it will be issued in about a week.

It is an important document. But more importantly, as Mr. Malson

said to me, was the process of all of the right people being at the

table to develop this document. That is because having the right

people at the table laid the foundation for the relationships that

have helped the region deal with the current crisis.

That document will be available. I think it is an excellent framework for addressing the health issues in a bio-event or bio-chemical

situation.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much.

Congresswoman Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella.

The District is going to get $16 million from this appropriation,

if we ever get it out of the Senate. You are going to have to decide,

because that is money that was not anticipated. So if we can go

back to be as specific as we can on this minimal $100 million that

we have now.

I believe that the Mayor mentioned something about anthrax and

$23 million. Did I hear you correctly on that; the health component

of the plan?

Mayor WILLIAMS. I was just saying that the past couple of weeks

have highlighted the necessity that in working with the private

hospitals and our Health Department, we have a network response

capability to meet a bio-terrorism threat.

Ms. NORTON. Dr. Walks mentioned to me that there were direct

expenses flowing from that. I asked him to get me information on

that.

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The reason is, we were able to get $6 million. I do not know how

much of that is left now, but the President can write out the first

$20 billion. We got that for your overtime, for the police. It does

seem to me that this falls into exactly the same kind of category:

a completely unanticipated expense, that nobody should have to

pay for, up front.

Mayor WILLIAMS. I think we provided you with a list of all the

agencies and their expenses in all these different areas, and the

need, you are right, to tap into Federal resources, without triggering, I think it is the Stafford Act, in a declaration of emergency,

which I think none of us wants.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, I would just like to get as much as possible out of this first $20 billion, because everybody is coming in on the

second. What we have had is up-front expenses, that nobody else

has had.

I am particularly interested, as I said in my opening statement,

in the pressure you are under as a government, as a result of this.

Mayor Williams, you say that New York anticipates a 2.5 percent

of city revenue lost, because of September 11th, and you anticipate

a 3.5 percent loss of revenue.

Now I have got a question about that. Your testimony says

10,000 small businesses are at risk, and 24,000 jobs could be lost.

That is before these figures were in, so I do not know if you were

basing that on anticipated unemployment figures of the kind we received today or not.

It is an astounding figure in your testimony; almost half of the

members of the local hotel and restaurant employees union are unemployed. That is astounding.

Because even leaving out all these other businesses in this town,

because if you look at almost any business in this town, and it is

not two-thirds, but 80 to 90 percent of the other businesses employ

people from the region. Many of these people live in this town.

That is a figure that is extremely alarming. I have seen some reports that during the Persian Gulf war, it took the District about

a year to get back to normal in tourism.

So I am going to ask you, therefore, how much of your reserve

do you anticipate using in 2002; and whether you think there will

be any difficulty paying it back in 2003, as you are required; and

whether you are anticipating doing what apparently others in the

region have done?

For example, in Maryland, they are doing anticipatory budget

cuts. You wait until you get hit, and then you cut far more than

if you do cuts early on. That is why the District went down. The

District went down because it waited until the very end, and then

the whole Government went down with it.

So first I am going to ask you about the reserve for 2002. Are

we going to use it all; is there going to be anything left in it; are

we going to be able to pay it back in 2003; and are you, the Council

and the Mayor, contemplating where you can cut back, or are you

waiting to see whether you will have to cut back?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, first of all, Congresswoman Norton, I

think you know better than anyone else the fragile nature.

While it is substantial, we are so proud that we were leading the

country, for example, in our office economy; leading the country

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prior to September 11th in our hotel occupancy; leading other

major cities in our unemployment rate.

I mean, there are so many different indicators. For the District

to be noted by many business magazines as the No. 1 place for

doing business really spoke volumes about where we were prior to

September 11th.

Now after September 11th, you are right, it has had a major effect on our hospitalilty/tourism industry, which as you know is our

No. 2 industry in the city.

The immediate attack on the Pentagon, the closure of Reagan

National Airport, the closure of various streets, the messages that

are inadvertently sometimes sent, the limited access to the White

House now and to the Capital, have all had a big effect on these

visitors that would otherwise come to the city.

What has the District done? I am proud to say that even though

the District, despite its recovery, recognizes that we have a fragile

budget balance, and you know that our tax base is not really a tax

base to brag about; while our economy was strong, and I think it

will become strong again, we are artificially structured in terms of

our access to our tax basis.

Fifty percent of our property is off limits. Our income tax base

is off limits. We are forced to serve a huge population of millions,

with a tax being provided only by our District citizens.

That tailors and colors everything we do going forward. So despite all this the District on its own, I am proud of the fact that

the Mayor and the Council have had an unprecedented level of cooperation since October 1st.

They have come together, for example, to construct a loan guar- antee program for our small businesses to the tune of $100 million.

We have come together to expand unemployment insurance for our

workers who have been unemployed. We give them 75 percent of

their wages, and allow them, if they have part-time employment,

to supplement that, to get them somewhere back on their feet.

I am proud, for example, that working the Council and our corporate leadership, we have put together a disaster relief fund of

now approaching, I think it is $2 million, to provide, in addition to

measures we have already talked about, transition assistance for

people.

So we are doing what we can on our own to provide the needed

relief, but we need the help of the Federal Government, because all

of this has been occasioned by national circumstances and/or national decisions. We really need that help.

Going into this next year, we are looking at anywhere from, I

have heard, figures of $80 million to $150 million. We are able to

absorb a figure of the order of magnitude of $100 million with the

reserves that we have built up.

Be reminded, and it turns out to have been prophetic now, we

have very strict requirements on our budget reserves, and very

strict requirements on our cash reserves. Our cash reserves, at 7

percent, are leading the country in State and local governments, in

the amount of money set aside in cash.

That is a good thing now, because those cash reserves are able

to satisfy this immediate hit of around $100 million. That, with

spending plans, unless things get dramatically worse, I think will

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allow us to get through 2002 with spending plans and cash reserve

arrangements that are already in place.

But then what do we do in 2003? Obviously, if we are using the

cash now, that puts pressure on 2003. I think we may have to look

at the rate and the pace at which we were meeting our cash reserve requirements, because of this impact.

We certainly have to look at it again. I cannot say this enough.

Federal help in meeting these responsibilities; when you have a

limited tax base, for the District to be going the extra mile with

local self-help efforts to meet these responsibilities, I think it would

be tragic if we did not get any Federal help to meet our answer

to what is, in fact, a national/Federal challenge.

Then finally, I think the legislation that you have proposed, and

we can get into this in the next hearing, but the legislation that

you have proposed over the years in terms of tax incentives for the

District, I think clearly ought to be part of our stimulus approach.

The measures that you have talked about, in terms of a tax credit to address firmly and decisively, once and for all, the structural

imbalance in our budget is clearly called for over the long run. Because what I am saying is, we may be able to meet the needs in

2002, but all it does is just radiate out in 2003/2004, because of

this fragile budget balance we have.

Finally, I think I can speak for the Council very emphatically on

this. One thing that we have learned is, the last thing we want to

do is bring back the Control Board. I think we are willing to take

the political hits that are necessary to see that we are working in

advance.

We already have our financial people, both the Council and the

CFO staff, working on contingency plans now, and if necessary, apportionment plans now, to see that we are working ahead of time

to avoid coming up in July or August saying, oh, we have got a big

problem; what are we going to do?

Ms. NORTON. I noticed you have a tax cut that has a trigger to

it. Do you think that if the economy, in fact, goes sour, that these

tax cuts do not need to automatically go forward? That was put in

there as a safeguard. What do you anticipate with respect to those

tax cuts? Are you still going to keep giving tax cuts with this happening, is what I am asking.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Yes, obviously, if the situation were to deteriorate to a very ominous level, everything is on the table.

But if it were to deteriorate beyond our projections, and these

triggers in the tax package are put in place, then I think we ought

to honor those triggers.

Ms. NORTON. Part of what is happening in the region is that the

tax cuts went out. You have got a deficit in Virginia, and you had

more of a surplus than Maryland did. That is how prudent you

were. Part of it is because D.C. did not go out and spend a lot of

its money, and you wisely put in a trigger.

I am very pleased with what you have done with unemployment

insurance. I have just issued a release, given the unemployment in

this town and how it is galloping along, to creditors, to say that in

light of what is happening to the mail in D.C., that they not entertain an interest and late payment windfall at the expense of the

mail.

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There is no ward in the District of Columbia that has not had

its mail delayed. We did research and found that the average late

payment is $24. On top of the unemployment that we are experiencing, that seems to me to be terrible. I am asking the Mayor and

the Council to pass a resolution or do something that would also

call upon local business, utilities, government, not to charge for

these October/November problems, as Brentwood still is not open.

I am almost through. Could I ask you, the Council passed some

legislation for loans and loan guarantees. I must say, I look with

a jaundiced eye, if only because the District had one of the most

atrocious rates in the country, on people giving loans to people and

never getting the money back. I understand that yours would go

through banks and so forth.

But the SBA has loans, and apparently District small businesses

have come forward in greater numbers than elsewhere in the region. They give people 30 years to pay back. They have obviously

100 percent Federal money, and up to $1.5 million per business.

Did anybody in the city look to make sure you were not redundant to a 100 percent federally funded program? If you are not redundant, in what way are you different?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, I could get you the exact parameters and

details, Congresswoman, on how we are different. But I know, and

we talked about this, that this is what you always have in these

programs. It is a gap analysis of ‘‘but for.’’ But for this loan program, your business is going to have a cash-flow situation.

Implicit in that is that you have to have gone to the SBA and

made your request to SBA, and then show us your analysis, as opposed to just coming to us, asking for easy, free money, without

any of the necessary due diligence that you mentioned.

Ms. NORTON. I think that is important, because it is D.C. money.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely.

Ms. NORTON. And to the extent that we can make the Federal

Government pay for the losses to our businesses, I hope we are

going to make them do it, rather than step up to the plate ourselves.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely, and I am sure you understand the

local level of effort, as well.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, and I think it is a very important initiative.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Right.

Ms. NORTON. I just want to make sure that we are not paying

for what the Feds ought to be paying for, for losses that they inflicted upon us.

My last question is, I know that the city had taken a very important initiative. For the first time, the city was going to have to advertise to get tourists. This was after September 11th, when people

were afraid to get on planes. The Congress had done almost nothing to encourage people to get back on. Our airport was closed.

Then that got stepped on by the anthrax scare. Now we have got

the message going out that, hey, we are not sure whether the

planes are safe yet; and remember, their airport was closed down,

which means that they may really not be safe; and by the way,

there is something called anthrax there.

At a town meeting that I had on Monday, it was a huge meeting,

and over 500 people came. A teacher from Prince George’s County

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said that there was a directive out in the region not to bring children to our museums. This is a region which is suffering from the

same kind of tourist drought that we are suffering from.

Of course, the last time I heard, there was not any anthrax found

in any museum. The House was closed down before any anthrax

was even found here. So, obviously, that sent a message out to everybody, do not even wait to see if there is anthrax. Just close the

joint down. These folks are closing the District of Columbia down.

That is very, very disconcerting to see this.

I would like to know what you think you can now do, now that

you appear to have gotten the anthrax business under control and

our airport is open. Did these ads go out? Were they used anywhere in the country?

Are there any more ads now going out? Who is paying for them?

What are we going to do? How can we get a counter-message out

there, which I think is the right message? I think the District is

the safest city in the United States.

Mayor WILLIAMS. I agree.

Ms. NORTON. I truly believe that. It is being patrolled in the air,

in the waterways, in the streets, like no city. If you want to be safe,

leave where you are and come to the District of Columbia.

As for anthrax, your mail is not being sanitized. Ours is going

to go to Ohio, and I cannot tell you about your mail. Anyway, it

is not catching. All of these messages, if we do not get those messages out there, I am not sure when we are going to recover.

So I have got to ask you, Mr. Mayor, in the midst of all of this,

of the expert handling of the anthrax crisis, of having taken

proactive steps to get tourists back, and then having that message

stepped on, stomped on, by anthrax, what are you going to do now

to make people understand that they should visit their Nation’s

Capital?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, I think people put this in perspective. I

mean, you were out with us and some other Congress people, when

we were out at D.C. General, where they were doing treatment,

where they have now treated over 10,000 people.

I remember my mother was talking to one of the doctors. She

says, you know, you have got to get me these pills, honey, because,

Lord knows, I do not want to catch Amtrak. [Laughter.]

So to your regular citizen, this is just all one big blur, and I

think it is really important. I think the point is, it is really important for us to bring this into focus, and then bring this into perspective.

Shortly after this, and Chairman Cropp was involved and you

were involved, we brought together a business task force. They are

helping us assess the economic damage. They are helping us with

tourism promotion.

Together with the Council, we have now put together with our business and industry people $2 million for a marketing and promotion effort.

This was really planned kind of in concentric circles. There was

going to be an initial local effort. We had the Metro free fare weekend, which was actually very, very successful. Moving from a local

effort, it was then to go into a kind of regional Mid-Atlantic effort,

and then to a national global effort.

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So I think the good news here is that we have not yet launched

that national global effort. So major expenditures have not been

trumped by this anthrax situation.

I guess I would leave you with this major point. The same kind

of coordination that is needed in terms of our security arrangements and the balance that has to be struck there, we are going

to need the same kind of coordination on the marketing and promotion front.

So, for example, you need a high level of coordination between

the different branches of the Federal Government and the District,

if you are going to get school kids back. The school kids, as you say,

they are not going to come back if the Capital has got limited access and/or is closed, and the White House has got limited access

and/or is closed.

That has to all be coordinated ahead of time. We need the same

kind of political leadership, coordinated and working together with

a message, in the same way that Rudy Guiliani brought together

all the Broadway stars saying, come to New York.

We need to get all the political leaders of this city, regardless of

partisanship or background, standing somewhere with the President and saying, come to Washington, DC. That is the level of coordination that we have not yet had, but I am confident we can

produce with your help.

Mrs. MORELLA. I see that as your role, Mr. Mayor. We will rally

around you.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. If I may say, Madam Chairman, we do not have

quite the talented and good looking stars that they have in New

York in that wonderful advertisement that they did.

But I promise you this, I am going to ask Speaker Hastert and

Minority Leader Gephardt to stand with you and me, to invite people to come back here, when this place opens for tourism, and to

say, do not simply come to your Congress; come back to your Nation’s Capital.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely, and we are looking forward to

Council Chair Cropp being with us.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. We will go to Congresswoman Watson for the last

questioning, if you have any.

Ms. WATSON. I have no further questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Well, I want to thank this wonderful panel. I

know we kept you a long time. I think you know that we will be

submitting some further questions.

This is a very complex project and program and hearing that we

have today. The issues are so very important and we have never

faced them before, but you have been just terrific.

I want to give my thanks to the Mayor, my thanks to the Council

Chair, my thanks to FEMA and HHS, COG, and our Police Chief,

for being here. You have done a great job. I look forward to further

communications and working with you. Thank you very much.

Now we have our second panel that has been ever so patient.

Please know that we appreciate it enormously. This has been such

a very important topic. Having all of the stakeholders on the first

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panel and the second panel has just taken an inordinate amount

of time. But I thank you all very much.

As I had done with the first panel, it is the policy of the committee to swear you in, so if you would stand and raise your right

hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. MORELLA. It is now recorded as an affirmative response.

Mr. Cogbill, we were just with you yesterday, is the chairman of

the National Capital Planning Commission; Joseph Moravec, Commissioner of the Public Building Service, GSA; and Robert Malson,

president of the D.C. Hospital Association; thank you, gentlemen.

I will start off with your testimony, Mr. Cogbill.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN COGBILL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION; JOSEPH A. MORAVEC, COMMISSIONER OF THE PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE, GSA; AND

ROBERT MALSON, PRESIDENT, D.C. HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION

Mr. COGBILL. Thank you, Congresswoman Morella; and thank

you for inviting us here today, Congresswoman Norton and Congresswoman Watson.

As you noted, my name is John Cogbill, and I am the chairman

of the National Capital Planning Commission, and a member of its

Interagency Task Force, which examined the impact of security

measures on the historic design of our Nation’s Capital.

The Commission recognizes that security has become a necessary

and fundamental requirement of daily life in this city. At the same

time, we are concerned about the effect of closed streets, hastily

erected jersey barriers, concrete planters, and guard huts on Washington’s Monumental Core. These installations are unsightly, and

do not reflect the landscape of a free and open democratic society.

For this reason, in March of this year, the Commission established an Interagency Task Force to examine the future of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House and, more generally, the

impact of existing security measures.

Serving on the Task Force, in addition to myself, are senior representatives of the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of

General Services, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the

chairman of the District of Columbia Council. Richard Friedman,

a presidentially appointed member of the Commission, serves as

the Task Force chairman.

In addition to senior representatives of other Federal agencies,

who also serve and participated as members of the Task Force,

were participating agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Federal Highway Administration, the Commission of Fine Arts, the U.S. Capitol

Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Advisory Council on

Historic Preservation.

In addition, the chairmen of the House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,

the Federal City Council, and the Downtown BID have all been

represented in these deliberations.

Our Task Force convened on March 23rd, and members agreed

that their objective was to identify urban design solutions that

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would set a benchmark for security design throughout the Federal

city.

The Task Force recognizes that although, in the wake of September 11th, increased security measures will be necessary to protect

Federal facilities throughout the Nation’s Capital, such measures

can and should be implemented in a manner consistent with our

democratic values.

The Task Force has forwarded its recommendations to the full

commission yesterday, and at that time, our commission approved

those recommendations for transmittal to the Congress and to the

administration. I would like to briefly highlight those recommendations.

First, our commission proposes to prepare and implement, with

the help of other Government agencies, the Urban Design and Security Plan, which will identify permanent security and streetscape

improvements to ensure a secure and distinguished public realm in

the Nation’s Capital.

We are pleased to report to you that the administration has re- quested nearly $800,000 as part of the emergency supplement now

awaiting congressional approval to fund this plan.

The plan will include an array of landscape treatments, street

furniture, bollards, and recommend design solutions for Pennsylvania Avenue, President’s Park, the Federal Triangle, and our National Mall.

Security measures must protect our citizens and the environments that honor and house our democracy. However, we believe

that security measures should enhance the public environment of

the city, and they can do so when conceived with sensitivity and

imagination, and implemented with good urban design as one of

their major objectives.

Our commission has also recommended that NCPC, along with

one or more nationally recognized urban designers, undertake the

planning and concept design for the proposed plan. Project design

and construction would be undertaken by an appropriate agency,

such as GSA, the National Park Service, or the District government. This unified approach would ensure that the work is done

properly, professionally, and not in a piecemeal fashion.

The commission also recommends that Pennsylvania Avenue in

front of the White House remain closed to normal city traffic at

this time. If, in the future, the security environment or security

technology improves, this recommendation could be reconsidered.

Because the closure of this part of Pennsylvania Avenue removes

a major east/west traffic artery, we recommend the implementation

of traffic improvements such as synchronizing traffic lights, more

strictly enforcing parking rules, and redesigning intersections.

Based on the experience in other cities, we know that these simple

steps can greatly help to relieve traffic congestion.

Pennsylvania Avenue between 15th and 17th Streets has been

unsightly for too long. We envision it redesigned as a beautiful,

landscaped civic space that welcomes pedestrians and that respects

the historic setting of the White House.

We believe it is possible to create a distinguished public space

and promenade that maintains the historic integrity of the street,

and permits the Inaugural Parade to follow its traditional route.

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Finally, we are commended that the Federal Government fund

all costs associated with the development and implementation of

the Urban Design and Security Plan. This would provide us the opportunity to implement the traffic improvements, the Circulator,

and the tunnel assessments, which were set out in our report. If

the tunnel is built, its funding should also be part of a Federal obligation.

I mentioned briefly the Circulator system. This is a new transit

service, which is now being planned for our downtown area. This

is actually first described in the NCPC Legacy Plan.

Our Commission recommends implementation of the Circulator

to permit the partial and limited use of Pennsylvania Avenue in

front of the White House. This would help mitigate traffic congestion by restoring an important cross-town transportation link.

The city’s long-term viability requires adequate east-west transportation capacity. The loss of Pennsylvania Avenue restricts that

east-west access.

Therefore, we are calling for serious consideration of a tunnel

within the Pennsylvania Avenue or the E Street Corridors, combined with the Circulator and combined with wider application of

traffic improvements, as I have previously mentioned. We believe

that a study of this tunnel and its potential impacts should be undertaken immediately and completed within 18 to 24 months.

In summary, we believe that the Urban Design and Security

Plan will promote the safety of those who live in, work in, and visit

the Nation’s Capital, while preserving the openness and historic

design that have made Washington an expression of American

ideals.

Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my formal remarks. I will

be happy to answer any questions that you or the other members

of your panel might have. I would like to thank you for allowing

us to appear here today.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Cogbill. I also want

to congratulate you on assuming the Chair of the National Capital

Planning Commission. Little did you know that you would have so

many challenges that you would be facing.

Mr. COGBILL. It is a challenge and a privilege, Madam Chair.

Mrs. MORELLA. That is very nicely stated.

Mr. Moravec of GSA has been very much involved, and I thank

you for being here for us. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cogbill follows:]

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Mr. MORAVEC. Madam Chairwoman, Congresswoman Norton,

thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify on behalf of

GSA at this hearing on emergency preparedness in our Nation’s

Capital.

I am pleased to discuss with you the role and responsibilities of

GSA in preparing for and responding to domestic disasters and national security emergencies, and on GSA’s efforts to coordinate its

role and responsibilities in the Nation’s Capital with local and Federal Government agencies.

GSA is assigned specific responsibilities for domestic and national security emergency preparedness under Executive Orders

12656 and 12472. These key responsibilities include: providing

rapid and efficient logistical support and telecommunications; assisting client agencies in their recovery efforts; providing support

to those Federal agencies that assist victims of disaster or emergencies; and ensuring the continuity of GSA operations.

These responsibilities are the same in peace time or war time

emergencies. Since September 11th, GSA has faced its greatest

challenge yet in carrying out these responsibilities.

In the immediate aftermath of the terrible terrorist attacks in

New York City and in the Washington, DC, area, GSA personnel

nationwide went into action in accordance with our Continuity of

Operations plans.

Within 2 hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New

York City, GSA had set up an emergency command center in New

York, to begin providing affected agencies with the supplies and

services needed to restore operations. GSA associates literally

worked around the clock to produce logistical miracles within a

matter of days.

In the Washington, DC, area, soon after the attack on the Pentagon, officials at the Department of Defense asked GSA to locate,

make ready for occupancy, and totally equip nearly 850,000 square

feet of space, to relocate DOD employees displaced from areas within the Pentagon affected by the attack. By September 17th, GSA

had located and begun preparation for occupancy of 850,000 square

feet for DOD in northern Virginia.

At the same time, GSA has been called upon to provide additional space, facilities, and a wide variety of services to the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, both in New York City and

Washington, DC.

Just 2 weeks ago, GSA also responded to a call for assistance

from the Architect of the Capitol, as he sought furniture, computers, and other office equipment necessary to set up alternative office space for the Congress to carry out its critical functions.

At the same time, GSA has responded with a security awareness

and response posture that has been consistently at or near the

highest levels called for by this national emergency.

Madam Chairwoman, in national disasters like these, or in other

national or regional emergencies requiring rapid agency action,

GSA has attempted to coordinate its actions with other affected

Federal, State, and local governmental agencies.

GSA has been coordinating with representatives of the District

of Columbia City Council and the D.C. Protective Services, prior to

and following the September 11th attacks, to outline security and

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access requirements for certain common areas in the District of Columbia.

Historically, when it is necessary for GSA to close a public thoroughfare or a public space in the District, GSA has coordinated its

actions with the D.C. Department of Public Works and with other

Federal agencies. We will continue these coordination efforts to develop the most viable solutions.

We note that the District of Columbia, as the seat of our Federal

Government, also has some unique authorities that allow Federal

agencies and D.C. agencies to better coordinate their emergency

preparedness.

Section 1537 of Title 31 of the U.S. Code allows Federal and D.C.

agencies to provide services to one another. While this inter-governmental authority is not limited to specific domestic or war time

emergencies and disasters, it can nevertheless be used to rapidly

address services-related needs that might arise in these situations.

For instance, GSA could use this authority to assist District officials with many types of services, from snow removal during blizzards, to crowd control, to telecommunications support during Presidential Inaugurations.

Finally, in response to a recent Federal law, and in an effort to

better coordinate the jurisdiction of D.C. Metropolitan Police and

certain Federal law enforcement agencies, and to assist in crime

prevention and law enforcement activities, GSA recently entered

into a Cooperative Agreement with the Metropolitan Police.

In addition to enhancing our law enforcement abilities in and

around our Nation’s Capital, this Cooperative Agreement also

should enhance our abilities to coordinate law enforcement activities and prepare for national emergencies like those we recently experienced.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I will, of

course, be glad to answer any questions that you or Congresswoman Norton may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moravec follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Moravec.

I am now pleased to recognize Robert Malson, president of the

D.C. Hospital Association.

Mr. MALSON. Madam Chairman and Mrs. Norton, I am Robert

Malson, president of the District of Columbia Hospital Association,

and I chair the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government’s

Bio-terrorism Task Force.

DCHA represents all full service and most specialty hospitals in

the District of Columbia, plus four Federal hospitals: the Veterans

Affairs Medical Center, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Malcolm Grew Medical Center at Andrews Air Force Base, and the National Navy Medical Center in Bethesda, MD.

Your invitation to testify asked how the Federal and local governments coordinate to defend the Nation’s Capital, and that you

would examine the coordination of decisions and actions of Federal

and local governments to ensure security.

We coordinate through memorandums of understanding, planning, and frequent exercises. We coordinate vertically through private hospitals, universities, city and county governments, and the

Federal Government. We coordinate horizontally, through regional

MOUs, particularly through the Council of Government.

Our Council of Government’s Bio-terrorism Task Force, for example, has two members here today, who we just met in the audience.

Behind me is Captain Elliott Grollman of the Federal Protective

Service, who served with us for the 19 months in writing our plan.

Over to our right, with his elbow on the chair, is Dr. Michael Soto,

from the George Washington University School of Public Health

and Health Sciences.

DCHA hospitals were prepared to receive about 150 to 200 victims from the attack on the Pentagon. We actually ended up receiving about half that many. Approximately 95 or so living victims

came out of the Pentagon. The majority of those went to the hospitals in northern Virginia, and a few less than that came to the

District of Columbia. Our colleagues in Maryland, particularly in

Prince George’s and Montgomery County, were standing by.

Since the anthrax was discovered in the Hart Senate Office

Building, DCHA has initiated and coordinated the National Capital

Region’s health systems’ response by hosting daily conference calls

among Federal, State and local health officials and hospital representatives, to enhance the metropolitan area’s communications

ability to share real time status reports on the current anthrax crisis.

In addition, DCHA and our hospitals have added additional personnel, security, pharmaceutical, and other supply expenses for

these essentially public health and public safety functions.

For the last few weeks, our hospital emergency rooms have been

inundated with concerned and frightened residents, who want to be

screened for anthrax at the same time that the yearly influenza

season is about to begin.

We were pleased that the D.C. Department of Health began

using D.C. General Hospital to administer testing and treatment in

the early stages of the Brentwood Postal Service situation.

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However, if a more serious biological or chemical attack occurs,

our hospitals are not prepared for a surge of inpatients that may

require decontamination and/or isolation.

While all of our hospitals have reviewed and updated their emergency response plans, the city must also be prepared to enhance

the capacity of the D.C. General facility to accommodate mass casualty patients.

It is not easy to reverse the trend of the last 10 years that dramatically reduced bed capacity at all District hospitals. It will take

Federal Government assistance to provide the necessary resources.

Furthermore, we urge the Federal Government, the Governors of

Maryland and Virginia, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia

to coordinate closely with the hospitals of D.C., Maryland, and Virginia, to provide immediate assistance to all hospitals that have

tirelessly fulfilled these public health and safety functions since

September 11th.

None of the State and local governments or the hospitals of the

region anticipated the added burdens that we are experiencing.

Nonetheless, we are responding to ensure that the National Capital

area residents have access to the required medical and health services.

Our hospitals believe that there are a number of concrete steps

that should be taken immediately. First, we need enhanced communication and coordination for all levels of alert.

The D.C. Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Operations Center can be upgraded to facilitate the connection between

the District’s Department of Health officials with the hospital and

private medical community.

Second, health care professional credentialling during emergencies can be accelerated. Third, medical liability relief during

emergency conditions will enable us to act more quickly and yet

just as safely.

Fourth, increased pharmaceutical reserves and medical supplies

will ensure that our people will have what they need, should it be

required. Fifth, under any one of a number of predictable scenarios,

our hospitals will simply not have adequate security. The Metropolitan Police Department and the D.C. National Guard should be

tasked and funded to address those requirements.

Further, our hospitals fully support the Mayor’s request made

earlier this morning that he be given the authority to activate the

National Guard in a wide-spread emergency.

Finally, clear and precise public service announcements must be

disseminated quickly, to ensure that our citizens have the right information to protect their health and safety and that of their families.

I can assure you, Madam Chair, that the hospitals of the District

of Columbia and the nearby suburbs of Maryland and Virginia continue to be committed to enhancing the coordination among the

Federal, State, and local governments, and our private and Federal

hospitals.

We cannot continue at this pace without help. We are developing

a detailed proposal on the specific types and amounts of resources

needed, and will share it with the committee in the next 2 weeks.

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Again, we thank you for this opportunity to provide comments

about emergency preparedness in the Nation’s Capital. This concludes my formal comments. I would be happy to answer any questions that the committee may have, or to provide any information

that the committee might need.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malson follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. The three of you have presented excellent testimony. It is just too bad that we did not start at 7 a.m., so that we

would have a full array of people, as well as the press. [Laughter.]

I am going to ask each of you a question, and I will start off then

with Mr. Cogbill. Again, congratulations on the Task Force report.

Good luck with getting the kind of money that you need for the

study of the tunnel.

As I mentioned yesterday, I think that you have to have some

assurance from the administration that there will be some funding

for a tunnel, if that were to take place.

But I agree with what Congresswoman Norton had said to, let

us not give up on opening Pennsylvania Avenue. We think the traffic management changes are excellent, and the Circulator is excellent in opening E Street. But I would still like to think of it as temporary, and that maybe technology will allow us to open it.

Here was something that we noted. The District of Columbia

Home Rule Act established a National Capital Service Area, which

covers the Federal Enclave, and it requires the President to appoint a National Capital Service Area Director, who would be responsible for obtaining police protection and maintain streets, with

the exception of the grounds of the U.S. Capitol buildings, the Library of Congress, and the Supreme Court.

To your knowledge, has this charter provision ever been implemented; and should a National Capital Service Area be established,

in order to better coordinate street maintenance and physical security planning in that Federal monumental core?

Mr. COGBILL. Madam Chairwoman, as I understand it, that position remains unfilled, I think, since the inception of that legislation, or at least the Chair position.

With respect to the second part of your question about what

should be done, certainly, from our role in the National Capital

Planning Commission, as the professional planners for the Federal

properties within the District, and having the advisory responsibility for other properties, we would certainly support and participate

in that process, given the opportunity.

We work very closely with the city. In fact, one of the things that

I have tried to do, since coming to the Chair of this important body,

is to work more closely with the city. We are reaching out, as you

would expect, through the normal planning process, directly to the

Planning Department, to the city’s Department of Transportation,

and to the other agencies, with whom we would interact on a regular basis.

Mrs. MORELLA. Now in terms of that National Capital Service

Area Director, who would appoint that person? Is that a Presidential appointment? Would it be your appointment, or the Commission’s?

Mr. COGBILL. No, ma’am, I do not believe it would be my appointment. I honestly cannot speak to that specific question. I just

do not have an answer to that.

Mrs. MORELLA. It might be worth, given the context of the current situation, to look into that. If you would share that with us,

we would greatly appreciate it.

Mr. COGBILL. We would be happy to respond.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

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I will ask our representative from GSA about Federal agencies.

Are they following the GSA guidelines regarding the installation of

security barriers, Mr. Moravec?

Mr. MORAVEC. First, let me say that no one who cares about this

great city, including me, can observe dispassionately or without

pain the closure of streets, which are vital to its life and commerce.

I want you to know that I feel that way.

The reality is that the Federal Government is not a monolithic

command and control hierarchial organization. It consists of many

agencies and branches.

Agency heads, Congress, and judges can and do make decisions

that they feel are necessary to protect their people. GSA cannot direct a Cabinet Secretary to do anything. We can advise and coordinate, and we do.

In a couple of instances, in the case of the Treasury Department

and the Department of Justice, they have authority to remove

parking and to close streets, without even consulting with GSA.

In all other instances, including instances where we have delegated the authority, as we often have in the case of the department’s headquarters to manage and provide security at their facility, we are in contact with those agencies.

We can direct an agency to the right people: to the Fine Arts

Commission, to the National Capital Planning Commission, to the

city agencies, to coordinate proposed closings. We can use what

guidance we can to make sure that process is facilitated.

Mrs. MORELLA. If they just neglect it, ignore it, or do not go to

the relevant source to assist them, what would you do?

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, as I say, we do our best to coordinate and

advise and cajole.

Mrs. MORELLA. That is the extent of your authority?

Mr. MORAVEC. In reality, it is, yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Should it be changed?

Mr. MORAVEC. Far be it for me to ask for a wider range in powers for GSA. But it is clear that there needs to be a broader coordinated effort amongst Federal agencies with regard to this decisionmaking process.

Mrs. MORELLA. GSA is in charge of telecenters, right? You find

the place where they do the telework that takes place with our

Federal employees, and we are trying to promote more and more

of it?

Mr. MORAVEC. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. MORELLA. And I hope you are going to find a couple of them

in Montgomery County, MD. It is a perfect location, to keep cars

off the road.

But I was speaking to the OPM Director, and there are benefits

of telecenters for emergency response for Federal employees and

probably for other essential workers.

But can you see some merit in that? If you had an emergency,

and you had to put people up places, like GAO tired to do with

Longworth being closed and Hart being closed; what if you used

the telecenters?

Mr. MORAVEC. I can absolutely see merit in the existence of telecenters, even in the absence of an emergency. That is a very good,

common sense way of deploying the Federal work force and making

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it convenient for people to be productive, and at the same time, to

have other dimension to their lives.

Mrs. MORELLA. And also as part of an emergency preparedness

plan.

Mr. MORAVEC. Certainly, anything that takes pressure off of

dense urban areas in a time of crisis, in terms of people needing

to be there would be a welcome relief valve.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Malson, we look forward to seeing that report that you worked on. I am delighted to know that there was

such great coordination that took place there.

I have just a couple of questions for you. One that I began to

pose about is, is there an assessment of, let us say, the District of

Columbia, and I would certainly think about it in terms of the region, too, the health system with regard to the capacity of each of

these hospitals to handle the health care risks, the number of beds,

isolation capacity, infection control, special centers for care, mass

casualty plans, medical personnel employed, list of site, quarantine.

I mean, there is a whole litany, and you could go on and on with

that. But has any assessment been done, and if not, should there

be more intensive and extensive assessment?

Mr. MALSON. Madam Chair, the overall answer is yes. Our hospitals in the District of Columbia are connected. Our emergency

rooms are connected by a radio system, which we call the HMARS,

the Hospital Mutual Aid Radio System. Every day, we do random

radio checks on a 24/7 basis.

Mrs. MORELLA. I did not mean to interrupt, but was done also

before September 11th.

Mr. MALSON. Oh, we have been doing it for years.

Mrs. MORELLA. So you have always done that.

Mr. MALSON. That is one of the reasons that on September 11th,

our system was, as reported by the Post and not by us, the only

one that was really functioning in real time within the city. That

is not including Maryland and Virginia. That was in real time

within minutes of the attack on the Pentagon.

We do bed checks. We had been doing bed checks once a week.

But since the anthrax was discovered in the Hart Building, I started doing bed availability checks daily.

Yesterday, for example, with the DCHA hospitals alone, those

that I mentioned, which are also at the bottom of my testimony

and you can see it at the bottom of the page, within that hospital

grouping alone, as of 9 a.m. yesterday, we could have taken 119

major trauma patients and 310 minor trauma patients.

We do that every day, and trauma is a very specific type of injury, which requires not only the bed, but also the people who are

technically qualified to serve people who need those services. So we

have to have the surgeons there and the radiologists and the others

who can actually accommodate the needs of people who have those

kinds of needs.

So we are doing that daily now, and we will continue to do it

until we begin to feel that we can stand down that level of alert.

Mrs. MORELLA. You see, I have a concern that hospitals, because

they compete, may not cooperate or share as much as they could,

because of the specter of competition.

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So if you had an emergency in the District of Columbia, say anthrax, do you know where these people should go, which hospital;

so that you have specialty hospitals and they are sharing and not

all trying to have the equipment for everything?

Mr. MALSON. Absolutely, and let me describe two systems that

compliment each other. In Maryland, for example, in your State, if

someone dials 911, they get the local 911 responder, and an ambulance or a helicopter, as appropriate is dispatched to that victim.

Once they get the victim, they come under the control of the

Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services out of Baltimore. So where that victim is taken, the hospital that victim is

taken to in Maryland is actually controlled by a central source

throughout the State. It is probably one of the most advanced, if

not the most advanced system of that type in the country.

In the District, by comparison, when you dial 911, we are much

more contained geographically and we do not need that kind of

breadth in geography that Maryland has. But we are also able to

dispatch our victims through the D.C. fire and EMS to the nearest

appropriate facility.

Now I would like to spend a moment on what constitutes appropriate. Appropriate may or may not be the closest hospital. If there

is already a line of ambulances at the closest hospital, then you

want to pass that one to go to the next hospital, because there may

not be a line there, just to cite a single example of the kind of coordination that takes place all the time.

So we have these systems in northern Virginia, and while I am

not as familiar with their practices, there are best practices standards in the hospital industry, where we look at what each other

does, and we try to adopt the best practices, and we tend to move

in that direction.

On the subject of competition, you struck two chords with me.

The first is, you heard the first panel speak in terms that made my

hospital salivate, if we could just get in line for a little bit of that

money.

But the truth of the matter is, Madam Chair, as you have seen

and has everyone has seen on television for the last 3 weeks, the

first responders for bio-terrorism are our hospitals and private physicians’ offices.

That is where people go, when they think they have anthrax or

are sick or afraid. Most of them are simply afraid that they may

have it, and they want to be told by a physician that after a discussion about what they are feeling, that they are, in fact, safe.

The import of my comment is that all levels of government, city,

county, State, and Federal, have to recognize that in this era of bioterrorism, the front line first responders are the private sector; the

private physicians in their offices and our private hospitals. We

have not, in this country, thought about that in that way.

Forty years ago this Fall, I raised my hand and promised to defend this country when I joined the Navy. We have always thought

of defending this country as something we did beyond the Atlantic

and the Pacific.

Now we are having to re-think that. We are on the front lines,

here in the Nation’s Capital and around the country. We are on the

front lines in our private hospitals, and our physicians are, as well.

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How do we make sure that the Federal Government plays the

proper role in assisting our private sector first responders to give

the kind of care that we all expect them to give? They cannot do

it on their own.

Mrs. MORELLA. We will have one more quick round, after Congresswoman Norton asks her questions. Congresswoman Norton,

thank you.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella.

I appreciate all your efforts in the wake of September 11th. I

have some urgent concerns with the GSA, in particular.

We had a situation to occur where an agency put up a barricade

and then had to take it down because of violation of D.C. law in

effect.

You say in your testimony, GSA has been coordinating with representatives of the District of Columbia City Council and the D.C.

Protective Services.

Mr. MORAVEC. Right, that is specifically in relation to the Ronald

Reagan Building and the Wilson Building, right in that area.

Ms. NORTON. Oh, I see, and you also imply that you do not have

a lot to say as to what an agency does itself. I mean, I can understand how an agency can make an ad hoc decision about barrier.

That would not be a very permanent barrier, if they were making

an ad hoc decision in the face of an impending emergency.

But do you mean, somebody can, except for those two agencies

that you named who had their own independent authority, that

other agencies can go out and say look, I want this or that barrier

up, and take these parking meters out, and that is what I say, because I am a Cabinet officer?

Mr. MORAVEC. We advise them of the law, and we have and will

continue to play a role, to the greatest extent possible, in reminding agency heads, for example, of what the laws are of the District

of Columbia. We can be quite strident in giving our advice to them

in that regard.

But as a practical matter, for example, in the instances that you

just mentioned, the action is taken, then we are informed, and then

we intercede. So it is not as smoothly coordinated as we would like

it to be.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Moravec, can I ask that you send a memo to

agencies, describing what the law is, and that we act pro-actively

in asking them to work through your offices? I think some of them

have never had to do this before, so they are not aware of how they

ought to proceed.

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, we are working with them. I do not want

to give you the impression that we are not.

For example, we have had preliminary, not formal requests, but

preliminary requests from several departments, to investigate

whether they can remove parking meters on streets adjacent to

their buildings. Obviously, that is not a possibility that we take

lightly.

We are working at GSA to establish guidelines as to when that

may be appropriate. We also will be, in that case, trying to establish proper compensation for the District of Columbia, in the case

where that were to take place. So we are giving guidance to agencies with regard to those kinds of requests.

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Ms. NORTON. I just think there needs to be written guidance. I

am very concerned and the city has been particularly concerned.

You do not indicate that you specifically coordinate with any official of the D.C. Government for these.

Mr. MORAVEC. No, but I would hasten to point out that we do

have a very close working relationship, both personal and professional, with the Mayor, with deputy mayors, with the city administrator, and with a number of different department heads within the

municipal government, at my level, as well as at the regional office

level.

Ms. NORTON. In fact, I know that. I have no complaints about the

way in which you deal with the D.C. government.

I am asking for a point person in GSA to work with the District

Government, when it comes to barricades, to help coordinate that.

Mr. MORAVEC. That person is our Assistant Regional Administrator for the National Capital Region, Tony Costa.

Mr. COGBILL. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Yes.

Mr. COGBILL. If I could interject here, the NCPC is also playing

a role in this. We have a draft letter which will be going out probably early next week. It is going to all the Federal agencies, reminding them of their responsibility to come back to the NCPC for

any approvals of barricades that are established along the streets.

We have no jurisdiction within the street, and certainly with respect to removing parking meters. But we have a policy that is in

place, and we intend to remind all of the Federal agencies of that,

as early as next week.

Ms. NORTON. If agencies think they can continue to ignore what

the GSA says or what the NCPC says, then we can make that a

matter of law.

We simply cannot allow ad hoc barricades to go out, agency by

agency, or for them to say, well, you know, GSA really cannot tell

us what to do; not at a time, when it seems to me that the NCPC

has come up with a perfect way to do this.

We can get you a barrier. We can get you a barrier that is attractive. We can get you a barrier in keeping with the LaFonte plan.

That is the way to do it, unless you have an emergency, in which

case, people ought to be able to operate immediately. But we are

not independent actors in the Federal presence, and a Cabinet official does not have the jurisdiction, in my judgment, to make these

decisions.

If they think they have, then I think we can make sure that they

understand they do not. I understand how your hands may be tied

there. I understand how GSA has to work. Let me go on, because

I know the time is fleeting.

Mrs. MORELLA. On that, Congresswoman Norton, we may want

to explore legislation. But in the meantime, you and I may want

to sign a letter to him, asking him to reach out to the agencies.

Would that help you to give you that kind of thrust?

Mr. MORAVEC. That would help.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Ms. NORTON. So the agencies can then get a copy of that. Thank

you, Mrs. Morella.

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Very serious concerns have been raised by the major public

building when it comes to costs in a new building. That, of course,

is the Ronald Reagan Building. We may have to have a specific

hearing on the Ronald Reagan Building.

We know that you have taken specific steps with respect to security in the Ronald Reagan Building, about which there were longterm concerns about security, long before September 11th.

I also know, and I am in sympathy with GSA on the public parking, because I know that the public parking is necessary in order

to pay for the building. But I do think that presents an extraordinary challenge to you.

Let me ask you how you are dealing with this. Here is this target, virtually. It costs us almost $1 billion to put that building up.

Yet, we need the public in it, and we need the public parking in

it.

It may not have been built architecturally with any of this in

mind. But let me ask you if you can assure us that the public parking will be made available, and yet employees and others in the

building will remain safe, because you have checked people as they

go, or otherwise made sure that the public parking does not carry

with it any dangers to people in that huge building?

Mr. MORAVEC. First of all, it is GSA’s security philosophy to tailor individual counter-measures and protocols with regard to the

security of buildings on an individual basis to each building individually.

The Ronald Reagan Building, not only because of its size, but because of its location and because of its iconic nature, if I may say

so, represents a very special kind of situation.

I can say to you that I am confident, not complacent, but confident that the most stringent security counter-measures and security procedures that we have available to us are in place at the

Ronald Reagan Building.

I have met personally with a number of the agency heads in that

building. I think, for the most part, they have been reassured,

when we have explained exactly what we are doing.

That does not include the matter of public parking, which is the

matter that you are raising. The problem, as you point out, is that

the Ronald Reagan is, by law, a public building. Therefore, it is accessible to members of the public.

Ms. NORTON. No, no, that is not the definition. I mean, public

parking is not available in the House of Representatives. Public

parking is not available in many, if not most, Government buildings, because public parking is not used to help pay for the building. You have a special situation there.

Mr. MORAVEC. It is really not a matter so much of revenue, as

of the purpose of the building. The building is used for international trade shows, for cultural events, for entertainment events.

It is a very important civic venue for these activities.

Ms. NORTON. It is a multi-purpose building. Understand, I am on

your side. There has got to be public parking there. But the fact

is, to even get into this building, I cannot even get into my own

House of Representatives, without having cops look under my car

to make sure there are no bombs and look into my trunk.

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Mr. MORAVEC. Congresswoman Norton, I do not know if you have

tried to drive into the Ronald Reagan Building lately, but it is a

pretty stringent lately, but it is a pretty stringent protocol.

The car is stopped. It is surrounded. You are asked to show identification. A mirror is used to pass underneath the carriage of the

car, to make sure there is nothing underneath. The trunk is

opened.

Ms. NORTON. This is for members of the public, as well?

Mr. MORAVEC. This is for members of the public, all vehicles.

There is a test called the Barrenger test, which is applied to make

sure there are no explosive devices on board. We have bomb sniffing dogs there.

The Ronald Reagan Building has not only its only Security Director, who is probably one of the top people in our force, but its own

police station present.

So I want to assure you that every car that enters the Ronald

Reagan Building is subjected to a very high level screening.

Ms. NORTON. That is very good news. We have had calls from

employees saying that there was a difference between public parking and employee parking. If every car that goes in there is having

the same treatment that we are getting in the House of Representatives, that is the best you can do.

Mr. MORAVEC. Not since September 11th, I am pretty sure.

Ms. NORTON. Not since September 11th; that is very important.

Let me ask Mr. Cogbill, the administration has responded to the

cost items and essentially said, no way, because of two reasons. It

says, we are not going to have that area around the White House

dug up during this kind of war, and with all the call on revenue,

we are not about to spend money on a tunnel, when there are other

urgent matters. I mean, that is what they have said.

When the administration, which has not been unkind to us, says

that, I must tell you, I am putting the tunnel aside. And I am, as

I said at the press conference yesterday, focusing on your very good

recommendations that could be done now.

Let me ask you, what are you doing or will you do to

operationalize your recommendation to open E Street both ways?

I mean, you recommended it. The idea stands in the air there.

Nothing will happen unless somebody does something about it.

What are you going to do about it? I take that one, because it

is one of the easiest ones, because nobody has said that E Street

was closed down because of security concerns. It was closed down

for the same reasons that a whole bunch of places were closed

down; just to make sure nothing else would happen.

Every day that goes by, Mr. Cogbill, and I really emphasize this,

it leads to permanent closing. It has not been opened in a year, yet.

Unless there is somebody that keeps pushing, it is not going to be

opened again. We will be back where we were after all the work

we did to get E Street widened and opened two ways.

The rest of it will be for nothing, because there will not be any

pressure to open it. What will the NCPC do to do more than have

a recommendation out there somewhere, hanging in the air, where

nobody has to pick it up and move on it?

Mr. COGBILL. The short answer is that we are in contact, on a

regular basis, with our contacts at the Secret Service, as a result

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of the Task Force and the Commission hearings on this plan that

we have just presented to you, yesterday.

When this matter first occurred, we had very extensive discussions with the Secret Service about the whys and wherefores of the

E Street closing. We were told, at that time, that it was different

from Pennsylvania Avenue, and that there had been an Executive

order that had been issued with respect to Pennsylvania Avenue,

and that no such order had been issued or was anticipated to be

issued with respect to E Street. Therefore, the closing was on a

day-to-day basis.

Based upon the comments that were made by you and Congresswoman Morella yesterday, I did contact Secret Service again to express to them our strongest indication and belief that we wanted

that street opened, as is set forth in our report.

Ms. NORTON. And what did they respond, Mr. Cogbill?

Mr. COGBILL. There response was, we are looking at it on a dayto-day basis.

Ms. NORTON. I am going to ask the Chair is she will sign off on

a letter with me then, to say if they are not going to open it, then

we need to know why. There is a clear and present danger that

that not reopen.

Mrs. MORELLA. I could not agree more. In fact, I was going to

ask who has the ultimate authority? It is the President, is it not?

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma’am, I think that is the ultimate authority.

Ms. NORTON. Maybe that is who we ought to write. This is really

very important, given what you have recommended on Pennsylvania Avenue. I do not fault you on that. Nobody expected you to

recommend otherwise.

Let me finally ask you about my letter. I appreciate your response to my letter. On October 10th, I wrote to Chairman Nay of

our House Administration Committee, and to Chris Dodd, the

Chair of the comparable Senate Committee, actually trying to use

your work as a model.

Just let me quote a little bit from it. ‘‘For several months, the

National Capital Planning Commission has been preparing a major

study and recommendations concerning the impact of Federal security measures around national memorials and Federal buildings in

the city’s core and around the White House. I would like to recommend coordination of efforts by the Congress, the executive

branch, and the District of Columbia to assure appropriate information and action among the several entities that are hurriedly

erecting barricades.’’

Then essentially, I am asking for everybody to get together, so

you do not have the Congress and the Supreme Court, and these

are two independent branches of government; so that under our

Constitution, they can all decide for themselves.

You responded to me on October 31st, and you sent copies to all

the relevant congressional officials who would be involved in this

matter. Then you say in here, ‘‘We appreciate the participation of

the Architect of the Capitol and the U.S. Capital Police in the

workings of our Task Force.’’

You do not say that they were on your Task Force, but you have

had some contact with them. What did they have to do with your

Task Force, and how can you draw them operationally more into

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your work, so that we have them involved in your urban design

recommendations that you put forward yesterday.

Mr. COGBILL. Well, first we want to thank you for writing that

letter, and offering us the opportunity to help with your process

here on Capital Hill.

We did have presentations by the Architect of the Capitol and by

the Capital Police. They came to our meetings. They were part of

the participating Task Force members that made contributions.

Ms. NORTON. But they are not listed as members of the Task

Force. They are listed as people her were involved in the workings.

But then as I read it, I do not read their names on the Task Force.

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma’am, and I am looking at the book that we

provided or the plan that we provided yesterday. We did list them

as participating members. They were not voting members.

Ms. NORTON. I see.

Mr. COGBILL. But they did participate.

Ms. NORTON. Go ahead; I am sorry.

Mr. COGBILL. I was going to further say that we have followed

up with the Architect of the Capital, in order to try to start the dialog with the Architect of the Capitol and the Capitol police, to try

to move this matter forward, as you suggested.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, and you will see what is being done

around the Senate buildings. There is some sense of elegance there.

If you look at Russell, where they are closed off there. But look

at the other end of the street, where they have finished, there is

a huge oval there. But the Architect has always had a sense of

beautification here.

I do not know anything about the barricades on C Street, except

they must be temporary. Are they, Mr. Moravec?

Mr. MORAVEC. I am not sure I understand; which one, specifically?

Ms. NORTON. If you go down C Street, there are these terrible

things that Connie and I have to go through, and all staff have to

go through. You have to go around. You have to go through a maze.

They are uglier than anything we have ever seen before. They have

got to be temporary.

Mr. MORAVEC. Congresswoman Norton, I have been informed

that those are within the purview of the Capitol.

Ms. NORTON. Well, I know they are.

Mr. MORAVEC. I do not know whether they are temporary or not.

Ms. NORTON. I know they are. But you seemed to know whether

they were temporary. That is the only reason I turned to you. You

are absolutely right. A separate branch of Government, which is

mainly the Congress, does not have to coordinate with the Executive, which is who you are, has done that.

Mr. MORAVEC. Right.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Cogbill, however, has to do with the Federal

presence. He can steps, one, to understand what in the world is

going on there and how long will it be that way, and whether they

can be a part of the urban design plan that the NCPC has put forward.

Mr. MORAVEC. I am proud the role that GSA is playing in the

NCPC plan. I mean, unfortunately we are experts, since Oklahoma

City, in how to design, build, and secure buildings in such a way

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that protects the occupants and visitors to the building, and at the

same time, does not create an oppressive climate of fear.

We really, if I do say so myself, have produced some really marvelous dynamic buildings that do no look like medieval fortresses.

We have also learned a lot about, for example, if something is

mundane, for example, as to how to make a bollard look beautiful.

We are ready, willing, and able to work with the National Capital

Planning Commission, as we have been, to give them the benefit

of our expertise in this area.

Ms. NORTON. GSA has a problem, not of its own making. It has

the same problem with barricades that it has with security.

That is, if the Federal Government had dumped on you, as security problems have emerged, and they did not emerge on September 11th, matters that were never included in your mission; you

were never to be the super security agency for the Federal Government. Yet, you had to make them secure.

I agree that you have done very good things with buildings, and

we are working with you now in the Department of Transportation

building, on the ATF building, with setbacks and all the rest of it.

But I have to say that one of the reasons that the NCPC has

done the work it has done is that over and over again, people do

say, I think justifiably, that the District of Columbia increasingly

looks like an armed camp; that it looks like an ugly armed camp.

The Chair has said we have got to make sure it does not become

Ft. Washington. Obviously, she is very kind in the way she approaches it. [Laughter.]

That is not anything I would blame on the GSA. That is why the

NCPC work is so important, and I appreciate that. Was GSA a part

of the Task Force?

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma’am, and I would like to just comment on

that. Specifically, the GSA was a very, very strong player on that

task force and a very strong contributor.

In fact, we were very sympathetic to their issues in dealing with

their customers in clients, that come to them on a regular basis,

asking for these security measures, and the coordination that was

going on between GSA and the NCPC in trying to make sure that

we do the best job that we can, in the amount of time that we have

to make Washington safe; but at the same time, achieve our overall

purpose of going back to a beautiful urban environment.

Ms. NORTON. The Urban Design Plan that NCPC revealed yesterday is the first time in 200 years that any work has been done

that tries to coordinate security with the elegance associated with

the LaFonte Plan. That is not the work of GSA. That is the kind

of initiative that the NCPC, which is essentially the planning agency for the Federal Government, is supposed to do. It was its own

initiative. It deserves great plaudits.

Now I know that the Chair and I will be working together to

make sure that plan does not simply lie on the table. It is a plan.

It is just too valuable to simply lie there. That is why I asked you

questions about E Street, in particular. If people see E Street open,

they will understand that it is not just a plan.

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Madam Chair, if I could ask that my letter to Chairman Nay and

Chairman Dodd, and the response of the NCPC be made a part of

the record of this hearing.

Mrs. MORELLA. So ordered.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Well, we are in accord on the results that we look for, and our

congratulations to you on the work that you are doing and may you

continue.

I would like to ask Mr. Malson about the employees at the various hospitals. Are they expected to stay on the job, in the event

of another emergency or terrorist attack, or something of that dimension?

Mr. MALSON. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. MORELLA. In an emergency evacuation, they do not evaluate?

Mr. MALSON. I understood your question initially a little differently. I thought you were asking me, would our hospital employees be expected to stay on the job if there were victims coming to

them.

Mrs. MORELLA. If there were a terrorist attack, such as September 11th.

Mr. MALSON. Oh, absolutely, yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. They would?

Mr. MALSON. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Here is the second part of the question then.

What if there were an emergency evaluation?

Mr. MALSON. There are many different types of evacuations, and

there are many different types of terrorist attacks. Bio-terrorism

differs from most in that most attacks are essentially circumstances that go ‘‘boom’’ or ‘‘bang’’ and everyone is either a victim, a responder, or an observer. It is in an instant, and you know

which category you are in.

With bio-terrorism, and in many instances, chemical terrorism,

you do not know which category you are in; which is why it is

called terror. Because the fright exists for quite awhile. That extends not only to the people who are victims or may be victims, but

also the responders, as well.

That overlay also applies to evaluation plans, both within the

hospitals, as well as within the city or the region.

So in many ways, it sort of beds for more detail on your question,

in order to be able to respond.

Mrs. MORELLA. Well, what it beds for is the idea that education

is needed and training.

Mr. MALSON. Absolutely.

Mrs. MORELLA. Therefore, do you have training, in terms of bioterrorism and the various faucets at the hospitals?

Mr. MALSON. Yes, we do. Our hospitals have many different

kinds of plans, all hazards plans. We deal with floods, fires, hurricanes, as well as acts of war or natural events, yes, and we have

to exercise those.

Mrs. MORELLA. I have one final point. Do you think that at some

point it would be very helpful if the ranking member and I met

with the leaders of the various hospitals, the administrators?

Mr. MALSON. It would not only be helpful, but this is a new area.

In defense of our Federal colleagues on the executive branch, they

have been doing an enormous job in attempting to coordinate with

us in the private sector under very difficult circumstances, and

every day, they get better at it.

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But my 18 hospitals, with 26,000 employees within the District

of Columbia, plus Bethesda Naval and Malcolm Grow at Andrews,

are in constant need of daily contact with our State and local

health departments and CDC. We are the front line troops, and we

need to know what our commanders want us to do daily.

Frequently, they are torn by the need to coordinate a Federal response, before they can come to our local responders with the plan

of the day. We get better at it every day. We are no where near

where we ought to be, and the frustration levels within our hospitals are extraordinary.

So I can tell you unequivocally, yes. Our hospital chief executive

officers, our medical directors, and I can get you as many people

as you want, Madam Chair, and they would be delighted to share

with you their needs, under these circumstances.

Mrs. MORELLA. I would like to follow through with you, and

maybe you could discuss this with the staff, and see what you

think we could achieve, how it could be done, and what the idea

would be.

I just simply want to ask, if any of you have any statement you

would like to make, particularly since you were here all morning

and heard what everybody else had to say, is there anything you

want to refute or you want to add?

Mr. MALSON. May I go first? The country has not yet come to

grips with the fact that America’s physicians and America’s hospitals are on the front line for what has historically been a Federal

responsibility. That is the defense of the homeland.

Because we are on the front line, it is incumbent upon our legislators and our executives to figure out how to make the transition.

As the Chair so eloquently put it, since we are the private sector,

even our nonprofits are frequently in competition with each other.

So the complexities are there, and they are very real. But yet,

I cannot express how proud I have been of all of our hospitals, private, public, for profit, not for profit, and military hospitals, working together for the common good.

But that does not address the need for resources. We have to figure out what those needs are, the extraordinary needs of these circumstances, and then how to adequately and appropriately fund

them, in the context of most of the hospitals being in the private

sector.

Mr. MORAVEC. I would like to say that in the present climate,

while we all need to do everything possible to protect our people,

I would hope that we would allow emotion to ebb. Descartes once

said that life is a comedy to those who think, and a tragedy to

those who feel. We have all been doing a lot of feeling. I think it

is very important for us to think rationally in the cold grey light

of dawn, of what we are doing.

Before we make long-term, expensive, irreversible decisions, I

think it is very important that we, in sense as a society, get a grip,

and I think that is especially important here.

I do believe that the Federal Government has a leadership role

to play in helping society deal with this new reality. The fact is

that September 11th was, in a way, kind of the Oklahoma City for

the private sector.

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GSA understands that responsibility. Among other things, we are

convening a national symposium with the American Institute of Architects to involve people in focusing on the built environment in

urban planning, in the wake of September 11th. I think we have

a lot to add to that dialog, and we will be hopefully showing some

leadership in that area.

I would also just like to say that as a relatively recent convert

from the private sector to public service, I just wanted to say how

terribly proud I am of the women and men of GSA, and of the people in the Federal Government, during this very difficult time,

when people need their Government more than they ever have before in my lifetime.

Mrs. MORELLA. We are proud of them, too. You can see from the

polling that the American public have the confidence in Government, and they have continued to increase. Thank you.

Mr. Cogbill.

Mr. COGBILL. Congresswoman Morella, when you started this

proceeding today, you talked about working together. I think that

is what I would say is the new word for the relationship between

NCPC and the District of Columbia.

We believe we are entering a new age of partnering with the District, and we want to push that forward so that we can work together to achieve these very important goals that are outlined in

our Urban Design and Security Plan.

You talked about the economics. I realize that is another day.

But that is one of the things that our plan is designed to do, to

make people feel comfortable in this environment, and make them

want to come back.

Certainly, as a resident of Richmond, VA, I love to come to

Washington, and I always have. I intend to put my dollars into the

economy, when I bring my wife and my daughter and my motherin-law back here at the end of this month, to again do what we like

to do, which is visit and be a part of our Nation’s Capital and the

glory that is this country.

Finally, I would like to say thank you to both of you, for all of

the help that you have given to NCPC, by providing leadership, by

helping us to work through and to get it to the point where we are

today, with this Urban Design and Security Plan. We look forward

to implementing it.

We will continue to work with you and with the other people in

our Government, to continue to make Washington a beautiful place

and a wonderful place to live, visit, and work.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, and we do look forward

to continue working together with all of you. Thank you, Mr.

Cogbill; thank you, Mr. Moravec; and thank you, Mr. Malson.

As we adjourn our subcommittee hearing, I want to thank some

great staff: Russell Smith, Heea Vazirani-Fales, Rob White, Matthew Batt, Shalley Kim, Earley Green, Jon Bouker, M.K. Hallahan,

Howie Denis, Victoria Proctor, and, of course, my good friend, our

ranking member, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes-Norton.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to

reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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